LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM MICHAEL J. HOROWITZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G00186R001201570008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 15, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

Data
ROUTING AND TRANSN Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88000186ROO1201570008-2 ECRETARIAT
T0: (Narr. ofin symbol, roan number.
Ming Apncy/Posy ' , . -,
Initials
Date
O
DO NOT. use thu form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences,' disposals,
clearances. and similar actions
Room No.-Bldg.
EO/DDA 7DI8H Q$
Phone No. .
6011-lot .. OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Mserlbed bpyy G&A
Q'0 : 19810 - 361-529 (148)- FPMR N1 CFRi 101-11206
To # 10: For direct response please
info copy to DCI:
STAT
m
C"3
cutive Secretary
1 Feb 85
Dot.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DA
X
Em~
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
){
11
IG
_
12
Compt
)(
13
D/Pers
14
D/OLL
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
19
NIO
20
21
22
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
the-`Fede.r al Labor'Management } Re lat ionsa-Prog raia:' ??
In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 11030,
as amended, it was submitted to this office, along with the
enclosed transmittal memorandum, by the Department of the
Treasury.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. UM
February 15, 1985
Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
Enclosed is a ppose~dE >ors"deru~enttled"Excl;usionfrom
On behalf of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
I would appreciate receiving any comments you may have concerning
this proposal. If you have .any comments-or.-objections they
should :be..Th a ved,: no:,.later than Friday, March 1:119;8'5.
Comments or inquiries may be submitted by telephone to
Mr. Charles E.M. Kolb of this office (395-5600).
Michael J. Horowitz
Counsel to the Director
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88G00186R001201570008-2
 LII I I II L_L__ __ .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
Dear Mr. Horowitz:-
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220
The -pu r4o:se;~ of~,;tset;
woul
that
Executive Order 12171
r
_._
Off ic'e; of- ;Intelligence rom thee..
Federal Labor ;Rejlations~ct;Tt
Act' of: 1.978 (FLRA.;): (5
12171 currently-,excludes the Office ~=of "=Ynvestigations of the
Customs-Service. The proposed amendment would add the Office
Intelligence- to the existing exclusion. This amendment is
necessitated by a recent reorganization of the enforcement,
investigating and intelligence functions within Customs that
resulted in the establishihent of the Office of Intelligence. The
reorganization does not affect the activities that justify the
existing exclusion of the Office of Investigations.
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. ? 7103(b)(1) the President may issue an
Executive order excluding an agency or subdivision thereof from
coverage under the labor relations statute if the President
concludes that the agency or subdivision "has as a primary
function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative or
national security work," and the President determines that the
labor relations statute cannot be applied to the organization in a
manner consistent with national security considerations. An
exclusion pursuant to this section, therefore, involves a two-part
determination by the President. First, an objective determination
must be made that the group in question has as a primary function
intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative or national
security work. Second,-the President must make the subjective
finding that the application of the labor relations statute to the
unit in question is inconsistent with national security
considerations. We believe that an affirmative finding supporting
the exclusion of the Office of Intelligence should be made on both
criteria.
The Office of -Intelligence, in the Office of Enforcement, is
responsible for. functional management of the intelligence system
within Customs -and directly supports 'both Headquarters' officials
and field managers. The Office provides strong functional
supervision regarding the timely tasking, collection, analysis,
and dissemination of intelligence information. The Office of
Intelligence is Customs' focal point for active, continuing
liaison with the "intelligence community' and other national
elements for intelligence matters. The office aggressively
obtains tactical intelligence, from external sources, for
dissemination to the appropriate internal operational elements.
Continuing contact is maintained with the Central Intelligence
19 FEB 1985
girl @5-1
][C1 uaeCAe VusLOmS T. V ce -5
re ?`
aa-ining,.Funit-;povisions of - the?_
VIIzof -the ci`yi1 Serv.ice.:-Reform
rh 'et `s_eg ) Executive, 3rd.e?r'-
IiTf111 ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO0186R001201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Dtug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Coast Guard, and other
intelligence organizations.
