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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 10 June 1985 The Honorable Jim Courter U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Jim, Thank you for your note and thank you for putting my speech on Central America in the Congressional Record. We would be very pleased to give you whatever information we can for helping on your book, and I would be glad to meet with you to discuss Central America. Best regards. Orig -_F,d.drssee (Via OLL) 1 - DDO 1 - D/ PAO 1 - ER File William J. Casey Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 EJECUIWESEC :TARIAT -VAR. OUTING SLIP AcON INFO DATE INITIAL DCI X-+ 2 DDCI X 3 EXDIR 4 D/ICS 5 DDI 6 DDA 7 DDO 8 DDS&T 9 Chm/NIC 10 GC 11 IG 12 Compt 13 D/OLL X 14 D/PAO 15 VC/NIC 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 N June 1985 3637 (10.8)) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 JIM COURTER LCOMMITTEES: NEW JERSEY 1978 RMED SERVICES Cops of the United States %oost of Repreoentat ueo Ulaohinoton, W:2ostf June 3, 1985 Mr. William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Mr. Casey: I was pleased to see the full text of your San Antonio address appear in the Washington Times, and have had it entered into the Congressional Record in the hope that some of my colleagues will benefit fran it as much as I have. SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING The speech could not have been more timely; the House is now to face anew the same old choice about whether or not to resist the establishment of a second Marxist-Leninist state in the Central American region. I have taken a rather visible role in the Nicaragua debate, made a trip to Central America in December, and have set down some of my opinions and findings in various published forms. I am at work at present on a booklet on the Nicaraguan government's consolidation of power, and will be pleased to send along a copy to you when it is completed. Should you find yourself available at some date for an opportunity to meet with me and discuss Central American issues, I would be most pleased for the chance. Thank you for your expert work for this country's intelligence services, and thank you for your leadership and your patriotism. Sincerely, of Congress JAC/ch Enclosures Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Vol. 13'1 WASH GTON, WEDNESDAY, MAY , 1985 No.68 ~on~re,~,~ional Record DIRECTOR CASEY ON THE SAN- DINISTA STRATEGIC BLUE- PRINT HON. JIM COURTER or txw JERSEY IN THE HOUSZ Or REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 22, 1985 ? Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, I would like my colleagues to see the best, most comprehensive review of Marxist-Leninist political strategy in foreign countries to appear in the public prints in some time. It is the text of a speech CIA Director William Casey made to the World Business Council in San Antonio, T$ on May 18. Ranging over such strategic indica- tors as military aid, the presence of ad- visers, political cultivation of the young. propaganda, and efforts to dis- credit the moral and spiritual author- ity of the Catholic Church, the ad- dress by Mr. Casey serves, from one standpoint, as a veritable checklist of the ways in which the new Nicaraguan Government is reproducing old Marx- ist-Leninist patterns of taking and con- solidating power. The text which follows is reprinted from the Washington Times. Sums isTAs HAVE "BLIIZPRINT FOR Susvxaslvz AcoassatoN" Today, I would like to tell you about the subversive war which the Soviet Union and its partners have been waging against the United States and its interests around the world for a quarter of a century or more. This campaign of aggressive subversion flas nibbled away at friendly governments and our vital interests until today our national security is impaired in our immediate neigh- borhood as well as in Europe. Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is not an undeclared war. In 1961, [Nikital Khrushchev, then leader of the Soviet Union, told us that communism would win not through nuclear war which could destroy the world or conventional war which could quickly lead to nuclear war, but through "wars of national liberation" in Africa. Asia, and Latin America. We were re- luctant to believe him then. Just as In the 1930. we were reluctant to take Hitler seri- ously when he spelled out in "Mein Kampf" how he would take over Europe. Over the last 10 years, Soviet power has been established: In Vietnam, along China's border and astride the sea lanes which bring Persian Gulf oil to Japan. In Afghanistan, 500 miles closer to the warm-water ports of the Indian Ocean and to the Straits of Hormuz. Through which comes the oil essential to Western Europe. In the Horn of Africa, dominating the southern approaches to the Red Sea and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. In Southern Africa. The source of miner- als which we and other industrial nations must have. And in the Caribbean and Central Amer- ica, on the very doorstep of the United States. This is not a bloodless war. Marxist-Lenin- ist policies and tactics have unleashed the four horses of the apocalypse-Famine. Pes- tilence, War and Death. Throughout the Third World we see famine in Africa, pesti- lence through chemical and biological agents in Afghanistan and Indochina, war on three continents, and death everywhere. Even as I speak, some 300,000 Soviet, Viet- namese, and Cuban troops are carrying out savage military operations directed at wiping out national resistance In Afghani- stan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and several other countries. In the occupied countries-Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia. Angola. Nicaragua-in which Marxist regimes have been either Lin- posed or maintained by external forces, there has occurred a holocaust comparable to that which Nast Germany inflicted In Europe some 40 years ago. Some four mil- lion Afghans. more than one-quarter of the population, have had to flee their country. The Helsinki Watch tells us that they have fled because "the crimes of Indiscriminate warfare are combined with the worst ex cesses of unbridled state sanctioned violence against civilians." It cites evidence of "civil- ians burned alive, dynamited. beheaded; crushed by Soviet tanks; grenades thrown into rooms where women and children have been told to wait." In Cambodia, two to three million people, something like one-quarter of the pre-war population, have been killed in the most vio- lent and brutal manner by both internal and external Marxist forces. In Ethiopia, a Marxist military govern- ment, supported with extensive military support from Moscow and thousands of Cuban