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Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Honorable William J. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Bill: 1136 19 MAR 1986 On the morning of March 25, I plan to release the 1986 edition of Soviet Military Power. As you know, this publication has been highly instrumental in fostering a greater public awareness of the ever-expanding Soviet threat facing the United States and our continuing need for intelligence capabilities. The cooperation and assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency are most appreciated. As the result of our joint efforts, Soviet Military Power has become respected around the world as the most comprehensive statement of Soviet military policies and capabilities. I have forwarded a copy to the President, noting CIA's assistance in this endeavor. Enclosed is your personal copy of the document. I believe this outstanding publication will serve the interests of both the intelligence community and the nation as a whole. Sincerely, 7:4 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SOVIET murrittly POWER 1986 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SOVIET MILITARY POWER First Edition September 1981 Second Edition March 1983 Third Edition April 1984 Fourth Edition April 1985 Fifth Edition March 1986 For sale by Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1986 '1111,?(1 t?rnim?tit I1N iiit' 1.;,1(,111,1, Lit, 1,111111.1111i1i it Ii c \ 1c1 1:111,)11 WW1' 1111l11111111' l'(111',.,(q11111W11, ,)1111.1(' 111;11, :11't. 1110 Ilt.Ci,,;11'11% )111;11 lu 11111,11'111.1M1,, 10 1'4,, (it f(.11,. 1.1(.11111,- ('.111()11 c111 11(1111,1cd ii IIiH 1)111111c:111101 .11't? W11'1,.t.11 il'()111 \ 11111111, t -11111V11,, \\ Ill lc MO 111'111'1,1' 111 111.111'\ 11t11111, 111,?\ In .1- A11111111111' Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 CONTENTS Chapter The Soviet Military Chapter II Nuclear Force Operations Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Chapter VII Global Ambitions Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs 7 21 ,11 59 93 105 12:3 143 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 PREFACE With its introduction in 1981, Souiet Military Power gained immediate public attention and was recognized as a detailed. frank, and authoritative report on devel- opments within the military forces of the USSR. It provided infOrmation not m.ide available by the Soviets themselves. Subsequent editions have detailed ongoing So- viet military developments ill keeping with the belief that informed and free people everywhere can best judge the merits of the policies and programs their governments have designed to meet the Soviet challenge a challenge faced by all free nations. Unlike citizens of the Soviet Union. peoples of democratic nations can exercise their right to question the decisions made by their governments. Decisionmaking within the USSR. however, is not subject to public scrutiny or debate. The So- viet leadership can devote a large percentage of the national income to defense programs a cost no Western nation is willing- to pay nor need incur in times of peace. The benefits that accrue to the Soviet military cannot be overlooked or ig- nored, and they must be examined in the light of their implications for the security of the Free World. In order to make possible a full and precise assessment of the Soviet challenge, both now tind during the next several years, this edition of Soule! Military Power provides infintmation on trends in the Soviet military. With the initial deployment of mobile SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles to operational ICBM regiments in 1985. the Soviet Union confronted the world wit ii further proof of its intensive drive for offensive military weapons capable of under- writing its political objectives against the West. Deployment of the SS-2;5 violates SALT II, and the manner in which it has been based violates SALT I. rDie new, highly survival le. road-mobile, fifth-generation SS-25s entered service is the deployment of the USSR's highly accurate, fOurth-genertit ion. silo-based 55- 18 Mod 4 ICBM program was reaching completion. At the same time. test firings of the fifth-generation, rail-mobile SS-X-24 ICBM continued. Preparations were tilso underway for test flights of three future ICBMs being- developed to build on the ca- pabilities of the fourth and fifth generations. By the mid-1990s. nearly all of the USSR's currently deployed strategic nuclear attack forces ICBMs. Si I UtI s. ind manned strategic bombers will have been replaced by more advanced strtitegic nuclear weapons systems. Paralleling the offensive strategic developments of 1985. the Soviet [Ilion pressed forward with advanced strateg,ic defense systems. Construction continued on new over-the-horizon radars tmild large phased-array radars capable of tracking greater numbers of targets with increased accuracy. Two new classes of silo-based ABM interceptor missiles in the Moscow ABM system were in tidvanced stages of test ing. NIore important, advanced research continued on the components that tire necessary to achieve ti rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system. In 1985, the USSR con- tinued to work on advanced strategic defense technology programs focused on the development of high-energy lasers, kinetic energy weapons, radio frequency weapm ins. tuld particle beam weapons. These programs have already produced developmental ground-based lasers capable of interfering with satellites. By the late 1980s, the IJSSR may well advance to the testing of lasers for targeting ballistic missiles in flight. Over the past five years, successive editions of' Souict Mi/itury Power have ciltiled the continuing growth and modernization of the USSR's Armed Forces across the Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 cut ire spectrum of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, the Air Forces, the Navy, and the Air Defense Forces. ? During this half-decade, Soviet ground forces have been enlarged, and the concept for using a powerful ground force corps, almost twice the size of tank divisions, is being evaluated for conducting large-scale, high-speed operations. ? Main battle tanks of the T-64, T-72, and T-80 series have been entering the Soviet operational inventory of some 52,600 tanks at a rate of 2,300 a year. ? Since 1981, the USSR has produced some 3,800 new fighter and intercep- tor aircraft for its air forces and 47 new major surface combatants for its expanding naval forces. ? The number of deployed, mobile SS-20 launchers, with missiles carrying 3 M IRV warheads, has almost doubled from 250 in 1981 to 441 in 1985 representing an increase from 750 to 1,323 nuclear warheads with more warheads available on refire missiles, ready for delivery against targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia at ranges up to 5,000 kilometers. Looking to the future, Moscow shows no indication of reducing the percentage of resources dedicated to the Soviet Armed Forces; the industrial capacity devoted to continued force modernization; research and development, as well as the theft of Western technology, required for new generations of weapons systems; the commit- ment to improved readiness, mobility, and sustainability to support Soviet forces; and the continued projection of power beyond Soviet borders. Indeed, by each of' these measures, Soviet military power continues to grow. Within the past year: ? The Soviets, in addition to deploying the SS-25, have continued testing the SS-X-24 rail-mobile ICBM. ? The fourth TYPHOON and the third DELTA IV-Class strategic ballistic missile submarines were launched, adding to the number of longer range, more capable MIRVed SLBMs in the USSR's submarine force. Additional units are under construction. A still newer class of strategic ballistic missile submarine is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s. ? Additional units of the new supersonic manned strategic BLACKJACK bomber have emerged to participate in advanced flight-testing of this new bomber, which will carry the 3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile. At the same time, additional new BEAR H strate- gic bombers have been produced, with some 40 bombers now carrying the AS-15 cruise missile. ? Increased deployment of the strategic air-launched cruise missile has been accompanied by advanced testing of the sea-launched and ground- launched variants of this missile. Over the next ten years, the Soviets are likely to deploy 2,000 to 3,000 of these nuclear-armed cruise missiles, thereby achieving an entirely new dimension of multidirectional offensive strategic nuclear capability. ? With the continuing deployment of the SA-10 surface-to-air missile and the advanced stage of development of the SA-X-12 SAM system, the USSR Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 has continued to build toward the nationwide deployment of advanced systems not only with air defense capabilities against manned bombers but also with some capabilities against cruise missiles and some types of ballistic missiles. ? The Soviet Navy's new 65,000-ton aircraft carrier, which has half again the displacement and aircraft carrying capacity of the KIEV-Class carri- ers, has been launched and is being fitted out in preparation for its first sea trials in the late 1980s. ? Both of the USSR's new generation of space-launched vehicles are mov- ing forward with successful test flights of the new medium-lift booster that will carry the manned space plane into orbit. Concurrently, testing is un- derway for the heavy-lift booster designed to send aloft the USSR's space shuttle as well as space station payloads in excess of 100 tons. ? The Mach-2, all-weather, air-superiority Su-27/FLANKER fighter/inter- ceptor has become operational, joining the MiG-29/FULCRUM in the new generation of highly advanced Soviet combat aircraft. Each year Moscow has received thousands of pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part of its campaign to acquire Free World technology by legal and illegal means. Vir- tually every Soviet military research project well over 4,000 each year in the late 1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s----benefits from these documents. Some key Soviet armaments and equipment are based at least partly on technology acquired from the Free World. Examples are the look-down/shoot-down capability of the new Su-27/FLANKER and MiG-29/FULCRUM fighter/interceptors, the new heavy-lift Mi- 26/HALO helicopter, and the roll-on/roll-off capability of Soviet merchant ships that support naval operations. The assimilation of Free World technology is so pervasive that the United States and other Free World nations have, in effect, been subsi- dizing the Soviet military buildup. Acknowledging this vulnerability, Free World nations have been working together to counter Soviet attempts to acquire Western technology. Soviet Military Power 1986 provides a current, authoritative assessment of Soviet global, theater, and conventional force developments, of the doctrine guiding these developments, and of the structure dedicated to supporting the Soviet Armed Forces. This year's edition details Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements iind the threat to peace posed by the USSR's role in regional conflicts. Aggression by Soviet troops or their proxies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua cannot be ignored. Finally, Soviet Military Power 1986' reports on US policies and programs and those measures we and our allies have undertaken to meet the continuing Soviet chal- lenge. It also outlines the steps being taken to modernize our nuclear deterrent, the capabilities of our conventional forces, and our research efforts within the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is our hope that one day the threat of nuclear mass destruct ion can be drastically reduced and eventually eliminated. In the pursuit of that goal, we must continue to take the necessary steps-t maintain peace a-id freedom. March 1986 C' spar 'W. Weinberger Secretary of Defense Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 6 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter I The Soviet Military During the past year. the political and mil- itary leadership of the Soviet Union experi- enced several key changes. These changes will not. however. alter the growth ;ind expansion of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. 'Hie Soviets will continue to invest substantially in their military and, by direction of the new leadership. Vill applV new technologies to im- prove the efficiency, quality, and capacity of their industrial base and military equipment. The USSR's heavy industry infrastructure. ini- tiated by Stalin in the First Five-Year Plan in 1927 and still operative today, was designed to support the Soviet military. Thus, the military historically has been the major impetus of in- dustrial growth. The int roduct ion of technolog- ically advanced production techniques some acquired from the Free \Vorld will further enhance the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces. In addition, the USSR will 01111) tie to pur- sue its global inihit ioils. oviet foreign pol- icy will remain guided by Lenin's strategy of "peaceful coexistence" (the furtherance of so- cialist revolution and class struggle with in- (lustrialized nations by means short of major war). To alter this course would portend the collapse of Communist ideology and the failure of intermit 101101 socialism. To further national goals, the new leadership will continue to mod- ernize its armed forces, infuse new technolo- gies into the country's llnlitrv-i1ldustiia1 base, The Soviet Union's drive to achieve strate- gic nuclear superiority has led to the deploy- ment of the highly survivable, road-mobile SS-25 ICBM. In strengthening its increas- ingly more modern nuclear arsenal with the fifth-generation ICBMs, including deployment of the SS-25 and testing of the SS-X-24, the USSR has violated SALT!!, which prohibits the introduction of more than one new type of ICBM. The manner of the SS-25's deploy- ment violates SALT Chapter I The 5) 1(1 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 BALTIC FLEET NORTHERN FLEET PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 45 AIRCRAFT CARRIER 1 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 95 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 73 SUBMARINES 45 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 78 NAVAL AVIATION 260 SUBMARINES 180 NAVAL AVIATION 425 ? 55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW 1)- PACT DIVISIONS Murmansk Olenegorsk 30 SOVIE DIVISIONS EASTERN EUROPE Sevastopol BLACK SEA FLEET/ CASPIAN FLOTILLA PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 79 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 99 SUBMARINES 35 NAVAL AVIATION 450 "III 88 DIVISIONS 11146141 Nikolayev .Tyuratam Tashkent. DM) &try. Shagen 30 DIVISIONS (4 IN AFGHANISTAN) The symbols on the map are representational locations and are neither exact nor complete. SOVIET ? Pechora USSR NUCLEAR FORCES TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ICBMs LRINF SLBMs BOMBERS SS-11 448 SS-N-5 39 BACKFIRE 270 SS-13 60 SS-N-6 304 BISON 30 SS-17 150 SS-4 112 SS-N-8 292 BEAR 150 SS-18 308 SS-20 441 -N-17 12 BADGER 262 TACTICAL SS-19 360 SS-N-18 ISS 224 BLINDER 135 AIRCRAFT SS-25 70 SS-N-20 80 SS-NX-23 32 The United States Government has 110t recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union Other boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative Including 125 in Soviet Naval Aviation. Five BLACKJACK in advanced flight testing. 6,300 8 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 VIILITARY FORCES DOD +tj Mishelevka nn)) I. ? Krasnoyarsk ?Komsomorsk 53 DIVISIONS (51N MONGOLIA) *Vladivostok A. Petropavlovsk PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 83 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS SUBMARINES NAVAL AVIATION 120 115 ? 510 ? Includes SSBNs and SSBs NSWP Air and Naval Forces not depicted GROUND FORCES" MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS 142 TANK DIVISIONS 51 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS 7 COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS 1 ' Totals exclude 12 mobilization divisions and 2 new Army Corps STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES NAVAL FORCES g ABM RADAR INTERCEPTORS 1,210 ABM lASAT SAM" LAUNCHERS 9.000f LAUNCHERS 100 In USSR only does not include Soviet Strategic SAMs (SA-2/3/5) in Mongolia or with Groups of Forces. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 3 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 280 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 392 COMBATANT CRAFT 745 AUXILIARIES 300 SUBMARINES 375 NAVAL AVIATION 1,645 9 ChapterI The Sm. iv( Militao Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 and pursue the expansion of Soviet influence t h roughout t he Third world. The Soviet Leadership Since hecoming General Secretary in March 1985. ikhail Gorbachev has moved rapidly to consolidate his authority and place his personal stamp on Soviet national policy. During his first several months in power. Gorbachev elevated fOur men to full Politburo status uid promoted two others, Defense Minis- ter Sergey Sokolov and the new State Planning Committee Chief Nikolav Talyzin, to candidate Politburo membership. In addition, he placed three of his supporters on the Central Com- mittee Secretariat. Perhaps the most striking example of Gorbachev's political strength was his ouster of one of his main political oppo- nents, Grigoriy Romanov, from both the Polit- buro and the Secretariat. In addition, five of the eleven Central Committee economic depart- ments have changed hands. The net result has been the emergence of i Party leadership that owes its position and loyalty to the General Secretary. The swiftness with which the General Sec- l'Ot arV }MS moved Oil 0001101111C issues reflects a sense of urgency to formulate a strategy for stimulating the economy. Current eco- nomic growth rates are not high enough to improve hot h militarV capabilities and living standards to desired levels while simultane- ously ensuring future economic growth. To achieve hot h program goals, the USSR will have to accelerate lagging economic growth rates. Lilly indications ;ire the Soviets in- tend to return to an intensive-growth strategy primarily through Unproved productivity and new technology. The policies advocated by Gorbachev to m- plement tile int ensive-growt h strategy shift in investment policy, a speedup in techno- logical advances, a program to increase worker productivity through consumer incentives and stepped-up worker discipline, and increased managerial efficiency through limited decen- tralization represent a relat ively modest program of economic changes. None of these proposed measures are new, nor do they rep- resent a wholesale restructuring of the Soviet Union's economic system. \\That is new is Gor- bachev's forceful style, his political momen- tum, his apparent willingness to carry through a limited program of administrative decentral- ization in the interest of economic efficiency, and his intent to increase investments for in- dustrial machinery. The Soviet military has a strong, long-term interest in the success of inn lot ives designed to stimulate the economy. The military stands to benefit if the Soviet industrial base can he mod- ernized and if' economic performance can he improved over the long term. If significant eco- nomic growth can be achieved, the technolog- ical foundation for present and future militiry programs will be enhanced. Soviet Doctrine and Strategy To the Soviets, military doctrine is con- cerned with the