REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE OSS/DONOVAN SYMPOSIUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 19, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
ER,
Revised copy, please destroy one you have.
Joyce
22 Sep 86
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8 -
[rutin Pj
86- .545.-Ir
REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
THE OSS/DONOVAN SYMPOSIUM
FRIDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
THE MAYFLOWER HOTEL, STATE BALLROOM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Approved For Release 2011/01/11 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-1 "O2/
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
FELLOW SURVIVORS, IT'S GREAT TO GATHER THIS MORNING WITH
SO MANY OLD FRIENDS AND COMRADES WHO SHARE A PRIDE AND SATISFACTION
IN THE WORK OF OSS SOME FORTY TO FORTY-FIVE YEARS AGO. THANK
GOD WE'RE ALL HERE!
I'D FIRST LIKE TO CONGRATULATE MAX CORVO FOR CONCEIVING
THIS SYMPOSIUM ON THE HISTORY OF OSS, AND THANK HIM FOR HAVING
THE SPIRIT AND THE WILL AND PERSISTENCE TO BRING US TOGETHER
FOR THIS OCCASION. WE OWE A DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO MIM DADDARIO,
RAY CLINE AND OTHERS ON THE COMMITTEE FOR PUTTING THE PROGRM
TOGETHER. WE THANK JEFF JONES FOR HIS DILIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP
AS PRESIDENT OF VETERANS OF OSS.
MY ASSIGNMENT IS TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW. I'VE PUZZLED
A GREAT DEAL AT WHAT THAT REQUIRES. IT IS NOT EASY BECAUSE
OSS WAS SUCH A FAR-FLUNG ACTIVITY. A GREAT DEAL OF NEW
DOCUMENTATION ABOUT OSS HAS BECOME AVAILABLE. THERE IS, IN THE
HISTORICAL WORK ALREADY DONE ON OSS A WIDE RANGE OF OPINION
AND INTERPRETATION. EVEN AFTER TWO DAYS' LIVELY DEBATE, THESE
PROCEEDINGS WILL NOT PRODUCE FINAL ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF
HOW OSS CAME TO BE CREATED, WHAT IT DID IN THE WAR, AND HOW
ITS EXPERIENCE HAS INFLUENCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE SINCE THEN. IN THESE TWO DAYS, ONE OF THE MOST
USEFUL THINGS WE CAN DO IS TO IDENTIFY THE HIGH POINTS AND
THE MAIN GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OSS.
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
OSS WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY WELL-DOCUMENTED ORGANIZATION
AND THERE ARE A LOT OF PRIVATE PAPERS AROUND. IN THE PAST
YEAR, THE U.S. ARMY'S MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE AT CARLISLE,
PENNSYLVANIA, HAS OPENED UP THE PAPERS OF GENERAL DONOVAN
HIMSELF TO RESEARCHERS. WHILE THIS VALUABLE COLLECTION INCLUDES
SOME MICROFILM OF THE WARTIME DIRECTOR'S OFFICE FILES, THE PAPERS,
NATURALLY, MAINLY FOCUS ON GENERAL DONOVAN AND NOT ON OSS. THE
TRUTH IS THAT COMPREHENSIVE AND THOROUGHLY DOCUMENTED STUDIES
OF THE HISTORY OF OSS CAN'T BE DONE WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL RESEARCH
IN ITS OFFICIAL WARTIME RECORDS. UNTIL RECENTLY, HOWEVER, MOST
OF THESE RECORDS WERE STILL CLASSIFIED AND RESEARCHERS HAD NO
ACCESS TO THEM EXCEPT THROUGH THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
I'M GLAD TO BE ABLE TO REPORT, HOWEVER, THAT THESE RECORDS--
AROUND 4,000 CUBIC FEET OF THEM--HAVE NEARLY ALL NOW BEEN
DECLASSIFIED, TRANSFERRED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION, AND OPENED TO THE PUBLIC FOR RESEARCH. THE
OSS RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE OVER
MORE THAN 100 MILLION PAGES OF OSS RECORDS AVAILABLE FOR
HISTORICAL RESEARCH.
ONE OF THE GREAT RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THOSE INTERESTED
IN OSS HISTORY IS JOHN E. TAYLOR, WHO FOR MANY YEARS HAS
ASSEMBLED AND ORGANIZED THE OSS RECORDS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
HE CERTAINLY KNOWS MORE ABOUT OSS AND ITS HISTORY THAN ANYONE
ELSE IN THE WORLD AND GLADLY SHARES THIS KNOWLEDGE TO HELP
RESEARCHERS FIND WHAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR IN THIS VAST
COLLECTION.
2
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
OSS WAS VIRTUALLY WORLDWIDE, EXCEPT THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR
AND ADMIRAL NIMITZ DID NOT USE OSS IN THEIR HUGE PACIFIC THEATER.
UNDER CARL EIFLER AND RAY PEERS, A LARGE FORCE OF KACHINS WAS
ORGANIZED AND SUPPLIED TO ASSIST GENERAL STILWELL BY FIGHTING
BEHIND JAPANESE LINES IN BURMA. EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
WERE CARRIED OUT IN CHINA, SOMETIMES WITH AND SOMETIMES AGAINST
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. TOWARDS THE END OF
THE WAR, OSS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CARRIED ON WITH
MAO SE TUNG'S COMMUNIST FORCES IN CHINA AND OSS FUNCTIONED IN
INDOCHINA IN SUPPORT OF AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL
MOUNTBATTEN'S HEADQUARTERS IN INDIA AND CEYLON. OTHER ACTIVITIES
WERE CARRIED ON IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
MY OWN ACTIVITY AND KNOWLEDGE WAS CONFINED TO GENERAL
DONOVAN'S HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON AND THE WAR AGAINST THE
NAZIS IN EUROPE. THE BEST WAY I CAN PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW AS TO
HOW OSS WORKED AND THE RANGE OF ITS CAPABILITIES IS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT
COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES WERE CARRIED ON IN OTHER THEATERS --
ITALY, THE BALKANS, THE MIDDLE EAST, BURMA, CHINA AND INDOCHINA.
