UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON US COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00687R000100080011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 4, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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NOTE FOR: D/ICS
I
4 June 1984
SUBJECT: Unclassified Statement on US Collection
Capabilities
The attached memorandum to Commodore Reynolds
provides a revised unclassified statement on US
collection capabilities for arms verification.
Preparation of such a statement is in response
to a Congressional request.
In our view, this statement is consistent with
the 1978 NSC guidelines on disclosure of the "fact
of" photo satellite reconnaissance. Consequently,
we do not believe it requires DDCI approval.
Nevertheless, we suggest he be provided an
information copy.
Essentially this statement qualifies the
theme presented in 1978 that national technical
means provide a high degree of confidence in
monitoring treaty compliance by pointing out that
they are not infallible and that the USG cannot
rely solely on them to detect treaty violations.
STAT
VChairman
7h e 0.ct (.~, ~^ ~l A i r'^rt
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h n,c ktp ft- Ao e b" - s F-STAT
Attachment: a/s
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.,,".. _..FST,E COPY s pct Temp
e
3
Director i .
Intelligence Comm ~mit91 taff
Washington, D.C. 20505
DCI/ICS-84-4560
6 June 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Collection Management
Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Unclassified Statement on US Collection Capabilities
REFERENCE: DIA Memorandum U-31, 081/DC-3A, 11 May 1984; Subject:
Review of Unclassified Statement.
1. The COMIREX Staff has reviewed and revised the proposed unclassified
statement on US collection capabilities transmitted by the reference and
prepared a response to a request from Congresswoman Johnson. This was done in
collaboration with CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and Collection
Requirements and Evaluation Staff. The revised statement is attached
(Attachment 1). n
2. The COMIREX Staff conducted its review in the context of guidelines
published by the National Security Council in October 1978 at the time
President Carter made a public declaration of the fact of photo satellite
reconnaissance as an element of national technical means of verification
(Attachment 2). We believe any new statement pertaining to US verification
capabilities such as the one proposed must still conform to these guidelines
(Attachment 3). In our view the attached statement is in conformance.
3. We recommend that prior to release of the subject statement,
coordination be sought from Chief of DIA DI-5, International
Negotiations Division, and that final concurrence and approval be obtained
from an appropriate member of the NSC Staff. Release should then be
accomplished through OSD Public Affairs. 0
Attachments (3)
As Stated
(`ONFIDENTI/
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Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Cane Canaveral, Florida)
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT
CONGRESSIONAL SPACE MEDALS P19ARDS CEREMONY
Kennedy Space Center,
Shuttle Landing Facility
Weather satellites have already saved billions
of dollars, thousands of lives through early warnings of
hurricanes and floods. We will continue to develop them.
We have greatly strengthened our national security through
defense space applications. We will continue to develop
these capabilities.
Photo reconnaissance satellites have become an
important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring
of arms control agreements. They make an immense contribution
to the security of all natYons. Tie shall continue to develop
them.
Earth resources satellites have already proved
their value to many countries through remote sensing. They
tell us about everything from the location of mineral and
energy deposits to the condition of our crops, from the
rotion of icebergs to the health of the oceans.
We will continue to develop and to use these
satellites for the benefit of all people of the o'orld.
Aboard the shuttle on many of its missions will
be the European-built laboratory, the space lab. Scientists
of many nations will use the space lab to do research in
all branches of science and engineerina. No one can say
where this research '.'ill lead, but carefully selected
experiments could yield direct benefits in the cominc,
decades.
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 ? - COMIREXO-c.2/22
S7?
Attachment
~Z~~
THE WHI-= HOTtab~ ~Gja
CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS(2)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
September 29, 1978
THE
SECRETARY
OF STATE
THE
SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
THE
DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
.DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY
SUBJECT: Guidance on;,Public Queries Related to
Declassification of the "Fact of"
Photoreconnaissance Satellites
The attached reflects the Administration policy regarding
public queries to be observed by all Departmentb and Agencies
commencing October 2, 1978. All public queries are to be
referred to the office of the Secretary of Defense/Public
Affairs at this time for response.