essence. purpose, and charac- ter of a possible future war and the preparat ion of' the country and its armed forces for con- ducting such a war. Military strategy deals with defining the strategic tasks of' the armed forces; carrying- out measures to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the population for war: determining potential adversaries; and determining the size and composition of' mili- tary forces necessary to wage war. The actual practice of' preparing the country and its armed forces for war as well as training troops for strategic, operational. and tM'tiCal combat is encompassed in Soviet military art the ell' ec- tive application of' national power to achieve political goals. Soviet military writings state that a flit we war would he a decisive clash on a global scale between two diametrically opposed socio- economic systems socialism and capitalism. The existence of two distinct and opposing camps means that i future world war would he a coalition war. The Soviets believe that ;in outcome favorable to their interests depends on complete unificat ion of' the poi it ic;11, economic. and military forces of all countries within the socialist coalition. To this end, the Soviets have concentrated On developing- and imple- menting a single strategic policy for the entire Warsaw Pact forces. Marshal Kulikov, Com- mander in Chief (CIN() of' the Warsaw Pact, has referred to his command as a unified com- bat formation. The Soviet approach to preparing for and actually conducting coalition warfare is gov- erned by the assumption that ;111V coalition, be it military or otherwise, derives its strength from the cohesiveness of its memhers. Con- versely, they argue that when its unity is 10 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 A RF IC TVt: threatened or begins to erode for whatever rea- son, the entire alliance and each member of that alliance is placed at risk. The cohesion of a coalition, from the Soviet perspective, is both its greatest strength and its greatest vul- nerability. The Soviets believe that the ability of the Warsaw Pact to function in an effec- tive and cohesive manner is a key factor in the successful prosecution of a future war. In a like manner, they argue that internal contra- dictions plague the NATO Alliance and tend to undermine its political and military effec- t iveness and hence are a critical vulnerability. The Soviets have devoted considerable en- ergy toward building the Warsaw Pact into a strong military alliance while at the same time exploiting NATO's perceived vulnerabil- ities. This effort reflects Moscow's determi- nation to forge a cohesive coalition based on Soviet military strategy and guided by Soviet policy objectives, regardless of their implica- tions for the sovereign rights of member states. The military principles governing the conduct of coalition warfare constitute a key element in Soviet strategy a strategy aimed at divid- ing and destroying an opposing coalition while at the same time maintaining the unity of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets believe that a world war could be waged for a period of time with conven- tional weapons only. Although general nuclear war is not considered inevitable, the Soviets believe it is possible that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear conflict. Despite the fact that strategic nuclear forces would play the dominant role in such a war, the Sovi- ets recognize the crucial function of combined arms in seizing and occupying ultimate objec- tives. The Soviets believe that a world war could be relatively brief or could develop into a protracted conflict. Great importance is at- tached to the initial phase of' a war because to a large degree it would determine the course of all subsequent actions. This accounts for the extraordinary attention the Soviets pay to their overall mobilization capability and their perceived requirement for the rapid transition of high-level political-military control organs from a peacetime to a wartime footing in or- der to take maximum advantage of the initial period of a conflict. Soviet doctrine envisions a future world war of wide scope waged over vast territories. Such a war would be characterized by an absence of' continuous fronts, rapid and sharp changes in the strategic situation, and deep penetrations 11 Chapter I The Soviet Military Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 into rear areas of the forces involved. Forces would rely on mobility to maneuver and wage an intense stniggle to seize and maintain the initiative. The Soviets emphasize the primacy of the offensive, stating that military and po- litical objectives are ultimately achieved only through aggressive and continuous offensive actions. Although defensive actions would oc- casionally be necessary, they would be active and innovative operations undertaken to sup- port nearby offensive operations or to create fa- vorable conditions for resuming the offensive. The Soviets be that victory in war is possible only through the combined and coordi- nated efforts of all services and troop branches. As a result, Soviet military strategy, which views warfare as a series of interdependent large-scale operations, is the same for all the services. The Soviet concept of combined arms warfare specifies that the various services and independent units must be brought together un- der a single unified commander. This permits the most effective use of all forces and weap- ons and ensures their united and coordinated employment in achieving overall strategic objectives. Although the Soviets envision the possi- NORTHERN FLEET' C AUXILIAR4S i -- --- 95 , ARCTIC TVD SUBMARINES 141. NAVAL AVIATION 425 NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE 1 DIV,i'SI S ,- 10 T.AP ",) , 1,400 APC IFV _ 3,130 ART LLERYI 2,000 _,-.----r, TAC ICAL SM 100 TA ICAL IRCR(AFT 22 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 73 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 78 ? NOT INCLUDING SSBNe bility of three the iters of war Western, South- ern, and Far Eastern they employ the concept of theaters of military operations (Teatr Voennykh Deistuii, abbreviated TVI)s) in planning for strategic operations. A Eu- ropean TVD, for example, can be a thousand kilometers in both depth and width. Military assets employed in a TVD vary and are usu- ally determined by political objectives and en- emy strength. For the conduct of actions on a strategic scale, plans are formulated for the full spectrum of combat for the entire geographic area encompassed by a TVD. The TVD organizational concept enables mil- itary planners to work out the strategy and tactics to achieve political objectives in the ge- ographic region, taking into consideration the capabilities of the missiles, aircraft, ships, and ground forces at their disposal. While a strate- gic operation within the various TVDs may be conventional only, nuclear strikes are still planned within the operational concept down to division level. On a global scale, the Soviets have identified ten continental TVDs and four oceanic TVDs. These are: ? the Western TVD, which includes , - c\ i, cVESTERN TV411.) , ,- DI ISIONS 63 (USS' TANKS u'l 19,450 ( , ' 9,900 APC-/LFV j 21;1, CUSS ARTILItRY 19, (USS TACTfAtSsM(USS TACTICAL _ , AIRCRAFT 20 (US PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 45 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS/CRAFT 95 AUXILIARIES 45 SUBMARINES 45 NAVAL AVIATION 260 NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE 'INCLUDING 6 GOLF II SSEts- MEDIUM LLERY = FIELD Y. Pd Aafits. A 1?4 12 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the NATO Central Region, the Baltic approaches, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the western USSR: ? the Northwestern TVD, which covers the Scandinavian Peninsula, Iceland, and the northwestern USSR: ? the Southwestern TVD, which includes the NATO Southern Region, the east- ern Mediterranean. Hungary, Romania. Bulgaria, and the southwestern USSR: ? the Southern TVD, which covers South- west Asia including Afghanistan, Iran, eastern Turkey, the Caucasus, inc-1 the Turkestan region of the USSR: ? the Far Eastern TV D, which covers Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, China, the Koreas. Japan, and Alaska: ? the North American, South American, African, Australian, and Antarctic TVDs; ? the Arctic Ocean TVD, which covers the Arctic. Ocean and the Barents and Norwegian Seas. ? the At Ocean TVD, which cov- ers the Atlantic Ocean south of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: ? the Indian Ocean TVD: and, ? the Pacific Ocean TVD, which includes that ocean as well as the coastal areas of the Soviet Far East. The contemporary Soviet concept of the the- ater strategic operation has expanded in scope and complexity. The Soviets now plan for a theater operation to consist of several fronts conduct ing dynamic. fast-moving operations to seize strategic ground objectives located 600- 800 kilometers away. Front offensive opera- 27 (US 6,850 ( 5.400 ( 6,900 (U 200 (USS 10 (USSR pktucipALs CO AN 0-*IfER 0 AN SHIpS s ) , Ei. ITEt?BANEAIV-SQUAb 1:10Ar- AU BMA --NAVAL AVIA NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE SHI ,AVERAGE 40-50 ANTPIDIHOUS SU ARINES 7-9 WARFARE SHIPS 1-2 2-3 _MINE WARFARE D ROVERS \ 24 S F ATES AUXI !Afars -3-25 DIVISIONS TANKS APC/IFV ARTILLERY TACTICAL SSM TACTICAL AIRCRAFT FA 144AST TVD 53 14,900 17,300 13,480 375 1,7 PACIFIC T VD ACIFIC FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 83 OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS 120 AUXILIARIES 90 SUBMARINES 90' NAVAL AVIATION NAVAL INFANTRY DIVISION 'NOT INCLUDING SSBN4 510 tions would be conducted in coordination with air, antiair, assault (airborne, amphibious, or joint), and naval operations. The air opera- tion would be a massive offensive campaign designed to gain air superiority and disrupt and destroy an enemy's command and control and nuclear capability. Frontal forces would contribute to the ii r operation by attacking en- emy air and air defense facilities with rocket, artillery, and ground forces. In turn, the air operation, by degrading and disrupting enemy command, control, and communication as well as aviation and nuclear capabilities, would cre- ate favorable conditions for the fronts to ac- complish their objectives quickly. A theater-wide ant lair operation involving tactical and strategic air defense assets coordi- nated at the theater level would be conducted to defend allied forces from enemy aircraft. In addition, naval forces would operate off coastil flanks to destroy enemy naval forces, secure the coastal flanks of the theater, participate in amphibious operations, and thwart the enemy's attempt to employ amphibious forces. If' the war escalated to the nuclear level, the Soviets could employ nuclear strikes of' vary- ing scale and scope. Such actions could in- volve the coordinated use of' ground, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). naval, and aviation sys- tems. Nuclear strikes would be exploited by frontal forces taking advantage of shock and disruption. Specific Soviet aims in a global war would be to: ? defeat NATO forces at any level of' con- flict, occupy European NATO countries, and use Europe's surviving ecommlic assets to assist Soviet recovery: 13 Chapter I The Soviet Military Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SOUTHERN TVD DIVISIONS TANKS APC/IFV ARTILLERY CA IAN FLOTILLA L SUItEpE ATAN 5 COMB ANT SH -S 28 AUXILIARIES 30 5,400 9,100 5,800 TACTICAL SSM 185 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 985 ? neutralize separately China and the United States and its allies by disrupt- ing and destroying their military forces; and ? dominate the post-war world in which socialism would replace capitalism as the basic politico-economic system in all nations. From an internal viewpoint, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership would seek to maintain its control over the Soviet Government, civilian population, mili- tary, police, and internal security organs. Ef- forts would be made to minimize losses to the Soviet leadership, essential scientific and tech- nical personnel, to the general population, and to the economy. Repair and recovery oper- ations would be organized to deal with war- related damage. Soviet Armed Forces Structure Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed Forces is vested by the Soviet constitution in the CPSU and the highest bodies of the Soviet Government the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Party con- trol of the military, however, is facilitated by the existence of the Defense Council, an orga- nization that is chaired by the CPSU General Secretary and consists of top Party, govern- ment, and military leaders. The Defense Coun- cil is the most senior decisionmaking body for all aspects of national security policy. It also forms the nucleus of what would be expanded in wartime to the highest Party-state body responsible for establishing unified strategic leadership of the USSR and providing central- ized direction to the national economy and the entire war effort. In this regard, it would per- form functions similar to the USSR's World War II State Defense Committee. Party dominance of the Soviet Armed Forces is assured through its decisionmaking author- ity. The top Party leadership establishes mil- itary doctrine and approves military strategy as developed by the General Staff. The Defense Council, the highest decisionmaking body for all aspects of national security policy, reflects the Party's wishes on all defense, budgetary, or- ganizational, and senior personnel assignment matters. Senior military officers are selected from a Central Committee list, and all major organizational changes in the Soviet military must be approved by the Defense Council. Direct control and administration of the daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) Sergey Sokolov. As Minister of Defense, Soko- lov is charged with maintaining the condi- tion and overseeing the development of the armed forces, including officer recruitment and conscription of enlisted personnel; equipping the forces with weapons systems and military materiel; developing military strategy, opera- tional art, and tactics; training the forces; and ensuring high standards of military discipline and political loyalty. Sokolov also is respon- sible, in coordination with local Soviet government organizations, for the civil defense program. The Ministry of Defense Collegium functions as a consultative body and policy review board. Chaired by Sokolov, the Collegium discusses and resolves issues connected with the devel- opment of the armed forces, their combat and mobilization readiness, and the effectiveness of military and political training. Membership in- cludes the Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and other top military leaders. The Minister of Defense exercises control of the armed forces through First Deputy Minis- ters and Deputy Ministers of Defense. The First Deputy Ministers are: MSU Sergey Akhro- meyev, Chief of the General Staff since Septem- ber 1984; MSU Viktor Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces since 1977: and former C1NC of the Ground Forces, Vasiliy Petrov. Five of the eleven Deputy Ministers 14 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 161 11111;1:A C-in-C Soviet Armed Forces M. S. Gorbachev Minister of Defense S I Sokolov Stavka of the Soviet Supreme High Command Chief of Main Political Directorate tr D Lizichev Wartime Defense Council Chdat,,in KGB Supreme High Command (VGK) First Deputy Ministers of Defense Chief Main Political Directorate C.-in-Cs of Soviet Forces General Secretary CPSU Minister of DeferlSe Chief of the General Staff General Staff (Executive Agent of VG K First Deputy Minister of Defense S F Akhromeyev (Chief of the General Staff ) First Deputy Minister of Defense '/ G (C iii C VVarsavv Pact Forces) I ?arr - - JAI/A First Deputy Minister of Defense V I Petro, Chiutinan USSR Council of Wester, Chairman GOSPI AN Other Party and State Figures as Required Deputy Minister of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense Deputy of Minister Defense Deputy Minister of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense I iC harm, C Ground Foe Y F' Makymov f or ( Sadist, Ri.ket Fon es) A C irs I Koldimov C Aerospace Forces) A N Yet ir5riy IC -in C All Frirrsi C V N Cheraw!, III CNaval Fon esi As of February 1986 15 h apter I T he Si) \ let M ilili r Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 16 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Soviets' 441 SS-20 LRINF launchers, discussed in the nuclear forces chapter, are a constant reminder of the growing nuclear threat from accurate and survivable mobile missile systems. At top, the SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher is illustrated configured for operational deployment. The photos, at left and above, are of a Soviet SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher used for crew training and familiarization. 17 Chapt(.1. I The Sox iet Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 are CINCs of' the services Strategic Rocket Forces. Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces, and Air Forces. The five service CINCs are responsible for the peacetime administrative management., including combat and political training of the forces. Operational control of the forces rests with a peacetime structure of the Supreme High Command (Vcrkhounoe Glaunokomando- uanlye, abbreviated V( K) and is administered by the General Staff. The other six Deputy De- fense Ministers are in charge of civil defense, rear services, the main in construc- tion incl billeting. personnel, and armaments. The most important element in the Soviet Ministry of Defense for peacetime forces man- agement, as well as wartime control of opera- tional formations, is the General Staff headed by Marshal Akhromeyev. As the central mil- itary staff organ, the General Staff exercises operational control over the armed forces and is responsible for coordinating the activities of t he main staffs of' the 5 services, the staffs of' the 16 military districts, 4 groups of forces, 4 fleets, rear services, civil defense forces, and the main directorates of' the Ministry of' Defense. 