OSS STARTED WITH BILL DONOVAN'S VISION THAT INTELLIGENCE,
SUBVERSION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COULD BE OUR SPEARHEAD IN
THE INVASION OF EUROPE. HE CREATED A NOVEL INSTRUMENT TO SERVE
THAT PURPOSE. THE THRUST AND CUTTING EDGE WHICH INTELLIGENCE
AND DECEPTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND IRREGULAR WARFARE CAN GIVE TO A
3
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
MILITARY COMMAND AND TROOPS IN BATTLE CANNOT BE CONJURED UP
OVERNIGHT. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COVERT WAR AGAINST HITLER
WERE BUILT BY THE BRITISH WHEN THEY STOOD ALONE. ITS MAJOR
ACHIEVEMENTS--THEIR READING OF THE GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS, THE
WRITING OF GERMAN INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS FROM LONDON BY THEIR
DECEPTION PLANNERS, THE TIMELY ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST GERMAN SECRET WEAPONS AND THE EARLY
SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE FORCES IN EUROPE--WERE ALMOST ENTIRELY
BRITISH. WHILE THIS FOUNDATION WAS BEING BUILT, AMERICA HAD
LITTLE MORE THAN A VOLUNTEER ONE-MAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, PLUS A FEW BRILLIANT CRYPTOGRAPHERS HIDDEN
AWAY, WHEN HENRY STIMSON AS SECRETARY OF STATE DECLARED THAT
GENTLEMEN DON'T READ OTHER PEOPLE'S MAIL. THE ORGANIZATION
WHICH DONOVAN CREATED HAD TO BE TAUGHT AND TRAINED AND BUILT
ON THE EXPERIENCE AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE WHICH HAD BEEN
BUILT UP IN BRITAIN--AND IN FRANCE AND POLAND, BELGIUM AND
HOLLAND, SCANDINAVIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
YOU HAD ONLY TO BE AROUND OSS A FEW DAYS IN THE SUMMER
OF 1943 TO REALIZE HOW EMBATTLED AN ORGANIZATION IT WAS TWO
YEARS INTO THE WAR, EVEN AFTER ITS METTLE HAD BEEN TESTED AND
PROVEN IN THE CRUCIBLE OF THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN. BUT
TO THE ENTRENCHED WASHINGTON BUREAUCRACIES THAT CUT LITTLE
ICE. IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT DONOVAN CREATED OSS
AGAINST THE FIERCEST KIND OF OPPOSITION FROM EVERYBODY--THE
ARMY, NAVY AND STATE DEPARTMENTS, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
THE REGULAR ARMY BRASS, THE WHOLE PENTAGON BUREAUCRACY, AND,
PERHAPS MOST DEVASTATINGLY, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF.
4
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
EVERYONE IN WASHINGTON WAS TRYING TO WALK OFF WITH A
SLICE OF DONOVAN'S FRANCHISE. J. EDGAR HOOVER RESENTED A
RIVAL AND FOUGHT FOR AS MUCH INTELLIGENCE TURF AS HE COULD
GET. HE ENDED UP IN CHARGE OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
IN LATIN AMERICA, AN AREA FROM WHICH OSS WAS TOTALLY EXCLUDED.
NELSON ROCKEFELLER HACKED OUT AN EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE TO REPORT
AND ANALYZE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE THERE, AS WELL
AS CONDUCT PROPAGANDA. BYRON PRICE HEADED THE OFFICE OF
CENSORSHIP; LOWELL MILLET THE DIVISION OF INFORMATION OF THE
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. PLAYWRIGHT ROBERT SHERWOOD
EDGILY DIVIDED HIS TIME BETWEEN WRITING FDR'S SPEECHES AND
RUNNING THE FOREIGN INFORMATION SERVICE UNDER DONOVAN, WHILE
HE WAS BUCKING FOR AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION FRANCHISE.
ARCHIBALD MCLEISH HAD THE OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES. IT
SEEMED AS IF ANYONE WITH ACCESS TO ROOSEVELT COULD GET A
CHARTER FOR HIMSELF.
THAT OSS OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA DID NOT ESTABLISH THE
ORGANIZATION MORE FIRMLY AS PART OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
MUST REMAIN ONE OF THE MINOR MYSTERIES OF THE WAR. RARELY HAD
INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMACY MESHED AS SMOOTHLY AS THEY DID IN
PREPARING OPERATION "TORCH" AND HELPING IT ACHIEVE EARLY VICTORY.
NORTH AFRICA WAS OSS' FIRST TESTING GROUND. DONOVAN HAD
PINPOINTED THE AREA AS A CRITICAL ONE IN HIS REPORT TO ROOSEVELT
18 MONTHS BEFORE THE AMERICAN LANDINGS IN NOVEMBER 1942. THAT
5
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
MOST REMARKABLE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, ROBERT MURPHY, HAD
GIVEN OSS A HEADSTART IN NORTH AFRICA WHERE HE SERVED AS A
KIND OF AMERICAN PRO-COUNSUL. IN LATE 1940, MURPHY PERSUADED
FRENCH AUTHORITIES TO LET HIM BRING IN 12 OBSERVERS, OSTENSIBLY
TO ASSURE THE BRITISH THEN BLOCKADING THE AFRICAN COAST THAT
FOOD SHIPMENTS ALLOWED THROUGH DID NOT GET INTO GERMAN HANDS.
THESE OBSERVERS WERE ALSO ALLOWED TO USE SECRET CODES AND
COURIERS WITH LOCKED POUCHES. ABLE TO SEND OUT UNCENSORED
REPORTS, THEY BECAME THE NUCLEUS FOR THE FIRST OPERATING AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK OF THE WAR. AND DONOVAN WASTED LITTLE
TIME BUILDING ON THE BASE THEY PROVIDED. HE NAMED MARINE
COLONEL WILLIAM EDDY, ENGLISH PROFESSOR AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
IN CAIRO AND FLUENT IN ARABIC, AS HIS CHIEF IN NORTH AFRICA.
LARGE ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN NORTH AFRICA AND
MANY FRENCH CIVILIANS WERE PREPARED FOR RESISTANCE TO ANY
GERMAN OCCUPATION. EDDY AND HIS MEN HELPED ORGANIZE AND SUPPLY
THIS RESISTANCE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WINNING THE SUPPORT OF
NATIVE MOOR, ALGERIAN AND TUNISIAN LEADERS.
OSS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS SCHOLARS UNDER BILL LANGER AND
SHERMAN KENT DELIVERED STUDIES OF THE FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN
RAILWAYS, THE CAPACITY OF THE ROLLING STOCK, THE CONDITION OF
THE ROADBED AND TRACK, TERRAIN MAPS, CHARTS OF REEFS AND -
CHANNELS, TIDAL TABLES--ALL ASSEMBLED FROM MANUALS, ENGINEERING
JOURNALS, AND OTHER SOURCES AVAILABLE IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
6
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
TN NOVEMBER 1942, THE MONTHS OF PREPARATION PAID OFF. AS THE
SHIPS APPROACHED THEIR DESTINATIONS ALONG THE COASTS OF MOROCCO
AND ALGIERS, ALLIED ARMY, NAVY AND AIR OFFICERS WITH THE INVASION
FLEET RECEIVED, UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE OF H-HOUR AND BEYOND,
DETAILED INFORMATION ON WHAT TO EXPECT AT EVERY LANDING POINT.
THEY WERE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BY OSS REPRESENTATIVES WHO ADVISED
THEM ON THE TERRAIN, ON LOCATIONS OF FRENCH HEADQUARTERS AND
GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION OFFICES, AND ON THE OFFICIALS ON
WHOM THEY COULD RELY FOR ASSISTANCE.
SQUADS OF FRIENDLY FRENCHMEN, MOORS AND RIFFS WERE INSTRUCTED
TO CUT TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE LINES AND TO OBSTRUCT PUBLIC UTILITIES
GENERALLY. STILL OTHERS WERE TO GO JUST BEFORE H-HOUR TO DETONATE
MINES ON ROADS AND BEACHES WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO USE.
GROUPS WERE ASSIGNED TO BEACHHEADS AND LANDING AND PARACHUTE FIELDS,
WITH FLARES TO SIGNAL TROOPS IN FROM SHIPS AND GUIDE THEM INLAND.
BOB MURPHY'S DOZEN AND DONOVAN'S OSSERs HAD SUCCESSFULLY
PREPARED THE WAY AND ALMOST ENTIRELY ELIMINATED RESISTANCE TO
THE LANDING OF ONLY 110,000 AMERICAN AND BRITISH TROOPS ALONG
1,200 MILES OF ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN BEACHES. MILITARY
PLANNERS IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON HAD ESTIMATED THAT THEY
WOULD NEED 500,000 MEN, TO TAKE AND HOLD FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.
