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June 20, 1984
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Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 The Director of al intelligence ? WashingIon.D C.20505 20 June 1984 Dear Allen, Thanks so much for sending the documents prepared for the European Parliament on the destabilizing activities of eastern countries in Europe. I had not seen them and they do a remarkable job of pulling together a lot of information, most of which we do have. I appreciate your thinking of me. Yours, William J. Casey STAT cc w/incoming documents - DDI NIO for Counterterrorism Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1 Terms of Reference EXPLANATORY-STATEMENT In attempting to report to the European Parliament about the "destabilising activities" of the Soviet Union and her allies, I am anxious at the outset to define which activities are meant. 1 assume that the main topic of this report must be international terrorism generally and the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in particular. It was this last event that motivated colleagues to draft Motions for Resolutions and initiate the report. However, the Motions refer not only to terrorism and the attempt on the Pope's life. They mention international ]inks between east European secret services and efforts made by these services to des-abilise western countries. I have therefore thought it necessary to report to Parliament in terms wider than terrorism which cover any activity by the Soviet Union and her allies deemed dangerous, clandestine or improper. 1','hat are these "improper" ana "destabilizing" activities? We know that there is today an adversarial relationship between the Soviet bloc and western Europe. Nine of our Community members belong to the North Atlantic alliance, and the tenth, Ireland, although neutral militarily, is ideologically an ally of the others. The Soviet Union is the dominant ration of the Warsaw Pact. The two groups of European nations are therefore in conflict, militarily and ideologically. We regret this. It is expensive and dangerous. We would prefer detente and we are hoping to achieve detente. but our efforts in this direction are hindered by a numbei of factors: disputes over influence in the Third World, dissatisfaction over the division of Europe, the separation of peoples and families, above all by the problems that naturally arise when a group of countries governed by the principles of Marx and Lenin con?root at their borders countries with governments elected on a multi-party basis. This very fact, the Community's commitment to plurali:.t democracy, causes a further complication. We are not monolithic and we do not believe that we are infallible. We admit the Tight of other ideologies to carry on political activity, to try and gather support, perhaps even to gain power. We allow all shades of non-violent opinion, including those that reject the western alliance, even those that support our adversary, the Soviet Union. A minority of people in the Community do support the Soviet Union and they are represented in the European Parliament. It therefore follows that the Soviet Union and her allies are free to dis- seminate their point of view throughout the Community and, operating openly through their representatives, to present arguments in favour of their internal and external interests. And the fact that Soviet-bloc countries do not reciprocate, that they refuse to allow any but the Marxist-Leninist view to be disseminated in their own territory, is not seen as sufficient reason to withdraw their right to enjoy these privileges. T.a(div Moscow kroadcasts to western Europe in Er.,1ish, French, Italian and Greek. Its broadcasts are not jammed, even though west European broadcasts to ................ :..................... ..................... ............................... ...... ....................... Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 the Soviet Union are jammed. Soviet publications are available in the West on subscription at subsidised rates. There are 22 available in Britain alone. Neste rn journals frequently print articles and letters written by Soviet representatives, invariably putting forward the Soviet government's point of view. The Soviet side does not reciprocate. Soviet-bloc diplomats in western Europe cultivate personal relations with influential people from many walks of life in the countries to which they are accredited, entertaining them and explaining the Soviet viewpoint. They also maintain links with local communist parties and other leftist groups, among whom there are many who share the Soviet ideology and are ready to assist the Soviet government politically and in other practical ways. This Soviet-bloc activity, designed as it often is to present the western alliance as aggressive and its leaders as warmongers, to stir up public opinion against the alliance and to stimulate disagreement within it, to portray as a myth the evidence of Soviet arms expansion, to denounce as "interference" or "anti-Soviet propaganda" or "red-baiting" any expression of concern over oppressive Soviet policies at home or abroad, can certainly