THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140026-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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COMIREX FILE COPY
THE
SOVIET-CUBAN
CONNECTION
CENTRAL AMERICA
and the
CARIBBEAN
Released by the Department of State and Department of Defense
March 1985
Washington,
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THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION
IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
2ND PRINTING
APRIL 1985
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CONTENTS
Cuba: The Key Soviet Proxy
3
Grenada: A Failed Revolution
11
Nicaragua: A Betrayed Revolution
19
El Salvador: A Democratic Revolution
31
Castro: Subversive Catalyst
37
The Challenge and the Response
41
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We Americans should be proud of what we're trying to do in Central America, and
proud of what, together with our friends, we can do in Central America, to support
democracy, human rights, and economic growth, while preserving peace so close to
home. Let us show the world that we want no hostile, communist colonies here in
the Americas: South, Central, or North.
RONALD REAGAN
May 1984
This booklet provides information about Soviet
and Cuban military power and intervention in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean. The threats result-
ing from this factor are as much a part of the region's
crisis as are better known indigenous and historic
factors.
United States policy in the area is based on four
mutually supportive elements that are being pursued
simultaneously:
principal threats to democracy in Central America. In
El Salvador, the guerrillas are fighting the reforms of
President Jose Napoleon Duarte and his elected
government with arms channeled through Nicaragua
with the active support of the Sandinistas. Since 1979,
guerrilla actions have cost the Salvadoran people end-
less suffering and their economy more than $1 billion.
The goal of the guerrillas, acting in concert with
Havana and Managua, is to establish a Marxist-
Leninist government in El Salvador.
? To assist in the development of democratic in-
stitutions and to encourage creation of
representative governments accountable to their
citizens.
? To address on an urgent basis the economic and
social problems of the region by providing eco-
nomic assistance to stimulate growth, create op-
portunity, and improve the quality of life of the
people.
? To provide security assistance to enable the
countries to defend themselves against Soviet-
bloc, Cuban, and Nicaraguan supported insur-
gents and terrorists intent on establishing
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships.
? To promote peaceful solutions through negoti-
ation and dialogue among the countries of the
region and among political groups within each
country.
This policy is working. Democracy is now emerg-
ing as the rule, not the exception. Five of the six coun-
tries in Central America have conducted elections
widely judged free and fair. Only in Nicaragua did
people go to the polls with no real choice, due to San-
dinista harassment of the democratic opposition.
Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union are the
Marxist-Leninists promise freedom, national de-
velopment, and a classless society. In reality, they
deliver repressive governments that are unable to
produce economically, but are ever ready to give as-
sistance to foreign- groups trying to seize power in other
countries. Castro's Cuba has been the prime example
of this form of government in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Sandinista Nicaragua is following the Cuban
example. Grenada was on the same path until October
1983.
Soviet interest in exploiting the economic, politi-
cal, and social problems of Central America and the
Caribbean is evident in a document found by U.S.-
Caribbean security forces during the Grenada rescue
mission. In a 15 April 1983 meeting with Grenadian
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko was quoted as describing
the region as "boiling like a cauldron" and saw Cuba
and Nicaragua as "living examples for countries in that
part of the world." Cautious opportunism was evident
in Gromyko's words, advising Bishop that "imperi-
alism" should not be "agitated," to avoid alerting the
United States prematurely. At the same time he urged
Grenada to continue revolutionary operations in the
region.'
Over the last five years, the Soviet Union has
sought to exploit this "boiling cauldron" by provid-
ing more military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua
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than the United States has provided to all of Latin
America. The Sandinista military buildup began in
1980, two years before there was any significant armed
opposition to the Managua regime. From July 1979
through April 1981, the United States was providing
generous economic assistance to Nicaragua ($118 mil-
lion) and providing only small amounts of military as-
sistance to Nicaragua's neighbors. Subsequent
increases in U.S. military assistance to these neighbor-
ing countries has been a direct reaction to the military
build-up and support for guerrillas undertaken by
Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc.'
The Soviet Union sees in the region an excellent
and low-cost opportunity to preoccupy the United
States-the "main adversary" of Soviet strategy-thus
gaining greater global freedom of action for the USSR.
While the Soviets are not likely to mount a direct mili-
tary challenge to the United States in the Caribbean
Basin, they are attempting to foment as much unrest
as possible in an area that is the strategic crossroads
of the Western Hemisphere. Working through its key
proxy in the region, Cuba, the Soviet Union hopes to
force the United States to divert attention and mili-
tary resources to an area that has not been a serious
security concern to the United States in the past.
President Reagan outlined the challenge faced by
the United States in his 9 May 1984 televised speech
to the nation:
As the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America, chaired by Henry Kis-
singer, agreed, if we do nothing or if we
continue to provide too little help, our
choice will be a Communist Central Ameri-
ca with additional Communist military
bases on the mainland of this hemisphere,
and Communist subversion spreading
southward and northward. This Com-
munist subversion poses the threat that 100
million people from Panama to the open
border on our south could come under the
control of pro-Soviet regimes.
If we come to our senses too late,
when our vital interests are even more
directly threatened, and after a lack of
American support causes our friends to
lose the ability to defend themselves, then
the risks to our security and our way of life
will be infinitely greater.
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CUBA: THE KEY SOVIET PROXY
The 1959 revolution carried out by Fidel Castro and
his 26th of July Movement has been of inestimable
value to the Soviet Union. The first proof that the
USSR understood the strategic advantages it could
gain from Cuba came in the early. 1960s. At that
time, the USSR lagged behind the United States in
long-range nuclear systems, and in 1962, the oppor-
tunistic Soviets secretly introduced medium- and
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Had
they succeeded in keeping the missiles in Cuba, the
Soviets would have controlled a nuclear base only 90
miles from the Florida coast.
The Soviets now have in Cuba 7,000 civilian ad-
visers, a 2,800-man combat brigade, another 2,800
military advisers, plus about 2,100 technicians at the
Lourdes electronic intelligence facility. Since 1969,
the Soviet navy has deployed task forces to Cuba and
the Caribbean 24 times. Soviet long-range naval
reconnaissance aircraft are also deployed to Cuba.
From there, they operate along the U.S. East Coast
and ; in the Caribbean, shadowing carrier battle
groups and spying on other U.S. military forces and
installations. The Soviets also use Cuba as a stopover
point for reconnaissance aircraft enroute to Angola.
To protect their military investment in Cuba, the
Soviets are making a sizeable economic investment as
well. Each year the Soviets provide more than $4
billion to the Cuban economy. During the last four
years alone, they have given the Cubans almost $3
billion in military aid. In fact, since the early 1960s,
Cuba has not paid for any of the military assistance it
has received from the Kremlin.
This substantial investment in Cuba gives the
Soviet Union both military and intelligence
capabilities in an area that is a lifeline for the U.S.
economy. The Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico
maritime routes carry about 55010 of imported
petroleum to the U.S., as well as approximately 45010
of all U.S. seaborne trade. Furthermore, in any
NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, more than half
of all NATO resupply would be shipped, from Gulf
ports and would have to pass by Cuba.
Cuba's strategic location makes it an ideal site
for an intelligence facility directed against the United
States. The Soviet Union established such a site at
Lourdes near Havana in the mid-1960s. Lourdes to-
day is the most sophisticated Soviet collection facility
Soviet naval combatants in Caribbean waters during their March-April 1984 deployment. Since 1969, the
Soviet navy has deployed task forces 24 times to participate in training exercises with the Cuban navy
and, to establish a periodic naval presence in the Caribbean.
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U.S. Navy F-4 intercepts Soviet BEAR D long-ran
reconnaissance aircraft 42 miles off the Virginia
coast. The Soviet aircraft, operating out of Cuba, had
just penetrated the U.S. defense zone during sea tri-
als of the nuclear aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vin-
son , in January 1982.
Soviet naval long-range reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Cuba. These aircraft collect intelligence on
U.S. military installations on the East Coast and U.S. naval activities in the Atlantic and Caribbean.
outside the Soviet Union itself. From this key listen-
ing post, the Soviets monitor U.S. commercial
satellites, U.S. military and merchant shipping com-
munications, and NASA space program activities at
Cape Canaveral. Lourdes also enables the Soviets to
eavesdrop on telephone conversations in the United
States.
Castro and Communism
It is sometimes asserted that Fidel Castro took Cuba
into the Soviet orbit because the United States turned
a cold shoulder to his 1959 revolution. This is a
double distortion.
It is no surprise that a 1983 article in Forbes
asked, "Why do the Russians pump $4 billion to $5
billion a year into Cuba's collapsing economy?
Because they know it is their best buy when it comes
to making trouble for the U.S. For less than the an-
nual cost of supporting a single aircraft carrier task
force, the Soviet Union has developed a wondrous
weapon. "3
The United States was ready to discuss foreign
aid with Castro's government. In April 1959, when
Fidel Castro made his first visit to the United States,
he privately forbade his economic minister to consent
to even preliminary discussions with the United
States on the topic of economic aid.4 During a TV in-
terview in Spain in January 1984, Castro confirmed
that U.S. hostility was not a major factor in his deci-
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THE FIRST 60 DAYS SAILS FROM GULF PORTS THROUGH
FLORIDA STRAITS.