'rile General Staff coordinates military plan- ning, advises the Defense Council on matters of' in policy, develops military strategy for approval by the Defense Council, and di- rects functions common to all of' the services. The major responsibilities of' the General Staff in peacetime are to ensure that military forces reach and sustain a high level of combat readi- ness and to prepare strategic operation plans in the event of war. During wartime, the Gen- eral Staff would be the primary organization to implement operational orders of' the Supreme High Command, rferritoriilly, the Soviet Armed Forces lo- cated within the USSR are organized into 16 military districts (MDs). An MD is a high-level administrative command element that contains military units up to army level, training in- stitutions, recruitment and mobilization offices or military commissariats, and other military establishments. The primary mission of' a mili- tary district is to train military units to ensure a high level of' combat readiness. Other important responsibilities include reg- istration and induction of draftees, mobiliza- tion, civil defense, and premilitary and reserve training. In the event of' war, certain mili- tary districts, such as those on the periphery of the USSR, could generate fronts or other operational field forces, either singly or in com- bination. Soviet units stationed in Eastern Eu- rope are organized into four Groups of' Forces located in Poland. East Germany, Czechoslo- vakia, and Hungary. Military districts and Groups of' Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. They contain their own organic staff elements re- sponsible for political affairs, personnel admin- istration, training, rear services, construction and billeting, and civil defense. Each MD and Group of' Forces command staff has officers who serve as chiefs of' their respective service com- ponents. Soviet naval forces are assigned to four fleets, all of' which have command and staff organizations and relationships similar to those of' military districts. The structure of' the Soviet Armed Forces extends to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces as well. The Soviet commitment to ensure that the military resources of' all Warsaw Pact states will contribute effectively to a war effort is an important element in Moscow's attempt to achieve military superiority. The Warsaw Pact organization has a central role in the military effort of' the Bloc states and in the USSR's over- all objectives. Because of' the importance of that role, the Soviets have made sure that their control is complete and unchallengeahle. Through the subordination of' non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces the Soviets seek to guar- antee that the coalition will act as a single body and that the nnerests of' Eastern Europe are the same as those of' the USSR. In terms of' a wartime strategy, the Soviet objective of dismantling NATO and maintaining the cohe- sion of' the Warsaw Pact is of' primary impor- tance. For the East European member states, this means that their particular national in- terests, especially in time of war, will be sub- sumed by Soviet-defined policies. From the Soviet perspective, such a consequence would be the in and necessary result of properly preparing to fight and win a coali- tional war. Wartime Command and Control The Soviets believe in a rapid and efficient transfOrmation of' their peacetime national security organization into an operational com- mand capable of' successfully achieving all ma- jor political and military objectives in the event of' general war. To this end, they have 18 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 estaNished peacetime national security and high-level military organizations that closely approximate the expected wartime structure. These peacetime or could shift their id ivities to wartime operations with minimal disruption and little .itignientation in mem- bership. Party and state control would be maintained through the relocation of selected high-level officials to hardened emergency facilities. In the event of war, the current Defense Council probably would be expanded to include representatives of the highest Party, state, and military leadership. It would function in a man- ner similar to the World War II State Defense Committee, ensuring centralized political and economic direction of the entire war effort. General Secretary Gorbachev would function as wartime Defense Council Chairman and ex- ercise direct leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces as Supreme Commander in Chief of the VG K and head of its General Headquarters (.??;10 ). The Ministry of Defense Colleg,ium would probably provide the foundation for the war- time Stu VGK, which would include, in ad- dition to Gorbachev, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and other First Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and the five Armed Forces Commanders in Chief. The General Staff would serve as operational staff and executive agent for the Stauka VGK. Working in conjunction with the main staffs of the five services, the Ni am Operations Direc- torate of the General Staff would draft strate- gic operations plans for consideration by the VGK. Once approved, these plans would be issued to operational commanders as orders of the VGK. This group would ensure timely and precise execution of the VGK military cam- paign plans by the operational commands. In order to ensure centralized control of strategic planning and decentralized battle management of the armed forces, the Soviets in wartime would employ intermediate High Com- mands of Forces in TVDs that would be subor- dinate to the VGK and would be responsible for directing the efforts of subordinate formations. Commanders for four of the probable TVD High Commands are: Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov: Army General 1.A. Gerasimov: Army General M.NI. Zaytsey: and Army Gen- eral I.M. Treryak. In certain circumstances, the VGK might create High Commands fOr spe- cific strategic directions (that is. a major axis 01: avenue of attack not already under the c( n- trol of' a High Command in a TVI)). The Soviets also have created an elaborate system of emergency relocation facilities. many of' which are hardened and designed to en- sure the survival of' Party and state control by protecting high-level Party, government, and military leaders. These facilities are equipped with hardened communications equipment and would serve as alternate command and con- trol posts for the top leadership in wartime. In addition, essential personnel of critical in- dustries would he evacuated along with crit- ical machinery out of' urban areas and away from immediate battle areas to emergency lo- cations to facilitate their continued operation. All these measures are designed to provide un- interrupted functioning of the various elements of' Soviet strategic leadership and the national economy in wartime, including nuclear war. A wartime coalition command structure also has been created for the quick transformation of' the Warsaw Pact into an effective military alliance capable of operating as an extension of the Soviet Armed Forces. Since the late 1979s, the Soviets have introduced and institu- tionalized measures aimed at modernizing the Warsaw Pact's unified command structure. In- tegration would be achieved through the com- plete wartime subordination of' the armed forces of' the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact coun- tries to the High Commands of Forces in the Western and Southwestern TV Ds. These com- mands provide a key link between the supreme military authority vested in the VGK and the fronts and armies operating within the var- ious TVDs. In keeping with the Soviet concept of' com- bined arms operations. the TVI) commander has at his disposal not only the assets available in the ground forces but also the naval tt-1(1 air assets assigned to the TVD itself. In the case of the Western and Southwestern TV Ds, s(mie, if' not all, of the armed fOrces of' the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states operating in these TV Ds will be subordinate to the Soviet TVI) com- mands. This subordination reflects Moscow's belief that well-equipped and we War- saw Pact forces, under Soviet leadership, can defeat any other coalition. 19 Chapter I Soviet Military Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 2,0 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter II Nuclear Force Operations The Soviet Union has pressed ahead with the development and deployment of new _._,'.(.11- erations of increasinglv capable land. sea. and ah' forces for nuclear attack. Nlodernizat ion of the fourth generation of intercontinental bal- listic missiles (I(lil\ls) is essentially complete. In clear violation of the SALT II Trett v, de- ployment of a fifth-generation ICBM, the SS-25. has begun, and its deployment has been under- taken in a manner that violates SALT I. Thi2.; highly survivable weapon system represents the world's first operationally deplored road- mobile Development continue: ;ipace on the SS-X-21. which could deployed in a rail- mobile version this year. 'File Soviets' strategic nuclear-powered bal- listic missile submarine (SS1N) force remains the largest in the world. Const nal ion continues on several new TYPHOON-Class RNs. The SS-NX-2:1. the USSR's most ca- pable long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLII N). is nearing operational status. It is deployed on the DELTA IV and pmbnhlv will he deployed on DELTA III SSI1Ns. The USSR currently has three manned intercontinental-capable bombers ill develop- ment and production tile lq::\ IZ I I. the 111?,\CMACK. and t BACK N(wly built IlEAR 11 bombers are the first launch platform for the long-range AS-15 lit.-latinched cruise missile (ALCNI Projections for the Years ahead are: ? Additional TYPHOON-Class suhmarines. The USSR's forces for intercontinental nu- clear attack include growing numbers of the new TYPHOON-Class (lower left) and DELTA IV-Class (center, entering tunnel) strategic ballistic missile submarines fitted with new generations of MIRVed missiles with greater range, payload, and accuracy. These sub- marines may operate from bases where tun- nels are being constructed for protection. 21 Chapter II Nueleat Force Operat Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 BLACKJACK and BEAR H bombers, and SS-X-24 ICBMs, all carrying many more warheads than the systems they are replacing , will be deployed. ? Hv 1990, if' the Soviets continue to main- tain over 2,500 missile launchers and heavy bombers and even if' they are within the quantitative sublimits of SALT II, the number of deployed warheads will grow to over 12,000. ? Although the Soviets would not necessar- ily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond some 12,000 to 1:3,000 war- heads, they clearly have the capability to do so. Based on recent trends, even un- der SALT, the Soviets could deploy over 15,000 warheads, or by violating SALT, Over 20,000 warheads by the mid-1990s. The modernization and upgrading of these strategic forces have been paralleled by growth and increased capabilities of the Soviets' longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) and short-range ballistic missile (SR BM) systems deployed with Soviet combat forces. Significant improvements in nuclear- capable aircraft as well as increases in tactical missiles and nuclear artillery have also occurred. Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy Soviet leaders since the 1960s have followed a consistent and relentless policy for the de- velopment of forces for nuclear attack. The Soviet leadership recognizes the catastrophic consequences of' a general nuclear war. How- ever, Soviet military forces have taken actions and exhibited behavior which indicate that they believe a nuclear war could be fought and won at levels below general nuclear war. The grand strategy of' the USSR is to attain its objectives, if possible. by means short of war by exploiting the coercive leverage inherent in superior forces, particularly nuclear forces, to instill fear, to erode the West's collective secu- rity arrangements, and to support subversion. Thus, the primary role of' Soviet military power is to provide the essential underpinning for the step-by-step extension of Soviet influence and control. In any nuclear war, Soviet strategy would be to destroy enemy nuclear forces before launch or in flight to their targets, to reconstitute the war base should nuclear weapons reach the So- viet homeland, and to support and sustain com- bined arms combat in different theaters of mil- itary operations. Several overarching stratega. wartime missions are: ? to eliminate enemy nuclear-capable forces and related command, control, and com- munications capabilities: ? to seize and occupy vital areas on the Eurasian landmass: and ? to defendthe Soviet state against attack. These missions would involve: ? disruption and destruction of the en- emy's essential command, control, and communications capabilities: ? destruction or neutralization of' enemy nuclear forces on the ground or at sea before they could be launched: and ? protection of' the Soviet leadership and cadres, military forces, and military and economic assets necessary to sustain the war. Strategic and theater forces and programs in place or under active development designed to accomplish these objectives include: ? hard-target-capable ICBMs, new subma- rine-launched ballistic missiles. LRINE ballistic missiles, and land- and sea-based cruise missiles: ? short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and free rocket over ground (FRO( l) systems deployed with combat troops: ? bombers and ALCMs designed to pene- trate US and allied defensive systems: ? large numbers of land attack and antiship cruise missiles on various platforms: ? antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces to attack Western nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines: ? air and missile defenses, including early warning satellites and radars, interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiballistic missile (ABM) radars and interceptors, and some antiaircraft artillery: ? antisatellite weapons: ? passive defense forces, including civil de- fense forces and countermeasures troops and equipment devoted to confusing in- coming aircraft: and ? hardened facilities numbering in the thousands, command vehicles, and evac- uation plans designed to protect Party, military, governmental and industrial staffs, essential workers, and to the ex- tent possible the general population. 22 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elim- inating the US capacity to fight and support a conflict wcmld require the capability to employ theater and strategic. forces over a variety of i.inges and the destruction of: ? military-associated command and control facilities and other assets; ? war-supporting industries, ;irsc?nals. and major military facilities: ? ports and airfields in the United States and along air and sea routes to European and Asian theaters of war; and ? satellite surveillance sensors, ground- based surveillance sensors, and related communications facilities. Soviet nuclear forces are designed and per- sonnel are trained to fulfill their missions un- der all circumstances. Soviet leaders appear tI believe that nuclear war might last weeks or even months and have factored this possi- bility into their force planning. Despite pub- lic rhetoric all their commitment to no Ii rst-use of nuclear weapons. the Soviets have Nuclear Forces-SLBMs ? ? ?N?nosks SS-N-5 39 SS-N-18 224 SS-N-6 304 SS-N-20 80 SS-N-8 292 SS-NX-23 32 SS-N-17 12 Test Center A SLBM/SSBN Port developed extensive plans either to preempt a nuclear attack or to launch a massive first st rike. The key to a successful preemptive attack would he effective coordination of the strike and accurate intelligence on enemy intentions. Meet ing these demands in war requires reliable command. control, and communications under all conditions. A launch-under-attack circumstance would place great stress on attack warning systems and launch coordination. To meet the demands of a launch-under-attack contingency, the So- viets have established an elaborate warning system. Satellite, over-the-horizon radar, and early warning systems have been huilt to pro- vide the Soviet Union with the capahility to as- sess accurately and respond effectively to any nuclear attack. These warning systems could give the Soviets time to launch their nuclear forces very quickly. Nuclear Forces-Bombers ? ? ? tRam?nskoy? ? ?Vladlmirovka ? ? ? BACKFIRE 270' BADGER 262 BISON 30 BLINDER 135 BEAR 150 Test Center ? Bomber Base ? ? Including 125 in Soviet Naval Aviation. Five BLACKJACK in advanced flight testing Nuclear Forces-ICBMs SS 17 Yedrovo ,..S 11,6',19,/ ? Phiestsk u zc...... ?.....y.L_ary? ss.Th Oswaztany? ?,?"Ii----_-88-21$ .84-1_1119\ ?Lait,ssr?1"17 .ii ? Pervomays? T??k:v? s.s..-verithrenve SW" S8-19 ? 88-1818 P?rm T.fichchevo ?01101KII? Ola Kam: tin Yssar .18. ? ....,_88........"184, 88-18 ? Niadkays nyy ? SS-18 Uxhur. "11 ? Imeni Nostello ?Aisy.k88-111 Drovy.811-011._ . t L11 Dornbarovskiy ?,, no,. ?Tyuratam MISSILE/SPACE ?}S- 8 $ z Tobe CENTER rnan g SS-11 448 SS-18 308 SS-13 60 SS-19 360 SS-17 150 SS-25 70 ? Test Center ? ICBM Base _ ? Chapter II Nuclear Force Opt-rat ions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces Warhead Mix 1985 Estimates based on current trends. Fix ICBM M id -1990s Follow-on strikes would require the survival of the command, control, and communications systems as well as the weapons themselves. The Soviets have invested heavily in providing this survivability. 'rule 55-17, 55-18, and 55-19 ICBMs housed in the world's hardest op- erational silos. The Soviets are building silos for the new ABM interceptors around Moscow. To increase its survivability, the SS-20 LRINF missile is mobile. The mobile SS-25 ICBM is being deployed; the development of the mo- bile SS-X-2-1 continues; and a mobile surface-to- air missile, the SA-X-12, with some capabilities against certain types of ballistic. missiles, is almost operational. The launch-control facil- ities ho' offensive missiles are housed in very Base support facilities for the road-mobile SS-25, consisting of launcher garages equipped with sliding roofs, already exist at several bases, with more bases under construction. hard silos or on off-road vehicles. t't)mmuni- cations are redundant and hardened against both blast and electro-magnetic pulse damage. Higher commands have multiple mobile alter- nate command posts available for their use, including land vehicles, trains, aircraft, and ships. Bombers are assigned dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile submarines could be hidden in caves, submerged in deep fjords just off their piers, or dispersed while being protected by Soviet surface and submarine forces. The belief that a nuclear war might be pro- tracted has led to the USSR's emphasis on nuclear weapon system survivability and sus- tainability. For their ICBM, I.RINF, SRBM. SLIM, and air defense forces, the Soviets have stocked extra missiles, propellants, and war- heads throughout the USSR. Sonic, ICBM silo launchers could be reloaded, and provisions have been made for the decontamination of those launchers. Plans for the survival of' nec- essary equipment and personnel have been de- veloped and practiced. Resupply systems are available to reload SSBNs in protected waters. Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles The operational Soviet ICBM force consists of' some 1,400 silo and mobile launchers, aside from those at test sites. Some 818 of' the silo launchers have been rebuilt since 1972; nearly half of' these silos have been refurbished since 1979. All 818 silos have been hardened against attack by currently operational US ICBMs. These silos contain the 55-17 Mod (150 si- los), the 55-18 Mod 4 (:308), and the 55-19 Mod (360), which were the world's most modern de- 94 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Although the USSR has recently completed the deployment of its fourth-generation ICBMs and has started deploying a fifth gen- eration, even newer ICBMs are in develop- ment. The Soviets' new SS-18 follow-on is nearing the flight test stage. When deployed, it is likely to carry at least ten warheads and to have better accuracy and greater throw- weight than its predecessor. ployed ICBMs until t he more modern, mobile SS-25 was deployed. Each SS-18 and SS-19 ICI1M can carry more and larger MIRVs than the Minutenmn III, the most modern deployed US ICBM. The SS-18 'Mod carries at least ten MIRVs, and the SS-19 Mod :1 carries six, whereas the Minute- man Ill carries only three. 'File SS-18 Mod was specifically designed to attack and destroy ICBMs uid other hardened targets in the US. The SS-18 Mod I force currently deployed has the capability to destroy about 65 t percent of US ICIII\1 silos. using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after this type of attack. over 1.000 SS-18 kvarheads would he available for further attacks :.tgainst targets in the lJH. The SS-19 Mod I ICBM. while not identical to the SS-18 in accuracy. has similar capabilities. It could be assigned similar missions and could he used against targets in Eurasia. Although the .