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Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 COMIREX FILE COPY Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 SOVIET MILITARY POWER First Edition September 1981 Second Edition March 1983 Third Edition April 1984 Fourth Edition April 1985 For sale by Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 SOVIET. MILITARY POWER 1985 The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps in Soviet Military Power 1985 are not necessarily authoritative. The illustrations of Soviet weapons systems introducing each chapter and elsewhere are derived from various US sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 CONTENTS Chapter I 7 Soviet Military Power Chapter II 25 Forces for Nuclear Attack Chapter III -43 Strategic Defense and Space Programs Chapter IV 61 Ground Forces Chapter V 79 Air Forces Chapter VI 91 Naval Forces Chapter VII 113 Global Ambitions Chapter VIII 133 Response to the Challenge 1; Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 PREFACE A valuable starting point from which to measure the current and projected strength, trends, and global military capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, as well as the forces of its Warsaw Pact allies, is the following assessment pre- sented in the introduction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 1984 official publication, NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons: The Warsaw Pact maintains large-scale strategic nuclear forces, interme- diate- and short-range nuclear forces, and massive conventional forces. Moreover, Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature and military exercises calls for large-scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasize the element of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations. The forces of the USSR and its allies continue to expand, modernize, and deploy with increasingly capable weapons systems designed for the entire spectrum of strate- gic, theater-nuclear, and conventional conflict. The Soviet Union has made no secret of certain of these advances. For example, in the autumn of 1984, the Soviet Defense Ministry announced that the USSR was beginning to deploy a new generation of nuclear-armed, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets also re- vealed that nuclear-armed, short-range ballistic missiles had been forward-deployed from the USSR to operational sites in Eastern Europe and that additional ballis- tic missile submarines were on patrol in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In a speech before the Politburo, General Secretary Chernenko said that further actions would be taken to strengthen the Soviet Union's military capability. These announcements serve notice of the increasingly ambitious Soviet procurement and deployment of ma- jor categories of new armaments. The success that the Soviets have achieved in both quantity and quality of systems is based on combining an aggressive R&D program with a systematic effort to target and obtain advanced Western technologies. Some of the more significant developments reported in this, the fourth edition of Soviet Military Power, are: ?Test firings continue for the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 ICBMs, the new, fifth-genera- tion intercontinental ballistic missiles. The SS-X-25 violates Soviet obligations under SALT II. The level of deployed MIRVed ICBM warheads continues to rise with overall modernization of the Soviet strategic missile force. *Two units of a new DELTA IV-Class of strategic ballistic missile submarine have been launched; they are the likely platform for the USSR's newest, most accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23. ?A third 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile submarine has completed sea trials, joining the two TYPHOON units already operational, each fitted with 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs, with each missile capable of delivering six to nine MIRVed warheads to ranges of 8,300 kilometers. ?The new supersonic, swing-wing BLACKJACK bomber continues in advanced test and development. New strategic BACKFIRE bombers continue to join Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 operational Soviet forces at a rate of at least 30 a year. New BEAR-H strategic bombers are emerging from Soviet aircraft plants and deploying with the 3,000-kilometer-range, air-launched, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile. ?The USSR is continuing to devote extremely high priority to its military- related space program. A major emphasis is on space systems for long-duration, manned missions engaged in military research. They are developing new heavy- lift launch vehicles, capable of launching 150-ton payloads, for the space shut- tle and manned space station programs. The USSR is continuing research on ground-based and space-based high-energy lasers for. use in antisatellite roles. The Soviets currently have the world's only deployed antisatellite weapons system that can attack satellites in near-earth orbit. ?The USSR continues to upgrade its heavily layered strategic defenses with ex- pansion of ballistic missile detection and tracking systems and the development of new early warning and air surveillance radars. Silo-based high-acceleration interceptor missiles are replacing older above-ground launchers in the an- tiballistic missile system ringing Moscow, bringing increased capabilities to the world's only deployed ABM system. A new, large, phased-array radar un- der construction at Krasnoyarsk violates the ABM Treaty. The USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. In addition, the Soviets are actively engaged in extensive research on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Modernization of Soviet forces at the strategic level is mirrored by force improve- ments at theater-nuclear and conventional levels: ?The Soviets have pressed ahead with construction of new SS-20 missile bases in both the western and eastern USSR, enabling a substantial increase from the 378 MIRVed 5,000-kilometer-range nuclear missiles reported last year to a new total of about 400. In parallel, new SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles are now deployed with Soviet divisions in East Germany, and more accurate 900- kilometer-range SS-22/SCALEBOARD missiles have been forward-deployed to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. ?Soviet Ground Forces, which in 1981 numbered 181 divisions, have now grown to 199 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions. New main battle tanks continue to flow from Soviet factories-some 3,200 in 1984-upgrading tank division capabilities, which are equipped from an USSR inventory of 52,000 tanks. ?The fourth 37,000-ton KIEV-Class aircraft carrier is fitting out, preparing to join the already operational carriers Novorossiysk, Minsk, and Kiev. Construc- tion continues on the lead unit of an entirely new class of aircraft carrier that will be about 65,000 tons displacement. ?The second unit of the 28,000-ton nuclear-powered KIROV-Class cruisers has joined the Soviet fleet. A third unit of these heavily armed guided-missile cruis- ers is on the building ways. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ?Nine separate classes of Soviet submarines are in production; these classes include four nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of carrying the new SS-NX-21 land-attack sea-launched cruise missile. *The Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air-superiority fighter will soon be deployed, further adding to the capability of Soviet tactical aircraft. The Soviet military is not a home-based garrison force as attested by the more than 30 ready divisions forward-deployed throughout Eastern Europe, the divisions in combat in Afghanistan, the brigade in Cuba, and military advisers throughout the Third World. The Soviet Navy is the most visible element of the USSR's growing global reach. In Vietnam, for example, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh Bay into their largest forward deployment naval base in the world, adding more Tu- 16/BADGERs and a squadron of MiG-23/FLOGGER fighters. As the Navy adds to the capabilities of its submarine, surface, and air units, the USSR continues to press for greater access to overseas facilities for its Armed Forces and continues to support the establishment and strengthening of regimes sympathetic to and supportive of Soviet purposes. The continuing flow of increasingly advanced weapons to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is a prime example. Soviet Military Power 1985 examines the unceasing introduction of new nuclear and conventional Soviet military capabilities. It examines the doctrine guiding the organization, control, and employment of Soviet forces, and it chronicles key devel- opments in each element of the Soviet Armed Forces, highlighting the continuing increases in Soviet military power. To contribute to a clearer understanding of these forces and their capabilities, this year's edition of Soviet Military Power not only draws on the 1984 NATO force comparisons study, but also provides comparative data on developments in US forces. These comparative data serve to highlight even more vividly the magnitude and the dimensions of the threatening challenge posed by Soviet force developments. As I have noted, comprehensive information on the forces of the US is regularly made available to the public in such publications as the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is incumbent upon the United States and its allies to have a full and precise understanding of the Soviet challenge as we take the steps necessary to preserve our freedom, to ensure an effective deterrent to the threat and use of force, and, at the same time, to seek genuine and equitable arms reductions, contributing to global stability and to our transcending goal as awe people-the goal 2010p eace and security. / / % C&-WC/ / aewq~ CA PAR W. WEINBERGER Secretary of Defense Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter I Soviet Military Power' The Soviet Union has long relied on military power as the principal instrument of expan- sionist policies aimed at the extension of Soviet control and influence throughout the world. Soviet Armed Forces are equipped, trained, and readied for employment to further these aims. The threat posed by these forces is manifested in the mounting arsenal of nuclear and conven- tional weapons systems as well, as the coercive leverage, short of actual use of force, that the USSR's Armed Forces are able to exert. The USSR's willingness to threaten and use military force under certain conditions to achieve external State objectives is document- ed by a lengthy, stark record of invasion and military suppression of other nations. Recall, for example, that the Red Army partitioned Poland with the Nazis in 1939 and attacked Fin- land later that winter. In 1940, Finland was forced to cede territory to the Soviets, and the Red Army occupied Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Romanian province of Bessarabia. In 1950, the North Korean invasion of South Korea was made possible by Soviet material support. The Soviets moved 20,000 to 25,000 troops to border areas of North Korea, and Soviet pilots defended the Yalu River bridges until the Chinese entered the conflict. In 1953, the Soviets assisted the East Ger- man regime in putting down a popular upris- ing. In October 1956, Khrushchev threatened to use Soviet military force in Poland, and in October-November 1956, Soviet tanks crushed With the operational deployment of the new, 3, 000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile aboard new BEAR H strategic bombers in 1984, the Soviet Union has again underscored its commitment to field increas- ingly capable weapons systems designed for the entire spectrum of strategic, theater- nuclear and conventional warfare, as part of the upgrading of Soviet military power. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 SOV/E1 BALTIC FLEET NORTHERN FLEET PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 43 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 80 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 92 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 72 SUBMARINES 33 SUBMARINES 180 NAVAL AVIATION 270 NAVAL AVIATION 440 55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS 30 SOVIETS4 DIVISIONS him BLACK SEA FLEET/ CASPIAN FLOTILLA AIRCRAFT CARRIERS PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS SUBMARINES NAVAL AVIATION SS-11 520 SS-13 60 SS-17 150 SS-4 120 SS-18 308 SS-20 About 400 SS-19 360 1 79 90 33 435 SS-N-5 42 SS-N-6 336 I SS-N-8 292 SS-N-17 12 SS-N-18 224 SS-N-20 60 SS-NX-23 16 The United States Government hes not recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative. Moscow BACKFIRE 250' BISON 48 BEAR BADGER 125 287 TACTICAL BLINDER 136 AIRCRAFT 6,135 Including 120 in Soviet Naval Aviation. - Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 VI/LITARY FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS ' 85 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 114 SUBMARINES 134 NAVAL AVIATION 500 I GROUND FORCES* i MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS tTANK DIVISIONS AIRBORNE DIVISIONS iCOASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS Totals exclude 14 mobilization divisions and 2 new Army Corps 140 51 7 1 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 3 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 287 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS' 368 COMBATANT CRAFT 765 AUXILIARIES 780 SUBMARINES 380 NAVAL AVIATION 1,645 ABM RADAR 4 SAM" ABM 1ASAT LAUNCHERS 10,000 LAUNCHERS 100 "In USSR only - does not include Soviet Strategic SAMs (SA-2/3/5) in Mongolia, or with Groups of Forces. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 the Hungarian revolution. In August 1968, So- viet and other Warsaw Pact forces occupied Czechoslovakia to destroy a socialist regime "with a human face." In 1979, the Soviets in- vaded Afghanistan and executed one Commu- nist prime minister to install a more tractable one. In 1980-81, the threat of Soviet military intervention was used several times to pres- sure Polish authorities to crack down on the Solidarity Labor Movement. Polish officials imposed martial law to avert a Soviet invasion. The role of military power in the Soviet Union can be best comprehended by under- standing the State's full commitment to devel- oping, supporting, and sustaining armed forces for internal, regional, and global use. This ex- amination begins with a review of the extraor- dinarily great resources the USSR devotes to its military, the resulting overall nuclear and conventional force capabilities, and the nature of the Soviet political and military command structure overseeing the development of Soviet military doctrine and strategy. Chapters II - VII of Soviet Military Power 1985 examine the organization and capabilities of Forces for Nuclear Attack, Strategic Defense and Space Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Soviet Global Ambitions. The Western response to the Soviet Union's military challenge is discussed in Chapter VIII. Military Expenditures The cumulative cost of the Soviet military program during 1974-83 exceeds that of the US by a large margin, despite a slowdown in the rate of overall Soviet economic growth. For this decade, the estimated dollar cost of the to- tal Soviet military program is 35 percent more than the comparably defined US defense out- lays, while the cost of Soviet weapons procure- ment is 50 percent greater. Although the dollar cost differences have narrowed with the recent growth in US defense spending, the magnitude of the Soviet military effort in important spe- cific categories, such as R&D, still surpasses that of the US. Moreover, there is clear evi- dence of an upturn in Soviet weapons procure- ment beginning in 1983. The rate of increase in spending does not give an appreciation of the large stocks of strategic and conventional weapons systems deployed by the Soviets during the past decade. Despite the procurement plateau of the late 1970s, when the Soviets emphasized R&D for next-generation systems, spending was so high that during the period 1977 through 1983, So- viet forces acquired 1,500 ICBMs, more than 1,300 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 250 bombers, 5,000 fighters, some 15,000 new tanks, and substantial numbers of new additional major surface combatants, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and attack submarines. During the same pe- riod, the US added to its inventory 135 ICBMs, 390 SLBMs, no bombers, 3,000 fighters, 5,000 tanks, and 106 major warships. Soviet efforts to develop advanced weapons systems continue in the 1980s, at least at the rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among these weapons are fighter and airborne control aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space sys- tems, and submarines. The new systems cover the full range of technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets will need to modernize all their forces. New, complex, and increasingly expensive weapon systems-such as the new, fifth-generation ICBMs, air-superiority fighters such as the MiG-29/FULCRUM, and new, nu- clear attack submarines such as the MIKE, SIERRA, and AKULA-Classes-are all contrib- uting to the upturn in procurement costs. The sustained Soviet economic commitment to the military is further revealed by the flow of resources to and growth of the machinery in- dustry. This key sector of the economy, broadly divided into military and civilian machinery production, is the source of the Soviet Union's military weapons, civilian investment goods, and consumer durables. The machinery sector continues to experience the most rapid growth in the economy; and, in 1984, when overall in- dustrial growth was 4 percent, the machinery sector expanded by some 7 percent. The mili- tary machinery portion of this sector now ac- counts for 60 percent of total machinery output and has been receiving nearly all the additions to the machinery sector's labor force, leaving little or no labor growth for the civilian sector. Current estimates of Soviet military spend- ing, in rubles from the early 1970s through the early 1980s, show a significant increase at a rate faster than overall economic growth. As a result, throughout the last decade, the Soviet military has absorbed an increasing share of the nation's estimated gross national product (GNP), a share now estimated at 15-17 percent. Even in a period of slowing economic growth, the Soviet military sector continues to main- tain its priority claim on the Soviet Union's economic resources. V Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Full-scale production of the new BACKJACK manned strategic bomber, now in development, is expected to take place in the new complex being added to the USSR's Kazan Airframe Plant. Industrial Base and Production The large economic investment in military programs has enabled the Soviet military in- dustrial base to expand to become the world's largest weapons producer. During the past decade, industry supporting the Soviet mili- tary is estimated to have grown more than 30 percent. The USSR's ability to produce large quantities of armaments in all categories has enabled them to equip and modernize their forces and those of their allies and still export large quantities of weapons to proxy and Third World nations. As the West has turned increasingly to au- tomated production methods, the Soviet Union has 'i also been introducing computers and au- tomation into its military production process. The, use of such production methods was a So- vieti goal first articulated in the 1960s. Through both legal and illegal acquisition of modern Western production techniques, the Soviets are establishing more efficient, integrated, and technologically advanced capabilities for the production of highly sophisticated weapons. Soviet Doctrine and Strategy According to the Soviet definition, military doctrine is concerned with the essence, pur- pose, and character of a possible future war and the preparation of the country and its Armed Forces for conducting such a war. Soviet mil- itary strategy, operational art, and tactics are components of Soviet military art. These three encompass the actual practice of preparing the country and its Armed Forces for war as well as planning and conducting strategic opera- tions. Specifically, military strategy is con- cerned with defining the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces; carrying out measures to pre- pare the Armed Forces, the economy, and the population for war; determining potential ad- versaries; and determining the size and compo- sition of military forces necessary to wage war. According to the Soviets, strategy and politics are closely interrelated. Concerning the character of a possible fu- ture war, Soviet military writings state that such a conflict would be a decisive clash be- tween two diametrically opposed socio-econo- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 mic systems-socialism and capitalism. Most of the world's nations would be involved and the conflict would be global. The division of the world into two distinct and opposing camps means that a future world war would be a coali- tion war, fought by two major groupings of nations, each pursuing specific political and military objectives. The Soviets believe that an outcome favorable to their interests depends on complete unification of the political, economic, and military forces of all countries of the so- cialist coalition. To this end, the Soviets have concentrated on developing and implementing a single strategic policy for the entire Warsaw Pact forces. Marshal Kulikov, Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Warsaw Pact, has referred to his command as a unified combat formation. The Soviets believe that a world war might begin and be waged for a particular period of time with conventional weapons only. Al- though general nuclear war is not considered to be inevitable, the Soviets believe it is possi- ble that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear conflict. Despite the fact that strategic nuclear forces would play the dominant role in such a war, the Soviets recognize the crucial function of ground armies in seizing and oc- cupying their ultimate objectives. They also believe that a world war could be relatively brief-several weeks-or that it could develop into a protracted conflict. Great importance is attached to the initial phase of a war because to a large degree it would determine the course of all subsequent actions. This accounts for the extraordinary attention the Soviets pay to their overall mobilization capability and their perceived requirement to effect the transition of high-level political-military control organs rapidly from peacetime to wartime to take max- imum advantage of the initial period of war. Soviet doctrine envisions a future world war of wide scope waged over vast territories. Such a war would be characterized by an absence of continuous fronts, rapid and sharp changes in the strategic situation, and deep penetrations into rear areas of the forces involved. Forces would rely on mobility and maneuver to wage an intense struggle to seize and maintain the initiative. The Soviets emphasize the primacy of the offensive, stating that military and po- litical objectives are ultimately achieved only through aggressive and continuous offensive actions. Although defensive actions occasion- ally would be necessary, they would be active and innovative operations undertaken with the purpose of either supporting nearby offensive ----- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 operations or creating favorable conditions for resuming the offensive. The Soviets believe that victory in war is possible only through the combined and coordi- nated efforts of all services and troop branches. As a result, Soviet military strategy, which views warfare as a series of interdependent large-scale operations, is the same for all the services. The Soviet concept of combined arms warfare specifies that the various services and independent units must be brought together un- der' a single unified commander at the army, front, and theater of military operations (TVD) levels. This permits the most effective use of all forces and weapons and ensures their united and coordinated employment in achieving over- all strategic objectives. The major Soviet strategic goal in a war in Europe would be the defeat of NATO mil- itary forces, the frustration of NATO's overall warfighting capability through the destruction of crucial command and control elements lo- cated in the NATO rear area, and the eventual dismantlement of the Alliance itself. Priority targets would be nuclear delivery systems and weapons; command, control, and communica- tions centers; air defense weapons and control points; and government control centers. COMBATANTS 80 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS/CRAFT 132 AUXILIARIES 200 'NOT INCLUDING SSBNs BALTIC FLEET PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 43 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS/CRAFT 347 AUXILIARIES 170 SUBMARINES 33 NAVAL AVIATION 270 NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE ESTERN Specific Soviet aims in a global war would be to: .defeat NATO forces at any level of con- flict, occupy NATO countries, and use Europe's economic assets to,assist Soviet recovery; .separately neutralize the United States and China by disorganizing and destroy- ing their military forces; and .dominate the post-war world in which "socialism" would replace "capitalism" as the basic politico-economic