The Caribbean sea lanes are viewed by the Soviets as the "strategic rear" of the United States.
I j
Soviet intelligence collection facility at Lourdes near Havana, Cuba. This listening post enables the Soviets
to monitor sensitive U.S. maritime, military, and space communications, as well as telephone iconversa-
tions in the United States.
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Cuban President Fidel Castro, after 26 years, is still
committed to violent revolution and a close align-
ment with the Soviet Union.
sion to take Cuba into the Soviet camp, adding that
"inexorably, we considered ourselves to be Marxist-
Leninists." I
During the first years of Sandinista rule in
Nicaragua, Castro advised the Sandinistas to hide
their adherence to Marxism-Leninism. This is the
same pattern that Castro had followed in Cuba. To
obtain and hold the support of moderates in Cuba
and abroad, Castro portrayed himself as a democrat
while the struggle against Batista was underway.
After his own dictatorship was firmly established,
Castro changed his tune. In a 2 December 1961
speech, he told the Cuban people that he had been an
"apprentice Marxist-Leninist" for years, that he had
disguised his true political beliefs, and that he would
remain a Marxist-Leninist until he died.6 In a May
1977 interview with Barbara Walters of ABC televi-
sion, Castro said that he had made the decision to
become a communist while he was a student in law
school in the late 1940s.7
A Garrison State
Under Soviet tutelage, Cuba's armed forces have ex-
panded steadily. They now include 160,000 active
duty military personnel, plus up to 135,000 well-
trained and experienced reservists who can be
mobilized in two to three days. This total force ex-
ceeds that of the active duty armed forces of Brazil, a
country with 13 times Cuba's population. Through
its operations in Africa over the past decade, Cuba
has gained more extensive and more recent foreign
combat experience than any other country in the
Western Hemisphere.
Cuba has more than 950 tanks and more than
200 jet fighters, principally the MiG-21 but also the
MiG-23, a front-line fighter of the Soviet Union's air
force. In addition, the Soviets have given Cuba an
improved naval capability with frigates, submarines,
and missile/torpedo firing patrol boats. The Cuban
air force and civil air fleet could transport at least
15,000 combat soldiers anywhere in the Caribbean
Basin within two to three weeks. Important elements
of this force could be in place within a few hours. No
single country in the basin, except the United States,
has the means to repel such an attack without exter-
nal assistance.
Cuba has developed the capability, through the
recent addition of two amphibious landing ships,
together with smaller amphibious craft of the Cuban
navy, of placing an initial assault force of about
1,000 men, with either tanks or artillery support, on
nearby island nations. The Cuban merchant marine
could transport personnel to any country in the
Caribbean area as well. This ability, sharpened by ex-
tensive training exercises in recent years, is an
ominous threat to Cuba's small island neighbors.
The capability of Cuban MiG-23s to support
operations throughout the Caribbean cannot be over-
looked. These planes have the range to attack targets
in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, including key
oil fields and refineries. Its operations in Africa,
especially those in Angola and Ethiopia, have shown
that Cuba can project its military power over great
distances.
The Soviet-made MiG-21 shown here, along with the
even more advanced MiG-23, give Cuba the most
powerful air force in the Caribbean region.
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Practically Every Member of Society Is Required To Undergo Military Training in Castro's Cuba.
Members of the Cuban Women's Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery Regiment demonstrate their skills.
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Cuban children training with Soviet-supplied AK-47
assault rifles.
The caption for this photograph, taken from the
Cuban magazine Verde Olivo, reads, "The activities
of SEPMI ensure that the new generation learns,
among other things, to shoot, and shoot well!!" SEP-
MI is the patriotic military education society that
promotes military activities among Cuban children.
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Cuban troops carry out amphibious landings in
training exercise.
One more submarine, one more plane, one more
ship at a time may not seem important. However, by
gradually increasing every aspect of its military
power, Cuba has made itself a potential military
threat to its Caribbean and Central American
neighbors.
A Strong Supporter of
Communist Expansion
There are now about five times as many Cuban
soldiers in Africa alone as there were in the Cuban
armed forces that Castro defeated in coming to
power in 1959. Ten years after Cuban troops first ar-
One of the three FOXTROT-Class submarines sup-
plied to Cuba by the Soviet Union.
Cuban commandos deploying from a Soviet-built
Cuban air force AN-26 transport plane during train-
ing exercises.
rived there, Castro still has a force of 30,000 soldiers
in Angola. Since 1975, Castro has sent military forces
and/or advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
South Yemen, Congo, Ghana, Mali, Guinea-Bissau,
as well as Grenada and Nicaragua. Although the
propaganda focus is on such ideals as "socialist
solidarity," Castro is known to charge many of these
countries for Cuban troops, "construction workers,"
and other "internationalists," draining scarce foreign
exchange from local economies. According to
reliable sources, recipient governments must pay
Cuba a fixed sum per month for each Cuban soldier
and each civilian technician. Thus, Castro is
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SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 ; 91 92
*Estimate-- Data still being compiled.
The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in each of the last four years has been greater than
in any year since the 1962 missile crisis.
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simultaneously playing the world revolutionary role
he has always desired, supporting Soviet foreign
policy goals, and acquiring hard currency.
Cuba needs the money it gains from foreign ven-
tures. The state-controlled economy of Cuba has
shown little growth in the 26 years Castro has been in
power. It has become heavily dependent on the
Soviet Union. As Hugh Thomas, the noted British
historian of Cuba, has written:
The Revolution has preserved, even
heightened, the extent to which the country
depends on one crop [sugar]. For that
reason, if no other, Cuba's foreign policy is
as dependent on the Russians as it used to
be on the U.S. Most of the Russo-Cuba
commerce concerns sugar which Russia
buys at a price formally about three-times
higher than present world market prices.8
Castro's assistance is indispensable for guerrilla
movements in Latin America. Since the early 1960s,
Cuba has attracted guerrillas from virtually every
country in the region. Castro has given logistical and
financial support to thousands of these guerrillas as
well as providing them military training, usually in
courses lasting three to six months. The alumni of
Castro's guerrilla training range from most of
Nicaragua's current Sandinista leadership to the
demolition experts sabotaging the economy of El
Salvador. A 1981 State Department analysis of
Cuba's support for violence in Latin America showed
the extent of Castro's efforts to train and supply ur-
ban and rural terrorists.9
Cuban and Soviet efforts to gain influence are
not limited to the military realm. One of their goals is
to shape the political attitudes of foreign students
who are provided scholarships. Since the mid-1.970s,
more than 20,000 students - pre-school through
university-have studied at Cuba's Isle of Youth
educational complex. Students have come from
several countries, principally Ethiopia, Angola,
Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua. In addition
to this Cuban effort, the Soviets and their Eastern
European allies are providing thousands of
government-sponsored scholarships specifically to
Latin American and Caribbean students.' ?
The Soviet Union and Cuba have worked effec-
tively toward the objective of establishing additional
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Central America and the
Caribbean. Although Castro has become more
calculating in his export of violence and exploitation
of poverty, his aims remain as they were in the 1960s.
He publicly proclaimed in the 1976 constitution
Cuba's right and duty to support revolutionary and
national liberation movements. For its part, the
Soviet Union has intensified its efforts to create
chaos or conflict near the United States to divert U.S.
attention and resources from Soviet challenges in
other critical areas of the world.
U.S. AND SOVIET BLOC GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EXCHANGES,
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN,
BY NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND YEAR
10000
NUMBER
OF
STUDENTS
8000
6000
4000
2000
*SOVIET BLOC
**UNITED STATES
* EXCLUDES CUBA
** THIS GRAPH DOES NOT INCLUDE THE LARGE NUMBER OF NON-GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES
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GRENADA: A FAILED REVOLUTION
Grenada turned toward the Cubans and the Soviet
bloc in 1979 when Maurice Bishop led a coup to
depose the unpopular prime minister, Eric Gairy.
Contrary to Bishop's promise that his revolution
would modernize the economy, improve living stand-
ards, and promote democracy, life in Grenada
deteriorated steadily during his four-year regime,
1979-1983. Bishop secretly planned to impose a
single-party dictatorship while promising a pluralistic
democracy. The Soviets and Cubans were party to
the lentire deception. 1
A basic objective of Bishop was to consolidate
power in his New Jewel Movement. The NJM was
organized along classic Marxist-Leninist lines, with
power concentrated in a single leader and exercised
through a small central committee and political
bureau. Bishop called his regime the People's Revolu-
tionary Government and established close ties with the
Soviet Union and Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Libya,
North Korea, and Vietnam.
Grenada Followed Cuba's Model
Following Castro's strategy, the NJM first estab-
lished a broad coalition. It was led by the radical left,
but, it also included non-communist elements. "This
was done," Bishop explained in his 13 September 1982
"Line of March" speech, "so imperialism won't get
too excited."' 2 Later, he removed the moderates from
government, as Castro had done 20 years before in
Cuba. Elections were never held. Opposition was dealt
with firmly, often through imprisonment. The media
was controlled. Church leaders were denied access to
radio since they were seen as a principal impediment
to the goals of the NJM.