troops, by collectivizing agriculture and keeping food prices low in order to maintain urban support, has exacerbated a famine which threatens the lives of millions of its citizens. It has exploited the famine by using food as a weapon to forcibly relo- cate people fighting an oppressive govern- ment In the north hundreds of miles to the south where there is no preparation to re- ceive them. In urban areas, food rations are distributed through party cells. k lei out ght a the minimum Communist of 1.000 former Somoza national guardsmen during the summer of 1979. In 1982, It forcibly relo- cated some 15,000 Mtskito Indians to deten- tion camps, forced many more to flee to ref- ugee camps in Honduras. and burned some 40 Indian villages. Last month, the Sandi- nistas forcibly moved 60,000 campesinos from areas close to the Honduran regions, burning their houses and killing their cattle. What is the purpose of all this carnage, this creeping Imperialism? In my view, there are two primary targets-tile all fields of the Middle East which an the lifeline of the Western Alliance, and the Isthmus be- tween North and South America. Afghani- stan. South Yemen, Ethiopia, as well as Cam Ranh Bay In Vietnam, and Mozam- bique and Angola in southern Africa, bring Soviet power astride the sea lanes which carry those resources to America. Europe and Japan. Capabilities to threaten the Panama Canal in the short term and Mexico in a somewhat longer term are being developed in Nicaragua where the Sandinista revolu- tion is the first successful Castrolte seizure of power on the American mainland. They have worked quietly and steadily toward Sanitized Copy Approved for Release their objectives of building the power of the state security apparatus, building the strongest armed forces in Central America, and becoming a center for exporting subver- sion to Nicaragua's neighbors. The American intelligence community over recent months unanimously concurred in four national estimates on the military buildup, the consolidation and the objec- tives of the Soviets and the Cubans and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. If I were to boll the key Judgments of those estimates down to a single sentence it would be this: The Soviet Union and Cuba have established and are consolidating a beachhead on the Amer- ican continent, are putting hundreds of mil- lions of dollars worth of military equipment into it, and have begun to use it as a launch- ing pad to carry their style of aggressive subversion into the rest of Central America and elsewhere in Latin America. Let me review quickly what has already happened In Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have developed the best equipped military in the region. They have an active strength of some 65,000 and a fully mobilized strength Including militia and reserves of nearly 120,000. These forces are equipped with Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, state of the art helicopters, patrol boats and an in- creasingly comprehensive air defense system. This gives the Sandinistas a mili- tary capability far beyond that of any other Central American nation and Indeed all Central American nations put together. In addition to the considerable military hardware, there are now an estimated 6,000 to 7,500 Cuban advisers and several hundred other communists and radical personnel in Nicaragua assisting the regime In Its mili- tary buildup and Its consolidation of power. The Communist government under Cuban direction and guidance has been essential In helping the regime establish control over the media create propaganda mechanisms and neutralize the effectivenas of those who oppose the Sandinista totalitarianism. Today, we see Nicaragua becoming to Cen- tral and Latin America what Beirut was to the Middle East for almost 15 years since 1970 when Lebanon became the focal point for international and regional terrorists. Managua's support for training of Central American subversives Is well documented- they support Salvadoran communists, Gua- temalan communists, radical leftists In Costs Rica, and are attempting to increase the number of radical leftist terrorists in Honduras. More recent evidence Indicates Nicaraguan support for some South Ameri- can terrorist groups and growing contacts with other international terorist groups. Yet. Just last week the American congress refused to approve $14 million for people re- sisting communist domination of Nicaragua, on the very day that a Soviet ship unloaded more than $14 million worth of helicopters, East German trucks, and other military cargo at Corinto, the principal port in Nica- ragua. On the very next day, (Daniel) Ortega, the Nicaraguan communist dictator, trav- eled to Moscow to ask the Soviet Union to make $200 million available to him to con- solidate a Leninist communist dictatorship across a stretch of land which separates South America from North America. This development In our immediate neigh- borhood should not be viewed in isolation but as a part of a worldwide process which has already worked in Furope, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Let me now give you an Insicl!t on how all Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 with Bob Ames, our CIA Middle East expert, who died at the hand of a terrorl3t attack in beirut in 1983. Stationed In Aden. South Yemen. in 1967. he met and befriend- ed the young revolutionary Abd'ai Fatah Ismail, who became president of South Yemen and is now back In Aden after being exiled briefly to the USSR. Abd'al Fatah told Bob of his experience to the higher Komsomol school which the Soviets main- tain for training young revolutionaries from non-communist countries. He explained that he had been taught in Moscow that he needed 20 years, a generation, to consolidate his revolution. He would have to control the education of the youth and to uproot and undermine and ultimately change the traditional elements of society. This meant undermining the in- fluence of religion and taking the young away from their parents for education by the state. He was taught that to control the people he would have to establish block committees as a powerful secret police. Fi- nally. Abd'al Fatah spoke in Impassioned terms of a need to export revolution to carry out his mission as a dedicated Marxist- Leninist and to ensure that attention was focused on neighboring countries thus di- verting attention from his own country and allowing it to consolidate its revolution. Bob Ames said that as he looked back. Abd'al Fatah-with Soviet Bloc help-had done as he said he would. He captured and subverted a legitimate war of liberation. He killed or drove Into exile those members of the movement who believed in democracy and then went