be termed confrontational and adversarial. Its unfairness angers majorit, west European public opinion, especially since we are refused access to * east 'European press or media and denied a chance to set the record straight. However, in your rapporteur's view, since such activity is open and public,, it is not improper and it has no destabilising effect. It is part of the uneasy relationship that is bound to exist between countries that challe .,e one another's system of government on moral as well as political grounds, while at the same time maintaining diplomatic representatives in each other's capital cities and trying to maintain the peace. The Soviet Union and Terrorism Terrori'm is part of the Soviet Union's historical background. It was part of the philosophy of the 19th century Socialist. Revolutionaries who assassinated Tsar Alexander II. During the Russian uprising of 1905 Lenin instructed the Bolsheviks of St Petersburg to "supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs" and to "undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station". He added, "let every group learn, if it is only by beating up a policeman." Likewise Trotsky pointed out the important political effect of the terrorist act: "It kills individuals did intimidates thousands." After the October 1917 revolution the Soviet leaders continued to authorise the use of terror in western countries, mainly against former Soviet citizens deemed particularly dangerous. Two of their most famous victims are Walter Krivitsky, once head of Soviet military intelligence in western Europe, murdered by the NkVD in the United States in 1941, and Stefan Bandera, killed by the KGB in West Germany in 1959. During the past twenty years, however, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the KGB have themselves carried out acts of murder in Community countries. Nowadays the Soviet Union supports "national liberation movements" and encourages them in the use of force against colonialism or foreign occupation. For inf.tance, the Palestine Liberation Organisation representative at the United Nations, Zehdi Lahib Terzi, said in 1979, "They (the Soviet Union) give us full support - diplomatic, moral, educational - and also they open their military academies to some of our freedom fighters." He also made it clear that the PLO receives military equipment from the Soviet Union. The Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 L!_ Soviet Union has also given facilities to the African National Congress and to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. This includes training, equipment, propaganda material and rest and recreation facilities. At the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1976 Leonid Brexhne/ said, "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom.... We act as we are bidden by our revolutionary conscience and our communist convictions." This report makes no value judgement on such organisations as ANC, ZAPU and the PLO. Some in the European Parliament will see their members as terrorists, others as freedom fighters. The line between the two is hard to distinguish. This means, however, that the Soviet policy of assisting national liberation movements is also on occasion bard to distinguish from aid to terrorism. For instance, Soviet publications regularly present the crisis in Northern Ireland as a popular uprising by an oppressed colonial community against British imperialism, ascribing sectarian differences to a supposed British policy of "divide and rule". An I:vestiya article in February 1983 claimed that Protestant extremists were carrying out genocide against the Catholic population and that shooting at "living targets" had become "a common occupation of British tommies". The violence of the Irish Republican Army is hardly ever mentioned. In March the newsagency Tass accused Britain of abandoning the search for a political solution In Northern Ireland and of trying to "preserve colonial practices by intensifying terror and repression". A former Pravda correspondent in London, V.V. Oychinnikov, in a recent book accused Britain of using northern Ireland as a "training ground" for her armed forces, to give them the experience they would need to deal with future uprisings by British workers. Soviet-dominated international bodies maintain a continuing interest in Northern Ireland. The World Peace Council issued a statement condemning Britain's "continuing military oppression" in May 1981, at the time of the death of hunger-striker Bobby Sands. The World Federation of Trade Unions, based in Prague, backed the H-t?i.,ck prisoners' demands during the first hunger strike in November 1980 and its newspaper Voice reproduced an H-block Committee leaflet in ten languages. In October 1971 weapons bought by Irish terrorists from the Omnipol arms factory in Czechoslovakia were intercepted in Amsterdam and in November 1977 a large quantity of east European armaments, including Kaleshnikov rifles, were discovered in Antwerp on their way to Dublin. Soviet and east European weapons are often discovered in Northern Ireland, although most of them have been bought on the open market in the Middle East. Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Soviet Union with the Provisional IRA, there is little doubt that the Soviet authorities encourage Irish terrorists with inilammatorv statements, indicating that they are in'e -d a liberation movement fightir4, a c~ ^1 oppressor. Press reports have suggested that three Soviet officials expelled b the Irish government i:: September 1P 3 for "unacceptable activity" hac, visited Northern Ireland and been in touch with extremist groups. Tne Soviet authorities' link with the PLO, which is established, has in the past resulted in terrorist activity on west European territory. In ]973 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 a trainload of Soviet Jewish emigres was seized near Vienna by PLO fighters who had crossed fully armed into Austria from Czechoslovakia. This border is very closely guarded and they could hardly have crossed without Czechoslovak and Soviet approval. A number of well known t:st European terrorists have made frequent visits to the Soviet bloc. Red Brigade leader Renato Curcio had Czechoslovak visas in both his real and his fake passports when he was arrested in 1974. During the April 1978 trial in Turin of Red Brigade's terrorists accused of kidnapping a Fiat executive it was alleged that one of the gang had been trained at a camp in Czechoslovakia The following month the Rome publication 11 Settimanale published details, allegedly leaked b the Italian security services, of the training of Italians and Germans near Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia. Students received training, according to the article, in sabotage, use of explosives and forgery of documents. During the 1970s there were close links between German terrorists and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In 1970 a group including Andreas Baader and Ulricke Meinhof was trained at a PFLP camp in Jordan. There fr;ilowed a series of incidents involving collaboration between German and Palestinian terrorists:,the raid on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in December 1975, the hijacking six months later of an Air France airliner to Entebbe (Uganda) and the hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft in October 1977. In view p( Soviet assistance to the PLO and its offshoot the PFLP, it appears that there was an indirect link between the Soviet Union and various Italian and German terrorist groups, the Palestinians being intermediaries. One cannot be certain to what extent these links were forged by Soviet intelligence with the clear aim of destabilising west European society, but there can be no doubt that the effect of the cooperation was destabilising. Community citizens have been thrown into the web of intrigue that surrounds the Soviet Union's admitted assistance to national liberation movements. For instance, Siegfried Haag, according to Die Zeit in April 1977, was employed as n training officer at a camp for guerilla fighters in the People's De..ocratic Republic of Yemen, a country under Soviet influence. The Soviet Union and her allies admit such activity and take pride in dt. The GDR official communist newspaper Neues Deutschland revealed in August 1980 that more than 2,300 "patriots" had in recent years received medical treatment in GDR hospitals, many of them wounded in "liberation struggles". Some members of the European Parliament would doubtless look sympathetically on some of the individuals wounded in some of the liberation struggles referred to in the Neues Deutschland article. However, it is your rapporteur's view that the Soviet Union and her allies interpret the term "national liberation struggle" in a narrow, carefully defined sense. They do not, for instance, support national liberation struggles in Poland or Afghanistan. They support mainly those struggles which are likely to favour Soviet foreign policy and disrupt the Community or her allies. These struggles, irrespective of their owr, intrinsic merit, often attract individual Community citizens who reject our democratic institutions and Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 strive to overthrow our systems of government by violent means. Therefore, although there is no conclusive evidence of direct Soviet involvement in terrorist groups operating in Community countries - or, if there is, such evidence is not releasable for security or diplomatic reaS5ns - it seems clear that the Community suffers from the "spill-over" into western Europe of the conflicts that the Soviet Union encourages. And Fast-tVest relations are bound to suffer in consequence. Terrorism and Bulgaria There is evidence to suggest that the Bulgarian government is less inhibited Shan the kremlin and other allied governments in the use of terrorism and violence outride her borders. In Jul', 1973 a Bulgarian exile, Boris Arnoff, disappeared from his home in Aarhus, Denmark. Shortly afterwards he appeared beFore a Sofia court charged with anti-state activity. he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He died in prison a few months later. The Communist Youth periodical Narodna Mladeh then printed an article about the "traitor" Arnoff announcing that "the same fate awaits anyone who