SOVIET MILITARY POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 148
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2009
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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COMIREX FILE COPY
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SOVIET
MILITARY
POWER
First Edition September 1981
Second Edition March 1983
Third Edition April 1984
Fourth Edition April 1985
For sale by Superintendent of Documents, US Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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SOVIET.
MILITARY
POWER
1985
The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps in Soviet Military
Power 1985 are not necessarily authoritative.
The illustrations of Soviet weapons systems introducing each chapter and elsewhere are derived
from various US sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.
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CONTENTS
Chapter I 7
Soviet Military Power
Chapter II 25
Forces for Nuclear Attack
Chapter III -43
Strategic Defense and Space Programs
Chapter IV 61
Ground Forces
Chapter V 79
Air Forces
Chapter VI 91
Naval Forces
Chapter VII 113
Global Ambitions
Chapter VIII 133
Response to the Challenge
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PREFACE
A valuable starting point from which to measure the current and projected
strength, trends, and global military capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Soviet
Union, as well as the forces of its Warsaw Pact allies, is the following assessment pre-
sented in the introduction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 1984 official
publication, NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons:
The Warsaw Pact maintains large-scale strategic nuclear forces, interme-
diate- and short-range nuclear forces, and massive conventional forces.
Moreover, Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature and
military exercises calls for large-scale penetration into enemy territory in
order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasize the element
of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations.
The forces of the USSR and its allies continue to expand, modernize, and deploy
with increasingly capable weapons systems designed for the entire spectrum of strate-
gic, theater-nuclear, and conventional conflict. The Soviet Union has made no secret
of certain of these advances. For example, in the autumn of 1984, the Soviet Defense
Ministry announced that the USSR was beginning to deploy a new generation of
nuclear-armed, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets also re-
vealed that nuclear-armed, short-range ballistic missiles had been forward-deployed
from the USSR to operational sites in Eastern Europe and that additional ballis-
tic missile submarines were on patrol in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In a speech
before the Politburo, General Secretary Chernenko said that further actions would
be taken to strengthen the Soviet Union's military capability. These announcements
serve notice of the increasingly ambitious Soviet procurement and deployment of ma-
jor categories of new armaments. The success that the Soviets have achieved in both
quantity and quality of systems is based on combining an aggressive R&D program
with a systematic effort to target and obtain advanced Western technologies.
Some of the more significant developments reported in this, the fourth edition of
Soviet Military Power, are:
?Test firings continue for the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 ICBMs, the new, fifth-genera-
tion intercontinental ballistic missiles. The SS-X-25 violates Soviet obligations
under SALT II. The level of deployed MIRVed ICBM warheads continues to rise
with overall modernization of the Soviet strategic missile force.
*Two units of a new DELTA IV-Class of strategic ballistic missile submarine
have been launched; they are the likely platform for the USSR's newest, most
accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23.
?A third 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile submarine has
completed sea trials, joining the two TYPHOON units already operational, each
fitted with 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs, with each missile capable of delivering six to
nine MIRVed warheads to ranges of 8,300 kilometers.
?The new supersonic, swing-wing BLACKJACK bomber continues in advanced
test and development. New strategic BACKFIRE bombers continue to join
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operational Soviet forces at a rate of at least 30 a year. New BEAR-H strategic
bombers are emerging from Soviet aircraft plants and deploying with the
3,000-kilometer-range, air-launched, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile.
?The USSR is continuing to devote extremely high priority to its military-
related space program. A major emphasis is on space systems for long-duration,
manned missions engaged in military research. They are developing new heavy-
lift launch vehicles, capable of launching 150-ton payloads, for the space shut-
tle and manned space station programs. The USSR is continuing research on
ground-based and space-based high-energy lasers for. use in antisatellite roles.
The Soviets currently have the world's only deployed antisatellite weapons
system that can attack satellites in near-earth orbit.
?The USSR continues to upgrade its heavily layered strategic defenses with ex-
pansion of ballistic missile detection and tracking systems and the development
of new early warning and air surveillance radars. Silo-based high-acceleration
interceptor missiles are replacing older above-ground launchers in the an-
tiballistic missile system ringing Moscow, bringing increased capabilities to
the world's only deployed ABM system. A new, large, phased-array radar un-
der construction at Krasnoyarsk violates the ABM Treaty. The USSR may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. In addition, the Soviets are
actively engaged in extensive research on advanced defenses against ballistic
missiles.
Modernization of Soviet forces at the strategic level is mirrored by force improve-
ments at theater-nuclear and conventional levels:
?The Soviets have pressed ahead with construction of new SS-20 missile bases
in both the western and eastern USSR, enabling a substantial increase from
the 378 MIRVed 5,000-kilometer-range nuclear missiles reported last year to a
new total of about 400. In parallel, new SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles are
now deployed with Soviet divisions in East Germany, and more accurate 900-
kilometer-range SS-22/SCALEBOARD missiles have been forward-deployed to
East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
?Soviet Ground Forces, which in 1981 numbered 181 divisions, have now grown
to 199 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions. New main battle tanks
continue to flow from Soviet factories-some 3,200 in 1984-upgrading tank
division capabilities, which are equipped from an USSR inventory of 52,000
tanks.
?The fourth 37,000-ton KIEV-Class aircraft carrier is fitting out, preparing to
join the already operational carriers Novorossiysk, Minsk, and Kiev. Construc-
tion continues on the lead unit of an entirely new class of aircraft carrier that
will be about 65,000 tons displacement.
?The second unit of the 28,000-ton nuclear-powered KIROV-Class cruisers has
joined the Soviet fleet. A third unit of these heavily armed guided-missile cruis-
ers is on the building ways.
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?Nine separate classes of Soviet submarines are in production; these classes
include four nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of carrying the new
SS-NX-21 land-attack sea-launched cruise missile.
*The Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air-superiority fighter will soon be deployed,
further adding to the capability of Soviet tactical aircraft.
The Soviet military is not a home-based garrison force as attested by the more
than 30 ready divisions forward-deployed throughout Eastern Europe, the divisions
in combat in Afghanistan, the brigade in Cuba, and military advisers throughout the
Third World. The Soviet Navy is the most visible element of the USSR's growing
global reach. In Vietnam, for example, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh
Bay into their largest forward deployment naval base in the world, adding more Tu-
16/BADGERs and a squadron of MiG-23/FLOGGER fighters. As the Navy adds to the
capabilities of its submarine, surface, and air units, the USSR continues to press for
greater access to overseas facilities for its Armed Forces and continues to support the
establishment and strengthening of regimes sympathetic to and supportive of Soviet
purposes. The continuing flow of increasingly advanced weapons to the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua is a prime example.
Soviet Military Power 1985 examines the unceasing introduction of new nuclear
and conventional Soviet military capabilities. It examines the doctrine guiding the
organization, control, and employment of Soviet forces, and it chronicles key devel-
opments in each element of the Soviet Armed Forces, highlighting the continuing
increases in Soviet military power.
To contribute to a clearer understanding of these forces and their capabilities,
this year's edition of Soviet Military Power not only draws on the 1984 NATO force
comparisons study, but also provides comparative data on developments in US forces.
These comparative data serve to highlight even more vividly the magnitude and the
dimensions of the threatening challenge posed by Soviet force developments. As I
have noted, comprehensive information on the forces of the US is regularly made
available to the public in such publications as the Secretary of Defense's Annual
Report to the Congress and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It is incumbent upon the United States and its allies to have a full and precise
understanding of the Soviet challenge as we take the steps necessary to preserve
our freedom, to ensure an effective deterrent to the threat and use of force, and,
at the same time, to seek genuine and equitable arms reductions, contributing to
global stability and to our transcending goal as awe people-the goal 2010p eace
and security. / /
%
C&-WC/ / aewq~
CA PAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense
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Chapter I
Soviet Military
Power'
The Soviet Union has long relied on military
power as the principal instrument of expan-
sionist policies aimed at the extension of Soviet
control and influence throughout the world.
Soviet Armed Forces are equipped, trained, and
readied for employment to further these aims.
The threat posed by these forces is manifested
in the mounting arsenal of nuclear and conven-
tional weapons systems as well, as the coercive
leverage, short of actual use of force, that the
USSR's Armed Forces are able to exert.
The USSR's willingness to threaten and use
military force under certain conditions to
achieve external State objectives is document-
ed by a lengthy, stark record of invasion and
military suppression of other nations. Recall,
for example, that the Red Army partitioned
Poland with the Nazis in 1939 and attacked Fin-
land later that winter. In 1940, Finland was
forced to cede territory to the Soviets, and the
Red Army occupied Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
and the Romanian province of Bessarabia.
In 1950, the North Korean invasion of South
Korea was made possible by Soviet material
support. The Soviets moved 20,000 to 25,000
troops to border areas of North Korea, and
Soviet pilots defended the Yalu River bridges
until the Chinese entered the conflict.
In 1953, the Soviets assisted the East Ger-
man regime in putting down a popular upris-
ing. In October 1956, Khrushchev threatened
to use Soviet military force in Poland, and in
October-November 1956, Soviet tanks crushed
With the operational deployment of the new,
3, 000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed AS-15
cruise missile aboard new BEAR H strategic
bombers in 1984, the Soviet Union has again
underscored its commitment to field increas-
ingly capable weapons systems designed for
the entire spectrum of strategic, theater-
nuclear and conventional warfare, as part of
the upgrading of Soviet military power.
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SOV/E1
BALTIC FLEET
NORTHERN FLEET
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
43
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
80
OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS
92
OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS
72
SUBMARINES
33
SUBMARINES
180
NAVAL AVIATION
270
NAVAL AVIATION
440
55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW
PACT DIVISIONS
30 SOVIETS4
DIVISIONS
him
BLACK SEA FLEET/
CASPIAN FLOTILLA
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS
SUBMARINES
NAVAL AVIATION
SS-11 520
SS-13 60
SS-17 150
SS-4 120
SS-18 308
SS-20 About 400
SS-19 360
1
79
90
33
435
SS-N-5 42
SS-N-6 336
I SS-N-8 292
SS-N-17 12
SS-N-18 224
SS-N-20 60
SS-NX-23 16
The United States Government hes not recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.
Moscow
BACKFIRE
250'
BISON
48
BEAR
BADGER
125
287
TACTICAL
BLINDER
136
AIRCRAFT
6,135
Including 120 in
Soviet Naval Aviation.
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VI/LITARY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
2
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS '
85
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS
114
SUBMARINES
134
NAVAL AVIATION
500
I
GROUND FORCES*
i
MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS
tTANK DIVISIONS
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS
iCOASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS
Totals exclude 14
mobilization divisions and
2 new Army Corps
140
51
7
1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
3
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS
287
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS'
368
COMBATANT CRAFT
765
AUXILIARIES
780
SUBMARINES
380
NAVAL AVIATION
1,645
ABM
RADAR
4 SAM" ABM
1ASAT LAUNCHERS 10,000 LAUNCHERS 100
"In USSR only - does not include Soviet Strategic
SAMs (SA-2/3/5) in Mongolia, or with Groups of Forces.
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the Hungarian revolution. In August 1968, So-
viet and other Warsaw Pact forces occupied
Czechoslovakia to destroy a socialist regime
"with a human face." In 1979, the Soviets in-
vaded Afghanistan and executed one Commu-
nist prime minister to install a more tractable
one. In 1980-81, the threat of Soviet military
intervention was used several times to pres-
sure Polish authorities to crack down on the
Solidarity Labor Movement. Polish officials
imposed martial law to avert a Soviet invasion.
The role of military power in the Soviet
Union can be best comprehended by under-
standing the State's full commitment to devel-
oping, supporting, and sustaining armed forces
for internal, regional, and global use. This ex-
amination begins with a review of the extraor-
dinarily great resources the USSR devotes to
its military, the resulting overall nuclear and
conventional force capabilities, and the nature
of the Soviet political and military command
structure overseeing the development of Soviet
military doctrine and strategy.
Chapters II - VII of Soviet Military Power
1985 examine the organization and capabilities
of Forces for Nuclear Attack, Strategic Defense
and Space Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces,
Naval Forces, and Soviet Global Ambitions.
The Western response to the Soviet Union's
military challenge is discussed in Chapter VIII.
Military Expenditures
The cumulative cost of the Soviet military
program during 1974-83 exceeds that of the US
by a large margin, despite a slowdown in the
rate of overall Soviet economic growth. For
this decade, the estimated dollar cost of the to-
tal Soviet military program is 35 percent more
than the comparably defined US defense out-
lays, while the cost of Soviet weapons procure-
ment is 50 percent greater. Although the dollar
cost differences have narrowed with the recent
growth in US defense spending, the magnitude
of the Soviet military effort in important spe-
cific categories, such as R&D, still surpasses
that of the US. Moreover, there is clear evi-
dence of an upturn in Soviet weapons procure-
ment beginning in 1983.
The rate of increase in spending does not
give an appreciation of the large stocks of
strategic and conventional weapons systems
deployed by the Soviets during the past decade.
Despite the procurement plateau of the late
1970s, when the Soviets emphasized R&D for
next-generation systems, spending was so high
that during the period 1977 through 1983, So-
viet forces acquired 1,500 ICBMs, more than
1,300 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), 250 bombers, 5,000 fighters, some
15,000 new tanks, and substantial numbers of
new additional major surface combatants,
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines,
and attack submarines. During the same pe-
riod, the US added to its inventory 135 ICBMs,
390 SLBMs, no bombers, 3,000 fighters, 5,000
tanks, and 106 major warships.
Soviet efforts to develop advanced weapons
systems continue in the 1980s, at least at the
rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among
these weapons are fighter and airborne control
aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space sys-
tems, and submarines. The new systems cover
the full range of technologically advanced
weaponry the Soviets will need to modernize all
their forces. New, complex, and increasingly
expensive weapon systems-such as the new,
fifth-generation ICBMs, air-superiority fighters
such as the MiG-29/FULCRUM, and new, nu-
clear attack submarines such as the MIKE,
SIERRA, and AKULA-Classes-are all contrib-
uting to the upturn in procurement costs.
The sustained Soviet economic commitment
to the military is further revealed by the flow
of resources to and growth of the machinery in-
dustry. This key sector of the economy, broadly
divided into military and civilian machinery
production, is the source of the Soviet Union's
military weapons, civilian investment goods,
and consumer durables. The machinery sector
continues to experience the most rapid growth
in the economy; and, in 1984, when overall in-
dustrial growth was 4 percent, the machinery
sector expanded by some 7 percent. The mili-
tary machinery portion of this sector now ac-
counts for 60 percent of total machinery output
and has been receiving nearly all the additions
to the machinery sector's labor force, leaving
little or no labor growth for the civilian sector.
Current estimates of Soviet military spend-
ing, in rubles from the early 1970s through the
early 1980s, show a significant increase at a
rate faster than overall economic growth. As a
result, throughout the last decade, the Soviet
military has absorbed an increasing share of
the nation's estimated gross national product
(GNP), a share now estimated at 15-17 percent.
Even in a period of slowing economic growth,
the Soviet military sector continues to main-
tain its priority claim on the Soviet Union's
economic resources.
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Full-scale production of the new BACKJACK manned strategic bomber, now in development, is
expected to take place in the new complex being added to the USSR's Kazan Airframe Plant.
Industrial Base and Production
The large economic investment in military
programs has enabled the Soviet military in-
dustrial base to expand to become the world's
largest weapons producer. During the past
decade, industry supporting the Soviet mili-
tary is estimated to have grown more than 30
percent. The USSR's ability to produce large
quantities of armaments in all categories has
enabled them to equip and modernize their
forces and those of their allies and still export
large quantities of weapons to proxy and Third
World nations.
As the West has turned increasingly to au-
tomated production methods, the Soviet Union
has 'i also been introducing computers and au-
tomation into its military production process.
The, use of such production methods was a So-
vieti goal first articulated in the 1960s. Through
both legal and illegal acquisition of modern
Western production techniques, the Soviets
are establishing more efficient, integrated, and
technologically advanced capabilities for
the production of highly sophisticated weapons.
Soviet Doctrine and Strategy
According to the Soviet definition, military
doctrine is concerned with the essence, pur-
pose, and character of a possible future war and
the preparation of the country and its Armed
Forces for conducting such a war. Soviet mil-
itary strategy, operational art, and tactics are
components of Soviet military art. These three
encompass the actual practice of preparing the
country and its Armed Forces for war as well
as planning and conducting strategic opera-
tions. Specifically, military strategy is con-
cerned with defining the strategic tasks of the
Armed Forces; carrying out measures to pre-
pare the Armed Forces, the economy, and the
population for war; determining potential ad-
versaries; and determining the size and compo-
sition of military forces necessary to wage war.
According to the Soviets, strategy and politics
are closely interrelated.
Concerning the character of a possible fu-
ture war, Soviet military writings state that
such a conflict would be a decisive clash be-
tween two diametrically opposed socio-econo-
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mic systems-socialism and capitalism. Most
of the world's nations would be involved and
the conflict would be global. The division of
the world into two distinct and opposing camps
means that a future world war would be a coali-
tion war, fought by two major groupings of
nations, each pursuing specific political and
military objectives. The Soviets believe that an
outcome favorable to their interests depends on
complete unification of the political, economic,
and military forces of all countries of the so-
cialist coalition. To this end, the Soviets have
concentrated on developing and implementing
a single strategic policy for the entire Warsaw
Pact forces. Marshal Kulikov, Commander in
Chief (CINC) of the Warsaw Pact, has referred
to his command as a unified combat formation.
The Soviets believe that a world war might
begin and be waged for a particular period
of time with conventional weapons only. Al-
though general nuclear war is not considered
to be inevitable, the Soviets believe it is possi-
ble that a conventional war will escalate to a
nuclear conflict. Despite the fact that strategic
nuclear forces would play the dominant role in
such a war, the Soviets recognize the crucial
function of ground armies in seizing and oc-
cupying their ultimate objectives. They also
believe that a world war could be relatively
brief-several weeks-or that it could develop
into a protracted conflict. Great importance is
attached to the initial phase of a war because
to a large degree it would determine the course
of all subsequent actions. This accounts for
the extraordinary attention the Soviets pay to
their overall mobilization capability and their
perceived requirement to effect the transition
of high-level political-military control organs
rapidly from peacetime to wartime to take max-
imum advantage of the initial period of war.
Soviet doctrine envisions a future world war
of wide scope waged over vast territories. Such
a war would be characterized by an absence of
continuous fronts, rapid and sharp changes in
the strategic situation, and deep penetrations
into rear areas of the forces involved. Forces
would rely on mobility and maneuver to wage
an intense struggle to seize and maintain the
initiative. The Soviets emphasize the primacy
of the offensive, stating that military and po-
litical objectives are ultimately achieved only
through aggressive and continuous offensive
actions. Although defensive actions occasion-
ally would be necessary, they would be active
and innovative operations undertaken with the
purpose of either supporting nearby offensive
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operations or creating favorable conditions for
resuming the offensive.
The Soviets believe that victory in war is
possible only through the combined and coordi-
nated efforts of all services and troop branches.
As a result, Soviet military strategy, which
views warfare as a series of interdependent
large-scale operations, is the same for all the
services. The Soviet concept of combined arms
warfare specifies that the various services and
independent units must be brought together un-
der' a single unified commander at the army,
front, and theater of military operations (TVD)
levels. This permits the most effective use of
all forces and weapons and ensures their united
and coordinated employment in achieving over-
all strategic objectives.
The major Soviet strategic goal in a war
in Europe would be the defeat of NATO mil-
itary forces, the frustration of NATO's overall
warfighting capability through the destruction
of crucial command and control elements lo-
cated in the NATO rear area, and the eventual
dismantlement of the Alliance itself. Priority
targets would be nuclear delivery systems and
weapons; command, control, and communica-
tions centers; air defense weapons and control
points; and government control centers.
COMBATANTS 80
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS/CRAFT 132
AUXILIARIES 200
'NOT INCLUDING SSBNs
BALTIC FLEET
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 43
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS/CRAFT 347
AUXILIARIES 170
SUBMARINES 33
NAVAL AVIATION 270
NAVAL INFANTRY
BRIGADE
ESTERN
Specific Soviet aims in a global war would
be to:
.defeat NATO forces at any level of con-
flict, occupy NATO countries, and use
Europe's economic assets to,assist Soviet
recovery;
.separately neutralize the United States
and China by disorganizing and destroy-
ing their military forces; and
.dominate the post-war world in which
"socialism" would replace "capitalism"
as the basic politico-economic system in
all nations.
From an internal viewpoint, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership
would seek to maintain its control over the So-
viet government, military, police and internal
security organs, and the civilian population.
Efforts would be made to minimize losses to
the Soviet leadership, scientific-technical elites
and other essential personnel, to the general
population, and to the economy. Repair and re-
covery operations would be organized to limit
war-related damage.
Soviet Force Capabilities
During peacetime the five Soviet forces func-
tion as administrative service entities for the
ARTI
TAC1
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SUBMARINES---1142'
NAVAL AVIATION 440
NAVAL INFANTRY
BRIGADE 1
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purpose of equipping, training, and maintain-
ing their respective force components. Dur-
ing wartime, however, all Soviet forces would
be combined under the executive leadership of
the General Staff to form the Armed Forces of
the Soviet Union. The Soviet forces would be
formed into a single war machine that would
bring to bear all systems and forces as needed
in a unified and effective manner. This com-
bined arms concept is not simply the joint use
of weapons systems and forces; rather, it is
the unified application of all military assets
to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical
objectives.