about the work of consolidat- Ing a communist regime and began armed subversion against Oman and North Yemen. In Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan. and Grenada. dedicated Marxist-Leninist revolu- tionaries followed this Soviet blueprint with only slight modifications. Our analysts have studied this blueprint for taking over a government and consoli- dating a totalitarian regime as it has been exemplified in seven totalitarian regimes; six Marxist-Leninist In Cuba, South Yemen, Ethiopia. Angola. Grenada. Nicaragua, and the Islamic revolutionary pverrraent of Iran. They have Identified 46 indicators of the consolidation of power by a Marxist. Leninist regime, These Indiaters measure the movement toward one-party govern- ment, control of the mWtary. of the security services, of the media, of education, of the economy. the fuming or takeover of labor or other macs organisatioin. exerting social and population control. curbing religious in- fluence and alignment with the SovNt bloc. Of the 44 indicators, Nicaragua In five and one-half years has accomplished 33. They have established control of the media. taken over radio and TV. cansond the broadcasts of Sunday sermons of the Archbishop of Managua. and subjected the only free news- paper. La Prensa. to a brutal daily censor- ship. They have taken watrwl of the educa- tion system. Nicaraguan textbooks now teach Marxism. They attack the tenets of Western democracy. They attach traditional religious teachings and entourage children to maintain revolutionary vigilance by watching for signs of ideological Impurities In their neighbors. friends and relatives. The Sandinistas have taken control of the military. They have taken control of the in- ternal secret police and have established a Directorate of State Security. That director- ate. according to our reports, has 400 Cubans, 70 Soviets. 40-50 East German and 20-25 Bulgarian advisers. There are So vet advisers at every level of the secret police. In fact. It is safe to say that it Is controlled by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Block committees have been established to watch and control the people. The church has been persecuted. Witness the campaign mounted by the Di- rectorate of State Security to harass and embarrass Pope John Paul II during his 1993 visit to Nicaragua. They have used po- litical mobs (similar to the Red Guards of Soviet and Chinese revolutionary history) to attack democratic politicians, union mem- bers and religious leaders. And finally, just as Abd'al Fatah told Bob Ames what he must do. and following Hitler and Khru. shchev. the Sandinistas have told the world that they would spread the example of Nicaragua beyond Nl Salvador to Honduras, Guatemala, and the entire region. An integral part of this blueprint for sub- versive aggression is deception and disinfor- mation to manipulate and influence public opinion and policies in western countries. This takes many shapes and forms. A worldwide propaganda campaign has been mounted and carried out on behalf of the Sandinista regime and Salvadoran guer- rillas which would not have been possible without the capabilities, the contacts, and the communication channels provided by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. The Sandinistas themselves have shown remarkable ingenui- ty and skill In projecting disinformation into the United States itself. Perhaps the best example of this is the systematic earn- paign to deceive well-intentioned members of the western media and of western reli- gious institutions. There are many examples of Nicaraguan deception. The Sandinista press, radio and government ministry have put out claims that the United States used chemical weap- on In Grenada, that the United States was supplying Nicaraguan freedom fighters with drugs, and that the United States might give the opposition bacteriological weapons. The debate in the Congress disclosed few who think that what Is happening in Cen- tral America Is a desirable state of affairs or that it Is compatiable with avoiding a possi- bly permanent impairment of our national security and a serious deterioration in the American geopolitical position in the world. There are some who will be content with an agreement that the Nicaraguans will now forego further aggression. Our experience in Korea and Indochina provides some les- sons on the value of agreements with com- munist governments. Korea started to vio- late the Korean Armistice within days of the truce signing. Under the 1973 Paris Accords, North Viet- nam agreed to cease firing in South Viet- nam, withdraw Its forces from Cambodia and Laos, and refrain from Introducing addi- tional troops and war materiel into South Vietnam except on a one-for-one replace- ment basis. North Vietnam never observed the cease-fire and troop withdrawal require- ments. and within little more than two months after It had signed the peace agree- ments it had already Infiltrated some 30.000 additional troops and over 30.000 tons of mi. liltary equipment into South Vietnam. We believe the Sandinistas' main objec. tives in regional negotiations are to buy time to further consolidate the regime. His- tory and the record and purposes of Marx. ist-Leninist regimes in general and the San- dinistas In particular lead us to believe that unless Nicaragua has implemented a genu- ine democracy as required by the Organiza- tion of American States such assurances could not be adequately verified and would not be complied with. Cuban officials have urged the Salvadoran communist guerrillas f . slow down their attacks against the Duarte government in order to fortify and consolidate the Nicaraguan revolution. We believe that Cuba has assured the Salvador- an communists that It might take as long as five to 10 years, but as long as the Sandi- nista regime in Nicaragua remains, that country will serve as a base for communist expansion in the area and the Salvadoran Insurgency will be renewed once the Sandi- nistas have been able to eliminate the armed resistance. What dots this mean for America's future? Should Central America fall under communist control. it could mean a tidal wave of refugees into the U.S. Every country that has fallen under corn munist control since World War II has ac: refugees streaming over the borders-fiz. Eastern Europe, then Cuba, and more re- cently Vietnam and Afghanistan-and the potential Influx from Central America is even higher than from any of these. Since 1910, some 300,090 Salvadorans fleeing the communist?WNated violence In their own country have entered the V.L, Illegally. Ille- gal movement from Mexico has increased, with some one million Mexicans illegally en- tering this country in 1993 alone. In 1984, the Bipartisan