`.-',S-17 is somewhat less capable than the SS-19. it has similar target ing flexibility. The remaining Soviet ICBM silos are fitted primarily with the SS-11 Mod and SS-1:i US and ICBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1970-1986 9,000 - 8,000 - 7,000 - 6,000 - 5,000 - 4,000 - 3,000 - 2,000 - 1,000 - 0 Soviet RVs US RVs Soviet ICBMs US ICBMs - 9,000 8,000 - 7,000 - 6,000 - 5,000 -4,000 -3,000 - 2.000 1,000 1970 1 974 1978 1982 0 1 986 Mod 2s. These ICBMs of older vintage are housed in less-survivable silos and are consid- erably less capable. Nevertheless. their de- structive potential against softer area targets in the United States and Eurasia is significant in terms of many of the Soviet requirements out lined earlier. rrhe most recent development in the Soviets' operational ICIIM force occurred with the de- 95 Chapter II Nuclear 101 (1' Operat ions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 plovment of their road-mobile SS-25 missile, in violation of SALT I and SALT II. The SS-25 is approximately the same size as the US Minute- man ICBM. It carries a single reentry vehicle and is being deployed in a road-mobile config- uration similar to that of the 55-20. As such, it will be highly survivable with an inherent refire capability. Several bases for the SS-25 ;ire operational. with a total of over 70 launch- ers deployed. They consist of launcher garages equipped with sliding roofs and several support buildings to house the requisite mobile support equipment. Within the past year. the Soviets have begun dismantling 55-11 silos in compensation for S5- 25 deployments. The Soviets are expected to continue to dismantle SS-11 silos. By the 1111d- 1900s, all 55-11s will probably be deactivated. Deployment programs for all of' the currently operational silo-based Soviet ICBMs are es- sentially complete. The command, control, and communications system that supports the Soviet ICBM force is modern and highly sur- vivable, and the reliability of' the ICBMs them- selves is regularly tested by live firings from operational complexes. Some silo-based ICBMs in the current force that the Soviets decide not to replace with mod- ified or new ICBMs will, in accord with past Practice. be refurbished to increase their use- ful lifetime and reliability. During this process some system modifications also could be miide. Fore(' Deuelopmcnts. Soviet retit'alTh and de- velopment on ICBMs is a dynamic process in- volving many programs. A modernized version or a new replacement for the liquid-propelled METERS 30 20 10 SS -11 SS-13 ICBMs SS-16 SS SS -17 -18 SS -19 SS-X-24 SS-25 NUMBER DEPLOYED WARHEADS MAX RANGE (KM) LAUNCH MODE MOD MOD 2 60 1 9,400 Hot MOD 3 Undetermined 150 1 4 MIRVs 9,000 10,000 Cold Cold MOD 4 308 10 -,MIRVs 11,000 Cold MOD 3 360 6 MIFIVs 10,000 Hot 70 1 10,500 Cold In Development/ Testing Up to 10 MIRVs 10,000 Cold 1 28 1 11,000 Hot 2 3 420 1 13,000 Hot 3 MRVs 10,600 Hot METERS 30 20 10 TITAN II US ICBMs MINUTEMAN II MINUTEMAN III PEACEKEEPER 0 NUMBER DEPLOYED 17' 450 550 In Development WARHEADS 1 1 3 Up to 10 MAX RANGE (KM) 12,000 12,500 11,000 11,000 , LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot Hot Cold ' As of early 1 986 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Modernization of Soviet ICBMs Warhead Mix SS-11, SS-13, SS-25 1985 ? Estimates based on current trends. Mid-1990s? 55-18 is likely to be produced and deployed in existing silos through the end of the century. The Soviets appear to be planning on new solid-propellant ICBMs to meet many fUture mission requirements, including a counterforce capability. The Soviets already have two new solid-propellant ICBMs the small. mobile 55- 2r, described above. now being deployed, and the SS-X-24. Tie medium-size SS-X-24 is well along in its Hight test program. The S5-X-24 de- ployment in a rail-mobile mode could begin as early as late 198G. Silo-based deployment c?ould occur later. Early preparations fOr the deploy- ment of the SS-X-24 are already underway. Activity at the Soviet ICI-3M test ranges indi- cates that two additional new ICBMs are under development. A new ICBM to replace the SS- 18 is nearing the Hight test stage of develop- The rail-mobile SS-X-24 missile, carrying ten independently targetable warheads, is likely to be deployed as early as late 1986. 97 Chapter II Nuclear Force Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 DELTA-I, DELTA-II Modernization of Soviet SLBMs Warhead Mix YANKEE- Class 1985 ? Estimates based on current trends. DELTA-I, YANKEE- DELTA-II Class Mid-1990s? ment. solid-propellant missile that may be larger than the SS-X-2.1 will be- gin flight-testing in the next few Years. lloth of these missiles lie likely to have better accu- racy and greater throwweight potential than their predecessors. A third possible develop- ment is that a NIINVed version of the SS-25 will be developed later this decade. Such a development would further expand the already large warhead inventory possessed by the So- viets. lv the mid-I990s, the Soviet force will have been almost entirely replaced with new systems. a number of which may violate s..\1:1, II constra,ints. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles The Soviets maintain the world's largest bal- listic missile submarine force. As of early 1P6. the force numbered 62 modern 55I1Ns carrying 911 SALT-accountable nuclear-tipped missiles. Neither total includes the 11 older GOLF II SSIIs with :19 missiles which are currently is- signed theater missions. The GOLF III SSI1 and HOTEL III SSIIN are only SALT-accountable for their missile tubes. Twenty SSUNs are fitted with :1:16 MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLI1Ms). These 20 units have been built and deployed within the past nine years. Two-thirds of' the ballistic missile Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines USSR Us YANKEE-Class YANKEE I 130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6 YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-17 DELTA-Class DELTA I 140m 12 Tubes SS N 8 DELTA III I55m 16 Tubes SS-N-18 DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS-N 8 -I DELTA IV 160m 16 Tubes SS NX 23 TYPHOON-Class 1111111111 SI TYPHOON 170m 20 Tubes SS N 20 Comparative Cross-Sections of SSBNs TYPHOON- Class POSEIDON SSBN 11 POSEIDON 129.5m 16 Tubes TRIDENT (OHIO-Class) SSBN 111111111,1111111J TRIDENT 170.7m 24 Tubes OHIO- Class 1 3m Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 186Y0S OR 170M 120YDS OR 110M 030(DOCK7C1U C17 OD(21(210(DMOC) submarines are fitted with long-range SI.liAls, enablitiv them to patrol in waters close to the Soviet Union. Ilii s itfords protection from NAT() antisubmarine warfare operations. 1\1oreover, the long-range missiles allow the So- viets to fire from home ports and still strike targets in the [inked States. Vow. units of tlie modern Soviet 1)allistic missile submarine. tlie TYPH()()N, have iI ready been built. Each TY1)11()()N carries 20 SH-N-() AlMVed S1,11Ms. The T171)11()()N is tlie world's largest submarine, with a displacernent 1 third greater than that of the US Ohio-Class. It can operate under the Arctic Ocean icecap, ;idding further to the pro- tection afforded by the 8,:100-kilometer range of its SS-N-2() S1,111\1s. Three or four additional TYI)11()()Ns lit probably now under construc- tion, ind t lie early 1990s tile Soviets could Football Field Four 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 long-range missiles with MIRVed warheads, are now at sea. have as many as eight of these pot ein wipoms systems in their operational force. In iccordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Soviets have. since 197. re- moved 11 YANKF.F. I units from service as US ' 7 OHIO * Modern SSBN Force Levels s- US 30 LAFAYETTE I3E N F R ANKLIN Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles METERS 15 10 5 SS-N-6 SS -N-8 SS -N-17 SS -N-18 MOD MOD MOD SS-N-20 SS-NX-23 A\ 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 RV s 1 1 2 MRVs 1 1 1 3 MIRVs 1 7 MIRVs 6.9 MIRVs 10 MIRVs RANGE (KM) 2,400 3,000 3,000 7,800 9,100 3,900 6,500 8,000 6,500 5,300 8,300 SS-N-5s not shown USSR 22 DELTA 11 YANKEE 4 TY. PHOO N *i LIS USSR 16 DELTA 9 YANKEE POSEIDON TRIDENT SLBM C-3 SLBM C-4 10 MIRVs 4,000 99 8 MIRVs 7,400 Chapter II Ntteluar 0111. )perat Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 ballistic missile submarines. These units had to be removed as newer submarines were pro- duced in order for the overall Soviet 55 BN force to stay within the 62 modern SSBN/950 SHIM limits estiblished in 1972. These YAN- KEEs, however, have not been scrapped. Some have been reconfigured as attack or long-range cruise missile submarines. Force Deivlopmcn Is. The Soviets have launched three units two of which are cur- rent ly accountable under SA I,T of a new class of SS 13N. the DELTA IV, which will be fitted with the SS-NX-2:1 SLIIM, now being flight- tested. This large. liquid-propelled SLIIIVI will have greater throwweight, carry more war- heads, and be more accurate than the SS-N-18 which is currently carried on the DELTA III SSBN. The SS-NX-2:1 is likely to be deployed on DELTA Ills as a replacement for the SS-N-18. The Soviets probably will beg-in flight-testing a modified version of the SS-N-20. Additionally. based on past Soviet practice, they probably will develop a modified version of the SS-NX- 2:3 before the end of the decade. Both modified :30 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 versions of the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-2:1 are likely to In, more ;tccurate than their predecessors ;Ind eventually 11MV provide the Soviets with ;1 hard-target capability for SLBMs. To ensure communications reliability, the Soviets tie expected to deploy an extremely low frequency (ELF) communications system that will enable them to contact SSI1Ns under most operating. conditions. Strategic Aviation The five air armies subordinate to the )S and SLBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1970-1986 6,000 5,000 - 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 US RVs - 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 Soviet SLBMs - 1,000 US SLBMs 0 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 Supreme High Command (V( 'ik) which ('(tilt till the Soviet strategic bombers tild strike air( ,,ft are: ? Smolensk Air Army: ? Legnica Air Army: ? Venitza Air Army: ? Irkutsk Air Army: and ? Moscow Air Army. The assets of the air armies include some BEAR lild BISON bombers. 145 11ACK- VIRE bombers. :197 medium-range BLINDER itld BADGER bombers, and -150 shorter range FENCER strike aircraft. The Soviets have al- located these aircraft among five air ;irmies to cover specific theaters of military opera- tions (Europe, Asia, and the United Si ites) and vet retain the flexibility to reallocate aircraft as necessary during wartime. This flexibility allows the Soviets to alter the use of their strategic. ii i' assets is circumstances require. Soviet Naval Aviation assets include some 125 BACKFIRE and 2:1() BLINDER and BAIWEH bombers. Air army BEAR and hISON bombers also could be made available for maritime mis- sions. In addition, the air trinies and So- viet Naval Aviation have a total of' some 5:10 Two units of the newest Soviet ballistic missile submarine, the DELTA IV, are now on sea trials. Chapter 11 Nuclear Force ()peration,-; Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers Weapon Mix BISON 1985 'Estimates based on current trends. Mid-1990s' tanker, reconnaiance, :ind electronic warfare :iircraft. Soviets ;ire in the process of upgrad- ing their long-range 1)0111 her force. The new BEAR II bomber, which carries the AS-15 long- range cruise missile, became operational in 1981. About ?10 of these :tircraft are now in the inventory. 111'',AR H bombers have been observed in training flights simulating attacks against the North American continent. The BEAR II is the first new production of a strike version of the BEAR airframe in over 15 years. Additionally, the Soviets are recon- figuring older BEAR aircraft, which carry the subsonic AS-:1 :hit-to-surface missile (ASM), to carry the newer supersonic AS-1. Several of these reconfigurations, known as BEAR Gs, are operat Th(s Soviets have been producing the BACKFIRE, their most modern operational bomber, at a rate of about :10 per year. Sev- eral modifications have been made to the air- craft and further modifications are likely to upgrade performance. The BACKFIRE can per- fOrm a variety of missions including nuclear strike, conventional att:ick, antiship strikes, 111(1 reconnaissance. Its low-altitude capabil- ities make it a formidable platform for high- speed military operations. Additionally, the BACKFIRE can he equipped with a probe to permit in-flight refueling to increase its range. This would improve its capabilities against the contiguous United States. The Soviets have assigned some FENCER strike aircraft to the air armies. The FENCER is a supersonic, variable-geometry-wing, all- weat her tighter-bomber that has been in oper- ation since 197-1. Four variants have been pro- duced, the most recent introduced in 198:1. The FENCER is still in production, and the number assigned to air armies is likely to increase over the next few years. Force Deuelopments. The BLACKJACK, a new long-range bomber larger than the US B-1B, is still undergoing flight-testing. The BLACKJACK will be faster than the US B-IB and may have about the same combat radius. Invent? y 500 400 - 300 - 200 - 100 - US and Intercontinental- Capable Bombers' Ossl; USSR (excluding aircraft assigned to Naval Aviation) 0 1980 1982 1984 Inventory - 500 - 400 - 300 - 200 - 100 0 1986 ' US forces include B-52, FB-111, and B-1 B; Soviet forces include BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE. ;19 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 METERS 60 45 30 15 0 UNREFUELED COMBAT RADIUS (KM) MAX SPEED (MACH) METERS 60 45 30 15 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Tu-95 BEAR BACKFIRE Bomber Aircraft BLACKJACK 11/I-TYPE BISON Tu-16 BADGER Tu-22 BLINDER 8,300 4,000 7,300 5,600 3,100 2,900 08 2.0 2.0 .85 .85 1.4 Bomber Aircraft B-1 B B-52G/H UNREFUELED COMBAT RADIUS (KM) 1,480 7,500 8,000 MAX SPEED (MACH) 2.5 1.25 0.9 The new homher will be capable of carryinf..,, cruise missiles. bombs, or a combination of' hoth and could he operational as early as 1988. It probably will he used first to replace the much less capable BEAR A bomber and then the BEAR (1 bomber. For several Years the Soviet Union has been developing the MIDAS, an aerial-re- fueling tanker version of the 1i-76/CANDID air- crak. When deployed in the near future, the new tanker can be used to support tactical and strategic operations and will expand sig- nificantly the ability of the Soviets to conduct longer range missions. Long-Range Cruise Missiles The AS-15, a small, air-launched, subsonic, low-altitude cruise missile, became operational in 198-4. It is similar in design to the US Tomahawk and has a range of' about 3,000 kilometers. It is currently deployed with the BEAR II and is expected to be carried on the BLACKJACK when that aircraft becomes op- erational. The BEAR H and eventually the BLACKJACK, in combinat km with the nuclear-armed 1S-15. will significantly increase Soviet capabilities for strategic intercontinen- tal air operations. The Soviets have a sea-launched version and a ground-launched version of the AS-15 un- der development. The sea-launched variant, the SS-NX-21, is small enough to be fired from standard Soviet torpedo tubes. Possihle launch platforms for the SS-NX-21 include tluve VICTOR classes of' nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs): the reconfigured YANK EE- Class SSN: and the new AKULA-, K E-, and SIERRA-Class SSNs. The SS-NX-21 is expected to become operational soon ;mild could he de- ployed on submarines off US and allied coasts. The ground-launched cruise missile variant, the SSC-X-i, will probably become operational this year. Its mission will he to support oper- ations in the Eurasian theater since the Sovi- ets are unlikely to deploy it outside the USSR and its range is too short for intercontinental strikes. The SSC-X-1 is being developed as a mobile system and probably will follow opera- tional procedures similar to the SS-20 I,RINF system. In addition to these variants of the AS-15, a larger cruise missile is under devel- opment. This missile, designated the SS-NX-2.1. will he flight-tested from a specially converted YANKEE-Class nuclear-powered cruise missile ;ittack submarine (SS( N). It could beet out op- erational by 1987. A ground-based version of this missile may be developed. All of' these cruise missiles probably will he equipped with nuclear warheads when first de- ployed and will he capable of attacking hard- ened targets. These systems could he accurate enough to permit the use of' conventional war- 33 (' 11 al) ter II Nuclear For ce )pe r at i () Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The BEAR H bomber is a launch platform for the 3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile. heads, depending on munitions developments and the types of guidance systems incorporated in their designs. With such warheads and guid- ance, cruise missiles would pose a significant non-nuclear threat to US and Eurasian air- fields and nuclear weapons. US Strategic Nuclear Forces In measuring and evaluating the continu- ing improvements being made by the USSR's strategic forces, it is useful to bear in mind the status of US forces, the modernization of which is discussed in Chapter VIII. By mid-1986, US strategic deterrent forces will include: ? 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs; ? 17 Titan ICBMs (the Titan force will be retired by the end of 1987); ? 240 B-52G/H model bombers plus about 2:3 aircraft undergoing maintenance and modification; ? 56 FB-111 bombers plus some 5 aircraft undergoing maintenance and modifica- tion; ? 17 B-IB bombers; ? 480 Poseidon (C-3 and C-4) fleet ballistic missile launchers; and ? 