In addition, Headquarters personnel of the Office of
Intelligence represent the Department of the Treasury and Customs
in a variety of Intelligence Community co,c itt-.:s an:? other
governmental working groups. Among these are the Technology
Transfer Intelligence Committee, the Export Control Committee, and
several sub-groups and task forces sponsored by these committees,
such as the Narcotics Working Group and Law 2nf-rcement security
Panel, the Narcotics Intelligence Managers Group, anA the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.
The Regional Intelligence Branches provide direction,
guidance, and management to the Customs intellinAn^p funs-tion at
the regional and subordinate levels and are responsiole to the
Assistant Regional Commissioners (Enforcement). These branches
provide technical advice on all aspects of the Customs
intelligence systems and serve as points of coordination and
contact with the Office of Intelligence at Headquarters.
Further, the branches coordinate the aggressive collection,
reporting, analysis, and dissemination of iriteliigen within the
_
region, and are responsible for providing direct an' tir:1y
analytical support to the wide spectrum of Customs fie19
operational elements. As a result, the Customs Office of
Intelligence, both at Headquarters and in the field, has
intelligence as its primary function and therefore meets the
objective criterion of 5 U.S.C. S 7103(b)(1) for bargaining unit
exclusions.
Given the primary function of the Office o. intelligence, we
believe the President should find that the application of the
labor relations statute to this unit would be inco,-.3istent with
national security. The intelligence, investigatory and national
security functions of this entity would be. sevc' _'.v compr.omised-*by'
the application of the labor-management relations provisions of
Chapter 71. The very nature of union functions would require
union representatives to negotiate over and 'to be knowledgeable of
the duties, functions and procedures of the Office and its
personnel, including conditions of employment relating to the
tasking, collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence
information. Full and proper negotiations concer;i112 ' ,se
conditions necessarily would involve the disclosure of sensitive
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 . IL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
-3-
information and methods of operation. The result of such
disclosures would be a negative impact on the Office's national
security objectives.
For your information, we have enclosed a copy of a memorandum
(Attachment A) from the Commissioner of Customs to the Assistant
Secretary (E&O), which provides a more detailed statement of the
justification for excluding this organizational unit. That
memorandum was prepared prior to a change in the name of that
organizational unit and refers to the Office of Intelligence as
the Intelligence Division. In addition, we have enclosed a copy
of the Assistant Secretary's concurrence and approval of the
proposed amendment (Attachment B), and draft Executive Orders, in
final and comparative type formats (Attachment C).
Modification of Executive Order 12171 as requested would be
consistent with the existing exclusion of the Office of
Investigation from the bargaining unit provisions of the FLRA and,
as noted above, is necessary because of the reorganization of
intelligence functions within the Customs Service. We recommend
that the amended Executive Order be forwarded to the President.
If you have any questions, or need assistance, you may
contact Selig S. Merber, Acting Assistant General Counsel (E&O),
at 566-5404.
Sincerely,
Margery Wdirman - -
Acting General Counsel
Michael J. Horowitz, Esq.
Counsel to the Director
-Office of Management and Budget
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. -20503
-p- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 1111,1Ii r. III L U _ . _ - L1L1_ I - - _
? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
rAGENCY
EXHIBIT
A
z
iniI 1 . - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 i 11 1 1 Iih. 1 11 11..4.., I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
7.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
DATE: November 23, 1984
FILE: PER-17-03 CC:CF
PL-83-10-13
TO . John M. Walker, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
(Enforcement and Operations)
FROM Commissioner of Custom
SUBJECT: Exclusion of the Intelligence Division from the
Bargaining Unit
This memorandum proposes the issuance of an Executive Order
excluding the Intelligence Division of the United States Customs
Service (Customs) from coverage under the Federal Labor Relations
Statute, (FLRS), Title VII of. the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
5 U.S.C. 7101 et seg.
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103 (b)(1) the President,may issue an
Executive Order excluding an agency or subdivision thereof from
coverage under the labor relations statute if the President con-
cludes that the agency or subdivision "has as a primary function
intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative or national
security. work," and-the President determines that the labor
relations statute cannot be applied to the organization in a manner
consistent with national security considerations. An exclusion
pursuant to this section, therefore, involves a two-part deter-
mination by the President. First, an objective determination must
be made that the group in question has as a primary function
intelligence, counterintelligence,-investigative or national
security work. Second, the President must make the subjective
finding.that the-application of the labor-relations. statute to the
unit in question-is inconsistent with national security-
considerations. Each part of the test is examined separately
below.