THE FOOTHOLD IN NORTH AFRICA, WHICH THE MILITARY PLANNERS HAD
ESTIMATED WOULD COST 10,000 CASUALTIES, HAD BEEN GAINED WITH
LESS THAN A COUPLE OF HUNDRED.
7
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
IN FEBRUARY 1943, DONOVAN SENT DAVID BRUCE TO LONDON TO
TAKE OVER A SMALL OSS HEADQUARTERS. IT WAS BRUCE'S TASK TO
SELL OSS TO THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN WARTIME LONDON, THOSE
BUILDING THE INVASION ARMADA AND THOSE CHARGED WITH DIRECTING
THREE WARS FROM LONDON--THE AIR WAR, THE SUBVERSIVE WAR ALREADY
UNDER WAY, AND THE LAND WAR SOON TO BE LAUNCHED OVER FRENCH
BEACHES.
WE WERE THE NEW BOYS ON THE TEAM AND THE BRITISH WERE
RELUCTANT TO RISK WHAT THEY HAD BUILT UP TO LET US SHOW OUR
STUFF AND DEVELOP OUR TALENTS IN AREAS WHERE THEY WERE ALREADY
ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL. THEY PREFERRED TO ENGAGE OSS IN NEW
PROJECTS AND TO DO THAT UNDER BRITISH TUTELAGE. MUCH TO HIS
LATER CHAGRIN, DONOVAN AGREED TO THIS.
DONOVAN SOON REGRETTED HIS COMMITMENT NOT TO SEND
AMERICAN AGENTS INTO EUROPE FROM BRITAIN WITHOUT BRITISH
APPROVAL, BUT HE COULD NOT CHANGE IT. MOREOVER, EVEN WITHOUT
SUCH AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT, THE BRITISH COULD EASILY HAVE
STOPPED ANY INDEPENDENT EFFORT WHENEVER THEY FELT IT RISKED
THEIR OWN OPERATIONS. THEY CONTROLLED THE AIR AND THE SEA
AND ALL MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF BRITAIN.
WE FINALLY GOT THE BRITISH TO AGREE TO A JOINT INTELLIGENCE
UNDERTAKING. THE SUSSEX PLAN CALLED FOR DISPATCHING 120 AGENTS
IN TEAMS OF TWO, ONE OBSERVER AND ONE RADIO OPERATOR, INTO FRANCE
8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
JUST AHEAD OF THE INVADING ARMIES. THEY WERE TO REPORT FROM
KEY POINTS IN FRANCE ON GERMAN TROOP MOVEMENTS. IT WAS
A TRIPARTITE OPERATION WITH FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN AGENTS
IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES ORGANIZED INTO 30 TEAMS FOR THE BRITISH
COMBAT ZONE IN FRANCE AND ANOTHER 30 FOR THE AMERICAN BATTLE
AREA.
IN THE SUMMER OF 1943, ALLEN DULLES SCORED THE FIRST BIG
OSS COUP IN SWITZERLAND AND WE FELT THE REPERCUSSIONS IN LONDON.
FRIT/ KOLBE, AN OFFICIAL OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE CHARGED
WITH HANDLING CABLE TRAFFIC WITH DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALL OVER THE
WORLD, HAD MADE HIS WAY TO BERNE CARRYING 16 TELEGRAMS TAKEN
OUT OF THE FILES OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN BERLIN. ULTIMATELY,
DULLES RECEIVED A HUGE AMOUNT OF THIS INFORMATION WHICH WE
CALLED "WOODS CABLES".
THEY STIRRED UP A FIERCE STORM IN LONDON. SIR CLAUDE DANSEY,
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE, HAD BEEN IN CHARGE
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FROM SWITZERLAND BEFORE THE WAR.
HE CHARGED OSS WITH FALLING FOR AN OBVIOUS PLANT. WHEN OUR
"WOODS CABLES" STOOD UP AS VALID UNDER COMPARISON WITH THE
DECODIFICATION OF CABLES INTERCEPTED BETWEEN THE GERMAN FOREIGN
OFFICE AND GERMAN EMBASSIES ABROAD, DANSEY RETREATED GRUDGINGLY
AND DULLES' "WOODS" REPORTS GAINED ACCEPTANCE AS PERHAPS THE
GREATEST ESPIONAGE COUP OF THE WAR.
9
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
IN THOSE EARLY DAYS, MOST OF OUR INTELLIGENCE CAME FROM
THE NEUTRAL CAPITALS. IN SWITZERLAND, ISTANBUL, LISBON, MADRID,
AND STOCKHOLM, FREE OF OUR BRITISH TUTORS, DONOVAN HAD CREATED
MISSIONS TO DEVELOP CONTACTS AND SOURCES AND THE FLOW OF AMERICAN
INFORMATION FROM THESE AREAS ENHANCED THE OSS POSITION IN
LONDON'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. WITH DIRECT AIR LINKS VIA
REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHTS TO BOTH BERLIN AND LONDON,
THE NEUTRAL CAPITALS--LISBON, MADRID, STOCKHOLM, BERNE AND
ISTANBUL--SERVED AS WINDOWS ON OCCUPIED EUROPE AND MEETING
PLACES FOR "OUR" AND "THEIR" PEOPLE.
GREGORY THOMAS AND FRANK SCHOONMAKER BUILT UP EXTENSIVE
INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS FROM BARCELONA AND SAN SEBASTIAN INTO
SOUTHWESTERN FRANCE. HENRY HYDE FROM ALGIERS AND ALLEN DULLES
FROM SWITZERLAND BUILT AGENT NETWORKS INTO SOUTHERN, EASTERN
AND CENTRAL FRANCE. WHEN CALVIN HOOVER, WHO RAN OSS OPERATIONS
IN STOCKHOLM, ESTABLISHED THAT BALLBEARING EXPORTS WERE MUCH
LARGER THAN THE SWEDES ADMITTED, A U.S. ECONOMIC WARFARE MISSION
WON SWEDISH AGREEMENT TO STOP THE SHIPMENTS.
IN LONDON WE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
IN EXILE, THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE RESISTANCE IN THEIR HOMELANDS,
AND WITH THE INTELLIGENCE LINKS THEY ESTABLISHED BACK HOME.
NONE WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE FRENCH. FRANCE WAS OUR
INVASION TARGET. THOUGH THE REGIME IN EXILE AND THE RESISTANCE
AT HOME WAS RIVEN WITH FACTIONS, BOTH WERE ACTIVE, STRONG AND
10
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
EAGER. BY 1944, DEGAULLE'S INTELLIGENCE, UNDER COLONEL PASSY
AND COLONEL REMY, WAS DISTRIBUTING REPORTS TO THE ENTIRE LONDON
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TWICE A DAY. THE MONTHLY OUTPUT OF THIS
INFORMATION FACTORY AVERAGED 200,000 MIMEOGRAPHED SHEETS, 60,000
COPIES OF MAPS AND SKETCHES, AND 10,000 PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS.