The following discussion of Soviet force
capabilities addresses the Soviet command
structure, wartime command and control, and
combined arms warfare. As part of their com-
bined arms concept, the Soviet Armed Forces
are prepared to fight any type of war, nu-
clear or conventional, at any level. To the
Soviets, the level and intensity of conflict-
rather than being compartmented by opera-
tional plans-are influenced both by political
objectives and enemy operations. Moreover, a
nuclear exchange could occur in a limited or
large-scale manner at the tactical, operational,
strategic, or intercontinental level-or all si-
multaneously. Should the Soviets execute a
nuclear attack, they would expect to continue
conventional operations to exploit the results.
Combined Arms Warfare
Over the past two decades, Soviet forces
have steadily expanded and upgraded every
category of weapons systems. Soviet ground
force divisions have been reorganized, enlarged,
and equipped with increasingly modern tanks,
artillery, and helicopters. Soviet naval forces
continue to receive larger and more capable
ships and submarines. Soviet air forces are be-
ing modernized with high-performance aircraft.
In addition to these force enhancements, So-
viet military planners are adapting operations
to the capabilities of new systems and chang-
ing political objectives as part of the dynamics
of combined arms warfare.
The Soviets envision as many as three the-
aters of war: Western, Southern, and Far
Eastern, each with a set of political objectives
affecting military operations within the the-
ater. More importantly, in planning for such
military operations, the Soviets could divide a
theater, for operational command and strate-
gic planning purposes, into theaters of military
^
E ITE ANEA SQU o
S IPS VERAGE 30-40 AMPUS
S BM INES 6-8 WARFARE SHIPS 1-2
CR IS 1-2 E WARFARE
DES OYERS 1-3 SH
FRI ATES - AUXILI
BgACK Sa
D N ? THER
es.
operations (TVDs). Soviet planning for the
Western Theater, encompassing all of Europe,
envisions three continental TVDs-North-
western, Western, and Southwestern-and two
oceanic TVDs, Arctic and Atlantic. This or-
ganizational concept enables military planners
to formulate military strategy and tactics to
achieve political objectives in the geographic
region, taking into consideration the capabili-
ties of the missiles, aircraft, ships, and ground
forces at their disposal. The same planning
process occurs for Soviet objectives in the South-
ern and Far Eastern Theaters. While a strate-
gic operation within the various TVDs may
be conventional only, nuclear strikes are also
planned within the operational concept down
to the division level.
Soviet forces for conventional warfare con-
sist of the assets of ground, air, naval, and
air defense forces. Each of these services is
discussed in more detail in the following chap-
ters. In wartime these services would form the
combined arms forces of the Soviet Union.
With the reorganization of Soviet Air Forces,
the growth in the number of longer-range in-
termediate-range nuclear force (LRINF)
missiles, and the high state of readiness of
forward-deployed forces, the USSR is capable
of executing the initial phase of an attack with-
out mobilization of additional forces. However,
if the order should be given to go to war, the
Soviets would implement their national mobi-
lization plan, drawing upon some nine million
recently trained reservists. These reservists
would be used to bring understrength units,
cadre units, and mobilization bases to full man-
ning in a matter of days. While mobilizing
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andI moving over 200 divisions is an extremely
large task, the Soviets can assimilate the re-
servists, train them for combat, and be ready
to conduct offensive operations in less than 60
days. To the Soviets, a combined arms battle
would be fought by a highly integrated for-
mation of ground, air, and air defense forces,
with attached units of other service branches.
In maritime sectors these formations would in-
clude naval forces as well. The use of nuclear
weapons and the participation of the various
service branches or forces, in conjunction with
great troop mobility, would impart an espe-
cially decisive and maneuver-oriented charac-
ter to combined arms warfare.
With the advent of longer range and more
capable aircraft and missiles, coupled with in-
creased troop mobility and maneuverability,
Soviet concepts for employment of combined
arms units and formations are evolving accord-
ingly. The Soviets believe that modern warfare
would substantially exceed the framework of
front operations. As a result, they envision a
larger scale military operation, which they re-
DIVISIONS 30
0 TANKS 5,200
ARTILLERY/MORTAR 6.600
CA IAN LOTILLA TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 890
C M ATAN S ' 5
R COMB ANT
S S/CRAP 65
AUXI ARIES J _x..25
fer to as a theater strategic operation. In such
an operation, the front commander would be re-
sponsible for the conduct of two or more front
operations in succession. While the Soviet con-
cept of the front as a large combat formation in
the field remains essentially intact, the Soviets
are now focusing on operations by groups of
fronts.
The contemporary Soviet concept of the the-
ater strategic operation has expanded in scope
and complexity. The Soviets now plan for a
theater operation to consist of several fronts
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DIVISIONS 53
TANKS 14,900
ARTILLERY/MORTAR 15,200
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 1,690
PACIFIC.;
ACIFIC FLEET
fIRCRAFT CARRIERS
2
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS
85
OTHER COMBATANT
AUXILIARIES
^235
SUBMARINES
110'
conducting dynamic, fast-moving operations to
seize strategic ground objectives located 600-
800 kilometers away. These land offensive op-
erations would be conducted in coordination
and mutual support with air, antiair, assault
(airborne, amphibious, or joint); and naval op-
erations to attain the Soviets' strategic goals
within the TVD. The air operation is a mas-
sive offensive campaign designed to gain air
superiority and disrupt and destroy an enemy's
command and control and nuclear capability.
Front forces would contribute to the air oper-
ation by attacking enemy air and air defense
facilities with rocket, artillery, and ground
forces. In turn, the air operation, by degrad-
ing and disrupting enemy command, control,
and comunication, as well as its aviation and
nuclear capabilities, would create favorable
conditions for the fronts to accomplish their
objectives quickly.
A theater-wide antiair defense operation in-
volving tactical and strategic air defense as-
sets coordinated at the theater level would be
conducted to defend Warsaw Pact forces from
residual enemy aircraft. In addition, naval
forces would operate in the waters off a coastal
flank to destroy enemy naval forces, secure the
coastal flank of the theater, participate in am-
phibious operations, and thwart the enemy's
attempt to employ amphibious forces.
If the war escalated to the nuclear level, the
Soviets could employ a massive theater-wide
nuclear strike involving the coordinated use of
ground, Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), naval,
and aviation systems. This strike would be ex-
ploited by the rapid advance of front forces,
taking advantage of the shock and disruption
produced by massive nuclear employment.
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The development of these complex opera-
tions has required the Soviets to develop
theater-level commands to exert proper coordi-
nation and control. To support high commands
in theaters, the Soviets have deployed an ex-
tensive fixed and mobile communications struc-
ture and constructed numerous hardened or
bunkered command facilities. In addition, the
Soviets may have established peacetime perma-
nent theater commands for several TVDs.
As many as five fronts could exist in a TVD.
The highest commander in a TVD would be
at least a three-star general who is directly
responsible to the Supreme High Command
(VGK). The commander would be supported by
a combined arms staff with the responsibility
of overseeing and coordinating the activities of
the various operational formations.
In wartime the General Staff would operate
as the executor of the VGK and would develop
plans for control of the forces. As stated ear-
lier, the Soviets have organizationally struc-
tured their forces to form a unified command
structure under the VGK. This provides the
Soviets with the command structure to apply
the totality of their military power in warfare
so that the whole of the operation would be
greater than the sum of its parts.
Soviet Command Structure
Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed
Forces is vested by the Soviet Constitution in
the CPSU and the higher bodies of Soviet State
power-the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
and the Council of Ministers. Party control of
the military, however, is facilitated by the exis-
tence of the Defense Council, an organization
that is chaired by the CPSU General Secretary
and consists of top Party, government, and mil-
itary leaders. The Defense Council is the most
senior decisionmaking body for all aspects of
national security policy. It also forms the nu-
cleus of what would be expanded in wartime
to the highest Party-state body responsible for
establishing unified strategic leadership of the
USSR and providing centralized direction to
the national economy and the entire war effort.
In this regard, it would perform functions sim-
ilar to the USSR's World War II State Defense
Committee.
Party dominance of the Soviet Armed Forces
is assured through the Party's role in deter-
mining military doctrine and strategy and its
control of budgetary resources and senior per-
sonnel assignments. The top Party leadership
establishes military doctrine and approves mili-
tary strategy as developed by the General Staff.
The Defense Council, dominated by the Party
leadership, controls the defense budget and
makes the decision to develop and deploy each
new major weapons system. Senior military of-
ficers are selected from a Central Committee
list, and all major organizational changes in
the Soviet military must be approved by the
Defense Council. Party control of the military
is also underscored by the fact that the Party
General Secretary, in addition to being Defense
Council Chairman, is also Supreme Comman-
der in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Direct control and administration of the
daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is
entrusted to the Ministry of Defense (MOD),
headed since 1976 by Marshal of the Soviet
Union (MSU) Dmitriy Ustinov, until his death
in December 1984. His replacement, MSU
Sergey Sokolov, is expected to continue the
policies initiated by Ustinov. As Minister of
Defense, Sokolov is charged with maintaining
the condition and overseeing the development
of the Armed Forces, including officer recruit-
ment and conscription of enlisted personnel;
equipping the forces with weapons systems and
military materiel; developing military strat-
egy, operational art, and tactics; training the
forces; and ensuring high standards of military
discipline and political loyalty. The Ministry
of Defense is also responsible, in coordination
with local Soviet government organizations,
for the Civil Defense program.
Within the hierarchy of the Ministry of De-
fense there is a Collegium that functions as
a consultative body and policy review board.
Chaired by the Minister, the Collegium dis-
cusses and resolves issues connected with the
development of the Armed Forces, their combat
and mobilization readiness, and the effective-
ness of military and political training. Member-
ship includes the Deputy Ministers of Defense,
the Chief of the Main Political Directorate,
and other top military leaders. Collegium de-
cisions normally are implemented as orders of
the Minister of Defense.
Minister of Defense Sokolov exercises con-
trol of the Armed Forces through First Deputy
Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defense.
The First Deputy Ministers are: Marshal of
the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of
the General Staff since September 1984; MSU
Viktor Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the
Warsaw Pact Forces since 1977, and former
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CINC of the Ground Forces, Vasiliy Petrov.
Five of the 11 Deputy Ministers are CINCs of
the Services-Strategic Rocket Forces,, Ground
Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces, and Air
Forces. The five service CINCs are responsi-
ble for the peacetime administrative manage-
ment, including combat and political training
of the forces. Operational control of the forces
rests with a peacetime variation of the VGK
and is administered by the General Staff. Six
other Deputy Defense Ministers are in charge
of civil defense, rear services, the main inspec-
torate, construction and billeting, personnel,
and armaments.
The most important element in the Soviet
Ministry of Defense for peacetime forces man-
agement, as well as wartime control of opera-
tional formations, is the General Staff headed
by Marshal Akhromeyev. As the central mil-
itary staff organ, the General Staff exercises
operational control over the Armed Forces and
is responsible for coordinating the activity of
the main staffs of the five services, the staffs
of 16 military districts, four groups of forces,
four fleets, rear services, civil defense forces,
and the main directorates of the Ministry of
Defense. The General Staff coordinates mili-
tary planning, advises the Defense Council on
matters of military policy, develops military
strategy for approval by the Defense Council,
and directs functions common to all of the ser-
vices. The major responsibilities of the General
Staff in peacetime are to ensure that military
forces reach and sustain a high level of combat
readiness, and to prepare strategic operation
plans in the event of war. During wartime,
the General Staff would be the primary organi-
zation to implement operational orders of the
Supreme High Command.
Territorially, the Soviet Armed Forces lo-
cated within the USSR are organized into 16
military districts (MDs). An MD is a high-level
administrative command element that contains
military units up to army level, training in-
stitutions, recruitment and mobilization offices
or military commissariats, and other military
establishments. The primary mission of a mil-
itary district is to train military units and en-
sure their high level of combat readiness. Other
important responsibilities include registration
and induction of draftees, mobilization, civil
defense, and premilitary and reserve training.
In the event of war, certain military districts,
such as those on the periphery of the USSR,
could generate fronts or other operational field
forces, either singly or in combination. Soviet
units stationed in East Europe are organized
into four Groups of Forces located in Poland,
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
Military districts and Groups of Forces are
subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and
General Staff. They contain their own or-
ganic staff elements responsible for political af-
fairs, personnel administration, training, rear
services, construction and billeting, and civil
defense. Each MD and Group of Forces com-
mand staff has officers who serve as chiefs of
their respective service components. Soviet
naval forces are assigned to four fleets, all of
which have command and staff organizations
and relationships similar to those of military
districts. Naval fleets are also operationally
subordinated to the General Staff.
Command and Control
The Soviets believe in a rapid and efficient
transformation of their peacetime national se-
curity organization into an operational com-
mand capable of successfully achieving all
major political and military objectives in the
event of general war. To this end, they have
established a peacetime control system that
closely approximates the anticipated wartime
structure. The Soviets have created peacetime
national security and high-level military orga-
nizations. These organizations are headed by
the Defense Council and can function as the
strategic command element in wartime with
very little change. This wartime management
structure would provide a unified system of
command for the Armed Forces, the Soviet
Government, and the national economy capa-
ble of exerting centralized direction but de-
signed to permit a degree of autonomous
operations required by modern warfare.
The current Defense Council probably would
be expanded to include representatives of the
highest Party, state, and military leadership.
It would function in a manner similar to the
World War II State Defense Committee, ensur-
ing centralized political direction of the entire
war effort. Soviet military writings state that
concentration of the leadership of the country
and its Armed Forces in the hands of the high-
est political agency of government control is
a necessary condition for attaining victory in
war. The creation of single organs of military
and political leadership underscores the Soviet
emphasis on the interdependence of politics
and military strategy. In addition to directing
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Minister of
Defense
S. L. Sokolov
Chief of
Main Political
Directorate
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
S. F. Akhromeyev
(Chief of the
General Staff)
Deputy Minister
of Defense
Y.F. Iva novsk iy
(C-in-C Ground
Forces)
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
V. G. Kulikov
(C-in-C Warsaw
Pact Forces)
Deputy Minister
of Defense
V. F. Tolubko
(C-in-C Strategic
Rocket Forces)
Deputy Minister
of Defense
A. I. Koldunov
(C-in-C Air Defense
Forces)
Stavka of the Soviet
Supreme High Command
First Deputy
Ministers of Defense
Supreme High
Command (VGK)
Chief,
Main Political
Directorate
C-in-Cs of
Soviet Forces
General Secretary
CPSU
Minister
of Defense
Chief of the
General Staff
Chairman, USSR
Council of Ministers
General Staff
(Executive Agent of VGK)
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
Deputy Minister
of Defense
A. N. Yefimov
(C-in-C Air Forces)
Other Party
and State
Figures as Required
Deputy Minister
of Defense
S. G. Gorshkov
(C-in-C Naval Forces)
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the conduct of military operations, the Defense
Council would supervise the nation's economy
and its support of the war effort through con-
trol of the vast ministerial structure of the
Soviet Government.
Direct leadership of the Armed Forces would
be the responsibility of the Supreme High Com-
mand (VGK), headed by the Party General
Secretary as Supreme Commander in Chief.
Former Defense Minister Ustinov provided pub-
lic confirmation during an awards ceremony in
late September 1984 that Chernenko occupies
such a position even in peacetime. The Party
General Secretary would also head the General
Headquarters (Stavka) of the VGK. The Stavka
would be responsible for the preparation and
conduct of military campaigns and strategic
operations. It would also resolve issues con-
cerned with the overall wartime situation of
the country.
The MOD Collegium would probably provide
the foundation for the wartime Stavka VGK,
which would include, in addition to the CPSU
General Secretary, the Minister of Defense,
the Chief of the General Staff and other First
Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the
Main Political Directorate, and the five Armed
Forces Commanders in Chief. Supreme Party
control of the entire war effort is confirmed by
the fact that, in addition to being Party Gen-
eral Secretary and the senior Politburo mem-
ber, the Party General Secretary would also
function as wartime Defense Council Chair-
man, Supreme Commander in Chief, and head
of the Stavka VGK.
The General Staff would serve as operational
staff and executive agent for the Stavka VGK.
Working in conjunction with the main staffs
of the five services, the main Operations Direc-
torate of the General Staff would draft plans
for strategic operations for consideration by
the Stavka VGK. Once approved, these plans
would be issued to operational commanders as
orders of the VGK. The General Staff would
be responsible for ensuring compliance with all
VGK orders and directives, including timely
and precise execution of the VGK military cam-
paign plans by the operational commands.
In order to ensure both centralized control
of'strategic planning and decentralized battle
management of the Armed Forces, the Sovi-
ets in wartime would employ intermediate High
Commands in TVDs that would be subordinate
to the VGK and would be responsible for di-
recting the efforts of subordinate formations.
Commanders for four of the probable TVD High
Commands are: Marshal of the Soviet Union
N.V. Ogarkov; Army General I.A. Gerasimov;
Army General Y.P. Maksimov; and General
I.M. Tret'yak. In certain circumstances the
VGK might create High Commands for specific
strategic directions, i.e., a major axis or avenue
of attack not already under the control of a
High Command in a TVD.
The Soviets also have created an elaborate
system of emergency relocation facilities, many
of which are bunkered, designed to ensure the
survival of Party and State control through the
protection of high-level Party, government, and
military leaders. These facilities are equipped
with hardened communications equipment and
would serve as alternate command and con-
trol posts for the top leadership in wartime.
In addition, managers and factory personnel
of critical industries would be evacuated with
critical machinery out of urban areas and away
from immediate battle areas to emergency lo-
cations to facilitate their continued operation.
All these measures are designed to provide un-
interrupted functioning of the various elements
of Soviet strategic leadership and the national
economy in wartime, including nuclear war.
The Soviets have carefully thought out and
continue to develop the details of their sys-
tem of strategic leadership. To a large extent,
the system designed for war fighting and war
survival is already in place. The nucleus of
critical Party-State control organs and high-
level military command elements that would
be needed in wartime exists during peacetime
in the form of top political and military or-
ganizations. These peacetime organizations
could shift their activities to wartime opera-
tions with minimal organizational disruption
and little augmentation in membership. The
peacetime Soviet national security apparatus
and its likely wartime counterpart are struc-
tured with the sole purpose of ensuring the
continued survival of the CPSU through the
successful conduct of military operations and
consequent achievement of overall political
objectives.
Technology Transfer
The Soviet Union continues an intensive,
carefully executed program-both legal and
illegal-to acquire advanced Western technol-
ogy. The Soviets have been forced to turn
increasingly to illegal technology acquisition
efforts in response to US Government tighten-
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The MiG-25/FOXBAT E interceptor, above, has a limited look-down/shoot-down capability.
Acquisition of Western technology enabled the USSR to fit the MiG-31/FOXHOUND interceptor
with a true look-down/shoot-down radar system.
ing of export control laws and procedures. The
illegal business of technology acquisition is an
expensive proposition for the Soviets and of-
ten involves rings of professional thieves who
work through networks of phony companies in
various countries.
Acquisition of sophisticated technology, es-
sential to many Soviet military advances, in-
volves operations not only against the United
States but also, increasingly, against other
world technological leaders, including Western
Europe and Japan. For example, in October of
1984, the Soviets tried to divert a photomicro-
densitometer from West Germany to East Ger-
many, having failed in two previous attempts
to obtain the equipment through legal means
from the US. The equipment-militarily useful
for analysis of streak camera photography-
was bound for the Lebedev Institute in Moscow
when it was detained at the East German bor-
der by West German authorities at US request.
Soviet industrial modernization programs are
supported by an elaborate network for the
collection of foreign scientific and technolog-
ical information. Guidelines for introduction
of advanced manufacturing systems, involving
computer-aided design and automated manu-
facturing systems, include a constant monitor-
ing of available Western technology.
No areas of Western technology are given
higher priority than computers and electronics.
KGB and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
agents are targeted against Western sources
for these critical technologies in order to deter-
mine exactly where and how the hardware and
software can be acquired. Collection require-
ments are coordinated with the USSR weapons
development and production system. Weapons
designers and technologists submit their re-
quests directly through the KGB departments
located at each facility. The turnaround time
for the receipt of the desired design information
or "hardware" can be a matter of weeks. Stand-
ing science and technology (S&T) requirements
are continually updated by the S&T elements
of the KGB and GRU, as well as by the State
Committee for Science and Technology, many
of whose staff members are KGB and GRU
officers. In addition, the USSR Academy of
Sciences and several of its institutes follow
Western S&T, even tapping into Western data
bases through a growing number of transna-
tional computerized networks dedicated to S&T
collection and dissemination.
It is estimated that Western military-related
technology acquired by Soviet intelligence has
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saved the Soviet defense industry billions of
dollars; for example, classified reports were
obtained on advanced US weapons systems
still under development. The classified re-
ports included information on the F-15 look-
down/shoot-down radar system, the B-1 bomber
radar system, PHOENIX air-to-air missiles, PA-
TRIOT surface-to-air missiles, the improved
HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and a NATO air-
defense system. The effect on the Soviets of
illegal diversion attempts has been quantified
for the first time in a Department of Defense pi-
lot study. Surveying a sample of denied export
license applications in 1983-84, it was deter-
mined that had these exports been approved,
the Soviets would have saved between $6.6 and
$13.3 billion in primary military research costs
during the 1990s and beyond. The Soviets stand
to save hundreds of millions, if not billions,
of dollars by now being able to utilize proven
US designs to field counterpart systems-as
well as effective defense and countermeasure
systems-in a much shorter time and with less
risk. Protection of Western technology is an
integral part of our total defense posture.