1. Primary Function: Intelligence and National Security Work
Customs is an enforcement and revenue collecting agency. As
such, it is concerned with the movement of persons, vehicles,
A
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
merchandise, Grid currency across the border ir, violation of
existing statutes and regulations.
Law enforcement is the highest priority of Customs. In :?icw
of its diverse and complex responrih:lities, these law enforcevei,t
activities cover a wide range of spec{al programs and projects such
as anti-smuggling, FYOPUS, corniercial fraud, anti-terrorist.,
Oreratior. LCiIJ1)A, the Presidential Drug Enforccr.er.t Task Force
Program, Pre the rational Narcotics Border interdiction System
(NNBIS). (See Attaachn,er.ts A, B). In connection, with the fulfill-
mert cf these responsibilities, the intelligence Division, both in
the regions and at }eadquartcrs, was established primarily to
provide intelligence support and to enhance the operatiorF] 1_'Y
ri,_`crcrrc,rt efforts of Customs by pro?'idirb timely and aggressive
exchange of enferccrcnt data.
The Intell_gcr.ce Division, in the Office of Enforcer:er.t, is
rr fpcrsi! le for functional management of the intelligence system
within Customs. (See Attachment Q. It directly supports both
!:eadquarter officials and ficld managers. The Division prcviees
strong furcticral supervision regarding the timely tasking, col-
lection, analysis, aid dissemination of intelligerce information.
The In.telligerce Division is Customs' focal point for active,
ccrtinuing liaison with the "intelligence ccrrunity" and other
national elements for intelligence matters. (See Attachr.cnts D,
L). The rivision aggressively Ot+tr ;T. tactical intelligence, from
e:.ternal sources, for disser.inrti_or to the appropriate internal
operational elements. Cortiruing contact is maintained with the
Central _t,teiligence Agency (CIA) , I:at_ oral Security Agency (NSA) ,
Drug Enforcement Ac? r.;_r_iLt_ation (DEA), El Paso Intelligev.cc Center
(EPIC), Fcccrai bureau of Investigation (FE?), U. S. Coast Guard,
and other intelligcr.ce organizations. In addition, 1 cadquarters
-personnel rep:cseiit the Department of the Treasury rr.e Cr.stor.s in a
variety of lr.telligence Community ccz^mittees and cther governmental
working groups. Arc.tg these are the Technology Transfer
intelligence Committee, the Export Control Committee, and severFl
stt.-Frct,ps and task forces sponscrcd t, these ccrrittees, such as
the Narcotics Workirg Group and Law Enforcement Security the
I:arcctics intelligence Managers Group, are.. the irterde.partmental
Committee on Ir.tfrr.Ll Security.
ence Branches.pro ide direction,
l l
i
R
g
eg
ona
The
guidance, and management to the Customs intelligence function at
the regional and subordinate levels and axe responsible to- the
Assistant Regional CoLr,issioners (Enforcement). (See Attachr.:cr:t
F). ThcLe brPr_ches provide technical advice can all aspects of the
Customs intelligence. system and serve as a poirt of coordination
and contact with the Intelligence Division at FPadqucrters.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
Further, the branches coordinate the aggressive collection,
reporting, analysis, and disserinr.tion of intelligence within the
region, and are responsible for providing direct and timely aualy-
tical support to the wide spectrum of Customs field operational
elements. (Scc Attachment G). Therefore, it is clcar from this
review of the Custcros Intelligence Division, both at Headquarters
rrr:c ii, the field, that it meets the objective criteria of 5 U.S.C.
E7103(b)(1) for bargaining unit exclusion by having intelligencc at
its primary function.
The ambiguous term "national security" has beer interpreted to
include only thcse sensitive activities of the government that are
directly related to the protection and preservation of the
military, economic, and productive strength of the United States.