Commission on Central America warned that a communist Central America would likely be followed by the de- stabiliaatlon, of Mexico and that this could result In many millions of additional Mexi- cans fleeing into the United States. Today. the Cuban and Nicaraguan mill. tary forces am together four than the size of those of Mexico and are equipped with vastly superior weapons. Today. with armed forces larger and better equipped than the rest of Central America put together. Nica- ragua could walk through Costa Rica, which has no army, to Panama, and Cuba can threaten our vital sea lanes in the Caribbe- an. The Insurgency Is a major obstacle to San. di nil" consolidation In that it encourages the erosion of active support for the Sandi- nistas by creating uncertainties about the future of the regime; by challenging Its claims of political legitimacy; and by giving hope to the leaders of the political opposi- tion. The largest anti-Sandinista insurgent group, the PDN, is still providing strong military resistance despite cutoff of United States aid almost a year ago. Popular sym. athy for the insurgents appears to be in. creasing In the countryside. and the FDN continues to receive significant numbers of new recruits. That opposition can Increase the pressure until the Sandinista support has eroded suf- ficiently to leave them no option other than modification of their rejection of internal reconciliation. The objective is to allow for the same proem of democratisation that Is taking place in the rest of Central America to occur In Nicaragua.* Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Vol. 131 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1985 No. 27 ~on~re~~ional Record COURTER INTRODUCES RESOLU- TION GRANTING POLITICAL RECOGNITION TO DEMOCRAT- IC RESISTANCE OF NICARA- GUA HON. JIM COURTER OF REW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, March 7, 1985 ? Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, situa- tion in Nicaragua parallels the situa- tion of 1979, when the Somoza govern- ment was still in power. A dangerous armed conflict is going on while the dictatorial government resists the op- position's call for freedom, human rights, and democracy. Last Saturday, the political and mili- tary elements of Nicaragua's demo- cratic opposition united in a broad coa- lition to call for peace and a negotiat- ed transition to democracy. This initia- tive offers the best hope for national reconciliation in Nicaragua, and it is based on the respect for human rights and democracy that we all share. I have drafted a resolution which calls on the President and our neigh- bors in the Organization of American States to support this peace initiative, and calls on the President to grant "explicit political recognition" to the Nicaraguan resistance. To call for rec- ognition' is not to call for U.S. with- drawal of recognition of the Sandinis- tas, nor does it imply abandonment of Contadora or other international talks. It simply asks that the President demonstrate, in whichever manner he finds appropriate, that the United States sides with Nicaragua's demo- crats, and supports their plan to fulfill the democratic aspirations of the Nica- raguan people. I am pleased to be Joined by the fol- lowing Members who have cospon- sored this resolution: Representatives McEWEN, HAMMzascin TDT, STUMP, MCCAIw, HOPKINS, YOUNG of Alaska, KAsrci, OALLO, HYDE, MILLER of Washington, SOLOMON, EDWAaDs of Oklahoma, HUNTER, SILwANDER, Moaix- ARI, GILMAN, DORIAN, DEWurz, MCCOLLUIC STRANG, SAXTON, OING- RICH, Bi aazzs, BADHAM, WORTLEY, WEBER, BURTON of Indiana, RITTER, LUNGREN, CRANE, CAMPBELL, REMP, SMITH of Oregon, BARTON, WALKER, Lewis of California, MACK, Loo=, DICKINSON, DAVIS, SENSENBRENNER, SKEEN, DANNE- MEYER, DAUB, SPENCE, McGaATH, DREIER, GREGG, LOEFr'LER, STANGELA YD, ROGERS, LowaRY, and ARCHER. The text of the resolution follows: Whereas the Organization of American States, in its XVII Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on June 23, 1979 approved a resolution which deprived the Somos government of Its legitimacy; Whereas this action was taken to alleviate suffering, to end armed conflict, and pro- mote human rights in Nicaragua, and to remove a threat to regional stability; Whereas the Organization of American States resolution called for the following: "1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Samosa regime. "2. Installation In Nicaraguan territory of a democratic government, the composition of which should include the principal repre- sentative groups Which oppose the Somoza regime and which reflects the free will of the people of Nicaragua. "3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception. "4. The holding of free elections as soon as Possible, that will.lead to the establish- ment of a truly democratic government that guaranfass Peace, freedom. and justice."; Whereas on July R12_, ~1979 the ruling junta of the Proatslanal Goeeemnent of National Reconstruction, formed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, wrote to the Organization of American States and promised "to establish full re- spect for human rights," "to enforce civil Justice," and to conduct in Nicaragua the first free elections 'that our country will have in this century'; Whereas the Sandinista government of Nicaragua has proclaimed its allegiance to Marxism-Leninism; Whereas the Sandinistas have restricted freedom of expression, travel, warship and assembly. have failed to, guarantee civii jus- tice. and have failed to conduct tree and fair elections; Whereas these policies expressly violate the pledges made to the Organization of American States in the letter of July 12, 1979; Whereas the Sandinista government now threatens regional peace and the human rights of the Nicaraguan people; Whereas the military conflict between the Sandinista government and its domestic op- ponents is rooted in political causes and will only be resolved by the establishment of de- mocracy in Nicaragua; Whereas political and military forces op- Posing the Sandinista government of Nica- ragua have formed a broad coalition; Whereas the "Document of the Nicara- guan Resistance concerning National Dia- logue," issued at San Jose, Costa Rica on March 2, 1985 calls for a peaceful, negotiat- ed transition to democracy and national rec- onciliation in Nicaragua; and Whereas the cause of the Nicaraguan Re- sistance is just and worthy of support by all democrats of the Americas: Now, therefore, be It Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress- (1) reaffirms the declaration of the Orga- nization of American States, made on June 23, 1979, that the solution to Nicaragua's political problems is "within the 'exclusive Jurisdiction of the People of Nicaragua' ; (2) urges the President to grant explicit political recognition to the democratic Nica- raguan Resistance; and (3) urges the President and all the mem- bers of the Organization of American States to Support the Nicaraguan Resistance in its quest for peace, human rights, free elections and national reconciliation, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 r4111iW+;4 ?4:t~~~' ? ? 