THE POLES IN LONDON RAN ONE OF THE MOST EFFICIENT AND
AMBITIOUS OF THE EXILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. COLONEL GANO
DEVELOPED LARGE NETWORKS BOTH IN POLAND AND IN FRANCE WHERE
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF POLES HAD FOUND REFUGE. BELGIAN
INTELLIGENCE HAD EIGHT TO TEN EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS
OPERATING IN BELGIUM AND IN THAT PART OF NORTHERN FRANCE THE
GERMANS ADMINISTERED FROM BRUSSELS. THE NORWEGIANS, THE DANES,
AND THE DUTCH WERE SIMILARLY ACTIVE.
THE FIRST OF WHAT WOULD TOTAL SOME 150 MESSAGES WHICH
PASSED AMONG BERNE, LONDON, STOCKHOLM AND WASHINGTON, CLATTERED
OVER THE AIRWAVES AT THE TURN OF 1944. IT TOLD US ABOUT A
MUSHROOMING CONSPIRACY INSIDE THE REICH WHICH DULLES CALLED
"BREAKERS.? THE CONSPIRATORS WANTED TO GET RID OF HITLER, FORM
A NEW GOVERNMENT AND BRING THE WAR TO AN END.
THE BRITISH JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND OUR JOINT
CHIEFS URGED A RESTATEMENT OF THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER
FORMULA TO ENCOURAGE GERMAN COMMANDERS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.
11
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
ROOSEVELT REJECTED THESE PROPOSALS BUT EISENHOWER KEPT PRESSING
ALL THE WAY TO THE END, ALMOST TO THE DAY OF THE INVASION. AT
THE END OF APRIL, HE HAD BEDELL SMITH FORMULATE A POLICY, WHICH
THE GERMAN GENERALS MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT, TO QUIT FIGHTING
AND IN LATE MAY HE GOT BOB SHERWOOD TO DRAFT A SPEECH REDEFINING
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED AFTER THE
LANDING, BUT APPARENTLY NEVER APPROVED.
WHEN THE ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE CAME ON JULY 20, 1944,
THE INFORMATION DULLES PROVIDED CAUSED CHURCHILL TO PUBLICLY
ENCOURAGE INTERNAL ACTION AGAINST HITLER, DULLES' CONTACTS WITH
THE GERMAN RESISTANCE RESULTED IN ROOSEVELT HAVING FOR SOME
DAYS EARLIER A PAPER FROM DONOVAN TELLING HIM THAT AN ATTEMPT
ON HITLER'S LIFE WAS IMMINENT AND URGING HIM TO DO LIKEWISE.
MEANWHILE, OSS WAS CONTRIBUTING HEAVILY TO THE INTELLECTUAL
AND STRATEGIC BASIS FOR THE AIR WAR ON GERMAN INDUSTRY. THIS
WAS DONE BY THE ENEMY OBJECTIVES UNIT DEVELOPED IN DONOVAN'S
IVORY TOWER BACK IN WASHINGTON BY ED MASON, AN ECONOMICS PROFESSOR
FROM HARVARD AND BROUGHT TO LONDON UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF CHARLIE
KINDELBERGER.
THE AMERICAN TALENT WORKING IN THIS AREA WAS PRODIGIOUS,
AS THE FUTURE CAREERS OF THOSE WHO TOOK PART WOULD TESTIFY.
KINDELBERGER'S STARS INCLUDED WALT ROSTOW, LATER TO BECOME
12
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
LYNDON JOHNSON'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; ROBERT ROOSA, A
FUTURE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR MONETARY AFFAIRS;
CHARLES HITCH, WHO WOULD BECOME PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA; CARL KAYSEN, WHO WAS TO HEAD THE INSTITUTE
FOR ADVANCED STUDIES AT PRINCETON; CHAN MORSE; EMIL DESPRES;
HAROLD BARNET; AND OTHERS I CAN'T RECALL.
- THESE OSS ECONOMISTS, APPLYING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO STRATEGIC
BOMBING, DEVELOPED CRITERIA AND DOCTRINE FOR TARGET SELECTION
AND CARRIED OUT COST BENEFIT ANALYSES ON THE RELATIVE MERITS
OF BOMBING FACTORIES THAT MADE AIRCRAFT ENGINES, ASSEMBLED
PLANES, AND PRODUCED BALL-BEARINGS.
IN THE SPRING OF 1944, THEY LOST A CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE
EISENHOWER TO SHIFT FROM THE BOMBING OF RAILROAD MARSHALING YARDS,
WHICH THEY ARGUED COULD BE QUICKLY REPAIRED, TO THE DESTRUCTION
OF SYNTHETIC OIL PLANTS WHICH THEY FELT COULD BE KEPT OUT OF
ACTION LONGER AND WHICH WOULD SLOW DOWN GERMAN AIRPOWER AND
TRUCKS MORE PERMANENTLY AND MORE VALUABLY THAN DAMAGING MARSHALING
YARDS. THEY FELT THAT ANY TRAFFIC DELAYS RESULTING FROM THE
BOMBING OF MARSHALING YARDS WOULD SLOW DOWN CIVILIAN MORE THAN
MILITARY TRANSPORT BECAUSE THE GERMAN MILITARY WOULD HAVE
PRIORITY AND GET THROUGH.
WHERE AND HOW AND WHEN SUPPLIES TO THE FRENCH RESISTANCE
WOULD BE DELIVERED WAS PLANNED JOINTLY BY OSS AND SOE, ALREADY
WORKING IN TANDEM AS SPECIAL FORCES HEADQUARTERS (SFHQ).
SPECIALLY TRAINED BRITISH AND AMERICAN CREWS FLEW MODIFIED PLANES
13
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
TO DROP WEAPONS TO THE RESISTANCE. WITH THE FRENCH RESISTANCE
LEADER IN LONDON WE STRUGGLED WITH THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE TO
GET MORE AIR DROPS FOR THE RESISTANCE AND WITH THE BRITISH WE
TRAINED AND SENT CLOSE TO 100 YOUNG AMERICANS AS AGENTS INTO FRANCE.
IN THOSE LAST WEEKS BEFORE THE LANDINGS, THE WIRELESS
REPORTS RECEIVED IN LONDON IN INCREASING PROFUSION CREATED
A GROWING SENSE OF CONTROL OVER LARGE AREAS OF FRANCE. OUR
AGENTS WOULD FIND THEMSELVES SURROUNDED BY A LARGE GROUP OF
PEOPLE AS THEY LANDED WITH FIRES BURNING, AUTOS UNHAND TO
DRIVE THEM THROUGH VILLAGES AND SMALLER TOWNS UNDER MAOUIS
CONTROL. SUPPLY DEPOTS AND HOSPITALS FOR RESISTANCE FIGHTERS
WERE FUNCTIONING. GERMAN FORCES KEPT TO THE ROUTES NATIONALES
AND THE BIG TOWNS BECAUSE THEY FOUND THE SECONDARY ROADS TOO
DANGEROUS. BY STICKING TO BACKROADS IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR OUR AGENTS
TO DRIVE LONG DISTANCES WITH IMPUNITY.
OUR PLANES WERE PARACHUTING ALMOST 100 TONS OF ARMS AND
AMMUNITION A WEEK, TEN TIMES WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING TWO MONTHS
EARLIER. THE RAF WAS DROPPING EVEN MORE. STILL MORE CAME FROM
ALGIERS. THE RADIO SETS IN CONTACT WITH LONDON OR ALGIERS HAD
BECOME THE GREAT SOURCES OF POWER IN DEALING WITH RESISTANCE
FACTIONS AND THEIR LEADERS. THE TAPPING OF THE MORSE KEY COULD,
LIKE MAGIC, BRING THEM STEN GUNS, GRENADES, BAZOOKAS AND EXPLOSIVES.