Arms Control Compliance
In considering the totality of Soviet military
power it is essential to monitor closely the
Soviet Union's performance, or lack thereof,
in honoring formal international obligations
bearing on that power.
As President Reagan stated in his January
1984 Report to the Congress on Soviet Non-
compliance with Arms Control Agreements, "If
the concept of arms control is to have meaning
and credibility as a contribution to global and
regional stability, it is essential that all par-
ties to agreements comply with them." How-
ever, the Soviet Union has violated many of
its major arms control obligations and polit-
ical commitments when it was in its inter-
est to do so. Some of these violations and
probable violations were documented in two
official US reports and in an independently
produced advisory study on arms control com-
In 1984, the new AKULA-Class submarine joined the Soviet Navy's growing number of modern,
nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of carrying the new SS-NX-21 land-attack
sea-launched long-range cruise missiles.
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pliance that were forwarded by the President
to the Congress at its request.
The first report, submitted on 23 January
1984, presented seven cases in which the So-
viet Union has violated or probably violated its
arms control obligations. The advisory study
was prepared independently by the General
Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Dis-
armament and sent to the Congress on 10 Oc-
tober 1984. This more comprehensive study
covered Soviet compliance practices under
arms control commitments from 1958 to 1983.
The conclusions of both reports give cause for
serious concern regarding the Soviet Union's
conduct with respect to observance of arms
control agreements.
The second US report on Soviet noncompli-
ance, forwarded to Congress on 1 February
1985, addressed 13 compliance issues and stated
that other compliance issues remained under
review. It reaffirmed the conclusions of the
January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has
violated the Helsinki Final Act, specifically the
requirement of advance notification of certain
military exercises; has violated the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention by maintain-
ing an offensive biological warfare program
and capability; has violated the Geneva Proto-
col on Chemical Weapons and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention by the pro-
duction, transfer, and use of chemical agents
and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and South-
east Asia; and has violated two provisions
of SALT II-telemetry encryption and ICBM
With testing of the SS-X-25 ICBM, the USSR is violating the SALT /I provision prohibiting more
than one new type of ICBM.
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modernization-by encrypting telemetry delib-
erately to impede verification and by testing
an ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose
weight is less than 50 percent of the ICBM
throwweight, if we were to accept the Soviet ar-
gument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited sec-
ond new type. The 1985 report also reaffirmed
that the Soviet Union has probably violated the
SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and
has likely violated the yield limit of the Thresh-
old Test Ban Treaty by conducting some tests
that exceeded 150 kilotons.
In the 1985 report, the US Government also
concluded that the Soviet Union has violated
the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by con-
structing the Krasnoyarsk radar; has violated
the Limited Test Ban Treaty by causing ra-
dioactive matter to be present outside its ter-
ritorial limits; and has violated the SALT II
prohibition against more than one new ICBM
by developing and testing both the SS-X-24
and the SS-X-25. With respect to the ABM
Treaty, the 1985 report concluded that the So-
viet Union potentially violated the prohibition
on the development of a mobile land-based
ABM system, or components for such a sys-
tem, by the development of components of a
new ABM system that apparently are designed
to be deployable at sites requiring relatively
little or no preparation. It also concluded
that the Soviet Union has probably violated
the prohibition on testing surface-to-air mis-
sile (SAM) components in the ABM mode by
conducting tests that have involved SAM air
defense radars in ABM-related activities. The
US Government judges that the aggregate of
the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related ac-
tions suggest that the USSR may be preparing
an ABM defense of its national territory, which
is prohibited.
With regard to these compliance issues, the
United States has tried through appropriate
diplomatic channels, including the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), to persuade
the Soviet Union to explain its actions and to
take corrective measures. Unfortunately, thus
far, the Soviet Union has not provided satisfac-
tory explanations nor undertaken corrective
actions that would alleviate our concerns.
President Reagan stated in both reports, "So-
viet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls
into question important security benefits from
arms control and could create new security
risks. It undermines the confidence essential
to an effective arms control process in the fu-
ture. It increases doubts about the reliability
of the USSR as a negotiating partner and thus
damages the chances for establishing a more
constructive US-Soviet relationship." More-
over, Soviet violations cast serious doubt on
some of the key assumptions about arms con-
trol that have guided US policy and Western
public opinion for 30 years. Specifically, they
call into question that the risk of detection
would generally deter the Soviets from violat-
ing their arms control obligations, or in the
rare instances when the Soviets would not be
deterred, they would suffer serious penalties.
Our verification capabilities have not de-
terred the Soviet Union from violating arms
control agreements. Moreover, if the Soviets
are not made to account for their actions, it is
unlikely that they will be deterred from more
serious violations. We must approach arms
control today more carefully than we have in
the past.
We must fully consider the Soviet compli-
ance record as we develop arms control pol-
icy and defense policy in the future. We must
seek better means of detection, more compre-
hensive treaty provisions for verification, and
more careful treaty drafting that might help
deter cheating. However, by themselves these
measures are not enough; alone, they cannot
enforce compliance. Most fundamentally, the
USSR must adopt a more responsible policy to-
ward compliance. The traditional Soviet effort
to achieve unilateral advantage through arms
control treaties demonstrates that the West's
determination to maintain a military balance
is crucial to significant, equitable arms reduc-
tions. The Soviet Union will have no incentive
to accept such reductions unless it is convinced
that the West will not allow it to achieve uni-
lateral advantage within or outside the arms
control framework.
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Chapter II
Forces for
Nuclear Attack
In the year since the publication of Soviet
Military Power 1984, the Soviet Union has
pressed ahead with the development and de-
ployment of new generations of increasingly
capable land, sea, and air forces for nuclear
attack. As modernization of the fourth genera-
tion of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBMs) has neared completion-ICBMs
with greater accuracy and survivability-the
USSR has moved with great speed in the de-
velopment and test firing of a fifth generation
of ICBM, with a new dimension of capability-
mobility that increases its survivability.
As the USSR's strategic nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force has
increased its capability with the introduction
of each new TYPHOON-Class SSBN, the Sovi-
ets have launched a new SSBN-the DELTA
IV-as the platform for their most capable
long-range multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRVed) submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23.
The USSR now has three manned strategic
bombers in production and development-the
BACKFIRE, the BEAR H, and the BLACK-
JACK. With the reopening of the BEAR pro-
duction line, the Soviets are producing a new,
upgraded variant of the BEAR turboprop
bomber, thereby increasing their long-range
bomber force. Newly built BEAR H bombers
have become the launch platform for the now-
operational long-range AS-15 air-launched
cruise missile.
The modernization and upgrading of these
The introduction of new generations of Soviet
forces for offensive nuclear warfare - forces
ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles
to nuclear-tipped artillery - is a dynamic pro-
cess that includes both increased accuracy for
the weapons of those forces and increased mo-
bility for survivability. The fifth-generation SS-
X-24 ICBM will probably be silo-deployed at
first; rail-mobile deployment could follow.
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strategic forces have been paralleled by growth
and increased capabilities of the Soviets' longer
range intermediate-range nuclear force
(LRINF) and short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM) systems deployed with Soviet combat
forces. Significant improvements in nuclear-
capable aircraft, as well as increases in tac-
tical missiles and nuclear artillery, have also
occurred.
Soviet ;leaders since Khrushchev have fol-
lowed a consistent and relentless policy for
the development of forces for nuclear attack.
The Soviet leadership, however, recognizes the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. The
grand strategy of the USSR, therefore, is to at-
tain its objectives, if possible, by means short of
war-exploiting the coercive leverage inherent
in superior forces, particularly nuclear forces,
to instill fear, to erode the West's collective
security arrangements, and to support subver-
sion. Thus, the primary role of Soviet military
power is to provide the essential underpinning
for the step-by-step extension of Soviet influ-
ence and control.
In a global conflict, Soviet strategic policy
would be "to destroy Western nuclear forces be-
Nuclear Forces-ICBMs
1 SST ykovo
5013 perm
Y.ostikar Ola
om
-"'],IT,,Y at PACE
MISS~11L'E/S
?ss~8]
Aleysk
i
s-11, ,i
lovyannaya
SS-11
520
SS-18
308
SS-13
60
SS-19
360
SS-17
Test Center
150
A
fore launch or in flight to their targets; to en-
sure national survival should nuclear weapons
reach the Soviet homeland; and to support and
sustain combined arms combat in several the=aters of military operations. From these policy
directives come several, overarching strategic
wartime missions:
.eliminate Western nuclear capabilities and
related supporting facilities;
.seize and occupy vital areas on the
. Eurasian landmass; and
.defend the Soviet State against attack.
These missions would involve:
.disruption and destruction of the West's
essential command, control, and communi-
cations capabilities;
.destruction or neutralization of the West's
nuclear forces on the ground or at sea
before they could be launched; and
Nuclear Forces-SLBMs
SS-N-5
42
SS-N-18
224
SS-N-6
336
SS-N-20
60
SS-N-8
292
SS-NX-23
16
SS-N-17
12
Nuclear Forces-Bombers
BACKFIRE
250'
BADGER
287
BISON
48
BLINDER
136
BEAR
Test Center
125
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oprotection of the Soviet leadership and
cadres, military forces, and- military and
economic assets necessary to sustain the
war.
The Soviets believe that a conventional war
in Europe might escalate to the nuclear level.
Despite their oft-repeated commitment to no
firstI use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets have
developed extensive plans either to preempt
a NATO nuclear strike by launching a mas-
sive) attack, or to launch a massive first strike
against prime NATO targets should their con-
ventional operations falter.
Strategic and theater forces and programs in
place or under active development designed to
accomplish these objectives include:
ohard-target-capable ICBMs, ;LRINF ballis-
tic missiles, and land-based cruise missiles;
oshort-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and
free rocket over ground (FROG) systems
deployed with combat troops;
obombers and air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) designed to penetrate US and
Allied defensive systems;
osubmarine-launched ballistic missiles
and cruise missiles (SLCMs) on various
platforms;
oantisubmarine warfare (AS W,) forces to
attack Western nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines;
oair and missile defenses, including early
warning satellites and radars, interceptor
They submarine-launched SS-NX-21 cruise missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and can be fired
from standard size Soviet submarine torpedo tubes.
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aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),
antiballistic missile (ABM) radars and in-
terceptors, and some antiaircraft artillery;
?antisatellite weapons;
.passive defense forces, including civil de-
fense forces and countermeasures troops
and equipment devoted to confusing in-
coming aircraft; and
.hardened facilities 'numbering in the thou-
sands, command vehicles, and evacuation
plans designed to protect Party, military,
governmental and industrial staffs, essen-
tial workers, and to the extent possible,
the general population.
Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elim-
inating the US capacity to fight and support a
conflict would require the capability to employ
theater and strategic forces over a variety of
ranges and the destruction of:
.other military-associated command and
control;
.war-supporting industries, arsenals, and
major military facilities;
.ports and airfields in the United States
and those along sea and air routes to
European and Asian theaters of war; and
.satellite surveillance sensors, ground-
based surveillance sensors, related facili-
ties, and communications.
Offensive forces (ICBMs, LRINF, SLBMs,
SRBMs, cruise missiles, and bombers) and anti-
satellite weapons would generally be assigned
these tasks. In some cases, special purpose
forces could be used for these missions, espe-
cially in Eurasia. These tasks would be gen-
erally less demanding than those in the prime
category.
Soviet nuclear forces are designed and per-
sonnel trained to fulfill their missions under all
circumstances. In a nuclear exchange, the So-
viets believe the most favorable circumstance
would be a preemptive strike; the ,least favor-
able would be a follow-on strike after nuclear
weapons hit the USSR. The Soviets have train-
ing programs intended to enable nuclear forces
to operate under all circumstances. Moreover,
the Soviets appear to believe that nuclear war
might last weeks or even months and have fac-
tored that into their force planning.
?The key to success in preemption would
be effective coordination of the strike and
sound intelligence on Western intentions.
During wartime, the main mission of So-
viet intelligence would be to determine the
West's intended courses of action. Meet-
ing these demands in war requires reliable
command, control, and communications
under all conditions.
?A launch-under-attack circumstance would
place a great stress on attack warning sys-
tems and launch coordination. To meet
this demand the Soviets have established
a satellite-based ICBM launch-detection
system, built an over-the-horizon radar
missile launch-detection system to back up
the satellites, and have large phased-array
radars ringing the USSR. These warning
systems could give the Soviets time to
launch their forces very quickly.
.Follow-on strikes would require the sur-
vivability of the command, control, and
communications systems as well as the
weapons themselves. The Soviets have
invested heavily in providing this sur-
vivability. The SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19
ICBMs are housed in the world's hardest
silos. Silo deployment has been adopted
for ABMs as well. To increase survivabil-
ity, the SS-20 LRINF missile is mobile.
Mobile ICBMs are nearing deployment,
and a mobile strategic surface-to-air mis-
sile is almost operational. The launch-
control facilities for offensive missiles are
housed in very hard silos or on off-road
vehicles. Communications are redundant
and hardened. Higher commands have
multiple mobile alternate command posts
available for their use, including land ve-
hicles, trains, aircraft, and ships. Bombers
are assigned -dispersal airfields. Ballistic
missile submarines could be submerged in
deep fjords just off their piers or dispersed
while being protected by Soviet surface
and submarine forces.
?The belief that a nuclear war might be
protracted has led to the USSR's em-
phasis on survivability along with war
reserves, protection for essential person-
nel and equipment, and the capacity to
reload launchers. For their ICBM, LRINF,
SRBM, and air defense forces, the Soviets
have stocked extra missiles, propellants,
and warheads throughout the USSR. Some
ICBM silo launchers could be reloaded,
and provisions have been made for the de-
contamination of those launchers. Plans
for the survival of necessary equipment
and personnel have been developed and
practiced. Resupply systems are available
to reload SSBNs in protected waters.
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USSR ICBMs
METERS
=30=
SS-19 SS-X-24
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD In Nearing
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 Development Deployment
NUMBER DEPLOYED 100 420 60 Undetermined 150 308 360
WARHEADS 1 1 3 MRVs 1 1 4 MIRVs 10 MIRVs 6MIRVs Up to 10 MIRVs 1
MAX RANGE (KM) 11,000 13,000 10,600 9,400 9,000 10,000 11,000 10,000 10,000 10,500
LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot Hot Hot Cold Cold Cold Hot Cold Cold
METERS
=30=
-
rwl
-
NUMBER R DEPLOYED 26? 450 550 In Development
WARHEADS 1 1 3 Upto10
MAX RANGE (KM) 12,000 12,500 14,000 14,000
LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot Cold
As of early 1985
Even with these ambitious development and
deployment programs, the Soviets continue to
modernize all elements of their nuclear attack
forces. At the same time, the Soviet leader-
ship has been directing a campaign to support
and amplify ongoing antinuclear movements in
the West to influence, delay, or frustrate West-
ern !nuclear force programs. Using this two-
pronged approach, Moscow seeks new gains in
relative capability despite the drive of Western
governments to redress the imbalance that has
developed over the past decade.
Forces for Intercontinental Attack
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The operational Soviet ICBM force consists
of some 1,400 silo launchers, aside from those
at test sites. Some 818 of these launchers have
been rebuilt since 1972. Nearly half of these
silos are new versions of the original designs
and have been reconstructed or modified in the
past six years. All 818 silos have been hard-
ened better to withstand attack by currently
operational US ICBMs. These silos contain the
world's most modern deployed ICBMs-the SS-
17 Mod 3 (150 silos), the SS-18 Mod 4 (308), and
the SS-19 Mod 3 (360). Deployment of these
ICBMs began just six years ago.
The highly accurate SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs
carry more and larger Multiple; Independently
Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) than the
MINUTEMAN III, the most modern US ICBM.
The SS-18 Mod 4 carries ten MIRVs, and the
SS-19 Mod 3 carries six, whereas the MINUTE-
MAN III carries only three. The SS-18 Mod
4 was specifically designed to attack and de-
stroy ICBM silos and other hardened targets
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in the United States. Each of its .10 warheads
has more than 20 times the destructive power
of the nuclear devices developed during World
War II. The SS-18 Mod 4 force currently de-
ployed has the capability to destroy more than
80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear
warheads against each. The SS-19 Mod 3 ICBM
could be assigned similar missions and, in addi-
tion, could be used against targets in Eurasia.
Although the SS-17 Mod 3 is somewhat less ca-
pable than the SS-19, it has similar targeting
flexibility.
The remaining 580 Soviet ICBM silos are fit-
ted with the SS-11-420 SS-11 Mod 2/3s, 100
SS-11 Mod is-and 60 SS-13 Mod 2s. These
ICBMs of older vintage-1966 and 1973 ini-
tial deployment, respectively-are housed in
less-survivable silos and are considerably less
capable. Nevertheless, their destructive po-
tential against softer area targets in the United
States and Eurasia is significant in terms of
many of the Soviet nuclear requirements out-
lined above.
The SS-16 is a three-stage, solid-propellant,
single-RV ICBM that the Soviets claim has not
been deployed. The system was first tested in
1972; the last known test took place in 1976.
The SS-20 LRINF missile is closely related to
the SS-16. The SS-16 probably was intended
originally for both silo and mobile deployment,
using equipment and a basing arrangement
comparable to that used with the SS-20. The So-
viet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce,
test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and,
in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third
stage, the RV, or the appropriate device for
targeting the RV of that missile. While the
evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it indicates
that the SS-16 activities at Plesetsk are a prob-
able violation of SALT II, which banned SS-16
deployment.
Deployment programs for all of the currently
operational Soviet ICBM systems are complete.
The command, control, and communications
system that supports the Soviet ICBM force is
modern and highly survivable, and the reliabil-
ity of the ICBMs themselves is regularly tested
by live firings from operational complexes.
Those ICBMs in the current force that the
Soviets decide not to replace with modified or
new ICBMs will, in accord with past practice,
be refurbished to increase their useful lifetime.
During this process, some system modifications
could also be made. Through this capacity for
refurbishment, the Soviets can sustain a higher
level of confidence in system reliability over a
longer term than would otherwise be possible.
Force Developments. Soviet research and de-
velopment on ICBMs is a dynamic process in-
volving many programs. The completion of
current deployment programs probably marks
US and Soviet ICBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1969-1985
Soviet RVs
5,000 5,000
4,000 4,000
3,000 3,000
US RVs
2,000 2,000
Soviet ICBMs
L:~:~ I
1,000 ?- ?_--- 1,000
0 0
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
the end of significant Soviet investment in the
development of entirely new liquid-propellant
ICBMs. Modified versions of the SS-18, how-
ever, are likely to be produced and deployed in
existing silos in the future.
The Soviets appear to be planning on new
solid-propellant ICBMs to meet future mission
requirements, including a counterforce capa-
bility and ICBM force survivability. Two new
solid-propellant ICBMs, the medium-size SS-X-
24 and the smaller SS-X-25, are well along in
their flight test programs from the range head
at Plesetsk in the Soviet north. A mobile ver-
sion of each of these systems will be deployed.
The SS-X-24 will probably be silo-deployed at
first, with initial deployment expected in 1986.
Rail-mobile deployment could follow by one to
two years. Early preparations for the deploy-
ment of the SS-X-24 are already underway.
The SS-X-25 is approximately the same size
as the US MINUTEMAN ICBM. It will carry
a single reentry vehicle. The SS-X-25 has ap-
parently been designed for road-mobile deploy-
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ment similar to that of the SS-20; as such it will
be highly survivable with an inherent refire ca-
pability. Two bases, probably for the SS-X-25,
are nearing operational capability. They con-
sist of launcher garages equipped with sliding
roofs and several support buildings to house
the necessary mobile support equipment.
Recent activity at the Soviet ICBM test
ranges indicates that two additional new
ICBMs are under development. A new ICBM
to replace the SS-18 is nearing the flight test
stage of development. Additionally, a solid-
propellant missile that may be larger than the
SS-X-24 will begin flight testing in the next few
years. Both of these missiles are likely to have
better accuracy and greater throwweights than
their predecessors.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
The Soviets maintain the world's largest bal-
listic missile submarine force. As of early 1985,
the force numbered 62 modern SSBNs carry-
ing 928 nuclear-tipped missiles. These totals
do not include 13 older submarines with 39
missiles currently assigned theater missions.
Eighteen SSBNs are fitted with 300 MIRVed
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
These 18 units have been built and deployed
within the past 8 years. Over two-thirds of the
ballistic missile submarines, including those
equipped with MIRVed missiles are fitted with
long-range SLBMs that enable the submarines
YANKEE 1130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6
YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-11
DELTA-Class
YANKEE-Class
4--DELTA 1140m 12 Tubes SS-N-8-
+---DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-8-
DELTA III 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-18-
DELTA IV 160m 16 Tubes SS-NX-23
TYPHOON-Class
to patrol in waters close to the Soviet Union.
This affords protection from NATO antisubma-
rine warfare operations. Moreover, the long-
range missiles allow the Soviets to fire from
home ports, if necessary, and still strike targets
in the United States.
Three units of one of the most modern Soviet
ballistic missile submarine, the TYPHOON,
have already been built. Each TYPHOON car-
ries 20 SS-N-20 solid-propellant MIRVed
SLBMs. The TYPHOON is the world's largest
submarine, with a displacement of 25,000 tons,
one-third greater than the US OHIO-Class. The
submarine can operate under the Arctic Ocean
icecap, adding further to the protection af-
forded by the 8,300-kilometer range of the SS-N-
20 SLBM. Three or four additional TYPHOONs
are probably now under construction, and, by
the early 1990s, the Soviets could have as many
as eight of these potent weapons systems in
their operational force.