19 M May, 1985 Nicaragua's Military Buildup: Fact or Fiction? Few will deny that Nicaragua's revolutionary government has conducted a military buildup without parallel in the Central American region. Does it matter? Other nations have military power in the Americas, but we don't consider them all to be threats to ourselves or our neighbors. The judgment boils down to the question of intentions, and this is the first sticking point in American debates about Nicaragua. Some view Nicaragua as a willing supporter of Soviet imperialism, a base for foreign subversion and terrorism, and a Communist dictatorship in the process of consolidating power. Others, while at times disappointed in Sandinista "mistakes and excesses," believe that Nicaragua seeks only peaceful, democratic development of its economy and society. By their own statements, the Nicaraguan rulers do believe in democratic and progressive change. But what do they mean by these terms? A Nicaraguan official touring the Soviet Union in March 1985 used the word "democratic" in the following context: "The USSR's successes in building communism, in bringing up a new man have always and will remain an inspiring example for the Nicaraguan people building a democratic society." "Progressive change" takes on a similarly novel meaning in a Nicaraguan-Soviet communique, issued in April 1980, condemning "the campaign by imperialist and reactionary forces to increase international tension around the events in Afghanistan." The communique said that this campaign seeks to "stifle the inalienable right of the people of.. .Afghanistan. ..to follow the road of progressive change." These statements represent just two selected elaborations of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy that Sandinista rulers admit to be the guiding, theory behind their revolution. Other examples abound, showing a full Sandinista carmitznent to the revolutionary ideology of the Soviet Union and its client states. It is this revolutionary commitment which threatens Nicaragua's neighbors, especially when it is backed up by a large military force. In response to this, the claim is often made that the Sandinista military buildup is defensive in character. Were it not for the growing military opposition in Nicaragua, it is said, the Sandinistas would not need the military capability that they now have. These arguments would be more persuasive if the Sandinistas had forces of a size and character which conform to purely defensive needs. But they do not: instead, they have acquired forces which are far better suited to intimidating or attacking their neighbors than to defeating the threat of 15,000 freedom fighters in the mountains of Nicaragua. Even before the armed opposition emerged in early 1982, the Sandinistas planned and commenced their military buildup. By 1982, they had built a force of nearly 50,000 troops, exceeding by over three times the peak strength of the National Guard of right-wing dictator Anastasio Soxnoza, who was overthrown in 1979. Today, their forces include over 119,000 troops, with an active duty force of over 62,000. Congr..am n rim Courf r is N.w J.is y's only m mb.r on th. How. Armed S.rvlc.a Commlltw. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 There is an emphasis on armored forces -- not a useful capability to counter the dispersed, hit and run tactics of guerrillas -- and the Soviets have supplied scores of tanks to meet the Sandinistas' needs. Today the Sandinistas have 110 36-ton Soviet T-55 tanks, each armed with a 100-millimeter gun. In 1984 they acquired 30 PT-76 light Soviet tanks, which have an amphibious capability that allows them to cross rivers. These lighter, more mobile tanks are more versatile and can be argued to be more appropriate to the guerrilla threat, but their amphibious capability makes tham a threat to Nicaragua's neighbors as well. The heavy T-55 tanks which can't cross rivers on their own can be ferried across river? by'the six GSP amphibious ferries which the Soviets have supplied to Nicaragua. In contrast, the armored capability of Somoza's National Guard consisted of three World War II-vintage tanks. Sandinista air power follows similar patterns. .The Sandinistas have begun to acquire Soviet MI-24 HIND helicopters -- heavily armed, fast attack helicopters which can carry over 2800 pounds of rockets, barbs and missiles. These helicopters, which the Soviets use in Afghanistan, are adding to an inventory of other Soviet attack and cargo helicopters. They can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. There is another aspect of Nicaraguan air power, however, which can't be justified by any defensive purpose. This is the construction of the Punta Huete airfield near Managua. One of several military airfields which the Sandinistas have built, Punta Huete has a runway 3200 meters long, 44 meters wide and one meter thick, and facilities to accarodate jet fighter aircraft. The runway's size allows it to accomodate any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, including barbers and long-range reconnaissance planes which could conduct reconnaissance flights off our Pacific Coast, just as Soviet planes use Cuban bases to patrol our Atlantic (bast. When Senator Moynihan (D-NY) visited Nicaragua in December 1983 he thought he had been given sincere assurances by the Nicaraguan government that projects such as this would not be undertaken. One junta member responded to his concern about Soviet submarine, air or missile bases by assuring him that such developments "would not happen now or in the future." Referring to Punta Huete, Senator Moynihan told the Senate in August 1984: "That the Nicaraguans have gone forward in this project leads me to ask whether they understand what I was saying or believed what they were saying." Whether the Sandinistas believe what they say is indeed an important question for Nicaragua's neighbors. The Sandinistas often speak the language of peace, but they have built infantry, artillery and air power that belies their peaceful intentions. They use the threat of the freedom fighter to justify this buildup and the political repression that accompanies it. They could end the threat immediately by accepting the freedom fighters' offer to stop fighting and negotiate for the establishment of a real democracy, to replace the totalitarian "democracy" in which the people's will is supposedly served by the ruling Sandinista party. The Sandinistas resemble their Soviet mentors in more ways than we care to recognize. Both states are dictatorships which exercise the widest possible control over public information. Their domestic propaganda raises the spectre of the re-Nazification of Germany, and the Sandinistas tell theirs of the freedom fighters. or possible U.S. intervention. These propaganda themes are a fundamental political necessity for Carnunist rulers, because they allow them to keep their people highly regimented and militarized, and distracted from the fact that they are denied the human rights which would lead to a decent material and spiritual life. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 THE TRENTONIAN DECEMBER 13, 1984 Courter: Aid Nicaraguan Rebels By DAVID J. LYNCH States News Service WASHINGTON - Just back from a whirlwind tour of six Central American countries in five days, Rep. Jim Courter said yesterday the United States should re- sume funding the anti-Sand- inista rebels in Nicaragua. Prompted by reports of direct Central Intelljggpce Agency involvement in the mining of Nicaragua's har- bors, Congress in October cut off aid to the so-called "contras." But Courter said U.S. help was needed to prevent an- other Cuba. "It becomes viv- idly clear to me that you have a Marxist government in Nicaragua that is tighten- ingthe yoke," he said. "Inevitably, as time goes by, fewer and fewer freedoms will be permitted by that government," said Courter, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. "Whether they admit it or not, they will follow the Cuban model in creating a closed society," he warned. Courter and two other committee members, Reps. Beverly Byron, D-Md., and Buddy Darden, D-Ga., jour- neyed to El Salvador, Hon- duras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Belize. While in Managua, the Hackettstown Republican met with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and leaders of the Nicaraguan opposition. In El Salvador, the four-term lawmaker met with top of- ficials of the Salvadoran mil- itary. Courter also accused the Nicaraguans of supplying arms to the anti-government rebels in El Salvador. The New Jersey congressman, who speaks Spanish, said he had taken "personal testi- mony" from individuals who had witnessed the arrival of arms shipments. `;There is some photo- graphic evidence we've had in the Armed Services Com- mittee," he added. Courter conceded, how- ever, that the photgraphs - purportedly showing Nicaraguans transferring arms to El Salvadoran ,guerillas - were often of poor quality. After . talking with -El Salvadoran military officials, Courter said he was en- couraged about the situation in that strife-torn nation. "Most people feel the mili- tary situation there is marginally better than it was six months ago," he said. But Courter cautioned that the situation in El Salvador remains extremely fluid. "It's a long, difficult, painful haul," he said. Higher levels of American aid won't be required, Courter said. But greater public awareness of the dan- ger from continued turmoil and instability in Central America will be, he added. I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 April 2, 1985 783 words 1985-13 By Rep. Jim Courter Jim Courter (R.-N.J.), now serving his fourth term in the House, is a member of the Armed Services Commmittee. This address is an expanded version of remarks delivered as a guest commentary over "Radio America." The secretary-general of the "Nicaraguan Association for Friendship with the Socialist Countries" was on an official visit to the Soviet Union a few weeks ago. He made a pronouncement about what he called the "progressive transformation" of his homeland, and praised the USSR for its "fraternal support" which "infuses tt Nicaraguan people with confidence of the ultimate victory of odr revolution." Then he went further: "The USSR's successes in building communism, in bringing up a new man, have always been and will remain an inspiring example for the Nicaraguan people building a democratic society." That may sound like a strange use of the word "democratic." It ought to. It is. But saying "democratic" and meaning "communist" has become something of a Sandinista specialty. A year ago this month the Minister of Planning, Henry Ruiz, was visiting the East Germans and praising their educational system--one of the world's most militarized--as a' model for "a new democratic education system in Nicaragua." But it was in the summer of 1979, when Somoza was nearing his end, that talk of democracy, pluralism, freedom, and human rights was most to be heard. The Sandinistas were courting world opinion: They marshalled their words as carefully as their soldiers, and many people were eager to believe them. The Organization of American States, (OAS) of which the U.S. is a member, took the unprecedented action of demanding the end of a regime--Somoza's, and its replacement with a democratic government. The Sandinistas replied to the OAS with a letter on July 12, 1979. It was replete with promises, all since broken. They promised "full respect for human rights." Instead, Nicaraguans have endured a one-party dictatorship, and the fullest range of legal deprivations. The country has witnessed: - The forced relocation of thousands of Miskito Indians; - The flight from the country of tens of thousands of other Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Nicaraguans; - a draft which can put 13-year old boys into battle after as little as 8 days of training; - pressure on parents to send their children to Cuba's cadre- building schools; - elaborate literacy programs, but little to read apart from Marxist literature; - Steady harassment of opposition figures, and of the only surviving non-Party newspaper, La Presna; - Unabashed persecution of the church in a country that is deeply Catholic, including the infiltration of religious groups, crude abuse of priests, attempts to control the texts of sermons, and the presentation, in childrens' school books, of vicious caricatures of the religious orders. (I would hesitate to report such things second- hand, but I visited Nicaragua in December, and I saw them.) r The Sandinistas promised "civil justice," too. But how can it be guaranteed where there is no civil law, no constitution? Government is by decree, and the so-called "People's Courts" have no independence from the political authorities. Therefore, a minority has no protection from the majority. A man has no defense against the police. A citizen has no means of resisting the powers of the local "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution," which can