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Enclosure
Press Guidance
CONFIDENTI __--XGDS (2)
CU!-`SIZIZD BY Zbigniew Brzezinski
EXLM~ 1 . V~u 17.r. :~ rJV~`r lC
EC JLE C~ ,-rim r~r C,
5B (2)
Q.\ 2 Oct '78
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CUMIKEX_' f11
CONFIDENTIAL--&S (2) AttachmellW
Press Guidance or. Questions Related to President's Statement
cn U.S. Satellite Photoreconnaissance
Comments shall not go beyond the President's direction to
acknowledge that the U.S.. conducts satellite photoreconnais-
sance including acknowledgement that photoreconnaissance is
one of?the NTMS used to verify compliance with SALT and
other arms control agreements. In particular, spokesmen are
not to comment on-any questions relating to: (1) the capa-
bilities of these systems; (2) their operation; (3) comparison
to other U.S. or foreign reconnaissance systems; (4) uses of
photoreconnaissance satellites other than the "generic" fact
and/or support of arms control agreements; (5) other types
of classified satellites; (6) specific form and dissemina-
tion of information obtained by photosatellites; (7) uses of
such information other than for "national security require-
ments" and/or verification of arms control agreements; (8)
any other aspect of overhead reconnaissance.
To foster uniformity and best protect security, the only
office to respond to inquiries from the public at this time
concerning "fact of" and "facts about" photoreconnaissance
activities of the U.S. will be the Office o= the Secretary
of Defense. All queries will be referred to OSD/PA.
Questions and authorized answers are attached. Unless a
question can be answered by reference to the President's
statement, this guidance, or the attached Q's and A's, OSD
spokesmen shall clear all other responses to queries with
the National Security Council.
CONFIDENTI'%.---XGDS (2 )
CLASSI7ID BY Zblgaiew Brzezi :ski
5L 2)
i'J?V~/:I^LT . 1'L VLL~~.- --D C. 1 L+
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COMIREX- ..., 1[
CONFIDENTIAL-- S (2)
Attachment
QUESTIONS AND TF*S*ErZS
Q. How good is the quality of the pictures our satellites
take?
A. .Very good. I cannot go into specific detail regarding
'the capabilities of these systems.
Q. How often do we photograph a given area?
A. Photoreconnaissance coverage is contingent on national
security requirements and requirements to verify com-
pliance with arms control agreements. I cannot discuss
the specific operational characteristics of our photo-
reconnaissance systems.
Q. What do we photograph from satellites?
A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor cer-
tain activities that are relevant to compliance with
arms control agreements and other national security
requirements.
Q. Do we take satellite photographs of other countries
besides the Soviet Union?
A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor cer-
tain activities that are relevant to compliance with
arms control agreements and other national security
requirements.
Q. Do we ever photograph the U.S. from space?
A. Yes. Periodically, we operate these systems over the
U.S. in a manner that preserves and respects estab-
:_..1 .she.3. _conceptk..of : privacy_.and _. c ivil. l iherties
Q. Who operates the satellites we use to verify as
control agreements?
A. Those satellites are operated by the Department of
Defense at the direction of the President and the
National Security Council. I cannot comment on details
of operational control.
CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2 )
CI~C._'?I^ ?' Zbigni ew nrzez~ ski
SCI=:I_ OF 2 Oct 7 3
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4Vtvr iJL1V 1 la-ali uua c Attachment
TabB
Q. Who sees the results?
A. The results of satellite photoreconnaissance are avail-
able to appropriate analysts and policymakers in the
Executive and Legislative Branches.
Have we ever shown photographs taken by these sat-
ellites to the Soviets?
Q. Do we show these satellite photographs to our Allies?
A. We share information with our Allies.
Q-
Does the Soviet Union also use satellite photography?
How can we be sure that.the Soviets won't destroy our
satellites?
A. The SALT ONE agreements and the draft SALT TWO treaty
specifically prohibit Soviet interference with U.S.
national technical means of verification which include
photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition, we are
currently engaged in discussions with the Soviets aimed
at limiting anti-satellite capabi.]ities. The White
House statement on space policy issued last June re-
affirms that an attack on a U.S. satellite would
clearly be a hostile act.
Is it legal to take pictures from outer space?
A. Yes, the use of photoreconnaissance satellites is con-
sistent with the Outer Space Treaty of 1_977 and is not
..; precluded by any principle: of. _in~ernational law. she.
SALT ONE'agreements specifically provide that national
technical means will be used for verification of com-
pliance with the agreements. The draft SALT TWO agree-
ment nearing completion also refers to the use of such
means of verification.
