LIBYAN-CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THIRD WORLD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 16, 2010
Sequence Number: 
23
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 19, 1985
Content Type: 
MEMO
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Iq Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Several years ago, some mem- bers of the Lebanese govern- ment of more-or-less President Amin Gemayel esti- THE WASHINGTON TIMES 19 August 1985 mated the value of the shells and of savage fighting there at to mu- lion. That kind of extraordinary outlay of money and weaponry - a devel- opment privately remarked upon with a kind of awe among analysts from Western Europe to the Middle East - is leading to some startling new speculation on what Lebanon really is all about. Some of them are saying that, far from being an accidental or out-of- control war, Lebanon, on many lev- els, is a deliberate and . planned chaos. As one analyst intimately con- nected with the war put it to me: "The story not told is that this is an international war. It is the Span- ish Civil War of our times. At stake area number of things, from the fate of the Palestinians to whether the Soviets take over the whole area. "One key area the Soviets did not control was Lebanon. Now, there is Georgie Anne Geyer is a nation- ally syndicated columnist. The Lebanon war most definitely is being used and molded from outside, in particular by the Soviets. Soviet control - but negatively Ile paused for emphasis. "This is Viet- nam II," he added. What is important to watch in Lebanon is the sheer a"11011111 oI weaponry and money for weaponry This tells both the anry and at the same time why ih,- ;or\ is so dan gerous that none "I !hese anal~,t: Canted to he tluute Basically. the'.: e: t nl ent l,ebarn Cate balance between factions, could have fallen apart into warring clans and sectors But. without the little- reported and unprecedented inter- national supply of arms, it would never have reached the stage of sav- agery that goes on day after day even now. - There are missiles launched from trucks. and they are shot off at the rate of 36 every half-minute. For the most common ,,un. the' 152mm, every shell costs S1,000. Private armies have D-72 tanks, which the Soviets i.nve to some Warsaw Pact countries: and some Palestinian groups have helicopters. The enormous preponderance of comes across the Black Sea fr en Soviet 'Union through the lane at such ports as l.atakia. Some come iu ! . i !and :across Syria, again .....: ,:..~ ? ..:.,r's:nos. by the Foreign and Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Commonwealth Office in London say that Syria, the Soviets' main foothold in the Arab World,` heads. the list of Soviet-arms recipients for the :last five years. In 1983 alone,'supplies to it were worth about $1.7 billion. One. curiosity also little known is that the -Soviets obtained about .20 percent of their hard currency earn- ings, . again in 1983 alone, from repayments of principle and interest on arms sales in these countries., So while the attention of the lead- ers of the world's traditionally organized countries (the United States and Western Europe) is focused on the "big" issues of nuclear arms and their control, it is telling that virtually no one is watching the supposedly "periph- eral" area of Lebanon. I called the prestigious Interna- tional Institute of Strategic Studies in London and asked whether they had any information on the amounts of arms going into Lebanon. 'In a word, no:' a military spokesman told me. "We watch the big stuff:' Then he asked the key question: "How do you cover stuff from the Syrians to their proteges? From Iran to the Hezbollah? Tb Christians from Cyprus? Knowledgeable sources can't, because the data is too scarce:' Because. the entire Lebanon war is 'orchestraated in such an "irreg-. ular" manner, the constituted authority of the world .cannot get a grip on it. And,. ndeed,'that is pre- .. -cisely why it is orchestrated in such a way. One caveat: it would be far too much to say that the entire Lebanon war, which now has gone on for 10 horrifying years, was planned from afar - from Moscow or Damascus. There are too many fissiparous protagonists in Lebanon. But what begins to become clear when you separate some of the strands of the Lebanon war is that it most definitely is being used and i molded from outside, in particular by the Soviets, through their maca- bre arms input and the control that gives them. The useful chaos of the moment! can, then, in their eyes, lead to a quite different future, as yet unforeseen, one in which the Soviet Union plays a major role. The analysts also say, for instance, that the little-known Lebanese Communist Party increasingly is inserting itself into important posts. The Spanish Civil War of our time? When one thinks about it, it: doesn't seem as unlikely as it might sound at first. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Iq Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 13 AUG 1985 KMe for: DD I ks j Attached is 0GI'? re4ponse to the DCI's tasking to identify areas of competition between Cuba and Libya in the Third World. It reflects extensive input' from NESA and ALA and was coordinated with the DO. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Libyan-Cuban Competition for Influence in the Third World A Background Paper for the DCI In recent years Cuba and Libya have assisted groups or governments in some 43 Third World countries. For the most part Cuban and Libyan activities are mutually supportive, and Havana on occasion has even encouraged Third World governments and political groups to seek out Libyan assistance. (S NF) In Latin America, however, recent reports indicate Cuba is concerned that Libyan advocacy of militant tactics will disrupt its post-Grenada strategy of counseling moderation among regional leftists. While Cuba and Libya continue to provide complementary support to opposition groups in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, as well as to the Sandinista regime, friction has surfaced in the Caribbean. (S NF) Although Cuba in the past welcomed additional sources of financial support, there are indications that Havana has recently come to view Libyan activism in the Caribbean as meddling in its own backyard. Havana probably fears that violent anti-US activi- ty in the region could be seen in Washington as Cuban-inspired, thus prompting a strong US response. Cuban annoyance with and opposition to Libyan activities has already been reported in a number of countries Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 ;ECRET NOFORN We believe there is potential for Cuban-Libyan competition or conflict in Latin American countries: In Africa, Libyan and Cuban activities mostly complement each other. Both countries, for example, are strong backers of the Ethiopian government and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. (S NF) While there is little evidence that either side views the other as a direct competitor in the region, we believe the potential for competition exists in some countries: o In Ethiopia, while Addis Ababa is confident of its longstanding Cuban military and economic assistance, it believes Libya may renew its support for Eritrean separatists. o In Sudan, Tripoli is attempting to establish a state-to- state military assistance relationship o While Cuba has made repeated attempts to establish better relations, including an economic assistance program with the Zairian government, Libya has been reported to be increasing support to insurgent groups. (S NF) Appendix A is a listing of the Third World countries where Libya and Cuba have since 1982 promised or provided Official Military Assistance, Official Economic Assistance (including scholarships to students), or engaged in Political Penetration activities (the promise or provision of arms, money or other forms of support to political groups, political arties, dissi- dents, or insurgents in that country). Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 S ~I.KG l ~ L) UKiv Cuba-Libya: Summary of Third World Aid Activities, 1983-Present* Official official Political official official Political Military Economic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra- Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion LATIN AMERICA ANTIGUA X X ARGENTINA X BAHAMAS X x BARBADOS X BELIZE X BOLIVIA X X BRAZIL X CHILE X X COLOMBIA X x COST, RICA x x DOMINICA X X DOMINICAN REPUBLIC X X ECUADOR X X EL SALVADOR X x FRENCH GUIANA X X GRENADA X X GUADELOUPE X X GUATEMALA X x GUYANA X X X X X HAITI X HONDURAS X JAMAICA X MARTINIQUE X X MEXICO X X NETH. ANTILLES X X NICARAGUA X X X X X X PANAMA X X Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 ' ECRET NOFORN Official Official Political. Official Official Political Military Economic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra- Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion PERU PUERTO RICO X ST. LUCIA X ST. VINCENT X.. SURINAME X X X x x TRINIDAD & TOBAGO X URUGUAY X VENEZUELA X NORTH AFRICA ALGERIA MAURITANIA MOROCCO TUNISIA WESTERN SAHARA SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ANGOLA X X BENIN X X X X BOTSWANA X BURKINA X X X BURUNDI X X X CAMERON X CAPE VERDE X x C.A.R. CHAD CONGO X X x EQUATORIAL GUINEA X X ETHIOPIA X X X X GHANA X X X X X GUINEA X X GUINEA-BISSAU X x x Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Official Official Political. Official official Political Military Econanic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra- Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion KENYA LESOTHO MADAGASCAR MALAWI MALI MAURITIUS MOZAMBIQUE X NAMIBIA NIGER NIGERIA RWANDA SAO TOME PRINCIPE X SEYCHELLES X SIERRA LEONE X SOMALIA SCIJTH AFRICA SUDAN TANZANIA X UGANDA ZAIRE ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE EAST ASIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES THAILAND X X x X x X x x x 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 CYPRUS IRAQ JORDAN LEBANON OMAN NORTH YEMEN SOUTH YEMEN SYRIA TURKEY U.A.E. SOUTH ASIA AFGHANISTAN BANGLADESH NEPAL PAKISTAN Official Official Political. Military Econanic Penetra- Assistance Assistance tion Official official Political Military Econanic Prnetra- Assistance Assistance tion *Excludes countries in which Cuban and/or Libyan involvement is minimal. 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1 Iq Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/16: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1