168 Trident fleet ballistic missile launchers. The historic and continuing objective of US nuclear forces is deterrence of nuclear and ma- METERS 15 10 5 SS-NX-21* WARHEADS 1 RANGE (KM) 3,000 'In development Long-Range Cruise Missiles AS-15 SSC X-4" 3,000 GLCM* SS -NX-24 3,000 1.7.5 TOMAHAWK ALCM GLCM SLCM 1 2,500 2,500 2,500 34 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 jor conventional aggression against the United St at es and its allies. This policy has preserved peace for a quarter-century and, in sharp con- trast to the Soviet priority accorded nuclear warfighting, is based on the conviction, widely held in the US, that there could be no win- ners in a nuclear conflict. The United States does not now have a first-strike policy, nor do we plan to acquire a first-strike capability in the future. Rather. US deterrence policy seeks to maintain the situation in which any poten- tial aggressor sees little to gain and much to lose by initiating hostilities against the United Stites or its allies. In turn, the maintenance of peace through deterrence provides the vital opportunity to pursue the US goal of eliminat- ing nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all states. Realizing these deterrence objectives re- quires the development. deployment, and main- tenance of' strategic forces whose size and characteristics clearly indicate to an opponent that his politico-military objectives cannot be achieved either through the employment of' nu- clear weapons or through political coercion based on nuclear advantages. Soviet Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces The Soviets began a vigorous effort to mod- ernize and expand their intermediate-range nu- clear force in 1977 with the deployment of' the first SS-20 LRINF missiles. Each SS-20 is equip- ped with three MIRVs, more than doubling the 35 Chapter 11 Nuclear Force Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Soviets have converted a YANKEE-Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine into a cruise missile attack submarine as the test platform for the large, long-range, nuclear-tipped SS-NX-24 cruise missile. The SS-NX-24 aboard submarines will add yet another dimension to the Soviet strategic threat to the United States in the years ahead. number of I R I NE warheads that existed in 1977 when the SS-20 was first deployed. The SS-20s also have significantly greater range and accu- racy and a much shorter reaction time than the missiles they are replacing. The Soviets have deployed 441 SS-20 launch- ers It bases west of the Urals and in the So- viet Far East. During 1984, the Soviets began construction of more new bases for the SS-20 than in any other year. Some of this construc- tion was to facilitate the relocation of SS-20 units that had been displaced from their for- mer bases. (These bases are being converted to accommodate the SS-25 mobile I( BM.) In spite of some conversions, real growth was observed in the SS-20 force in 1985. The mobility of the 55-20 svstem, unlike the 55-4, allows it to operate under both on- and :16 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles METERS 24 SS 18 12 6 0 REENTRY VEHICLES -4 SS 1 3 MIRVs -20 PERSHING .47' II GLCM 1 RANGE (KM) 2,000 5,000 1,800 2,500 DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS' 112 441 108 32 WARHEADS' 112 1,323 108 128 ' As of 31 December 1985 oil-road conditions. Consequently, the surviv- ability of the 55-20 is greatly enhanced because of the difficulty in detecting and targeting this system when it is field deployed. Further, the SS-20 launcher can be reloaded and refired, and the Soviets stockpile refire missiles. In addition to the SS-20s, the Soviets still maintain approximately 112 55-4 LRINF mis- siles, all of which are located in the western USSR opposite European NATO. Future Force Dec,clopment. The Soviets are Hight-testing an improved version of' the SS-20 which is expected to be more accurate than its predecessor. The mobile SS-20, in addition to being a more accurate and survivable LRINF missile sys- tem, does not require fixed sites to support launches. Shorter Range Missiles Current ...;).N'SiC171:.> Ild FOrCC Lel'el.S, In 1985, a brigade in the Belorussian Military District became the first operational unit to receive the 55-23 shorter range INF missile. The 55- 23. with its 500-kilometer range, miresents marked improvement in range and accuracy over the 300-kilometer SS-1 ,SCUD h surface-t surface missile it is now beginning to replace. If the SS-23 follows the same sequence of de- ployment seen with the SCUD B, the Western Military Districts will receive it first, followed by deployment to the Group of Soviet Forces. Germany. Each front commander also may have a hri- gade of 12 to 18 SCALEBOARD missiles avail- able that are more accurate than the older missiles they replaced. Over 70 SCALEBOA RD launchers are opposite European NATO and 40 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border. There is a battalion opposite southwest Asia/eastern Turkey, and one brigade is maintained in strategic reserve. Because of their greatly increased accuracy. the new short-range mis- siles can also he employed effectively with non- nuclear warheads. In 1984, the Soviets forward-deployed the SCALEBOARD short-range ballistic missile to Eastern Europe. These front-level weapins. which normally accompany Soviet combined arms formations, are now in position to strike deep into Western Europe. Sea-Based Forces The Soviets also maintain and operate 13 37 Chapter II Nuclear Force Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 GOLF II-Class ballistic missile submarines equipped with :355-N-5 SI.BMs each. Six GOLF Ils are based in the Baltic, where they pose a threat to most of Europe, while the remaining seven patrol the Sea of Japan, where they can he employed against targets in the Far East. Short-Range Nuclear Forces Current Systems and Force Levels. Soviet armies and fronts have missile brigades equip- ped with 12 to 18 55-1C SCUD SRBMs. Over 500 SCUD launchers are located opposite Eu- ropean NATO, and over 100 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East. Additi- onally, about 75 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey, with one brigade held in strategic reserve. The Soviet division commander has a variety of nuclear assets available to him. The most predominant such system at division level is the unguided free rocket over ground (FROG), which is deployed in a battalion of four launch- ers. The Soviets are replacing FROGs with the more accurate, longer range SS-21s in some divisions opposite NATO. There are now 500 FROG and SS-21 launchers opposite NATO. Soviet Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Deployments* LEGEND Reentry Vehicles SS-4 SS-5 SS-20 ? Does not count retires 800 - 600 - 400 - - 200 - - Deployment and Target Coverage 1986 - 1,600 - 1,400 - 1,200 - 1,000 - 800 - 600 - 400 - 200 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 38 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the forward edge of' the battle area and at greater depths within the military theater of' operations US Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces The initial deployment of' Pershing its and ground-launched cruise missiles (GL('Ms) be- gan in Europe in late 1983. According to the agreed schedule, the number of' US LRINF missiles deployed in Europe on 31 December 1985 totaled 236 missiles on 140 launchers. These consist of' 108 Pershing- It missiles on 108 launchers and 128 GI,CNIs on 32 launchers. The deployment of' US Pershing II and ground- launched cruise missiles responds to the Soviet N F missile threat to NATO. Shorter Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Kilometers 6.000 - 5,000 - 4,000 - 3,000 2,000 - 1,000 - Land -Based Ranges Missiles/Aircraft Kilometers 6,000 - 5,000 - 4,000 - 3,000 - 2,000 - 1,000 LRINF Up to 5,500 km SRINF to km SNF Up 1.800 Under 500 km Another 215 FROG launchers are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; about 100 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern Turkey; and about 75 are in strategic reserve. Front commanders also have available nuclear-capable artillery tubes. Three new self- propelled, nuclear-capable artillery pieces are being added to the inventory: a 152-mm gun, a 203-mm self-propelled gun, and a 240-mm self- propelled mortar. When fully deployed, the total number of these new nuclear-capable ar- tillery tubes plus older I52-mm howitzers that are also capable of' firing nuclear rounds will exceed 10,000. Force Deuelopments. As in all other nu- clear attack forces, the Soviets probably will continue to seek ways to improve the capa- bilities of' their tactical missiles and nuclear artillery. These improvements will be accom- plished through incremental modernization of existing systems as well as through the intro- duction of entirely new systems. The Soviets probably will continue to seek improvements for their short-range ballistic missile force. Advancements in warhead capa- bilities, accuracy, and reliability are expected. Combined arms commanders would then have enhanced non-nuclear targeting options and more flexible and survivable SRHYls. These systems will be capable of' delivering nuclear, chemical, or conventional warheads closer to With the removal of' US Pershing Is and the Soviet SS-23s replacing SCUDs in Europe, the Soviet Union will maintain its substantial numerical superiority in shorter range non- strategic nuclear missiles while improving the qualitative characteristics of its forces. The USSR also has a significant numerical advan- tage in SRINF aircraft and is reducing the qualitative advantage NATO has enjoyed. This is occurring despite NATO's SRINF aircraft modernization program, in which older aircraft are being replaced by the F-16 and Tc an ado. Short-Range Nuclear Forces Short-range nuclear f'orces (SNF) consist of' tube artillery and missiles of' much shorter range than INF. The United States' SNF is made up of Lance tactical missiles and nuclear artillery. Although SNF artillery traditionally has been an area of NATO advantage, the bal- ance has shifted dramatically in favor of the Soviets in recent years. The Soviets also have achieved parity in overall numbers of SNF 39 Chapter II Nuclear Force ()perations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 40 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Over the last 25 years. the Soviets have in- creased their active and passive defenses in a clear and determined it to blunt the ef- fect of any attack on the Soviet Union. The USSR has major passive defense programs, in- cluding civil defense and structural hardening, designed to protect important assets from at It also has extensive active defense sys- tems which utilize weapons systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key as- sets. Soviet developments in the area of active defenses fall into three major categories: air de- fense; ballistic missile defense based on current technologies; and research and development on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Important recent activities in the Soviet Strategic Defense Program (SSDP) include: ? upgrading and expanding tile world's only operational ABM system around Moscow; ? construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballis- tic missile detection and tracking radar, which violates the 1972 ABM Treaty; ? extensive research into 'tdvanced tech- nologies for defense against ballistic missiles, including laser weapons, par- ticle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons; ? maintaining the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system; The Soviet Strategic Defense Program is involved in extensive research on advanced technologies for defense against ballistic mis- siles, including work on particle beam weapons, kinetic energy weapons, and laser weapons. The USSR already has ground- based lasers, conceptually illustrated here, capable of interfering with some US satellites and could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s. 41 chapter Ill trategic Defense and spare Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 ? modernizing their strategic air defense forces: and ? improving passive defenses by maintain- ing- deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel and enhancing the surviv- ability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening. Evidence of the importance the Soviets at- tach to defensive damage limitation can be traced to the beginning of the nuclear age. The National Air Def'ense Forces became an in- dependent service in the late 1950s and since 1959 have generally ranked third in prece- dence within the Soviet Armed Forces, fol- lowing the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces. By the mid-1900s, two new mission areas ASAI operations and ABM defense were added to the National Air Defense mission. As a result, Soviet strategic defense against ballistic missiles includes the world's only op- erational ABM system and a large and ex- panding research and development program. In addition, the Soviets have the world's only op- erational antisatellite system, which has the capability to destroy critical US and other satellites in low-earth orbit. The Soviet emphasis on the necessity of' re- search on ballistic missile defense was demon- strated in 1972 by then-Minister of Defense Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty. Speaking to the Soviet Presidium, he said that the Treaty "places no limitations whatsoever On the conducting of research and experimental work directed towards solving the problem of defending the country from nu- clear missile st rikes.- The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine md strategy. In the event of nuclear war, Soviet offensive forces are to: ? destroy or disrupt enemy nuclear- associated command, control, and commu- nications: and ? destroy or neutralize as many of' the en- emy's nuclear weapons as possible on the ground or at sea before they are launched. Soviet defensive forces, lending greater cred- ibility to offensive forces, are to: ? intercept and destroy surviving weapons aircraft and missiles before they reach t heir targets; and ? protect the Party, the state, military forces, industrial infrastructure, and the essential working population with ac- tive and passive measures against those weapons that survive attacks hy Soviet offensive forces. In pursuit of' these goals, the USSR places considerable stress on the need for effective strategic defenses as well as offensive forces. In the Soviet view, the USSR could best achieve its aims in a nuclear war if' it attacks first, de- stroying much of the US and allied capability for retaliation. Defensive measures, both ic- tive and passive, would in turn prevent those enemy forces that survived a Soviet first strike from destroying targets in the USSR. In Military Strategy originally published in 1962 Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy defined the aim of Soviet strategic defenses in this way: ''They have the task of creating an invincible system for the defense of' the entire country.... While, in the last war, it was sufficient to de- stroy 15-20 percent of' the attacking air Opera- tion, now it is necessary to assure, essentially, 100 percent destruction of' all attacking air- planes and missiles.- Soviet defensive force de- velopments over the past 25 years demonstrate that the strategy articulated by Sokolovskiy still applies. Ballistic Missile Defense The world's only operational ABM system is maintained tround Moscow. In 1978, the Sovi- ABM Interceptor Coverage 49 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management Radars HEN HOUSE radars DOG HOUSE CAT HOUSE radars New large phased-array radars Krasnoyarsk radar els began to upgrade and expand that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The original single-layer Moscow ABM system included bI reloadahle above-ground launch- ers at 4 complexes and DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE battle management radars south of Nloscow. Each complex consisted of TRY ADD tracking and guidance radars and GALOSH exoatmospheric interceptors (nuclear-armed, ground-based missiles designed to intercept warheads in space shortly before they reenter the Earth's at When completed, the modernized Moscow ABM system will he a two-layer defense com- posed of silo-based, long-range, modified GA- LOS11 interceptors; silo-based GAZELLE high-acceleration endoatmospheric interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmo- sphere; associated engagement, guiclance and battle management radar systems; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may he reloadable. The new system will have the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty and could be fully operational by 1987. The Soviet system for detection and tracking 43 Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch- detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars, and a series of large phased-array radars. The current launch-detection satellite net- work can provide about 30 minutes warning after any US ICBM launch and can determine the general on of the missile. Two over-the- horizon radars directed at the US ICBM fields also could give the same 30 minutes warning. The next operational layer of ballistic mis- sile detection consists of' l large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars at 6 lo- cations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of antiballistic missile forces. The capability of these radars has been improved since the signing of' the ABM Treaty. The Soviets are now constructing a network The 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, top left, at 6 locations on the periphery of the USSR, provide warning and target-tracking data in support of the Soviet ABM system. The DOG HOUSE radar, top right, provides battle management for the antiballistic mis- sile interceptors around Moscow. The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the sit- ing, orientation, and capability of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, bottom left. The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballis- tic missile detection and tracking radar at Pechora are shown at bottom right. The design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora radar. Unlike the Pechora radar, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not meet the ABM Treaty requirement that early warning radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be oriented outward. 44 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 of six new large phased-array radars that can track more ballistic missiles with greater accu- racy than the existing H EN HOUSE network. Five of these radars duplicate or supplement the coverage of the HEN HOUSE network, but with greatly enhanced capability. The sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage against ballistic mis- sile at Together, the six new large phased- array radars form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest Soviet Union, around Siberia. to the Caucasus in the sout hwest. The United States is now constructing new ballistic missile early warning radars, known as PAVE PAWS, that are located on the pe- riphery of our territory and oriented outward. These radars are much less capable than Soviet large phased-array radars. Both the US and the USSR, in signing the ABM Treaty, recog- nized the need for ballistic. missile early warn- ing radars. At the same time, they recognized that ballistic missile early warning radars can detect and track warheads at great distances incl therefore have a significant antiballistic missile potential. Such an ABM capability would play :in important role in a nationwide ABM defense, which the treaty was designed to prevent. As a result, the US and the So- viet Union agreed that future ballistic missile early warning radars must be located on a na- ticin's periphery and be oriented outward. In that way, the desirable and legitimate goal of' early warning could be advanced while mini- mizing the danger that an effective nationwide battle management network could result. The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for bal- listic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning. It violates the 1.)72 ABM Treaty as it is not located within a 150-kilometer radius of the national capi- tal (Moscow) as required of ABM radars, nor is it located on the periphery of the Soviet. Union and pointed outward as required for early warning radars. It is 3,700 kilometers from Moscow and is situated some 750 kilome- ters from the nearest border Mongolia. More- over, it is oriented not toward that border, but. across approximately 4,099 kilometers of Soviet territ.w.y to the northeast.. The Soviet Union has claimed that the Kras- noyarsk radar is designed for space tracking, rather than ballistic missile early warning, and therefore does not violate the ABM Treaty. Its design, however, is not suited for a space- tracking role, and the radar would, in any event, contribute little to the existing Soviet space-tracking network. Indeed, the design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of other radars that are known and acknowledged by the Soviets to be for ballis- tic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning. The growing Soviet network of' large phased- array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, of which the Krasnoyarsk radar is a part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take