This includes the security of the government in domestic and
foreign affairs, L-gainst or from espionage, sabotage, subversion,
foreign ag?rct t i cr. , and any other illegal acts uhicli adversely
affect the national defense. Cole v. Young. 351 U.S. 536 (1936);
32 CFR 136.5. Lr.cly-sis of the sp tic work requirei,cnts of the
neatens cf the Intelligence Division denorct=ates the relation-
ship of the work of the Intcllcence Division to the national
security.
The intelligence research Epecielists stationed at
Headquarters all pomp :r security clearances ranging fret: a r.ir.ir-ur'
of secret to compartmentalized, a clearancc above that of top
secret. (:'ce Attachment H). When staffing for these positions is
completed in the field, all employees, including support pcrsnr.r.el,
t':'1 possess a minimum clearance of secret. The possession of a
c-ect:city clearance is essential because Intelligence Division
Intelligence Ressearch Specialists are required to work with hi #hly
sensitive intelligence information. (See httachment I). In fact,
the positic'r. cc:scription for intelligence re!esrch specialists
states as a principal duty and responsibility the collection,
cev?lcpnent, analysis and correlation of all intelligence. This
includes continuous covz uricetion with members of the "Intel l ig,ence
Community."
However, the-- duties of the Intelligence Research Specialists
involve i c e than the gathering and disbursing of information. The
position requires "detailed" ar.alysi.s to"produce a more complete
picture of suspected criv in.ni activities and to support currei:t
investigations. The position description cites domestic as well as
foreign intelligence reports as critical to the assessment of the
impact of foreign events upon Customs operations. (See Attachment
J). Further, the Intelligence Division is involved in a large
number of topical areas of national interest. However, tt;o areas
ccrve to emphasize the effect of the work of these Specialists on
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
national security. These are the areas of critical technology and
terrorism..
The Division processes intelligence regarding the sale, offer,
or movement of suspected United States origin critical techrology
or strategic equipment to, or on behalf oi, cotrtries subject to
United States trade restrictions or embargoes. Customs Directive
4310-01 lists the end-use countries of primary interest which
irc1nie the Soviet Union, Libya, Fed Iraq among others.
(ittachment A). Thus, it is incumbent upcn the Division to prevent
the illegal export of certain items (e.g., goods, eSuiprcrt,
softverc). The Directive cautions that -` ilf such items pre acquired
by the l.i.stcd countries, it would be injurious to our and our
allies' national security.
it has long been recognized that one of the most effective
measures egeir.rt transnational terrorist is the rapid cci uri-
cation of i_nfernatioii &nc: intelligence between lax: er.forceTner..t
e er_cics . The United States has been fortunate in escaping the
terrorism experienced in other countries. However, recent a cr.ts
indicate that terrorist eczivity in this country is a present
danger. The specter of terrorist violence derE.nds cr, efficient and
effective Irteiliger.ce Division. Thus, the intelligence analysts
play a crucial role in preventing terrorist atz-acks.
The Division's mission in this area is to track the persoriiii
identifying characteristics of terrorist ircli_vierals and their
metr.cds of eptrr,t_on. Further, the Division must be knowledge-
able of the extent to which the terrorist groups are controlled or
i.r.4lucr.ced by subversive sources. There are many documented cases
that involve intelligence ar.E.lysts coordinating intelligence rE-
lating to terrorist activities,. ear-pit! cases include the Libyer
&.1 1
"hit scrod," the Japanese Red Arm' Faction., and Eaader-heinhoi, a
German terrorist group. !lore recently, the intelli.gerce r.rrly sts
were in corr,tni cation with military intelligence concerning
counter-terrorist documents needed in preparation for the 1SE4
Glympics. (See Attachment K).
