AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES CAN THEY DO THE JOB?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Whose mar vs its nobody ~~ns up
Nicaragua's U.S. prisoner talks
a lot, knows.less. As the debate
goes on, it becomes moot: Aid
to the contras again is legal
Managua
O Eugene Hasenfus, on' trial for sup-
plying arms to U.S.-backed contra reb-
els, is not a heroically silent soldier of
fortune. "Look, fellows, this ain't my
ward", he insisted to Sandinista captors
after: ~lris plane was shot down inside
Nicaragua. Actually, the hapless mer-
cenary had the job of kicking supplies
out the rear of the plane. As a minor
player, he tried but was hardly able to
answer the larger question, "Then
whose war is it?"
For days after his capture-and possi-
bly in response to pressure-Hasenfus
detailed one allegation after another im-
plicating the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, Vice President George Bush and the
governments of-El Salvador,
Costa Rica and Honduras in a
shadowy arms-supply opera-
tion that Congress intended to
outlaw in 1984. Documents
from the downed plane and
leaks to journalists have only
sharpened questions on the role
of senior U.S. oflicials. One
suggestion is that some may
have gone beyond well-known
support for legal U.S. "humani-
tarian" aid and for privately
funded arms shipments to fa-
cilitate the flow of arms until Congress
resumed military aid to the contras.
The administration's response: No
wav. "It might not smell very nice," said
one senior aide, "but I'm sure it will all
~?~~ o?t rn tic lc,..,t ?
.. o_..
By the time the trial was under way,
the point was moot. President Reagan
on October 24 signed an ocder provid-
ing 5100 million in aid approved by
Congress, S70 million of it military aid
that could include use of U.S. advisers
to ti'aih the cotrtras.
"1'm gu[Ity of everything ..;:'
Hasenfus, 45, whose family lives in
Marinette, Wis., faces up to 30 years'
imprisonment if convicted by a People's
Anti-Somocista Tribunal of terrorism,
illicit association and disrupting public
security. He pleaded innocent to the.
charges on October 23 after earlier tell-
ing interviewers, "I'm guilty of every-
thingthey've charged." Sandinistas told
U.S.News & t:{'orld Report that once his
case ended Hasenfus could be returned
to the U.S. "within a few months."
As t}re trial plays out, what is cmcrg-
The captured mercenary at trial
staged by President Ortega, left.
The American's claims, and leaks
In Washington, spotlight a shad-
owy supply chain that supporters
would rather see overlooked
ing arc only allegations-no proof-of
indirect White House assistance that
enabled both humanitarian assistance
and weapons to reach the contras. After
seeing classified reports, Senator Pat-
..ct: Lc::r, (D-Vt.;, vice chairman of
tl~e Senate intelligence panel, said he'
had "substantial questions" about the
"indirect" involvement of U.S. officials.
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee investigators were
gathering evidence for review in
January. A General Accounting
Office investigation, USN& WR
learned, found some past hu-
manitarianaid had been convert-
ed to buy military equipment.
Congress in 1984 forbade use of
U.S. funds to support "directly
or indirectly military or paramil-
itary operations in Nicaragua by
any nation, group, organization,
movement or individual."
Mum's the word
Whatever the extent ofadmin-
istration assistance behind the
scenes, the White House clearly
meant to keep its role quiet. One
participant in White House
meetings said officials avoided a
"paper trail" and never men-
tioned lethal aid. Assistance ap-
parently reached the contras
through private groups, includ-
ing the World Anti-Communist
League, the Alabama-based Ci-
vilian Military Assistance group
and the Florida-based Air Com-
mandos Association. All have
denied participating in arms
shipments.
Financing is similarly hard to
trace. One apparent source: Sau-
di Arabia, as a gesture of grati-
tude for the U.S. sale of AWACS
reconnaissance planes in 1981.
Beyond stirring controversy
in the U.S., Hasenfus's allegations com-
plicated U.S. relations with El Salvador
and Honduras. Both nations have pub-
licly denied aiding the coartras while
privately backing the U.S. effort. Salva-
dc~~n nresidcr;t J^sc ?r' ,,cte~r rJ~~~rtc
suffered special embarrassment, deny-
ing that a Salvadoran base was used to
supply t}re contras only to Icarn his own
military had lied about its involvement.
While governments bob and weave,
the explosion of a land mine in Nicara-
gua refocused attention on the mount-
ing costs of civil war. Six civilians died,
and 30 were wounded. Residents near
the blast blamed the contras. Curiously,
the incident failed to increase Sandinis-
ta anger at the man first labeled the
"Rambo Hasenfus."
"There is =no demand (or blood
here," says Alejandro Bendana, a top
official in the Foreign Ministry.
"You've got to pity the guy." ^
by Stewart Powell, with Carta Anne RoSb~ns
m Managua ark Steven Emorson and
Dervrs MUI~n m Wastrngton
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 1986
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CAN THEY DO THE JOB?