system in all nations. From an internal viewpoint, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership would seek to maintain its control over the So- viet government, military, police and internal security organs, and the civilian population. Efforts would be made to minimize losses to the Soviet leadership, scientific-technical elites and other essential personnel, to the general population, and to the economy. Repair and re- covery operations would be organized to limit war-related damage. Soviet Force Capabilities During peacetime the five Soviet forces func- tion as administrative service entities for the ARTI TAC1 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 SUBMARINES---1142' NAVAL AVIATION 440 NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE 1 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 purpose of equipping, training, and maintain- ing their respective force components. Dur- ing wartime, however, all Soviet forces would be combined under the executive leadership of the General Staff to form the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The Soviet forces would be formed into a single war machine that would bring to bear all systems and forces as needed in a unified and effective manner. This com- bined arms concept is not simply the joint use of weapons systems and forces; rather, it is the unified application of all military assets to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The following discussion of Soviet force capabilities addresses the Soviet command structure, wartime command and control, and combined arms warfare. As part of their com- bined arms concept, the Soviet Armed Forces are prepared to fight any type of war, nu- clear or conventional, at any level. To the Soviets, the level and intensity of conflict- rather than being compartmented by opera- tional plans-are influenced both by political objectives and enemy operations. Moreover, a nuclear exchange could occur in a limited or large-scale manner at the tactical, operational, strategic, or intercontinental level-or all si- multaneously. Should the Soviets execute a nuclear attack, they would expect to continue conventional operations to exploit the results. Combined Arms Warfare Over the past two decades, Soviet forces have steadily expanded and upgraded every category of weapons systems. Soviet ground force divisions have been reorganized, enlarged, and equipped with increasingly modern tanks, artillery, and helicopters. Soviet naval forces continue to receive larger and more capable ships and submarines. Soviet air forces are be- ing modernized with high-performance aircraft. In addition to these force enhancements, So- viet military planners are adapting operations to the capabilities of new systems and chang- ing political objectives as part of the dynamics of combined arms warfare. The Soviets envision as many as three the- aters of war: Western, Southern, and Far Eastern, each with a set of political objectives affecting military operations within the the- ater. More importantly, in planning for such military operations, the Soviets could divide a theater, for operational command and strate- gic planning purposes, into theaters of military ^ E ITE ANEA SQU o S IPS VERAGE 30-40 AMPUS S BM INES 6-8 WARFARE SHIPS 1-2 CR IS 1-2 E WARFARE DES OYERS 1-3 SH FRI ATES - AUXILI BgACK Sa D N ? THER es. operations (TVDs). Soviet planning for the Western Theater, encompassing all of Europe, envisions three continental TVDs-North- western, Western, and Southwestern-and two oceanic TVDs, Arctic and Atlantic. This or- ganizational concept enables military planners to formulate military strategy and tactics to achieve political objectives in the geographic region, taking into consideration the capabili- ties of the missiles, aircraft, ships, and ground forces at their disposal. The same planning process occurs for Soviet objectives in the South- ern and Far Eastern Theaters. While a strate- gic operation within the various TVDs may be conventional only, nuclear strikes are also planned within the operational concept down to the division level. Soviet forces for conventional warfare con- sist of the assets of ground, air, naval, and air defense forces. Each of these services is discussed in more detail in the following chap- ters. In wartime these services would form the combined arms forces of the Soviet Union. With the reorganization of Soviet Air Forces, the growth in the number of longer-range in- termediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles, and the high state of readiness of forward-deployed forces, the USSR is capable of executing the initial phase of an attack with- out mobilization of additional forces. However, if the order should be given to go to war, the Soviets would implement their national mobi- lization plan, drawing upon some nine million recently trained reservists. These reservists would be used to bring understrength units, cadre units, and mobilization bases to full man- ning in a matter of days. While mobilizing Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 andI moving over 200 divisions is an extremely large task, the Soviets can assimilate the re- servists, train them for combat, and be ready to conduct offensive operations in less than 60 days. To the Soviets, a combined arms battle would be fought by a highly integrated for- mation of ground, air, and air defense forces, with attached units of other service branches. In maritime sectors these formations would in- clude naval forces as well. The use of nuclear weapons and the participation of the various service branches or forces, in conjunction with great troop mobility, would impart an espe- cially decisive and maneuver-oriented charac- ter to combined arms warfare. With the advent of longer range and more capable aircraft and missiles, coupled with in- creased troop mobility and maneuverability, Soviet concepts for employment of combined arms units and formations are evolving accord- ingly. The Soviets believe that modern warfare would substantially exceed the framework of front operations. As a result, they envision a larger scale military operation, which they re- DIVISIONS 30 0 TANKS 5,200 ARTILLERY/MORTAR 6.600 CA IAN LOTILLA TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 890 C M ATAN S ' 5 R COMB ANT S S/CRAP 65 AUXI ARIES J _x..25 fer to as a theater strategic operation. In such an operation, the front commander would be re- sponsible for the conduct of two or more front operations in succession. While the Soviet con- cept of the front as a large combat formation in the field remains essentially intact, the Soviets are now focusing on operations by groups of fronts. The contemporary Soviet concept of the the- ater strategic operation has expanded in scope and complexity. The Soviets now plan for a theater operation to consist of several fronts Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 DIVISIONS 53 TANKS 14,900 ARTILLERY/MORTAR 15,200 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 1,690 PACIFIC.; ACIFIC FLEET fIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 85 OTHER COMBATANT AUXILIARIES ^235 SUBMARINES 110' conducting dynamic, fast-moving operations to seize strategic ground objectives located 600- 800 kilometers away. These land offensive op- erations would be conducted in coordination and mutual support with air, antiair, assault (airborne, amphibious, or joint); and naval op- erations to attain the Soviets' strategic goals within the TVD. The air operation is a mas- sive offensive campaign designed to gain air superiority and disrupt and destroy an enemy's command and control and nuclear capability. Front forces would contribute to the air oper- ation by attacking enemy air and air defense facilities with rocket, artillery, and ground forces. In turn, the air operation, by degrad- ing and disrupting enemy command, control, and comunication, as well as its aviation and nuclear capabilities, would create favorable conditions for the fronts to accomplish their objectives quickly. A theater-wide antiair defense operation in- volving tactical and strategic air defense as- sets coordinated at the theater level would be conducted to defend Warsaw Pact forces from residual enemy aircraft. In addition, naval forces would operate in the waters off a coastal flank to destroy enemy naval forces, secure the coastal flank of the theater, participate in am- phibious operations, and thwart the enemy's attempt to employ amphibious forces. If the war escalated to the nuclear level, the Soviets could employ a massive theater-wide nuclear strike involving the coordinated use of ground, Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), naval, and aviation systems. This strike would be ex- ploited by the rapid advance of front forces, taking advantage of the shock and disruption produced by massive nuclear employment. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The development of these complex opera- tions has required the Soviets to develop theater-level commands to exert proper coordi- nation and control. To support high commands in theaters, the Soviets have deployed an ex- tensive fixed and mobile communications struc- ture and constructed numerous hardened or bunkered command facilities. In addition, the Soviets may have established peacetime perma- nent theater commands for several TVDs. As many as five fronts could exist in a TVD. The highest commander in a TVD would be at least a three-star general who is directly responsible to the Supreme High Command (VGK). The commander would be supported by a combined arms staff with the responsibility of overseeing and coordinating the activities of the various operational formations. In wartime the General Staff would operate as the executor of the VGK and would develop plans for control of the forces. As stated ear- lier, the Soviets have organizationally struc- tured their forces to form a unified command structure under the VGK. This provides the Soviets with the command structure to apply the totality of their military power in warfare so that the whole of the operation would be greater than the sum of its parts. Soviet Command Structure Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed Forces is vested by the Soviet Constitution in the CPSU and the higher bodies of Soviet State power-the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Party control of the military, however, is facilitated by the exis- tence of the Defense Council, an organization that is chaired by the CPSU General Secretary and consists of top Party, government, and mil- itary leaders. The Defense Council is the most senior decisionmaking body for all aspects of national security policy. It also forms the nu- cleus of what would be expanded in wartime to the highest Party-state body responsible for establishing unified strategic leadership of the USSR and providing centralized direction to the national economy and the entire war effort. In this regard, it would perform functions sim- ilar to the USSR's World War II State Defense Committee. Party dominance of the Soviet Armed Forces is assured through the Party's role in deter- mining military doctrine and strategy and its control of budgetary resources and senior per- sonnel assignments. The top Party leadership establishes military doctrine and approves mili- tary strategy as developed by the General Staff. The Defense Council, dominated by the Party leadership, controls the defense budget and makes the decision to develop and deploy each new major weapons system. Senior military of- ficers are selected from a Central Committee list, and all major organizational changes in the Soviet military must be approved by the Defense Council. Party control of the military is also underscored by the fact that the Party General Secretary, in addition to being Defense Council Chairman, is also Supreme Comman- der in Chief of the Armed Forces. Direct control and administration of the daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), headed since 1976 by Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) Dmitriy Ustinov, until his death in December 1984. His replacement, MSU Sergey Sokolov, is expected to continue the policies initiated by Ustinov. As Minister of Defense, Sokolov is charged with maintaining the condition and overseeing the development of the Armed Forces, including officer recruit- ment and conscription of enlisted personnel; equipping the forces with weapons systems and military materiel; developing military strat- egy, operational art, and tactics; training the forces; and ensuring high standards of military discipline and political loyalty. The Ministry of Defense is also responsible, in coordination with local Soviet government organizations, for the Civil Defense program. Within the hierarchy of the Ministry of De- fense there is a Collegium that functions as a consultative body and policy review board. Chaired by the Minister, the Collegium dis- cusses and resolves issues connected with the development of the Armed Forces, their combat and mobilization readiness, and the effective- ness of military and political training. Member- ship includes the Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and other top military leaders. Collegium de- cisions normally are implemented as orders of the Minister of Defense. Minister of Defense Sokolov exercises con- trol of the Armed Forces through First Deputy Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defense. The First Deputy Ministers are: Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff since September 1984; MSU Viktor Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces since 1977, and former Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 CINC of the Ground Forces, Vasiliy Petrov. Five of the 11 Deputy Ministers are CINCs of the Services-Strategic Rocket Forces,, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces, and Air Forces. The five service CINCs are responsi- ble for the peacetime administrative manage- ment, including combat and political training of the forces. Operational control of the forces rests with a peacetime variation of the VGK and is administered by the General Staff. Six other Deputy Defense Ministers are in charge of civil defense, rear services, the main inspec- torate, construction and billeting, personnel, and armaments. The most important element in the Soviet Ministry of Defense for peacetime forces man- agement, as well as wartime control of opera- tional formations, is the General Staff headed by Marshal Akhromeyev. As the central mil- itary staff organ, the General Staff exercises operational control over the Armed Forces and is responsible for coordinating the activity of the main staffs of the five services, the staffs of 16 military districts, four groups of forces, four fleets, rear services, civil defense forces, and the main directorates of the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff coordinates mili- tary planning, advises the Defense Council on matters of military policy, develops military strategy for approval by the Defense Council, and directs functions common to all of the ser- vices. The major responsibilities of the General Staff in peacetime are to ensure that military forces reach and sustain a high level of combat readiness, and to prepare strategic operation plans in the event of war. During wartime, the General Staff would be the primary organi- zation to implement operational orders of the Supreme High Command. Territorially, the Soviet Armed Forces lo- cated within the USSR are organized into 16 military districts (MDs). An MD is a high-level administrative command element that contains military units up to army level, training in- stitutions, recruitment and mobilization offices or military commissariats, and other military establishments. The primary mission of a mil- itary district is to train military units and en- sure their high level of combat readiness. Other important responsibilities include registration and induction of draftees, mobilization, civil defense, and premilitary and reserve training. In the event of war, certain military districts, such as those on the periphery of the USSR, could generate fronts or other operational field forces, either singly or in combination. Soviet units stationed in East Europe are organized into four Groups of Forces located in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Military districts and Groups of Forces are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. They contain their own or- ganic staff elements responsible for political af- fairs, personnel administration, training, rear services, construction and billeting, and civil defense. Each MD and Group of Forces com- mand staff has officers who serve as chiefs of their respective service components. Soviet naval forces are assigned to four fleets, all of which have command and staff organizations and relationships similar to those of military districts. Naval fleets are also operationally subordinated to the General Staff. Command and Control The Soviets believe in a rapid and efficient transformation of their peacetime national se- curity organization into an operational com- mand capable of successfully achieving all major political and military objectives in the event of general war. To this end, they have established a peacetime control system that closely approximates the anticipated wartime structure. The Soviets have created peacetime national security and high-level military orga- nizations. These organizations are headed by the Defense Council and can function as the strategic command element in wartime with very little change. This wartime management structure would provide a unified system of command for the Armed Forces, the Soviet Government, and the national economy capa- ble of exerting centralized direction but de- signed to permit a degree of autonomous operations required by modern warfare. The current Defense Council probably would be expanded to include representatives of the highest Party, state, and military leadership. It would function in a manner similar to the World War II State Defense Committee, ensur- ing centralized political direction of the entire war effort. Soviet military writings state that concentration of the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces in the hands of the high- est political agency of government control is a necessary condition for attaining victory in war. The creation of single organs of military and political leadership underscores the Soviet emphasis on the interdependence of politics and military strategy. In addition to directing Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Minister of Defense S. L. Sokolov Chief of Main Political Directorate First Deputy Minister of Defense S. F. Akhromeyev (Chief of the General Staff) Deputy Minister of Defense Y.F. Iva novsk iy (C-in-C Ground Forces) First Deputy Minister of Defense V. G. Kulikov (C-in-C Warsaw Pact Forces) Deputy Minister of Defense V. F. Tolubko (C-in-C Strategic Rocket Forces) Deputy Minister of Defense A. I. Koldunov (C-in-C Air Defense Forces) Stavka of the Soviet Supreme High Command First Deputy Ministers of Defense Supreme High Command (VGK) Chief, Main Political Directorate C-in-Cs of Soviet Forces General Secretary CPSU Minister of Defense Chief of the General Staff Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers General Staff (Executive Agent of VGK) First Deputy Minister of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense A. N. Yefimov (C-in-C Air Forces) Other Party and State Figures as Required Deputy Minister of Defense S. G. Gorshkov (C-in-C Naval Forces) Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 the conduct of military operations, the Defense Council would supervise the nation's economy and its support of the war effort through con- trol of the vast ministerial structure of the Soviet Government. Direct leadership of the Armed Forces would be the responsibility of the Supreme High Com- mand (VGK), headed by the Party General Secretary as Supreme Commander in Chief. Former Defense Minister Ustinov provided pub- lic confirmation during an awards ceremony in late September 1984 that Chernenko occupies such a position even in peacetime. The Party General Secretary would also head the General Headquarters (Stavka) of the VGK. The Stavka would be responsible for the preparation and conduct of military campaigns and strategic operations. It would also resolve issues con- cerned with the overall wartime situation of the country. The MOD Collegium would probably provide the foundation for the wartime Stavka VGK, which would include, in addition to the CPSU General Secretary, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and other First Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and the five Armed Forces Commanders in Chief. Supreme Party control of the entire war effort is confirmed by the fact that, in addition to being Party Gen- eral Secretary and the senior Politburo mem- ber, the Party General Secretary would also function as wartime Defense Council Chair- man, Supreme Commander in Chief, and head of the Stavka VGK. The General Staff would serve as operational staff and executive agent for the Stavka VGK. Working in conjunction with the main staffs of the five services, the main Operations Direc- torate of the General Staff would draft plans for strategic operations for consideration by the Stavka VGK. Once approved, these plans would be issued to operational commanders as orders of the VGK. The General Staff would be responsible for ensuring compliance with all VGK orders and directives, including timely and precise execution of the VGK military cam- paign plans by the operational commands. In order to ensure both centralized control of'strategic planning and decentralized battle management of the Armed Forces, the Sovi- ets in wartime would employ intermediate High Commands in TVDs that would be subordinate to the VGK and would be responsible for di- recting the efforts of subordinate formations. Commanders for four of the probable TVD High Commands are: Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov; Army General I.A. Gerasimov; Army General Y.P. Maksimov; and General I.M. Tret'yak. In certain circumstances the VGK might create High Commands for specific strategic directions, i.e., a major axis or avenue of attack not already under the control of a High Command in a TVD. The Soviets also have created an elaborate system of emergency relocation facilities, many of which are bunkered, designed to ensure the survival of Party and State control through the protection of high-level Party, government, and military leaders. These facilities are equipped with hardened communications equipment and would serve as alternate command and con- trol posts for the top leadership in wartime. In addition, managers and factory personnel of critical industries would be evacuated with critical machinery out of urban areas and away from immediate battle areas to emergency lo- cations to facilitate their continued operation. All these measures are designed to provide un- interrupted functioning of the various elements of Soviet strategic leadership and the national economy in wartime, including nuclear war. The Soviets have carefully thought out and continue to develop the details of their sys- tem of strategic leadership. To a large extent, the system designed for war fighting and war survival is already in place. The nucleus of critical Party-State control organs and high- level military command elements that would be needed in wartime exists during peacetime in the form of top political and military or- ganizations. These peacetime organizations could shift their activities to wartime opera- tions with minimal organizational disruption and little augmentation in membership. The peacetime Soviet national security apparatus and its likely wartime counterpart are struc- tured with the sole purpose of ensuring the continued survival of the CPSU through the successful conduct of military operations and consequent achievement of overall political objectives. Technology Transfer The Soviet Union continues an intensive, carefully executed program-both legal and illegal-to acquire advanced Western technol- ogy. The Soviets have been forced to turn increasingly to illegal technology acquisition efforts in response to US Government tighten- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The MiG-25/FOXBAT E interceptor, above, has a limited look-down/shoot-down capability. Acquisition of Western technology enabled the USSR to fit the MiG-31/FOXHOUND interceptor with a true look-down/shoot-down radar system. ing of export control laws and procedures. The illegal business of technology acquisition is an expensive proposition for the Soviets and of- ten involves rings of professional thieves who work through networks of phony companies in various countries. Acquisition of sophisticated technology, es- sential to many Soviet military advances, in- volves operations not only against the United States but also, increasingly, against other world technological leaders, including Western Europe and Japan. For example, in October of 1984, the Soviets tried to divert a photomicro- densitometer from West Germany to East Ger- many, having failed in two previous attempts to obtain the equipment through legal means from the US. The equipment-militarily useful for analysis of streak camera photography- was bound for the Lebedev Institute in Moscow when it was detained at the East German bor- der by West German authorities at US request. Soviet industrial modernization programs are supported by an elaborate network for the collection of foreign scientific and technolog- ical information. Guidelines for introduction of advanced manufacturing systems, involving computer-aided design and automated