forgets the ideal of the fatherland". In August 1978 another Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Rostov, was leaving the Paris metro with his wife when he felt a sharp pain in his thigh. He developed a high fever, which lasted three days. He then recovered. Ten days later Georgi Markov, another Bulgarian who also worked for the emigre radio station Radio Free Europe, was walla ng near the BBC offices in Aldwych, London, when he too felt a sudden pain in his leg. He turned round and saw a man, who seemed foreign, running away. That evening (September 7th) hlarkor developed a fever and the next day he was admitted to hospital. Three days later he died. An examination of his body revealed a circular area of inflammation on the right thigh with a central puncture mark about two millimetres in diameter. Further examination showed that beneath the victim's skin there was a spherical piece of metal 1.52 millimetres in diameter and made of a platinum/iridium alloy used mainly in the aircraft industry, pierced with four tiny holes. According to the scientists who gave evidence at Markov's inquest, such an object could only be made with the aid of a high-temperature furnace and precision drilling equipment. The inquest concluded that Markov had been killed by the introduction of poison into his bloodstream by means of this pellet. The London police carried out enquiries for many months and in many countries, but the murderer was not found. After these facts were published, Vladimir Rostov recalledbis own experience in the Paris metro and went in for a medical examination. An X-ray of his thigh revealed a small metal object. Detectives came to Paris from London and, in their presence, a French surgeon removed a two-centimetre square of flesh that contained the object. Microscopic examination of the object showed that it was identical to the one f',Lnd in hMarkov's body. French and 3.-:tirh scientists are not sur._ what poison was used to kill Markov and nearly kil_ T:ostov, but they suspect that it was ricin, an extremely toxic and little-known, substance derived from the cantor oil plant. French and British police are likewise unable to prove who was responsible for the two murderous attacks, however, they have noted the coincidence of the two Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 attacks on. two well-known Bulgaria:, defectors taking place within a few days of each other. They have also observed the extreme technical sophistication with which the murder weapon in each case, a tiny metal object, was manufactured. Your rapporteur believes that the coincidence of the two attacks makes it most probable that the motive in each case was political. He does not believe that any private individual or emigre group would have the technical resources to produce the murder weapon or the chemical knowledge to make such a highly concentrated poision. He recalls that the Bulgarian authorities had a sound motive for wishing to silence two former citizens who were criticising them regularly and fiercely in radio broadcasts. He believes, in short, that it was the Bulgarian authorities, probably with the knowledge of the Soviet authorities, that committed both crimes. The Attempt on the Life of Pope John Paul II This report makes no attempt to apportion blame or to reach a verdict on this crime, which is presently being investigated by Judge Ilaric Martella and the Italian authorities. We can only hope that the investigators wial eventually discover and reveal the whole truth about the execution of this foul deed. However, a political problem has been raised by the allegation made by the assassin Hehmet Ali Agca that the act which took place on May 13th, 1981, was conceived in a Sofia hotel room where another Turk, Bekir Celenk, offered him $1.7 million to shoot the Pope. Agca identified three Bulgarian officials from photographs, including the chief of the Bulgarian airline office in Rome, Sergei Antonov, and accused the= of involvement in the plot. Agca gave Judge Martella a description of Antonov's apartment. The description turned out to be accurate. It was also established that Agca had spent 50 days in Bulgaria during the summer of 1980, after being sentenced to death in Turkey, and that after leaving Bulgaria on August 31st he travelled through western Europe, staying in hotels, spending money but cashing no cheques. In November 1982 the Italian police arrested Antonov. The existence of a prima facie case for Bulgarian involvement in the crime, perhaps even Soviet involvement, has caused a crisis in relations between Italy and Bulgaria, one that concerns not only the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's main ally, but also the German Federal Republic, where Agca and other alleged accomplices lived at various times. On December 20th, 1982, Italian Defence minister Lelio Lagorio told Parliament, "The Bulgarian connection in this affair provokes and justifies the most acute concern." Be added that foreign secret services might be involved in Italian terrorism and that in this context 31 foreign diplomats, ten of them from easte mEurope and 21 from Libya, had been expelled from Italy since 1980. Foreign