THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE STRATEGY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88B00443R001704290013-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 5, 2010
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 25, 1985
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88B00443R001704290013-8.pdf43.17 KB
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Approved For Release 2010/01/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01704290013-8 The Director of Central Intelligence Wdshtn lon. D C. 20505 MEMORANDUM FOR: Jay Keyworth Herb Meyer SUBJECT: The President's Defense Strategy Following up on our conversation yesterday, I would insert after the first paragraph of Jay's memo something like this: To deal with the efforts of those working to limit and undercut the full scope of the President's objectives-- the opposition on both sides of the Iron Curtain--it is essential to redefine and clarify the President's proposals to bring out more clearly and forcefully these aspects of his proposal: 1. The President is striving for a strategy which will establish defense as not only less threatening, but as cheaper and more effective than offense. 2. We have technology which makes this strategy feasible with respect to conventional as well as strategic arms. 3. The President is ready to discuss the timing and method of integrating strategic defensive capabilities into the force structure but not to give anyone a veto over the deployment of capabilities which will spend billions to develop if they will protect the safety and interests of the United States and its allies and contribute to strategic stability. (Last qualification on strategic stability may give rise to too much debate and might best be dropped from the paper here.) 4. The allies need to understand that we can deploy at an early date conventional capabilities which can significantly raise the nuclear threshhold. Conveying this to the world can greatly strengthen the strategic initiative by broadening the area of debate and highlighting the worth of our technological prospects. We will be in deep trouble with our allies if they learn about these capabilities after they have based their defenses on obsolete weapons which are more expensive and less effective. William J. Casey Approved For Release 2010/01/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01704290013-8