In accordance with the SALT I Interim
Agreement, the Soviets have, since 1978, re-
moved 12 YANKEE I units from service as bal-
listic missile submarines. These units had to be
removed as newer submarines were produced in
order for the overall Soviet SSBN force to stay
within 62 modern SSBN/950 SLBM limits es-
tablished in 1972. These YANKEEs, however,
have not been scrapped. Some have been recon-
figured as attack or cruise missile submarines.
The Soviets may have begun to assign
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines
US
i+POSEIDON 129.5m 16 Tubes
POSEIDON SSBN
4E
Comparative
Cross-Sections
of SSBNs
TYPHOON-
Class
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OHIO- f1
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Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
USSR US
METERS SS-NA8_____SS.-N-20_SS-NX_23
1'5
SS-N-8 POSEIDON TRIDENT
SLBM C-3 SLBM C-4
SS-N-6 SS-N-17
1:0
:;
iii-I:
.
M
OD
MOD MOD
1 3 2 1 2 3 In
1
2
RV's 1 1 2 MRVs 1 1 1 3 MIRVs 1 7 MIRVs 6.9 flight 10 8
RANGE (KM) 2,400 3,000 3,000 7,800 9,100 3,900 6,500 8,000 6,500 8,300 test 4,000 7,400
SS-N-5s not shown
theater attack missions to some of the 21 re- the DELTA IV, which will be fitted with the
maining YANKEE I submarines. However, SS-NX-23 SLBM, now being flight tested. This
YANKEE patrols targeted against the United large, liquid-propelled SLBM will have greater
States continue. throwweight, carry more warheads, and be
Force Developments. The Soviets have more accurate than the SS-N-18, which is car-
launched two units of a new class of SSBN, ried on the DELTA III SSBN. The SS-NX-23 is
The drawing at right helps to place the
enormous hull size of the TYPHOON-Class 186YDS OR 170M
SSBN in perspective. 120YDS OR 110M
C)CC7C7OC7 C7 ~ 0
0 10
rz; Football Field
wN-^ x
7 1
7
.
WIWI . Or z ?b"w' ?'~
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likely to be deployed on DELTA Ills as a re-
placement for the SS-N-18 as well as on the new
DELTA IVs.
The Soviets will probably begin flight testing
a modified version of the SS-N-20. Additionally,
US and Z?yautx SLBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1969-1985
0 - o
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
based on past Soviet practice, they may initiate
testing of a modified version of the SS-NX-23
before the end of the 1980s. Both modified ver-
sions of the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23 are likely to
be more accurate than their predecessors.
To ensure communication reliability, the So-
viets emphasize redundant and timely com-
mand and control for their military forces,
especially those for intercontinental attack.
The Soviets are expected to deploy an extremely
low frequency (ELF) communications system
that will enable them to contact SSBNs under
most operating conditions.
Strategic Aviation
Soviet strategic bombers and strike aircraft
ARCTIC OCEAN A_ ., ARCTIC OCEAN
5 O IH5 0 11i 0OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN
have been restructured to form five air armies
subordinate to the Supreme High Command
(VGK). The five armies are:
.Smolensk Air Army;
.Legnica Air Army;
.Venitza Air Army;
.Irkutsk Air Army; and
.Moscow Air Army.
These armies were established to place Soviet
strategic aircraft on a footing in peacetime that
would facilitate the transition to wartime. The
armies are focused on potential conflicts in Eu-
rope, Asia, and the United States.
Strategic aviation assets include some 170
BEAR and BISON bombers and about 250
BACKFIRE bombers (including 120 BACKFIRE
bombers in Soviet Naval Aviation). The Sovi-
ets also have 360 medium-range BLINDER and
BADGER bombers; 450 shorter range FENCER
strike aircraft; and 530 tanker, reconnaissance,
and electronic warfare aircraft. The Soviets
have allocated these aircraft among the five air
armies to provide support for specific theaters
of military operations and to assure the flexi-
bility to reallocate aircraft as necessary during
wartime. The intercontinental BEAR and BI-
SON bombers are available for maritime and
Eurasian missions, and the BACKFIRE can be
used against the United States. This flexibility
allows the Soviets to focus their strategic air
assets as circumstances require.
The Soviets have taken recent steps that in-
dicate greatly increased interest in their long-
range strategic bomber force. An entirely new
variant of the BEAR bomber-the BEAR H-
is now operational with the AS-15 long-range
cruise missile. This is the first new produc-
tion of a strike version of the BEAR airframe
in over 15 years. In addition, older BEAR
aircraft configured to carry air-to-surface mis-
siles (ASMs) are being reconfigured to carry
the newer, supersonic AS-4 missile in place of
the subsonic AS-3. Several of these reconfigu-
rations (BEAR G) have been completed. With
the BEAR H in series production, the decline in
the inventory of BEAR aircraft, characteristic
of recent years, has been reversed.
The BACKFIRE is the most modern oper-
ational Soviet bomber. The Soviets continue
to produce this aircraft at a rate of at least
30 per year; this production rate is likely to
be maintained at least through the end of the
decade. The original design has been modi-
fied several times, and further modifications
are likely to be made to upgrade aircraft per-
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UNREFUELED
COMBAT
RADIUS (KM) 8,300
MAX SPEED (KTS) 500
5,500
1,100
US Long-Range Strike Aircraft
=60
formance. The BACKFIRE is a long-range
aircraft capable of performing nuclear strike,
conventional attack, antiship, and reconnais-
sance missions. The BACKFIRE can be equip-
ped with a probe to permit in-flight refueling
to increase its range and radius capabilities. It
could be used against the contiguous United
States on high-altitude subsonic missions. Its
low-altitude supersonic dash capabilities make
it a formidable weapon to support military op-
erations in Europe and Asia as well.
The Soviets have some FENCER strike air-
craft assigned to strategic aviation. The
FENCER is a supersonic, variable-geometry-
wing, all-weather fighter-bomber that first
reached operational status in 1974. Three vari-
ants have been developed, the most recent
introduced in 1981. The aircraft is still in pro-
duction, and the number assigned to strategic
aviation is likely to increase over the next
few years.
Force Developments. The new Soviet long-
range bomber, the BLACKJACK, is in the
flight test stage of development. The BLACK-
JACK is larger than the US B-1B, probably will
be faster, and may have about the same combat
7,300
1,200
radius. This new bomber could be operational
by 1988. The BLACKJACK will be capable of
carrying cruise missiles, bombs, or a combina-
tion of both. It probably will first replace the
much less capable BISON bomber and then the
BEAR A bomber.
A new aerial-refueling tanker aircraft, based
on the 11-76/CANDID, has been under devel-
opment for several years. When deployed in
the near future, the new tanker will support
tactical and strategic aircraft and will signifi-
cantly improve the ability of Soviet aircraft to
conduct longer range operations.
US and Soviet Intercontinental-
Capable Bombers'
Inventory Inventory
600-1 r 500
350
350
300
USS---
300
250
/
250
20o 200
USSR (excluding
aircraft assigned
150 to Naval Aviation) 150
100 100
50 50
1982 1983
Year
US data include B-52, FB-111; Soviet data include BEAR.
BISON and BACKFIRE.
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Long-Range Cruise Missiles
Current Systems and Force Levels. The AS-
15, a small, air-launched, subsonic, low-altitude
cruise missile, similar in design to the US
TOMAHAWK, reached initial operational ca-
pability with the BEAR H in 1984. The AS-15
has a range of about 3,000 kilometers. The sys-
tem, could also be deployed on BLACKJACK
bombers when that aircraft becomes opera-
tional. The combination of the AS-15 and the
new BEAR H and BLACKJACK bombers will
increase Soviet strategic intercontinental air
power in the late 1980s. There are some 25
BEAR H bombers operational at this time.
Force Developments. The Soviets are de-
veloping four other long-range cruise missile
systems. Two of these are variants of the
AS-15, and the other two are variants of a
larger system probably designed for long-range
operations. The latter have no US counterpart.
The two smaller cruise missiles are being de-
veloped for launch from sea- and ground-based
platforms, respectively. The sea-based vari-
ant,% the SS-NX-21, is small enough to be fired
from standard Soviet torpedo tubes. Candidate
launch platforms for the SS-NX-21 include: the
existing VICTOR III nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN), a new YANKEE-Class SSN
and; the new AKULA, MIKE, and SIERRA-
Class SSNs. The SS-NX-21 is expected to be-
come operational this year and could be
deployed on submarines near US coasts.
The ground-based SSC-X-4 variant of the
small cruise missile may not be ready for oper-
ational deployment until late this year or next.
Its range and the likelihood the Soviets will not
deploy the system outside the USSR indicate
that its mission will be in support of theater
operations. The system will be mobile and prob-
ably follow operational procedures like those of
the SS-20 LRINF missile.
The larger cruise missile is being developed
as a sea-based system that has been designated
the SS-NX-24. A newly converted YANKEE-
Class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack sub-
marine (SSGN) will be the test platform for
the SS-NX-24. A ground-based variant of this
missile may be in development. The SS-NX-24
could be operational within the next two years,
and the ground-based version sometime after
that.
When first deployed, these cruise missiles
probably will be fitted with nuclear warheads
and capable of attacking hardened targets. De-
pending on future munitions developments and
the types of guidance systems incorporated in
their designs, they could eventually be accu-
rate enough to permit the use of conventional
warheads. With such warheads, highly accu-
rate cruise missiles would pose a significant
non-nuclear threat to US and NATO airfields
and nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict.
US Nuclear Forces
In measuring and evaluating the continuing
progress being made by the USSR's strategic
forces, it is useful to bear in mind the status of
US forces. By mid-1985, US strategic deterrent
forces will consist of:
?1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBMs;
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
USSR ___
WARHEADS
1
1
1
RANGE (KM)
in development
3,000
3,000
3,000
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?26 TITAN ICBMs;
?240 B-52G/H model bombers, plus about
23 aircraft undergoing maintenance and
modification;
?56 FB-111 bombers, plus some 5 aircraft
undergoing maintenance and modification;
?496 POSEIDON (C-3 and C-4) fleet ballistic
missile launchers; and
?144 TRIDENT fleet ballistic missile
launchers.
The historic and continuing objective of US
strategic forces is deterrence of nuclear and
major conventional aggression against the
United States and its allies. This policy has pre-
served nuclear peace for nearly 40 years and, in
sharp contrast to the Soviet priority accorded
nuclear warfighting, is based on the convic-
tion of all postwar American administrations
that there could be no winners in a nuclear
conflict. Rather, US deterrence policy seeks
to maintain the situation in which any poten-
tial aggressor sees little to gain and much to
lose by initiating hostilities against the United
States or its allies. In turn, the maintenance of
peace through nuclear deterrence provides the
vital opportunity to realize a complementary
and constant US goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons from the arsenals of all states. To re-
alize these deterrence objectives requires the
development, deployment, and maintenance of
strategic forces whose size and characteris-
tics clearly indicate to an opponent that he
cannot achieve his politico-military objectives
either through employment of nuclear weapons
or through political coercion based on nuclear
advantages. Modernization of US strategic de-
terrent forces is reported in Chapter VIII.
Forces for Theater Attack
With the initial deployment of the SS-20
LRINF missile in 1977, the Soviets launched
a concerted effort to modernize and expand
their intermediate-range nuclear force. Each
SS-20 carries three MIRVs, thereby providing
a significant force expansion factor even as the
older single-RV SS-4 is withdrawn. The SS-20
also has significant improvements in accuracy
and reaction time over the older missiles they
are replacing.
About 400 SS-20s have been deployed, two-
thirds of which are opposite European NATO.
Some shifting of the SS-20 force has recently
been observed as the Soviets prepare for de-
ployment of the SS-X-25 ICBM; however, no
reduction in the SS-20 force is expected from
this activity. The mobility of the SS-20 sys-
tem enables both on- and off-road operation.
As a result, the survivability of the SS-20 is
greatly enhanced because detecting and target-
ing them is difficult when they are field de-
ployed. Further, the SS-20 launcher has the
capability of being reloaded and refired, and
the Soviets stockpile refire missiles.
In addition to the SS-20 force, the Soviets
still maintain some 120 SS-4 LRINF missiles.
All of these missiles are located in the western
USSR opposite European NATO. In addition to
the land-based LRINF missile forces, the Sovi-
ets still maintain and operate 13 GOLF II-Class
ballistic missile submarines. Each submarine is
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Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Deployments
equipped with three SS-N-5 SLBMs. Six GOLF
II units are based in the Baltic, where they con-
tinue to pose a threat to most of Europe, while
the remaining seven GOLF Its patrol the Sea of
Japan, where they could be employed against
targets in the Far East.
Future Force Developments. A modified ver-
sion of the SS-20 is in flight test. This missile
is expected to have even greater accuracy and
other improvements over the current SS-20.
US Non-Strategic Forces
The initial deployment of PERSHING Its and
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) be-
Deployment
and Target Coverage
1985
gan in Europe in late 1983. Deployment will
continue until 1988, when 108 PERSHING Its
and 464 GLCMs will be in place, unless a US-
Soviet agreement that eliminates or limits the
number of LRINF missiles on both sides is con-
cluded. The deployment of US PERSHING II
and ground-launched cruise missiles responds
to the Soviet LRINF missile threat to Europe.
As the US PERSHING Its replace the shorter
range PERSHING Is and Soviet SS-23s replace
the SCUDs in Europe, the Soviet Union will
at least maintain its substantial numerical su-
periority in shorter range non-strategic nu-
clear missiles while improving the qualitative
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characteristics of its forces. The USSR also
possesses a significant numerical advantage
in intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) air-
craft and is reducing the qualitative advantage
NATO has enjoyed, despite NATO's INF air-
craft modernization program, which consists of
the replacement of older aircraft with the F-16
and TORNADO.
Short-range nuclear forces (SNF) consist of
tube artillery and missiles of much shorter
range than INF missiles. The balance in SNF
artillery, traditionally an area of NATO advan-
tage, also has shifted dramatically in favor of
the Soviets in recent years. The Soviets have
achieved parity in overall numbers of SNF and
continue to have a substantial advantage in the
category of short-range missiles, giving them
more flexibility in the employment of SNF.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
Current Systems and Force Levels. Armies
and fronts have missile brigades equipped with
12-18 SS-1C SCUD SRBMs. Over 400 SCUD
launchers are opposite European NATO; over
100 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in
the Far East; about 75 are opposite southwest
Asia and eastern Turkey; and one brigade is in
strategic reserve. The SCUD is expected to be
Missile Production
USSR and NATO'
Missile
1980 1981 1982
1983
1984
1984
Type
USSR USSR USSR
USSR USSR NATO?
ICBMs
250 200 175
150
100
350
350
.,.
SLCMs
750 750 800
800
850
665
SLBMs
200 175 175
200
200
80
Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes
United States; excludes France and Spain.
replaced by the SS-23, which has a longer range
and improved accuracy. Initial deployment is
anticipated opposite NATO and China. Each
front commander may also have a brigade of
12-18 SCALEBOARD missiles available. They
are more accurate than the SS-12 they re-
placed. Over 60 launchers are opposite
European NATO and 40 are opposite the Sino-
Soviet border in the Far East. There is one bat-
talion opposite southwest Asia/eastern Turkey,
and one brigade is in the Strategic Reserve mil-
itary districts. The new generation of shorter
range missiles can be employed effectively with
conventional and improved conventional mu-
nitions warheads in light of their greatly in-
creased accuracy.
In 1984, the Soviets, for the first time, for-
ward deployed the SCALEBOARD short-range
ballistic missile to Eastern Europe. These
front-level missiles, which normally deploy with
Soviet combined arms formations, are now in
position to strike deep into NATO without hav-
ing first to forward deploy.
Force Developments. It is likely that the So-
viets will continue to seek improvements in
their SRBM force. Improvements in guidance
and control, warhead capabilities, and accura-
cies are expected. Such improvements will give
the combined arms commanders enhanced non-
nuclear targeting options and more flexible, re-
liable, and survivable SRBMs. These systems
will be capable of delivering nuclear, chemical,
or conventional warheads closer to the forward
edge of the battle area and at greater depths
within the military theater of operations.
Tactical Missiles and Nuclear Artillery
Current Systems and Force Levels. At di-
vision level, the predominant weapon is the
unguided FROG, found in a battalion of four
launchers. The Soviets have begun to replace
the FROG with the more accurate, longer
range SS-21 in most divisions opposite NATO.
Currently there are some 375 FROG and SS-21
launchers opposite NATO. Two hundred FROG
launchers are opposite the Sino-Soviet border
and in the Far East; about 100 are opposite
southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; and about
75 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs.
In addition to FROG and SS-21 launchers,
a division commander has some 800 nuclear-
capable artillery tubes at his disposal. Two
new self-propelled artillery pieces, a 152-mm
gun and a howitzer/mortar, are now entering
the inventory. Both of these guns are nuclear-
capable and will bring the total number of
nuclear-capable artillery tubes to over 2,000
when fully deployed. An additional 4,000 152-
mm howitzers have at least a potential nuclear
capability.
Force Developments. As in all other nu-
clear attack forces, it is likely that the Soviets
will improve the capabilities of their tactical
missiles and nuclear artillery pieces. This im-
provement will be accomplished through incre-
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Land-Based INF Aircraft Deployed
at End of 1983*
Up to 3,000
Short-Range Nuclear Forces
(SNF) Deployed at End of 1983. "
100
1,100 r:j
NATO
Aircraft
F-111, F-4, F-16, F-104
JAGUAR, BUCCANEER,
TORNADO
WARSAW PACT
Aircraft"
BADGER, BLINDER, FISHBED,
FITTER, FLOGGER, FENCER
'Numbers refer to deployments of land-based aircraft (including maritime
aircraft) in Europe.
The BACKFIRE bomber with its primary nuclear role has been included in
the strategic section because it has an inherent intercontinental capability
although in its maritime and European land-attack roles it poses a serious
threat to NATO Europe.
From 1984 Edition of NATO Publication:
NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons
mental modernization of current systems and
the introduction of entirely new systems.
Strategic Rocket Forces
Immediately following World War II, Stalin
committed Soviet scientists and engineers to
develop the type of artillery promised by the
V-1 and V-2 rockets as rapidly as possible.
These weapons were to have increased ranges
for use in strategic warfare and, if possible,
an intercontinental capability. Stalin had as-
signed most missile development programs in
the Soviet Union to the artillery component
of the ground forces and kept their develop-
ment under strict security. The prevailing So-
viet view at the time was that rockets were
ordnance, not pilotless aircraft. From the mis-
sion point of view, however, use of long-range
missiles was assigned to Long-Range Aviation
(LRA) since it was responsible for the conduct
of strategic warfare. This mission assignment
lasted until late 1953, when the collective lead-
NATO
Missiles
L
LANCE, HONEST JOHN
Artillery
155mm, 203mm
WARSAW PACT
Missiles
FROG/SS-21
Artillery
152mm. 203mm, 240mm
For NATO the data reflect forces deployed in NATO Europe; for the
WARSAW PACT, forces facing NATO Europe.
From 1984 Edition of NATO Publication:
NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons
ership in the post-Stalin era stripped LRA of its
operational control of ballistic missiles.
In the 1950s as issues of doctrine and strat-
egy became clearer, yet to be resolved was what
service or services controlled ballistic missiles
and would be responsible for their operational
use. According to the Soviets, the issue was
discussed at the highest levels in the Ministry
of Defense and the Politburo. In late 1959, the
Soviets decided to create a new service, the
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), responsible for
the development, administration, training, and
operation of ballistic missiles. The creation of
the SRF and the appointment of M.I. Nedelin
as its commander was announced in January
1960 during a session of the Supreme Soviet.
Force Training
The Soviets were quick to realize that the
improvements in ballistic missiles and the for-
mation of the SRF required better technically
trained personnel and combat readiness. In
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Sea-Based Strategic Ballistic Missile
Force Development
Technological
(USSR estimated
at about 6 years)
Engineering and Testing
(USSR estimated
at about 5 years) -
SS-N-6
SS-N-5 JIM NWI
~CANC
SS-NX-231 POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
r -------- -r-
1945 1950
-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Longer Range Intermediate-Range
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Force Development
SS-20
1980 1985
1
1990
1
1990
SSC-X-4
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Technological
(USSR estimated
at about 8 years)
Engineering and Testing
(USSR estimated
at about 5 years)
W]
r
1945
1950 1955 1960 1965
1970 1975
1980 1985 1990
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Technological
(USSR estimated
at about 6 years)
Engineering and Testing
(USSR estimated
at about 5 years)
Deployment
SS-8
SS-7
SS-6
FMW
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Force Development
SS-11
ss-X-10 I /CANCELL D
MOD 2/,3 MOD 4
MINUTEMAN I
1945? 1950 1955 1960
addition to the training of personnel in mis-
silel maintenance and operations, the Soviets
trained missile crews to meet the demands of
modern nuclear warfare. As more technically
sophisticated computers and automated con-
troll systems were introduced and missile sys-
tems attained higher degrees of readiness, crew
sizes were reduced. The demands placed upon
crew readiness, however, increased to the point
whiere most or all ICBM and LRINF missiles
could be launched in minutes. The Soviets in-
sistthat SRF personnel be combat ready at all
times. As a result, Soviet missile crews are reg-
ularly trained for the contingencies of preemp-
tion, launch-on-tactical-warning, or a'second-
strike attack. An additional part of crew train-
ing is reconstitution and refire of those silos
PEACEKEEPER
1965 1970 1975 1980 1485 1990
not destroyed in a counterattack. ' ' In keeping
with the demands of Soviet nuclear doctrine,
missile crews are trained to perform' their tasks
under any contingency. I
Chapter II Forces for NuclearlAttack
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Chapter 1111
Strategic
Defense and
Space Programs
Strategic defenses are vital to the overall So-
viet strategy for nuclear war. The operations of
Soviet defensive and attack forces, as noted in
Chapter II, are closely coupled; attack strate-
gies are geared in large part to the reduction
of the defensive burden. In the' Soviet concept
of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved
through multiple types of defensive capabilities
compensating for shortcomings in individual
systems and for the likelihood that neither of-
fensive strikes nor any one layer of defense will
stop all attacking weapons. The Soviets are
making major improvements in their deployed
strategic defenses and are investing heavily in
ABM-related developments.