minister Colombo criticised Bulgaria for its unwillingness to cooperate in the investigation. The political. problem is aggravated by the fact that Bulgaria, of all Soviet- bloc countries, is the one which has most blatantly encouraged and used Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 ? terrorist methods in Community member states during recent years, as mentioned above. The Italian investigation has also revealed the possibility of Bulgarian involvement in drug-running and arms-peddling. The Bulgarian government, it is alleged, take a permissive attitude to these dealings and even exploit them to gain foreign currency. For instance, Bekir Celenk, the man who allegedly asked Agca to murder the Pope, is wanted in both Italy and Turkey on smuggling charges. These charges were repeated in the Italian Parliament by Justice minister Darida on December 20th, 1982. This report makes no judgement about Bulgarian or Soviet involvement in the attempt on the Pope's life. Those judgements must be made by the Italian courts. Still, there is no hiding the fact that the whole murky story has serious political consequences, which the Ten would be well advised to consider most carefully, using all the available machinery. Soviet-Bloc Clandestine Manipulation of Community Public Opinion Your rapporteur believes that the Soviet Union is fully entitled to seek to influence public opinion in our member countries, using any means that is lawful and open. They may sell us books and periodicals, beam radio broadcasts towards us in our various languages, speak to us through diplomatic representatives, contribute letters and articles to our newspapers, appear on our radio and television programmes. They may suggest that the neutron bomb, Cruise and Pershing II are evil weapons, whereas the SS-20 is not evil, that NATO is an aggressive alliance, whereas the Warsaw Pact is defensive and seeks peace. They are free to disseminate this point of view throughout our Community and those who support. NATO are free to put forward the opposite view. However, the use of Soviet propaganda becomes improper when it is disguised with a non-Soviet facade, inserted surreptitiously into a non-Soviet body or put forward in the form of deliberate forgeries. In recent years, as detente has run into difficulties, Soviet intelligence has stepped up a campaign known as "active measures" that depends on the use of disinformation, forgeries, front groups and other secret activit'es. Soviet "active measures" should not be confused with public propaganda or diplomacy. A well known tactic is the forged document amounting to a "revelation" of aggressive western policy or of interference, usually by the United States, in the internal affairs of other countries. These documents arrive through the mail usually without a covering letter, always without a return name or address. Sometimes the "sender" apologises for his own anonymity, pleading that he fears for his life or career. Some documents are signed by well known military or political personalities. Others are marked with an exaggerated high security classification. This is to enhance the news value of the forger;' and to make sure that it is given prominent local exposure. Some of the forgeries are put together with great skill. They are photocopies, but they carry what look like genuine letterheads and signatures, sometimes even genuine and little known codewords. They are compiled with great care and detail. A local political group would not have the technical expertise - 13 - PE 87.279/ fin. Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 An example of this technique is the "Clark-Stearns Letter", which surfaced in Athens in January 1982. It purported to be a letter from the then under- secretary of state William Clark to the US Ambassador in Greece, Monteagle Stearns, indicating that the United States might support a military coup in Greece in order to preserve American bases there. It was sent to Athens newspapers in plain envelopes without a return address and, although it was never published, it was calculated to worsen relations between the United States and Greece's socialist government. Another example was the "Haig-Luns Letter", allegedly sent by the then SuprPrre Allied Commander to the NATO secretary general. It referred to "currant projects for the limited use of US nuclear forces in Europe in an emerc?ncy and to the possibility of NATO "being forced to make first use of p?'clear weapons". Although denounced at once as a forgery, it was printed in the Belgian weekly De_ Nieuwe and in the Luxembourg communist newspaper Ze i tun g vrn Lt~tzeburger Vol lek in Apri l 1982. During the Falklands crisis a forged press release attributing insulting remarks to defence secretary Casper Weinherger was circulated among the Washington diplomatic community. It said that the United States was supporting Britain in the Falklands war so as to establish an American military base there "from which we will assert our control of the whole of the Latin-American continent". A year later a forged tape of a telephone conversation between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, designed to discredit