manu- facturing systems, include a constant monitor- ing of available Western technology. No areas of Western technology are given higher priority than computers and electronics. KGB and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) agents are targeted against Western sources for these critical technologies in order to deter- mine exactly where and how the hardware and software can be acquired. Collection require- ments are coordinated with the USSR weapons development and production system. Weapons designers and technologists submit their re- quests directly through the KGB departments located at each facility. The turnaround time for the receipt of the desired design information or "hardware" can be a matter of weeks. Stand- ing science and technology (S&T) requirements are continually updated by the S&T elements of the KGB and GRU, as well as by the State Committee for Science and Technology, many of whose staff members are KGB and GRU officers. In addition, the USSR Academy of Sciences and several of its institutes follow Western S&T, even tapping into Western data bases through a growing number of transna- tional computerized networks dedicated to S&T collection and dissemination. It is estimated that Western military-related technology acquired by Soviet intelligence has Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 saved the Soviet defense industry billions of dollars; for example, classified reports were obtained on advanced US weapons systems still under development. The classified re- ports included information on the F-15 look- down/shoot-down radar system, the B-1 bomber radar system, PHOENIX air-to-air missiles, PA- TRIOT surface-to-air missiles, the improved HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and a NATO air- defense system. The effect on the Soviets of illegal diversion attempts has been quantified for the first time in a Department of Defense pi- lot study. Surveying a sample of denied export license applications in 1983-84, it was deter- mined that had these exports been approved, the Soviets would have saved between $6.6 and $13.3 billion in primary military research costs during the 1990s and beyond. The Soviets stand to save hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars by now being able to utilize proven US designs to field counterpart systems-as well as effective defense and countermeasure systems-in a much shorter time and with less risk. Protection of Western technology is an integral part of our total defense posture. Arms Control Compliance In considering the totality of Soviet military power it is essential to monitor closely the Soviet Union's performance, or lack thereof, in honoring formal international obligations bearing on that power. As President Reagan stated in his January 1984 Report to the Congress on Soviet Non- compliance with Arms Control Agreements, "If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global and regional stability, it is essential that all par- ties to agreements comply with them." How- ever, the Soviet Union has violated many of its major arms control obligations and polit- ical commitments when it was in its inter- est to do so. Some of these violations and probable violations were documented in two official US reports and in an independently produced advisory study on arms control com- In 1984, the new AKULA-Class submarine joined the Soviet Navy's growing number of modern, nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of carrying the new SS-NX-21 land-attack sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 pliance that were forwarded by the President to the Congress at its request. The first report, submitted on 23 January 1984, presented seven cases in which the So- viet Union has violated or probably violated its arms control obligations. The advisory study was prepared independently by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Dis- armament and sent to the Congress on 10 Oc- tober 1984. This more comprehensive study covered Soviet compliance practices under arms control commitments from 1958 to 1983. The conclusions of both reports give cause for serious concern regarding the Soviet Union's conduct with respect to observance of arms control agreements. The second US report on Soviet noncompli- ance, forwarded to Congress on 1 February 1985, addressed 13 compliance issues and stated that other compliance issues remained under review. It reaffirmed the conclusions of the January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has violated the Helsinki Final Act, specifically the requirement of advance notification of certain military exercises; has violated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by maintain- ing an offensive biological warfare program and capability; has violated the Geneva Proto- col on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by the pro- duction, transfer, and use of chemical agents and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and South- east Asia; and has violated two provisions of SALT II-telemetry encryption and ICBM With testing of the SS-X-25 ICBM, the USSR is violating the SALT /I provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 - Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 modernization-by encrypting telemetry delib- erately to impede verification and by testing an ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the ICBM throwweight, if we were to accept the Soviet ar- gument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited sec- ond new type. The 1985 report also reaffirmed that the Soviet Union has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and has likely violated the yield limit of the Thresh- old Test Ban Treaty by conducting some tests that exceeded 150 kilotons. In the 1985 report, the US Government also concluded that the Soviet Union has violated the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by con- structing the Krasnoyarsk radar; has violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by causing ra- dioactive matter to be present outside its ter- ritorial limits; and has violated the SALT II prohibition against more than one new ICBM by developing and testing both the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25. With respect to the ABM Treaty, the 1985 report concluded that the So- viet Union potentially violated the prohibition on the development of a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a sys- tem, by the development of components of a new ABM system that apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation. It also concluded that the Soviet Union has probably violated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air mis- sile (SAM) components in the ABM mode by conducting tests that have involved SAM air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The US Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related ac- tions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited. With regard to these compliance issues, the United States has tried through appropriate diplomatic channels, including the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), to persuade the Soviet Union to explain its actions and to take corrective measures. Unfortunately, thus far, the Soviet Union has not provided satisfac- tory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions that would alleviate our concerns. President Reagan stated in both reports, "So- viet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the fu- ture. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive US-Soviet relationship." More- over, Soviet violations cast serious doubt on some of the key assumptions about arms con- trol that have guided US policy and Western public opinion for 30 years. Specifically, they call into question that the risk of detection would generally deter the Soviets from violat- ing their arms control obligations, or in the rare instances when the Soviets would not be deterred, they would suffer serious penalties. Our verification capabilities have not de- terred the Soviet Union from violating arms control agreements. Moreover, if the Soviets are not made to account for their actions, it is unlikely that they will be deterred from more serious violations. We must approach arms control today more carefully than we have in the past. We must fully consider the Soviet compli- ance record as we develop arms control pol- icy and defense policy in the future. We must seek better means of detection, more compre- hensive treaty provisions for verification, and more careful treaty drafting that might help deter cheating. However, by themselves these measures are not enough; alone, they cannot enforce compliance. Most fundamentally, the USSR must adopt a more responsible policy to- ward compliance. The traditional Soviet effort to achieve unilateral advantage through arms control treaties demonstrates that the West's determination to maintain a military balance is crucial to significant, equitable arms reduc- tions. The Soviet Union will have no incentive to accept such reductions unless it is convinced that the West will not allow it to achieve uni- lateral advantage within or outside the arms control framework. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter II Forces for Nuclear Attack In the year since the publication of Soviet Military Power 1984, the Soviet Union has pressed ahead with the development and de- ployment of new generations of increasingly capable land, sea, and air forces for nuclear attack. As modernization of the fourth genera- tion of intercontinental ballistic mis- siles (ICBMs) has neared completion-ICBMs with greater accuracy and survivability-the USSR has moved with great speed in the de- velopment and test firing of a fifth generation of ICBM, with a new dimension of capability- mobility that increases its survivability. As the USSR's strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force has increased its capability with the introduction of each new TYPHOON-Class SSBN, the Sovi- ets have launched a new SSBN-the DELTA IV-as the platform for their most capable long-range multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23. The USSR now has three manned strategic bombers in production and development-the BACKFIRE, the BEAR H, and the BLACK- JACK. With the reopening of the BEAR pro- duction line, the Soviets are producing a new, upgraded variant of the BEAR turboprop bomber, thereby increasing their long-range bomber force. Newly built BEAR H bombers have become the launch platform for the now- operational long-range AS-15 air-launched cruise missile. The modernization and upgrading of these The introduction of new generations of Soviet forces for offensive nuclear warfare - forces ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles to nuclear-tipped artillery - is a dynamic pro- cess that includes both increased accuracy for the weapons of those forces and increased mo- bility for survivability. The fifth-generation SS- X-24 ICBM will probably be silo-deployed at first; rail-mobile deployment could follow. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 strategic forces have been paralleled by growth and increased capabilities of the Soviets' longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems deployed with Soviet combat forces. Significant improvements in nuclear- capable aircraft, as well as increases in tac- tical missiles and nuclear artillery, have also occurred. Soviet ;leaders since Khrushchev have fol- lowed a consistent and relentless policy for the development of forces for nuclear attack. The Soviet leadership, however, recognizes the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. The grand strategy of the USSR, therefore, is to at- tain its objectives, if possible, by means short of war-exploiting the coercive leverage inherent in superior forces, particularly nuclear forces, to instill fear, to erode the West's collective security arrangements, and to support subver- sion. Thus, the primary role of Soviet military power is to provide the essential underpinning for the step-by-step extension of Soviet influ- ence and control. In a global conflict, Soviet strategic policy would be "to destroy Western nuclear forces be- Nuclear Forces-ICBMs 1 SST ykovo 5013 perm Y.ostikar Ola om -"'],IT,,Y at PACE MISS~11L'E/S ?ss~8] Aleysk i s-11, ,i lovyannaya SS-11 520 SS-18 308 SS-13 60 SS-19 360 SS-17 Test Center 150 A fore launch or in flight to their targets; to en- sure national survival should nuclear weapons reach the Soviet homeland; and to support and sustain combined arms combat in several the=aters of military operations. From these policy directives come several, overarching strategic wartime missions: .eliminate Western nuclear capabilities and related supporting facilities; .seize and occupy vital areas on the . Eurasian landmass; and .defend the Soviet State against attack. These missions would involve: .disruption and destruction of the West's essential command, control, and communi- cations capabilities; .destruction or neutralization of the West's nuclear forces on the ground or at sea before they could be launched; and Nuclear Forces-SLBMs SS-N-5 42 SS-N-18 224 SS-N-6 336 SS-N-20 60 SS-N-8 292 SS-NX-23 16 SS-N-17 12 Nuclear Forces-Bombers BACKFIRE 250' BADGER 287 BISON 48 BLINDER 136 BEAR Test Center 125 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 oprotection of the Soviet leadership and cadres, military forces, and- military and economic assets necessary to sustain the war. The Soviets believe that a conventional war in Europe might escalate to the nuclear level. Despite their oft-repeated commitment to no firstI use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets have developed extensive plans either to preempt a NATO nuclear strike by launching a mas- sive) attack, or to launch a massive first strike against prime NATO targets should their con- ventional operations falter. Strategic and theater forces and programs in place or under active development designed to accomplish these objectives include: ohard-target-capable ICBMs, ;LRINF ballis- tic missiles, and land-based cruise missiles; oshort-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and free rocket over ground (FROG) systems deployed with combat troops; obombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) designed to penetrate US and Allied defensive systems; osubmarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (SLCMs) on various platforms; oantisubmarine warfare (AS W,) forces to attack Western nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; oair and missile defenses, including early warning satellites and radars, interceptor They submarine-launched SS-NX-21 cruise missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and can be fired from standard size Soviet submarine torpedo tubes. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiballistic missile (ABM) radars and in- terceptors, and some antiaircraft artillery; ?antisatellite weapons; .passive defense forces, including civil de- fense forces and countermeasures troops and equipment devoted to confusing in- coming aircraft; and .hardened facilities 'numbering in the thou- sands, command vehicles, and evacuation plans designed to protect Party, military, governmental and industrial staffs, essen- tial workers, and to the extent possible, the general population. Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elim- inating the US capacity to fight and support a conflict would require the capability to employ theater and strategic forces over a variety of ranges and the destruction of: .other military-associated command and control; .war-supporting industries, arsenals, and major military facilities; .ports and airfields in the United States and those along sea and air routes to European and Asian theaters of war; and .satellite surveillance sensors, ground- based surveillance sensors, related facili- ties, and communications. Offensive forces (ICBMs, LRINF, SLBMs, SRBMs, cruise missiles, and bombers) and anti- satellite weapons would generally be assigned these tasks. In some cases, special purpose forces could be used for these missions, espe- cially in Eurasia. These tasks would be gen- erally less demanding than those in the prime category. Soviet nuclear forces are designed and per- sonnel trained to fulfill their missions under all circumstances. In a nuclear exchange, the So- viets believe the most favorable circumstance would be a preemptive strike; the ,least favor- able would be a follow-on strike after nuclear weapons hit the USSR. The Soviets have train- ing programs intended to enable nuclear forces to operate under all circumstances. Moreover, the Soviets appear to believe that nuclear war might last weeks or even months and have fac- tored that into their force planning. ?The key to success in preemption would be effective coordination of the strike and sound intelligence on Western intentions. During wartime, the main mission of So- viet intelligence would be to determine the West's intended courses of action. Meet- ing these demands in war requires reliable command, control, and communications under all conditions. ?A launch-under-attack circumstance would place a great stress on attack warning sys- tems and launch coordination. To meet this demand the Soviets have established a satellite-based ICBM launch-detection system, built an over-the-horizon radar missile launch-detection system to back up the satellites, and have large phased-array radars ringing the USSR. These warning systems could give the Soviets time to launch their forces very quickly. .Follow-on strikes would require the sur- vivability of the command, control, and communications systems as well as the weapons themselves. The Soviets have invested heavily in providing this sur- vivability. The SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs are housed in the world's hardest silos. Silo deployment has been adopted for ABMs as well. To increase survivabil- ity, the SS-20 LRINF missile is mobile. Mobile ICBMs are nearing deployment, and a mobile strategic surface-to-air mis- sile is almost operational. The launch- control facilities for offensive missiles are housed in very hard silos or on off-road vehicles. Communications are redundant and hardened. Higher commands have multiple mobile alternate command posts available for their use, including land ve- hicles, trains, aircraft, and ships. Bombers are assigned -dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile submarines could be submerged in deep fjords just off their piers or dispersed while being protected by Soviet surface and submarine forces. ?The belief that a nuclear war might be protracted has led to the USSR's em- phasis on survivability along with war reserves, protection for essential person- nel and equipment, and the capacity to reload launchers. For their ICBM, LRINF, SRBM, and air defense forces, the Soviets have stocked extra missiles, propellants, and warheads throughout the USSR. Some ICBM silo launchers could be reloaded, and provisions have been made for the de- contamination of those launchers. Plans for the survival of necessary equipment and personnel have been developed and practiced. Resupply systems are available to reload SSBNs in protected waters. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 USSR ICBMs METERS =30= SS-19 SS-X-24 MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD In Nearing 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 Development Deployment NUMBER DEPLOYED 100 420 60 Undetermined 150 308 360 WARHEADS 1 1 3 MRVs 1 1 4 MIRVs 10 MIRVs 6MIRVs Up to 10 MIRVs 1 MAX RANGE (KM) 11,000 13,000 10,600 9,400 9,000 10,000 11,000 10,000 10,000 10,500 LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot Hot Hot Cold Cold Cold Hot Cold Cold METERS =30= - rwl - NUMBER R DEPLOYED 26? 450 550 In Development WARHEADS 1 1 3 Upto10 MAX RANGE (KM) 12,000 12,500 14,000 14,000 LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot Cold As of early 1985 Even with these ambitious development and deployment programs, the Soviets continue to modernize all elements of their nuclear attack forces. At the same time, the Soviet leader- ship has been directing a campaign to support and amplify ongoing antinuclear movements in the West to influence, delay, or frustrate West- ern !nuclear force programs. Using this two- pronged approach, Moscow seeks new gains in relative capability despite the drive of Western governments to redress the imbalance that has developed over the past decade. Forces for Intercontinental Attack Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles The operational Soviet ICBM force consists of some 1,400 silo launchers, aside from those at test sites. Some 818 of these launchers have been rebuilt since 1972. Nearly half of these silos are new versions of the original designs and have been reconstructed or modified in the past six years. All 818 silos have been hard- ened better to withstand attack by currently operational US ICBMs. These silos contain the world's most modern deployed ICBMs-the SS- 17 Mod 3 (150 silos), the SS-18 Mod 4 (308), and the SS-19 Mod 3 (360). Deployment of these ICBMs began just six years ago. The highly accurate SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs carry more and larger Multiple; Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) than the MINUTEMAN III, the most modern US ICBM. The SS-18 Mod 4 carries ten MIRVs, and the SS-19 Mod 3 carries six, whereas the MINUTE- MAN III carries only three. The SS-18 Mod 4 was specifically designed to attack and de- stroy ICBM silos and other hardened targets Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 in the United States. Each of its .10 warheads has more than 20 times the destructive power of the nuclear devices developed during World War II. The SS-18 Mod 4 force currently de- ployed has the capability to destroy more than 80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. The SS-19 Mod 3 ICBM could be assigned similar missions and, in addi- tion, could be used against targets in Eurasia. Although the SS-17 Mod 3 is somewhat less ca- pable than the SS-19, it has similar targeting flexibility. The remaining 580 Soviet ICBM silos are fit- ted with the SS-11-420 SS-11 Mod 2/3s, 100 SS-11 Mod is-and 60 SS-13 Mod 2s. These ICBMs of older vintage-1966 and 1973 ini- tial deployment, respectively-are housed in less-survivable silos and are considerably less capable. Nevertheless, their destructive po- tential against softer area targets in the United States and Eurasia is significant in terms of many of the Soviet nuclear requirements out- lined above. The SS-16 is a three-stage, solid-propellant, single-RV ICBM that the Soviets claim has not been deployed. The system was first tested in 1972; the last known test took place in 1976. The SS-20 LRINF missile is closely related to the SS-16. The SS-16 probably was intended originally for both silo and mobile deployment, using equipment and a basing arrangement comparable to that used with the SS-20. The So- viet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage, the RV, or the appropriate device for targeting the RV of that missile. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it indicates that the SS-16 activities at Plesetsk are a prob- able violation of SALT II, which banned SS-16 deployment. Deployment programs for all of the currently operational Soviet ICBM systems are complete. The command, control, and communications system that supports the Soviet ICBM force is modern and highly survivable, and the reliabil- ity of the ICBMs themselves is regularly tested by live firings from operational complexes. Those ICBMs in the current force that the Soviets decide not to replace with modified or new ICBMs will, in accord with past practice, be refurbished to increase their useful lifetime. During this process, some system modifications could also be made. Through this capacity for refurbishment, the Soviets can sustain a higher level of confidence in system reliability over a longer term than would otherwise be possible. Force Developments. Soviet research and de- velopment on ICBMs is a dynamic process in- volving many programs. The completion of current deployment programs probably marks US and Soviet ICBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1969-1985 Soviet RVs 5,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 US RVs 2,000 2,000 Soviet ICBMs L:~:~ I 1,000 ?- ?_--- 1,000 0 0 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 the end of significant Soviet investment in the development of entirely new liquid-propellant ICBMs. Modified versions of the SS-18, how- ever, are likely to be produced and deployed in existing silos in the future. The Soviets appear to be planning on new solid-propellant ICBMs to meet future mission requirements, including a counterforce capa- bility and ICBM force survivability. Two new solid-propellant ICBMs, the medium-size SS-X- 24 and the smaller SS-X-25, are well along in their flight test programs from the range head at Plesetsk in the Soviet north. A mobile ver- sion of each of these systems will be deployed. The SS-X-24 will probably be silo-deployed at first, with initial deployment expected in 1986. Rail-mobile deployment could follow by one to two years. Early preparations for the deploy- ment of the SS-X-24 are already underway. The SS-X-25 is approximately the same size as the US MINUTEMAN ICBM. It will carry a single reentry vehicle. The SS-X-25 has ap- parently been designed for road-mobile deploy- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ment similar to that of the SS-20; as such it will be highly survivable with an inherent refire ca- pability. Two bases, probably for the SS-X-25, are nearing operational capability. They con- sist of launcher garages equipped with sliding roofs and several support buildings to house the necessary mobile support equipment. Recent activity at the Soviet ICBM test ranges indicates that two additional new ICBMs are under development. A new ICBM to replace the SS-18 is nearing the flight test stage of development. Additionally, a solid- propellant missile that may be larger than the SS-X-24 will begin flight testing in the next few years. Both of these missiles are likely to have better accuracy and greater throwweights than their predecessors. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles The Soviets maintain the world's largest bal- listic missile submarine force. As of early 1985, the force numbered 62 modern SSBNs carry- ing 928 nuclear-tipped missiles. These totals do not include 13 older submarines with 39 missiles currently assigned theater missions. Eighteen SSBNs are fitted with 300 MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These 18 units have been built and deployed within the past 8 years. Over two-thirds of the ballistic missile submarines, including those equipped with MIRVed missiles are fitted with long-range SLBMs that enable the submarines YANKEE 1130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6 YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-11 DELTA-Class YANKEE-Class 4--DELTA 1140m 12 Tubes SS-N-8- +---DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-8- DELTA III 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-18- DELTA IV 160m 16 Tubes SS-NX-23 TYPHOON-Class to patrol in waters close to the Soviet Union. This affords protection from NATO antisubma- rine warfare operations. Moreover, the long- range missiles allow the Soviets to fire from home ports, if necessary, and still strike targets in the United States. Three units of one of the most modern Soviet ballistic missile submarine, the TYPHOON, have already been built. Each TYPHOON car- ries 20 SS-N-20 solid-propellant MIRVed SLBMs. The TYPHOON is the world's largest submarine, with a displacement of 25,000 tons, one-third greater than the US OHIO-Class. The submarine can operate under the Arctic Ocean icecap, adding further to the protection af- forded by the 8,300-kilometer range of the SS-N- 20 SLBM. Three or four additional TYPHOONs are probably now under construction, and, by the early 1990s, the Soviets could have as many as eight of these potent weapons systems in their operational force. In accordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Soviets have, since 1978, re- moved 12 YANKEE I units from service as bal- listic missile submarines. These units had to be removed as newer submarines were produced in order for the overall Soviet SSBN force to stay within 62 modern SSBN/950 SLBM limits es- tablished in 1972. These YANKEEs, however, have not been scrapped. Some have been recon- figured as attack or cruise missile submarines. The Soviets may have begun to assign Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines US i+POSEIDON 129.5m 16 Tubes POSEIDON SSBN 4E Comparative Cross-Sections of SSBNs TYPHOON- Class Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 OHIO- f1 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles USSR US METERS SS-NA8_____SS.-N-20_SS-NX_23 1'5 SS-N-8 POSEIDON TRIDENT SLBM C-3 SLBM C-4 SS-N-6 SS-N-17 1:0 :; iii-I: . M OD MOD MOD 1 3 2 1 2 3 In 1 2 RV's 1 1 2 MRVs 1 1 1 3 MIRVs 1 7 MIRVs 6.9 flight 10 8 RANGE (KM) 2,400 3,000 3,000 7,800 9,100 3,900 6,500 8,000 6,500 8,300 test 4,000 7,400 SS-N-5s not shown theater attack missions to some of the 21 re- the DELTA IV, which will be fitted with the maining YANKEE I submarines. However, SS-NX-23 SLBM, now being flight tested. This YANKEE patrols targeted against the United large, liquid-propelled SLBM will have greater States continue. throwweight, carry more warheads, and be Force Developments. The Soviets have more accurate than the SS-N-18, which is car- launched two units of a new class of SSBN, ried on the DELTA III SSBN. The SS-NX-23 is The drawing at right helps to place the enormous hull size of the TYPHOON-Class 186YDS OR 170M SSBN in perspective. 120YDS OR 110M C)CC7C7OC7 C7 ~ 0 0 10 rz; Football Field wN-^ x 7 1 7 . WIWI . Or z ?b"w' ?'~ Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 likely to be deployed on DELTA Ills as a re- placement for the SS-N-18 as well as on the new DELTA IVs. The Soviets will probably begin flight testing a modified version of the SS-N-20. Additionally, US and Z?yautx SLBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1969-1985 0 - o 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 based on past Soviet practice, they may initiate testing of a modified version of the SS-NX-23 before the end of the 1980s. Both modified ver- sions of the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23 are likely to be more accurate than their predecessors. To ensure communication reliability, the So- viets emphasize redundant and timely com- mand and control for their military forces, especially those for intercontinental attack. The Soviets are expected to deploy an extremely low frequency (ELF) communications system that will enable them to contact SSBNs under most operating conditions. Strategic Aviation Soviet strategic bombers and strike aircraft ARCTIC OCEAN A_ ., ARCTIC OCEAN 5 O IH5 0 11i 0OCEAN PACIFIC OCEAN have been restructured to form five air armies subordinate to the Supreme High Command (VGK). The five armies are: .Smolensk Air Army; .Legnica Air Army; .Venitza Air Army; .Irkutsk Air Army; and .Moscow Air Army. These armies were established to place Soviet strategic aircraft on a footing in peacetime that would facilitate the transition to wartime. The armies are focused on potential conflicts in Eu- rope, Asia, and the United States. Strategic aviation assets include some 170 BEAR and BISON bombers and about 250 BACKFIRE bombers (including 120 BACKFIRE bombers in Soviet Naval Aviation). The Sovi- ets also have 360 medium-range BLINDER and BADGER bombers; 450 shorter range FENCER strike aircraft; and 530 tanker, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft. The Soviets have allocated these aircraft among the five air armies to provide support for specific theaters of military operations and to assure the flexi- bility to reallocate aircraft as necessary during wartime. The intercontinental BEAR and BI- SON bombers are available for maritime and Eurasian missions, and the BACKFIRE can be used against the United States. This flexibility allows the Soviets to focus their strategic air assets as circumstances require. The Soviets have taken recent steps that in- dicate greatly increased interest in their long- range strategic bomber force. An entirely new variant of the BEAR bomber-the BEAR H- is now operational with the AS-15 long-range cruise missile. This is the first new produc- tion of a strike version of the BEAR airframe in over 15 years. In addition, older BEAR aircraft configured to carry air-to-surface mis- siles (ASMs) are being reconfigured to carry the newer, supersonic AS-4 missile in place of the subsonic AS-3. Several of these reconfigu- rations (BEAR G) have been completed. With the BEAR H in series production, the decline in the inventory of BEAR aircraft, characteristic of recent years, has been reversed. The BACKFIRE is the most modern oper- ational Soviet bomber. The Soviets continue to produce this aircraft at a rate of at least 30 per year; this production rate is likely to be maintained at least through the end of the decade. The original design has been modi- fied several times, and further modifications are likely to be made to upgrade aircraft per- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 UNREFUELED COMBAT RADIUS (KM) 8,300 MAX SPEED (KTS) 500 5,500 1,100 US Long-Range Strike Aircraft =60 formance. The BACKFIRE is a long-range aircraft capable of performing nuclear strike, conventional attack, antiship, and reconnais- sance missions. The BACKFIRE can be equip- ped with a probe to permit in-flight refueling to increase its range and radius capabilities. It could be used against the contiguous United States on high-altitude subsonic missions. Its low-altitude supersonic dash capabilities make it a formidable weapon to support military op- erations in Europe and Asia as well. The Soviets have some FENCER strike air- craft assigned to strategic aviation. The FENCER is a supersonic, variable-geometry- wing, all-weather fighter-bomber that first reached operational status in 1974. Three vari- ants have been developed, the most recent introduced in 1981. The aircraft is still in pro- duction, and the number assigned to strategic aviation is likely to increase over the next few years. Force Developments. The new Soviet long- range bomber, the BLACKJACK, is in the flight test stage of development. The BLACK- JACK is larger than the US B-1B, probably will be faster, and may have about the same combat 7,300 1,200 radius. This new bomber could be operational by 1988. The BLACKJACK will be capable of carrying cruise missiles, bombs, or a combina- tion of both. It probably will first replace the much less capable BISON bomber and then the BEAR A bomber. A new aerial-refueling tanker aircraft, based on the 11-76/CANDID, has been under devel- opment for several years. When deployed in the near future, the new tanker will support tactical and strategic aircraft and will signifi- cantly improve the ability of Soviet aircraft to conduct longer range operations. US and Soviet Intercontinental- Capable Bombers' Inventory Inventory 600-1 r 500 350 350 300 USS--- 300 250 / 250 20o 200 USSR (excluding aircraft assigned 150 to Naval Aviation) 150 100 100 50 50 1982 1983 Year US data include B-52, FB-111; Soviet data include BEAR. BISON and BACKFIRE. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Long-Range Cruise Missiles Current Systems and Force Levels. The AS- 15, a small, air-launched, subsonic, low-altitude cruise missile, similar in design to the US TOMAHAWK, reached initial operational ca- pability with the BEAR H in 1984. The AS-15 has a range of about 3,000 kilometers. The sys- tem, could also be deployed on BLACKJACK bombers when that aircraft becomes opera- tional. The combination of the AS-15 and the new BEAR H and BLACKJACK bombers will increase Soviet strategic intercontinental air power in the late 1980s. There are some 25 BEAR H bombers operational at this time. Force Developments. The Soviets are de- veloping four other long-range cruise missile systems. Two of these are variants of the AS-15, and the other two are variants of a larger system probably designed for long-range operations. The latter have no US counterpart. The two smaller cruise missiles are being de- veloped for launch from sea- and ground-based platforms, respectively. The sea-based vari- ant,% the SS-NX-21, is small enough to be fired from standard Soviet torpedo tubes. Candidate launch platforms for the SS-NX-21 include: the existing VICTOR III nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), a new YANKEE-Class SSN and; the new AKULA, MIKE, and SIERRA- Class SSNs. The SS-NX-21 is expected to be- come operational this year and could be deployed on submarines near US coasts. The ground-based SSC-X-4 variant of the small cruise missile may not be ready for oper- ational deployment until late this year or next. Its range and the likelihood the Soviets will not deploy the system outside the USSR indicate that its mission will be in support of theater operations. The system will be mobile and prob- ably follow operational procedures like those of the SS-20 LRINF missile. The larger cruise missile is being developed as a sea-based system that has been designated the SS-NX-24. A newly converted YANKEE- Class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack sub- marine (SSGN) will be the test platform for the SS-NX-24. A ground-based variant of this missile may be in development. The SS-NX-24 could be operational within the next two years, and the ground-based version sometime after that. When first deployed, these cruise missiles probably will be fitted with nuclear warheads and capable of attacking hardened targets. De- pending on future munitions developments and the types of guidance systems incorporated in their designs, they could eventually be accu- rate enough to permit the use of conventional warheads. With such warheads, highly accu- rate cruise missiles would pose a significant non-nuclear threat to US and NATO airfields and nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict. US Nuclear Forces In measuring and evaluating the continuing progress being made by the USSR's strategic forces, it is useful to bear in mind the status of US forces. By mid-1985, US strategic deterrent forces will consist of: ?1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBMs; Long-Range Cruise Missiles USSR ___ WARHEADS 1 1 1 RANGE (KM) in development 3,000 3,000 3,000 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ?26 TITAN ICBMs; ?240 B-52G/H model bombers, plus about 23 aircraft undergoing maintenance and modification; ?56 FB-111 bombers, plus some 5 aircraft undergoing maintenance and modification; ?496 POSEIDON (C-3 and C-4) fleet ballistic missile launchers; and ?144 TRIDENT fleet ballistic missile launchers. The historic and continuing objective of US strategic forces is deterrence of nuclear and major conventional aggression against the United States and its allies. This policy has pre- served nuclear peace for nearly 40 years and, in sharp contrast to the Soviet priority accorded nuclear warfighting, is based on the convic- tion of all postwar American administrations that there could be no winners in a nuclear conflict. Rather, US deterrence policy seeks to maintain the situation in which any poten- tial aggressor sees little to gain and much to lose by initiating hostilities against the United States or its allies. In turn, the maintenance of peace through nuclear deterrence provides the vital opportunity to realize a complementary and constant US goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all states. To re- alize these deterrence objectives requires the development, deployment, and maintenance of strategic forces whose size and characteris- tics clearly indicate to an opponent that he cannot achieve his politico-military objectives either through employment of nuclear weapons or through political coercion based on nuclear advantages. Modernization of US strategic de- terrent forces is reported in Chapter VIII. Forces for Theater Attack With the initial deployment of the SS-20 LRINF missile in 1977, the Soviets launched a concerted effort to modernize and expand their intermediate-range nuclear force. Each SS-20 carries three MIRVs, thereby providing a significant force expansion factor even as the older single-RV SS-4 is withdrawn. The SS-20 also has significant improvements in accuracy and reaction time over the older missiles they are replacing. About 400 SS-20s have been deployed, two- thirds of which are opposite European NATO. Some shifting of the SS-20 force has recently been observed as the Soviets prepare for de- ployment of the SS-X-25 ICBM; however, no reduction in the SS-20 force is expected from this activity. The mobility of the SS-20 sys- tem enables both on- and off-road operation. As a result, the survivability of the SS-20 is greatly enhanced because detecting and target- ing them is difficult when they are field de- ployed. Further, the SS-20 launcher has the capability of being reloaded and refired, and the Soviets stockpile refire missiles. In addition to the SS-20 force, the Soviets still maintain some 120 SS-4 LRINF missiles. All of these missiles are located in the western USSR opposite European NATO. In addition to the land-based LRINF missile forces, the Sovi- ets still maintain and operate 13 GOLF II-Class ballistic missile submarines. Each submarine is Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Deployments equipped with three SS-N-5 SLBMs. Six GOLF II units are based in the Baltic, where they con- tinue to pose a threat to most of Europe, while the remaining seven GOLF Its patrol the Sea of Japan, where they could be employed against targets in the Far East. Future Force Developments. A modified ver- sion of the SS-20 is in flight test. This missile is expected to have even greater accuracy and other improvements over the current SS-20. US Non-Strategic Forces The initial deployment of PERSHING Its and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) be- Deployment and Target Coverage 1985 gan in Europe in late 1983. Deployment will continue until 1988, when 108 PERSHING Its and 464 GLCMs will be in place, unless a US- Soviet agreement that eliminates or limits the number of LRINF missiles on both sides is con- cluded. The deployment of US PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles responds to the Soviet LRINF missile threat to Europe. As the US PERSHING Its replace the shorter range PERSHING Is and Soviet SS-23s replace the SCUDs in Europe, the Soviet Union will at least maintain its substantial numerical su- periority in shorter range non-strategic nu- clear missiles while improving the qualitative Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 characteristics of its forces. The USSR also possesses a significant numerical advantage in intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) air- craft and is reducing the qualitative advantage NATO has enjoyed, despite NATO's INF air- craft modernization program, which consists of the replacement of older aircraft with the F-16 and TORNADO. Short-range nuclear forces (SNF) consist of tube artillery and missiles of much shorter range than INF missiles. The balance in SNF artillery, traditionally an area of NATO advan- tage, also has shifted dramatically in favor of the Soviets in recent years. The Soviets have achieved parity in overall numbers of SNF and continue to have a substantial advantage in the category of short-range missiles, giving them more flexibility in the employment of SNF. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles Current Systems and Force Levels. Armies and fronts have missile brigades equipped with 12-18 SS-1C SCUD SRBMs. Over 400 SCUD launchers are opposite European NATO; over 100 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; about 75 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; and one brigade is in strategic reserve. The SCUD is expected to be Missile Production USSR and NATO' Missile 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984 Type USSR USSR USSR USSR USSR NATO? ICBMs 250 200 175 150 100 350 350 .,. SLCMs 750 750 800 800 850 665 SLBMs 200 175 175 200 200 80 Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes United States; excludes France and Spain. replaced by the SS-23, which has a longer range and improved accuracy. Initial deployment is anticipated opposite NATO and China. Each front commander may also have a brigade of 12-18 SCALEBOARD missiles available. They are more accurate than the SS-12 they re- placed. Over 60 launchers are opposite European NATO and 40 are opposite the Sino- Soviet border in the Far East. There is one bat- talion opposite southwest Asia/eastern Turkey, and one brigade is in the Strategic Reserve mil- itary districts. The new generation of shorter range missiles can be employed effectively with conventional and improved conventional mu- nitions warheads in light of their greatly in- creased accuracy. In 1984, the Soviets, for the first time, for- ward deployed the SCALEBOARD short-range ballistic missile to Eastern Europe. These front-level missiles, which normally deploy with Soviet combined arms formations, are now in position to strike deep into NATO without hav- ing first to forward deploy. Force Developments. It is likely that the So- viets will continue to seek improvements in their SRBM force. Improvements in guidance and control, warhead capabilities, and accura- cies are expected. Such improvements will give the combined arms commanders enhanced non- nuclear targeting options and more flexible, re- liable, and survivable SRBMs. These systems will be capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or conventional warheads closer to the forward edge of the battle area and at greater depths within the military theater of operations. Tactical Missiles and Nuclear Artillery Current Systems and Force Levels. At di- vision level, the predominant weapon is the unguided FROG, found in a battalion of four launchers. The Soviets have begun to replace the FROG with the more accurate, longer range SS-21 in most divisions opposite NATO. Currently there are some 375 FROG and SS-21 launchers opposite NATO. Two hundred FROG launchers are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; about 100 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; and about 75 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs. In addition to FROG and SS-21 launchers, a division commander has some 800 nuclear- capable artillery tubes at his disposal. Two new self-propelled artillery pieces, a 152-mm gun and a howitzer/mortar, are now entering the inventory. Both of these guns are nuclear- capable and will bring the total number of nuclear-capable artillery tubes to over 2,000 when fully deployed. An additional 4,000 152- mm howitzers have at least a potential nuclear capability. Force Developments. As in all other nu- clear attack forces, it is likely that the Soviets will improve the capabilities of their tactical missiles and nuclear artillery pieces. This im- provement will be accomplished through incre- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Land-Based INF Aircraft Deployed at End of 1983* Up to 3,000 Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Deployed at End of 1983. " 100 1,100 r:j NATO Aircraft F-111, F-4, F-16, F-104 JAGUAR, BUCCANEER, TORNADO WARSAW PACT Aircraft" BADGER, BLINDER, FISHBED, FITTER, FLOGGER, FENCER 'Numbers refer to deployments of land-based aircraft (including maritime aircraft) in Europe. The BACKFIRE bomber with its primary nuclear role has been included in the strategic section because it has an inherent intercontinental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack roles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe. From 1984 Edition of NATO Publication: NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons mental modernization of current systems and the introduction of entirely new systems. Strategic Rocket Forces Immediately following World War II, Stalin committed Soviet scientists and engineers to develop the type of artillery promised by the V-1 and V-2 rockets as rapidly as possible. These weapons were to have increased ranges for use in strategic warfare and, if possible, an intercontinental capability. Stalin had as- signed most missile development programs in the Soviet Union to the artillery component of the ground forces and kept their develop- ment under strict security. The prevailing So- viet view at the time was that rockets were ordnance, not pilotless aircraft. From the mis- sion point of view, however, use of long-range missiles was assigned to Long-Range Aviation (LRA) since it was responsible for the conduct of strategic warfare. This mission assignment lasted until late 1953, when the collective lead- NATO Missiles L LANCE, HONEST JOHN Artillery 155mm, 203mm WARSAW PACT Missiles FROG/SS-21 Artillery 152mm. 203mm, 240mm For NATO the data reflect forces deployed in NATO Europe; for the WARSAW PACT, forces facing NATO Europe. From 1984 Edition of NATO Publication: NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons ership in the post-Stalin era stripped LRA of its operational control of ballistic missiles. In the 1950s as issues of doctrine and strat- egy became clearer, yet to be resolved was what service or services controlled ballistic missiles and would be responsible for their operational use. According to the Soviets, the issue was discussed at the highest levels in the Ministry of Defense and the Politburo. In late 1959, the Soviets decided to create a new service, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), responsible for the development, administration, training, and operation of ballistic missiles. The creation of the SRF and the appointment of M.I. Nedelin as its commander was announced in January 1960 during a session of the Supreme Soviet. Force Training The Soviets were quick to realize that the improvements in ballistic missiles and the for- mation of the SRF required better technically trained personnel and combat readiness. In Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Sea-Based Strategic Ballistic Missile Force Development Technological (USSR estimated at about 6 years) Engineering and Testing (USSR estimated at about 5 years) - SS-N-6 SS-N-5 JIM NWI ~CANC SS-NX-231 POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 r -------- -r- 1945 1950 - 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 Longer Range Intermediate-Range Ballistic and Cruise Missile Force Development SS-20 1980 1985 1 1990 1 1990 SSC-X-4 POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Technological (USSR estimated at about 8 years) Engineering and Testing (USSR estimated at about 5 years) W] r 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Technological (USSR estimated at about 6 years) Engineering and Testing (USSR estimated at about 5 years) Deployment SS-8 SS-7 SS-6 FMW Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force Development SS-11 ss-X-10 I /CANCELL D MOD 2/,3 MOD 4 MINUTEMAN I 1945? 