Soviet Military Power 1983 and 1984 outlined
the continuing expansion into space of the So-
viet drive for military superiority. In the past
year, some 80 percent of Soviet! space launches
have been purely military in nature, with much
of the remainder serving both military and civil
functions. This is an increase from 70 percent
in previous years. The Soviet military space
program dominates the USSR's overall space
effort. Soviet military doctrine establishes re-
quirements for the military space program.
Laser/Energy Weapons Systems
Soviet directed-energy development pro-
grams involve future Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) as well as antisatellite I and air-defense
weapons concepts.
The Soviet space shuttle, riding atop a BISON
bomber, is taken aloft on a test flight as part
of the USSR's extensive and growing military
space program, which includes operational
antisatellite weapons, development of ground-
and space-based laser weapons, and the intro-
duction of new heavy-lift space boosters and
manned spacecraft - all contributing to an op-
erational military capability in !space.
43
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By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have
prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballis-
tic missile defense. Testing of the components
for a large-scale deployment system could be-
gin in the early 1990s. The many difficulties
in fielding an operational system will require
much development time, and initial operational
deployment is not likely in this century. How-
ever, with high priority and some significant
risk of failure, the Soviets could skip some test-
ing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based
laser BMD by the early-to-mid-1990s.
Ground- and space-based particle beam wea-
pons for ballistic missile defense will be more
difficult to develop than lasers. Nevertheless,
the Soviets have a vigorous program underway
for particle beam development and could have a
prototype space-based system ready for testing
in the late 1990s.
The Soviets have begun to develop at least
three types of high-energy laser weapons for
air defense. These include lasers intended for
defense of high-value strategic targets in the
USSR, for point defense of ships at sea, and for
air defense of theater forces. Following past
practice, they are likely to deploy air defense
lasers to complement, rather than replace, in-
terceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
The strategic defense laser is probably in at
least the prototype stage of development and
could be operational by the late 1980s. It most
likely will be deployed in conjunction with
SAMs in a point defense role. Since the SAM
and laser systems would have somewhat differ-
ent attributes and vulnerabilities, they would
provide mutual support. The shipborne lasers
probably will not be operational until after the
end of the decade. The theater force lasers may
be operational sometime sooner and are likely
to be capable of structurally damaging aircraft
at close ranges and producing electro-optical
and eye damage at greater distances.
The Soviets are also developing an airborne
laser. Assuming a successful development ef-
fort, limited initial deployment could begin
in the early 1990s. Such a laser platform
could have missions including antisatellite op-
erations, protection of high-value airborne as-
sets, and cruise missile defense.
The Soviets are working on technologies
or have specific weapons-related programs
underway for more advanced antisatellite sys-
tems. These include space-based kinetic en-
ergy, ground- and space-based laser, particle
beam, and radiofrequency weapons. The So-
viets apparently believe that these techniques
offer greater promise for future antisatellite ap-
plication than continued development of
ground-based orbital interceptors equipped
with conventional warheads. The Soviets also
believe that military applications of directed-
energy technologies hold promise of overcom-
ing weaknesses in their conventional air and
missile defenses.
The USSR's high-energy laser program,
which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger
than the US effort. They have built over a half-
dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and
they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers
associated with laser development. They are
developing chemical lasers and have contin-
ued to work on other high-energy lasers hav-
ing potential weapons applications-the gas
dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser.
They are also pursuing related laser weapon
technologies, such as efficient electrical power
sources, and are pursuing capabilities to pro-
duce high-quality optical components. They
have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydro-
dynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15
megawatts of short-term electric power-a de-
vice that has no counterpart in the West. The
scope of the USSR's military capabilities would
depend on its success in developing advanced
weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic
missile defense.
The Soviets have now progressed beyond
technology research, in some cases to the de-
velopment of prototype laser weapons. They
already have ground-based lasers that could be
used to interfere with US satellites. In the
late 1980s, they could have prototype space-
based laser weapons for use against satellites.
In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have pro-
gressed to the point where they could include
construction of ground-based laser antisatellite
(ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These
could be available by the end of the 1980s
and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser
ASAT capability beyond that currently at their
test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy
operational systems of space-based lasers for
antisatellite purposes in the 1990s, if their
technology developments prove successful, and
they can be expected to pursue development of
space-based laser systems for ballistic missile
defense for possible deployment after the year
2000.
Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had
a research program to explore the technical
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feasibility of a particle beam weapon in space.
A prototype space-based particle beam weapon
intended only to disrupt satellite electronic
equipment could be tested in the early 1990s.
One designed to destroy satellites could be
tested in space in the mid-1990s.
The Soviets have conducted research in the
use of strong radiofrequency (RF) signals that
have the potential to interfere with or destroy
components of missiles, satellites, and reentry
vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could test a
ground-based RF weapon capable of damaging
satellites.
Soviet programs for the development and
application of directed-energy technologies to
strategic defense have been very vigorous in
the past and will continue to be so in the fu-
ture, irrespective of what the US does about
new strategic defense initiatives.
In the area of kinetic energy weapons, us-
ing the high-speed collision of a small mass
with the target as the kill mechanism, the
Soviets have a variety of research programs
underway. These programs could result in a
near-term, short-range, space-based system use-
ful for satellite or space station defense or
for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite.
Longer range, space-based systems probably
could not be developed until the mid-1990s or
even later.
Early Warning
The Soviets maintain the world's most ex-
tensive early warning system for both ballis-
tic missile and air defense. Their operational
ballistic missile early warning system includes
a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-
horizon radar, and a series of large phased-
array radars located primarily on the periphery
of the USSR. Their early warning air surveil-
lance system is composed of an extensive
network of ground-based radars linked opera-
tionally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies.
The current Soviet launch-detection satellite
network is capable of providing about 30 min-
utes warning of any US ICBM launch and of
determining the general area from which it
originated. The two over-the-horizon radars
the Soviets have directed at the US ICBM
fields also could provide them with 30 min-
utes warning of an ICBM strike launched from
the United States, but with somewhat less
precision than the satellite network. Work-
ing together, these two early warning systems
can provide more reliable warning than either
working alone.
The next layer of operational ballistic mis-
sile early warning consists of 11 large HEN
HOUSE detection and tracking radars at six
locations on the periphery of the USSR. These
radars can distinguish the size of an attack,
confirm the warning from the satellite and
over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide
target-tracking data in support of antiballistic
missile (ABM) deployments.
Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection
and Tracking Systems
Over-the-horizon radars
Hen House radars
New phased-array radars under construction
Moscow ABM radars
Current Soviet air surveillance radar deploy-
ments include more than 7,000 radars of vari-
ous types located at about 1,200 sites. These
deployments provide virtually complete cover-
age at medium-to-high altitudes over the USSR
and in some areas extend hundreds of kilome-
ters beyond the borders. Moreover, the over-
the-horizon radars provide additional warning
of the approach of high-flying aircraft. Lim-
ited coverage against low-altitude targets is
concentrated in the western USSR and in high-
priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983, the So-
viets have begun to deploy two new types of
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The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation, and capability of
the large phased-array, early warning and ballistic missile target-tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.
air surveillance radars. These radars assist in
the early warning of cruise missile and bomber
attacks and enhance air defense electronic war-
fare capabilities.
The new large phased-array radar for ballis-
tic missile early warning and target-tracking
discovered in 1983 in Siberia is still under con-
struction. This new radar closes the final gap
in the combined HEN HOUSE and new large
phased-array radar early warning and track-
ing network. Together, this radar and the five
others like it form an arc of coverage from
the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around
Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest. The
new radar violates the 1972 ABM Treaty in
that it is not located on the periphery of the
Soviet Union, nor is it pointed outward as
required by the Treaty. Its orientation and
function indicate it is for ballistic missile de-
tection and tracking-not space object track-
ing as claimed by the Soviets. The complete
network of these radars, which could provide
target-tracking data for ABM deployments be-
yond Moscow, probably will be operational by
the late 1980s.
The Soviets may establish a network of satel-
lites in geostationary orbit designed to pro-
vide timely indications of ballistic missiles,
including submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launches. Such a network could be
operational by the end of the decade.
The USSR has a strong research and devel-
opment program to produce new early warn-
ing and other air surveillance radars as well
as to improve existing systems. More than 15
types of these radars are currently' in develop-
ment. In addition, the Soviets are continuing
to deploy improved air surveillance data sys-
tems that can rapidly pass data from outlying
radars through the air surveillance network
to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM
command posts. These systems will continue
to be deployed until all areas are equipped with
them.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Soviets are continuing a major upgrad-
ing of their ballistic missile defense capabili-
ties. The Moscow missile defenses are being
enlarged and equipped with a new generation
of radars and interceptor missiles. Develop-
ments aimed at providing the foundation for
widespread ABM deployments beyond Moscow
are underway.
The new SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile,
which incorporates ballistic missile defense ca-
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pabilities, is nearing operational status, while
research on directed-energy BMD technology
continues apace.
The Soviets maintain around Moscow the
worl'd's only operational ABM system. This
system is intended to afford a layer of defense
for Soviet civil and military command authori-
ties in the Moscow area during a nuclear war
rather than blanket protection for the city it-
self. Since 1980, the Soviets have been upgrad-
ing and expanding this system around Moscow
within the limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The original single-layer Moscow ABM sys-
tem included 64 reloadable , above-ground
launchers at four complexes for the GALOSH
ABM-1B, six TRY ADD guidance and engage-
ment radars at each complex, and the DOG
HOUSE and CAT HOUSE target-tracking ra-
dars south of Moscow. The Soviets are up-
grading this system to the 100 accountable
i
Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense
ABM-1B Complex
ABM Silo Sites Under Construction _?
Roads
The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in the map at right include the Pushkino ABM
radar, above, GALOSH antiballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-
acceleration interceptors, top right.
Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Programs
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launchers permitted under the ABM Treaty.
When completed, the new system will be a
two-layer defense composed of silo-based, long-
range, modified GALOSH interceptors
designed to engage targets outside the atmo-
sphere; silo-based high-acceleration intercep-
tors designed to engage targets within the
atmosphere; associated engagement and guid-
ance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino
designed to control ABM engagements. The
silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The
first new launchers are likely to be operational
this year, and the new defenses could be fully
operational by 1987.
The Soviets are developing a rapidly deploy-
able ABM system to protect important
target areas in the USSR. They have been test-
ing all the types of ABM missiles and radars
needed for widespread ABM defenses beyond
the 100 launcher limit of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Within the next 10 years, the Soviets could
deploy such a system at sites that could be
built in months instead of years. A typical
site would consist of engagement radars, guid-
ance radars, above-ground launchers, and the
high-acceleration interceptor. The new, large
phased-array radars under construction in the
USSR, along with the HEN HOUSE, DOG
HOUSE, CAT HOUSE, and possibly the
Pushkino radar, appear to be designed to pro-
vide support for such a widespread ABM de-
fense system. The aggregate of the USSR's
ABM and ABM-related activities suggests that
the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense
of its national territory.
In addition, the Soviets are deploying one
surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and
are flight testing another, the mobile SA-X-
12. The SA-X-12 is both a tactical SAM and
antitactical ballistic missile. It may have the
capability to engage the LANCE and both the
PERSHING I and PERSHING II ballistic mis-
siles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the
potential to intercept some types of US strate-
gic ballistic missiles as well. These systems
could, if properly supported, add significant
point-target coverage to a widespread ABM
deployment.
Air Defense
The Soviets have deployed numerous strate-
gic and tactical air defense assets that have
excellent capabilities against aircraft flying
at medium and high altitudes. Although their
capability to intercept low-flying penetra-
tors is marginal, they are in the midst of a
major overhaul geared toward fielding an in-
tegrated air defense system much more capa-
ble of low-altitude operations. This overhaul
includes partial integration of strategic and
tactical air defenses; the upgrading of early
warning and surveillance capabilities; the de-
ployment of more efficient data transmission
systems; and the development and initial de-
ployment of new aircraft, associated air-to-air
missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.
Over the years, the Soviets have invested
enormous resources in their air defense sys-
tems. This sustained effort has produced an
array of weapons systems designed for a vari-
ety of air defense applications. For example,
they have fielded 13 different surface-to-air mis-
sile systems, each designed to cover a specific
threat regime.
The Soviets have made significant shifts in
the subordination of their air and air defense
assets. The reorganization has resulted in a
streamlined organization that merged strate-
gic and tactical air and air defense assets in
most land border areas of the USSR. The air
defense (APVO) interceptors became part of
a new structure, the Air Forces of the Mili-
tary District (MD), which also includes most
of the assets of the former tactical air armies.
The Air Forces of an MD include all air assets
in their geographic area (excluding Strategic
Aviation and transport assets). These assets
can be used either offensively or defensively as
the situation requires. The new structure im-
proves defensive capabilities, but its most sig-
nificant impact is on the capability to conduct
massed offensive air operations. Technological
advances in weapons systems and in command,
control, and communications have made its im-
plementation possible.
In terms of numbers alone, Soviet strate-
gic and tactical air defense forces are impres-
sive. Moreover, with the continuing deploy-
ment of new systems like the SA-10 SAM and
impending deployment of the SA-X-12, these
numbers are increasing along with capabil-
ity. Currently, the Soviets have nearly 10,000
SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites for strate-
gic defense, along with more than 4,000 launch
vehicles for tactical SAMs, subordinated to
nearly 445 launch units. More than 1,200 in-
terceptors are dedicated to strategic defense,
while an additional 2,800 Soviet Air Forces
(SAF) interceptors could also be used. Fur-
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the (, the Soviets are continuing the MAIN-
STAY AWACS aircraft program and test and
evaluation is underway. The MAINSTAY will
substantially improve Soviet capabilities for
early warning and air combat command and
control, especially against low-flying aircraft.
The MAINSTAY will also provide Soviet air
defenses with overland and overwater capabili-
ties to detect aircraft and cruise missile targets
flying at low altitudes.- Additionally, the
MAINSTAY could be used to help direct fighter
operations over European and Asian battle-
fields and to enhance air surveillance and de-
fense of the USSR. MAINSTAY production
could be about five aircraft per year.
The 1,200 all-weather interceptors assigned
to strategic defense are primarily based in cen-
tral air defense regions of the Soviet Union, in
addition to fighter/interceptors subordinate to
thelmilitary districts that are generally located
on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The in-
terceptor force is composed of a wide variety of
aircraft with varying capabilities.
The deployment of the supersonic MiG-31/
FOXHOUND interceptor, the first Soviet air-
craft with a true look-down/shoot-down and
I
A new generation of air defense, all-weather
interceptors is joining the highly capable
FLOGGER G, seen at top with AA-7 and AA-8
air-to-air missiles under wing, and FOXBAT E,
seen with the AA-6 missile.
multiple-target engagement capability, con-
tinued during 1984. The FOXHOUND, com-
parable in size to the US F-14 TOMCAT, is
deployed at several locations from the Arkhan-
gelsk area to the Far East Military District.
More than 70 of these aircraft are operational.
The MiG-25/FOXBAT A/E is a high-altitude,
high-speed interceptor that comprises approxi-
mately one-quarter of the strategic interceptor
force. The upgrade program of the FOXBAT
A to the newer FOXBAT E configuration pro-
vides a limited look-down radar; capability. The
remaining FOXBAT A aircraft are expected to
be modified to the FOXBAT E configuration
during 1985.
The MiG-23/FLOGGER B/G fighter com-
prises approximately one-third of the total
strategic interceptor forces. This variable-
geometry-wing fighter is equipped with a lim-
ited look-down radar. The remaining aircraft
employed as interceptors (the older FLAGON,
FIDDLER, and FIREBAR) comprise less than
one-third of the force.
Two new fighter-interceptors, the Su-27/
FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, have
true look-down/shoot-down capabilities. The
FULCRUM is a single-seat, twin-engine fighter
similar in size to the US F-16. First deploy-
ments of the FULCRUM to the Soviet Air
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Force military districts have begun, and more
than 30 are now operational. The FLANKER
is a larger, single-seat, twin-engine fighter sim-
ilar in size to the US F-15. Both aircraft have
been designed to be highly maneuverable in
air-to-air combat.
The three latest Soviet fighter-interceptor
aircraft are equipped with two new air-to-air
missiles, the AA-9 designed for the FOXHOUND
and the AA-10 designed for the FULCRUM and
the FLANKER. The AA-9 is a long-range mis-
sile that can be used against low-flying targets;
the AA-10 is a medium-range missile with sim-
ilar capabilities.
The new 11-76/MAINSTAY aircraft is illustrated
as configured for its airborne warning and
control mission.
The FLANKER and the FULCRUM, as well
as the FOXHOUND, are likely to operate un-
der certain circumstances with the new MAIN-
STAY AWACS aircraft.
Soviet strategic SAMs form barrier, area,
and terminal defenses. They afford broad cov-
erage for medium- and high-altitude defenses
under all weather conditions. Five systems are
operational-the SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and
SA-10. Of these, only the SA-10 is capable of
defending against targets with a small radar-
cross-section such as cruise missiles.
The first SA-10 site reached operational
status in 1980. Nearly 60 sites are now
operational and work is underway on at least
another 30. More than half of these sites are lo-
cated near Moscow. This emphasis on Moscow
and the patterns noted for the other SA-10
sites suggest a first priority on terminal de-
fense of wartime command and control, mili-
tary, and key industrial complexes. Over the
years, the Soviets have continued to deploy the
long-range SA-5 and have modified the system
repeatedly. Further deployment and upgrading
of the SA-5 to enhance its capability to work in
conjunction with low-altitude systems like the
SA-10 are likely in the future.
In keeping with their drive toward mobility
as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are
developing a mobile version of the SA-10 SAM.
This mobile version could be used to support
Soviet theater forces but, perhaps more impor-
tantly, if deployed with the territorial defense
forces, it would allow the Soviets to change the
location of SA-10 sites in the USSR. The mobile
SA-10 could be operational sometime this year.
The 1980 air defense reorganization permits
efficient integration of strategic and tactical
SAM systems. Most tactical SAMs are not
as range-capable as strategic SAMs, but many
have better low-altitude capabilities.
A mixed and integrated system of aircraft,
SAMs, and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) pro-
vides the Soviet Union with the most compre-
hensive air defense system in the world. Over
4,600 SAM launcher vehicles and 11,500 AAA
pieces are deployed at regimental through front
level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder-
fired SAM launchers are found at battalion and
company level and with non-divisional units.
The standard air defense for a tank or motor-
ized rifle regiment is a battery of SA-9/13 SAMs
and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA pieces. The
SA-9 system, mounted on a wheeled transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL), is being replaced by
the SA-13 on a tracked TEL. A follow-on to
the ZSU-23/4 is expected shortly. The stan-
dard SAM at division level is the SA-6 or SA-8,
although some divisions still have an AAA-
equipped air defense regiment. A new division-
level SAM, the SA-11, is beginning to enter the
inventory. It features an onboard radar that
increases mobility and target-handling capa-
bility. The standard weapon at army and front
levels is the SA-4, soon to be replaced by the
SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 has good low-altitude
air defense capabilities as well as the ballistic
missile defense capabilities noted above. So-
viet tactical SAM development is both broad-
based and active. New tactical SAMs and
improvements to older ones are now under
development.
The largest concentration of SAM launchers
and AAA pieces-over 8,100-is found opposite
European NATO; over 4,200 are opposite the
Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; there
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USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
Tu-128
FIDDLER B
FOXBAT A/E FLAGON E/F FLANKER
SPEED (KTS)
1,625 1,
200
1,350
950
1,080
1,350
1;350
1.375
RADIUS (KM)
1,450 1,
000
1,500
1;500
900
1,300
1,150
2,100
ARMAMENT
4 AAMs 2
AAMs
6 AAMs
4 AAMs
2 AAMs
6 AAMs
6 AAMs
8 AAMs
WINGSPAN (M)
14 9
14
18
12
8 (swept)
121
14
North American Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
F-106A
F-4C/D F-15A
CF-118-
DELTA DART'
PHANTOM 11 EAGLE
HORNET,
lqjpl
o-
SP
EED (KTS) 1,15
0
1.200
1,450
1;040
RA
DIUS (KM) 92
5
825
1,000
1
740
AR
MAMENT 5 A
AMs
8 AAMs
AAMs
8
6 AAMs
WI
NGSPAN (M) 12
12
13
121
Canadian
Soviet Territorial Air Defense
Interceptor Aircraft Bases
Strategic SAM Concentrations
Radars (BMD EW, OTH types)
argil nearly 700 opposite southwest Asia and
eastern Turkey; over 1,300 are in the Strategic
Reserve military districts.