The support staff in the Intelligence Division is also
eligible_ for . exclusion. from the - bargaining unit. - The reces.sarily
close working relztionship between- the support and the proies-
siorial staff mandates absolute confidentiality.- The support staff
is privy to all secret or confidential communications in the
Division. Thus, their work involves them in sensitive nationa..
securit}y natters. Moreover, the Presidential exclusion considers
the work of an entity as a whole, not individual employees or
sub-units. (Attachment K).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
II. Application of FLRS inconsistent with national Security
Under the FLRS the employees' exclusive representative may
bring emu rFtter =elating to any condition of employment to the
collective harg: irirg table. In fact. 17114(b)(2) nrkes it
incumbent upon both agency and union to be "represented at the
ne`ctirtions" and "to be prepared to discuss and negotiate on any
condition of en:plcyzcr_t." Further, ?7114(b)(4)(F) requires that
both parties prcvi.c'e information which is "rc.:cor.ably available and
necessLry for full and proper discussion, understanding, and
negotiation of suhjectE vitt.in the scope of collective hrrgait,-
ire." Thus, the Division's furcticnal responsibilities in the
tsal.ing,, collection, analysis, and disser (nation of intelligence
informatien are all "conditions of employment" ana subject to
collective bai-guining. Full and proper negotiations concerning
these ccrelitioris would necessarily involve the disclosure of
sensitive information ci,d Lethods of operation. The result of such
disclosures has a negative impact cr. the Division's nationel
scct_rity objectives.
Further, the er.Flcyee's representative may raise any r^F.tter
r.c: tin- to a condition of erpleyt,er.t as a grievance. 5 U.S.C.
!7]]6(e)(1). Much of the infornatici: that the Intelligence
Division proce.seS cores frog! confidential sources. Possible
disclosure of th_c type of information through P. grievance
r -ccee .re has a chilling effect cr. the relationship between the
L.,visicr. arc its intelligence sources. Not only would the
Division's rir icr. be undermined but also the duties and respon-
sibilities set forth in Executive Order 12333, and Treccrr}
')epartr!ent Order No. 260.
Spccifically, section 1.1(b) of Executive Order 12333 requires
that "all meer.s corcistent with applicable United StE.te' ac's and
this Order . . . shall be used to Develop inteliiEer:ce. . ." Thus,
thc disclosure of specific intelligence procedures during a
grievance process would adversely impact national security.
Moreover, failure to employ such procedures in an effort to cep:form.:
to a ccllective bargaining agreement, woiV d be a violation of the
Order and det.rimer.tr_l to our nission.
Section 1.1(d, of -Lxecutive Order 12333 state- ". . ell
agencies and departments should seek to ensure full and free
cxcher.ge of information in order to derive raait'um benefit from the
United States intelligence effort." Information resulting from:,
this exchrr_ge could become an issue in a bargaining unit grievance
proceeding. Disclosure of the information would be a violation of
the "Third Agency rule" upless properly coordinated and approved.
Approval vould be outside the authority of Custcros and could result
in a stalemate in the grievance procedure.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
Section 1.3(a)(5) of Executive Order 12333 requires the
"protection of intelligence sources and methods." Issues arising
during the course of a grievance procedure could jeopardize this
protection. Under the current labor agrcei:,ent, overtime is a
condition of er.ployment but management is requi ed to give the
employee the earliest notification of any overtime requirement.
However, if for reasons beyord r...:nagement's control, such as
receipt of tire-sensitive information from a sensitive source, an
employee is required to work overtime with minimal notice, the
employee could refuse or not perform satisfactorily. Any dis-
cipline for such action would be grievLblc, and during the course
of the grievance proceedings, the source of the information or the
jn_`ornation itself might be viewed as pertinent for adjudicatior cf
the hatter. Disclosure of either would have an adverse impact on
national security considerations. Failure to disclose Jr. order to
protect the cei,rce or the information would most 'Likely result in
an adverse judgment against management.
In fact, the refusal to disclose such information could lead
tc a charge of an unfair labor practice against the agency.
Section 7116(a) (5) of the FLRS rakes it an unfair labor practice
for an agency to refuse to consult or negotiate in "good faith" and
?71 6ia)(S; rrkes it an unfair labor practice ''to otherwise fail or
refuse to cc?t:F?;' i:ith any provision of this ch;:Tter." Thus, in the
eyes of the union, failure to provide full disclosure during
C;7_e-;ance proceedings may evi&ncc a lack of good faith and nor,con.-
F 11. aI.ce with the duty to process gr_ev arces under the collective
bergair.ir.g rgT enr:rt ar well as to comply with the requiiencr.ts o`
the FLRS.
