LETTER TO MALCOLM WALLOP FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340066-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: August 5, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
5 August 1985
The Honorable Malcolm Wallop
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Malcolm,
I cannot permit The Wall Street Journal's excerpts in your April 19 speech
at the Fletcher School and your comments quoted in yesterday's Post to go without
response.
SECRET
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340066-4
Sincerely,
William J. Casey
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ARTICLE APPEARFF! 23 July 196J
ON PAGE 3.
State Dept. and CIA `Indulge Their Emptiness'
The following is excerpted from an
April 19 speech by Sen. Malcolm Wallop
(R., Wyo.) at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
The absence of intellectual and moral
principles allows tastes and personal con=
siderations to drive American officials into
doing some awful things. Today they want
to give military aid to the communist gov-
ernment of Mozambique to crush a demq-
cratic resistance. Today these officials'aid
Afghanistan's mujahedeen against the So-
viets with the same conviction with which
they aided the Kurds against Iraq. T? y
some of the highest officials in the CIA rie-
joice that they are finally rid of the burden
of supplying-ar= 15?
Indeed, for several. years they have been
discussing with lawmakers who share their
tastes at what point they should be
"dumped.". It is no passion for the Sandin-
istas at 21A or State, just a dull desire to
~'o the arduous . of confronting
them, and to return to routine. Their "rep-
utation." mean g eir ease, represents a
higher scale of values than their mission.'
No wonder that such officials are 'un-
comfortable discussing right and wrong,
better and. worse as though these terms
mean something objectively. Thus last
cause, responsible officials said. gff-cu
not -want to be party to a debate about
which side in that civil war is inherently
preferable! So mfach for the words of
Christ so. proudly carved on e s
building: "You shall know a truth, and
the truth shall make you free. The biogra-
phies of the contras finally compiled. I put
them into- the Congressional -Record. This,
year a, few dedicated foreign-service offs-'
cers expanded the set. But the State De-
partment's Bureau of Public Affairs
blocked their publication, until pressure
from the White House allowed it to pro-
ceed.
There is no reason for surprise here. If
the contras are indeed "our brothers," as
President Reagan said, if their cause is ob-
jectively better than that of their foes, then
the duty. we have In their regard is both
clear and strict. After all is said and done,
we simply cannot allow them to be crushed
and the worse 'side to triumph. At last,
then if this be? so, there is an objective
standard against which the CIA's and e
State 'Department's Eaformance can be
judged, That standard makes impossible
accommodation with the Sandinistas. But
that standard is inconvenient because liv-
ing by it displeases friends of so many high
officials.
F* that reason, such officials describe
the world as too complex to be painted
black and white.:?'Within a standardless
spectrum of gray;. they can-indulge their
emptiness. Another manifestation of this
emptiness is the ability of so many high of-
ficials to- give good. causes their due in
speech, but to betray them in action. Sec-
retary of State George Shultz is as good an
example as any of one who rejects the
Brezhnev doctrine with eloquent words but
has never been known to'oppose it with
any concrete actions. Such officials have
learned from Helmut Sonnenfelt's experi-
ence in 1976 that when their words reflect
their de facto preference for accommoda-
tion with totalitarians, the American politi-
cal system will produce a Ronald Reagan
who will discredit them before the Ameri-
can people, and make it impossible for
them to hold public office.
So they talk brave talk, formulate half-
baked plans, and present them to the Con-
gress in ways that subtly signal that they
would not be so upset if the Congress dis-
approved. Thus they project upon the Con-
gress and on the American people their
own confusion and lethargy. Thus do they
bring out the worst in the Congress. Re-
grettably, that is easy to do.
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