Passive Defense
Soviet passive defense preparations have
been underway in earnest for some 30 years
and have, over time, expanded from the pro-
tection of such vital entities as the national
Party and government leaders'hip'.and Armed
Forces to,embrace the territorial; leadership,
national economy, and general population. The
Soviets regard passive defense) as.an essential
ingredient of their overall military posture
and war planning. In conjunction with active
forces,the Soviets plan for a passive defense
program to ensure the survival and wartime
continuity of:
?Soviet leadership;
?military command and control entities;
?war-supporting industrial production
and services;
*the essential workforce; and
*as much of the general population
as possible.
As this program has expanded, elements of it
have been designated by the Soviets as "civil
defense." Use of this term in As normal West-
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ern context does not convey the full scope of
Soviet Civil Defense.
Extensive planning for the transition of the
entire State and economy to a wartime pos-
ture has been fundamental to Soviet passive
defense preparations. The Soviet General Staff
and Civil Defense officials have supervised the
development of special organizations and pro-
cedures to implement a rapid transition to war
and have emphasized the mobilization and pro-
tection of all national resources essential to the
successful prosecution of war and recovery.
The senior Soviet military establishment has
also supervised the 30-year program to con-
struct hardened command posts and survivable
communications for key military commanders
and civilian managers at all levels of the Party
and government. Likewise, protective harden-
ing, dispersal, and wartime production plans
for Soviet industry have all been coordinated
with the wartime requirements of the military
and supervised by Civil Defense personnel. The
protection of the general population through
evacuation procedures and extensive shelter-
ing in or near urban areas is the most visible
aspect of the passive defense program.
Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability
1-1
FRESCO
FARMER
FISH POT
FIREBAR
FIDDLER
FLAGON
FOXBAT
FLOGGER B
FLOGGER G
FOXBATE
FLOGGER B
FLOGGER G
FOXBAT E
FIREBAR
FIDDLER
FLAGON
Limited
Look-down
True Look-down
Shoot-down
FLAGON
1988 estimate
Range Only
Radar
The passive defense program reflects the So-
viets' belief of their wartime need. The wartime
management system would be the militarized
system of national administration in which
peacetime government bodies become Civil
Defense components under direct military
subordination. This would extend to Soviet
territorial administration at all levels and to
specialized functional components such as in-
dustrial, transport, power, and communications
ministries. Soviet authorities at all levels would
serve as uniformed chiefs of Civil Defense and
command their respective organizations in a
military capacity. Soviet Civil Defense thus
serves both as a vehicle to administer peace-
time preparations and training and as the in-
frastructure that would keep together civil and
military bodies in the unified wartime manage-
ment systems.
Soviet commanders and managers at all lev-
els of the Party and government are provided
hardened alternate command posts located well
away from urban centers. This comprehensive
and redundant system, composed of more than
1,500 hardened facilities with special communi-
cations, is patterned after similar capabilities
afforded the Armed Forces. More than 175,000
key personnel throughout the system are be-
lieved to be equipped with such alternate facil-
ities in addition to the many deep bunkers and
blast shelters in Soviet cities.
Soviet passive defense efforts include mea-
sures to maintain essential production and ser-
vices even during a nuclear war. Elaborate
plans have been set for the full mobilization of
the national economy in support of the war ef-
fort and the conversion to wartime production.
Reserves of vital materials are maintained,
many in hardened underground structures. Re-
dundant industrial facilities have been built
and are in active production. Industrial and
other economic facilities have been equipped
with blast shelters for the workforce, and de-
tailed procedures have been developed for the
relocation of selected plants and equipment.
By ensuring the survival of essential workers,
the Soviets intend to reconstitute vital produc-
tion programs using those industrial compo-
nents that can be redirected or salvaged after
an attack.
The annual military and civilian cost of four
elements of the program-pay and allowances
for full-time Civil Defense personnel; opera-
tion of specialized military Civil Defense units;
construction and maintenance of facilities for
these units; and shelter construction-is less
than 1 percent of the estimated Soviet defense
budget. If duplicated in the United States,
these four elements would cost roughly $3 bil-
lion annually. The cost of construction and
equipment for leadership relocation sites over
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METERS SA-1
=-12-_ A
SA-2
EFFECTIVE LOW-TO- MEDIUM- MEDIUM- LOW-TO- LOW-TO- LOW-TO- LOW-TO-
ALTITUDE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM TO-HIGH TO-HIGH MEDIUM LOW LOW HIGH MEDIUM HIGH LOW
IMPROVED
HAWK-_
EFFECTIVE
ALTITUDE
NIKE
HERCULES
MEDIUM-TO-
HIGH
the past 25 years is between 8 and 16 bil-
lion rubles, or $28-56 billion if acquired in the
United States.
North American Defense Forces
United States and Canadian interceptor
forces assigned to the North American Aero-
space Defense Command (NORAD) maintain
continuous ground alert at sites around the pe-
riphery of the United States and Canada. Alert
aircraft intercept and identify unknown intrud-
ers. At present, there are no SAMs for US
continental air defense. In a crisis, the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could provide
additional interceptors. Supported by AWACS
aircraft, these forces could provide a limited
defense against bomber attacks.
To meet the increasing Soviet bomber and
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) threats,
US interceptor squadrons assigned to NORAD
are being equipped with newer more advanced
40 10 80+
LOW-TO- LOW-TO-
MEDIUM LOW HIGH
F-15 and F-16 aircraft. These modern fight-
ers will provide a look-down/ shoot-down ca-
pability to detect and engage enemy bombers
penetrating at low altitudes. The Canadians
are upgrading their air defense forces with the
CF-18. Joint United States and Canadian im-
provements to long-range surveillance include
modern microwave radars for the Distant Early
Warning line and over-the-horizon back-scatter'
radars looking east, west, and south.
Soviet space-oriented military systems pose
a threat to the land, sea, and air forces of the
United States. Some Soviet satellites are de-
signed to support targeting of Soviet antiship
cruise missiles launched against US surface
ships. The US ASAT program, centering on the
Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle, is part of the
response to this and similar threats.
Finally, the United States has called for a
research program to explore the possibility of
strengthening deterrence by taking advantage
of recent advances in technology that could,
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The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor,
at right, is launched from Tyuratam, above,
where launch pads and storage for additional
interceptors and launch vehicles are available.
in the long term, provide an effective defense
against ballistic missiles. This Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) is discussed in the con-
cluding chapter.
The Soviet Space Program
The Soviets believe in the combined arms
concept of warfare in which all types of forces
are integrated into military operations to
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achieve the desired goals. Space assets play
a major role in this equation in the areas of
antisatellite warfare; intelligence collection;
command, control, and communications; mete-
orological support; navigational support; and
targeting. The military support systems are
linked to ground, naval, and air forces through
earth terminals. Thus, Soviet forces can re-
cei v I e orders and information via satellite from
command headquarters thousands of miles
away. Their reliance on these systems is grow-
ing. Space weapons also play an important role
in their strategic operations.
The late Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiiy included
space in a statement defining the modern con-
cept of a theater of military operations. The
Soviet drive to use space for military purposes
is an integral part of Soviet military plan-
ning. The Soviet coorbital ASAT system, while
launched from the ground, is a space weapon
system. The Soviets also have two ground-
based lasers that are capable of attacking satel-
lites in various orbits. These systems suggest
that the Soviets are willing to use space for
military purposes that are more ominous than
those for which it has been used thus far.
The Soviets are currently developing a ver-
sion of the US space shuttle, a heavy-lift booster
system, a space plane, and directed-energy
weapons and have engaged in military-related
experiments aboard the SALYUT-7 space sta-
tion. The Soviets continue to pursue their
manned space programs, maintaining in orbit
the j SALYUT space station, which is manned
The Soviet space plane, above, may well have
an antisatellite mission when operational. An
unmanned scale model, at right, has already
been tested.
during most of the year. This gives the Soviets
the capability to perform a variety of functions
from space, including military R&D and us-
ing man to augment their other reconnaissance
and surveillance efforts. In addition, there are
other developments indicating Soviet research
on space-based ballistic missile defense.
Antisatellite Systems. Since 1971, the Sovi-
ets have had the capability to attack satel-
lites in near-earth orbit with a ground-based
orbital interceptor. Using a radar sensor and
a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can at-
tack a target in various orbits during the in-
terceptor's first two revolutions. An intercept
during the first orbit would minimize the time
available for a target satellite to take evasive
action. The interceptor can reach targets or-
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biting at more than 5,000 kilometers, but it
probably is intended for high-priority satellites
at lower altitudes. The antisatellite intercep-
tor is launched from Tyuratam, where launch
pads and storage space for interceptors and
launch vehicles are available. Several inter-
ceptors could be launched each day. In addi-
tion to the orbital interceptor, the Soviets have
two ground-based, high-energy lasers with an-
tisatellite capabilities. The Soviets also have
the technological capability to conduct elec-
tronic warfare against space systems and could
use their ABM interceptors in a direct-ascent
attack on low-orbiting satellites.
Space Boosters. The Soviets currently main-
tain eight space launch systems that are used
to place objects in orbits ranging from low-
earth to geosynchronous and beyond. They
are developing two more systems-a TITAN-
Class medium-lift launch vehicle and a SA-
TURN V-Class heavy-lift vehicle. Also, they
are developing their version of the US shuttle
orbiter, which seems almost identical to its US
counterpart, except for the absence of main en-
gines. It is estimated that the new heavy-lift ve-
hicle will be used to launch their orbiter as well
as other large payloads. This vehicle should
be able to lift as much as 150,000 kilograms
to low-earth orbit, giving the USSR a tremen-
dous capability to orbit heavy objects, such as
the components for a large, manned space com-
plex. The estimate for the medium-lift vehicle
is a payload capacity of approximately 15,000
kilograms. This system may be used to launch
their space plane, discussed below.
Manned Space Program. The Soviets have
emphasized man in space since the beginning
of their space program. In 1961 they placed the
first man into orbit. Their SALYUT space sta-
tions have accommodated cosmonauts for ex-
tended periods, setting several records in the
process. In 1984, three cosmonauts set a new
record, spending 237 days aboard SALYUT 7.
In 1982, two Soviet cosmonauts spent 211 days
aboard the space station. At the end of 1984,
Soviet cosmonauts had accumulated 3,691 man-
days in space, compared to the US astronaut
total of 1,289. In the spring of 1984, Soviet
cosmonauts demonstrated their capability to
perform on-orbit maintenance and repair by
conducting extra-vehicular activity (EVA) five
times, gaining valuable experience in on-orbit
repairs. During one EVA, the cosmonauts
added new solar panels to SALYUT 7. Dur-
ing another EVA, the Soviets accomplished an-
US and S?ydc i? Space Launches
0i ~ F0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
other space first-a space walk by a female
cosmonaut, Svetlana Savitskaya.
The Soviets have made known their plans
to replace SALYUT 7 with large space com-
plexes, supporting 20 or more cosmonauts on
a permanent basis. Such a complex will en-
hance their space-based military support and
warfighting capabilities. Missions could in-
clude military R&D, on-orbit repair of satel-
lites, reconnaissance, imagery interpretation,
ASAT support operations, and ballistic missile
defense support operations. Their shuttle or-
biter will likely be used to ferry cosmonauts
to this station as well as to place satellites in
orbit.
The Soviets apparently have already found
some military utility in their manned space pro-
gram. They have stated that "earth surface
surveys" were conducted during past manned
missions, but none of the photographs has ever
been published. The continuation of photo-
graphic and other missions aboard SALYUT 7
indicates the Soviets are aware of the poten-
tial value of manned space stations in an actual
wartime situation.
The Soviets have been experimenting with a
test vehicle that is apparently a scale model
of a larger, manned space plane. This vehicle
has been orbited unmanned on four occasions,
landing in water each time. Similar in ap-
pearance to the earlier US Dyna Soar craft,
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METERS
-60
Soviet Space Launch Vehicles
A
LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)'
290,000
310,000
310,000
120,000
180,000
680,000
670,000
190,000
LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)'
410,000
420,000
420,000
160,000
280,000
900,000
900,000
280,000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)'
6,300
7,500
2,100
1,700
4,000
19,500
5,500
MEDIUM-LIFT HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE, LAUNCH VEHICLE2
L
LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)'
400,000,
2,000,000
WITH 6 OR MORE
STRAP ON BOOSTERS
LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)'
600,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)'
15,000+
30,000
150,000
' Approximate.
3 In final stages of development.
this plane's possible missions include recon-
naissance, crew transport, satellite repair and
maintenance, and ASAT operations. It could
also be used as a manned space station de-
fender. A clue to its purpose is found in a 1965
Soviet definition of antispace defense: "A com-
ponent part of air defense. The main purpose
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of antispace defense is to destroy space sys-
tems used by the enemy for military purposes,
in their orbits. The principal means of anti-
space defense are special spacecraft and vehi-
cles (e.g., satellite interceptors), which may be
controlled either from the ground or by special
crews.
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The directed-energy R&D site at the Sary Shagan proving ground includes ground-based lasers
that could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a BMD role in the future.
The Soviets have openly discussed their
plans for ambitious planetary exploration in
spite of their apparent decision not to match
US lunar expeditions. In 1992, the condition
for a launch to Mars will be favorable, and the
Soviets are considering a manned expedition
to that planet at that time. They have stated
that the recent manning of the SALYUT space
station for increasingly longer periods of time
is to simulate the time it would take to con-
duct a Mars mission. This timeframe also
coincides with the 75th anniversary of the Bol-
shevik Revolution and with the 500th anniver-
sary of Columbus' discovery of the New World.
Such an expedition would add great prestige
to the Soviet Union and would further demon-
strate the capability of its space technology.
Military Space Systems. Soviet space sys-
tems dedicated to military missions include
satellites that perform reconnaissance, mis-.
sile-launch detection and attack warning,
command and control, and ASAT operations.
Dual-purpose satellites that perform some civil-
ian functions are used for communications,
navigational support, and weather prediction
and monitoring. The US has no counterpart
to Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites, the
Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance
Satellite (EORSAT), or the nuclear-powered
Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (ROR-
SAT). Their mission is to detect, locate, and
target US and Allied naval forces for destruc-
tion by antiship weapons launched from So-
viet platforms. These systems track naval and
merchant shipping. Four such satellites were
launched in 1984, two of which were of the
same type (RORSAT) that crashed in 1978, one
spreading radioactive debris across northern
Canada.
The Soviets have recently employed a new
radar-carrying satellite system. Designed for
mapping ice formations in polar regions, these
satellites will greatly enhance the ability of the
Soviet Navy to operate in icebound areas. The
system can be used to aid in the navigation of
northern sea routes to assist in moving naval
ships from construction yards in the western
USSR to new ports in the Pacific.
The launch rate of satellites to geostation-
ary orbits has risen in recent years. In the
period 1974-78, one to two launches per year
were conducted. In 1979, the rate increased
to five per year, and eight launches occurred
in 1984. These satellites are presumed to be
for communications, although not all may have
been for that purpose. The Soviets have filed
their intent with international organizations
to place almost 40 satellites in 21 different
positions in the geostationary belt. Many of
these satellites are years overdue, but the So-
viets are apparently determined to fill the an-
nounced slots. The Soviets are also in the
early stages of developing.a satellite system
called GLONASS, which, when fully developed,
should provide the Soviets with accurate posi-
tioning data worldwide.
For the most part, Soviet satellites do not
have lifetimes as long as those of their US
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The Soviet space shuttle, when operational, will have many roles including the delivery of
personnel and components to increasingly sophisticated manned Soviet space complexes.
counterparts. This is especially true of their re-
connaissance platforms, necessitating frequent
launches of replacements. However, the Sovi-
ets have shown great flexibility in maintaining
these systems in orbit, augmenting them with
extra satellites as warranted by changing situ-
ations. They have demonstrated a launch surge
capability that could be a distinct advantage in
time of hostilities. In 1984, the Soviets orbited
a reconnaissance satellite that stayed in orbit
far longer than previous ones. This could indi-
cate a new system or an advanced modification
of an old one, demonstrating their increasing
sophistication and capabilities.
In late 1984, a new Soviet auxiliary ship
was seen arrayed with extensive radomes and
antennae. The ship, named after the first com-
mander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Mar-
shal M.I. Nedelin, appears to be a new space
and missile support ship capable of a vari-
ety of missions, including support to strategic
forces worldwide. On its maiden voyage the
NEDELIN transited directly from the Baltic to
the port of Vladivostok, the headquarters of the
Pacific Ocean Fleet. This ship will significantly
upgrade the Soviet capability to test new gen-
erations of missiles as well as support the ex-
panding Soviet space program. The NEDELIN
joins a growing fleet of Soviet space support
ships that provide assistance to manned and
unmanned missions. An additional ship of the
NEDELIN-Class is under construction.
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Chapter IV
Ground Forces
With approximately one-sixth of the earth's
land surface within its boundaries, the USSR
is a continental power that has traditionally
maintained large, well-equipped ground forces
as one of its prime components of military
power. The ground forces are the largest of
the USSR's five branches of the Armed Forces.
They are currently engaged in an ambitious
force development program involving force
expansion, equipment modernization, improve-
ments in training, the development of inno-
vative tactics and operational, concepts, and
enhancement of command and control capabili-
ties. The result of this effort is the development
of a formidable, offensively oriented force that
poses a serious threat to land areas peripheral
to the USSR and beyond.
Soviet ground forces are capable of partic-
ipating in large-scale, theaterwide, combined
arms offensive operations in areas contiguous
to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and
Afghanistan. As the main element in Soviet
Armed Forces, the ground forces have been
equipped and trained for a war of highly mobile
combat under nuclear conditions. Recently,
however, improvements have greatly increased
their capability to fight a non-nuclear conflict.
The past 15 years have seen technological
improvements in Soviet military equipment, an
expansion in the size of the ground forces, and
numerous organizational changes, all of which
are related to evolving Soviet military doc-
trine and adaptation to the problems of modern
warfare.
Until recently, a major assumption in Soviet
military planning was that a conventional war
would cross the nuclear threshold early in a
conflict; therefore, the Soviets, were prepared
28,000 of the USSR's 52,000 main battle tanks
are opposite NATO Europe. Pontoon bridges
and other river-crossing equipment - some
22000 meters of bridging equipment - have
been pre-positioned in Eastern Europe to speed
the forward thrust of Soviet tank and motor-
ized rifle divisions in the event'of conflict.
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The 50 tank divisions of the USSR's ground forces include growing numbers of modern main
battle tanks such as the T-72, seen here, the T-64, and the T-80.
to fight in a nuclear environment. This was re-
flected in their equipment, deployment of forces
in the field, and operational planning that envi-
sioned early use of nuclear weapons. Realizing,
however, the uncertainty of warfare once nu-
clear weapons are employed, Soviet military
leaders have developed an operational concept
designed to win a war before the enemy can use
nuclear weapons. If an adversary should de-
cide to escalate to nuclear warfare, the Soviets
would attempt to preempt with a massive the-
ater nuclear strike. They would also attempt
to intermingle their forces with the enemy in
order to inhibit enemy use of nuclear weapons.
Soviet military operational concepts are dy-
namic and respond to changes in technology,
military geography, politics, and developments
in enemy forces. However, the Soviet goal is
constant-the attainment of a quick victory in
theater warfare through the rapid advance to
deep theater objectives.
Ground Force Organization
In peacetime Soviet ground forces personnel
number approximately 1.9 million. Their com-
bat power resides in 213 maneuver divisions,
including 14 mobilization divisions, with two
additional divisions expanded to new corps-
type structures. There is also an extensive
combat support structure, including artillery,
missile, air defense, engineer, reconnaissance,
signal, chemical, and logistic units.
In peacetime, the ground forces in the USSR
are subordinate to 16 military districts. Forces
deployed in Eastern Europe are organized into
four Soviet Groups of Forces-one each in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Soviet forces in
Mongolia and Afghanistan are each organized
into an army subordinate to the adjacent mili-
tary district. The seven airborne divisions are
directly subordinate to Airborne Forces Head-
quarters in Moscow.
While the structure and size varies widely, a
typical military district or Group of Forces in-
cludes several combined arms or tank armies,
an artillery division, an air defense division,
several surface-to-air missile brigades, an avia-
tion component called the air forces of the
military district or Groups of Forces, and nu-
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merous other support units. During wartime,
the major Groups of Forces and military dis-
tricts would form fronts. There is no exact
Western counterpart to a front; the nearest
equivalent would be an Army Group with or-
ganic tactical aviation. A number of fronts
would conduct operations designed to secure
strategic objectives within a designated the-
ater of military operations (TVD). There is no
fixed organization for either an army or a front;
rather, each is tailored for operations in a par-
ticular area.
Tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions
constitute the basic maneuver forces of the So-
viet ground forces. Tank and motorized rifle
divisions are highly mobile armored forces. The
tank division-with 11,000 men-is based on
three tank regiments and one motorized rifle
regiment, while the motorized rifle division-
13,000 men-is based on three motorized rifle
regiments and one tank regiment. Both tank
and motorized rifle divisions have a full comple-
ment of support elements-aviation, artillery,
air defense, signal, engineer, chemical, recon-
naissance, maintenance, motor transport, and
medical units. Soviet airborne divisions do not
have the same degree of land mobility as tank
or motorized rifle divisions, but they are signif-
icantly more mobile than a US airborne divi-
sion. They consist of three parachute regiments
with BMDs (airborne amphibious combat vehi-
cles) plus combat support and service units.