^ Iran, 1980: A hastily assembled U.S.
task force attempts to rescue American
hostages held in Iran. The affair ends in .
failure and death at Desert One.
Beirut, 1983: Nearly 250 U.S.' ser-
vicemen die when a fanatic drives a
bomb-loaded truck into a Marine bar- - _
racks. In the aftermath, questions are
raised about security-and whether the ;?
regular military ignored warnings from
Malta, 1985: Three transport planes
break down, preventing a Delta Force
team from arriving on the scene during
the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner.
The list is a military critic's dream-
and aPentagon planner's nightmare. In
an age when nuclear war seems un-
thinkable and major conventional war-
fare only marginally less so, the most
immediate military threat facing the.
U.S. may not be arms control but rath-
er "low-intensity conflict"-Pentagon
jargon covering everything from terror-
ist acts and hostage takings to counter-
insurgency. "Low-intensity conflict is
the prime challenge we will face, at
least through the remainder of this cen-
tury," insists Secretary of State George
.Shultz. "The future of peace and free-
dom may well depend on how effective-
ly we.meet it."
So .far, the omens are not good-at
least according to a growing list of crit-
ics. At the center of the controversy are
America's Special Operations Forces
(SOF), the elite units such as Delta
Force, the Navy.SEALS and the Army
Rangers, whose mission is to counter
today's unconventional military threats.
Fe~v challenge their dedication to duty
or the quality of their training. Even so,
says Senator William Cohen (R-Me.),
$pectal F'OfCCS Ltalninonr, How. a, r98s
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into a terrorist stronghold to rescue hostages
pines, Somalia and fa S.rl~:r~iru-also
have trained at the JF}; C~nt~r.
? Task Force 160. }~ ncr~~n as the
Night Stalkers, member, ~,( th,s secret
Arrny aviation unit at i ~~rt C.unpbcll,
fey., are charged ~~~ith g~ttin:~ the llelta
Force, Rangers and ~fCen 13~rets into
action. They pilot I3lack Ha~~ i.. I iughes
SOOMD, Chinook and rul,~r hclicop-
ters, many of them ouUinr~i kith infra-
red night-vision cyuipm~nt-
The unit's record h.,. hc?~n t;rinted in
the past four years b}~ a ~~ne~ ' < `:.;''-'
"Stealth parachutes'; can be steered for;
up to 25 miles from the~ump`point:7he
ParaPlane, a three-+vheeled cart powered
by a pair of small engines, i;arries~a ,;
parachute inflated by propellers that sari '
thrust the craft as high as x.0,000 feel ;_? ,.
.- The MC-,130E Comt~t?alon transport :.
plane can slip into enemyyy`~erritory at 9 '? '
200-foot altitude to rescue people on the
ground or at sea by snatching thein~:'
aboard in a speaal harness attached ~to a ',
line held aloft by helium balloons.~;;%i';
A a30 million tilt~otor aircraft being "~" "
developed-called the Osprey-takes off
hke a helicopter and tries like a plane, ,
icauuuy Sl:rccu~ Gi -w~ n~Nu. luyn` .
powered minisubmafines knbwn as Swim-
mer Delivery Vehicles (SDV's) can be
launched from ships or submarines for
recannaissance missions, clandestine: ,'
coastal landings a to fire specially de-
signed torpedoes at enemy ships. New'
Saba gear used by Navy SEAIS leaves no
~.~;teUtale bubble~,trttfie rrater~1~'.?ytx '~
By tar the most unlikely of the offbeat
weapons are the dolphins, seals, sea lions
and whales Vained by the Navy to detect
mines, recover torpedoes and attach ca- ,
Wes. In one test conducted this year, some
sea lions retrieved antisubmarine rockets `
in water as deep as 750 feet.'Could sea
beasts be used to attach explosives to ~ -
enemy ships? "No comment," said a Navy
official. ,:~
by'Ste-ven F_rnerson
.,?, .
_, ~ : E ~':., F. ~'. . , .. ~ N 6
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U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 1986
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Blac
s~~e sgr4~
r~nvnc"crlTfl S
~2.rid~ig~fGisioj
;also"~r0'~
~....~~
their mission. Says one senior Special
Forces officer who recently retired,
"We've had the best-trained soldiers
for 30 years, but somehow the generals
and admirals pretend we don't exist."
Pentagon brass deny that accusation
and say they're working to streamline
the Special Forces and expand their role
while keeping them in the regular chain
of command. Yct Adm. William Crowe,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see
interview on page 47), admits that defin-
ing the role of the SOF is like the-fable
about blind men groping around an ele-
phant-"whatever part you feel, that's
what it's all about." He told a congres-
sional hearing: "We're still learning a
great deal about Special Operations
Forces. This is a sort of new item for us."