1 As in Cuba, Bishop adopted the control and
surveillance measures normally found in totalitarian
regimes. The Ministry of the Interior kept Western
diplomats, businessmen, and local opposition groups
under surveillance. The right to privacy of Grena-
This poster, distributed by the New Jewel Movement
(NJM), exemplified Grenada's close ties with Cuba
and Nicaragua. Left to right: Daniel Ortega,
Maurice Bishop, Fidel Castro.
dians and foreigners was routinely violated.
Telephones were tapped and mail intercepted as were
personal records and private bank accounts. The
People's Revolutionary Army was given police func-
tions, conducting searches and detaining suspects
without warrants. Human rights violations included
torture, beatings, imprisonment, and psychological
intimidation. Opposition political parties were forced
to disband or go underground. Some opposition
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NJM photo of political indoctrination of young Grenadians.
NJM political meeting. In background are portraits of (left to right) Maurice Bishop, Daniel Ortega, and
Fidel Castro. (NJM photo)
leaders left. Independent churches were seen as a special target. In many respects, Bishop was
threat. The so-called "People's Laws" gave Bishop repeating the steps taken by Castro in consolidating
and his top lieutenants nearly unlimited power. An power in the early 1960s.
important step in assuring Bishop and the NJM total
control was a propaganda and indoctrination cam-
paign. Children and adults were -required to attend
political orientation classes. Ideological training was
given to virtually all Grenadians, with the army a
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The Soviet-Grenadian Connection
Cubans and Soviets were key actors in- Bishop's
Grenada, but the extent of Soviet-Grenadian rela-
tions after the 1979 coup was not made known until
after the Bishop visit to Moscow in July 1982, and
even then key details were kept from the public.
Among the 35,000 pounds of documents collected in
October 1983 were five secret military agreements
signed by Grenada-three with the Soviet Union, one
with Cuba, and one with North Korea.
I The Soviet Union used Cuba to funnel military,
economic, and technical assistance to Grenada. This
included Soviet and Cuban material and equipment to
build the Point Salines airport. This airport, ostensi-
bly for civilian use, was built primarily by armed
Cubans, despite the high unemployment on the island
of Grenada. The Point Salines airport project was a
key issue for Maurice Bishop in his 15 April 1983 meet-
ing with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
Bishop's "Outline of Presentation" forithis meeting
emphasized the economic benefits of the' project, but
also included the revealing phrase, "There is also the
strategic factor which is well known!!" j"
Once completed, Point Salines could have pro-
vided a stopover point for Cuban flights to Africa,
an additional facility for Soviet long-range recon-
naissance aircraft, and possibly a transshipment
point for arms and supplies for Latin American in-
surgents and for the Sandinistas. Had the Point
Salines airport been operational in Aprill 1983, for ex-
ample, the Libyan aircraft detained in Brazil, while
clandestinely ferrying a cargo of military supplies to
Nicaragua, could have refueled in Grenada instead of
in Brazil.
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The Coverrr.ent of the 'Republic of Cuba and People's Revolutio
nary Government of Grenada, in full exercise of their sovereign
right as free end independent State, based on the fraternal
Pages from Soviet, North Korean, and Cuban secret military agreements with Grenada.
i
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Point Salines airfield under construction in
Grenada. Cuban workers in foreground. (NJM
photo)
Military Assistance
The Soviets and Cubans were quick to exploit the
potential of Grenada. Only a month after Bishop
seized power, the first large shipment of Eastern-bloc
manufactured arms arrived from Havana. This in-
cluded 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100 heavier
weapons, and ammunition.' .
Cuban military advisers were assigned by Fidel
Castro to organize and train the Grenadian military
and internal security forces. Hundreds of young
Grenadians were sent to Cuba for military training.
POINT SALINES AIRFIELD. GRENADA
The Point Salines airfield was scheduled to be inaugurated on 13 March 1984. Its runway length would
have enabled it to serve as a stopover point for Cuban and Soviet aircraft.
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Some of the Soviet-supplied PK 7.62mm general purpose machine guns found in Grenadian warehouses.
I
Grenadian troops riding Soviet-built BTR-60 ar-
mored personnel carriers. (NJM photo)
The Grenadian Army Chief of Staff and both of
Grenada's Deputy Secretaries of Defense went to the
USSR for training.
The covert nature of much of this assistance was
exemplified by boxes of ammunition labeled "Cuban
Economic Office" shipped to Grenada by Cuba. By
NJM photo of Grenadian soldiers marching. The
NJM had militarized Grenadian society in the clas-
sic pattern of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.
October 1983, tiny Grenada had more men under
arms and more weapons and military supplies than
all of its Eastern Caribbean neighbors com-
bined -with plans to give Grenada one of the largest
military forces in proportion to population of any
country in the world.
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In addition to signing a secret military agreement with Grenada, Cuba disguised the delivery of 7.62mm
ammunition In crates marked "Cuban Economic Office."
Support for Soviet/Cuban Policies
Leads to Instability
Under Bishop and the NJM, Grenada fully sup-
ported Soviet/Cuban policies, including the Soviet
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
From the beginning, Bishop and his followers
were anxious to prove their usefulness to the Soviet
Union. In July 1983, the Grenadian Ambassador to
Moscow sent a message to his Foreign Minister
reviewing Grenadian-Soviet relations. He empha-
sized the continuing need to convince the Soviets that
the Grenadian revolution was part of a
world wide process with its original roots in
the Great October Revolution [a reference
to the Russian Revolution of October
1917]. For Grenada to assume a position of
By October 1983, tiny Grenada had more men un-
der arms and more weapons than all of its Eastern
Caribbean neighbors combined. Shown here is a
U.S. officer of the U.S.-Caribbean security forces
with a crate of Soviet AK-47 assault rifles discovered
on the island.
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increasingly greater importance, we have to
be seen as influencing at least regional
events. We have to establish ourselves as the
authority of events in at least the English-
speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of
revolutionary activity and progressive
developments in this region at least.' 5
To further Grenada's regional ambitions, the
Bishop government adopted an active program of
meeting with "progressive and revolutionary parties
in the region" twice a year to heat up Gromyko's
"boiling cauldron." Belize and Suriname were seen
as particularly ripe for exploitation. Bishop apparently
saw such meetings as a means to convince the Soviets
of the pivotal role Grenada could play as the Soviets'
Eastern Caribbean agent. The meetings had cost the
Grenadians $500,000 by April 1983, and they requested
addtional Soviet financial assistance.16
Ultimately, of course, it was the Grenadian
government that disintegrated when a power struggle
erupted within the NJM during the fall of 1983. The
assassination of Bishop, three of his closest deputies,
and the killing of scores of innocent persons by troops
of the People's Revolutionary Army led to the collapse
of the NJM. All ports of entry and departure were
closed and a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew was
declared.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
made a formal request to the United States for
assistance. In addition, the sole remaining source of
governmental legitimacy, the Governor-General of
Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, made an urgent and con-
fidential appeal to the regional states to restore order
on the island. The United States, responding to these
requests and concerned over the safety of 1,000
American citizens on the island, participated in a
combined U.S.-Caribbean security force that landed
on Grenada on 25 October 1983. Peace and public
order were restored.
The reaction of the Grenadian people to the
U.S.-Caribbean security force was overwhelmingly
supportive. A CBS News poll of 3 November 1983
found that 91% of the Grenadian people expressed
strong approval for the actions taken by the United
States. On 3 December 1984, the people of Grenada
formally closed the books on the failed Marxist-
Leninist revolution by successfully holding the
island's first election in eight years.
Townspeople of Grenville, Grenada, welcome the arrival of the U.S.-Caribbean security forces. In spite
of four years of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination by the Bishop regime, the people of Grenada welcomed
the U.S.-Caribbean troops as liberators. A CBS news poll in Grenada found 91"/6 approval of the rescue
operation.
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NICARAGUA:
A BETRAYED REVOLUTION
In July 1979, a broad and popular coalition led
militarily by the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) overthrew the government of General
Anastasio Somoza and ended a family dynasty that
had ,ruled Nicaragua for more than four decades. The
new government owed much of its success to interna-
tional support for the anti-Somoza forces. The
Organization of American States had even adopted a
resolution calling for the "definitive replacement" of
Somoza and free elections as soon as possible." In
gaining this support, the Sandinistas had pledged to
have free elections, political pluralism, a mixed
economy, and a non-aligned foreign policy. The first
junta formed after Somoza fled appeared to confirm
the belief that Nicaragua was on the road to
democracy.
Since those hopeful early days, Nicaragua has
moved not toward democracy, but toward a new dic-
tatorship tied ever more closely to Cuba and the
Soviet Union.
The Sandinistas' betrayal of the ideals of the
revolution and the establishment of a closely con-
trolled society have driven many of their key allies
and, thousands of their former rank-and-file sup-
porters out of the country. Former junta members
Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, and even the
legendary "Comandante Cero" (Eden Pastora, who
served as Deputy Defense Minister), left Nicaragua
to take up the fight against their former colleagues.
In a 1984 interview, Pastora explained his reasons for
leaving the Nicaraguan government. Speaking of the
Sandinista leaders he said: "They isolated themselves
from what Sandinismo is supposed to be about.
Violations of human rights, Cuban troops in
Nicaragua, the alignment toward the Soviet bloc, the
moral deviations, it's a long list.""
