COUNTERPOINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: August 15, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECR" 4RIAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
t
I
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
C/PPS/DO
x
17
D/SOVA
X
18
19
20
21
22
xec ive Secretory
6 Aug 85
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340036-7
15 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PPS/DO
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: Counterpoint
This is good stuff. Send me a copy
of Volume 1, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 without the
holes punched in it. Also, Bob Gates and
the people following disinformation somehow
ought to get a subscription to it.
William J. Casey
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340036-7
COUNTERPOINT
A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures
As each new leader ascends to the post
of General Secretary of the CPSU, the
Soviet agitprop workers create an image for
him and 'sell' it to the West. Because of
the secrecy that surrounds the private and
public lives of the Soviet leadership, the
West eagerly consumes what little know
ledge is made available. Ever hopeful that
one day communism will assume a human
face, the West time and again 'buys' the
image and ignores the reality.
There was kindly Papa Lenin, forceful
Uncle Joe, the folksy Khrushchev, the
peace-loving Brezhnev and the westernized
Andropov. Now we are given Mikhail
Gorbachev a man who is more like us,
an intellectual reformer and a pragmatist
.,'1 whom the West can deal effectively.
r Gorbachev, his press clippings note,
lawyer and the best educated Soviet
leader since Lenin. As Stalin liquidated
anyone of his generation who was brighter
than he was, this is not too surprising.
Mr Gorbachev, although trained as a
lawyer, never practised law but devoted
himself to party work instead. As a Soviet
lawyer's job is to see that the formalities
of Soviet law are maintained, being a
lawyer does not necessarily mean that
Gorbachev is either a well-educated intel-
lectual or a champion of justice.
Mr Gorbachev's reputation as a
reformer' was earned by his efforts to
improve Soviet agricultural performance.
He served as the CPSU's Secretary for Agri-
culture, a no-win/no-lose position: no-win
because Soviet agriculture is hopelessly
mismanaged by the Party and no-lose
because it is impossible to do a worse job
than your predecessor. In the Soviet
Union reform takes place within the
system and does not entail any change of
the system itself. Gorbachev's 'reforms'
were little more than tinkering with an
already discredited system of management.
There is no reason to believe that he con-
templates any significant change in his
country's economic or governmental
structures.
There is also no reason to see Gorbachev
as a reformer of foreign policy. Although
as a specialist on agriculture he has not
focused to any great extent on inter-
national relations, Gorbachev has sup-
ported the Party line on foreign affairs
and has not given any indication that he
disagrees with it in any way. He has
praised the Vietnamese invasion of Laos
and Kampuchea, attacked the West for its
psychological warfare' against the Eastern
Bloc, and defended the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. His few statements on
foreign policy hardly support the image of
Gorbachev as a young liberal intent on a
less belligerent approach to the West.
Mr Gorbachev has been labelled a
pragmatist, it seems, because he does not
use Marxist-Leninist slogans in his conver-
sations with Western leaders and reporters.
No doubt, he will also refrain from using
his shoe a la Khrushchev to make a poli-
tical statement. But perhaps a far more
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COUNTERPOINT
A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures
SERVICE A of the FIRST CHIEF
DIRECTORATE of the KGB
The term Active Measures is explained
in the introductory letter to the first
number of COUNTERPOINT. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between the two
distinct categories of such Soviet measures,
i.e. between
a) Overt Active Measures, and
b) Covert Active Measures.
The responsibility for the planning and
directing of covert Active Measures lies
with Service A of the First Chief Direc-
torate of the KGB. Service A closely
cooperates with the International Depart-
ment/International Information Depart-
ment of the CPSU via the Secretariat of the
" "Iburo, where all important measures
(eared and where specific executive
-'risibility is allocated.
Service A directs and supports opera-
tions carried out overseas by the so-called
PR Lines of the KGB Residencies overseas.
Service A has been allocated more and
more staff since the late 70s and early 80s
and now constitutes a large section of the
First Chief Directorate (FCD), employing
some 200 officers and supporting staff,
including keen young intellectual officers
who see in this work a chance of rapid
recognition and promotion. It is the one
field where the Kremlin (the lnstantsyia)
can see real results.
The current head of the Service is
Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, a former KGB
operator under TASS cover in Vienna. He
has several area and functional Deputies.
The Service now occupies more than half
of the third floor of the FCD building at
Yasenevo near Moscow.
I echmyues regularly employed by the
minions of Service A overseas include:
covert manipulation of the media of
foreign countries both capitalist and
'Socialist':
the widespread use of so-called 'Agents of
Influence' in all walks of the target
country's life,
the selective use of forged documents
and of faked photo-montages and tapes:
the systematic spreading of rumours and
of material calculated to cause doubts and
uncertainty.
the systematic harassment of target indivi-
duals, institutions and ~,rganizatiuns
the transmission of false intelligence
through 'donhie agents' to other hostile
intelligence services.
The larger part of the evidence of these
activities has recently come from the
Third World where Soviets find that they
can ''still get away with it". A
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COUNTERPOINT
A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures
The World Youth Festival, scheduled to
take place in late July in Moscow, is of
great importance for the Soviet Politburo.
Soviet specialists on Active Measures will
make a major effort to manipulate the
activities of hundreds of young people
from the free world countries who will be
present at the Festival for the dramatic
enhancement of anti-US and anti-NATO
propaganda in all continents.
From our many years of experience as
members of Soviet intelligence organs, we
can confidently predict what much of the
planning of Soviet intelligence and counter-
intelligence (KGB) will entail.
Lists of the most active Soviet dissidents
are compiled. During the Festival, all of
-n will be detained, either locked up in
r under house arrest.
.GB technicians are thoroughly
checking the audio bugs installed in all the
hotel rooms where the foreign delegates
will stay. Bugs are also installed at every
table in restaurants which will be used to
feed the foreign crowd. At this moment
the KGB is working together with the
Soviet Youth Organisations Committee
(one of the International Department's
fronts) to finalize plans and draw up charts
as to where each delegation will stay.
This is to allow the KGB time to install
the most sophisticated bugging devices in
the rooms of delegates from the USA,
Great Britain, France, and certain other
Western countries - regardless of whether
the delegates are pro-Soviet or not. The
JUNE 1985
KGB does not trust its own citizens and
never trusts foreigners.
The KGB is arranging seminars for the
guides and interpreters, the majority of
whom are witting or unwitting KGB
informers, to coordinate their reporting to
the KGB case officers on every foreign
delegate. Young KGB officers are being
assigned to each busload of delegates so
that they will be able to react immediately
to any unexpected situations.
The KGB's First Chief Directorate (the
external intelligence service) has already
sent top secret coded cables to every KGB
residency abroad. The cable requires each
residency to obtain, through agents in
political circles and through semi-overt
contacts, information on the political
standpoint of the delegation to the Festi-
val. If criticism is intended of the Soviet
Union's external policy, such as the
invasion of Afghanistan, or its domestic
policy, such as the persecution of dis-
sidents, the residency must make every
effort to get the position revised in a way
favourable to the Soviet cause. The resi-
dency has to submit its proposals regarding
young academicians, politicians, and busi-
nessmen who are already KGB agents.
These individuals should be included in the
member lists of delegations, or be invited
as guests of the Festival, to use their visit
to the Moscow Festival as cover for special
training in techniques of espionage.
The huge division of the KGB's First
Chief Directorate that is responsible for
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