CONFIDENTIA:.--XGDS (2 )
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COMIREX'P_ t22
CONFIDENTIAL-- S (2) Attachmen
Q. Do we use photographic satellites to spy on other
countries?
A:.. -Photoreconnaissance satellites help us to verify ccm-
. pliance*with the terms of arms control agreements.
Q. Does the phrase "national technical means" refer to
other devices besides photoreconnaissance satellites?
A. Yes. Verification of different arms control agreements
necessarily involves various types of technology. For
.instance, a seismic detection system would be the prin-
cipal means of verifying compliance with agreements
that limit underground nuclear testing.
Is the use of photographic satellites to verify SALT
agreements something new? If you were reluctant to
talk about those satellites before, why are you doing
so now?
A. The President's explicit reference is the result of a
number of considerations. First, it is related to a
reassessment of our security classification procedures,
in order to make as much information available as
possible without jeopardizing national security.
Second, it is part of a general review of our national
space program. By referring to our use of photorecon-
naissance satellites, we want to make clear to the
public that verification of SALT agreements is based on
our own technical capabilities and does not depend on
Soviet good faith or assurances.
to verify a new SALT agreement and arms control agree-
ments generally.
If so, why did the President change his mind?
Many aspects of our space policy have been under con-
this `review'"s~:nee-~he=c,~?site'HOnse'announ~emerit~~f`
policy made last June. As I said before, one
factor that led to the President's statement was our
desire to promote public understanding of our ability
I understand that the President decided last spring
that the fact that the U.S. conducts satellite photo-
reconnaissance should remain classified. Is that true?
How the President's statement related to the Kampiles
incident?
CONFIDENTI -XGDS(2)
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COMIREX-D-Oi
CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2) Attachment
Tab B
A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and there-
fore any comm=nts relating to the case are inappropriate.
Q. Will the reported loss of a manual describing one of
our satellites damage our ability to conduct photo-
reconnaissance from space?
A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and there-
fore any comments relating to the case are inappropriate.
Q. Since the Soviets reportedly know how good the capa-
bilities of our photographic satellites are, why don't
you release some sample pictures so that the American
public can know too?
A. For a number of reasons I must emphasize that both the
photographs and analyses based on them remain classi-
fied however are available to the President, his senior
advisers, and to the Congress.
" hill 7 !~F
CONFIDEN T I:.:--XGDS (2 )
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 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D,C. 20301
I I MAY 1984
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U-31,081/DC-3A
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND
EXPLOITATION
SUBJECT: Review of Unclassified Statement
Reference: Congressional Tasking (enclosure 1).
1. DIA was tasked to develop a response to a Congressional inquiry and
coordinate it within the Intelligence Community. Per conversation
between the DIA and IC Staff Congressional Liaison offices, you were
identified as the IC Staff POC on this matter. If the proposed
response (enclosure 2) is acceptable to the IC Staff, request your
concurrence. If there are security sensitivities not adequately
considered in this proposal, your recommendations for specific changes
would be most helpful.
2. This response is also being coordinated with CIA and NSA.
We would appreciate your comments by y 1984.
STAT
STAT
STAT
2 Enclosures a/s
Assistant epu y nrec or
for Collection Management
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STAT
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0
STAT
Following a presentation of the Soviet Military Trends and Capabilities Briefing by
.. .. , _. r iL _. TT.,.. r+r, r.~ K~YITC~CL1 Yltaticlac (lTl
Representative Nancy Johnson (R CT) asked several questions concerning
h 1934
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arc
2 7
the extent and frequency of U.S. satellite reconnaissance coverage of the Soviet Union
and the ensuing U.S. analytical problems. Representative Johnson then stated that
numerous constituents in her district alledge that, because of omnipresent, detailed U.S
satellite collection, U.S. Intelligence is omniscient, and the U.S. should therefore be
free to enter into virtually any arms control agreement with the Soviets. She requested
that DIA provide an unclassified statement on U.S. collection capability and the actual
situation--that U.S. Intelligence has imperfect knowledge of the Soviet Union--for her
to use when speaking to these constituents.
2. Develop a statement as requested by Representative Johnson, coordinating with other
Intelligence Community agencies as necessary. Statement should not be addressed to
Representative Johnson; once developed, it should be equally useful and available to
other members of Congress. After statement is coordinated within the Intelligence Com-
munity by DC, DI-3 will obtain clearance from OSD/Public Affairs Security Review.
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