Both sides in the dispute acknowl-
edge alongstanding antipathy toward
the SOF by the traditional services.
One top Army officer ascribes the hos-
tility to a lingering image of the SOF's
"Rambo mentality-the sun shades, the
Rolex watches." He recalls: "In Viet-
nam, some of these guys were living in
lush camps in the mountains with TV,
hot and cold running water and chop-
pers delivering beer and steak. The rest
of file Army became quite angry and
decided to get rid of them when they
got the chance. They got the chance
after Vietnam."
In a move that some suspect reflected
fire regular services' disdain for unortho-
dox units, file Army in late 1983
launched a ma$sive investigation into
how hundreds of millions ofdollars were
spent by intelligence units created in the
wake of the failed Iran rescue mission. A
hvo-year Justice Department probepro-
duced just one conviction for improper
use of a 5796 airline ticket.
Among several ~`biack" or c~andes-
tine military ~pcratinns cut hack was
one called Seaspray. Controlled by the
Army but working with the CIA, this
55-man unit used aircraft to eavesdrop
on radio messages between guerrillas in
EI Salvador and Sandinista troops in
Nicaragua. After the finances probe,
Seaspray was reduced in size and sev-
ered from the CIA.
Said one retired general: "The Army
used the allegations of financial irregu-
larities as a means of dismantling spe-
cial operations." But Lt. Col. John My-
ers, spokesman for the Military District
of \Vashingtorr, replied: "When the
Army is made aware of misconduct,
the Army is required by law to take
appropriate action and Ict the chips fall
where they may."
Some SOF personnel complain of bar-
riers to promotion. "Special operations
are not career enhancing." says a senior
SOF ofTiccr. "If you stay in more than
two tours, you go nowhere." Admiral
Crowe replies: "Where Special Forces
officers have performed well; their pro-
motion rate has been equal to and in
most cases higher than their counter-
parts in conventional forces." Other-
Pentagon officials, meanwhile, say
many SOF officers slow their advance-
ment by refusing to leave their units.
Soldiers trained for swift action re-
port finding themselves slogging
through paper work. "I love this mis-
sion," said a master sergeant who is
quitting after nine years in the SOF.
"But I won't take it any more. I've
filled out my last meaningless form,
and I've painted my last dumpster."
Who's in charge here?
Compounding the problem; say Spe-
cial Forces officers, is that, until Con-
gress.acted, there has been a lack of a
unified SOF command. They note that
the successful foreign units have a
"stovepipe" command structure in
which orders come directly from the
defense ministers. In Britain, for exam-
ple, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
has personally participated in com-
mand-and-control exercises to keep
current on the capabilities of the SAS.
= Until the reorganization plan ap-
proved by Congress goes into effect, the
Delta Force and -SEAL Team 6 fall
under the Joint Special Operations
Command while the Rangers and
Green Berets are controlled by the
Army's First Special Operations Com-
mand. Though both commands are
based at Fort Bragg, they are in differ-
ent buildings and only rarely coordi-
nate planning or training.
"If the President calls and says, `Go
fix this problem,' you've got to be able
to pick up tiro phone anti call tiro unit
that will fir the pmblcm," says a re-
tired Army general. "You can't go
through three other organizations, be-
cause 93 people will know you've got
this mission. All of them will insist on a
briefing, and all will find a reason why
they have to be involved. Suddenly, the
entire Army is going to solve this prob-
lem that three PFC's in a pickup truck
were going to handle."
Writer Arthur Hadley noted in T/re
Straw Grant, his book on the American
military, that the hastily formed Iran
rescue team didn't even have common
radio frcquen~ies and wound up using
poorly maintained Navy helicopters
flown by inadequately briefed Marine
pilots.
Yet so ingrained in the American
psyche is the distrust of secret military
units that efforts to beef them up have
been met with alarm in some quarters.
Critics want that SOF troops operating
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as advisers abroad, either fighting or
aiding insurgents, might drag the U.S.
into another Vietnam War.
The SOF's proponents argue that the
massive military establishment tends to
ignore the small units in favor of con-
centrating on the big picture-how to
deter nuclear conflict or turn away
massed Soviet tanks on the plains of
Europe. Total outlays for the SOF add
up to only 1 percent of Defense Depart-
ment spending. "An institution that
consumes billions does not want to
hear about low-budget solutions to
some of their problems," says fornler
Pentagon official Noel Koch, who had
jurisdiction over the SOF.
One glaring flaw cited by partisans of
the elite units: Airlift capability for Spe-
cial Forces is 59th on the Military Airlift
Command's list of priorities. One study
shows the military's ability to airlift its
highly trained fighters today is no better
than it was in 1980, when aircraft fail-
Armed Services Readiness Subcommit-
tee said during debate over the reforms
that U.S. armed forces "for the last 40
years have concentrated on deterring
nuclear conflict and the `big war' on the
plains of Europe.... We are well pre-
pared for the least likely conflicts and
poorly prepared for the most likely."