Treasury Order 240 sets forth procedures relating to
interact=on with the CIA. Customs personnel assigned to intelli-
gence duties are regular y and routinely exposed to and process
information received from, the CIA. The sensitivity of such
information is frequently at the highest levels and subject to
strict controls. A bargaining unit grieve-r.ce could result in
disclosure of. the manner of processing or other procedures which
v:ould have a direct, adverse impact or., national security. Section
;166(b) of the FLRS makes the procedures khirh-management obser"es
in exercising erv granted authority a subject of collective
bargaining. 'thus, me.nagewent's right to 'hire, ascicn, direct,
layoff, and retain" would not protect the agency from disclosure of
sensitive information under these circumstances.
The foregoing are only a few examples of the miry trd varied
circumstances in which the actions of persons in the Intelligence
Division could adversely imprct national security if their
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
activities were subject to collective bargaining and reviewed under
the bargaining unit grievance procedures of the national agreement
between Customs and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).
The Division's duties and responsibilities as described in the
areas of critical technology and terrorism, and as stated in
Executive Order 12333 and Treasury Order No. 240, demonstrate the
inconsistency of the application of the FLRS with the security of
the government in domestic and foreign affairs. Thus it is
mandatory that the Division have maximum flexibility in personnel
practices and staffing. In order to effectively and lawfully
accomplish their mission, the management of this Division, like
that of the Office of Investigations, should not be encumbered by
the duties and responsibilities required by the labor relations
statute. Therefore, this office urges the approval and submission
of the attached Executive Order for the exclusion of the
Intelligence Division, in the Office of Enforcement, from the
federal labor management relations program.
Attachment
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
AGENCY
EXHIBIT
B
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 III L LI --~- -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220
AuuisTAtwIT SECRETARY
DEC?61984
MEMORANDUM TO: William von Raab
Commissioner
U.S. Customs service
FROM: John M. Walker, Jr.
Assistant Secretar
(Enforcement and erations)
SUBJECT: Exclusion of the Customs Service's office of
Intelligence from the Federal Labor-Management
Relations Program (Bargaining Units)
I have reviewed your memorandum of November 23, 1984,
concerning the captioned exclusion. I concur in the need for
and approve your request that an amendment to Executive Order
12171 be submitted to the President.
I am requesting the General Counsel'of the Treasury to
assist Customs and my office in preparing the paperwork and
taking other actions necessary to propose this amendment for
the signature of the President.
Please keep Bob McBrien and me informed of the progress
of the proposed amendment and any problems that are encountered.
cc: Ms. Denny
Messrs. Mulholland and Wallison
mrn Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO0186R001201570008-2
 111WIIl,_ -.i.Jl
1II 111 11111111 1111111 III 1I I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
1r
AGENCY
EXHIBIT
C
l
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 i i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
EXECUTIVE ORDER
EXCLUSION FROM THE FEDERAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROGRAM
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America,
including Section 7103(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code,
and in order to exempt the Office of Intelligence, United States
Customs Service, from coverage of the Federal Labor-Management
Relations Program, it is hereby ordered as follows: Executive
Order No. 12171, as amended, is further amended by amending
Subsection 1-203(g), to read as follows:
The Office of Investigations and the Office of Intelligence,
U.S. Customs Service. _
THE 14HITE HOUSE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
EXECUTIVE ORDER
EXCLUSION FROM THE FEDERAL LABDR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROGRAM
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America,
including Section 7103(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code,
and in order to exemot the Office of Intelligence, United States
Customs Service, from coverage of the Federal Labor-Management
Relations Program, it is hereby ordered as follows: Executive
Order No. 12171, as amended, is further amended by amending
Subsection 1-203(g), to read as follows:
The Office of investigations [and the office of
Intelligence], U.S. Customs Service.
THE WHITE HOUSE
7-11- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2
Iq
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP88GO01 86RO01 201570008-2