SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 29, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14: CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14: CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Soviet Arms Buildup in Nicaragua
he Sandinistas are
again oping to receive Soviet MIG-21s from Cuba, and I understand that
we are planning to make another demarche to the Soviets on this issue.
Confining any demarche or other step to the question of advanced fighter
aircraft to Nicaragua could obscure and even justify Soviet supply of
military items of greater value to the ongoing Soviet effort to turn
Nicaragua into another "Fortress Cuba." Helicopter gunships to chew up
the resistance and air defenses to prevent resupply of the Contras are
prime examples of this.
Soviet Bloc military aid to Nicaragua in 1986 already exceeds that of
any previous year, and the trend shows no sign of abating. So far,
nearly 19,000 metric tons of military equipment have been delivered, over
90 per cent of which has been sent by the Soviets themselves. A major
emphasis in the Soviet effort has been to upgrade the counterinsurgency
capability of the Sandinistas. For example, they have more than doubled
Managua's armed helicopter force this year by sending 23 MI-17s and six
new MI-25s, the first since 1984.
Over the last several years, Soviet deliveries have included T-55
tanks and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, BM-21 multiple rocket
launchers, 152mm howitzers, and the MI-17 and MI-25 helicopter gunships.
Furthermore, reports indicate that over the next year, the Soviets may
provide additional sophisticated weaponry, such as SA-3 air defense
missiles and ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft artillery. Finally, Moscow is
keeping the MIG-21 option open by completing Punta Huete airfield,
retraining fighter pilots, and delivering new guidance radars.
Meanwhile, the task of the democratic resistance forces is becoming
more difficult and costly as the Sandinistas employ their new weaponry.
For example, the Sandinistas have put large blocking forces inside
Honduras to threaten insurgent facilities and stop infiltration into
Nicaragua. Insurgent efforts to expel the Sandinista units from Honduras
CL BY Signer
DECL OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14: CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14: CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6
over t:il" past weekend have failed, primarily because yua was willing
to use its artillery and MI-17 helicopters to support beleaguered
troops. As a result, the democratic resistance torces have been beaten
back with relatively heavy losses. The iforiciurun :niiitarv has been
unwilling to enter the fray because of its fear of escalating the
conflict. If this keeps up, the credibility of our commitments to
Central American democracies will again be brought into question. The
price we will have to pay to restore confidence will be high.
In sum, it is important that our concern over the possible
introduction of MIG-21's not blind us to the disturbing implications of
the general and ongoing Soviet military deliveries to Nicaragua. Any
demarche you might make to Shevardna7e on this subject should, in my
opinion, apply to this overall flood of military support. I am concerned
that Moscow might "accommodate" us on MIG-21's, take credit for making a
general concession, and continue to pour in the kind of weaponry and
equipment that could be even more effective than MIG's in strengthening
the Sandinistas' overall military posture.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14: CIA-RDP88B00443R002004490019-6