SANDINISTA MILITARY ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001904430080-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: April 4, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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Executive Registry I
86- 1449
4 April 1986
Sandinista Military Actions and Intentions
Summary: Managua's 22/23 March 1986 incursion into Honduras cost it
heavy casualties and bad publicity, but it served a longstanding Sandinista
stategy that the Sandinistas will continue to pursue despite the
consequences. The strategic goal of the Sandinistas is the absolute
destruction of the Democratic Resistance which, along with the Catholic
Church, represents the only true obstacle to the consolidation of
Marxism/Leninism in Nicaragua. They do not intend to be deterred from the
pursuit of this goal by such considerations as international publicity or
deliberations in the U.S. Congress. While Sandinista diplomacy has been
geared toward efforts to influence U.S. Congressional votes, such issues are
secondary to their strategic plan. This explains why Daniel Ortega travelled
to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the vote by the House of
Representatives against all aid to the Democratic Resistance, and why it
launched punitive attacks deep within Honduras shortly after the House voted
to reject military aid to the Resistance. It is not that the Sandinistas
wished to alienate Congress; rather, it was simply a matter of priorities.
This signifies that the Sandinistas will again cross the Honduran border in
strength to attack rebel Nicaraguan support bases. The following suggests
that another incursion could take place in the near term.
-- The Sandinistas continue to hold positions just inside Honduras at
Banco Grande, Par Par, Plis, and San Andres de Bocay. This, coupled
with the fact that Sandinista forces are being replaced and
reinforced, suggests that renewed efforts will be made to stage
another incursion, probably before the rainy season begins in the
next six weeks. In view of the fact that the incursions of 22/23
March were such a costly tactical venture for the Nicaraguan Army and
its Cuban advisors, it can be expected that the next assaults will be
more carefully prepared and better supported logistically, including
more artillery and possibly with air support. The Sandinistas are
also likely to use more personnel in the future incursions to avoid
the tactical defeat they suffered in the 22/23 March assault.
-- The Sandinistas continue to serve notice in their public statements
of a more belligerent posture on the border, contending that
Tegucigalpa has yielded sovereignty to the Democratic Resistance in
the area and that, essentially, it is now a no man's land. This
seems designed to prepare international opinion for additional, and
perhaps larger, Sandinista incursions into Honduran territory.
Background: Since early 1986 the Sandinistas have focused their military
activities primarily on disrupting UNO/FDN infiltration efforts while at the
same time attempting to prevent the resupply of insurgent units operating deep
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inside Nicaragua.
-- On 4 January the Sandinistas began shelling points near Banco Grande
and P l i s .
-- An estimated 800 - 1,000 Nicaraguan troops occupied the area of
Bolinkey on 7 January after several days of shelling.
-- In mid-February elements of several Sandinista infantry battalions
attacked Banco Grande and Par Par.
-- On 7 March elements of at least two BLI's attacked San Andres de
Bocay. This was followed on 10 March by an attack near Bolinkey.
-- The most recent actions by the Sandinistas occurred on the weekend of
22/23 March and involved the largest and deepest penetration of
Honduran territory by the Nicaraguans. In all, an estimated troop
strength in excess of 2,000 men attacked positions stretching from
the Las Vegas Salient to San Andres de Bocay.
-- The Sandinistas began moving into attack positions in early March.
By 21 March an estimated 1,200 troops had moved into an assembly area
inside the Las Vegas Salient.
Early on 22 March the Nicaraguans launched a three-pronged attack
across the Honduran border to hit strategic objectives. Another
Nicaraguan force of perhaps 700 entered the salient simultaneously
from the southeast and west, and at about the same time some 500
troops occupied an airstrip at San Andres de Bocay. After three days
of heavy fighting, the Sandinistas retreated in some disorganization
toward the border.
-- It also appears that the Sandinistas were preparing for additional
actions in the western portion of the salient.
-- Nonetheless, the Nicaraguans did conduct a series of border-area
attacks against UNO/KISAN forces in the northeast between 25 and
27 March. Using mostly aircraft and artillery fire, the Sandinistas
have caused an exodus--which could reach 5,000--of Miskito refugees
into Honduras.
Conclusion: It is anticipated that--short of a stronger Honduran
military and diplomatic response to the Sandinista pressures--the only
effective deterrent to the continuation of this strategic policy of border
violations is a strong UNO/FDN. When the Democratic Resistance becomes active
enough inside Nicaragua and operates in strength behind Sandinista lines and
with a dependable system of resupply, Managua will be forced to disperse its
troop concentration on the border to meet the threat in central Nicaragua.
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