A SINGLE RADIO COULD PROVIDE A CENTER OF COMMUNICATION FOR GROUPS
OF HUNDREDS AND EVEN THOUSANDS OF RESISTANCE FIGHTERS EXTENDING
14
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
OVER HUNDREDS OF MILES OF WINDING ROADS AS THEIR LEADERS CAME
TO REQUEST ARMS AND PROPOSE OR ACCEPT MISSIONS OF DESTRUCTION,
INTERDICTION OR PRESERVATION.
AS THE INVASION DREW NEARER, RESISTANCE LEADERS OPERATING
BEHIND THE LINES AND OFFICERS COMMANDING INVADING TROOPS HAD TO
BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY IF THEIR OPERATIONS
WERE TO MESH. RADIO CONTACT ALONE COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH THIS.
WE NEEDED MEN IN ALLIED UNIFORMS TO ADVISE THE RESISTANCE ON
ALLIED NEEDS. WE NEEDED SPECIALISTS ATTACHED TO THE INVADING
ARMIES WHO UNDERSTOOD THE RESISTANCE TO ADVISE ALLIED COMMANDERS
ON WHAT FRENCH FORCES COULD DELIVER.
TEAMS OF THREE--AN AMERICAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICER
OR NON-COM--CALLED NJEDBURGHS" WERE AIR DROPPED INTO FRANCE
STARTING A DAY OR TWO BEFORE D-DAY. ALL IN ALL WE TRAINED 300
VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZED THEM INTO 93 TEAMS. VIRTUALLY ALL WERE
DISPATCHED INTO FRANCE BEHIND THE LINES. IN ADDITION, SMALL
SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENTS, MADE UP OF OSS AND SUE OFFICERS,
WERE DETAILED TO EACH ARMY AND ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS.
EQUIPPED WITH DIRECT RADIO LINKS TO OSS RADIO STATIONS IN
ENGLAND, THEY SERVED AS THE EUROPEAN RESISTANCE'S CENTRAL
NERVOUS SYSTEM IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE FORCES.
OUR COUNTERESPIONAGE OUTFIT, X-2, UNDER JIMMIE MURPHY AND
HUBERT WILL, ORGANIZED TEAMS TO JOIN THE ARMY STAFFS AND SUPPORT
THEM WITH DATA AND FILES WHICH, WHEN THEY GOT TO FRANCE, WERE
15
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
USED TO APPREHEND AND PLACE BACK TO THE GERMANS SPIES THEY HAD
LEFT BEHIND OR WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED. DONOVAN HAD TURNED TO THE
AMERICAN ETHNIC MELTING POT TO ORGANIZE OPERATIONAL GROUPS,
SOME 20 TO 40 OF FRENCH, ITALIAN, SCANDANAVIAN, AND SLAVIC
ORIGINS WHO WERE TO BE DROPPED INTO FRANCE, ITALY, NORWAY AND
YUGOSLAVIA TO COOPERATE AND SUPPORT LOCAL RESISTANCE FORCES.
SEVERAL OF THESE OPERATIONAL GROUPS WENT BEHIND THE LINES IN
FRANCE AND ITALY. TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR, BILL COLBY, HAVING
FINISHED HIS MISSION INTO FRANCE AS A JEDBURGH, TOOK AN
OPERATIONAL GROUP INTO NORTHERN NORWAY NEAR THE RUSSIAN BORDER.
ON MAY 31, WORD REACHED US AT GROSVENOR STREET THAT SHAEF
HAD TURNED THE POLICY FOR USING FRENCH RESISTANCE UPSIDE DOWN.
WE WERE TOLD THAT INSTEAD OF SIGNALING THE RESISTANCE TO RISE
UNIT BY UNIT AND JOIN THE FIGHTING ON A GRADUAL, AS-NEEDED BASIS,
ALL ACTION SIGNALS TO RESISTANCE GROUPS IN EVERY CORNER OF
FRANCE WOULD BE SENT OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.
MOST IMPORTANT, EISENHOWER WANTED TO PROTECT THE DECEPTION
CAMPAIGN THAT HAD THE GERMANS EXPECTING THE LANDINGS TO COME
FURTHER TO THE NORTH ON THE PAS DE CLAIS AND WOULD KEEP HITLER'S
BEST DIVISIONS THERE, 100 MILES FROM THE NORMANDY BEACHES, FOR
SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER THE LANDINGS.
16
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
OUR FIRST REACTION TO THE NEW ORDER WAS ONE OF GLOOM AND
FOREBODING. THIS COULD TOUCH OFF A NATIONAL UPRISING. THE
GERMANS WOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE DROWNING THE REVOLT IN A
BLOOD BATH WITH GRAVE, LONG-TERM POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. FINALLY,
AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, OUR TROOPS MOVING ACROSS FRANCE
WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE FFI. DAVID
BRUCE WENT TO ARGUE THIS OUT WITH GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH,
IKE'S CHIEF OF STAFF. TO NO AVAIL. THE DECISION WAS FIRM.
EISENHOWER WANTED ALL THE HELP HE COULD GET WHEN HE NEEDED IT
MOST, AT THE TIME OF THE LANDING.
ON JUNE 1, THE FIRST SET OF SOME 300 MESSAGES WENT OUT
OVER THE BBC ALERTING RESISTANCE LEADERS ALL OVER FRANCE THAT
THE LANDINGS WERE TO COME DURING THAT WEEK. THE ACTION MESSAGES
ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 5 TRIGGERED THE RAIL, WIRE CUTS, ROAD AND
BRIDGE DESTRUCTION WHICH HAD BEEN TARGETED ALL OVER FRANCE.
TRAINS AND CONVOYS CARRYING GERMAN TROOPS AND SUPPLIES TO THE
BRIDGEHEAD WERE DELAYED FOR DAYS AND WEEKS, TROOPS ARRIVED AT
THE FRONT ON BICYCLES AND HORSE-DRAWN CARTS, GERMAN HEADQUARTERS
WITH THEIR TELEPHONE LINES CUT HAD TO COMMUNICATE WITH RADIOS
WHICH OUR CODEBREAKERS IN ENGLAND READ WITH DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES.
IN LATE MAY, A SHAEF ASSESSMENT HAD FOUND THAT BOMBING
RAILROAD MARSHALING YARDS HAD INDEED FAILED TO IMPAIR THE
ENEMY'S ABILITY TO MOVE UP REINFORCEMENTS AND MAINTAIN HIS
FORCES IN THE WEST. THE GERMANS STILL HAD THREE TIMES THE
CAPACITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THEIR MILITARY TRAFFIC.
17
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
AFTER LOSING THE FIGHT TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ATTACKING
OIL FACILITIES, THE OSS ECONOMISTS HAD GONE ALL OUT TO REFOCUS
ALLIED BOMBINGS AWAY FROM MARSHALING YARDS TO BRIDGES, FUEL
AND AMMUNITION DUMPS, TANK AND TRUCK DEPOTS. THEY ARGUED THAT IT
COULD TAKE UP TO THREE WEEKS TO REPAIR A BRIDGE, ONLY HOURS TO
FIX A TRACK INSIDE OR NEAR A MARSHALING YARD OR RAILROAD
CENTER.