By words and deeds, the Sandinista leaders have
demonstrated that they are, in fact, dedicated
Marxist-Leninists. On 25 August 1981, Comandante
Humberto Ortega, the Minister of Defense, told his
subordinates that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific
doctrine that guides our revolution...: We cannot
be Marxist-Leninist without Sandinismo, and
without Marxism-Leninism, Sandinismo cannot be
revolutionary. . . . Our doctrine is' Marxism-
Leninism."' 9
Tomas Borge, the powerful Minister of the In-
terior whose responsibilities include internal security
and censorship, stated in a September 1983 interview
that he was a communist.20 According to an article
on 24 December 1984, he reconfirmed his views in
Cuba: "You cannot be a true revolutionary in Latin
America without being Marxist-Leninist."" Borge
controls the feared turbas divinas, or "divine-mobs,"
composed of Sandinista militants used by the govern-
ment to raid Catholic churches, break up political
rallies, and otherwise harass opponents of the
regime. The turbas were used in the government's ef-
forts to intimidate potential voters for opposition
presidential candidate Arturo Cruz before the
November 1984 elections. This contributed to Mr.
Cruz's decision not to run for president.
Revealing statements of the Sandinista political
philosophy were made in May 1984 by Comandante
Bayardo Arce, who had been assigned to run the San-
dinista election campaign. Speaking in what he
thought was a private and off-the-record meeting
with one of the Marxist-Leninist parties "competing"
with the Sandinistas, Arce stated that the upcoming
elections were a "nuisance" and should be used "to
demonstrate that ... the Nicaraguan people are for
Marxism-Leninism." He further stated that "if we did
not have the war situation imposed upon us by the
Portrait of Marx and Lenin held high at a Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) rally marking
the first anniversary of the revolution against Somoza, 19 July 1980.
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2k
Arturo Cruz after government-controlled divine mobs (turbas clivinas) attacked his vehicle in September
1984. Mr. Cruz is now a leader of the democratic opposition to the Sandinista government. He was a mem-
ber of the ruling Sandinista Junta and Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States. He resigned to pro-
test the increasingly totalitarian control of the Sandinista party over Nicaraguan society.
United States, the electoral problem would be totally
out of place in terms of its usefulness." He concluded
his lengthy remarks by stating that the election process
could have "positive benefits: the unity of the
Marxist-Leninists of Nicaragua."22 This speech was
not reported in the Nicaraguan press.
In the view of many former supporters of the
Sandinistas, the Managua regime has demeaned the
name of their patron, Cesar Augusto Sandino. This
fervent nationalist of the 1920s and 1930s was opposed
to all forms of foreign intervention, by international
communism as well as the United States. The Salvado-
ran guerrilla leader Augustin Farabundo Marti, com-
menting on Sandino, said: "(Sandino) did not wish
to embrace the Communist program which I support-
ed. His banner was only for independence, a banner
of emancipation, and he did not pursue the ends of
social rebellion. 1123
Today in Nicaragua, the banner of Sandinismo
is giving way to the reality of communism. Since
1979, the Sandinistas have consolidated control over
the government and the armed forces. They have
placed under direct state control nearly half of
Nicaragua's industry and 40% of its agriculture. By
the selective application of monetary and labor laws,
they exert pressure against the remainder of the indus-
trial and agricultural sectors. The Sandinistas control
all media outlets through censorship. La Prensa the
only major opposition newspaper, is censored every-
day and its writers and editors harassed. Neighborhood
watch committees, informant networks, rationing of
many basic necessities, and enforced participation in
Sandinista organizations are all used to control and
intimidate the people.
The Sandinistas' economic mismanagement,
human rights violations, and abuse of governmental
authority have driven more than 120,000 Nicaraguans
into exile (some estimates range far higher). An even
greater reflection of popular discontent has been the
number of Nicaraguan citizens who have taken up
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Daniel Ortega, with raised fist, is sworn in as President of Nicaragua as Fidel Castro looks on--10 January
1985. Castro was the only foreign head of state to attend the inauguration of Ortega.
arms against the Sandinistas. The armed opposition,
which began in 1982, has now grown to a strength of
some 15,000, most of whom were sympathetic to the
ideals of the 1979 revolution. It is interesting to com-
pare this strength with that of the Sandinistas in their
long struggle against Somoza. As of late 1978, the San-
dinista guerrillas numbered fewer than 1,000.24 By the
July 1979 victory, they had no more than 5,000 in their
ranks.25
The Sandinista Military Machine:
Central America's Largest Armed
Forces
The comandantes realized from the outset that they
would need a large, politicized military to pursue
their revolutionary objectives and maintain
themselves in power once the bloom of the revolution
had worn off and their true political orientation was
exposed. In their five years in power, the Sandinistas
have followed Cuba's example in developing a
massive military establishment. Nicaragua today has
the largest, most powerful armed forces in the history
of Central America.
On 5 October 1979 the Sandinistas distributed to
their followers the results of a three-day meeting held
the previous month for the Sandinista political cadre.
In discussing the security situation, the document
stated that "at present there is no clear indication that
an armed counter-revolution by Somocista forces
beyond our borders is going to take place and jeopar-
dize our stability."26 Nevertheless, they began to
build a large and well-equipped military. In February
1981, the Sandinistas announced that they would
build a 200,000-man militia to "defend the revolu-
tion" against "counter-revolutionaries." But, as the
20 February 1981 New York Times article reporting
this announcement pointed out, there was "surpris-
ingly little counter-revolutionary activity" faced by
the Sandinista government at that time.27
A unit of the Sandinista army passes in review, Sep-
tember 1984. The militarization of Nicaraguan so-
ciety has led to the building of armed forces nearly
half the size of those of Mexico, a country with more
than 25 times the population of Nicaragua.
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The lightly armed Sandinista guerrilla force of
about 5,000 in 1979 has now grown to a 62,000-man
active duty force, with an additional 57,000 in the
reserves and the militia. In late 1983, the Sandinistas
instituted the first draft in Nicaragua's history. This
action has caused strong popular resentment, with
thousands of young Nicaraguans fleeing their
homeland to avoid the draft. In rural areas of
Nicaragua, there has been open, active resistance by
the people against conscription."
In their struggle against Somoza, the FSLN
guerrillas had no tanks or other armored vehicles, no
artillery, no helicopters. After their victory in July
1979, they inherited from the Somoza National
Guard three tanks, 25 armored cars, seven
helicopters, and three artillery pieces. They now have
at least 340 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 70
long-range howitzers and rocket launchers, and 30
helicopters, including a half dozen of the world's
fastest, best armed attack helicopter, the Mi-24/HIND
D. This is the principal attack helicopter of the Soviet
army and holds the world helicopter speed record. Its
heavy underside armor makes it less vulnerable to
of Managua. Shown here are four Soviet-made Mi-241HIND D and one Mi-81HIP helicopters.
small arms fire. It has a heavy machine gun, can fire
anti-tank missiles, and can drop bombs. The HIND
D adds a new dimension to warfare in Central Ameri-
ca since areas of Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa
Rica would be within range of these flying "tanks"
as they are described in Jane's All the World's Air-
craft. 29
The first Soviet-made armor arrived in
Nicaragua in 1981, shortly after the 200,000-man
militia build-up was announced, but still about a year
before significant anti-Sandinista armed opposition
had developed. The mainstay of this armored force is
some 110 Soviet-made T-55 medium tanks. The T-55
was the main battle tank of the Soviet army for years.
Although now of limited value on a European bat-
tlefield against modern anti-tank weapons, it is a
powerful weapon in Central America. None of
Nicaragua's neighbors have tanks with the T-55's fire-
power. Moreover, the Sandinistas have received in the
past year nearly 30 PT-76 light tanks. With their river-
crossing capability, these amphibious tanks provide
more flexibility than the T-55s. An added potential
capability of tanks is to inhibit popular dissent.
I t I
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Corinto, located on the Pacific coast, has been a principal port through which Soviet-bloc military equip-
ment has been delivered to Nicaragua. Soviet-bloc countries use merchant ships for both military and
commerical deliveries.
I The Soviets have considered the Central
American terrain in tailoring the Sandinista armed
forces. They have provided about 40 flatbed trucks,
which are designed to carry the T-55 tank. The San-
dinistas have also been provided with six large fer-
ries! which will enable the tanks to be shuttled across
rivers to fighting zones, a significant capability given
the (fact that long stretches of the borders with Hon-
duras and Costa Rica are rivers. The PT-76s, of
course, can cross rivers and be used to secure a beach-
head while the T-55s are shuttled across.
I The Sandininistas have also been provided with
more than 1,000 field kitchens, a number of mobile
maintenance workshops, and about 75 gasoline
tankers, all requirements for an offensive-minded
army. On balance, however, logistics support con-
tinues to be a problem for the Sandinistas, but one they
arel orking to correct.
Honduras shares a 570-mile border with
Nicaragua. Should the Sandinistas decide to launch
offensive operations against Honduras, the most ob-
vious avenue of approach would be through the area
knojwn as the Choluteca Gap, in the northwest
coastal plain of the Honduran/Nicaraguan border.