years to construct and their existence might allow the Soviet Union to move rather quickly to construct a nationwide ABM defense if it. chooses to do so. The Soviets also are developing components of a new ABM system that would allow them to construct individual ABM sites in a matter of' months rather than the years that are required for more traditional ABM systems. Soviet ac- tivities in this regard potentially violate the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development of' a mobile land-based ABM system or compo- nents. We estimate that by using these com- ponents the Soviets could by the early 1990s quickly deploy an ABM system to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets in the western USSR and east of' the Urals. In addition, the Soviets have probably vio- lated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air missile (SAM) components in an ABM mode by conducting tests involving the use of SAM air defense radars in ABM-related testing activi- ties. Moreover, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 SAM systems may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles. Taken together, all of' the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related activities are more sig- nificant and more ominous than any one considered individually. Cumulatively, they suggest. that the USSR may be preparing to de- ploy rapidly an ABM defense of' its national ter- ritory, contrary to the provisions of' the ABM Treaty. Advanced ABM Technologies In the late 1960s, in line with its longstand- ing emphasis On strategic defense, the Soviet Union initiated i substantial research program into advanced technologies, some of' which are 45 Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 applicable for defense against ballistic missiles. That program covers many of the same tech- nologies involved in the US Strategic Defense Initiative but represents a far greater invest- ment of plant space, capital, and manpower. Laser Weapons The USSR's laser program is much larger than US efforts and involves over 10,000 scientists and engineers and more than a half- dozen major research and development facili- ties and test ranges. Much of this research takes place at the Sary Shag-an Missile Test Center where the Soviets also conduct tradi- tional ABM research. Facilities there are es- timated to have several lasers for air defense, lasers capable of' damaging some components of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile defense applications. A laser weapons program of' the magnitude of' the Soviet Union's effort would cost roughly $1 billion per year in the United States. The Soviets are conducting research on three types of gas lasers considered promis- ing for weapons applications the gas-dynamic laser, the electric discharge laser, and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements in this area, in terms of' output power, have been impressive. The Soviets also are aware of' the military potential of' visible and very short wave-length lasers. They are investigating excimer, free-electron, and x-ray lasers and have been developing argon-ion lasers for over a decade. The Soviets appear generally capable of sup- plying the prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed-energy weapons. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydro- dynamic generator which produces over 15 megawatts of electrical power a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their targets. They produced a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an astrophys- ical telescope in 1978 and claimed that this was Launch Detection Moscow ABM Long-Range Radars Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs Satellites Radars Original System New System HEN HOUSE Rapidly Deployable ABM Krasnoyarsk Type Ground-Based Laser ABM Weapon ASAT Space Weapons R&D phase Direct Ascent Capability" Co-Orbital Ground-Based Laser I Deployment phase I Laser Particle Beam ABM Treaty President's SDI Speech 1955 1965 1975 Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space-based weapons, were in place prior to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, US ABM/Space Defense research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested. 'Potential capability of the Moscow ABM system. 1985 46 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Systems Launch-detection satellites Over-the-horizon radars EW radars L_1 a prototype for a 25-meter mirror. A large mir- ror is considered necessary for a space-based laser weapon. Unlike the US, the USSR has now progressed in some cases beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that have a limited capability to attack US satellites and could have prototype space-based antisatellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. The Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s and could begin testing compo- nents for a large-scale deployment system in the early 1990s. The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper- ational system will require more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until the late 1990s or after the year 2000. If technolog-y developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based antisatellite lasers in the mid-to- late 1990s and might be able to deploy space- based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000. The Soviets' ef- forts to develop high-energy air defense laser weapons are likely to lead to ground-based de- ployments in the early 1990s and naval deploy- ments in the mid-1990s. Particle Beam Weapons Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been involved in research to explore the feasibility of space-based weapons that would use parti- cle beams. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon in- tended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capa- ble of physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably would require several addi- tional years of research and development. Soviet efforts in particle beams. and par- ticularly ion sources and radio frequency quadrapole accelerators for part icle beams, are very impressive. In fact, much of the US under- standing of how particle beams could be made into practical defensive weapons is based on Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Radio Frequency Weapons The USSR has conducted research in the use of strong radio frequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy crith-al electronic components of ballistic missile war- heads or satellites. The Soviets could test a ground-based radio frequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s. Kinetic Energy Weapons The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic en- ergy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mech- anism. In the 1960s. the USSR developed an experimental "gun- that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metiil such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 2.5 kilome- ters per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum. Long-range, space-based kinetic energy sys- tems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the in or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space- based system useful for satellite space station defense or for close-in attack by it maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are ad- 47 Chapter Ill Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor designed to destroy space targets with a multi- pellet blast is launched from the Tyuratam Space Complex, where two launch pads and storage for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available. equate for effective kinetic. energy weapons for use igainst some objects in space. Computer and Sensor Technology Advanced technology weapons programs including potential advanced defenses against ballistic. missiles and ASATs are dependent on remote sensor and computer technologies, areas in which the West currently leads the So- viet Union. 'Me Soviets, therefore, are devot- ing considerable resources to acquiring Western know-how and improving their ahili- ties and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves the in- creasing exploitation of' open and clandestine access to Western technology. Vol. example, the Soviets have long been engaged in a well effort to purchase illegally US high- technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors through third parties. Antisatellite Operations The USSR has had for more than a dozen years the world's only operational ant isatellite 48 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 system, which is launched into the sube orbit as its target satellite and, when it gets close enough, destroys the satellite by exploding a conventional warhead. Given the complexity of launch, target tracking, and radar-guided METERS 60 40 20 SL-3 intercept, the Soviet ASAT system is far from primitive. Soviet ASAT tests have been largely successful, indicating an operational system fully capable of' performing its mission. In addition, the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM Soviet Space Launch Vehicles SL-4 LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)' 290,000 310,000 LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)' 410,000 420,000 PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)' 6,300 7,500 METERS 80 SL-X-16 MEDIUM-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE2 60 SL-6 SL-8 SL-11 120,000 180,000 310,000 420,000 160,000 280,000 2,100 1,700 4,000 REUSABLE SPACE PLANE IN DEVELOPMENT 40 20 SL-W SHUTTLE2 SL-12 SL-13 680,000 900,000 670,000 900,000 19,500 SL-14 190,000 280,000 5,500 SL-W HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE2 LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)' 400,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)' 600,000 3,000,000 3,000,000 PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)' 15,000+ 30,000 100,000 ' Approximate. 2 In final stages of development. 49 Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 50 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 interceptor deployed around 'Moscow has an inherent ASAT capability, and Soviet ground- based lasers may he ible to damage some com- ponents of satellites. Furthermore. as noted previously, the Soviets are engaged in research and. in some cases, development of we:11)(01s which ultimately may serve as ballistic missile defense systems but probably will first provide ASAT capabilities. Operations in Space The Soviets operate several space systems that support both military and civil users. These include manned spacecraft, reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles, new space boosters. and a variety of other support systems. The Soviets have made progress in their space plane and space shuttle programs, with the first flight of a Soviet shuttle expected in late 1080 or 1987. The primary focus of Soviet space operations is military, as evidenced by the fact that at least 70 percent of Soviet space launches are purely military in nature and support both of- fensive and defensive operations. The tJSSR attempts to mask the true nature of most of its space programs by declaring that launches are "scientific,- usually without providing details on what kind of "scientific- mission is being conducted. The results of these "scientific- missions are rarely published or even disclosed. Military Support from Space The Soviets are increasing their efforts to develop and deploy space systems to SlIpport military operations. They now operate sev- eral space-based reconnaissance and sur- veillance systems, two of' which have no US counterpart. The latter are the nuclear- powered Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satel- lite (RORSAT) and the Electronic Intelligence As part of its efforts to militarize space, the USSR has pressed forward with an active re- search and development program, centered at Tyuratam, to deploy increasingly capable space-based reconnaissance and surveillance satellites as well as space-based military com- munications systems. Soviet achievements in manned space operations are typified by their continued use of the SALYUT-7 space sta- tion and development of their soon-to-be- tested space shuttle, seen here mated to the heavy-lift launch vehicle. 51 Chapter DI Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT), hoth of which are used to locate and target naval forces. Two RORSATs were launched in August 1085 in time to support a Soviet naval exercise in September. This was not the first time RORSAT launchings have taken place prior to military exercises. The Soviet satellite reconnaissance program has matured and has incorporated significant enhancements. The Soviets have improved I heir satellite imagery reconnaissance capabil- ity and are gradually improving their space- based electronic intelligence assets as well. They have demonstrated great versatility and flexibility in launching and maintaining sev- eral surveillance systems in orbit and are capa- ble of redirecting them for worldwide missions ls situations dictate. The Soviets continue to operate an extensive network of' satellites for missile launch detec- tion and attack warning missions. For a num- ber of years, the USSR has had the capability to monitor US ICBM fields. The Soviets have also pressed ahead with the development and deployment of a global nav- igation satellite system known as GLONASS. When fully developed, this system will provide three-dimensional (latitude, longitude, and al- titude) positioning data. New Launch Systems Souiet Military Power 1985 reported two new space launch vehicles under development, it heavy-lift system and a medium-lift system. Launch pad compatibility testing has contin- ued on the heavy-lift vehicle, a Saturn V-C lass booster, and the Soviets have flight-tested the Titan III-Class medium-lift vehicle. The heavy-lift booster system apparently will be used to launch the Soviet shuttle orbiter, a craft similar to the US space shuttle or- biter. This launch system will also be able to carry very heavy payloads of about 100,000 kilograms, enabling the Soviets to assemble very large modular space stations in orbit. This type of system could also be instrumental in the launch of other heavy payloads, such as directed-energy ASAT and ballistic missile de- Rinse weapons. The medium-lift booster may be used to I aunch the Soviet space plane, which is a differ- ent program from the space shuttle. This small, manned ciraf't could be used Rw real-time recon- naissance missions, satellite repair and main- tenance, crew transport, space station defense, and enemy satellite inspection or destruction. When these new launch systems become op- erational, the Soviets will have ten different. types of' expendable launch vehicles and two reusable manned space vehicles. These sys- tems will give the Soviets a versatile and re- dundant capability to conduct and augment. military operations in space. In addition, the Soviets would have a distinct advantage dur- ing times of crises or hostilities because of' the launch surge capability provided by their large number of' launch vehicles. Manned Operations In early 1985, the Soviets experienced trou- ble with their SALYUT-7 space station that resulted in failure of its electrical system. They announced in March it had fulfilled its mission and was being "mothballed.- In June, how- ever, two cosmonauts were launched from Tyu- ratam aboard SOYUZ T-13. Using manual ren- dezvous procedures, the cosmonauts succeeded in docking with the inactive station. Efforts to revive the space station commenced, and within two weeks the crew was operating the station normally and was probably conducting military-related experiments. This repair mis- sion provided valuable experience in space sta- tion maintenance that will contribute greatly to Soviet efforts to achieve a significant, per- 110- 100 - 90- 70 60 50 40 30 - 20 10- 0 1960 S and Space Launches USSR \ US A 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 -10 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 52 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 manent manned presence in near-Earth orbit. Last September, the Soviets conducted the first space station crew rotation in the history of manned space flight when SOYUZ T-14 deliv- ered three additional cosmonauts to SALYUT- 7. One T-13 cosmonaut and one T-14 cosmonaut subsequently deorbited on SOYUZ T-13. Crew rotation will become commonplace when the Soviets deploy their first large modular space station, which is likely to he launched in the late 1980s. 'Elle Soviets took a major step to- ward this capability with the launch of an ad- vanced SALYUT station with six docking ports in earl v 1986. Further progress toward a deployment of a new station was demonstrated by COSMOS- Iti86, which docked with SALYUT-7 in early October 1985. Such modules have a high- capacity cargo transport capability and could be outfitted as reconnaissance platforms, nu- clear power "substations,- or laboratories for various types of research and experimentation. These modules will serve as interchange- able (.omponents of future large modular space stations, and each is capable of autonomous operation. Once deployed, this space station will provide the Soviets with a manned space- based military capability for missions such as II connaissance, command and control, ASAT, and ballistic missile defense support operations as well as satellite maintenance and repair. Such space stations will probably be serviced and supported by the Soviet shuttle and space plane. The Soviets have realized that men in space can significantly contribute to military opera- tions. Soviet cosmonauts aboard a space sta- tion in low-earth orbit can observe large areas of the Earth's surface and transmit real-time infOrmation to military forces below. From the altitude at which SALYUT operates, much of' the Earth's surface can be seen with great clar- ity. If supported with optics, a cosmonaut could make out details such as airfields, port facil- ities, major transportation routes, and ships at sea. Passive Defenses In the more traditional areas of strategic de- fense, Soviet military doctrine calls for passive and active defenses to act in conjunction to ensure wartime survival. Physical hardening of in assets to make them more resistant to attack is an important passive defense tech- nique. The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities, and key command and con- trol centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of' the current US retaliatory force would be ineffective against these hardened targets. Soviet leaders and managers at all levels of' the government and Communist Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers in ad- dition to many deep bunkers and blast shel- ters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redundant system, patterned after a similar system designed for the Soviet Armed Forces, provides more than 1,500 hardened alternate fa- cilities for more than 1753)00 key Party and government personnel throughout the USSR. In contrast, the US passive defense effort is far smaller and more limited: it is in no way com- parable to the comprehensive Soviet program. Elaborate plans also have been made for the full mobilization of' the national economy in support of the war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equip- ed with blast shelters for the work force, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of' selected production capabil- ities. By planning for the survival of' the essen- tial work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute vital production programs using those indus- trial components that could be redirected or salvaged after an attack. In addition, the USSR has greatly empha- sized