both leaders, was sent to the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf with an inaccurate transcript in the Dutch language. In March 1983 a letter purportedly signed by the American trade union leader Irving Brown to an Italian labour official, Luigi Scricciolo, appeared in the weekly Sette Giorni. Scricciolo was at that time under arrest and had admitted working for Bulgarian intelligence. The letter, which was a forgery, suggested that Scricciolo had been used by the CIA to channel funds to the Polish trade union Solidarity. It. was presumably designed both to discredit Solidarity and to undermine Scricciolo's credibility. In March 1983 a senior Ghanaian official told a press conference that, according to a report issued by the FGR embassy in Accra, the CIA was planning to overthrow the Ghanaian government. The German government declared that the document was a forgery, but not before it had been widely printed in the Ghanaian press, where it was accepted as genuine. Other damaging forgeries to have surfaced in recent years include a letter from President Reagan to the King of Spain (November 1981) in which the King is invited to crush Spanish opposition to NATO entry. There was also the re-publication in London in October 1980 of "Top Secret Documents on US Forces Headquarters in Europe", subtitled "Holocaust Again for Europe". The Arne Petersen Case In April 1982 the Danish minister for justice, Ole Espersen,, announced that Soviet intelligence officers had attempted to use a Danish journalist, Arne Herlov Petersen, in order to manipulate Danish public opinion, Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 _j observed that WPC received large scale financial support from government sources and had gone to great pains to conceal this fact. WPC President Romesh Chandra said in December 1976 that detente would mean no reduction in the struggle against imperialism. He added, "Detente means the intensification of the struggle, but in new forms....". Mr Chandra was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1977. The WPC has never taken a position at variance with Soviet foreign policy. It attacks NATO and the European Community. It never attacks the Warsaw Pact or CtEA. It unwaveringly supported the Soviet viewpoint over the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). Improaer behaviour of Soviet Press and Media Representatives Soviet journalists, who are accredited to Community countries in large numbers, do not confine their activity to nevc,gathering. Several have been expelled from member states in recent years, some for espionage, c.hers for improper interference in local politics amounting to subversion. The most flagrant example of this occurred recently near the Community's borders in Bern, Switzerland. In April 1983 the Swiss government closed the Bern bureau of the Soviet newsagency "Novosti" and expelled its local director. Two of Novosti's Swiss employees had, with the knowledge f their Soviet bosses, been "influencing the Swiss Peace Movement from Moscow's point of view" and "inciting young people to delinquency". The Swiss government went on to state that the Novosti bureau had helped organise a large demonstration in Bern in December 1981. They distributed leaflets prepared in the Novosti office and even took part in para-military exercises. And in July 1982 they had helped organise a disturbance during a session of the Swiss parliament. Novosti's Bern bureau, the Swiss government statement concluded, had become "a centre of disinformation, subversion and agitation through the use of 'active measures' on Moscow's orders". Its actions amounted to a violation of Swiss sovereignty. Soviet-Bloc Technical and Scientific Espionage As East-West relations have deteriorated, there has been an intensification in Soviet efforts to acquire by clandestine means the fruits of west European industrial and technical achievement. Soviet industry has habitually imitated western design in the construction of technical goods. Their copies range from the Leica camera to the Concorde airliner. In recent years they have made up for their on lack of invention by expanding their network of information-gathers in western factories, universities and research establishments. There has in 1983 been an alarming increase in the numbers of Soviet repre- sentatives expelled from Community countries. There have been no such expulsions from Greece or Luxembourg since the beginning of 1981. In the ? Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 other eight member states there were four expulsions in 1981 and six in 1982. In the period January-September 1983 there were 68 expulsions - 47 from France, five from FGR, five from UK, four from Italy, three from Ireland, two from Belgium and one each from Denmark and the Netherlands. Those expelled were mainly diplomats, but they also included trade officials, journalists, an Aeroflot official, two Morflot (merchant navy) officials, employees of UNESCO and the International Wheat Council and a diplomat's wife. The French expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats and other officials in April 1983 was the largest since the expulsion of 105 by the United Kingdom in 1971. There had only been about 15 such expulsions from France in the previous 20 years. The French interior ministry explained that their counter-espionage had uncovered "agents of the secret services of the Soviet Union engaged in systematic search on French territory for tech- nological and scientific information, particularly in the military area". Several French citizens were also arrested in this connection. Former French interior minister Michel Poniatowski said in an interview with Le Matin on April 7th, "In France the KGB manipulates about 10,000 individuals, whether they are aware of it or not. As a general rule, one-third of the (Soviet) diplomatic staff belongs to the KGB. They are one-third of the total KGB staff, the rest working mainly for Aeroflot or Intourist. This makes 200 agents on whom 400 others depend. Normally each one manipulates 15 to 20 people ..... The primary motive of the KGB is destabilisation." Conclusions It is therefore your rapporteur's view that during the past few years, as East-West relations have worsened, there has been an increase in the level of improper behaviour by representatives of the Soviet Union and her allies in Community countries. 1 do not conclude that the Soviet Union is directly involved in terrorist acts, but 1 believe that her failure to restrain her close ally Bulgaria, which is dependent on her, is a cause for considerable concern. So is the inflammatory nature of Soviet pronouncements on their support for movements r of national liberation. Terrorism is encouraged by such pronouncements. It should also be noted that the West has never encouraged terrorism in Warsaw Pact countries. It has attacked the governments of these countries on moral and ideological grounds. Some western representatives have encouraged dissenters in those countries, but only non-violent dissenters. And in those Warsaw Pact countries there is no terrorism. Secondly, your rapporteur is also concerned at the step-up in Soviet "active measures", especially through the forgery of documents designed to sow disagreement in the western alliance and in the encouragement, often without the knowledge of the protestors themselves, of pacifist protests. Thirdly, there must be concern about the increase in Soviet espionage activity in our ten countries, especially in the heightened Soviet interest Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 in acquiring west European technology by improper means. The Ten should therefore seize every opportunity to coordinate their resistance to the improper and destabilising activities of our fellow- Europeans in the East. They should discuss the problem within the political cooperation machinery at every level. They should raise the problem in contacts with the Soviet Union and her allies, especially in the United Nations and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They should try to make the Soviet Union and her allies understand that this is something that can further damage East-West relations, rendering any return to the path of detente more remote. Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 MOTION FOR ARESOLUTION (Doc. 1-1074/82) tabled by Mr ZAGARI, Mr FERRI, Mr RIPA DI MEANA, Mr DIDO', Mr PELIKAN, Mr ARFE', Mrs MACCIOCCHI, Mr LEZZI, Mr GATTO and Mr ORLANDI pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the threat to peace posed by the emergence of international links between some secret services and their efforts to destabilize countries in the Western hemisphere. The-Euroeean_Parliament, -- --- --------- A - which has consistently appealed for respect for the Treaties as the basis for a stable international order and consistently supported all the acts, such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which are designed to preserve peace, B - deeply disturbed by the disclosures of attempts to cause international destabilization which have culminated in the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II in Rome, C - taking into account that some of the judicial inquiries in Italy into the attack on John Paul II, and into terrorist activities and arms trafficking have revealed indications of responsibility and links with the secret services of an Eastern bloc country, Bulgaria, D - considering that this destabilization factor, in the wake of others, could provoke an irreversible crisis with ominous consequences,, Calls on the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation to monitor very closely the development of the situation and to work out uniform positions and joint initiatives by the EEC countries in order to oppose effectively any activities which run counter to the tenets of international law and to the basic principles of human society. Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1 ? ANNEX II MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-1076/82) tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BETTIZA, Mr VISENTINI, Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, Mr RIPA DI MEANA, Mr DE LA MALENE, Mr BARB:, Mr ADONNINO, Mr PONIATOWSKI, Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr DONNEZ, Mr RUMOR, Lord O'HAGAN, Mrs CASSAMAGNAGO CERRETTI, Mr JUNOT, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HABSBURG, Mr BATTERSBY, Mr von WOGAU, Mr PURVIS, Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr CALVEZ, Mr JONKER, Mr CECOVINI, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr GAWRONSKI, Mr LIGIOS, Mr BOCKLET, Mr MACARIO, Mr VANDEWIELE, Mr NARDUCCI, Mr LOCKER, Mr TRAVAGLINI, Mr GONTIKAS, Mr STELLA, Mr TOLMAN, Mr GIAVAZZI, Mr van ROMPUY, Mr DIANA, Mr PAPAEFSTRATIOU, Mrs LENZ, Mr VERROKEN, Mr DEL DUCA, Mr PENDERS, Mr BARBAGLI, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr COLLESELLI, Mr WEDEKIND, Mr LEGA, Mr MODIANO and Mr SEITLINGER pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the international links between secret services and on their destabilizing activities in Western countries. The_Euroeea_artiament, --- ---- - ------- A. concerned at the numerous criminal acts which have occurred in Western countries, culminating in the recent attempt on the life of Pope John-Paul II, B. aware that, in the course of legal proceedings, links are emerging which connect the secret services of Eastern European countries - in particular of Bulgaria - with terrorism, arms trafficking and activities aimed at destabilizing both internal and international pol-*,ical balances, Requests the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation to obtain more detailed specific information about such activities and to react with appropriate political measures to counter what amounts to a danger to peace and peaceful human coexistence and to discourage any future resort to unacceptable forms of behaviour or activity in international relations, in total disregard for treaties, conventions and the Charters of the United Nations and of Helsinki. Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 -_J ? ? ANNEX III RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT ITS SITTING ON 13 JANUARY 1983 ---------------------------- --------------- ----- RESOLUTION on destabilizing activities of Eastern countries' secret services on the territory of the Community and the Western World The Europear. Parliament, A. concerned at the extreme gravity of the facts emerging from the investigations being conducted by the Italian magistrature and authorities after the attempted assassination of John-Paul II and into the international links of terrorism and the arms trade, B. indignant at the accusations of subversive activities in Poland made by the Soviet press against Pope John-Paul 11, who has himself been the victim of terrorist activities. C. having regard to the steps Taken by the Italian Government to inform the NATO countries of the crisis in its relations with Bulgaria, 1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation to speak out against these destabilizing factors which threaten internal institutions and international peace, 2. Considers that close cooperation and an improvement in the channels of information between the Ten may help to strengthen their defence against action of this sort, 3. With this end in view, calls for real progress towards the creation of a European judicial area which will constitute an appropri are-form of collaboration and cooperation against all manoeuvres aimed at destabilization and all terrorist activity, 4. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to report on the political implications and the consequences to be drawn from this situation, 5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to. the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation and the Governments of the Member States. PE 87.279/fin/Ann.III Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500080015-1 Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1 MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-361/83) tabled by Mr HABSBURG, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr ZECCHINO, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr PEDINI and Mr WAWRZIK pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on attempted terrorist subversion in the Member States and various associated countries. The European Parliament, A. concerned at the growing number of terrorist outrages foreboding a fresh wave of violence, B. deeply perturbed by terrorist and subversive activities at international level both in the Member States and various associated countries, C. whereas the terrorist movements have been shown to be linked and relations between the undercover organizations of the Eastern bloc states and the areas where terrorism, training camps, the arms trade and subversion develop are aimed at disrupting the political balance within the European Community and at international level, D. whereas this subversive factor and terrorist activity could create an irreversible crisis with tragic consequences, 1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to intensify their investigations, to monitor extremely closely the course of events and to take the necessary political and legal measures to prevent any further such machinations which represent a threat to peace and are in breach of Treaties, agreements, the U.N. Charter and the Final Act of Helsinki. Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1