They Sandinistas have conducted training with tanks,
armored personnel carriers, and long-range artillery
in areas close to the Choluteca Gap. This narrow
routing could prove difficult for the Sandinista tanks
if the Honduran Air Force retains the air superiority
it currently enjoys. But, if this Honduran deterrent
capability is sufficiently neutralized by a strength-
ened Sandinista air force and an effective air defense
system, then the disadvantage of a restricted route in-
to Honduras would be appreciably reduced.
The regime in Nicaragua poses both a real and a
psychological threat to the countriesI of Central
America. This fact is readily perceived bay the citizens
of Nicaragua's neighboring countries asiwas revealed
in a public opinion poll conducted by Gallup Interna-
tional in 1983. This poll showed that Nicaragua's
growing military strength and support for subversive
movements in other countries was a source of con-
cern throughout the region. In Honduras, for exam-
ple, about 80% of the respondents saw Nicaragua as
the principal cause of instability and as the primary
military threat faced by their country.30
Panama played a key role in providing military
support to the Sandinistas in 1978 and 1979. After
the Sandinistas came to power, however, they re-
jected Panama's advice and offers of assistance.
Recently, General Manuel Noriega, Commander of
Panama's Defense Force, told the editors of Costa
Rica's principal newspaper, La Nacion,;that the San-
dinista arms escalation posed a danger to the entire
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SOVIET-BLOC MILITAII
T-55 tank at Eduardo Contreras Military Training
Center, Nicaragua. This Is one of approximately 110
Soviet-made T-55 tanks in the Sandinista armor in-
ventory. In contrast, the Somoza National Guard
had three U.S.=made tanks.
region. In the article reporting Noriega's view, La
Nation's editors, reflecting widespread preoccupa-
tion in that most democratic of Latin American
countries about the militarization of Nicaragua,
wrote that "Sandinista militarism has to be halted
before it produces a holocaust in the entire Carib-
bean region."31
The Honduran army is striving to modernize
and professionalize, but it lags behind the rapid ex-
pansion of the Sandinista army. Costa Rica has no
army. The Salvadoran armed forces are fully oc-
cupied with combating Sandinista-supported in-
surgents. Clearly, Nicaragua's military power
threatens-and is not threatened by-its neighbors.
To increaseeits!mobility,`the Sandini`sta=ariny,has
been provided almost 30 PT-76 light amphibious
tanks by the Soviet b,loc.
The Sandinistas have acquired Soviet-bloc river
crossing equipment. The heavy amphibious ferry,
shown here, can carry the T-55 tank.
Cubans in Nicaragua
Fidel Castro clandestinely provided weapons and
other aid to the Sandinistas during their struggle
against Somoza. The first military advisers to the
new government were Cuban, arriving on 19 July
1979, the day the Sandinistas took over.
This was the beginning of the Sandinista military
alliance with the Soviet bloc. Between 30 to 40 Soviets
and over 60 East Germans have followed the Cubans
as advisers to the Sandinsta military. Members of the
armed forces of Libya and members of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), which has collaborat-
ed with the Sandinistas since at least 1970, are also
playing a minor role in the development of the San-
dinista armed forces.
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ZUIPMENT PROVIDED TO NICARAGUA.
This BTR-60 armored personnel carrier is among the
some 340 armored vehicles and tanks in the San-
dinista arsenal.
The 152mm howitzer can hit targets 17 kilometers
away. The Sandinistas have more than 70 long-
range artillery pieces and multiple rocket launch-
ers. Somoza's National Guard had three artillery
pieces.
While logistics remain a problem for the Sandinis-
ta armed forces, the acquisition of 75 fuel tankers
will better enable them to sustain operations.
METRIC
TONS
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IMAGE OF NICARAGUA
PERCENT IN EACH COUNTRY DESCRIBING NICARAGUA IN THESE TERMS
COSTA RICA 20
^ HONDURAS 10
EL SALVADOR 0
^ GUATEMALA
IS MILITARY
THREAT
DESTABILIZES
OUR GOVERNMENT
This Gallup International public opinion poll was conducted in major urban areas of the four countries
shown.
ACTIVE 'DUTY ARMED FORCES
INTERFERES TOO MUCH
IN C. AMERICA
1977 1984
? NICARAGUA ? HONDURAS ? GUATEMALA ? EL SALVADOR
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Although there have been upwards of 9,000
Cubans in Nicaragua, recent reports indicate that
about 1,500 teachers have returned to Cuba. Out of
the approximate 7,500 Cubans now present in
Nicaragua, some 3,000 are military or security person-
nel attached to the armed forces, internal security, and
intelligence organizations. These military security ad-
visers have made possible the rapid development of
Nicaragua's military and security machine. The other
Cubans are involved in construction, teaching, medi-
cine,J and similar programs. The bulk of these civilians
are younger men who have received some military
train I
The disproportionate presence of Cuban military
and security personnel is resented by many
Nicaraguans and is often cited by refugees fleeing
Nicaragua as a factor contributing to their decision to
leave, their homeland.
Nicaragua - Growing Soviet
Investment
Several huge construction projects backed by the
Soviet bloc represent the investment of hundreds of
millions of dollars, including $70 million for nearly
40 new military facilities. In addition, Bulgaria,. East
Germany, and Cuba are building critical infrastruc-
ture facilities which will have important military uses.
The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete air-
field, when completed, will be the longest military
runway in Central America. As the base took on the
unmistakable signs of a military air base, such as pro-
tective earthen mounds (or revetments) for fighter air-
craft, the Sandinista Air Force Commander admitted
that it would be a military air base.32
When Punta Huete becomes operational, it will
be able to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-
bloc inventory. The potential threat to Nicaragua's
neighbors would then increase dramatically. The re-
cent acquisition of Mi-24/HIND D attack helicopters,
along with the existing inventory of Mi-8 troop-
carrying helicopters, provides the Sandinistas with a
powerful helicopter force. The Sandinista! regime has
declared repeatedly its intention to acquire combat air-
craft, and Punta Huete would be a logical base from
which such aircraft could operate. Nicaraguan jet pi-
lots and mechanics have been trained in Eastern
Europe and are reportedly now flying in Cuba. San-
dinista acquisition of such jet aircraft would further
destabilize the regional military balance; the United
When Punta Huete is completed, it will be able to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-bloc inventory,
to include the long-range BEAR-D reconnaissance aircraft.
27
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The fall 1984 delivery by the Soviets of their top-of-the-line attack helicopter, the Mi-24/HIND D, has con-
siderably strengthened the striking capability of the Sandinista air force. This flying "tank" has devastating
firepower and is being used by the Soviets in Afghanistan against civilian and military targets.
States has consistently made clear in diplomatic chan-
nels its concern about such weaponry.
The Soviets could decide in the future that it is to
their advantage to fly long-range reconnaissance air-
craft from Punta Huete along the West Coast of the
United States, just as they currently operate such
flights along the East Coast of the United States by
flying out of Cuba.
The decisions of the Soviet Union and Cuba to
make this investment in Nicaragua indicate that
Soviet leaders consider Nicaragua an important com-
plement to Cuba in the Soviet strategy to increase
pressure on the United States in the Caribbean Basin.
The first of the Soviet-made armed Mi-8 troop-carrying helicopters arrived in Nicaragua in 1981, well
before the Sandinistas faced significant armed opposition.
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NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA, PICTURED BELOW ON JUNE 1984 VISIT TO THE SOVIET
UNION, BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY, AND POLAND.
Daniel Ortega with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko and Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko in Moscow. Ortega's first trip to Moscow took place in April 1980, only nine months after
the Sandinistas came to power, and at a time when the United States was providing Nicaragua with ex-
tensive economic aid. One month earlier, a number of agreements were reached between the USSR and
Nicaragua, cementing the close relationship that continues today.
Daniel Ortega with East German Communist Party
General Secretary and Chief of State, Erich
Honecker. East Germany has provided military
equipment, as well as internal security and military
advisers to the Sandinista regime.
Daniel Ortega pictured with Wojciech IJaruzelski,
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party
and Chairman of the Counsel of National Defense.
Daniel Ortega with Bulgarian Communist Party
General Secretary and Chief of State, Todor Zhiv-
kov (on far right). Bulgaria has trained Nicaraguan
jet pilots and mechanics, and has also provided the
Sandinistas with large quantities of military
equipment.
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Salvadoran citizens line up to vote during presidential elections on 25 March 1984. Hundreds of
international observers attested to the legitimacy of the elections, another step in the democratic process
taking place in El Salvador.
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EL SALVADOR:
A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
For more than five years, El Salvador has been a
target of Cuban and Nicaraguan violence, with the
support of the Soviet Union. With a population den-
sity greater than India, a feudal land tenure system,
and a violent history, in 1979 El Salvador seemed a
logical place for communist exploitation. An in-
digenous guerrilla force, which developed in the
mid-1970s in reaction to government-sponsored
political abuses, began receiving extensive support
from Nicaragua soon after the Sandinistas came to
power in July 1979.
Having seen the Somoza regime in neighboring
Nicaragua resist social change and subsequently col-
lapse in the face of a popular uprising, reform-
minded Salvadoran military officers overthrew the
authoritarian government of General Carlos Romero
in October 1979. Romero was replaced by a civilian-
military junta that pledged social and economic
reforms and democratic elections. The successive
governments of El Salvador have worked to follow
through on these pledges and El Salvador has begun
to build a democracy for the first time."