1950 1955 1960 addition to the training of personnel in mis- silel maintenance and operations, the Soviets trained missile crews to meet the demands of modern nuclear warfare. As more technically sophisticated computers and automated con- troll systems were introduced and missile sys- tems attained higher degrees of readiness, crew sizes were reduced. The demands placed upon crew readiness, however, increased to the point whiere most or all ICBM and LRINF missiles could be launched in minutes. The Soviets in- sistthat SRF personnel be combat ready at all times. As a result, Soviet missile crews are reg- ularly trained for the contingencies of preemp- tion, launch-on-tactical-warning, or a'second- strike attack. An additional part of crew train- ing is reconstitution and refire of those silos PEACEKEEPER 1965 1970 1975 1980 1485 1990 not destroyed in a counterattack. ' ' In keeping with the demands of Soviet nuclear doctrine, missile crews are trained to perform' their tasks under any contingency. I Chapter II Forces for NuclearlAttack ii Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter 1111 Strategic Defense and Space Programs Strategic defenses are vital to the overall So- viet strategy for nuclear war. The operations of Soviet defensive and attack forces, as noted in Chapter II, are closely coupled; attack strate- gies are geared in large part to the reduction of the defensive burden. In the' Soviet concept of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved through multiple types of defensive capabilities compensating for shortcomings in individual systems and for the likelihood that neither of- fensive strikes nor any one layer of defense will stop all attacking weapons. The Soviets are making major improvements in their deployed strategic defenses and are investing heavily in ABM-related developments. Soviet Military Power 1983 and 1984 outlined the continuing expansion into space of the So- viet drive for military superiority. In the past year, some 80 percent of Soviet! space launches have been purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. This is an increase from 70 percent in previous years. The Soviet military space program dominates the USSR's overall space effort. Soviet military doctrine establishes re- quirements for the military space program. Laser/Energy Weapons Systems Soviet directed-energy development pro- grams involve future Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as well as antisatellite I and air-defense weapons concepts. The Soviet space shuttle, riding atop a BISON bomber, is taken aloft on a test flight as part of the USSR's extensive and growing military space program, which includes operational antisatellite weapons, development of ground- and space-based laser weapons, and the intro- duction of new heavy-lift space boosters and manned spacecraft - all contributing to an op- erational military capability in !space. 43 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballis- tic missile defense. Testing of the components for a large-scale deployment system could be- gin in the early 1990s. The many difficulties in fielding an operational system will require much development time, and initial operational deployment is not likely in this century. How- ever, with high priority and some significant risk of failure, the Soviets could skip some test- ing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based laser BMD by the early-to-mid-1990s. Ground- and space-based particle beam wea- pons for ballistic missile defense will be more difficult to develop than lasers. Nevertheless, the Soviets have a vigorous program underway for particle beam development and could have a prototype space-based system ready for testing in the late 1990s. The Soviets have begun to develop at least three types of high-energy laser weapons for air defense. These include lasers intended for defense of high-value strategic targets in the USSR, for point defense of ships at sea, and for air defense of theater forces. Following past practice, they are likely to deploy air defense lasers to complement, rather than replace, in- terceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The strategic defense laser is probably in at least the prototype stage of development and could be operational by the late 1980s. It most likely will be deployed in conjunction with SAMs in a point defense role. Since the SAM and laser systems would have somewhat differ- ent attributes and vulnerabilities, they would provide mutual support. The shipborne lasers probably will not be operational until after the end of the decade. The theater force lasers may be operational sometime sooner and are likely to be capable of structurally damaging aircraft at close ranges and producing electro-optical and eye damage at greater distances. The Soviets are also developing an airborne laser. Assuming a successful development ef- fort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early 1990s. Such a laser platform could have missions including antisatellite op- erations, protection of high-value airborne as- sets, and cruise missile defense. The Soviets are working on technologies or have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced antisatellite sys- tems. These include space-based kinetic en- ergy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency weapons. The So- viets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future antisatellite ap- plication than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads. The Soviets also believe that military applications of directed- energy technologies hold promise of overcom- ing weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses. The USSR's high-energy laser program, which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger than the US effort. They have built over a half- dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with laser development. They are developing chemical lasers and have contin- ued to work on other high-energy lasers hav- ing potential weapons applications-the gas dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser. They are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources, and are pursuing capabilities to pro- duce high-quality optical components. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydro- dynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power-a de- vice that has no counterpart in the West. The scope of the USSR's military capabilities would depend on its success in developing advanced weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic missile defense. The Soviets have now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the de- velopment of prototype laser weapons. They already have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites. In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space- based laser weapons for use against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have pro- gressed to the point where they could include construction of ground-based laser antisatellite (ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for antisatellite purposes in the 1990s, if their technology developments prove successful, and they can be expected to pursue development of space-based laser systems for ballistic missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000. Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had a research program to explore the technical p Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 feasibility of a particle beam weapon in space. A prototype space-based particle beam weapon intended only to disrupt satellite electronic equipment could be tested in the early 1990s. One designed to destroy satellites could be tested in space in the mid-1990s. The Soviets have conducted research in the use of strong radiofrequency (RF) signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy components of missiles, satellites, and reentry vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could test a ground-based RF weapon capable of damaging satellites. Soviet programs for the development and application of directed-energy technologies to strategic defense have been very vigorous in the past and will continue to be so in the fu- ture, irrespective of what the US does about new strategic defense initiatives. In the area of kinetic energy weapons, us- ing the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism, the Soviets have a variety of research programs underway. These programs could result in a near-term, short-range, space-based system use- ful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Longer range, space-based systems probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. Early Warning The Soviets maintain the world's most ex- tensive early warning system for both ballis- tic missile and air defense. Their operational ballistic missile early warning system includes a launch-detection satellite network, over-the- horizon radar, and a series of large phased- array radars located primarily on the periphery of the USSR. Their early warning air surveil- lance system is composed of an extensive network of ground-based radars linked opera- tionally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies. The current Soviet launch-detection satellite network is capable of providing about 30 min- utes warning of any US ICBM launch and of determining the general area from which it originated. The two over-the-horizon radars the Soviets have directed at the US ICBM fields also could provide them with 30 min- utes warning of an ICBM strike launched from the United States, but with somewhat less precision than the satellite network. Work- ing together, these two early warning systems can provide more reliable warning than either working alone. The next layer of operational ballistic mis- sile early warning consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE detection and tracking radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of antiballistic missile (ABM) deployments. Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Systems Over-the-horizon radars Hen House radars New phased-array radars under construction Moscow ABM radars Current Soviet air surveillance radar deploy- ments include more than 7,000 radars of vari- ous types located at about 1,200 sites. These deployments provide virtually complete cover- age at medium-to-high altitudes over the USSR and in some areas extend hundreds of kilome- ters beyond the borders. Moreover, the over- the-horizon radars provide additional warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft. Lim- ited coverage against low-altitude targets is concentrated in the western USSR and in high- priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983, the So- viets have begun to deploy two new types of Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation, and capability of the large phased-array, early warning and ballistic missile target-tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk. air surveillance radars. These radars assist in the early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks and enhance air defense electronic war- fare capabilities. The new large phased-array radar for ballis- tic missile early warning and target-tracking discovered in 1983 in Siberia is still under con- struction. This new radar closes the final gap in the combined HEN HOUSE and new large phased-array radar early warning and track- ing network. Together, this radar and the five others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest. The new radar violates the 1972 ABM Treaty in that it is not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union, nor is it pointed outward as required by the Treaty. Its orientation and function indicate it is for ballistic missile de- tection and tracking-not space object track- ing as claimed by the Soviets. The complete network of these radars, which could provide target-tracking data for ABM deployments be- yond Moscow, probably will be operational by the late 1980s. The Soviets may establish a network of satel- lites in geostationary orbit designed to pro- vide timely indications of ballistic missiles, including submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Such a network could be operational by the end of the decade. The USSR has a strong research and devel- opment program to produce new early warn- ing and other air surveillance radars as well as to improve existing systems. More than 15 types of these radars are currently' in develop- ment. In addition, the Soviets are continuing to deploy improved air surveillance data sys- tems that can rapidly pass data from outlying radars through the air surveillance network to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM command posts. These systems will continue to be deployed until all areas are equipped with them. Ballistic Missile Defense The Soviets are continuing a major upgrad- ing of their ballistic missile defense capabili- ties. The Moscow missile defenses are being enlarged and equipped with a new generation of radars and interceptor missiles. Develop- ments aimed at providing the foundation for widespread ABM deployments beyond Moscow are underway. The new SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile, which incorporates ballistic missile defense ca- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 pabilities, is nearing operational status, while research on directed-energy BMD technology continues apace. The Soviets maintain around Moscow the worl'd's only operational ABM system. This system is intended to afford a layer of defense for Soviet civil and military command authori- ties in the Moscow area during a nuclear war rather than blanket protection for the city it- self. Since 1980, the Soviets have been upgrad- ing and expanding this system around Moscow within the limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The original single-layer Moscow ABM sys- tem included 64 reloadable , above-ground launchers at four complexes for the GALOSH ABM-1B, six TRY ADD guidance and engage- ment radars at each complex, and the DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE target-tracking ra- dars south of Moscow. The Soviets are up- grading this system to the 100 accountable i Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense ABM-1B Complex ABM Silo Sites Under Construction _? Roads The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in the map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, GALOSH antiballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high- acceleration interceptors, top right. Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Programs Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 launchers permitted under the ABM Treaty. When completed, the new system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based, long- range, modified GALOSH interceptors designed to engage targets outside the atmo- sphere; silo-based high-acceleration intercep- tors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guid- ance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The first new launchers are likely to be operational this year, and the new defenses could be fully operational by 1987. The Soviets are developing a rapidly deploy- able ABM system to protect important target areas in the USSR. They have been test- ing all the types of ABM missiles and radars needed for widespread ABM defenses beyond the 100 launcher limit of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Within the next 10 years, the Soviets could deploy such a system at sites that could be built in months instead of years. A typical site would consist of engagement radars, guid- ance radars, above-ground launchers, and the high-acceleration interceptor. The new, large phased-array radars under construction in the USSR, along with the HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, CAT HOUSE, and possibly the Pushkino radar, appear to be designed to pro- vide support for such a widespread ABM de- fense system. The aggregate of the USSR's ABM and ABM-related activities suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. In addition, the Soviets are deploying one surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and are flight testing another, the mobile SA-X- 12. The SA-X-12 is both a tactical SAM and antitactical ballistic missile. It may have the capability to engage the LANCE and both the PERSHING I and PERSHING II ballistic mis- siles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of US strate- gic ballistic missiles as well. These systems could, if properly supported, add significant point-target coverage to a widespread ABM deployment. Air Defense The Soviets have deployed numerous strate- gic and tactical air defense assets that have excellent capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes. Although their capability to intercept low-flying penetra- tors is marginal, they are in the midst of a major overhaul geared toward fielding an in- tegrated air defense system much more capa- ble of low-altitude operations. This overhaul includes partial integration of strategic and tactical air defenses; the upgrading of early warning and surveillance capabilities; the de- ployment of more efficient data transmission systems; and the development and initial de- ployment of new aircraft, associated air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Over the years, the Soviets have invested enormous resources in their air defense sys- tems. This sustained effort has produced an array of weapons systems designed for a vari- ety of air defense applications. For example, they have fielded 13 different surface-to-air mis- sile systems, each designed to cover a specific threat regime. The Soviets have made significant shifts in the subordination of their air and air defense assets. The reorganization has resulted in a streamlined organization that merged strate- gic and tactical air and air defense assets in most land border areas of the USSR. The air defense (APVO) interceptors became part of a new structure, the Air Forces of the Mili- tary District (MD), which also includes most of the assets of the former tactical air armies. The Air Forces of an MD include all air assets in their geographic area (excluding Strategic Aviation and transport assets). These assets can be used either offensively or defensively as the situation requires. The new structure im- proves defensive capabilities, but its most sig- nificant impact is on the capability to conduct massed offensive air operations. Technological advances in weapons systems and in command, control, and communications have made its im- plementation possible. In terms of numbers alone, Soviet strate- gic and tactical air defense forces are impres- sive. Moreover, with the continuing deploy- ment of new systems like the SA-10 SAM and impending deployment of the SA-X-12, these numbers are increasing along with capabil- ity. Currently, the Soviets have nearly 10,000 SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites for strate- gic defense, along with more than 4,000 launch vehicles for tactical SAMs, subordinated to nearly 445 launch units. More than 1,200 in- terceptors are dedicated to strategic defense, while an additional 2,800 Soviet Air Forces (SAF) interceptors could also be used. Fur- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 the (, the Soviets are continuing the MAIN- STAY AWACS aircraft program and test and evaluation is underway. The MAINSTAY will substantially improve Soviet capabilities for early warning and air combat command and control, especially against low-flying aircraft. The MAINSTAY will also provide Soviet air defenses with overland and overwater capabili- ties to detect aircraft and cruise missile targets flying at low altitudes.- Additionally, the MAINSTAY could be used to help direct fighter operations over European and Asian battle- fields and to enhance air surveillance and de- fense of the USSR. MAINSTAY production could be about five aircraft per year. The 1,200 all-weather interceptors assigned to strategic defense are primarily based in cen- tral air defense regions of the Soviet Union, in addition to fighter/interceptors subordinate to thelmilitary districts that are generally located on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The in- terceptor force is composed of a wide variety of aircraft with varying capabilities. The deployment of the supersonic MiG-31/ FOXHOUND interceptor, the first Soviet air- craft with a true look-down/shoot-down and I A new generation of air defense, all-weather interceptors is joining the highly capable FLOGGER G, seen at top with AA-7 and AA-8 air-to-air missiles under wing, and FOXBAT E, seen with the AA-6 missile. multiple-target engagement capability, con- tinued during 1984. The FOXHOUND, com- parable in size to the US F-14 TOMCAT, is deployed at several locations from the Arkhan- gelsk area to the Far East Military District. More than 70 of these aircraft are operational. The MiG-25/FOXBAT A/E is a high-altitude, high-speed interceptor that comprises approxi- mately one-quarter of the strategic interceptor force. The upgrade program of the FOXBAT A to the newer FOXBAT E configuration pro- vides a limited look-down radar; capability. The remaining FOXBAT A aircraft are expected to be modified to the FOXBAT E configuration during 1985. The MiG-23/FLOGGER B/G fighter com- prises approximately one-third of the total strategic interceptor forces. This variable- geometry-wing fighter is equipped with a lim- ited look-down radar. The remaining aircraft employed as interceptors (the older FLAGON, FIDDLER, and FIREBAR) comprise less than one-third of the force. Two new fighter-interceptors, the Su-27/ FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, have true look-down/shoot-down capabilities. The FULCRUM is a single-seat, twin-engine fighter similar in size to the US F-16. First deploy- ments of the FULCRUM to the Soviet Air Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Force military districts have begun, and more than 30 are now operational. The FLANKER is a larger, single-seat, twin-engine fighter sim- ilar in size to the US F-15. Both aircraft have been designed to be highly maneuverable in air-to-air combat. The three latest Soviet fighter-interceptor aircraft are equipped with two new air-to-air missiles, the AA-9 designed for the FOXHOUND and the AA-10 designed for the FULCRUM and the FLANKER. The AA-9 is a long-range mis- sile that can be used against low-flying targets; the AA-10 is a medium-range missile with sim- ilar capabilities. The new 11-76/MAINSTAY aircraft is illustrated as configured for its airborne warning and control mission. The FLANKER and the FULCRUM, as well as the FOXHOUND, are likely to operate un- der certain circumstances with the new MAIN- STAY AWACS aircraft. Soviet strategic SAMs form barrier, area, and terminal defenses. They afford broad cov- erage for medium- and high-altitude defenses under all weather conditions. Five systems are operational-the SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10. Of these, only the SA-10 is capable of defending against targets with a small radar- cross-section such as cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site reached operational status in 1980. Nearly 60 sites are now operational and work is underway on at least another 30. More than half of these sites are lo- cated near Moscow. This emphasis on Moscow and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on terminal de- fense of wartime command and control, mili- tary, and key industrial complexes. Over the years, the Soviets have continued to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have modified the system repeatedly. Further deployment and upgrading of the SA-5 to enhance its capability to work in conjunction with low-altitude systems like the SA-10 are likely in the future. In keeping with their drive toward mobility as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are developing a mobile version of the SA-10 SAM. This mobile version could be used to support Soviet theater forces but, perhaps more impor- tantly, if deployed with the territorial defense forces, it would allow the Soviets to change the location of SA-10 sites in the USSR. The mobile SA-10 could be operational sometime this year. The 1980 air defense reorganization permits efficient integration of strategic and tactical SAM systems. Most tactical SAMs are not as range-capable as strategic SAMs, but many have better low-altitude capabilities. A mixed and integrated system of aircraft, SAMs, and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) pro- vides the Soviet Union with the most compre- hensive air defense system in the world. Over 4,600 SAM launcher vehicles and 11,500 AAA pieces are deployed at regimental through front level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder- fired SAM launchers are found at battalion and company level and with non-divisional units. The standard air defense for a tank or motor- ized rifle regiment is a battery of SA-9/13 SAMs and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA pieces. The SA-9 system, mounted on a wheeled transporter- erector-launcher (TEL), is being replaced by the SA-13 on a tracked TEL. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected shortly. The stan- dard SAM at division level is the SA-6 or SA-8, although some divisions still have an AAA- equipped air defense regiment. A new division- level SAM, the SA-11, is beginning to enter the inventory. It features an onboard radar that increases mobility and target-handling capa- bility. The standard weapon at army and front levels is the SA-4, soon to be replaced by the SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 has good low-altitude air defense capabilities as well as the ballistic missile defense capabilities noted above. So- viet tactical SAM development is both broad- based and active. New tactical SAMs and improvements to older ones are now under development. The largest concentration of SAM launchers and AAA pieces-over 8,100-is found opposite European NATO; over 4,200 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; there Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft Tu-128 FIDDLER B FOXBAT A/E FLAGON E/F FLANKER SPEED (KTS) 1,625 1, 200 1,350 950 1,080 1,350 1;350 1.375 RADIUS (KM) 1,450 1, 000 1,500 1;500 900 1,300 1,150 2,100 ARMAMENT 4 AAMs 2 AAMs 6 AAMs 4 AAMs 2 AAMs 6 AAMs 6 AAMs 8 AAMs WINGSPAN (M) 14 9 14 18 12 8 (swept) 121 14 North American Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft F-106A F-4C/D F-15A CF-118- DELTA DART' PHANTOM 11 EAGLE HORNET, lqjpl o- SP EED (KTS) 1,15 0 1.200 1,450 1;040 RA DIUS (KM) 92 5 825 1,000 1 740 AR MAMENT 5 A AMs 8 AAMs AAMs 8 6 AAMs WI NGSPAN (M) 12 12 13 121 Canadian Soviet Territorial Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft Bases Strategic SAM Concentrations Radars (BMD EW, OTH types) argil nearly 700 opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; over 1,300 are in the Strategic Reserve military districts. Passive Defense Soviet passive defense preparations have been underway in earnest for some 30 years and have, over time, expanded from the pro- tection of such vital entities as the national Party and government leaders'hip'.and Armed Forces to,embrace the territorial; leadership, national economy, and general population. The Soviets regard passive defense) essential ingredient of their overall military posture and war planning. In conjunction with active forces,the Soviets plan for a passive defense program to ensure the survival and wartime continuity of: ?Soviet leadership; ?military command and control entities; ?war-supporting industrial production and services; *the essential workforce; and *as much of the general population as possible. As this program has expanded, elements of it have been designated by the Soviets as "civil defense." Use of this term in As normal West- Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Programs Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ern context does not convey the full scope of Soviet Civil Defense. Extensive planning for the transition of the entire State and economy to a wartime pos- ture has been fundamental to Soviet passive defense preparations. The Soviet General Staff and Civil Defense officials have supervised the development of special organizations and pro- cedures to implement a rapid transition to war and have emphasized the mobilization and pro- tection of all national resources essential to the successful prosecution of war and recovery. The senior Soviet military establishment has also supervised the 30-year program to con- struct hardened command posts and survivable communications for key military commanders and civilian managers at all levels of the Party and government. Likewise, protective harden- ing, dispersal, and wartime production plans for Soviet industry have all been coordinated with the wartime requirements of the military and supervised by Civil Defense personnel. The protection of the general population through evacuation procedures and extensive shelter- ing in or near urban areas is the most visible aspect of the passive defense program. Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability 1-1 FRESCO FARMER FISH POT FIREBAR FIDDLER FLAGON FOXBAT FLOGGER B FLOGGER G FOXBATE FLOGGER B FLOGGER G FOXBAT E FIREBAR FIDDLER FLAGON Limited Look-down True Look-down Shoot-down FLAGON 1988 estimate Range Only Radar The passive defense program reflects the So- viets' belief of their wartime need. The wartime management system would be the militarized system of national administration in which peacetime government bodies become Civil Defense components under direct military subordination. This would extend to Soviet territorial administration at all levels and to specialized functional components such as in- dustrial, transport, power, and communications ministries. Soviet authorities at all levels would serve as uniformed chiefs of Civil Defense and command their respective organizations in a military capacity. Soviet Civil Defense thus serves both as a vehicle to administer peace- time preparations and training and as the in- frastructure that would keep together civil and military bodies in the unified wartime manage- ment systems. Soviet commanders and managers at all lev- els of the Party and government are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers. This comprehensive and redundant system, composed of more than 1,500 hardened facilities with special communi- cations, is patterned after similar capabilities afforded the Armed Forces. More than 175,000 key personnel throughout the system are be- lieved to be equipped with such alternate facil- ities in addition to the many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. Soviet passive defense efforts include mea- sures to maintain essential production and ser- vices even during a nuclear war. Elaborate plans have been set for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of the war ef- fort and the conversion to wartime production. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Re- dundant industrial facilities have been built and are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the workforce, and de- tailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment. By ensuring the survival of essential workers, the Soviets intend to reconstitute vital produc- tion programs using those industrial compo- nents that can be redirected or salvaged after an attack. The annual military and civilian cost of four elements of the program-pay and allowances for full-time Civil Defense personnel; opera- tion of specialized military Civil Defense units; construction and maintenance of facilities for these units; and shelter construction-is less than 1 percent of the estimated Soviet defense budget. If duplicated in the United States, these four elements would cost roughly $3 bil- lion annually. The cost of construction and equipment for leadership relocation sites over Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 METERS SA-1 =-12-_ A SA-2 EFFECTIVE LOW-TO- MEDIUM- MEDIUM- LOW-TO- LOW-TO- LOW-TO- LOW-TO- ALTITUDE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM TO-HIGH TO-HIGH MEDIUM LOW LOW HIGH MEDIUM HIGH LOW IMPROVED HAWK-_ EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE NIKE HERCULES MEDIUM-TO- HIGH the past 25 years is between 8 and 16 bil- lion rubles, or $28-56 billion if acquired in the United States. North American Defense Forces United States and Canadian interceptor forces assigned to the North American Aero- space Defense Command (NORAD) maintain continuous ground alert at sites around the pe- riphery of the United States and Canada. Alert aircraft intercept and identify unknown intrud- ers. At present, there are no SAMs for US continental air defense. In a crisis, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could provide additional interceptors. Supported by AWACS aircraft, these forces could provide a limited defense against bomber attacks. To meet the increasing Soviet bomber and air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) threats, US interceptor squadrons assigned to NORAD are being equipped with newer more advanced 40 10 80+ LOW-TO- LOW-TO- MEDIUM LOW HIGH F-15 and F-16 aircraft. These modern fight- ers will provide a look-down/ shoot-down ca- pability to detect and engage enemy bombers penetrating at low altitudes. The Canadians are upgrading their air defense forces with the CF-18. Joint United States and Canadian im- provements to long-range surveillance include modern microwave radars for the Distant Early Warning line and over-the-horizon back-scatter' radars looking east, west, and south. Soviet space-oriented military systems pose a threat to the land, sea, and air forces of the United States. Some Soviet satellites are de- signed to support targeting of Soviet antiship cruise missiles launched against US surface ships. The US ASAT program, centering on the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle, is part of the response to this and similar threats. Finally, the United States has called for a research program to explore the possibility of strengthening deterrence by taking advantage of recent advances in technology that could, Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor, at right, is launched from Tyuratam, above, where launch pads and storage for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available. in the long term, provide an effective defense against ballistic missiles. This Strategic De- fense Initiative (SDI) is discussed in the con- cluding chapter. The Soviet Space Program The Soviets believe in the combined arms concept of warfare in which all types of forces are integrated into military operations to R - - - Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 achieve the desired goals. Space assets play a major role in this equation in the areas of antisatellite warfare; intelligence collection; command, control, and communications; mete- orological support; navigational support; and targeting. The military support systems are linked to ground, naval, and air forces through earth terminals. Thus, Soviet forces can re- cei v I e orders and information via satellite from command headquarters thousands of miles away. Their reliance on these systems is grow- ing. Space weapons also play an important role in their strategic operations. The late Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiiy included space in a statement defining the modern con- cept of a theater of military operations. The Soviet drive to use space for military purposes is an integral part of Soviet military plan- ning. The Soviet coorbital ASAT system, while launched from the ground, is a space weapon system. The Soviets also have two ground- based lasers that are capable of attacking satel- lites in various orbits. These systems suggest that the Soviets are willing to use space for military purposes that are more ominous than those for which it has been used thus far. The Soviets are currently developing a ver- sion of the US space shuttle, a heavy-lift booster system, a space plane, and directed-energy weapons and have engaged in military-related experiments aboard the SALYUT-7 space sta- tion. The Soviets continue to pursue their manned space programs, maintaining in orbit the j SALYUT space station, which is manned The Soviet space plane, above, may well have an antisatellite mission when operational. An unmanned scale model, at right, has already been tested. during most of the year. This gives the Soviets the capability to perform a variety of functions from space, including military R&D and us- ing man to augment their other reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. In addition, there are other developments indicating Soviet research on space-based ballistic missile defense. Antisatellite Systems. Since 1971, the Sovi- ets have had the capability to attack satel- lites in near-earth orbit with a ground-based orbital interceptor. Using a radar sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can at- tack a target in various orbits during the in- terceptor's first two revolutions. An intercept during the first orbit would minimize the time available for a target satellite to take evasive action. The interceptor can reach targets or- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 biting at more than 5,000 kilometers, but it probably is intended for high-priority satellites at lower altitudes. The antisatellite intercep- tor is launched from Tyuratam, where launch pads and storage space for interceptors and launch vehicles are available. Several inter- ceptors could be launched each day. In addi- tion to the orbital interceptor, the Soviets have two ground-based, high-energy lasers with an- tisatellite capabilities. The Soviets also have the technological capability to conduct elec- tronic warfare against space systems and could use their ABM interceptors in a direct-ascent attack on low-orbiting satellites. Space Boosters. The Soviets currently main- tain eight space launch systems that are used to place objects in orbits ranging from low- earth to geosynchronous and beyond. They are developing two more systems-a TITAN- Class medium-lift launch vehicle and a SA- TURN V-Class heavy-lift vehicle. Also, they are developing their version of the US shuttle orbiter, which seems almost identical to its US counterpart, except for the absence of main en- gines. It is estimated that the new heavy-lift ve- hicle will be used to launch their orbiter as well as other large payloads. This vehicle should be able to lift as much as 150,000 kilograms to low-earth orbit, giving the USSR a tremen- dous capability to orbit heavy objects, such as the components for a large, manned space com- plex. The estimate for the medium-lift vehicle is a payload capacity of approximately 15,000 kilograms. This system may be used to launch their space plane, discussed below. Manned Space Program. The Soviets have emphasized man in space since the beginning of their space program. In 1961 they placed the first man into orbit. Their SALYUT space sta- tions have accommodated cosmonauts for ex- tended periods, setting several records in the process. In 1984, three cosmonauts set a new record, spending 237 days aboard SALYUT 7. In 1982, two Soviet cosmonauts spent 211 days aboard the space station. At the end of 1984, Soviet cosmonauts had accumulated 3,691 man- days in space, compared to the US astronaut total of 1,289. In the spring of 1984, Soviet cosmonauts demonstrated their capability to perform on-orbit maintenance and repair by conducting extra-vehicular activity (EVA) five times, gaining valuable experience in on-orbit repairs. During one EVA, the cosmonauts added new solar panels to SALYUT 7. Dur- ing another EVA, the Soviets accomplished an- US and S?ydc i? Space Launches 0i ~ F0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 other space first-a space walk by a female cosmonaut, Svetlana Savitskaya. The Soviets have made known their plans to replace SALYUT 7 with large space com- plexes, supporting 20 or more cosmonauts on a permanent basis. Such a complex will en- hance their space-based military support and warfighting capabilities. Missions could in- clude military R&D, on-orbit repair of satel- lites, reconnaissance, imagery interpretation, ASAT support operations, and ballistic missile defense support operations. Their shuttle or- biter will likely be used to ferry cosmonauts to this station as well as to place satellites in orbit. The Soviets apparently have already found some military utility in their manned space pro- gram. They have stated that "earth surface surveys" were conducted during past manned missions, but none of the photographs has ever been published. The continuation of photo- graphic and other missions aboard SALYUT 7 indicates the Soviets are aware of the poten- tial value of manned space stations in an actual wartime situation. The Soviets have been experimenting with a test vehicle that is apparently a scale model of a larger, manned space plane. This vehicle has been orbited unmanned on four occasions, landing in water each time. Similar in ap- pearance to the earlier US Dyna Soar craft, 1 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 METERS -60 Soviet Space Launch Vehicles A LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)' 290,000 310,000 310,000 120,000 180,000 680,000 670,000 190,000 LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)' 410,000 420,000 420,000 160,000 280,000 900,000 900,000 280,000 PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)' 6,300 7,500 2,100 1,700 4,000 19,500 5,500 MEDIUM-LIFT HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE, LAUNCH VEHICLE2 L LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)' 400,000, 2,000,000 WITH 6 OR MORE STRAP ON BOOSTERS LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)' 600,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)' 15,000+ 30,000 150,000 ' Approximate. 3 In final stages of development. this plane's possible missions include recon- naissance, crew transport, satellite repair and maintenance, and ASAT operations. It could also be used as a manned space station de- fender. A clue to its purpose is found in a 1965 Soviet definition of antispace defense: "A com- ponent part of air defense. The main purpose Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 of antispace defense is to destroy space sys- tems used by the enemy for military purposes, in their orbits. The principal means of anti- space defense are special spacecraft and vehi- cles (e.g., satellite interceptors), which may be controlled either from the ground or by special crews. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The directed-energy R&D site at the Sary Shagan proving ground includes ground-based lasers that could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a BMD role in the future. The Soviets have openly discussed their plans for ambitious planetary exploration in spite of their apparent decision not to match US lunar expeditions. In 1992, the condition for a launch to Mars will be favorable, and the Soviets are considering a manned expedition to that planet at that time. They have stated that the recent manning of the SALYUT space station for increasingly longer periods of time is to simulate the time it would take to con- duct a Mars mission. This timeframe also coincides with the 75th anniversary of the Bol- shevik Revolution and with the 500th anniver- sary of Columbus' discovery of the New World. Such an expedition would add great prestige to the Soviet Union and would further demon- strate the capability of its space technology. Military Space Systems. Soviet space sys- tems dedicated to military missions include satellites that perform reconnaissance, mis-. sile-launch detection and attack warning, command and control, and ASAT operations. Dual-purpose satellites that perform some civil- ian functions are used for communications, navigational support, and weather prediction and monitoring. The US has no counterpart to Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites, the Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT), or the nuclear-powered Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (ROR- SAT). Their mission is to detect, locate, and target US and Allied naval forces for destruc- tion by antiship weapons launched from So- viet platforms. These systems track naval and merchant shipping. Four such satellites were launched in 1984, two of which were of the same type (RORSAT) that crashed in 1978, one spreading radioactive debris across northern Canada. The Soviets have recently employed a new radar-carrying satellite system. Designed for mapping ice formations in polar regions, these satellites will greatly enhance the ability of the Soviet Navy to operate in icebound areas. The system can be used to aid in the navigation of northern sea routes to assist in moving naval ships from construction yards in the western USSR to new ports in the Pacific. The launch rate of satellites to geostation- ary orbits has risen in recent years. In the period 1974-78, one to two launches per year were conducted. In 1979, the rate increased to five per year, and eight launches occurred in 1984. These satellites are presumed to be for communications, although not all may have been for that purpose. The Soviets have filed their intent with international organizations to place almost 40 satellites in 21 different positions in the geostationary belt. Many of these satellites are years overdue, but the So- viets are apparently determined to fill the an- nounced slots. The Soviets are also in the early stages of developing.a satellite system called GLONASS, which, when fully developed, should provide the Soviets with accurate posi- tioning data worldwide. For the most part, Soviet satellites do not have lifetimes as long as those of their US Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The Soviet space shuttle, when operational, will have many roles including the delivery of personnel and components to increasingly sophisticated manned Soviet space complexes. counterparts. This is especially true of their re- connaissance platforms, necessitating frequent launches of replacements. However, the Sovi- ets have shown great flexibility in maintaining these systems in orbit, augmenting them with extra satellites as warranted by changing situ- ations. They have demonstrated a launch surge capability that could be a distinct advantage in time of hostilities. In 1984, the Soviets orbited a reconnaissance satellite that stayed in orbit far longer than previous ones. This could indi- cate a new system or an advanced modification of an old one, demonstrating their increasing sophistication and capabilities. In late 1984, a new Soviet auxiliary ship was seen arrayed with extensive radomes and antennae. The ship, named after the first com- mander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Mar- shal M.I. Nedelin, appears to be a new space and missile support ship capable of a vari- ety of missions, including support to strategic forces worldwide. On its maiden voyage the NEDELIN transited directly from the Baltic to the port of Vladivostok, the headquarters of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. This ship will significantly upgrade the Soviet capability to test new gen- erations of missiles as well as support the ex- panding Soviet space program. The NEDELIN joins a growing fleet of Soviet space support ships that provide assistance to manned and unmanned missions. An additional ship of the NEDELIN-Class is under construction. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 , Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ff---- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter IV Ground Forces With approximately one-sixth of the earth's land surface within its boundaries, the USSR is a continental power that has traditionally maintained large, well-equipped ground forces as one of its prime components of military power. The ground forces are the largest of the USSR's five branches of the Armed Forces. They are currently engaged in an ambitious force development program involving force expansion, equipment modernization, improve- ments in training, the development of inno- vative tactics and operational, concepts, and enhancement of command and control capabili- ties. The result of this effort is the development of a formidable, offensively oriented force that poses a serious threat to land areas peripheral to the USSR and beyond. Soviet ground forces are capable of partic- ipating in large-scale, theaterwide, combined arms offensive operations in areas contiguous to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. As the main element in Soviet Armed Forces, the ground forces have been equipped and trained for a war of highly mobile combat under nuclear conditions. Recently, however, improvements have greatly increased their capability to fight a non-nuclear conflict. The past 15 years have seen technological improvements in Soviet military equipment, an expansion in the size of the ground forces, and numerous organizational changes, all of which are related to evolving Soviet military doc- trine and adaptation to the problems of modern warfare. Until recently, a major assumption in Soviet military planning was that a conventional war would cross the nuclear threshold early in a conflict; therefore, the Soviets, were prepared 28,000 of the USSR's 52,000 main battle tanks are opposite NATO Europe. Pontoon bridges and other river-crossing equipment - some 22000 meters of bridging equipment - have been pre-positioned in Eastern Europe to speed the forward thrust of Soviet tank and motor- ized rifle divisions in the event'of conflict. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 , Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The 50 tank divisions of the USSR's ground forces include growing numbers of modern main battle tanks such as the T-72, seen here, the T-64, and the T-80. to fight in a nuclear environment. This was re- flected in their equipment, deployment of forces in the field, and operational planning that envi- sioned early use of nuclear weapons. Realizing, however, the uncertainty of warfare once nu- clear weapons are employed, Soviet military leaders have developed an operational concept designed to win a war before the enemy can use nuclear weapons. If an adversary should de- cide to escalate to nuclear warfare, the Soviets would attempt to preempt with a massive the- ater nuclear strike. They would also attempt to intermingle their forces with the enemy in order to inhibit enemy use of nuclear weapons. Soviet military operational concepts are dy- namic and respond to changes in technology, military geography, politics, and developments in enemy forces. However, the Soviet goal is constant-the attainment of a quick victory in theater warfare through the rapid advance to deep theater objectives. Ground Force Organization In peacetime Soviet ground forces personnel number approximately 1.9 million. Their com- bat power resides in 213 maneuver divisions, including 14 mobilization divisions, with two additional divisions expanded to new corps- type structures. There is also an extensive combat support structure, including artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, reconnaissance, signal, chemical, and logistic units. In peacetime, the ground forces in the USSR are subordinate to 16 military districts. Forces deployed in Eastern Europe are organized into four Soviet Groups of Forces-one each in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Soviet forces in Mongolia and Afghanistan are each organized into an army subordinate to the adjacent mili- tary district. The seven airborne divisions are directly subordinate to Airborne Forces Head- quarters in Moscow. While the structure and size varies widely, a typical military district or Group of Forces in- cludes several combined arms or tank armies, an artillery division, an air defense division, several surface-to-air missile brigades, an avia- tion component called the air forces of the military district or Groups of Forces, and nu- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 merous other support units. During wartime, the major Groups of Forces and military dis- tricts would form fronts. There is no exact Western counterpart to a front; the nearest equivalent would be an Army Group with or- ganic tactical aviation. A number of fronts would conduct operations designed to secure strategic objectives within a designated the- ater of military operations (TVD). There is no fixed organization for either an army or a front; rather, each is tailored for operations in a par- ticular area. Tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions constitute the basic maneuver forces of the So- viet ground forces. Tank and motorized rifle divisions are highly mobile armored forces. The tank division-with 11,000 men-is based on three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment, while the motorized rifle division- 13,000 men-is based on three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment. Both tank and motorized rifle divisions have a full comple- ment of support elements-aviation, artillery, air defense, signal, engineer, chemical, recon- naissance, maintenance, motor transport, and medical units. Soviet airborne divisions do not have the same degree of land mobility as tank or motorized rifle divisions, but they are signif- icantly more mobile than a US airborne divi- sion. They consist of three parachute regiments with BMDs (airborne amphibious combat vehi- cles) plus combat support and service units. The Soviets are now engaged in a far-reach- ing and comprehensive upgrading of their ground force structure. This program is de- signed to ensure the maintenance of offensive capability in Eurasian theaters. These devel- opments enable the Soviets to implement their offensive doctrine calling for seizure of objec- tives deep in the theater in a short, intense campaign fought in a conventional, nuclear, or chemical environment. Force structure devel- opments involve: .force expansion through the growth of existing units and the creation of new units; .force modernization through the assign- ment of large numbers of new tanks, ar- tillery, air defense systems, helicopters, surface-to-surface missiles, and other sup- port equipment; .force reorganization to enable optimal em- ployment of the improved war-fighting ca- pabilities resulting from the introduction of new weapons systems; and .expansion and improvement of the logistic support structure. These enhancements are being complement- ed by improvements in training and in com- mand and control developments, as well as the employment of innovative operational con- cepts and tactics. Altogether, Soviet ground forces are a modern, powerful, mobile, offen- sive threat in land theaters of Eurasia. Force developments are most noteworthy in the expansion and reorganization of tank and motorized rifle divisions. The resultant di- visions are larger and more combat-capable, configured for high-speed, combined arms op- erations on either a conventional or nuclear battlefield which are envisioned in Soviet offen- sive strategy. The expansion of the motorized rifle and artillery assets of tank regiments is particularly noteworthy. These regiments are now a very effective combined arms formation. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) have been assigned to motorized rifle battalions to carry personnel to man crew-served weapons. The expansion of the division's helicopter detachment to a squadron equipped with attack helicopters now gives division commanders organic aerial fire support. The Soviets have converted two divisions into corps-like structures. Almost twice as large as a normal tank division, these new for- mations contain in excess of 450 tanks, 600 infantry vehicles and armored personnel car- riers, and 300 artillery pieces/multiple rocket launchers. They are ideally suited to act as an Operational Manuever Group (OMG), con- ducting high-speed, large-scale raid and ex- ploitation operations deep in an enemy's rear area. Additional units of this type are expected to be formed once testing and evaluation are completed. These new-type corps would be pow- erful formations, the employment of which would be a critical element of Soviet ground force operations. The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne force, currently seven divi- sions. The units of an eighth division are em- ployed in operations in Afghanistan but could be relocated to meet Soviet requirements. In addition to the regular airborne divisions, the Soviet Union has formed air assault brigades at front level and air assault battalions at army level. These units have the capability to be inserted behind the front line by parachute, he- liborne operations, or by air landings. Their Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 USSR Combat and Support Helicopters SPEED (KM/H), 300 RADIUS (KM) 240 11 - COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS Mi-24/HIND SPEED (KM/H) 320 RADIUS (KM) 160 NAVAL AIR VARIANTS Mi-B/HIP RADIUS (KM) 2UU COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS 26 Mi-6/HOOK SPEED (KM/H) 300 RADIUS (KM) 300 SOLDIERS 70 Mi-26/HALO SPEED (KM/H) 300 RADIUS (KM) 370 COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS 85+ Ka-27/HELIX SPEED (KM/H) 220- RADIUS (KM) 250 NAVAL AIR VARIANTS mission would be to secure key road and rail junctions and river crossing sites or to capture or destroy command, control, communications, and intelligence (C31) facilities and Western nuclear weapons systems. In addition to the upgrade of forces at the division level, non-divisional artillery support for maneuver forces is also experiencing signifi- cant growth. Some army-level regiments are be- ing expanded to brigade size with the addition of a fourth battalion. Concurrently, battalions are expanding from 18 to 24 guns each. These changes have resulted in a 40 percent increase in artillery pieces and are occurring primarily in units opposite NATO. In 1984, the Soviets deployed the SCALE- BOARD short-range ballistic missile to East- ern Europe. These missile units redeployed from the Western USSR. Their forward deploy- ment places the SCALEBOARDs, with their 900-kilometer range, in position to strike deep COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS RADIUS (KM) Ee 340 COMBAT LOADED COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS SPEED (KM/H) 240 RADIUS (KM) . 190 COMBAT LOADED UH-IN/IROQUOIS SPEED (KM/H) 200 RADIUS (KM) 200 COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS 9 CH-53E/SUPER SEA SPEED (KM,IH)=" 280 RADIUS (KM) 460 COMBAT LOADED COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS SPEED (KM/H) 260 RADIUS (KM) 190 COMBAT LOADED SOLDIERS 3311 into NATO's rear area from their new launch sites without having first to deploy forward, thus reducing warning time prior to launch. The Soviets are upgrading and expanding their helicopter forces. At division level, he- licopter detachments continue to expand to squadrons, and, in some squadrons, the number of HIND attack helicopters has been increased. At army level about 20 attack reg- iments have been formed, with up to 60 HIP and HIND attack helicopters in each. Over half are deployed opposite NATO forces. Most attack helicopters are the heavily armed Mi- 24/HIND DBE and Mi-8/HIP E. All three air- craft are armed with antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and 57-mm unguided rockets, which are effective against personnel and lightly ar- mored targets. The ATGMs and rocket pods on the HIND can be replaced with a mix of up to 750 kilograms of chemical or conventional bombs on each wing. Other armament on the R-- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The %i-28/HAVOC is the USSR's newest attack helicopter. HIND D/E includes a multibarrel 12.7-mm tur- reted nose gun; the HIP E has a single-barrel 12.7-mm gun. Soviet emphasis on a heavy-lift helicopter transport capability is reflected in the devel- opment and recent appearance of the Mi-26/ HALO. It is the world's largest production he- licopter, capable of carrying internally two air- borne infantry combat vehicles or about 90 combat-loaded troops. The Soviets are now equipping their helicopters with infrared (IR) suppressors, IR decoy dispensers, and addi- tional armor, thereby increasing their surviv- ability-modifications that are probably the result of lessons learned in Afghanistan. A new attack helicopter, the Mi-28/HAVOC, sim- ilar to the US Army APACHE, is expected to be deployed in the near future. The new HOKUM helicopter will give the Soviets a significant rotary-wing air superiority capa- bility. This system has no current Western counterpart. The Soviets are also employing helicopters 'as airborne command posts and electronic jamming platforms, as well as attack and transport platforms. To ensure proper support for their expanding maneuver and fire support forces, the Soviets are making changes in their logistics structure. In the past, transport, supply, .and servicing op- erations were fragmented. Today, at division level, there is, a materiel support battalion that includes motor transport, supply, and mainte- nance elements. Its transport vehicle inventory is about 30 percent larger than those of di- visional motor transport battalions. Materiel support brigades are being formed at army and front levels, with the consolidation of motor transport assets and materiel depots under one materiel support brigade commander, stream- lining logistics command and control. The Soviet Armed Forces have prestocked large quantities of ammunition, fuel, and other war Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 supplies in forward areas and maintain large strategic reserves for long-term conflicts. In the Western TVD, opposite European NATO, for example, there is sufficient fuel for 90 days and ammunition for 60 to 90 days of combat. Inventories and Deployments The Soviets currently have 199 active tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions. Of these, 98 are located opposite NATO, includ- ing 30 in Eastern Europe, and 53 are along the Sino-Soviet border and in the Soviet Far East opposite China and Japan. An additional ten divisions, including four in Afghanistan, are opposite southwest Asia. The 20 divisions in the Caucasus are available for operations in eastern Turkey and southwest Asia. An addi- tional 18 divisions are located in the Strategic Reserve MDs. Approximately 40 percent of Soviet divi- sions, including all those deployed outside the USSR and six of the seven airborne divisions, are manned at what the Soviets consider ready levels. These could be mobilized and prepared WEIGHT (MT) 51 55 SPEED (KM/HR) 50 70 MAIN ARMAMENT 105-mm 105- WEIGHT (MT) 36 37 SPEED (KM/HR) 50 50 MAIN ARMAMENT 100-mm 115-mm for combat in a short period of time. The remainder are cadre divisions and could re- quire up to 60 days to mobilize personnel and equipment, deploy to local dispersal areas, and train for offensive combat operations. The So- viets also have 14 mobilization bases or inac- tive divisions. These are unmanned equipment sets intended to form mobilization divisions in wartime. In total, the Soviets have 213 divi- sions and two new army corps. These forces are backed up by a well-organized and tested mo- bilization system that can rapidly call up the civilian reservists required to bring the Armed Forces to full wartime manning. The USSR has an enormous manpower pool with approx- imately 9 million reservists having served in the last five years, of which over 3 million are ground force trained. These would be called up first and could be quickly integrated into the force structure. The ground forces include over 52,000 main battle tanks in the active inventory, of which more than one-third are the latest models, the T-64/72/80 series. These new tanks feature in- creased firepower, with a 125-mm main gun, and improved fire control systems, including a laser range finder on some versions. Both the T-80 and a variant of the. T-64 can fire an anti- tank guided missile through the main gun. Sur- vivability has been increased through the use of improved armor, incorporating laminates and composites. Over half the tanks, nearly 28,000, are found opposite European NATO, including almost all the T-64/72/80 series. The second largest group- ing, about 15,000, is opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East. Forces opposite southwest Asia and in the Caucasus have an additional 5,000 tanks, and another 4,000 are located in the Strategic Reserve MDs. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Infantry Carriers To mesh the infantry with the tank force, the' ground forces have an inventory of some 60,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. The majority of the inven- tory consists of the BTR-60 wheeled APC, and they tracked BMP IFV. Normally, a motorized rifle regiment of a tank division and a motor- ized rifle regiment of a motorized rifle division are' BMP equipped; the other two motorized ri- fle regiments of the motorized rifle division are equipped with BTR-60s. A follow-on to the BTR-60, the BTR-70, has been fielded in limited numbers. It has an im- proved engine/drive train and better off-road performance. The improved BMP-2 is augment- ing and replacing the BMP. It has a 30-mm rapid-fire gun in place of the 73-mm gun of the original BMP and carries the AT-5 ATGM. In addition to the BTR/BMPs, the Soviets have fielded the BMD with airborne and air assault units and a number of light-ground-pressure ve- hicles such as the GTT/MT-LB series for use in areas of poor trafficability. As with tanks, the largest concentration of APCs/IFVs is opposite European NATO- nearly 29,000. Over 17,000 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East. An additional 8,000 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey, and over 3,500 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs. Shorter Range Missiles Over 1,500 tactical missile and shorter range intermediate-range nuclear force (SRJNF) bal- listic missile launchers are in the Soviet in- ventory. At division level, the predominant missile is the unguided, free rocket over ground (FROG) found in a battalion of four launchers. The Soviets have begun to replace the FROG with the more accurate, longer range SS-21 in some divisions opposite European NATO. Currently, there are some 375 FROG and SS- 21 launchers opposite NATO. Over 200 FROG launchers are in the Far East, about 100 are op- posite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey, and about 75 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs. Armies and fronts have missile brigades equipped with from 12 to 18 SS-1C SCUD SRINF missile launchers. Over 400 SCUD launchers are opposite European. NATO, over 100 are in the Far East, about 75 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey, and one brigade is in the Strategic Reserve MDs. It is likely that the SCUD will be replaced by the SS-23, which has a longer range and improved accuracy. Initial deployment is anticipated opposite NATO and China. The front commander, may also have a brigade of 12-18 SS-12s and SS-22s available. The SS-22 is more accurate than the SS-12 it is replacing. Over 60 launchers are opposite Eu- ropean NATO, and 40 are in the Far East. There is one battalion in the southwest Asia/eastern Turkey area and one in the Strategic Reserve MDs. The new generation of shorter range SS-23 short-range ballistic missile transporter- erector-launchers. USSR Surface-to-Surface Missiles ss-1 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 missiles can be employed effectively with con- ventional and improved conventional muni- tions (ICM) warheads due to their increased accuracy. Fire Support The Soviets have traditionally placed great emphasis on fire support and currently have over 33,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) greater than 100mm in cal- iber in their active inventory. The ground forces are now fielding self-propelled artillery at all levels. Over 14 percent of their in- ventory consists of self-propelled weapons, of which over 70 percent are opposite the NATO central region. The Soviets first began to de- ploy self-propelled artillery in the early 1970s, when 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers were in- troduced. In the mid-1970s, a 203-mm how- itzer and 240-mm mortar appeared in nuclear- capable heavy artillery brigades; and, in the late 1970s, the ground forces began deployment of a new, nuclear-capable 152-mm self-propelled gun. A towed version of this gun is also being fielded. The most recent self-propelled weapon to enter the inventory is a howitzer/mortar as- signed to airborne and air assault units. The number of nuclear-capable artillery tubes has gone from less than 800 to over 7,700 in about ten years. An additional 4,000 152-mm how- itzers have a potential nuclear capability. About half-17,000-of the artillery pieces and MRLs are deployed opposite European NATO, and over a quarter-nearly 10,000-are in the Far East; about 4,000 are opposite south- west Asia and eastern Turkey, and over 2,000 are in the Strategic Reserve MDs. There are also 10,000 artillery pieces 100mm or smaller in caliber used as training pieces or as substitutes for larger caliber weapons. 122-mm self-propelled howitzer. Surface-to-Air Missiles An integrated system of surface-to-air mis- siles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) provides the Soviet Union with the most com- prehensive troop air defense system in the world. Over 4,600 SAM launchers and 12,000 AAA pieces are deployed at regimental through front level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder-fired SAM launchers are at battal- ion and company level and with non-divisional units. The standard air defense for a tank or motor- ized rifle regiment is a battery of SA-9/13 SAMs and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA pieces. The SA-9 system, mounted on a wheeled transport- er-erector-launcher (TEL), is being selectively replaced and augmented by the SA-13 on a tracked TEL. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected. The standard SAM at division level ,r MAXIMUM RANGE (M) NUCLEAsR V rr CAPABLEd tx Pkroba Self selfTowed Propegllled Propelled ti ~o 240mmrri~Vlortar ~'~e152-mm>Gun,~J52=irim$G,un I- -- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 tp .~ ~y .1 ... A .. - V~A ... rr.. r. # ~ B S r s. lop, A a a .< ~} m The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high performance aircraft and will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles. is the SA-6 or SA-8, although some divisions still have an AAA-equipped air defense regi- meet. A new division-level SAM, the SA-11, is beginning to enter the inventory. It fea- tures onboard radar, which increases mobility and target handling capability. The standard weapon at army and front level is the SA- which should shortly begin being replaced ~rz C 4 Y b ' the SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 will probably also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles. The largest concentration of SAM launchers and AAA pieces-over 10,500-is found oppo- site European NATO, with 4,000 in the Far - - East; over 4,000 are opposite southwest Asia The SA-8 tactical air defense system is part of and eastern Turkey, and over 3,700 are in the the USSR's integrated system of surface-to- Strategic Reserve MDs. air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Major Soviet Military Storage Areas Ammunition Depots 12 million metric tons arms/ammunition including storage in Eastern Europe Reserve Armor Storage Depots 6,000 armored vehicles (tanks/APCs) including storage in Eastern Europe Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Storage Depot Concentrations 52 million metric tons including storage in Eastern Europe Capabilities and Operations The Soviets conceive of a theater-or TVD- campaign as an integrated, combined arms op- eration, with ground forces as the primary force component. The campaign would be con- ducted to seize theater objectives located at a depth of up to 800 kilometers in operations lasting 12 to 15 days. Operations would be con- tinued, if required, to seize deeper, subsequent objectives. In the Western TVD, for example, the Soviets envision a large, intense theater operation to attain immediate theater objec- tives in a campaign lasting approximately two weeks. The Soviets consider a strategic operation in a TVD as consisting of complementary and mutually supporting ground forces, aviation, air defense, and theater nuclear forces. The success of ground operations would be predi- cated on a favorable combat air environment resulting from the conduct of massive offen- sive air operations to attain air superiority. This would be complemented by an integrated, theater-wide air defense operation conducted to prevent remaining enemy aircraft from in- terfering with the ground advance or the func- tioning of rear area support activities. Naval forces would secure coastal flanks and partic- ipate in amphibious operations. If war esca- lated to the nuclear level, the Soviets would attempt to destroy enemy military capabilities by a massive theater-nuclear strike involving the coordinated use of ground, aviation, naval, and strategic rocket force systems to allow a rapid and unimpeded advance of frontal forces. Innovations in traditional Soviet operational concepts have kept pace with developments in force structure and weapons systems. The most prominent involves an increased emphasis on the concept of deep operations to an oppo- nent's rear area early in a conflict. Adapting their experience with mobile groups in World War II, the Soviets have developed Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) to conduct mobile warfare in the enemy's rear area following a breakthrough of his forward defenses. The insertion of OMGs, consisting of tank-heavy formations supported by infantry fighting vehi- cles, mobile fire support, air defense, air assault units, and aviation, is designed to isolate front- line defending forces; disrupt rear area logis- tics and reserves; threaten key command and control, economic and population centers; and neutralize nuclear attack systems. The success- ful use of OMGs would facilitate the commit- r, Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ment of second-echelon forces and accelerate the overall rate of advance. The use of multiple OMGs would be intended to impose a theater- wide, "deep battle" and, in the Soviet view, place the enemy in an untenable situation. From a Soviet viewpoint, the concentration of overwhelming firepower, either nuclear or conventional, would be the principal method of achieving advantageous force ratios. While past emphasis has been on the employment of massive numbers of artillery weapons, the con- cept of fire support has expanded to include not only field artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars, but also air defense systems, heli- copters, fixed-wing aviation, antitank weapons, surface-to-surface missiles, and unguided rock- ets. All these weapons systems would be fully integrated into a single, coordinated fire sup- port effort, using automated control systems to optimize the allocation of weapons to the target and to allow centralized command and control of firepower. Chemical Warfare. The USSR is better prepared to conduct op- erations in a chemical environment than any other force in the world. Soldiers receive exten- sive chemical defense training. Most combat vehicles are equipped with a chemical protec- tion system and a chemical detection alarm system. Chemical defense troops with special- ized detection and decontamination equipment are found throughout the ground forces. These units range in size from a platoon at regi- ment level to a brigade at front level. The Soviets have more than 80,000 officers and en- listed specialists trained in chemical warfare, a force that would double in wartime; of this, 45,000 are assigned to the ground forces. They have about 20,000 special vehicles for recon- naissance and decontamination. The Soviets have established chemical military academies and more than 200 sites for teaching and train- ing Soviet troops on how to protect and de- contaminate themselves following combat. Chemical troops are responsible for the devel- opment, testing, and evaluation of new chem- ical agents, weapons systems, antidotes, suits, gas masks, and protective and decontaminating systems. Offensively, nearly all Soviet mortars, howitzers, guns, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles can be used to de- liver chemical munitions. The Soviet Union continues to test, pro- duce, and stockpile chemical weapons. The Major Soviet Military Storage Areas Reserve Artillery Storage Depots 18.000 artillery and AAA pieces including storage in Eastern Europe Bridge Equipment Storage Depots 27,000 meters of bridging materials including storage in Eastern Europe Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Concentrations including storage in Eastern Europe Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 In the 1980s, Soviet ground forces have fielded a new bridge/ferry system to augment their river- crossing capability; here, a heavy amyl. 