Cash transfusion
Acutely aware of such misgivings, the
Reagan administration has quadrupled
SOF spending since 1981 to $1.6 billion.
Some $12 billion more will be sought to
reinvigorate the crack outfits over the
next five years. The. Air Force intends to
spend $3.3 billion._on special operations
over six years to replace aging helicop-
ters, increase the fleet of Combat Talon
transport planes to 35 from the current
14 and add 10 refueling planes.
The new reform package almost
surely will improve SOF clout in the
military and within the Reagan White
House. "Special Forces have come a
long way under this administration,"
says Deputy Under Secretary of the
Navy Seth Cropsey. "What cannot be
argued is that the U.S. needs a strong
special-operations capability today the
way an eagle needs its talons."
Many critics have not been im-
pressed. "Ten days late .and $100
short" is how one Senate aide described
the Pentagon's reforms prior to the re-
cent congressional legislation.
How long it will take to finish the
overhaul of America's Special Forces
ordered by Congress remains an open
question. But time is critical: If propo-
nents and skeptics of Special Forces
agree on anything, it's that "the new
battlefields-the tarmacs of troubled
airports, the random violence of terror-
ism, the continuing U.S.-Soviet con-
flicts by proxy everywhere from Cen-
tral America to Angola-will not turn
quiet anytime soon. ^
~y Robert A. Manning and
Steven Emerson
with Robert Kaylor
u, ~~ .,
Iran rescue fiasco. Would an SOF plan have saved American lives In Grenada?
Chairman Dan Daniel
(D-Va.) of the House
Nearly three years after
the U.S. invasion of Gre-
nada, new and troubling :~
details :about the -fight
for the Caribbean island :r
are still emerging. ~ :. ?
Special-,aOperations ~
Forces;onee were to play' t
the major ground role in
lti-
"
"
, a mu
Urgent Fury,
service operation hastily
1983, to neutralize Cuban troops and
rescue American medical students be-
1' ^d t0 b~ . da..,.... Fro.., .. r"di-
cal regime that had seized power. The
Marine Corps was assigned a support-
ive role. But U.S.News & T~'orld Report
has learned that, at the last minute, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff' gave the Marines
responsibility for taking the northern
half of the island..
Said Gen. E. C. Meyer, former Army
Chief of. Staff: "A lot of things ;went
wrong at Grenada because the Special
Forces plan was overlaid by the con-
ventional-forces plan." .. ,:
The Special Forces planned a 2 a.m.
landing. Under conventional ?com-
mand, the invasion was changed to
5:27 a.m..in the crioneous belief that
the Marine pilots were not trained to
land at night. "For years, the Rangers
have practiced to accomplish airfield
seizures at night, using our night-vision
devices to exploit enemy weaknesses,'.'
says a c]assified Pentagon report coin-
.,,..
What went wrong
nn rrnn~t~~7
u~~ u~~,~~ua.icx -
piled later. "Daylight attacks by the
Rangers give up this considerable ad-
vantage to-ihc enemy."
In the daybreak invasion, 19 U.S.
soldiers were killed, seven of them by
friendly fire and accidents.., ,
Poor communications in the invasion
were "the~single most glaring deficiency
of the entire operation," defense offi-
cials told aclosed-door House hearing
this year. Because of incompatible
equipment and technology, there .was
virtually no contact between Rangers
and Army airborne troops on the island
and the naval task force offshore. "Ev-
ery time a ship would turn, communica-
tion was lost until the antennas could be
manually adjusted," the report said.
back of accurate intelligence about
Cuban t;loop,strerigth~on
?,the'=islatid _was another,r'
s'shortcoming. Four`days~ ~'
before the invasion, the
Army tried to smuggle in
a Central. Intelligence
Agency informant to spy ,
and convert his island
home into a safe house for
advance U.S. troops. But
the operative, a wealthy
Grenadian landowner
who had been away for some time, sud-
denly got cold feet and refused to go.
Tntelligence sources say naval com-
manders also failed to use a secret
Army unit that included two advanced
Hughes SOOMD helicopters with night-
vision equipment, standing by on Bar-
bados, that could have helped with re-
connaissance missions and tried to
rescue four Navy SF~IS who_drowned
in a preinvasion operation.. ?~,'
In response . to such criticisms, De-
fense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said
in a recent letter to the New York Times:
"In both military and political terms, the
operation on Grenada was a success... .
There will always be some mistakes. We
have never hidden these, but it would be
more accurate and fair `to judge the
operation by its goal, which was to free
1,000 American citizens from a danger-
ous captivity and to free the island for a
return from anarchy to democracy."
U.S.NEWS b WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 19II6
42
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