Since 1982, the people of El Salvador have
shown their support for the democratic process by
going to the polls three times in the face of threats
and harassment by the guerrillas. In March 1982,
they selected a constituent assembly in an election
considered fair and free by the many distinguished
observers and journalists from Western democracies
that monitored the process. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a
reform-minded Christian Democrat previously jailed
and sent into exile by the military, was elected presi-
dent in the spring of 1984.
The guerrillas had initially attempted to en-
courage the people of El Salvador to boycott the 1982
election. When it became apparent that this tactic
would not succeed, they resorted to violence, burning
buses, and otherwise trying to intimidate the people
to prevent them from voting. The response of the
people was dramatic; more than 80010 of those eligi-
ble to vote did so. They repeated their strong support
for democracy in the 1984 presidential elections.
Again impartial international observers and jour-
nalists saw these elections as a true expression of the
popular will, and a repudiation of the guerrillas.
Commenting on the electoral process, the official
publication of the Archdiocese of San Salvador said:
.. one can say with absolute certainty that
three elections in a two-year period have
consituted to a true plebiscite in which the
people have expressed their will, their faith
in democracy, their desire for peace, their
rejection of violence, and their intrinsic
condemnation of the guerrillas.34
Among numerous economic reforms, the most
sweeping has been agrarian reform. Although ex-
tremists at both ends of the political spectrum
resisted these changes, more than 25% of the rural
population now either own their land outright or par-
ticipate as co-owners of agricultural cooperatives.
These people have a personal stake in seeing a
democratic system flourish in their country.
El Salvador is, in fact, moving toward the goal
of establishing a government that is accountable to
its citizens. This is being carried out behind the shield
of the much improved armed forces, whose initiative
on the battlefield, combined with President Duarte's
popular mandate, moved the guerrillas to accept Presi-
dent Duarte's call to participate in a dialogue with the
government. It began on 15 October 1984, in the town
of La Palma.
The Guerrillas
Lacking broad popular support, the guerrillas con-
tinue to be a potent military force because of the ex-
tensive support they receive from Nicaragua, Cuba,
other communist countries such as Vietnam, and
radical regimes such as Libya. The unification of the
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1970
V4ML 1980
The Salvadoran guerrillas are open about their Marxist-Leninist leanings, as shown by the flag in this
poster. The poster proclaims "Revolution or Death! The Armed People Will Triumphl"
Salvadoran guerrillas was coordinated by Fidel tional Liberation Front (FMLN), in which five previ-
Castro. Shortly after General Romero was over- ously separate guerrilla military factions banded
thrown, Castro brought Salvadoran guerrilla leaders together. Along with the FMLN, the Democratic
to Havana, promising them increased support if they Revolutionary Front (FDR), a parallel political arm,
would forget past rivalries and forge a united front. was established.
This led to the creation of the Farabundo Marti Na-
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The Puente de Oro bridge, or Golden bridge, was
destroyed by Nicaraguan-trained Salvadoran guerr-
illas on 15 October 1981. Through such economic
sabotage, the guerrillas; hope to undermine the peo-
ple's confidence in the government's ability to pro-
tect them.
The newly united guerrillas attempted a
Nicaraaguan-style "final offensive" in January 1981.
Their defeat by the Salvadoran army was made possi-
ble by the Salvadoran people's refusal to respond to
the guerrillas!' call to rise up. against the government.
After this defeat, the guerrillas shifted their tactics to
destroying the economic infrastructure of the coun-
try. They later openly acknowledged this decision in
an April 1983 guerrilla radio broadcast when they
declared: "Our forces will start sabotage against the
dictatorship's war' economy during the next days."35
This sabotage has included the destruction) of bridges
and electrical towers, as well as the cash crops so vital
to the Salvadoran economy. The government's bud-
get has been severely strained to repair the damage
caused by this systematic sabotage. The armed forces
have been stretched thin to defend vital facilities and
areas of agricultural productivity.
Through mid-1984, the war was a military
stalemate. But the Salvadoran. army now has the ini-
tiative.This has been made possible by the expanded
training and additional mobility permitted by in-
z I;
creased U.S. military assistance.
The Logistics Network
The guerrillas depend on an elaborate- logistics
pipeline to support their military operations. The ma-
jority of the U.S.-made M-16 rifles captured! from
the guerrillas by the Salvadoran military have been
traced, by individual serial numbers, to shipments
made by the United States to South Vietnam, and
GUERRILLA IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY OF EL SALVADOR
1980-1984
$1.OB
1000 $927.OM
900
800
{
MILLIONS 700
OF
DOLLARS 600
500
400
300
200
100
{
o
GUERRILLA COST U.S. ASSISTANCE
TO THE ECONOMY TO THE ECONOMY
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Salvadoran guerrilla holds Soviet-designed RPG-2
rocket launcher.
subsequently captured by communist forces after the
1975 fall of Saigon. But guerrilla propaganda efforts
seek to create the impression that virtually all of their
weapons are taken from government troops. In fact,
only a small portion have been captured from
Salvadoran forces. Alejandro Montenegro, a former
high ranking guerrilla leader, has stated that it was
guerrilla policy, directed from Managua, to mislead
international media on the true source of guerrilla
arms.36
Soviet-bloc countries have played a key role in
sending weapons to Cuba and Nicaragua, which in
turn have moved them into El Salvador through a
complex land, sea, and air infiltration network.
The principal land route for supplying the guerr-
illas originates in Nicaragua and passes through
Honduras into El Salvador. A road and trail network
has been developed, with the actual flow of ammuni-
tion, supplies, and weapons varying to meet the tac-
tical requirements of the guerrillas.
Seaborne delivery of arms and supplies is carried
out largely by ocean-going canoes powered by out-
board engines. These canoes are difficult to detect on
radar because of their low profile and wooden con-
struction. Leaving Nicaragua after sundown, the ca-
noes make their drop at predetermined points along
the southeast coast of El Salvador and return to
Nicaragua by dawn.
Aerial deliveries are also employed by the guerr-
illas. Light planes fly at low altitudes across the Gulf
of Fonseca from Nicaragua, landing at isolated
airstrips and unloading their cargo of arms and am-
munition. Air drops are also used.
Within El Salvador, pack animals, and vehicles
with compartments designed to conceal their con-
tents, are used to move supplies to more than 200
The Salvadoran guerrillas receive the bulk of their
arms, ammunition, and supplies from Nicaragua.
Shown here are the principal land and sea routes
for this infiltration.
ARMS INFILTRATION
-0- OVERLAND INFILTRATION
CORRIDOR
4- SEABORNE INFILTRATION POINT
TRADITIONAL GUERRILLA BASE
AREA
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camps, which are linked by an elaborate series of cor-
ridors. Within these corridors, guerrillas select multi-
ple routes and patrol them frequently to assure their
security.
Government forces are having some success
slowing the arms infiltration, but geography favors
the insurgents: a 200-mile coastline, 6,000 miles of
roads, 150 airstrips, and a mountainous, ill-defined
northern border.
Disinformation and Propaganda
Another aspect of the FMLN's "total war" effort is
the utilization of classic Soviet disinformation,
propaganda, and deception techniques. The guerr-
illas' goal in applying such measures is to gain sym-
pathy' for their cause. At the same time they wish to
sway international and United States public opinion
against the Salvadoran government and U.S.
economic and military assistance. The political
leaders of the guerrilla movement realize the impor-
tance of the media in shaping political attitudes in the
United States. In February 1982, one of the FDR's
political leaders, Hector Oqueli, told the New York
Times: "We have to win the war in the United
States 1 17
The guerrillas back up their disinformation
operations with constant propaganda, flowing from
their sown radio stations (Radio Venceremos and
Radio Farabundo Marti), friendly embassies, and
solidarity committees formed to provide propaganda
outlets within the United States, Latin America, and
Europe.
The Soviet Union also contributes to the guerr-
illa cause through its extensive "active measures"
program. This is a term used by the Soviet KGB for
its program of overt and covert deception operations,
including use of forged documents, front groups,
agents of influence, and clandestine broadcasting.
One example that follows the pattern of Soviet active
measures targeted on Central America is the forged
"State Department dissent paper," which surfaced in
1981. The paper purported to be the thoughts of
State 1 Department, National Security Council, and
CIA staff officers who disagreed with U.S. policy.
Actual "dissent papers," in fact, are used within the
government to allow expression of views at variance
with current policy. The paper in question warned
that further U.S. aid to El Salvador would soon
result in U.S. combat involvement. The paper also
supported U.S. recognition of the guerrillas, long an
insurgent goal. However, this "dissent paper,"
originally accepted as genuine by the news media,
was checked carefully and found to be a forgery.38
Soviet front groups have accused the United
States of conducting chemical and biological warfare
in Central America. Moscow's Radio Peace and
Progress, a well-known disinformation outlet, has
broadcast such inflammatory allegations as:
The CIA kidnaps children of Salvadoran
refugees in Honduras. . . . Some are sent
to special schools for brainwashing. Others,
because they are inept for these activities,
are sent to CIA research centers. Here they
are used as guinea pigs.39
U.S. military advisers participate in tortur-
ing Salvadoran rebels and prisoners. . . .40
Everything that is known, up to the present
time, indicates that the Yankee CIA, cor-
poration of murderers, is implicated in the
death of Torrijos.41
Broadcasting by the guerrillas follows'this Soviet
disinformation pattern. One such example occurred
in November 1984 in Suchitoto, a small town 50
kilometers northeast of San Salvador. The guerrillas
attacked the town in the early morning hours of 9
November. Their Radio Farabundo Marti an-
nounced that the Salvadoran air force had indiscrimi-
nately bombed the town to include "the church, the
hospital, the kindergarten and the central market in
Suchitoto. "62 In reality, as reported by the
Washington Post the following day, "The quaint,
whitewashed central Catholic church, the hospital
Salvadoran guerrillas surrender under the govern-
ment's amnesty program in fall 1982. The guerrill-
as enjoy far less support today than at any time in
the last five years.