'ious ferry transports a tank-mounted scissors bridge. Soviets have developed the doctrine, pls . per- sonnel, and equipment to support their use of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons night, of course, provide a military advantage in a conventional conflict. Their continued test- ing of chemical weapons, the enlarged stor- age capacity of chemical agents and weapons, and the existence of active production facilities are indicators of a serious chemical weapons program. These indications and strong evi- dence of the actual use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union and its client forces in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea reflect their drive to strengthen and improve the capability to wage chemical warfare and a willingness to employ such weapons in battle- field situations. In order to ensure control of forces on the modern battlefield, the Soviets have developed a command and control system that employs re- dundant command posts, communication networks, and equipment to enhance surviv- ability. Automated systems now being intro- duced are used in operational planning and decisionmaking, fire control, and logistics man- agement. The Soviets are improving their com- mand and control structure to facilitate the close coordination of ground forces, aviation, and air defense operations. Special Purpose Forces (SPETSNAZ) The USSR maintains a complement of spe- cial purpose forces, known by the Soviet acro- nym SPETSNAZ. These special purpose forces are controlled by the Main Intelligence Direc- torate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff and are trained to conduct a variety of sensitive missions, including covert action abroad. This latter mission was illustrated by their covert role, under KGB direction, in the December 1979 assassination of Afghan President Hafizul- lah Amin, which was performed by a joint KGB/SPETSNAZ force. During peacetime, the GRU carefully coordi- nates reconnaissance programs that are geared to meet the intelligence requirements for So- viet forces in war. In wartime, SPETSNAZ forces would operate far behind enemy lines for extended periods of time. They would con- duct reconnaissance, sabotage, and attacks on a wide variety of military and political targets. The KGB is assessed to have responsibility, under Central Committee guidance, for oper- ational planning, coordination, and political control of special purpose forces that operate abroad in peacetime. This was the case in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979. The KGB maintains its own special operations capabilities in the form Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 of clandestine assets dedicated to assassination and wartime sabotage. Wartime missions of GRU special purpose forces are planned under the direction of the General Staff and are integral to the Soviet combined arms operations. Intended to sup- port front or fleet-level operations, SPETSNAZ forces are capable of operating throughout the enemy homeland. Organized into brigades, these forces would infiltrate and fight as small teams. In a war, each of these brigades could be expected to field approximately 100 SPETSNAZ teams. A typ- ical team would be composed of an officer as leader with a warrant officer or sergeant as sec- ond in command. Other members of the group are trained as radio operators and weapons and demolition experts. In addition to the normal military training, all are trained in: .infiltration tactics; ?sabotage methods using explosives, incen- diaries, acids, and abrasives; ?airborne operations; .clandestine communications; ?hand-to-hand combat and silent killing techniques; ?psychological operations; .language/customs of target country; ?survival behind enemy lines; and ?reconnaissance and target location. To make training as realistic as possible, SPETSNAZ brigades have facilities equipped with accurate full-scale models of key targets such as enemy installations and weapons sys- tems. The brigades intended for operations against NATO share similar demolition train- ing and equipment familiarization. Training facilities are equipped with mockups of NATO nuclear systems including the PERSHING, LANCE, and GLCMs, as well as airfields, nu- clear storage, air defense sites, and communica- tions facilities. The missions of SPETSNAZ are a significant addition to Soviet combat forces. In both peace and war, these SPETSNAZ forces represent an important threat. In peace- time, they are a formidable instrument with which the Soviets can project limited, but de- cisive, force abroad, especially into the Third World. In war, major facilities and weapons systems are the objects of their attacks. Training Conscripts constitute about 75 percent of So- viet ground force personnel. Their training is highly centralized and standardized. Soviet units are expected to master a basic program of tactical maneuvers that would be carried out in war. The Soviets conduct an extensive program of training in which youths receive 140 hours of training prior to military service. Upon callup, conscripts serve for two years with the ground forces. Semiannual troop rotation in the spring and fall dictates an annual training cycle of two training periods. Each period commences with four weeks of basic training and then pro- ceeds to staff and unit training at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion level and ends with tests and inspections. The Soviets are implementing changes in their training program that should continue to improve the skills of personnel and main- tain unit cohesiveness. Conscript rotation now reflects a phased training program. Draftees, under the leadership of career officers, war- rant officers, and noncommissioned officers, are assigned to a new company in an active battal- ion. Here they train together for two years. Meanwhile, other companies in the battalion, unaffected by the semiannual troop rotation, can concentrate on more advanced unit and in- dividual training than was possible under the former system. This allows personnel to receive lengthier advanced training and enables Soviet forces to learn to operate the more complex weapons and equipment entering the ground forces. Research and Development Soviet force developments continue to be assisted by an extensive R&D program that ensures a flow of well-designed, technically advanced weapons and equipment. Tactical surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems, complex C3 systems, and advanced chemical and biological warfare agents from Soviet research and development are now being incorporated into Soviet ground forces' battle- field capability. Soviet tank R&D is a continu- ous process, with numerous permanent design bureaus, design teams, and associated work forces dedicated to new tank development. In recent years, the Soviets have fielded modern tanks such as the T-64, T-72, and T-80, and they continue the development of future tank capa- bilities. Soviet artillery R&D programs of the past several years have concentrated on the application of "state-of-the-art" technology to new self-propelled artillery, mortar, and rocket Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 SCUD-1B nuclear brigades are deployed with armies in all theaters. In field-training exercises, chemical troops practice chemical/ biological decontamination of SCUD launchers. systems. Air defense R&D programs for the So- viet ground forces stress advancements in sur- veillance, identification, and target-tracking capability. Maximum effort is devoted to the development of systems capable of operating in all types of combat environments. A strong effort is being made to achieve high technological advancements in radar, electro- optics, and laser and directed-energy weapons for use with their Armed Forces and with im- portant applications for their ground forces. The Soviets' R&D on directed-energy weapons dates back to the 1960s. The high-energy laser program, conducted at several secure facili- ties, is considerably larger than the US pro- gram. They are pursuing the development of high-quality optical components and efficient electrical power sources to support this laser program. They have already developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic generator that has produced 15 megawatts of short-term electrical power. This device, which is only in the very early stages of development in the West, could provide a compact, light-weight power source for mobile or transportable laser weapons. Soviet developments in compact and moderate-power laser weapons for tactical air defense, antipersonnel, and ground-to-ground applications may well be far enough along for such systems to be fielded by the end of this decade. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviets could demonstrate laser weapons in a wide variety of ground, ship, and aerospace applications. The Soviets also continue an intensive ef- fort aimed at the development of high-power microwave and millimeter-wave sources for ra- dio frequency weapons. Soviet radio frequency technology has now advanced to the stage where it could support development of a proto- type, short-range radio-frequency weapon. Many Western weapons systems would be vul- nerable to such a device, which not only could damage critical electronic components but also Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 could inflict disorientation or physical injury on personnel. There is also considerable research on the development of particle-beam weapons. They could deliver intense energy particles at the speed of light which would be capable of pene- trating the exterior of a target, destroying key internal components, or igniting fuels and mu- nitions. While much of the Soviet R&D effort in this field is on a par with Western efforts, there are difficult technological problems to be solved. Technology to support development of such weapons is not expected to be available before the mid-1990s. US Ground Forces US military strategy does not call for match- ing the size of the Soviet ground forces, but instead emphasizes refining the US qualita- tive edge in conjunction with moderate force increases. US active and reserve units are manned at higher levels, and the reserves receive more training than their Soviet counterparts. The US Army is developing organizational changes to improve combat effectiveness. The Army is undertaking a program entitled "Army 90" to implement its Air-Land Battle Doctrine. This doctrine has been developed to synchronize the close-in battle against enemy lead forces with a longer range battle against enemy follow- on forces. Army light and heavy divisions are being rearmed and restructured for sustained, continuous combat operations at any level of conflict. The Army is seeking to increase the strategic mobility of its light divisions while capitalizing on systems to increase their over- all firepower and combat effectiveness. The present generation of antiarmor weap- ons includes the long-range TOW and medium- range DRAGON missile, and light antitank short-range rockets. Improved warheads and guidance systems will increase the TOW's abil- ity to penetrate new Soviet armor. By the end of the decade, the Army is sched- uled to have over 1,500 attack helicopters, two- thirds of which will be the AH-1 COBRA TOW. The Army's AH-64 APACHE helicopter, which entered production in 1982, is an advanced, quick-reaction antitank weapon. It is.armed with 16 HELLFIRE antiarmor missiles, a 30- mm automatic gun, and 2.75-inch rockets. The M1 ABRAMS main battle tank has been deployed in Army field units since 1981. The M1 provides US forces with improved mobil- ity, survivability, and antiarmor firepower. The Army plans to mount the German-designed 120- mm main gun system on future Ml tanks. The Mls with the 120-mm main gun will be inter- operable with the German LEOPARD II main battle tanks. The multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)- a cooperative program with the Federal Repub- lic of Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom-was fielded with US forces in 1983. It is designed to give NATO ground forces en- hanced firepower to suppress enemy artillery and introduces a new capability to interdict en- emy operations beyond normal artillery range. The BRADLEY Fighting Vehicle, introduc- Production of Ground Forces Materiel USSR/NSWP and NATO' Equipment Type 1980 USSR NSWP 1981 USSR NSWP Other Armored Fighting Vehicles 6,500 1,300 5,200 1,300 Self-Propelled Field Artillery 900 50 950 50 Multiple Rocket Launchers Self-Propelled AA Artillery 1982 1983 1984 1984 USSR NSWP USSR NSWP USSR NSWP NATO 4,500 1,400 4,500 1,300 3,800 1,200 2,230 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ed in 1981, is modernizing Army mechanized forces. These vehicles are armed with 25-mm automatic cannons, 7.62-mm coaxial machine- guns, and TOW antitank weapons. They give mechanized infantry a true mounted combat ca- pability. Introduction of a new light armored vehicle will provide the Marine Corps units with increased mobility and firepower. United States and Allied tactical air defenses include several new weapons. The STINGER, with improved infrared-seeker guidance sys- tems, is a man-portable, surface-to-air missile system developed to replace the REDEYE. Two new systems, the PATRIOT and SGT YORK Division Air Defense Gun, will increase the Army's air defense capabilities against a va- riety of aircraft approaching at varying al- titudes. The PATRIOT, which will replace NIKE-HERCULES and the Improved HAWK as the principal theater-level SAM for defense against aircraft at high or medium altitudes, has begun deployment in Europe. NATO-Warsaw Pact Comparison The following NATO assessment does not in- clude France and Spain. Although both are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, they do not participate in its integrated military structure. In an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact, France and Spain would defend their national sovereignty with the fol- lowing forces: approximately 20 divisions; 2,000 tanks, 3,000 artillery/mortars; 1,000 antitank launchers; 8,000 combat vehicles; 450 helicop- ters; 9,000 aircraft; and 200 naval ships and craft. The 1984 edition of the NATO Alliance's NATO and the Warsaw Pact-Force Compar- isons provides the following assessment of Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces: Warsaw Pact forces facing Allied Command Europe (ACE), which is the NATO military command which stretches from the northern tip of Nor- way to the eastern borders of Turkey, consist of about 167 active and mo- bilisable divisions plus the equivalent of 9 divisions of airborne, air assault, and air-mobile formations, which could be used in a number of dif- ferent areas. Taking account of the forces of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet forces located in those countries but only the high readiness forces of the six Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union, there are some 115 divisions position- ed well forward or considered ready to fight at very short notice. More- over, these standing Warsaw Pact forces can be reinforced by about 16 divisions from the Strategic Reserve based in the central Military Districts of Russia (Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts). Warsaw Pact divi- sions normally consist of fewer personnel than NATO divisions but contain tanks and artillery, thereby producing similar combat power. Their principal offensive conventional capabilities consist of tanks, modern mechanised infantry vehicles, and highly mobile long-range artillery and mortars; large numbers of these are to be found in all their units. So- viet forces possess a wide variety of chemical agents and delivery systems and are the best equipped in the world to sustain operations in a chemical environment. Growing numbers of transport, support and attack heli- copters provide the Warsaw Pact with a quick-assault and reaction capabil- ity, and with a supplement to their fixed-wing tactical aircraft in the bat- tlefield area. A significant number of new electronic warfare helicopters have appeared in Soviet units during the past two years. Land forces committed to NATO and stationed in or rapidly de- ployable to Europe, consist of the equivalent of some 88 active and mo- bilisable divisions (including three air- borne/air mobile divisions), many of which are also ready to fight at very short notice... Almost half of NATO's tank and mechanised divisions are equipped with modern weapons al- though a very unfavourable ratio continues between NATO anti-tank guided weapons and Warsaw Pact tanks and armoured personnel vehi- cles. NATO similarly has a lower pro- portion of armed attack helicopters. Only the United States has a retal- iatory chemical capability and a number of NATO nations lack even adequate protection against chemical weapons. Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter IV Ground Forces ' Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Chapter V Air Forces The Soviet Air Forces (SAF) have three ma- jor combat components: Strategic Air Armies, Air Forces of Military Districts' and Groups of Forces; and Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA in Russian). The USSR is dedicating high priority to the upgrading of each component, with new generations of strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft in development, test, produc- tion, and deployment. This commitment to de- veloping a superior air force is exemplified in the production and deployment of BACKFIRE and BEAR H long-range bombers for strategic aviation and the FULCRUM and FROGFOOT aircraft for tactical aviation. The nuclear ca- pabilities of Soviet strategic bomber and strike aircraft are discussed in Chapter II. The BACKFIRE, first introduced into Soviet Air Forces in 1974, has a variable-geometry wing that can be swept for supersonic perform- ance. The BACKFIRE is designed for long- range subsonic cruise, high-altitude supersonic dash, and low-altitude high-subsonic penetra- tion. It can carry conventional or nuclear bombs internally or AS-4 supersonic cruise mis- siles attached to its wings. Production lines for the BEAR airframe have been reopened to pro- duce the BEAR H long-range turboprop strate- gic bomber. This new BEAR, however, has been specifically configured to carry the new AS-15 long-range cruise missile.1 In tactical aviation, the Soviets have introduced the MiG-29/FULCRUM high- performance aircraft into their inventory. The FULCRUM has been designed as an all- weather, counterair fighter-interceptor fitted with a true look-down/shoot-down radar inte- The MiG-29/FULCRUM all-weather, air superi- ority fighter-interceptor, seen in company with a BACKFIRE strategic bomber, reflects the USSR's continuing drive to produce new gen- erations of tactical, strategic, and transport air- craft. The FULCRUM is fitted with AA-10 mis- siles and the USSR's most modern look-down/ shoot-down radar - technology made possi- ble, in part, by thefts from the West. Chapter V Air,Forces Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 The CONDOR heavy-lift transport will have triple the payload capacity of the 11-76/CANDID. grated with the Soviets' improved AA-10 mis- sile. It is possible that the FULCRUM has a dual capability and might be configured for ground attack missions. For close air support missions, the Soviets have developed and de- ployed the Su-25/FROGFOOT. It is fitted with a 30-mm gun and can carry a variety of air-to- ground ordnance, including bombs, unguided rockets, and tactical air-to-surface missiles.' The Soviets have been using the FROGFOOT extensively in Afghanistan against the Mu- jahideen. The Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air superiority fighter, which is nearing deploy- ment, is similar to the US F-15. The FLANKER has a true look-down/shoot-down weapons sys- tem and beyond-visual-range AA-10 missiles. For strategic missions against the United States, the Soviets are developing the variable- geometry-wing BLACKJACK bomber, now in flight testing. The BLACKJACK almost cer- tainly will carry the AS-15 long-range cruise missile. Unlike the BEAR H stand-off launch platform for the AS-15, the BLACKJACK will probably be designed for low-altitude high- subsonic penetration of air defenses. To complement the new bomber and fighter systems, the Soviets are also working on new airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and tanker aircraft using the Il- 76/CANDID airframe. Rounding out Soviet Air Force developments is the new large CONDOR transport aircraft currently undergoing flight testing. Similar in many respects to the US C-5A Galaxy in size and lift capability, the CONDOR probably has clam shell-type rear doors for outsized cargo entry and exit as well as a visor-type nose to facilitate rapid load- ing and unloading from either end. With a payload even greater than the C-5A, the CON- DOR will substantially enhance Soviet military airlift and power projection capabilities when deployed in significant numbers. The current composition of the SAF reflects an evolutionary process dating from the So- viet experience in World War II. In 1940, a reorganization of the Soviet air arm was de- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 ...-------------- The I5u-24/FENCER is. a nuclear-capable, all-weather fighter-bomber. signed to produce a single military air ser- vice composed of five component parts. The mission of each part: was defined along func- tional lines. The components were: (1) Long- Rar ge Bomber Aviation, tasked with strategic bombing; (2) the Air Reserve of the High Command; (3) Frontal Aviation, assigned to MD/front commands; (4) Army Aviation, organic to and directly supporting the subor- dinate ground armies of MDs/fronts; and (5) Troop Aviation, tasked with providing liaison support to ground corps. The opening phase of the war exposed serious problems in the still-incomplete reorganization of the Soviet air arm'. The Soviet Air Forces lacked adequate command and control systems and specialized aircraft. In March 1942, the General Staff ordered the establishment of a simplified air force struc- ture. Long-Range Aviation (LRA) was subor- dinated to the Supreme High Command (VGK) ands assigned exclusive responsibility for at- tacking strategic targets. Frontal and Army aviation were integrated into air armies as- signed to combined arms fronts, which came to be called Tactical Air Armies (TAAs). The recentralized and streamlined field command of aviation assets provided greater flexibility and faster response at higher command levels. This structure remained largely intact for more than 30 years, except for the formal creation of VTA as a separate command in the 1950s. The reorganization of Soviet! air assets that began in the late 1970s dissolved LRA and the TAAs, which had become known as Frontal Aviation, and restructured Soviet Air Defense Forces (VPVO). All LRA and'some TAA as- sets were organized into five new Strategic Air Armies. The rest of TAA along with almost half the strategic interceptor force of Air Defense of the Homeland (APVO) were organized as air forces of specific military districts or GOFs. Current Structure There are 17 air forces in the Groups of Forces, peripheral military districts of the So- Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 viet Union, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Each of these air forces is operationally subordi- nate to the MD or Group commander and is comprised of combat fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-bombers, and helicopters-the latter known as Army Aviation-although the mix is not standard. Fighter and fighter-bomber regiments can be organized into divisions or remain independent, reporting directly to the military districts and Groups of Forces. Re- connaissance regiments and squadrons are in- dependent units, while helicopter units either report to the military districts and Groups of Forces or to their assigned maneuver entities. The five Strategic Air Armies include one de- signed for intercontinental and maritime strike missions and four designed to support various theater missions. Two of the latter air armies are comprised entirely of former TAA assets. Regiments within the air armies are generally organized into divisions, although some inde- pendent regiments exist. Soviet Military Transport Aviation, the third operational element of SAF, has the primary responsibility of providing airlift services for the Soviet Airborne Forces (VDV) and air as- sault units. It also provides air logistics sup- port for other deployed Soviet and allied armed forces, as well as supporting other Soviet polit- ical and economic interests, especially in the Third World. Today the Soviet Air Forces are tailored and equipped to meet the requirements of the various levels of command and the entire range of assigned missions. The Soviet Air Forces have as their combat and combat support assets nearly 900 bomber aircraft, nearly 6,100 fighter and fighter- bombers, and 600 VTA transports. Modernization of Strategic Aviation is on- going. BACKFIRE bombers continue to re- place BADGERS, and the BLINDER inventory continues to shrink gradually due to attrition. Two new long-range BEAR variants are en- tering the inventory. One, a modification to Comparable Tactical Aircraft Su-24 USSR FENCER MiG-23 MiG-27 MiG-25 METERS A/B/C FLOGGER FLOGGER FOXBAT B/D B/G D/J Su 17 MiG 21 FITTER D/H FISHBED L t ;s MiG-29 FULCRUM , Su-25 FROGFOOT SPEED (KTS) 1,250 1,350 980 1,200 1,625 1,205 1,350 475 RADIUS (KM) 1,800 1,300 800 700 900 500 1,150 550 ARMAMENT 2,500 KG 6 AAMS 3,000 KG 3,000 KG - 4 AAMs 6 AAMS 4,000 KG Bombs Bombs Bombs Bombs WINGSPAN (M) 10 (Swept) 8 (Swept) 8 (Swept) 10 (Swept) 14 7 12 15 Us METERS F-111 F-4C/E F-15A/C PHANTOM II EAGLE ^(~ A-7A/D CORSAIR II F-16A FIGHTING FALCON A-10A THUNDERBOLT II SPEED (KTS) 1,000 1,190 600 1,450 1,190 390 RADIUS (KM) 1,420 520 750 1,000 630 650 ARMAMENT 9,000 KG 4,100 KG 2,720 KG 8 AAMS 3,200 KG 4,000 KG Bombs Bombs Bombs Bombs Bombs WINGSPAN (M) 10 12 12 13 10 17 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7 _t