THE OSS ECONOMISTS HAD BEEN RIGHT AND THE ALLIED AIR
MARSHALLS--TEDDER, LEIGH-MALLORY, SPAATZ, ARNOLD--AUTHORIZED
THE ATTACKS ON BRIDGES SPANNING THE SEINE, OISE AND MEUSE.
SUCCESS WAS SPECTACULAR. GENERAL SPAATZ PARTICULARLY WENT
AFTER THE SYNTHETIC OIL PLANTS AS KINDELBERGER HAD URGED MONTHS
EARLIER AND THIS CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY IN SLOWING DOWN GERMAN
AIR ATTACKS, TANKS AND TRANSPORT FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
NOW AS THE FRENCH BRIDGES WERE HIT, STONE AND MASONRY
TUMBLED INTO THE DUSTY RIVERS, FORCING GERMAN SOLDIERS OFF
TRAINS TO TRUDGE DOWN A ROAD TOWARD THE FRONT LINES.
IN THE WEEK AFTER D-DAY, RESISTANCE TEAMS MADE 1,000
RAIL CUTS AND 2,000 WITHIN THREE WEEKS. AFTER JUNE 7, NOT
A SINGLE TRAIN CROSSED THE AREA OF BURGUNDY BETWEEN DIJON,
BESANCON, CHALON AND LOUS LE SAUNIER, THROUGH WHICH RAN ALL
THE MAIN AND SECONDARY LINES BETWEEN THE RHONE VALLEY AND
THE RHINE.
18
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
THE GERMAN 11TH PANZER DIVISION TOOK A WEEK TO GET FROM
RUSSIA TO THE RHINE AND THREE WEEKS TO GET ACROSS FRANCE TO
CAEN. ONE OF THE OLDEST AND PROBABLY THE BEST OF THE PANZER
DIVISIONS, DAS REICH, ORDERED TO NORMANDY, WHICH SHOULD HAVE
BEEN A THREE-DAY TRIP, ARRIVED 15 DAYS LATE.
AFTER THE LANDINGS, PARTICULARLY DURING LATE JUNE AND
JULY, WE POURED IN A TORRENT OF SUPPLIES. WITH THE LIFT
IT GAVE RESISTANCE FIGHTERS, IT PAID OFF DURING AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER WHEN RESISTANCE GROUPS SOUTH OF LOIRE PROTECTED
PATTON'S RIGHT FLANK AS HE RACED ACROSS FRANCE FROM BRITTANY
TO NANCY AND ULTIMATELY LIBERATED ALL OF FRANCE SOUTH OF THE
LOIRE AND WEST OF THE RHONE. EAST OF THE RHONE RESISTANCE
FORCES, ALONG NAPOLEON'S ROUTE, PROTECTED THE FLANKS OF THE
AMERICAN SEVENTH ARMY AS IT MOVED FROM ITS MEDITERRANEAN
LANDING BEACHES TO TAKE GRENOBLE WITHIN NINE DAYS AFTER LANDING
ON THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST. THE SEVENTH ARMY OPERATIONAL PLAN
HAD FIGURED IT WOULD TAKE MUCH LONGER TO TAKE GRENOBLE.
WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, OSS JEDBURGHS FROM ALGIERS RANGED
AS FAR NORTH AS DIJON AND AS FAR WEST AS VICHY, RALLYING
RESISTANCE FORCES TO DISRUPT GERMANS, WITH SOME SEEKING TO
PROVIDE REINFORCEMENT, OTHERS RETREATING. THE MILITARY COMMAND
IN ALGIERS HAD REMARKABLY ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE ON GERMAN
DISPOSITIONS IN FRANCE OF WHICH, A BRITISH G-2 OFFICER ESTIMATED,
50% CAME FROM OSS.
19
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
THIS BRILLIANT RESULT CAME FROM INTEL NETWORKS IN FRANCE
LAUNCHED WHEN HENRY HYDE PERSUADED THE BRITISH TO ALLOW HIM TO
SEND A TWO-MAN TEAM HE HAD RECRUITED IN ALGIERS FROM ENGLAND.
THE YEAR THIS GAVE HYDE TO DEVELOP HIS NETWORKS BEFORE ANY
OTHER AGENTS COULD BE DROPPED FROM ENGLAND PAID ENORMOUS
DIVIDENDS.
HYDE'S TEAM HAD QUICKLY BUILT A TIGHT ESPIONAGE NETWORK
THROUGH SOUTHERN FRANCE THAT HAD 2,500 AGENTS AND 337 RADIOS
TRANSMITTING INTELLIGENCE TO ALGIERS. COMPLIMENTING HYDE'S
ALGERIAN EFFORT WAS OSS IN MADRID, PUTTING AGENTS ACROSS THE
SPANISH BORDER, AND ALLEN DULLES, IN SWITZERLAND, PUSHING AGENTS
DOWN THROUGH THE ALPS TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST.
WHEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES APPROACHED THE BELGIAN
BORDER, THE PORT OF ANTWERP WAS A GREAT PRIZE. WHEN BELGIUM
WAS LIBERATED IN SEPTEMBER, THE BELGIAN SECRET ARMY HAD PREVENTED
THE GERMANS FROM CARRYING OUT ORDERS TO DESTROY IT. THE PORT
WAS HANDED OVER TO US INTACT. ONE OF THE GREAT FOUL-UPS OF
COMMAND IN WORLD WAR II WAS THE FAILURE TO CROSS THE ALBERT
CANAL TO SEAL OFF THE GERMAN 15TH ARMY IN ITS RETREAT FROM THE
CHANNEL COAST. THE RESULT WAS THAT SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THAT ARMY SURVIVED TO DEFEAT MONTGOMERY'S THRUST TO CROSS THE
RHINE AT ARNHEIM AND THAT WE HAD TO SIT UNTIL NOVEMBER TO
CLEAR THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP SO THAT SUPPLIES COULD BE BROUGHT
TO THE FRONT BY THE SHORTEST AND FASTEST ROUTE. THE WAR WOULD
HAVE LASTED A GOOD DEAL LONGER IF WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO USE
THOSE PORT FACILITIES IN THE LATE FALL OF 1944.
20
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, WITH FRANCE LIBERATED, EVERYONE
FROM THE BRITISH JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE TO THE HIGH
COMMAND TO THE LOWEST GI THOUGHT THE WAR WAS VIRTUALLY OVER, THE
GERMANS LICKED. OSS ALMOST DISMANTLED ITSELF. EVERYBODY HAD
HUSTLED TO PARIS IN ORDER TO BE IN PARIS. LONDON WAS DENUDED.
NEITHER OFFICE WAS REALLY FUNCTIONAL. OSS DETACHMENTS WITH THE
ARMIES IN THE FIELD HAD LITTLE WORK TO DO SINCE CONTACTS WITH
THE RESISTANCE AND THE LOCAL POPULATION EITHER WERE NON-EXISTENT
OR HAD TO BE REBUILT FROM SCRATCH. WE HAD STAFF AND ORGANIZATION
BUT FEW FUNCTIONING AGENTS, NO AIR LIFTS AND NO COMMUNICATIONS
ON THE CONTINENT.