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and the kindergarten, which rebel broadcasts had
said were bombed by the government, were found
undamaged. Residents of the city denied that govern-
ment forces had bombed the city during the fighting
today... ,"4a
The Future of the Guerrillas
The future does not appear bright for the guerrillas.
They now enjoy far less support from the Salvadoran
people than at any time in the last five years. It has
become increasingly obvious that they represent only
a small segment of the population.
The 1981 guerrilla decision to resort to the tactic
of destroying the economy, as a means of under-
mining the confidence of the people in the legitimate
government, has failed. The guerrillas continue to
operate as a viable military force largely because of
the support they are receiving from Nicaragua,
Cuba, and ultimately the Soviet Union.
The Salvadoran Catholic Church has been in the
forefront in the battle for social and economic
change. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, church
leaders were critical of the government's unwill-
ingness or inability to implement required changes.
By 1984, however, Salvadoran church leaders noted
that the political and economic conditions for the
people had improved significantly. San Salvador
Auxiliary Bishop Rosa Chavez argued this way in a
July 1984 sermon:
The Cuscatlan bridge, a key link of the Pan-
American highway, is shown here in a 1982 photo.
It was destroyed by the Salvadoran guerrillas on
New Year's Day, 1984. The leaders of the Salvado-
ran Catholic Church have condemned the guerr-
illas for such economic destruction, stating, "It is the
people who ultimately pay the price."
This, then, is the great question the guerrillas
have to ask themselves. No matter how often
they attempt to justify their actions of
sabotage with arguments that they fight
against the government, against oppression
and what they call the oligarchy, it is the peo-
ple who ultimately pay the price. It is the peo-
ple who suffer when the guerrillas down the
towers that carry the cables of electric pow-
er; it is the people who suffer when the guerr-
illas dynamite telephone installations; it is the
people who suffer when the guerrillas recruit
youths by force.... Therefore, I ask myself,
in whose favor are they really fighting?44
Rural school food and nutrition program. Because
of the costs of the war against the guerrillas, the
government of El Salvador has been unable to in-
crease health and education expenditures as it had
planned.
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CASTRO: SUBVERSIVE CATALYST
Acting to fulfill his own revolutionary ambitions as
well as being an agent of Soviet influence, Fidel
Castro is working closely with subversive elements
throughout Central America and the Caribbean.
Castro's goal in the 1980s remains much as it was
when he assumed power: to oppose the United States
and create Marxist-Leninist regimes that mirror his
own dictatorship. But the means to achieve this goal
have become more sophisticated, in part because of
the lessons he learned from guerrilla failures in the
region during the 1960s.
Castro has also had to adapt to the changing
popular perception of his revolution. Where once
Castro was a folk hero to most Latin Americans, to-
day he is seen as having converted Cuba into a
bankrupt and oppressive state beholden to a foreign
power.41
Although Castro's image has dulled with Central
Americans at large, he continues to be popular with
violent, radical groups throughout the region. This
support provides Castro with political and psycho-
logical capital. The governments of the (region are
PERCEPTION OF CUBA AS TOOL OF SOVIETS
100
90 86
80 78
71
PERCENT 70
60 56
50
CUBA IS:
40
TOOL OF n
SOVIETS 30
23
20
INDEPENDENT 11 11
11
10 6 7-7
0
0 NO OPINION OPINION IN OPINION IN OPINION IN OPINION
IN
COSTA RICA HONDURAS EL SALVADOR GUATEMA
LA
A 1983 Gallup International poll indicates that an overwhelming majority of Central Americans view Castro
as an instrument of the Soviet Union.
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Guerrilla weapons, posters, and flags captured by the Guatemalan armed forces. The guerrillas make
no attempt to disguise their ties to international communism.
acutely aware of Castro's ability to orchestrate events
in their countries. When the brother of President
Betancur of Colombia was kidnapped by guerrillas in
November 1983, it was largely the efforts of Castro
that eventually gained his release. It was obvious that
Castro could also have influenced the guerrillas to
keep the President's brother. This case was a vivid ex-
ample of how Castro has perfected the techniques of
political blackmail.
In addition to El Salvador, Guatemala and Hon-
duras have been targets of Castro's subversion. In
Guatemala, he has provided training and some finan-
cial support to three guerrilla factions, although he
has not succeeded in unifying them to the extent he
did in El Salvador.
Honduran territory is used principally as a con-
duit of support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, but
Honduras has also been a target of Cuban destabliza-
tion. In June 1983, although Honduras did not have
an active insurgency, about 100 Hondurans trained in
Cuba infiltrated into eastern Honduras from
Nicaragua. The would-be guerrillas were totally defeat-
ed, in great measure because of the Honduran peo-
ple's support of the government forces. A year later
another group of Cuban-trained guerrillas entered
Honduras and many of them met the same fate.
A disturbing aspect of the current Castro offen-
sive is the apparent use of money generated by nar-
cotics to supply arms for guerrillas. Several high-
ranking Cuban officials have provided protection for
planes and small ships carrying drugs. The drugs
move northward from Colombia to the United
States, at times via Cuba and on at least one occasion
via Nicaragua. In 1981, the Colombian government
discovered that the Cubans had been using a nar-
cotics ring to smuggle both arms and funds to Col-
ombian M-19 guerrillas. When the Colombian armed
forces and National Police entered the town of
Calamar in February 1984, they discovered that the
guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
had campesinos cultivating hundreds of hectares of
coca plants.
Recent United States Congressional hearings
have established the linkage of Cuba, narcotics, and
guerrillas.46 U.S. arrest warrants have been issued
for one Nicaraguan and several Cuban officials in-
volved in drug trafficking from Colombia. Reacting
to an all-out anti-drug campaign by the Colombian
government, the Colombian drug criminals have
murdered Colombian government officials, bombed
the U.S. embassy, and issued death threats against
U.S. diplomats and their families, Colombian Presi-
dent Betancur and his cabinet, and members of the
Colombian supreme court.
The emerging alliance between drug smugglers
and arms dealers in support of terrorists and guerr-
illas is a troublesome new threat to the Western
Hemisphere.
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Federico Vaughn (front, left, with mustache), described as the "right-hand man" of Nicaraguan Interior
Minister Tomas Borge, loading cocaine on a U.S.-bound plane at Los Brasiles military airfield in Nicaragua.
A Nicaraguan soldier can be seen in the background. This cocaine, seized by U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
officials after the plane landed in the United States, was part of the evidence used to indict Vaughn on
13 counts of narcotics trafficking. This photo was released during U.S. Congressional Hearings in August
1984.
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Soviet and Cuban subversion seeks to worsen the serious political, economic, and social tensions that plague
the region. The United States is responding to this challenge by supporting efforts to develop democratic
institutions, increase political dialogue, address the economic deterioration, and provide the capability
for the countries to defend themselves. U.S. economic assistance to the countries of Central America is
more than three times that of military assistance.
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THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE
The countries of Central America and the Caribbean,
struggling to defend or develop pluralistic political
systems, are confronted with Soviet-backed guerrilla
movements attempting to seize power. The Soviet
Union's interest in Central America and the Carib-
bean was indicated in a 10 March 1983 "Memoran-
dum of Conversation" between Grenadian Army
Chief of Staff Einstein Louison and the Soviet Army
Chief of General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov.
The Soviet military leader was quoted as saying,
"Over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin
America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a
serious battle is going on in El Salvador .1141
Ideology plays an important role in Soviet
motivations, as the creation of additional communist
states validates the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and
bolsters the Soviet Union itself. Most importantly,
Kremlin leaders hope that ultimately the United
States could become so preoccupied with turmoil in
the Central American and Caribbean region that it
would be less able militarily and politically to oppose
Soviet goals in other key areas of the world.
The Soviets are using Cuba and Nicaragua to ex-
ploit the instability and poverty in the area. There is a
high degree of congruence in Soviet, Cuban, and
Nicaraguan foreign policy goals. These three coun-
tries are working in concert to train and support
guerrilla organizations in countries throughout the
area. Should these guerrillas succeed in coming to
power, they undoubtedly will establish regimes
similar to those of their patrons-one-party com-
munist dictatorships maintained in power by military
force and political and psychological intimidation.
The consequences of a Soviet-aligned Central
America would be severe and immediate. The United
States would be faced with:
? Additional platforms for regional subversion
and Communist expansion, north to Mexico
and south toward Panama, and a perception
of U.S. ineptitude and powerlessness in the
face of Soviet pressures even close to home.