compel attendance at meetings, and withhold ration cards, and which function as an arm of the East German and Cuban-dominated secret police. There is a name for a political construction such as this. And it is not "democracy." It is hardly surprising that the Nicaraguan people have had enough. The ranks of the grimly dissatisfied grow every day, and with them, the ranks of the Contras, of whom there are now over 12,000. For every Somoza loyalist among them, there are a dozen peasants, small land-holders, city dwellers, and disillusioned Sandinistas. At a momentous meeting in San Jose, Costra Rica, this past March 3, the resistance leaders met, unified, and produced a declaration of common aspirations, a "Document on National Dialogue of the Nicaraguan Resistance." It calls for a cease-fire, an end to the state of emergency, and peace talks. It puts forward a detailed and thoughtful agenda for a transition to democracy. I believe this peace initiative deserves every measure of American support. I have introduced into the House of Representatives, and 59 of my colleagues have signed, a resolution asking President Reagan to grant some form of political recognition to the Contras. The resolution also asks the members of the organization of American States to re-enter the diplomatic arena in which they played such a part in 1979, and support the Contras' efforts to engage Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 the Sandinistas in meaningful negotiations. For five years, the Nicaraguan people have walked the way of the Sandinistas. That path has taken them to places as dark and harsh as any they knew with Somoza. Today, at last, there may be another way. There may be a democratic way. Steven Havtcard 1`Jil"I Public Research, Syndicated Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 JIM ...Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01704320052-1 COMMITTEES: NEW JE JER AIMED SERVICES (rongra,s of the 1"113 MOW states Mouse of Represaaacmcs 9eshigqcon, B4:2091 March 21, 1985 Dear Colleague: The democratic opposition of Nicaragua has united and offered a very promising peace proposal to the Sandinistas -- a proposal to negotiate an end to the civil war and a transition to democracy. This proposal seeks to fulfill the original promise of the Sandinista revolution, a promise of pluralistic, democratic government which was made to the OAS in July 1979. The proposal is described in the Washington Post editorial printed below. Unfortunately, the Sandinista reaction has been hostile. Arturo Cruz, the former Sandinista ambassador to the US, tried to go to Nicaragua to discuss the peace proposal, but was barred from entering his country. The heads of opposition political parties inside Nicaragua were rounded up and told they could have no contact with Cruz and his associates. The Sandinistas claim that the CIA is behind this entire enterprise, and is seeking to have Cruz return to Nicaragua, have him murdered and have the murder blamed on the Sandinistas. Daniel Ortega's current peace offensive should be examined in light of his refusal to negotiate with the Nicaraguan Resistance. It is doubtful that the Sandinistas, who have already violated their promises to the OAS, will ever negotiate seriously in any international forum such as Contadora if they refuse to meet their own countrymen who offer a cease-fire and a negotiated transition to democracy. The Nicaraguan Resistance deserves our moral support. I have introduced a resolution, H. Con. Res. 81, which urges President Reagan to grant explicit political recognition to the Nicaraguan Resistance, and urges the President and all members of the OAS to support the Resistance's effort to engage the Sandinistas in meaningful negotiations. If you would like to join the 59 cosponsors of this resolution, or if you have questions, please contact Phil Peters of my office at 5-5801. M COURTER ember of Congress SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING E6 &m y. MAaca 17,1985 A Fair Offer to the Sandinistas THE SANDI)ISTAS claim the ais a in Nica- The Sandinistas' initial, response to the proposal ragua arises ft m their conflict with the was to bar Arturo Crus from returning to Niara- United States. This is not so. It arises in the gua to announce it and to summon some Of 45 local first iustamoe from their Conflict with their fellow supporters to state security headquarters on citizens especially with the democratic people who grounds that they were tma in a U.&- fought the Somoaa dictatorship, whose leaders sponsored plot to overthrow govern- 4 ved the Sandinistas in the early period and who meat. Think of it An offer by the opposition to put turned against the Sandinistas only when they down arms and to start talking about achieving the found the democratic promise of the revolution Sandinistas' own early promises is dianiseed as a being denied. This needs to be understood in order hostile conspiracy. to see the importance of the offer the democrats How do the Sandinistas intend to explain to the have Just made to the Managua regime. Nicaraguan people a rdsffial to enter a dialogue on The Offer comes from a newly, finally unified group such a reasonable bass? How can any other iodepen- g the political opposition led by Arturo Cruz dent-minded Latin country--must that a mi de Cuba? and major branches of the armed resistance. Its es- ---tail to support this proposal? In El Salvador, the sence is a proposal for a unilateral cease-fire by the government accepted a dialogue without even getting contras to be followed by a political dialogue presided a cease-fire in return. The government in Nicaragua over by the bishops, The proposal is, in our view, en- is being offered a better deal. Pesbaps it will think ti sly fair and reasonable. The Sandinistas protest the again before delivering a final rejection. war? Here is an offer to stop it. How must they pay? And-the inevitable question--if the rejL--bon is Only by joniing a prop s that points to the original final? No doubt some will argue that the Sand nis- goals of their own revolution. Their own man, Dan- tas' failure to take the offer seriously makes Amer- iel Ortega. can remain president as the process un- icon support of the contras unarguable. The draft- folds. The proposal offers more than a chance for era of the Nicaraguan opposition propos4 how- national reconaliatiom It lets Nicaraguans remove ever, are shying away from that cl um. Desperate- their fate from foreign hands and restore it to Nia- ly, they are making a 'last effort to grant to our raguan bands alone. country a civilized solution." Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Vol. 131 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 1985 No. 45 congressional Record NICARAGUAN ALLIES (Mr. COURTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, a West German linked to the Baader-Meinhof gang is a counterintelligence officer in the Nicaraguan Army. Another com- mands an artillery battalion. Five Ital- ians. all former Red Brigade leaders, serve as noncommissioned officers in the Nicaraguan Army. A Basque ETA terrorist awaits trial in Costa Rica on charges of attempting to assassinate Contra commander Eden Pastora. Both Spain and Italy have formally protested the sanctuary Nicaragua 'gives to several dozen European leftist militants. Before coming to power in 1979, San- dinistas trained and fought beside ex- perienced guerrillas in Central Amer- ica and the Middle East. Relations with Cuba and the PLO were especial- ly close. Today, "proletarian interna- tionalism" deems that the governors of Nicaragua make returns for services rendered. Th Swiss Review of World Affairs has called Nicaragua the PLO's "most important base on the Latin American mainland." Ties to Colonel Qadhafi are strong, as infusions of Libyan money and armaments have proven. The Sandinistas are linked to terror- ists in Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and other Latin countrie . Americans cannot afford not to notice. According to the FBI, fully two-thirds of the terrorist attacks in this country. in 1983 were linked to Latin America. Furthermore, compel- ling evidence links Sandinista officials to narcotics sales in U.S. black mar- kets. As debate about our Central Ameri- can policies continues, we should not forget the Nicaraguan hand in the international terror network. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1 Vol. 131 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 1985 No. 41 Zonrcsziona1 'Record EUROPEANS RALLY TO NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE HON. JIM COURTER OF NEW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, April 2, 1985 ? Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, as the original sponsor of House Concurrent Resolution 81, which calls upon both President Reagan and the Organiza- tion of American States to extend ex- plicit political recognition to the Nica- raguan resistance, I was gratified to see that distinguished Western Euro- peans are equally interested in doing more to hold the Sandinistas to the promises about democracy they so freely made in 1979. A partial list of these European statesmen, soldiers, and scholars has been assembled by Mr. Bill Outlaw for the Washington Times, and was print- ed by that newspaper on March 28, 1985. I commend it to those of my col- leagues who share my interest in ob- taining a just resolution of the Nicara- guan war. EUROPEANS RALLY TO NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE (By Bill Outlaw) A group of European intellectuals and politicians, including several leaders of the resistance to the Nazis during World War II, have signed a petition calling on Congress to provide aid for the anti-Sandinista resist- ance. The "problem of Central America.is also a European problem," they say. The, petition was published as an open letter to Congress in many European news- papers earlier, including the Paris daily Le Monde, Le Soir of Belguim, La Stamps of Italy and De Telegraph bf the Netherlands. A group of the signers, including Vladimir Boukovsky, the Soviet dissident who lives now in France, will come to the United States Tuesday to present personal pleas for aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. "The freedom of the Nicaraguans is also your freedom, as it is ours." the petition as- serts. "It you fail Nicaragua, we must ask, where will you fall text? If freedom and do- mocracy are not worth defending in your own hemisphere, where are they vyorth de- fending? The free world awaits your answer. Its enemies are waiting too." Among the signers are Winston Churchill, a member of the British Parliament and grandson of the World War II prime minis- ter; Lord Chalfont, a former British foreign minister; playwright Eugene Ionesco; French author Jean-Francois Revel; former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, and Robert Conquest, the British historian. The visiting delegation of about 12 has re- quested a meeting with the president during next week's visit, said a Reagan adminstra- tion official. lie t',. Waite House was pi-ascd with the support and the prestige of those sign- ing the petition was impressive. The petition and the pending U.S. visit are the latest in what has become an in- tense lobbying effort in a battle between the Reagan administration and those op- posed to a proposed $14 million appropria- tion for Nicaraguan resistance. Last month, a delegation of lawmakers from several European countries visited the U.S. to lobby against funding Nicaraguan resistance. That delegation met with mem- bers of Congress and registered objections to the Reagan administration policy in Cen- tral America at meetings in the State De- partment. The petition argues that the aid is neces- sary because the Sandinista junta is a totali- tarian regime which since its inception has "declared its aim to be the incorporation of Central America into a single Marxist-Len- inist entity." The petition also contends the resumption of the aid is "necessary morally" because Western countries must be "forthright in support for those who are struggling to gain the rights which your own Declaration of Independence declares are inalienable and, therefore, possessed by, all men." The petitioners describe Central America as Europe's "Fifth Frontier." To deny aid to those who seek freedom in Central America, they argue, "is to deny the meaning of your own country." It says the United States would be placed in a difficult strategic position in dealing with the Soviet Union should the aid be suspended. The trip to the United States and the pub- lished statements in connection with the pe- tition are sponsored by Resistance Interna- tional, a Paris-based human rights, anti- communist organization. Others who signed the petition include former North Atlantic Treaty Organization Gen. Robert Close; Cuban poet Armando Valladares; Marie Madeleine Fourcade, chairman of the Action Committee of the French Resistance during World War II, and former French Prime Minister Jacques Chabin Delmas. Also, Italian publisher Massimo Pini; Mar- celle Lentz Cornette, of Luxembourg, a member of the European Parliament; Simon Wiesenthal, of Austria,. president of the Documentation Center on Jews persecuted by the Nazi regime, writer Leif Hovelsen, a Norwegian Resistance Fighter during World War II, and Joseph Luns, former secretary general of NATO.* I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704320052-1