THE SURPRISE AND POWER OF HITLER'S COUNTERATTACK THROUGH
THE ARDENNES CHANGED ALL THAT. DONOVAN MUST HAVE REACHED FOR
AN AIRPLANE THE MOMENT HE HEARD ABOUT HITLER'S DRIVE INTO THE
ARDENNES. HE WAS IN PARIS A FEW DAYS BEFORE CHRISTMAS.
INTUITIVELY, DONOVAN SENSED BOTH FAILURE AND OPPORTUNITY.
HE KNEW, TOO, THAT NEITHER OSS NOR THE BRITISH WERE
PRODUCING ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE FROM BEHIND GERMAN LINES. HE
NAMED ME CHIEF OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER
WITH BLANKET AUTHORITY TO PREEMPT PEOPLE FROM ANY PART OF OSS
AND CONCENTRATE ALL ITS RESOURCES ON PRYING FRESH INTELLIGENCE
OUT OF THE REICH. BITTERMAN REINFORCED ME BY BRINGING MILTON
KATZ UP FROM ITALY TO BE MY DEPUTY AND DICK HELMS AND MIKE
BURKE AND HANS TOFTE, WHO HAD COMPLETED MISSIONS IN FRANCE AND
21
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
YUGOSLAVIA, TO RUN OUR OPERATIONS INTO GERMANY. I HAVE WONDERED
HOW HE PICKED ON A YOUNG NAVAL LIEUTENANT FOR THAT TASK. I MAY
HAVE FOUND THE ANSWER QUITE RECENTLY WHEN A FRIEND POKING
THROUGH THE OSS FILES IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SENT ME A COPY
OF A PAPER I HAD SENT TO DONOVAN IN THE FALL OF 1944. IT LAID
OUT THAT WE HAD TO CHANGE GEARS. IN PART IT READ:
"IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE GERMANS WILL BE
ABLE TO MAINTAIN RESISTANCE THROUGHOUT THE WINTER
AND THAT THE ALLIED FORCES WILL BE FORCED TO DRIVE
SLOWLY, TAKING IMPORTANT CENTERS IN GERMANY AT
WELL SPACED OUT INTERVALS. AS LONG AS ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE IS MAINTAINED, THE INTELLIGENCE ON ORDER
OF BATTLE, DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS, AIR TARGETS,
MORALE, MILITARY PLANS AND OTHER CONDITIONS INSIDE
GERMANY WILL CARRY THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.
"CONTROLS OVER MOVEMENTS AND EATING ARE NOW SO
TIGHT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGENTS INSIDE GERMANY
IS LIKELY TO BE AN EXTREMELY SLOW AND UNCERTAIN
PROCESS. HOWEVER, IF AND WHEN CONTROLS BEGIN TO
BREAK DOWN, OSS MUST BE READY TO STEP UP THE PLACING
OF AGENTS WITHIN GERMANY. MOREOVER, IT IS LIKELY
THAT CONTROLS WILL BREAK DOWN LOCALLY IN AREAS IN
THE LINE OF ADVANCE OF ALLIED FORCES. OSS MUST BE
READY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEND AGENTS THROUGH
THE LINES IF AND WHEN THEY BECOME FLUID AND TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF LOCAL COLLAPSE OF CONTROLS IN AREAS UP
TO 25 AND 30 MILES BEHIND THE FRONT LINES...."
WE HAD HAD MEN AND WOMEN BEATING AT OUR DOORS TO JUMP
INTO FRANCE. NOW ALL WE WERE HEARING WAS HOW RISKY, EVEN
FOOLHARDY, IT WOULD BE TO TRY PUTTING AGENTS INTO THE DARKNESS
OF GERMANY. OUR BRITISH PARTNERS AND TUTORS HAD DECIDED LONG
AGO THAT ODDS AGAINST AGENTS SENT TO GERMANY WERE STACKED TOO
HIGH. THIS SHOOK ME, BUT WE HAD TO TRY. THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE
22
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
WAS PROVING HOW MUCH PUNCH THE WEHRMACHT HAD LEFT. THE MEN
WHO WOULD HAVE TO LAY THEIR LIVES ON THE LINE WERE ENTITLED
TO BETTER INFORMATION THAN WE HAD BEEN GETTING THEM.
BETWEEN OCTOBER 1944 AND APRIL 1945, WE SENT MORE THAN
150 AGENTS, MOSTLY BELGIANS, DUTCHMEN, FRENCHMEN AND PULES, INTO
GERMANY WITH IDENTIFICATION AS FOREIGN WORKERS, TOGETHER WITH
ANTI-NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMAN UNIFORM. THEY WERE SENT
TO TRANSPORTATION CENTERS WITH RADIO SETS OR NEW EQUIPMENT WE
DEVELOPED TO ENABLE THEM TO HOLD A CONVERSATION WITH AN AIRPLANE
SENT OUT FOR THAT PURPOSE. THESE BRAVE MEN WENT INTO GERMANY
BLIND AND IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT OVER 95 PERCENT OF THEM CAME
OUT ALIVE.
IN THE FEW MONTHS, SOME OF THEM ONLY WEEKS, THESE AGENTS
HAD TO OPERATE INSIDE GERMANY, WITH THE WAR DRAWING TO A CLOSE,
THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED WAS OF MARGINAL VALUE. BUT THE
EXPERIENCE AND CONFIDENCE IT GAVE US WAS INVALUABLE.
OSS OPERATED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM IN A WAY IT NEVER REALLY
HAD, EVEN DURING THE LATTER PHASE OF THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN.
THEN, WE HAD BEEN DEPENDENT ON THE FRENCH FOR COVER STORY,
INTELLIGENCE AND CREATIVITY AND ON THE BRITISH FOR DOCUMENT
MANUFACTURE AND AGENT EQUIPMENT. NOW, IN GERMANY, THE BRITISH
CAME TO US FOR THE HELP. THE PAINSTAKING RESEARCH AND ASSEMBLY,
THE ENDLESS CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION, HAD FINALLY PAID OFF.
23
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
OUR WORK MEI THE ACID TEST OF GERMAN INSPECTION WITH FLYING
COLORS. ONLY TWO SETS OF DOCUMENTS FAILED TO PASS INSPECTION
AND TWICE THE GERMANS ISSUED WARNINGS THAT AMERICAN AGENTS IN
SOUTHERN GERMANY WERE EQUIPPED WITH PAPERS TOO GOOD TO SPOT AS
FALSE.
DONOVAN'S INSISTENCE IN 1942 AND 1943 THAT THE AMERICAN
ARMIES SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT, SELF-SUSTAINING
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAD FINALLY BEEN VINDICATED IN GERMANY.
DONOVAN PROMISED TO SEND OUR GERMAN TEAM TO CHINA TO DO A
REPEAT PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE JAPANESE AND WE WERE READY AND
EAGER, BUT THE JAPANESE SURRENDER SAVED US THAT TROUBLE.
FINALLY, LET ME HAVE A BRIEF WORD ON WHAT THE OSS
EXPERIENCE MEANS TO US TODAY AND FOR THE FUTURE. IT PROVIDES
TRADITION, THE DOCTRINE, THE SKILLS AND MANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO BUILT
THE CIA. FOR HALF THE LIFE OF THE CIA ITS DIRECTOR HAS BEEN SOMEONE
WHO WORKED UNDER BILL DONOVAN IN THE OSS. WHAT WE FACE TODAY
HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH WHAT WE FACED IN 1944.