The Soviets are now engaged in a far-reach-
ing and comprehensive upgrading of their
ground force structure. This program is de-
signed to ensure the maintenance of offensive
capability in Eurasian theaters. These devel-
opments enable the Soviets to implement their
offensive doctrine calling for seizure of objec-
tives deep in the theater in a short, intense
campaign fought in a conventional, nuclear, or
chemical environment. Force structure devel-
opments involve:
.force expansion through the growth of
existing units and the creation of new
units;
.force modernization through the assign-
ment of large numbers of new tanks, ar-
tillery, air defense systems, helicopters,
surface-to-surface missiles, and other sup-
port equipment;
.force reorganization to enable optimal em-
ployment of the improved war-fighting ca-
pabilities resulting from the introduction
of new weapons systems; and
.expansion and improvement of the logistic
support structure.
These enhancements are being complement-
ed by improvements in training and in com-
mand and control developments, as well as
the employment of innovative operational con-
cepts and tactics. Altogether, Soviet ground
forces are a modern, powerful, mobile, offen-
sive threat in land theaters of Eurasia.
Force developments are most noteworthy in
the expansion and reorganization of tank and
motorized rifle divisions. The resultant di-
visions are larger and more combat-capable,
configured for high-speed, combined arms op-
erations on either a conventional or nuclear
battlefield which are envisioned in Soviet offen-
sive strategy. The expansion of the motorized
rifle and artillery assets of tank regiments is
particularly noteworthy. These regiments are
now a very effective combined arms formation.
Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored
personnel carriers (APCs) have been assigned
to motorized rifle battalions to carry personnel
to man crew-served weapons. The expansion
of the division's helicopter detachment to a
squadron equipped with attack helicopters now
gives division commanders organic aerial fire
support.
The Soviets have converted two divisions
into corps-like structures. Almost twice as
large as a normal tank division, these new for-
mations contain in excess of 450 tanks, 600
infantry vehicles and armored personnel car-
riers, and 300 artillery pieces/multiple rocket
launchers. They are ideally suited to act as
an Operational Manuever Group (OMG), con-
ducting high-speed, large-scale raid and ex-
ploitation operations deep in an enemy's rear
area. Additional units of this type are expected
to be formed once testing and evaluation are
completed. These new-type corps would be pow-
erful formations, the employment of which
would be a critical element of Soviet ground
force operations.
The Soviet Union maintains the world's
largest airborne force, currently seven divi-
sions. The units of an eighth division are em-
ployed in operations in Afghanistan but could
be relocated to meet Soviet requirements. In
addition to the regular airborne divisions, the
Soviet Union has formed air assault brigades at
front level and air assault battalions at army
level. These units have the capability to be
inserted behind the front line by parachute, he-
liborne operations, or by air landings. Their
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USSR Combat and Support Helicopters
SPEED (KM/H), 300
RADIUS (KM) 240
11 -
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS
Mi-24/HIND
SPEED (KM/H) 320
RADIUS (KM) 160
NAVAL AIR
VARIANTS
Mi-B/HIP
RADIUS (KM) 2UU
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS 26
Mi-6/HOOK
SPEED (KM/H) 300
RADIUS (KM) 300
SOLDIERS 70
Mi-26/HALO
SPEED (KM/H) 300
RADIUS (KM) 370
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS 85+
Ka-27/HELIX
SPEED (KM/H) 220-
RADIUS (KM) 250
NAVAL AIR VARIANTS
mission would be to secure key road and rail
junctions and river crossing sites or to capture
or destroy command, control, communications,
and intelligence (C31) facilities and Western
nuclear weapons systems.
In addition to the upgrade of forces at the
division level, non-divisional artillery support
for maneuver forces is also experiencing signifi-
cant growth. Some army-level regiments are be-
ing expanded to brigade size with the addition
of a fourth battalion. Concurrently, battalions
are expanding from 18 to 24 guns each. These
changes have resulted in a 40 percent increase
in artillery pieces and are occurring primarily
in units opposite NATO.
In 1984, the Soviets deployed the SCALE-
BOARD short-range ballistic missile to East-
ern Europe. These missile units redeployed
from the Western USSR. Their forward deploy-
ment places the SCALEBOARDs, with their
900-kilometer range, in position to strike deep
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS
RADIUS (KM) Ee 340
COMBAT LOADED
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS
SPEED (KM/H) 240
RADIUS (KM) . 190
COMBAT LOADED
UH-IN/IROQUOIS
SPEED (KM/H) 200
RADIUS (KM) 200
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS 9
CH-53E/SUPER SEA
SPEED (KM,IH)=" 280
RADIUS (KM) 460
COMBAT LOADED
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS
SPEED (KM/H) 260
RADIUS (KM) 190
COMBAT LOADED
SOLDIERS 3311
into NATO's rear area from their new launch
sites without having first to deploy forward,
thus reducing warning time prior to launch.
The Soviets are upgrading and expanding
their helicopter forces. At division level, he-
licopter detachments continue to expand to
squadrons, and, in some squadrons, the number
of HIND attack helicopters has been
increased. At army level about 20 attack reg-
iments have been formed, with up to 60 HIP
and HIND attack helicopters in each. Over
half are deployed opposite NATO forces. Most
attack helicopters are the heavily armed Mi-
24/HIND DBE and Mi-8/HIP E. All three air-
craft are armed with antitank guided missiles
(ATGMs) and 57-mm unguided rockets, which
are effective against personnel and lightly ar-
mored targets. The ATGMs and rocket pods
on the HIND can be replaced with a mix of up
to 750 kilograms of chemical or conventional
bombs on each wing. Other armament on the
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The %i-28/HAVOC is the USSR's newest attack helicopter.
HIND D/E includes a multibarrel 12.7-mm tur-
reted nose gun; the HIP E has a single-barrel
12.7-mm gun.
Soviet emphasis on a heavy-lift helicopter
transport capability is reflected in the devel-
opment and recent appearance of the Mi-26/
HALO. It is the world's largest production he-
licopter, capable of carrying internally two air-
borne infantry combat vehicles or about 90
combat-loaded troops. The Soviets are now
equipping their helicopters with infrared (IR)
suppressors, IR decoy dispensers, and addi-
tional armor, thereby increasing their surviv-
ability-modifications that are probably the
result of lessons learned in Afghanistan. A
new attack helicopter, the Mi-28/HAVOC, sim-
ilar to the US Army APACHE, is expected
to be deployed in the near future. The new
HOKUM helicopter will give the Soviets a
significant rotary-wing air superiority capa-
bility. This system has no current Western
counterpart. The Soviets are also employing
helicopters 'as airborne command posts and
electronic jamming platforms, as well as attack
and transport platforms.
To ensure proper support for their expanding
maneuver and fire support forces, the Soviets
are making changes in their logistics structure.
In the past, transport, supply, .and servicing op-
erations were fragmented. Today, at division
level, there is, a materiel support battalion that
includes motor transport, supply, and mainte-
nance elements. Its transport vehicle inventory
is about 30 percent larger than those of di-
visional motor transport battalions. Materiel
support brigades are being formed at army and
front levels, with the consolidation of motor
transport assets and materiel depots under one
materiel support brigade commander, stream-
lining logistics command and control. The
Soviet Armed Forces have prestocked large
quantities of ammunition, fuel, and other war
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supplies in forward areas and maintain large
strategic reserves for long-term conflicts. In
the Western TVD, opposite European NATO,
for example, there is sufficient fuel for 90 days
and ammunition for 60 to 90 days of combat.
Inventories and Deployments
The Soviets currently have 199 active tank,
motorized rifle, and airborne divisions. Of
these, 98 are located opposite NATO, includ-
ing 30 in Eastern Europe, and 53 are along the
Sino-Soviet border and in the Soviet Far East
opposite China and Japan. An additional ten
divisions, including four in Afghanistan, are
opposite southwest Asia. The 20 divisions in
the Caucasus are available for operations in
eastern Turkey and southwest Asia. An addi-
tional 18 divisions are located in the Strategic
Reserve MDs.
Approximately 40 percent of Soviet divi-
sions, including all those deployed outside the
USSR and six of the seven airborne divisions,
are manned at what the Soviets consider ready
levels. These could be mobilized and prepared
WEIGHT (MT) 51 55
SPEED (KM/HR) 50 70
MAIN ARMAMENT 105-mm 105-
WEIGHT (MT) 36 37
SPEED (KM/HR) 50 50
MAIN ARMAMENT 100-mm 115-mm
for combat in a short period of time. The
remainder are cadre divisions and could re-
quire up to 60 days to mobilize personnel and
equipment, deploy to local dispersal areas, and
train for offensive combat operations. The So-
viets also have 14 mobilization bases or inac-
tive divisions. These are unmanned equipment
sets intended to form mobilization divisions in
wartime. In total, the Soviets have 213 divi-
sions and two new army corps. These forces are
backed up by a well-organized and tested mo-
bilization system that can rapidly call up the
civilian reservists required to bring the Armed
Forces to full wartime manning. The USSR
has an enormous manpower pool with approx-
imately 9 million reservists having served in
the last five years, of which over 3 million are
ground force trained. These would be called up
first and could be quickly integrated into the
force structure.
The ground forces include over 52,000 main
battle tanks in the active inventory, of which
more than one-third are the latest models, the
T-64/72/80 series. These new tanks feature in-
creased firepower, with a 125-mm main gun,
and improved fire control systems, including a
laser range finder on some versions. Both the
T-80 and a variant of the. T-64 can fire an anti-
tank guided missile through the main gun. Sur-
vivability has been increased through the use
of improved armor, incorporating laminates
and composites.
Over half the tanks, nearly 28,000, are found
opposite European NATO, including almost all
the T-64/72/80 series. The second largest group-
ing, about 15,000, is opposite the Sino-Soviet
border and in the Far East. Forces opposite
southwest Asia and in the Caucasus have an
additional 5,000 tanks, and another 4,000 are
located in the Strategic Reserve MDs.
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Infantry Carriers
To mesh the infantry with the tank force,
the' ground forces have an inventory of some
60,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry
fighting vehicles. The majority of the inven-
tory consists of the BTR-60 wheeled APC, and
they tracked BMP IFV. Normally, a motorized
rifle regiment of a tank division and a motor-
ized rifle regiment of a motorized rifle division
are' BMP equipped; the other two motorized ri-
fle regiments of the motorized rifle division are
equipped with BTR-60s.
A follow-on to the BTR-60, the BTR-70, has
been fielded in limited numbers. It has an im-
proved engine/drive train and better off-road
performance. The improved BMP-2 is augment-
ing and replacing the BMP. It has a 30-mm
rapid-fire gun in place of the 73-mm gun of the
original BMP and carries the AT-5 ATGM. In
addition to the BTR/BMPs, the Soviets have
fielded the BMD with airborne and air assault
units and a number of light-ground-pressure ve-
hicles such as the GTT/MT-LB series for use in
areas of poor trafficability.
As with tanks, the largest concentration
of APCs/IFVs is opposite European NATO-
nearly 29,000. Over 17,000 are opposite the
Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East. An
additional 8,000 are opposite southwest Asia
and eastern Turkey, and over 3,500 are in the
Strategic Reserve MDs.
Shorter Range Missiles
Over 1,500 tactical missile and shorter range
intermediate-range nuclear force (SRJNF) bal-
listic missile launchers are in the Soviet in-
ventory. At division level, the predominant
missile is the unguided, free rocket over ground
(FROG) found in a battalion of four launchers.
The Soviets have begun to replace the FROG
with the more accurate, longer range SS-21
in some divisions opposite European NATO.
Currently, there are some 375 FROG and SS-
21 launchers opposite NATO. Over 200 FROG
launchers are in the Far East, about 100 are op-
posite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey, and
about 75 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs.
Armies and fronts have missile brigades
equipped with from 12 to 18 SS-1C SCUD SRINF
missile launchers. Over 400 SCUD launchers
are opposite European. NATO, over 100 are in
the Far East, about 75 are opposite southwest
Asia and eastern Turkey, and one brigade is in
the Strategic Reserve MDs. It is likely that the
SCUD will be replaced by the SS-23, which has
a longer range and improved accuracy. Initial
deployment is anticipated opposite NATO and
China. The front commander, may also have
a brigade of 12-18 SS-12s and SS-22s available.
The SS-22 is more accurate than the SS-12 it is
replacing. Over 60 launchers are opposite Eu-
ropean NATO, and 40 are in the Far East. There
is one battalion in the southwest Asia/eastern
Turkey area and one in the Strategic Reserve
MDs. The new generation of shorter range
SS-23 short-range ballistic missile transporter-
erector-launchers.
USSR Surface-to-Surface Missiles
ss-1
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missiles can be employed effectively with con-
ventional and improved conventional muni-
tions (ICM) warheads due to their increased
accuracy.
Fire Support
The Soviets have traditionally placed great
emphasis on fire support and currently have
over 33,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs) greater than 100mm in cal-
iber in their active inventory. The ground
forces are now fielding self-propelled artillery
at all levels. Over 14 percent of their in-
ventory consists of self-propelled weapons, of
which over 70 percent are opposite the NATO
central region. The Soviets first began to de-
ploy self-propelled artillery in the early 1970s,
when 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers were in-
troduced. In the mid-1970s, a 203-mm how-
itzer and 240-mm mortar appeared in nuclear-
capable heavy artillery brigades; and, in the
late 1970s, the ground forces began deployment
of a new, nuclear-capable 152-mm self-propelled
gun. A towed version of this gun is also being
fielded. The most recent self-propelled weapon
to enter the inventory is a howitzer/mortar as-
signed to airborne and air assault units. The
number of nuclear-capable artillery tubes has
gone from less than 800 to over 7,700 in about
ten years. An additional 4,000 152-mm how-
itzers have a potential nuclear capability.
About half-17,000-of the artillery pieces
and MRLs are deployed opposite European
NATO, and over a quarter-nearly 10,000-are
in the Far East; about 4,000 are opposite south-
west Asia and eastern Turkey, and over 2,000
are in the Strategic Reserve MDs. There are
also 10,000 artillery pieces 100mm or smaller in
caliber used as training pieces or as substitutes
for larger caliber weapons.
122-mm self-propelled howitzer.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
An integrated system of surface-to-air mis-
siles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA)
provides the Soviet Union with the most com-
prehensive troop air defense system in the
world. Over 4,600 SAM launchers and 12,000
AAA pieces are deployed at regimental through
front level. In addition, as many as 25,000
shoulder-fired SAM launchers are at battal-
ion and company level and with non-divisional
units.
The standard air defense for a tank or motor-
ized rifle regiment is a battery of SA-9/13 SAMs
and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA pieces. The
SA-9 system, mounted on a wheeled transport-
er-erector-launcher (TEL), is being selectively
replaced and augmented by the SA-13 on a
tracked TEL. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is
expected. The standard SAM at division level
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7
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The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high
performance aircraft and will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles.
is the SA-6 or SA-8, although some divisions
still have an AAA-equipped air defense regi-
meet. A new division-level SAM, the SA-11,
is beginning to enter the inventory. It fea-
tures onboard radar, which increases mobility
and target handling capability. The standard
weapon at army and front level is the SA-
which should shortly begin being replaced ~rz C
4
Y
b ' the SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 will probably
also have a capability against tactical ballistic
missiles.
The largest concentration of SAM launchers
and AAA pieces-over 10,500-is found oppo-
site European NATO, with 4,000 in the Far - -
East; over 4,000 are opposite southwest Asia The SA-8 tactical air defense system is part of
and eastern Turkey, and over 3,700 are in the the USSR's integrated system of surface-to-
Strategic Reserve MDs. air missiles and antiaircraft artillery.
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Major Soviet Military Storage Areas
Ammunition Depots
12 million metric tons arms/ammunition
including storage in Eastern Europe
Reserve Armor Storage Depots
6,000 armored vehicles (tanks/APCs)
including storage in Eastern Europe
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
Storage Depot Concentrations
52 million metric tons
including storage in Eastern Europe
Capabilities and Operations
The Soviets conceive of a theater-or TVD-
campaign as an integrated, combined arms op-
eration, with ground forces as the primary
force component. The campaign would be con-
ducted to seize theater objectives located at
a depth of up to 800 kilometers in operations
lasting 12 to 15 days. Operations would be con-
tinued, if required, to seize deeper, subsequent
objectives. In the Western TVD, for example,
the Soviets envision a large, intense theater
operation to attain immediate theater objec-
tives in a campaign lasting approximately two
weeks.
The Soviets consider a strategic operation
in a TVD as consisting of complementary and
mutually supporting ground forces, aviation,
air defense, and theater nuclear forces. The
success of ground operations would be predi-
cated on a favorable combat air environment
resulting from the conduct of massive offen-
sive air operations to attain air superiority.
This would be complemented by an integrated,
theater-wide air defense operation conducted
to prevent remaining enemy aircraft from in-
terfering with the ground advance or the func-
tioning of rear area support activities. Naval
forces would secure coastal flanks and partic-
ipate in amphibious operations. If war esca-
lated to the nuclear level, the Soviets would
attempt to destroy enemy military capabilities
by a massive theater-nuclear strike involving
the coordinated use of ground, aviation, naval,
and strategic rocket force systems to allow a
rapid and unimpeded advance of frontal forces.
Innovations in traditional Soviet operational
concepts have kept pace with developments in
force structure and weapons systems. The most
prominent involves an increased emphasis on
the concept of deep operations to an oppo-
nent's rear area early in a conflict. Adapting
their experience with mobile groups in World
War II, the Soviets have developed Operational
Maneuver Groups (OMGs) to conduct mobile
warfare in the enemy's rear area following a
breakthrough of his forward defenses. The
insertion of OMGs, consisting of tank-heavy
formations supported by infantry fighting vehi-
cles, mobile fire support, air defense, air assault
units, and aviation, is designed to isolate front-
line defending forces; disrupt rear area logis-
tics and reserves; threaten key command and
control, economic and population centers; and
neutralize nuclear attack systems. The success-
ful use of OMGs would facilitate the commit-
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ment of second-echelon forces and accelerate
the overall rate of advance. The use of multiple
OMGs would be intended to impose a theater-
wide, "deep battle" and, in the Soviet view,
place the enemy in an untenable situation.
From a Soviet viewpoint, the concentration
of overwhelming firepower, either nuclear or
conventional, would be the principal method
of achieving advantageous force ratios. While
past emphasis has been on the employment of
massive numbers of artillery weapons, the con-
cept of fire support has expanded to include not
only field artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
and mortars, but also air defense systems, heli-
copters, fixed-wing aviation, antitank weapons,
surface-to-surface missiles, and unguided rock-
ets. All these weapons systems would be fully
integrated into a single, coordinated fire sup-
port effort, using automated control systems to
optimize the allocation of weapons to the target
and to allow centralized command and control
of firepower.
Chemical Warfare.
The USSR is better prepared to conduct op-
erations in a chemical environment than any
other force in the world. Soldiers receive exten-
sive chemical defense training. Most combat
vehicles are equipped with a chemical protec-
tion system and a chemical detection alarm
system. Chemical defense troops with special-
ized detection and decontamination equipment
are found throughout the ground forces. These
units range in size from a platoon at regi-
ment level to a brigade at front level. The
Soviets have more than 80,000 officers and en-
listed specialists trained in chemical warfare,
a force that would double in wartime; of this,
45,000 are assigned to the ground forces. They
have about 20,000 special vehicles for recon-
naissance and decontamination. The Soviets
have established chemical military academies
and more than 200 sites for teaching and train-
ing Soviet troops on how to protect and de-
contaminate themselves following combat.
Chemical troops are responsible for the devel-
opment, testing, and evaluation of new chem-
ical agents, weapons systems, antidotes, suits,
gas masks, and protective and decontaminating
systems. Offensively, nearly all Soviet mortars,
howitzers, guns, multiple rocket launchers, and
surface-to-surface missiles can be used to de-
liver chemical munitions.
The Soviet Union continues to test, pro-
duce, and stockpile chemical weapons. The
Major Soviet Military Storage Areas
Reserve Artillery Storage Depots
18.000 artillery and AAA pieces
including storage in Eastern Europe
Bridge Equipment Storage Depots
27,000 meters of bridging materials
including storage in Eastern Europe
Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Concentrations
including storage in Eastern Europe
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In the 1980s, Soviet ground forces have fielded a new bridge/ferry system to augment their river-
crossing capability; here, a heavy amyl. 'ious ferry transports a tank-mounted scissors bridge.
Soviets have developed the doctrine, pls . per-
sonnel, and equipment to support their use of
chemical weapons. Chemical weapons night,
of course, provide a military advantage in a
conventional conflict. Their continued test-
ing of chemical weapons, the enlarged stor-
age capacity of chemical agents and weapons,
and the existence of active production facilities
are indicators of a serious chemical weapons
program. These indications and strong evi-
dence of the actual use of chemical and toxin
weapons by the Soviet Union and its client
forces in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea
reflect their drive to strengthen and improve
the capability to wage chemical warfare and a
willingness to employ such weapons in battle-
field situations.
In order to ensure control of forces on the
modern battlefield, the Soviets have developed
a command and control system that employs re-
dundant command posts, communication
networks, and equipment to enhance surviv-
ability. Automated systems now being intro-
duced are used in operational planning and
decisionmaking, fire control, and logistics man-
agement. The Soviets are improving their com-
mand and control structure to facilitate the
close coordination of ground forces, aviation,
and air defense operations.