? Far more complicated defense planning to
keep open the sea lanes through which pass
almost half of U.S. trade, more than half of
U.S. imported petroleum, and almost two-
thirds of the resupply and reinforcements need-
ed by NATO in time of war.
? Expanded centers for terrorist operations
against the United States and its neighboring
countries.
The human costs of communism should not be
forgotten. History shows that the establishment of a
communist regime brings with it severe and perma-
nent suppression of basic human rights; the outpour-
ing of refugees as exemplified in Eastern Europe,
Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia; militari-
zation of the affected society; and economic deterio-
ration.
The countries of Central America and the Carib-
bean are at a critical juncture. But this can be the im-
petus for the United States to devote the attention
and resources necessary to assist the countries of the
region. As the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America stated:
Our task now, as a nation, is to transform
the crisis in Central America into an oppor-
tunity.48
A cornerstone of United States policy is the
belief that the best means to assure the failure of
communist expansionism is the development of
democratic institutions, leading to governments that
are accountable to the people and not imposed on
them by either left or right extremes. The basic social
and economic inequities which breed frustration and
its offspring-insurgent movements-must be ad-
dressed if this policy is to succeed.
U.S. aid is designed to improve the quality of
life of the people of Central America. In the last four
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years, 78% of U.S. aid to Central America has been
economic. But the 22% devoted to military assistance
is essential if these sovereign nations are to have the
capability to defend themselves against the onslaught
of Soviet/Cuban-backed guerrillas.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Central
America Democracy, Peace and Development In-
itiative, and U.S. security assistance programs will
help to check Soviet and Cuban aggression in this
region. But this is only the beginning. The long-term
goal is to lay a foundation-a truly bipartisan
policy-on which to help build a future for all the
people of the region.
If the United States and the countries of the
region can marshal the necessary will and resolve to
respond to this challenge, then, in the words of the
President's National Bipartisan Commission on Cen-
tral America:
The sponsors of violence will have done the
opposite of what they intended: they will
have roused us not only to turn back the
tide of totalitarianism but to bring a new
birth of hope and of opportunity to the peo-
ple of Central America.49
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Notes
This document, found by the U.S.-Caribbean
security forces in the October 1983 Grenada res-
cue mission, was not included in the U.S.
Department of State/Department of Defense,
9.
U.S., Department of State, Cuba's Renewed
Support for Violence in Latin America, Spe-
cial Report No. 90, December 14, 1981.
Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selec-
tion, September 1984 publication because it
could not be reproduced legibly. A microfiche
copy is available for examination in the Nation-
10.
U.S., Comptroller General, "U.S. and Soviet-
bloc Training of Latin American Students:
Considerations in Developing Future U.S. Pro-
grams," Report to the Congress, August 16,
al Archives, Washington, D.C., Document
Number DSI-83-C-004845.
1984, p. 1.
11.
U.S., Department of State, Maurice Bishop's
2.
For detailed information on Sandinista military
activities and support for guerrillas in the region
"Line of March Speech, " September 13, 1982,
Grenada Occasional Papers-No. 1, August
see U.S. Department of State/Department of
Defense, Background Paper: Nicaragua's Mili-
tary Build- Up and Support for Central Ameri-
can Subversion, July 18, 1984, and News
1984.
Briefing on Intelligence Information on Exter-
nal Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador,
'August 8, 1984.
13.
A microfiche of this document, found by the
U.S.-Caribbean security forces in the October
1983 Grenada rescue mission, is available for
examination at the National Archives,
3.
Jerry Flint, "Cuba: Russia's Wondrous
Washington, D.C., Document Number
Weapon," Forbes, March 28, 1983, p. 39.
DSI-83-C-004708.
4.
Rolando Bonachea, "United States Policy
Toward Cuba, 1959-1961," unpublished Doc-
toral Dissertation, Georgetown University,
14.
Details of this April 1979 delivery, and subse-
quent military ties with the Soviet bloc are in-
cluded in U.S. Department of State/Depart-
1974.
ment of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary
Report, December 16, 1983.
5.
Broadcast on Madrid Domestic Service, Janu-
ary 5, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), Latin America, January 9,
15.
U.S., Department of State/Department of
Defense, Grenada Documents: An overview
1984, p. Q4.
and Selection, September 1984, p. 26-6.
6.
Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1373.
16.
Ibid., For information on Bishop's request for
additional financial assistance from the Soviets,
see Bishop's "Outline of Presentation" for his
7.
Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel
Castro," Foreign Policy, Fall 1977, No. 28, p.
15 April 1983 meeting with Gromyko. (Nation-
al Archives, Washington, D.C., Document
32.
Number DSI-83-C-004708.)
8.
Hugh Thomas, The Revolution on Balance
(Washington D.C.: The Cuban American Na-
tional Foundation, 1983), p. 7.
17.
Organization of American States, Seventeenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
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eign Affairs, Resolution II, Document 40/79,
29.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1984-1985, pp.
Rev. 2, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1979.
233-234.
18.
"Sandinista Hero Now Called Traitor,"
Washington Times, April 17, 1984, p. 12A.
30.
For a more complete analysis of this poll, see
La Nacion Internacional (San Jose, Costa
Rica), November 20-24, 1983.
19.
This speech was carried in Spanish in its entirety
in La Prensa (San Pedro Sula, Honduras), Oc-
31.
"Noriega's Statement," La Nacion (San Jose,
tober 27, 1981, pp. 16-19.
Costa Rica), October 16, 1984, Editorial.
20.
Claudia Dreifus, "Playboy Interview: The San-
dinistas," Playboy, September 1983, p. 60.
32.
"Nicaragua Confirms It Is Building Military
Airport," Washington Post, August 17, 1984
p. A4.
21.
"A Sandinista Comes Clean," Newsweek, De-
cember 24, 1984, p. 13.
33.
The turbulent 1979-81 years are detailed in U.S.
Department of State, El Salvador: The Search
22.
Joaquim Ibarz, "El Comandante Bayardo Arce
For Peace, Background Study, September
afirma que se va a implantar el marxismo-
leninismo y el partido unico" ("Comandante
1981.
Bayardo Arce affirms that they are going to es-
tablish Marxism-Leninism and a single party"),
La Vanguardia (Barcelona, Spain), July 31,
34.
"On U.S. Economic-Military Assistance,"
Orientacion (weekly newspaper of the Archdi-
ocese of San Salvador, El Salvador), May 20,
1984.
1984, Editorial. The editorial described the
guerrilas as the "enemy," saw them as obstruct-
23.
Carlos Ripoll, "Sandinismo y Comunismo,"
(Miami, Fl.: Ideal, September 1, 1974), p. 17.
ing the democratic process, and said that "to
fight the enemy we must have money to gener-
ate work and arms to defend the people's
24.
"Rebels Train To Overthrow Somoza,"
Washington Post, October 15, 1978, p. Al.
rights."
35.
Broadcast on Radio Venceremos, April 5, 1983.
25.
"Nicaraguan Junta Assumes Rule in Jubilant
Managua," Washington Post, July 21, 1979,
p. Al.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS),
Latin America, April 6, 1983, p. P7.
36.
Interview with Alejandro Montenegro at U.S.
26.
This 36-page document, formally titled "Anal-
ysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista
Department of State, March 12, 1984.
Peoples' Revolution," dated October 5, 1979,
is also known as the "72-Hour Document." It
37.
"Salvadorans' U.S. Campaign: Selling of
Revolution," New York= Times, February 26,
reported in detail on an extraordinary meeting
September 21-23, 1979, of the top leadership
1982, p. A10.
of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional
38.
"Keeping Us Honest," New York Times,
(FSLN). It outlined the situation in Nicaragua
and the world as the Sandinista leaders saw it
March 27, 1981, p. A27.
and set forth their plans for consolidating the
revolution.
39.
Broadcast on Moscow's Radio Peace and
Progress, February 4, 1982. U.S. Department
of State, Foreign Affairs Note, Publication
27.
"Fearful Nicaraguans Building 200,000 Strong
Militia," New York Times, February 20, 1981,
9292, August 1982.
p. A2.
40.
Ibid., Broadcast on January 12, 1982.
28.
"Teen Draft Dodgers Flee from Fighting
Nicaragua War," Christian Science Monitor,
41.
Ibid., Broadcast on August 10, 1981.
January 5, 1985, p. 1.
42.
Broadcast on Radio Faribundo Marti, Novem-
ber 9, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/19: CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140026-6
Service (FBIS), Latin America, November 13,
1984, p. P6.
43. "Salvadoran Rebels Attack Town," Washing-
ton Post, November 10, 1984, p. Al.
44. Homily delivered by Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio
Rosa Chavez, in the Cathedral of San Salvador,
El Salvador, on July 8, 1984.
45. La Nacion Internacional (San Jose, Costa
Rica), November 20-24, 1983.
46. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, Drugs and Terrorism,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., August 8, 1984.
47. A microfiche of this document, found by the
U.S.-Caribbean security forces in the October
1983 Grenada rescue mission, is available for
examination at the National Archives,
Washington, D.C, Document Number
DSI-83-C-004844.
48. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America, prepared for the Presi-
dent. Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman. Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
January 1984, p. 127.
49. Ibid., p. 127.
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