THE WEST AGAIN HAS TOTALITARIAN STATES USING FORCE AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST ITS INTERESTS. MARXIST-LENINIST POLICIES AND TACTICS
HAVE UNLEASHED THE FOUR HORSES OF THE APOCALYPSE--FAMINE,
PESTILENCE, WAR AND DEATH. THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD WE SEE
FAMINE IN AFRICA, PESTILENCE THROUGH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
AGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDOCHINA, DEATH EVERYWHERE WITH OVER
24
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
300,000 SOVIET, VIETNAMESE, AND CUBAN TROOPS IN SAVAGE MILITARY
OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT WIPING OUT NATIONAL RESISTANCE IN
AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, NICARAGUA AND SEVERAL
OTHER COUNTRIES.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ALL THIS CARNAGE, THIS CREEPING
IMPERIALISM? IN MY VIEW, THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY TARGETS--THE
OIL FIELDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH ARE THE LIFELINE OF THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE, AND THE ISTHMUS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
AMERICA. AFGHANISTAN, SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AS WELL AS
CAM RANH BAY IN VIETNAM, AND MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA, BRING SOVIET POWER MUCH CLOSER TO THE SOURCES OF OIL
AND MINERALS ON WHICH THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS DEPEND AND PUTS
SOVIET NAVAL AND AIR POWER ASTRIDE THE SEA LANES WHICH CARRY
THOSE RESOURCES TO AMERICA, EUROPE AND JAPAN.
ANOTHER PHENOMENON DOMINATING THE LANDSCAPE DURING AND
AFTER WORLD WAR II WAS THE TRAGIC PLIGHT OF REFUGEES ESCAPING
TOTALITARIANISM. TOTALITARIAN AGGRESSION SINCE THEN HAS
PRODUCED ADDITIONAL WAVES OF REFUGEES FROM EASTERN EUROPE
IN THE 1940s AND 1950s FROM CASTRO'S CUBA, FROM THE COMMUNIST
TAKEOVERS IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. ONE-QUARTER OF THE POPULATION
OF AFGHANISTAN HAS FLED INTO PAKISTAN. ALREADY HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF NICARAGUANS AND SALVADORANS HAVE FLED THEIR
COUNTRIES AND HEADED NORTH. CAN ANYONE DOUBT THAT AS SOON
AS IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE ABOUT TO
25
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
COMPLETE THEIR CONQUEST OF NICARAGUA ANOTHER SIGNAL WILL BE
FLASHED AND MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WILL LEAVE CENTRAL AMERICA,
AND ULTIMATELY MEXICO, TO CROSS THE BORDER OF THE UNITED STATES.
THIS RECURRING REFUGEE PHENOMENON IS AN ELOQUENT INDICTMENT
OF THE NATURE AND DIMENSION OF WHAT IS HAPPENING FROM ETHIOPIA
TO AFGHANISTAN TO CAMBODIA AND IN OUR OWN HEMISPHERE. IN
ADDITION TO THE MILLIONS VOTING WITH THEIR FEET, HOWEVER,
MOSCOW'S SURROGATE TOTALITARIANS ARE FACING A NEW PHENOMENON--
THE RISING UP OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE WHO
ARE VOLUNTEERS IN IRREGULAR WARS AGAINST THE SOVIET ARMY OR
SOVIET-SUPPORTED REGIMES. WHEREAS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s
ANTI-WESTERN CAUSES ATTRACTED RECRUITS THROUGHOUT THE THIRD
WORLD, THE 1980s HAVE EMERGED AS THE DECADE OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS
RESISTING COMMUNIST REGIMES. TODAY IN A VERY REAL WAY, THE
OCCUPYING FORCES ARE BESIEGED MUCH AS THE NAZI ARMY AND PUPPET
RULERS WERE BY THE FRENCH, BELGIAN, DUTCH AND NORWEGIAN RESISTANCE
IN 1943 AND 1944.
WE HEAR IT SAID THAT THESE CONTRAS, MUJAHIDEENS, AND TRIBESMEN
LED BY DR. JONAS SAVIMBI CAN'T WIN. WHO WOULD HAVE THOUGHT
THAT GEORGE WASHINGTON'S RAG TAG ARMY, DOWN TO 3,000 MEN AT
SOME POINTS, COULD HAVE, WITH COVERT ASSISTANCE FROM FRANCE,
THROWN THE BRITISH WITH THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL
ARMY IN THE WORLD OUT OF NORTH AMERICA? WHO WOULD HAVE THOUGHT
THAT THE VIETCONG, WITH SOVIET COVERT AID, COULD HAVE FORCED
AN AMERICAN ARMY OF HALF A MILLION OUT OF INDOCHINA?
26
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
THE TRUTH, AS REVEALED IN OUR WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCES
AND NUMEROUS STRUGGLES IN THE THIRD WORLD SINCE THEN, IS THAT
FAR FEWER PEOPLE AND WEAPONS ARE NEEDED TO PUT A GOVERNMENT
ON THE DEFENSIVE THAN ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT IT. A RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT DOES NOT SEEK A CLASSIC DEFINITIVE MILITARY VICTORY.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT IS ALMOST ALWAYS A KEY FACTOR IN RESISTANCE
SUCCESS. A PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR A
GOVERNMENT ACCOMPANIED BY NAGGING MILITARY PRESSURE LARGELY
AGAINST ECONOMIC TARGETS IS WHAT HELPS BRING DOWN OR ALTER A
REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENT.
THE SMALL AND WEAK COUNTRIES WHICH ARE COMBATTING SOVIET
INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE
COMBATTING MARXIST-LENINIST REPRESSION DO NOT NEED AND CANNOT
HANDLE A LOT OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY HARDWARE. WHAT THEY
NEED IS WHAT ALWAYS HAS BEEN NEEDED IN THESE KINDS OF SITUATIONS--
TRAINING IN SMALL ARMS AND THEIR USE IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS,
GOOD INTELLIGENCE, AND GOOD COMMUNICATIONS. WE HELPED PROVIDE
THIS WITH EFFECT TO THE RESISTANCE AGAINST NAZI GERMANY AND
IF WE CAN MUSTER OUR RESOLVE AND ACT BEFORE RESISTANCE ASSETS
ARE ALLOWED TO WITHER AWAY, WE CAN PUT THESE TACTICS TO GOOD
USE TODAY.
27
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8
IN CONCLUSION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT'S STILL WORTH
TALKING ABOUT HOW THE OSS AND THE BRITISH SOE HELPED THE
FRENCH RESISTANCE FORCES AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEFEAT OF
NAZI GERMANY BECAUSE I'M CONVINCED THAT OUR SUCCESS IN THAT
WORK CAN TEACH US SOMETHING ABOUT HOW WE CAN MEET OUR GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITIES TODAY. WITH A RELATIVELY FEW SKILLED OFFICERS
AND A TINY FRACTION OF OUR MILITARY BUDGET, WE CAN INTRODUCE
NEW ELEMENTS OF STABILITY INTO THE THIRD WORLD AND CHECK THIRD
WORLD MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES THAT ARE STAMPING OUT DEMOCRATIC
LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND POSING A THREAT TO OUR OWN
NATIONAL SECURITY. THANK YOU.
28
Approved For Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8