Special Purpose Forces (SPETSNAZ)
The USSR maintains a complement of spe-
cial purpose forces, known by the Soviet acro-
nym SPETSNAZ. These special purpose forces
are controlled by the Main Intelligence Direc-
torate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff and
are trained to conduct a variety of sensitive
missions, including covert action abroad. This
latter mission was illustrated by their covert
role, under KGB direction, in the December
1979 assassination of Afghan President Hafizul-
lah Amin, which was performed by a joint
KGB/SPETSNAZ force.
During peacetime, the GRU carefully coordi-
nates reconnaissance programs that are geared
to meet the intelligence requirements for So-
viet forces in war. In wartime, SPETSNAZ
forces would operate far behind enemy lines
for extended periods of time. They would con-
duct reconnaissance, sabotage, and attacks on
a wide variety of military and political targets.
The KGB is assessed to have responsibility,
under Central Committee guidance, for oper-
ational planning, coordination, and political
control of special purpose forces that operate
abroad in peacetime. This was the case in the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
of Afghanistan in 1979. The KGB maintains its
own special operations capabilities in the form
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of clandestine assets dedicated to assassination
and wartime sabotage.
Wartime missions of GRU special purpose
forces are planned under the direction of the
General Staff and are integral to the Soviet
combined arms operations. Intended to sup-
port front or fleet-level operations, SPETSNAZ
forces are capable of operating throughout the
enemy homeland.
Organized into brigades, these forces would
infiltrate and fight as small teams. In a war,
each of these brigades could be expected to field
approximately 100 SPETSNAZ teams. A typ-
ical team would be composed of an officer as
leader with a warrant officer or sergeant as sec-
ond in command. Other members of the group
are trained as radio operators and weapons and
demolition experts. In addition to the normal
military training, all are trained in:
.infiltration tactics;
?sabotage methods using explosives, incen-
diaries, acids, and abrasives;
?airborne operations;
.clandestine communications;
?hand-to-hand combat and silent killing
techniques;
?psychological operations;
.language/customs of target country;
?survival behind enemy lines; and
?reconnaissance and target location.
To make training as realistic as possible,
SPETSNAZ brigades have facilities equipped
with accurate full-scale models of key targets
such as enemy installations and weapons sys-
tems. The brigades intended for operations
against NATO share similar demolition train-
ing and equipment familiarization. Training
facilities are equipped with mockups of NATO
nuclear systems including the PERSHING,
LANCE, and GLCMs, as well as airfields, nu-
clear storage, air defense sites, and communica-
tions facilities. The missions of SPETSNAZ
are a significant addition to Soviet combat
forces.
In both peace and war, these SPETSNAZ
forces represent an important threat. In peace-
time, they are a formidable instrument with
which the Soviets can project limited, but de-
cisive, force abroad, especially into the Third
World. In war, major facilities and weapons
systems are the objects of their attacks.
Training
Conscripts constitute about 75 percent of So-
viet ground force personnel. Their training
is highly centralized and standardized. Soviet
units are expected to master a basic program of
tactical maneuvers that would be carried out in
war.
The Soviets conduct an extensive program of
training in which youths receive 140 hours of
training prior to military service. Upon callup,
conscripts serve for two years with the ground
forces. Semiannual troop rotation in the spring
and fall dictates an annual training cycle of
two training periods. Each period commences
with four weeks of basic training and then pro-
ceeds to staff and unit training at the squad,
platoon, company, and battalion level and ends
with tests and inspections.
The Soviets are implementing changes in
their training program that should continue
to improve the skills of personnel and main-
tain unit cohesiveness. Conscript rotation now
reflects a phased training program. Draftees,
under the leadership of career officers, war-
rant officers, and noncommissioned officers, are
assigned to a new company in an active battal-
ion. Here they train together for two years.
Meanwhile, other companies in the battalion,
unaffected by the semiannual troop rotation,
can concentrate on more advanced unit and in-
dividual training than was possible under the
former system. This allows personnel to receive
lengthier advanced training and enables Soviet
forces to learn to operate the more complex
weapons and equipment entering the ground
forces.
Research and Development
Soviet force developments continue to be
assisted by an extensive R&D program that
ensures a flow of well-designed, technically
advanced weapons and equipment. Tactical
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile
systems, complex C3 systems, and advanced
chemical and biological warfare agents from
Soviet research and development are now being
incorporated into Soviet ground forces' battle-
field capability. Soviet tank R&D is a continu-
ous process, with numerous permanent design
bureaus, design teams, and associated work
forces dedicated to new tank development. In
recent years, the Soviets have fielded modern
tanks such as the T-64, T-72, and T-80, and they
continue the development of future tank capa-
bilities. Soviet artillery R&D programs of the
past several years have concentrated on the
application of "state-of-the-art" technology to
new self-propelled artillery, mortar, and rocket
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SCUD-1B nuclear brigades are deployed with
armies in all theaters. In field-training
exercises, chemical troops practice chemical/
biological decontamination of SCUD launchers.
systems. Air defense R&D programs for the So-
viet ground forces stress advancements in sur-
veillance, identification, and target-tracking
capability. Maximum effort is devoted to the
development of systems capable of operating in
all types of combat environments.
A strong effort is being made to achieve high
technological advancements in radar, electro-
optics, and laser and directed-energy weapons
for use with their Armed Forces and with im-
portant applications for their ground forces.
The Soviets' R&D on directed-energy weapons
dates back to the 1960s. The high-energy laser
program, conducted at several secure facili-
ties, is considerably larger than the US pro-
gram. They are pursuing the development of
high-quality optical components and efficient
electrical power sources to support this laser
program. They have already developed a
rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic generator
that has produced 15 megawatts of short-term
electrical power. This device, which is only
in the very early stages of development in the
West, could provide a compact, light-weight
power source for mobile or transportable laser
weapons. Soviet developments in compact and
moderate-power laser weapons for tactical air
defense, antipersonnel, and ground-to-ground
applications may well be far enough along for
such systems to be fielded by the end of this
decade. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Soviets could demonstrate laser weapons in a
wide variety of ground, ship, and aerospace
applications.
The Soviets also continue an intensive ef-
fort aimed at the development of high-power
microwave and millimeter-wave sources for ra-
dio frequency weapons. Soviet radio frequency
technology has now advanced to the stage
where it could support development of a proto-
type, short-range radio-frequency weapon.
Many Western weapons systems would be vul-
nerable to such a device, which not only could
damage critical electronic components but also
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could inflict disorientation or physical injury
on personnel.
There is also considerable research on the
development of particle-beam weapons. They
could deliver intense energy particles at the
speed of light which would be capable of pene-
trating the exterior of a target, destroying key
internal components, or igniting fuels and mu-
nitions. While much of the Soviet R&D effort
in this field is on a par with Western efforts,
there are difficult technological problems to be
solved. Technology to support development of
such weapons is not expected to be available
before the mid-1990s.
US Ground Forces
US military strategy does not call for match-
ing the size of the Soviet ground forces, but
instead emphasizes refining the US qualita-
tive edge in conjunction with moderate force
increases.
US active and reserve units are manned at
higher levels, and the reserves receive more
training than their Soviet counterparts. The
US Army is developing organizational changes
to improve combat effectiveness. The Army is
undertaking a program entitled "Army 90" to
implement its Air-Land Battle Doctrine. This
doctrine has been developed to synchronize the
close-in battle against enemy lead forces with
a longer range battle against enemy follow-
on forces. Army light and heavy divisions are
being rearmed and restructured for sustained,
continuous combat operations at any level of
conflict. The Army is seeking to increase the
strategic mobility of its light divisions while
capitalizing on systems to increase their over-
all firepower and combat effectiveness.
The present generation of antiarmor weap-
ons includes the long-range TOW and medium-
range DRAGON missile, and light antitank
short-range rockets. Improved warheads and
guidance systems will increase the TOW's abil-
ity to penetrate new Soviet armor.
By the end of the decade, the Army is sched-
uled to have over 1,500 attack helicopters, two-
thirds of which will be the AH-1 COBRA TOW.
The Army's AH-64 APACHE helicopter, which
entered production in 1982, is an advanced,
quick-reaction antitank weapon. It is.armed
with 16 HELLFIRE antiarmor missiles, a 30-
mm automatic gun, and 2.75-inch rockets.
The M1 ABRAMS main battle tank has been
deployed in Army field units since 1981. The
M1 provides US forces with improved mobil-
ity, survivability, and antiarmor firepower. The
Army plans to mount the German-designed 120-
mm main gun system on future Ml tanks. The
Mls with the 120-mm main gun will be inter-
operable with the German LEOPARD II main
battle tanks.
The multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)-
a cooperative program with the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom-was fielded with US forces in 1983.
It is designed to give NATO ground forces en-
hanced firepower to suppress enemy artillery
and introduces a new capability to interdict en-
emy operations beyond normal artillery range.
The BRADLEY Fighting Vehicle, introduc-
Production of Ground Forces Materiel
USSR/NSWP and NATO'
Equipment
Type
1980
USSR NSWP
1981
USSR NSWP
Other Armored
Fighting Vehicles
6,500
1,300
5,200
1,300
Self-Propelled Field
Artillery
900
50
950
50
Multiple Rocket
Launchers
Self-Propelled AA
Artillery
1982 1983 1984 1984
USSR NSWP USSR NSWP USSR NSWP NATO
4,500 1,400 4,500 1,300 3,800 1,200 2,230
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ed in 1981, is modernizing Army mechanized
forces. These vehicles are armed with 25-mm
automatic cannons, 7.62-mm coaxial machine-
guns, and TOW antitank weapons. They give
mechanized infantry a true mounted combat ca-
pability. Introduction of a new light armored
vehicle will provide the Marine Corps units
with increased mobility and firepower.
United States and Allied tactical air defenses
include several new weapons. The STINGER,
with improved infrared-seeker guidance sys-
tems, is a man-portable, surface-to-air missile
system developed to replace the REDEYE. Two
new systems, the PATRIOT and SGT YORK
Division Air Defense Gun, will increase the
Army's air defense capabilities against a va-
riety of aircraft approaching at varying al-
titudes. The PATRIOT, which will replace
NIKE-HERCULES and the Improved HAWK
as the principal theater-level SAM for defense
against aircraft at high or medium altitudes,
has begun deployment in Europe.
NATO-Warsaw Pact Comparison
The following NATO assessment does not in-
clude France and Spain. Although both are
members of the North Atlantic Alliance, they
do not participate in its integrated military
structure. In an invasion of Western Europe
by the Warsaw Pact, France and Spain would
defend their national sovereignty with the fol-
lowing forces: approximately 20 divisions; 2,000
tanks, 3,000 artillery/mortars; 1,000 antitank
launchers; 8,000 combat vehicles; 450 helicop-
ters; 9,000 aircraft; and 200 naval ships and
craft.
The 1984 edition of the NATO Alliance's
NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Compar-
isons provides the following assessment of
Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces:
Warsaw Pact forces facing Allied
Command Europe (ACE), which is
the NATO military command which
stretches from the northern tip of Nor-
way to the eastern borders of Turkey,
consist of about 167 active and mo-
bilisable divisions plus the equivalent
of 9 divisions of airborne, air assault,
and air-mobile formations, which
could be used in a number of dif-
ferent areas. Taking account of the
forces of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
countries, the Soviet forces located
in those countries but only the high
readiness forces of the six Western
Military Districts of the Soviet Union,
there are some 115 divisions position-
ed well forward or considered ready
to fight at very short notice. More-
over, these standing Warsaw Pact
forces can be reinforced by about 16
divisions from the Strategic Reserve
based in the central Military Districts
of Russia (Moscow, Ural, and Volga
Military Districts). Warsaw Pact divi-
sions normally consist of fewer
personnel than NATO divisions but
contain tanks and artillery, thereby
producing similar combat power.
Their principal offensive conventional
capabilities consist of tanks, modern
mechanised infantry vehicles, and
highly mobile long-range artillery and
mortars; large numbers of these are
to be found in all their units. So-
viet forces possess a wide variety of
chemical agents and delivery systems
and are the best equipped in the world
to sustain operations in a chemical
environment. Growing numbers of
transport, support and attack heli-
copters provide the Warsaw Pact with
a quick-assault and reaction capabil-
ity, and with a supplement to their
fixed-wing tactical aircraft in the bat-
tlefield area. A significant number
of new electronic warfare helicopters
have appeared in Soviet units during
the past two years.
Land forces committed to NATO
and stationed in or rapidly de-
ployable to Europe, consist of the
equivalent of some 88 active and mo-
bilisable divisions (including three air-
borne/air mobile divisions), many of
which are also ready to fight at very
short notice... Almost half of NATO's
tank and mechanised divisions are
equipped with modern weapons al-
though a very unfavourable ratio
continues between NATO anti-tank
guided weapons and Warsaw Pact
tanks and armoured personnel vehi-
cles. NATO similarly has a lower pro-
portion of armed attack helicopters.
Only the United States has a retal-
iatory chemical capability and a
number of NATO nations lack even
adequate protection against chemical
weapons.
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Chapter IV Ground Forces
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Chapter V
Air Forces
The Soviet Air Forces (SAF) have three ma-
jor combat components: Strategic Air Armies,
Air Forces of Military Districts' and Groups of
Forces; and Soviet Military Transport Aviation
(VTA in Russian). The USSR is dedicating high
priority to the upgrading of each component,
with new generations of strategic, tactical, and
transport aircraft in development, test, produc-
tion, and deployment. This commitment to de-
veloping a superior air force is exemplified in
the production and deployment of BACKFIRE
and BEAR H long-range bombers for strategic
aviation and the FULCRUM and FROGFOOT
aircraft for tactical aviation. The nuclear ca-
pabilities of Soviet strategic bomber and strike
aircraft are discussed in Chapter II.
The BACKFIRE, first introduced into Soviet
Air Forces in 1974, has a variable-geometry
wing that can be swept for supersonic perform-
ance. The BACKFIRE is designed for long-
range subsonic cruise, high-altitude supersonic
dash, and low-altitude high-subsonic penetra-
tion. It can carry conventional or nuclear
bombs internally or AS-4 supersonic cruise mis-
siles attached to its wings. Production lines for
the BEAR airframe have been reopened to pro-
duce the BEAR H long-range turboprop strate-
gic bomber. This new BEAR, however, has
been specifically configured to carry the new
AS-15 long-range cruise missile.1
In tactical aviation, the Soviets have
introduced the MiG-29/FULCRUM high-
performance aircraft into their inventory. The
FULCRUM has been designed as an all-
weather, counterair fighter-interceptor fitted
with a true look-down/shoot-down radar inte-
The MiG-29/FULCRUM all-weather, air superi-
ority fighter-interceptor, seen in company with
a BACKFIRE strategic bomber, reflects the
USSR's continuing drive to produce new gen-
erations of tactical, strategic, and transport air-
craft. The FULCRUM is fitted with AA-10 mis-
siles and the USSR's most modern look-down/
shoot-down radar - technology made possi-
ble, in part, by thefts from the West.
Chapter V Air,Forces
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The CONDOR heavy-lift transport will have triple the payload capacity of the 11-76/CANDID.
grated with the Soviets' improved AA-10 mis-
sile. It is possible that the FULCRUM has
a dual capability and might be configured for
ground attack missions. For close air support
missions, the Soviets have developed and de-
ployed the Su-25/FROGFOOT. It is fitted with
a 30-mm gun and can carry a variety of air-to-
ground ordnance, including bombs, unguided
rockets, and tactical air-to-surface missiles.'
The Soviets have been using the FROGFOOT
extensively in Afghanistan against the Mu-
jahideen. The Su-27/FLANKER all-weather,
air superiority fighter, which is nearing deploy-
ment, is similar to the US F-15. The FLANKER
has a true look-down/shoot-down weapons sys-
tem and beyond-visual-range AA-10 missiles.
For strategic missions against the United
States, the Soviets are developing the variable-
geometry-wing BLACKJACK bomber, now in
flight testing. The BLACKJACK almost cer-
tainly will carry the AS-15 long-range cruise
missile. Unlike the BEAR H stand-off launch
platform for the AS-15, the BLACKJACK will
probably be designed for low-altitude high-
subsonic penetration of air defenses.
To complement the new bomber and fighter
systems, the Soviets are also working on new
airborne warning and control systems
(AWACS) and tanker aircraft using the Il-
76/CANDID airframe. Rounding out Soviet Air
Force developments is the new large CONDOR
transport aircraft currently undergoing flight
testing. Similar in many respects to the US
C-5A Galaxy in size and lift capability, the
CONDOR probably has clam shell-type rear
doors for outsized cargo entry and exit as well
as a visor-type nose to facilitate rapid load-
ing and unloading from either end. With a
payload even greater than the C-5A, the CON-
DOR will substantially enhance Soviet military
airlift and power projection capabilities when
deployed in significant numbers.
The current composition of the SAF reflects
an evolutionary process dating from the So-
viet experience in World War II. In 1940, a
reorganization of the Soviet air arm was de-
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...--------------
The I5u-24/FENCER is. a nuclear-capable, all-weather fighter-bomber.
signed to produce a single military air ser-
vice composed of five component parts. The
mission of each part: was defined along func-
tional lines. The components were: (1) Long-
Rar ge Bomber Aviation, tasked with
strategic bombing; (2) the Air Reserve of the
High Command; (3) Frontal Aviation, assigned
to MD/front commands; (4) Army Aviation,
organic to and directly supporting the subor-
dinate ground armies of MDs/fronts; and (5)
Troop Aviation, tasked with providing liaison
support to ground corps. The opening phase
of the war exposed serious problems in the
still-incomplete reorganization of the Soviet air
arm'. The Soviet Air Forces lacked adequate
command and control systems and specialized
aircraft.
In March 1942, the General Staff ordered the
establishment of a simplified air force struc-
ture. Long-Range Aviation (LRA) was subor-
dinated to the Supreme High Command (VGK)
ands assigned exclusive responsibility for at-
tacking strategic targets. Frontal and Army
aviation were integrated into air armies as-
signed to combined arms fronts, which came
to be called Tactical Air Armies (TAAs). The
recentralized and streamlined field command of
aviation assets provided greater flexibility and
faster response at higher command levels. This
structure remained largely intact for more than
30 years, except for the formal creation of VTA
as a separate command in the 1950s.
The reorganization of Soviet! air assets that
began in the late 1970s dissolved LRA and the
TAAs, which had become known as Frontal
Aviation, and restructured Soviet Air Defense
Forces (VPVO). All LRA and'some TAA as-
sets were organized into five new Strategic Air
Armies. The rest of TAA along with almost half
the strategic interceptor force of Air Defense
of the Homeland (APVO) were organized as air
forces of specific military districts or GOFs.
Current Structure
There are 17 air forces in the Groups of
Forces, peripheral military districts of the So-
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viet Union, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Each
of these air forces is operationally subordi-
nate to the MD or Group commander and is
comprised of combat fighters, reconnaissance
aircraft, fighter-bombers, and helicopters-the
latter known as Army Aviation-although the
mix is not standard. Fighter and fighter-bomber
regiments can be organized into divisions or
remain independent, reporting directly to the
military districts and Groups of Forces. Re-
connaissance regiments and squadrons are in-
dependent units, while helicopter units either
report to the military districts and Groups of
Forces or to their assigned maneuver entities.
The five Strategic Air Armies include one de-
signed for intercontinental and maritime strike
missions and four designed to support various
theater missions. Two of the latter air armies
are comprised entirely of former TAA assets.
Regiments within the air armies are generally
organized into divisions, although some inde-
pendent regiments exist.
Soviet Military Transport Aviation, the third
operational element of SAF, has the primary
responsibility of providing airlift services for
the Soviet Airborne Forces (VDV) and air as-
sault units. It also provides air logistics sup-
port for other deployed Soviet and allied armed
forces, as well as supporting other Soviet polit-
ical and economic interests, especially in the
Third World. Today the Soviet Air Forces are
tailored and equipped to meet the requirements
of the various levels of command and the entire
range of assigned missions.
The Soviet Air Forces have as their combat
and combat support assets nearly 900 bomber
aircraft, nearly 6,100 fighter and fighter-
bombers, and 600 VTA transports.
Modernization of Strategic Aviation is on-
going. BACKFIRE bombers continue to re-
place BADGERS, and the BLINDER inventory
continues to shrink gradually due to attrition.
Two new long-range BEAR variants are en-
tering the inventory. One, a modification to
Comparable Tactical Aircraft
Su-24
USSR
FENCER
MiG-23 MiG-27
MiG-25
METERS
A/B/C
FLOGGER FLOGGER
FOXBAT B/D
B/G D/J
Su 17 MiG 21
FITTER D/H FISHBED L
t
;s
MiG-29
FULCRUM
,
Su-25
FROGFOOT
SPEED (KTS)
1,250
1,350 980
1,200
1,625 1,205
1,350
475
RADIUS (KM)
1,800
1,300 800
700
900 500
1,150
550
ARMAMENT
2,500 KG
6 AAMS 3,000 KG 3,000 KG
- 4 AAMs
6 AAMS
4,000 KG
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
WINGSPAN (M)
10 (Swept)
8 (Swept) 8 (Swept) 10 (Swept)
14 7
12
15
Us
METERS
F-111
F-4C/E
F-15A/C
PHANTOM II
EAGLE
^(~
A-7A/D
CORSAIR II
F-16A
FIGHTING
FALCON
A-10A
THUNDERBOLT II
SPEED (KTS)
1,000
1,190
600
1,450
1,190
390
RADIUS (KM)
1,420
520
750
1,000
630
650
ARMAMENT
9,000 KG
4,100 KG
2,720 KG
8 AAMS
3,200 KG
4,000 KG
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
WINGSPAN (M) 10
12
12
13
10
17
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