mobility as a means of' enhancing the survivability of' military assets. The SS-20 and SS-25 missiles, for example, are mobile. Rail- mobile deployment of' the SS-X-24 is expected soon. The Soviets are also developing an ex- tensive network of mobile command, control, and communications facilities. Air Defense The Soviet Union has since the 1950s in- vested enormous resources in a wide array of strategic air defense weapons systems. Taken together, the Soviet strategic air defense net is a potent and increasingly capable force which would attempt to limit the retaliatory capability of' our strategic bombers and cruise missiles. With the emergence of' the Soviet cruise missile and the enhanced horn her threat to the United States, the US has under- 53 Chapter 111 Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 METERS 30 20 10 0 Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft Tu-128* FIDDLER B MG-25 Su-15 Su-27 FOXBAT A/E FLAGON E/F FLANKER SPEED (MACH) RADIUS (KM)** ARMAMENT WINGSPAN (M) METERS 20 10 0 SPEED (MACH) RADIUS (KM)" ARMAMENT WINGSPAN (M) 2.8 1,450 4 AAMs 14 M1G-29 M1G-31 YaK-28* MiG-23 FULCRUM FOXHOUND FIREBAR FLOGGER B/G 2.0 1,000 4 AAMs 9 2.0 1,500 6 AAMs 14 1.5 1,500 4 AAMs 18 18 900 2 AAMs 12 2.3 1,150 6 AAMs 8 (Swept) North American Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft F-106A F-15A F-15C*** DELTA DART EAGLE EAGLE 2.0 1,110 5.AAMs 12 2.5 1,200 8 AAMs 13 No external fuel ? Conformal tanks ?? Subsonic area intercept with external fuel ***** Canadian taken measures to improve its air defense IP hi lit i es The Soviets have deployed numerous strate- gic air defense systems with capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high al- titudes. They are now in the midst of a major program to improve their capabilities against aircraft and cruise missiles flying at low alti- tudes. That effort includes partial integration of strategic and tactical air defense assets, the upgt?ading of early warning and surveillance capabilities, the deployment of more efficient data transmission systems, and the develop- ment and initial deployment of' new aircraft, ;issociated ;iir-to-air missiles, surface-to-air mis- siles (ANI s). and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Currently, the Soviets have more than 9,000 strategic SAM hiunchers, over 4,600 tactical SAM launchers, and some 10,000 air defense radars. More than 1,200 Air Defense Forces interceptor aircraft are dedicated to strategic defense. An additional 2,800 interceptors as- 2.5 1,770 8 AAMs 13 2.3 1,150 6 AAMs 12 CF-18**** HORNET 1.8 1,170 6 AAMs 12 2.4 2,100 8 AAMs 14 signed to Soviet Air Forces (SAE) will be drawn upon for strategic defense missions. Collec- tively, these assets present a formidable de- fense barrier against any attack. The most capable Soviet air defense inter- ceptor aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target en- gagement capability. More than 100 FOX- H OUNDs are now operationally deployed at several locations from the Arkhangelsk area in the northwestern USSR to the Far East Mili- tary District. Two new fighter interceptors, the Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities and are designed to be highly maneuverable in air-to-air combat. The look-down/shoot-down capability was acquired from the US through espionage. The Soviets have deployed over 100 MiG-29/FULCRUM aircraft to operational units and have recently begun to deploy the Su- 27/FLANKER. These three ;iircraft ;ire equipped with two new air-to-air missiles the long-range AA-9 (for the FOXHOUND) and 54 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the medium-range AA-10 (for the FULCRUM mid FLANK ER) that can be used against low- flying targets. The USSR is also deploying the MAINSTAY AWACS aircraft which will improve substan- tially Soviet capabilities for early warning and air combat command and control, especially against low-flying aircraft. The MIDAS, a tanker variant of the [1-76/CANDID which should he operational soon, will significantly increase the endurance of' the new air defense aircraft, particularly the MAINSTAY and some of the new fighters if' an air refueling capabil- ity for them is incorporated. The Soviets maintain the world's most exten- sive early warning system for air defense. It is composed of' a widespread network of' ground- based radars linked operationally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies. As previously noted, more than 10,000 surveillance radars of var- ious types provide virtually complete cover- Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability FOXHOUND FULCRUM FLOGGER FOX BAT FIR EBAR FIDDLER FLAGON 1985 No Look-down FOXHOUND FLANKER FULCRUM FLOGGER FOXBAT FLAGON 1988 estimate FOXHOUND FLANKER FULCRUM FLOGGER FOX BAT 1992 estimate Limited True Look-down Look-down L_I Shoot down 100% age at medium-to-high altitudes over the USSR and, in some areas, well beyond the Soviet Union's borders. Three over-the-horizon radars for ballistic missile detection could provide ad- ditional warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft. The USSR also has an active research and development program to improve its air surveil- lance network. In 198;I, it began to deploy two new types of air surveillance radars which will enhance Soviet capabilities for air defense, electronic warfare, and early warning of cruise The new generation of all-weather air defense interceptors equipped with a true look-down/ shoot-down radar includes the MiG-29/FULCRUM, armed with the AA-10 missile, top left, and the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, armed with the AA-9 missile, above. 55 Chapter III St rat('gic I)efense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The mobile version of the SA-10 SAM is in the process of being deployed. missile and bomber attacks. The Soviets are also continuing to deploy improved air surveil- lance data systems that can rapidly pass data from outlying radars through the air surveil- lance network to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM command posts. Soviet strategic surface-to-air missiles pro- vide low-to-high-altitude barrier, area, and ter- minal defenses under all weather conditions. Five systems are now operational: the SA-I, SA-2, and SA-3, and the more capable SA-5 and SA-10. The recent Soviet air defense reorga- nization permits more efficient integration of strategic and tactical SAM systems. Although most tactical SAMs have a shorter range than their strategic counterparts, many have bet- ter capabilities against targets flying at low altitudes. The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high- performance aircraft at all altitudes, will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles, and may have the potential to engage some types of strategic ballistic missiles. 56 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 METERS 12 9 6 3 0 RANGE (KM) EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SA-1 50 MEDIUM Soviet Strategic Surface-to-Air Missiles SA-2 SA-5 50 MEDIUM SA-3 20 LOW-TO- MEDIUM 300 MEDIUM- TO-HIGH SA-10 m.4 100 LOW-TO- HIGH SA-X-12 100 LOW-TO- HIGH Soviet Strategic SAM Air Defense Barrier Illustrated from Fixed Sites* Kilometers 30 20- 10- 0 300 SA-1 SA-2 SA-3 150 SA-5 SA-10, SA-X-12 Kilometers 0 150 300 'All SAMs have a minimum effective altitude. Over the years the Soviets have continued to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have repeat- edly modified this system. Further deployment and upgrading are probable to enhance the SA-5's capability to work in conjunction with low-altitude systems like the SA-10. The SA-10 has some capability against low- altitude targets with small radar cross-sections, such as cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site was operational in 1980. Over 60 sites are now op- erational, and work is progressing on at least another 30. More than half of these sites are lo- cated near Moscow: this emphasis on Moscow and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on terminal defense of command and control, military, and key indus- trial complexes. In keeping with their drive toward mobility as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are in the process of deploying a mobile ver- sion of the SA-10. This mobile version could be used to support Soviet theater forces and to permit periodic changes in the location of SA-10 sites within the USSR to counter US retaliatory forces more effectively. The Soviets are also flight-testing another important mobile SAM system, the SA-X-12, which is capable of intercepting aircraft at all altitudes as well as cruise missiles and short- range ballistic missiles. As previously noted, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles as well. This is a serious development because these systems are expected to be de- ployed widely throughout the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They could, if properly supported, add significant point-target defense coverage to a nationwide Soviet ABM deployment. 57 Chapter III Strategic Defense and Space Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 58 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Control of theater operations rests with the Soviet Supreme High Command (V( N). Niajor elements of all five of t he rSSN's branches of the armed forces (ground, naval, air. air de- fense. tri(1 Strategic Rocket Forces) would be (1(.votvd to the,0(..r warfium A iarg,, (Thripo_ nent of these forces would he retained imme- diately under the control of the \( I\ to he employed or allocated at its discretion. These elements include strategic aviation air irniies. SS-1 and SS-20 units of the Strategic Rocket Forces. airborne forces. military transport ayi- ition, a large strategic reserve of ground furces (primarily units stationed in the interior mili- tary districts of the USSR). and an extensive logistic support structure. A High Command of Forces in the TVI) would have primary responsibility for conduct- ing the theater strategic operation. rider its control would he several fronts, a naval fleet (if applicable). strategic ail' defense elements in the TVD. and ;tny strategic air army and tirborne elements allocated by the V( K. The front is the basic comhined arms compo- nent of theater forces responsible for land op- erations. The closest NATO equivalent would he an .triny group with organic. tictical avia- tion. A front consists of several combined arms The USSR maintains the world's largest stockpile of chemical warfare agents. Vir- tually all Soviet conventional weapons systems mortars, artillery pieces, helicopters such as these Mi-24/HINDs, aircraft, and long-range tactical missiles--can deliver chemical munitions in the forward battle zone and against rear areas. Furthermore, Soviet research institutes are engaged in develop- ing new chemical agents with even greater lethality and are investigating binary weapons systems that would reduce the hazards asso- ciated with handling and storage. -9 Chapter IV Sox iet orces for Theater Operation:, Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 and tank ;irmies, a large assigned aviation ele- ment called the Air Forces of the Front, and an extensive support structure including several surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades, an ar- tillery division, and several surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades. Armies have a com- bined arms structure similar to a front, with three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions constituting their basic maneuver elements. A tank army has a preponderance of tank divi- sions while a combined arms army has a pre- ponderance of motorized rifle divisions. Theater Warfare Capabilities A command system that will ensure effec- tive control of diverse operations is essential to the conduct of theater strategic operations. The Soviets have made a significant investment in the control structure of' their various TVDs, including the construction of several hundred hardened, hunkered command posts and com- munications centers; the creation of an exten- sive communications system in peacetime; and the establishment of numerous, well-equipped mobile signal and headquarters support units. In wartime, the Soviets would field a robust and survivable command system featuring nu- merous hardened, fixed, and mobile command posts; a dense communications network pro- viding redundant channels between command posts; and extensive camouflage, concealment, and deception. In 1985, the Soviets began activating peace- time High Commands within the TVDs with high-ranking officers appointed as permanent commanders in chief (CINCs). This increased the readiness of' Soviet forces by moving the peacetime command structure much closer to the wartime mode. Marshal Ogarkov, the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, is believed to have been appointed head of the crucial Western TVD oriented against NATO's Central Region. The Soviets are increasing the speed and effectiveness of their command, control, and communications (C") system by introducing nu- merous computer systems and other automated aids. Commanders and staffs are being as- sisted in rapid decisionmaking by computerized combat models resulting from a large military operations research effort. The Soviets have also employed the results of' numerous Western operations research efforts published in open- source journals. Planned TVD Operations As expressed in their literature, the Soviets believe that the Western TVD would be the scene of the decisive conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, they have deployed a very large force there that includes their best equipped and most ready units. So- viet ground forces in the theater have the most modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery in the Soviet inventory. Moreover, air forces in the TVD comprise over 37 percent of' all the Soviet tactical aviation assets. Within the Western TVD, deep-interdiction attacks against NATO airfields and other deep targets would be conducted by FENCER air- craft as well as almost 400 Strategic Aviation BACKFIRE B/C, BLINDER, and BADGER G medium bombers stationed in the western So- viet Union. Force capabilities will continue to improve as additional BACKFIREs replace older BADG E Rs. The combined Baltic Fleet, consisting of' the Soviet Baltic Fleet plus the East German and Polish navies, has a substantial force of' prin- cipal surface combatants and relatively large numbers of missile-capable minor combatants. The Polish and East German navies are partic- ularly strong in amphibious warfare and would contribute substantially to Soviet amphibious operations in the Baltic. The Soviets envision a complex theater strat- egic operation involving a rapid advance across West Germany, Denmark, and the low coun- tries to immediate objectives on the French border, the North Sea coast, and the Danish straits. This advance would be made possible by a massive air operation to paralyze NATO's air, air defense, theater nuclear, and command and control capabilities and by an amphibious operation to secure the Danish straits. Con- tinued operations across France would then be conducted after immediate strategic objectives are attained. The Soviets would hope to win a quick victory through speed and surprise in this theater before NATO could fully mobilize or bring in reinforcements. Operations in the Northwest and the South- west TVDs are considered secondary to the decisive operations in the Western Theater in Soviet plans. The Northwestern TVD con- tains Soviet Northern Fleet bases with numer- ous strategic submarines. Soviet theater operations would be conducted to protect the 60 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 WESTERN TVD 44EN STRATEGIC DIRECTION OPERATIONAL DIRECTION MOSCOW Soviet strategic attack assets ifictl to support naval operations in the Arctic and Atlantic Ocean TV Ds. The objective of land operations in the Northwestern TVD would be to seize vi- tal air and naval facilities in northern Norway, using the most favorable avenues of approach. Soviet control of northern Norway is impor- tant to the protection of' Northern Fleet bases and assets, particularly ballistic missile sub- marines, and to the movement of Soviet naval and air forces into the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. Soviet plans also call for a land offensive operation through Finland and possibly Swedish territory. The Northern Fleet would conduct combat operations in the Arctic and Atlantic Ocean TV Ds and on the seaward Hanks of' the North- western TVD. The vast majority of the North- ern Fleet's assets would be dedicated to the Arctic Theater, which encompasses the Arctic Ocean and the Norwegian. Barents, and Green- land Seas the main operating areas for strate- gic ballistic missile submarines. In addition to providing the ballistic missile submarine as- sets for strategic operations during conflict, the other tasks of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic Ocean TVD would be: ? to protect the USSR from sea-based at- tacks by establishing naval superiority in the Arctic, Barents, Greenland, and Norwegian Seas: and ? to conduct ASW operations against NATO ballistic missile and general pur- pose submarines within this geographic area. Combat operations in the At hintic Ocean TVD would be considered less cruciiil by the Soviet military leadership than those in the Arctic. In the Atlantic TVD, the Northern Fleet would be tasked to conduct operations against NATO ballistic missile submarines and to interdict NATO sea lanes carrying reinforce- ments and supplies from North America to Eu- rope. Soviet attack submarines would conduct most of these operations, which would proba- bly entail minelaying and patrols off key North American, United Kingdom, and West Euro- pean ports and bases. Some Naval Aviation and Air Force bombers probably would participate in these interdiction operations. The Soviets plan operations in the South- western TVD to support their advance in the Western Theater and to establish dominance in NATO's Southern Region. In wartime, So- viet plans for offensive operations in the re- gion include an attack through neutral Austria 61 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for 'Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 into southern (let-many and northern Italy. So- viet plans also include operations to seize the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Efforts to seize the Turkish straits would be accomplished by coor- dinated ground. airborne, iiid Imphibious operations. Warsaw Pact naval forces in the theater organized into i combined Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would attempt to clear the Black Sea of NATO naval forces and would at to prevent Al- lied forces from using the eastern Mediter- ranean to reinforce their defenses. Soviet interest in the Southern TVD has been increased by the collapse of the pro- Western regime of the Shah in Iran as well as STRATEGIC DIRECTION OPE RATIONAL DIRECTION NORTHWESTERN TVD by other developments in the turbulent Middle East. The Soviets wish to establish dominance in this region and to deny the West access to its vital oil resources in wartime. Soviet forces are now engaged in combat in Afghanistan to ensure the success of t he Communist regime in- stalled by Moscow and to reduce that nation to a client state. In wartime. the Soviets would probably plan to conduct offensive operations from the USSR :ind Afghanistan through Iran to the Persian (lull' in order to obtain a stran- glehold on the West's oil supplies. Also, the Soviets could use Afghanistan as a base from which to launch an attack on Pakistan. The Far Eastern TVD is the largest continen- tal TVD. Since the 1970s and into this decade, the Soviets have increased their forces in this SOUTHWESTERN TVD STRATEGIC DIRECTION OPERATIONAL DIRECTION area. In this theater. priority for the assign- ment of new equipment is second only to the vital Western TVD. The Far Eastern TVD also contains the bases of the USSR's Pacific Fleet. In a war with NATO, the Soviets would hope to deter Chinese entrance into the conflict. If deterrence failed, the Soviets probably would engage in rapid offensive operations to seize relatively limited objectives in China in order to force a quick termination of the war on the eastern front. In this way the Soviets would hope to avoid a two-front war as well as be- coming enmeshed in a prolonged conventional ground war in China. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is tasked with con- ducting operations in the Far Eastern. the SOUTHERN TVD STRATEGIC DIRECTION OPERATIONAL DIRECTION (i2 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 cific Ocean. and Indian Ocean TVDs. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet fleets. Its size can he ;Ittributed to its wartime missions, the increasing importance of the Pacific Basin in trade and commerce, and its .2,Tographic isolation from the western fleets and the major shipbuilding centers in the USSR. This remoteness would make rein- forcement exceedingly difficult during wartime. The Pacific Ocean Fleet's wartime operations would be concentrated mainly in the northwest Pacific. In addition to protecting ballistic mis- sil(i submarine assets, the Pacific Fleet's tasks would include: ? protecting the USSR from sea-based at- tacks by establishing naval superiority in the Sea of Japan. Sea of Okhotsk, along the Kuril Islands, and off the Kamchatka Peninsula: ? conducting operations against enemy sea- based strategic platforms: and ? interdicting enemy sea lines of communi- cation. The Pacific Heet's sea-control effort would entail extensive surface ship, submarine, and naval aircraft ASW and Out operations along the Soviet Far East periphery. Control of these seas would also be crucial to defending Soviet territory against possibl(? US carrier- based anistrikes or iimphibious assaults. To complement its sea-control mission, the fleet would deploy attack and cruise missile submarines iind strike iiircraft into the north- west Pacific to engage US forces. In essence, the fleet would attempt to establish an ech- eloned defense of' the Soviet Far East. Sub- marines and strike aircraft would spearhead the outer defense in the northwest Pacific: and surface combatants in combination with sub- marines and strike aircraft would form an in- ner defense along the Soviet coast. Soviet attack submarines probably would de- ploy for ASW and possibly minelaying oper- ations off' the US ballistic missile submarine base at Bangor. Washington. Additionally, a few submarines might attempt to deploy near ports and bases off the US west coast and the Hawaiian Islands. Operating primarily out of Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet naval forces would conduct antiship strikes against transiting enemy forces, inter- dict sea lines of communication in the South China Sea, and possibly attack US facilities in the region. FAR EAST TVD STRATEGIC DIRECTION OPERATIONAL DIRECTION In the Far East TVD, the Soviets have strengthened ground forces oriented against US allies. They have deployed a coastal de- fense division to the Japanese Northern Terri- tories (south of' the Kuril Islands) to the north- east of the Japanese island of' Hokkaido. Four Soviet divisions are now deployed on the Pa- cific ;ipproaches to the USSR the Northern Territories, Kurils, Sakhalin Island, ;111(1 Kam- chatka Peninsula. These divisions t bus con- stitute the ground component of' the Soviets' maritime strategy in the Pacific. In addition, those forces on the Northern Territories. Kurils and Sakhalin Island could threaten J a pmi. To support their operations in the various TVDs, the Soviets have amassed large mu )u of ground. air. naval, and air defense equip- ment and forces. These vast quantities in part reflect Soviet military planning to employ over- whelming power to achieve their objectives. They also reflect the offensive nature of' Soviet military doctrine and strateg,y in that at forces are believed to require at least a 5:1 force ratio in anticipation of' high losses inherent in offensive operations. Wartime Air Force Employment Since the mid-1960s. the Soviets have moved toward a doctrine and force capability to fight decisively at all levels of conflict. with or with- out nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear option, however, still requires a force posture capable of negating. or at least reducing, an enemy's air and nuclear resources. To achieve this, the Soviets have again looked to their histor- ical experiences and developed a modernized version of the air operations of World War II. 63 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Soviets would, under non-nuclear condi- tions, substitute the mass employment of avi- ation forces for an initial mass nuclear strike. Such an operation would be performed simulta- neously within the sectors of several fronts in an attempt to achieve air superiority and de- stroy or weaken an enemy's air and nuclear resources. The air operation has been devel- oped into a crucial component of the theater strategic operation. The success of' this oper- ation is critical to the outcome of the theater campaign. The principal targets of an air operation would be the enemy's aviation, nuclear re- sources, air defense, and command, control, and communications (C") facilities. Airstrikes would be directed to destroy tactical nuclear capabilities, disrupt any coordinated defense, and assure air superiority by neutralizing the main force of enemy aviation at the outset of' hostilities. The Soviet Union envisions an air operation lasting three or more days that would involve from three to seven mass strikes over the pe- riod. Two or three mass strikes would occur on the first day, with one or two additional mass strikes on subsequent days. Wartime em- ployment of' fixed-wing, tactical ground-attack airpower after completion of the air operation would probably fall into small and large strike packages. The small attacks would be two to fOur aircraft Hying close support for troops, defense suppression, or perhaps armed recon- naissance missions. Large strike packages, on the order of' 50 to 100 aircraft, would conduct major strike missions against nuclear storage depots, airfields. C" facilities, ports, and rear area logistics and support bases. All Soviet air operations would occur as part of' a planned and coordinated combined arms operation in- tended to achieve Soviet war aims. Pre- and post-strike reconnaissance, electronic counter- measures (ECM) escort support, and air de- fense support would be closely integrated with strike aircraft in major combat operations. Soviet Military Transport Aviation's ( Voyen no-transportnoya aulatsiya, abhrev i at ed VTA) wartime functions would remain primar- ily paradrop and the landing of combat units as well as the provision of' logistics support to all Soviet Armed Forces as needed. This could include rapid reinforcement. and aerial resupply, nuclear weapons resupply, and med- ical evacuation. VIA, along with the mobi- lized Soviet Civil Aviation (Aeroflot) and the air transports of' the other Soviet military ele- ments, would probably provide sufficient. num- bers of' a? transport assets to perform their missions. especially since all Eurasian conti- nental TVDs are accessible by rail and highway transportation networks. Ground Forces The USSR has traditionally in large, well-equipped ground forces as a pri- mary component of military power. The ground forces are the largest of the USSR's five branches of' the armed forces. An ambitious force development program is underway involv- ing expansion, equipment modernization, train- ing improvements, innovative tactics and operational concepts, and enhancement of' com- mand and control capabilities. In peacetime, Soviet ground force personnel USSR Selected Artillery 2S3 2S1 M-1975 M-1975 2S5 M-1976 TOWED/ Self- Self- Self- Self- Self- Towed SELF-PROPELLED Propelled Propelled Propelled Propelled Propelled CALIBER/TYPE 152-mm Howitzer 122-mm Howitzer 203-mm Gun 240-mm Mortar 152-mm Gun 152-mm Gun MAXIMUM RANGE (M) 17,200 15,300 30,000 12,000 27,000 27,000 NUCLEAR? CAPABLE Probably No Yes Yes Yes Yes 64 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 number approximately 1.9 million. Their com- bat power resides in 213 maneuver divisions, including 12 mobilization base divisions (un- manned equipment that will be activated as di- vi:-;ions upon mobilization), with two additional divisions expanded to corps-type structures. In peacetime, the ground forces within the USSR are subordinate to the 16 military dis- tricts, except for the 7 airborne divisions which are directly subordinate to Airborne Forces Headquarters in Moscow. Forces deployed in Eastern Europe are organized into four Soviet Groups of Forces, one each in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Soviet forces in Mongolia and Afghanistan are each organized into an army subordinate to the ad- jacent military district. Assets of the Groups of Forces and military districts would be con- verted to fronts in wartime. Tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions comprise the basic maneuver elements of So- viet ground forces. Tank and motorized rifle divisions are highly mobile armored forces. The Soviet tank division, which has 11,000 men, is comprised of three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment, while the motorized rifle division (13,000 men) is based on three mo- torized rifle regiments and one tank regiment. Both tank and motorized rifle divisions have a full complement of' support elements, includ- ing aviation, artillery, air defense, signal, engi- neer, chemical, reconnaissance, maintenance, motor transport, and medical units. The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne force, currently seven divi- sions. Elements of an eighth division are oper- ating in Afghanistan. Soviet airborne divisions do not have the same degree of land mobil- ity as tank or motorized rifle divisions but are T-54/55 significantly more mobile than a US airhorne division. They consist of three parachute reg- iments with airborne amphibious combat vehi- cles (BMDs) plus combat support and service units. In addition to the regular airborne di- visions, the Soviets have formed air assault brigades at front level and air assault battal- ions at army level. Current developments in Soviet ground forces are highlighted below: ? Tank and motorized rifle divisions are being expanded and reorganized. The re- sultant divisions are larger, more capable, and are configured for high-speed, com- bined arms operations on a conventional or nuclear battlefield. ? Two corps-type structures have been formed. These units are divisions ex- panded to almost twice the size of' a tank division. The new formations contain over 450 tanks, 600 infantry fighting ve- hicles and armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 300 artillery pieces and mul- tiple rocket launchers. They are ideally US Main Battle Tanks M -60A1 /3 PATTON M-1/M -1A1 ABRAMS WEIGHT (MT) 51 55 SPEED (KM/HR) 50 70 MAIN ARMAMENT 105-mm 105-mm/120-mm MUZZLE VELOCITY 1,500 1,500/1,660 (MPS) Main Battle Tanks T-62 T-64 T-72 T-80 WEIGHT (MT) 36 37 35 41 42 SPEED (KM/HR) 50 50 50 60 60 MAIN ARMAMENT 100-mm 115-mm 125-mm 125-mm 125-mm MUZZLE VELOCITY 1,500 1,600 1,750 1,750 1,750 (MPS) 65 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Trends in Soviet Artillery, Tanks, and Armored Vehicles 100,000 - 100,000 80,000 - - 80,000 60,000 - - 60,000 40,000 - - 40,000 20,000 - - 20,000 Artillery ?Estimated 1985 1990" Tanks Armored Vehicles Trends in US Artillery, Tanks, and Armored Vehicles Artillery ? Estimated 1985 Tanks 1990* Armored Vehicles suited to act as an Operational Maneu- ver Group (OMG), conducting high-speed operations deep in an enemy's rear area. Additional units of this type are expected to be formed once testing and evaluation are completed. ? Nondivisional artillery support for ma- neuver forces is also being expanded. Some army-level regiments are being ex- panded to brigade size with the addition of a fourth battalion. Battalions are con- currently expanding from 18 to 24 guns each. These changes have resulted in a 40-percent increase in artillery pieces in the brigades and are occurring primarily in units opposite NATO. New artillery units are also being formed; for exam- ple, two new artillery divisions have been formed since 1984. Helicopters. To support ground operations, the Soviets continue to emphasize their heli- copter forces, which are being expanded and modernized. At division level, helicopter de- tachments continue to expand to squadrons, and in some squadrons the number of HIND attack helicopters has been increased. At army level about 20 attack regiments have been formed, with up to 60 HIP and HIND attack helicopters in each. Over half of these are de- ployed opposite NATO forces. Most attack heli- copters are the heavily armed Mi-24/HIND D/E and Mi-8/HIP E. Soviet emphasis on a heavy- lift helicopter transport capability is reflected in the development and recent appearance of the Mi-26/HALO. It is the world's largest pro- duction helicopter and is capable of carrying internally two airborne infantry combat vehi- cles or about 85 combat-ready troops. Much of the technology and hardware used in its pro- duction was obtained from the West. The Soviets are now equipping their heli- copters with infrared (IR) jammers and sup- pressors, IR decoy dispensers, and additional armor, thereby increasing their survivability The Mi-28/HAVOC, the USSR's newest at- tack helicopter, will be deployed in the near future. 66 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Mi-28/HAVOC Combat and Support Helicopters SPEED (KM 'H) 300 RADIUS (KM) 240 TROOP LIFT 0 HOKUM SPEED KM H) 350 RADIUS (KM) 250 Mi-24/HIND SPEED (KM 'HI RADIUS (KM) TROOP LIFT Mi-8/HIP SPEED (KM/H) RADIUS (KM) TROOP LIFT Mi-6/HOOK SPEED (KM/H) RADIUS (KM) TROOP LIFT Mi-26/HALO SPEED (KWH) RADIUS (KM) TROOP LIFT Ka-27/HELIX SPEED (KM/H) 260 RADIUS (KM) 300 NAVAL AIR VARIANTS Ka-25/HORMONE SPEED (KM/H) 220-- RADIUS (KM) 250 NAVAL AIR VARIANTS METERS 0 10 20 30 40 probably as a result of lessons learned in Af- ghanistan. A new attack helicopter, the Mi- 28/HAVOC, similar to the US Army Apache, is expected to be deployed soon. The new HOKUM helicopter, which has no current West- ern counterpart, may give the Soviets a sig- nificant rotary-wing air-superiority capability. The Soviets are also employing helicopters as airborne command posts and electronic jam- ming platforms, as well as attack and transport platforms. Soviet Ground Force Equipment Armor Soviet ground forces have some 52,600 main battle tanks in their active inventory, of which more than a third are the latest models, the T-64/72/80 series. These new tanks feature in- creased firepower, with a 125-mm main gun and Combat and Support Helicopters AH-64/APACHE SPEED (KM/H) 30044 RADIUS (KM) 240 TROOP LIFT 0 AH-IT/SEA COBRA SPEED (KM/H) 260 RADIUS (KM) 340 TROOP LIFT 0 AH-IS/HUEY COBRA SPEED (KM/H) 26-0-2z RADIUS (KM) 230 TROOP LIFT 0 CH-46E/SEA KNIGHT SPEED (KM/H) 240 RADIUS (KM) 190 TROOP LIFT 24 UH-IN/IROQUOIS SPEED (KM/H) 200 RADIUS (KM) 200 TROOP LIFT 9 CH-53E/SUPER SEA STALLION SPEED (KM/H) 280 RADIUS (KM) 460 TROOP LIFT 35 UH-60A/BLACK HAWK SPEED (KM/H) 260 RADIUS (KM) 300 TROOP LIFT 13 CH-47D/CHINOOK SPEED (KM/H) 260 RADIUS (KM) 190 TROOP LIFT 33 METERS 10 20 30 40 improved fire control systems, including a laser range finder on some versions. Both the T-80 and a variant of the T-64 can fire an antitank guided missile through the main gun. Surviv- ability has been increased through the use of improved armor incorporating laminates and composites. Several thousand tanks currently not in the active inventory are also available if necessary. The USSR's ground forces have about 59,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fight- ing vehicles (IFVs) in their active inventory, with about 20,000 armored vehicles in reserve. Most of the inventory consists of the BTR-60 wheeled APC and the tracked BMP IFV. The BTR-80, which is a follow-on to the BTR-70 and BTR-60, is being fielded in limited numbers. It has an improved engine and drive train and bet- ter off-road performance. The improved BMP-2 is augmenting and replacing the BMP. It has 67 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 SCALEBOARD Coverage from the USSR and Eastern Europe Potential SS-23 and SCA LEBOARD Missile Coverage in an Advance Across Europe / SciilintoARcr-7) SS-23 The Soviets' new main battle tank, the T-80, on field maneuvers. 68 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 RANGE (KM) DEPLOYMENT LEVEL USSR Short-Range Missiles FROG-7 SS-21 70 Division Ittoo 120 Division SS-1 SCUD B MEW ? ?*461Viittrw) de' Soviet SS-21 short-range missile on transporter-erector-launcher. a 30-mm rapid-fire gun in place of the 73-mm gun on the original BM P and carries the AT- 5 antitank guided missile (ATGM). In addition to the Kilt-BA/Ps, the Soviets have fielded the BM D with airborne and air assault units and a number of light-ground-pressure vehicles such as the GT-T/MTLB series for use in areas of or trafficability. Shorter Range Missiles The Soviets have about 1,600 tactical and shorter range intermediate-range nuclear force (SRI NF) ballistic missile launchers in their inventory. In 1985, the Soviets began to deploy their newest SRINF missile system, the SS-23. This missile, which has a longer range and improved accuracy over the SCUD, is expected to replace the latter at army and front levels. The front commander may also have a brigade of 12 to 18 SCALEBOARD missiles available. A more accurate version of the SCALEBOARD has been deployed. In 1984, the Soviets deployed the SCALEBOARD to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, marking 300 Army/Front SS-23 ? Oro 500 Army/Front SCALEBOARD 900 Front/Theater New 120-mm airborne amphibious combat vehicle. the first time this missile has been stationed outside the USSR. Much of Western Europe is now within range of these 900-kilometer missiles. The new generation of short-range missiles can be employed effectively with con- ventional warheads because of increased ac- curacy. Deployment will give the Soviets a formidable conventional deep-strike system. In the area of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Soviet armies and fronts have missile brigades equipped with from 12 to 18 SS-IC SCUD missile launchers. At division level, the predominant SNF weapon is the unguided free rocket over ground (FROG) found in a battal- ion of four launchers. The Soviets have begun to replace the FROG with the more accurate, longer range SS-21 missile in some divisions opposite European NATO. Fire Support The Soviets have traditionally placed great emphasis on fire support and currently have over 39,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) greater than 100mm in cal- 69 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operat ions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 70 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 iber in their active inventory, with about 10,000 held in reserve. The ground forces are now fielding large numbers of self-propelled artillery at all levels. Developing Operational Concepts Soviet improvements in equipment and weap- ons developments reflect concepts to accom- plish longstanding operational goals. The rapid penetration of forward enemy defenses on se- lected axes is designed to ensure that the fo- cus of decisive action is shifted to an adver- sary's rear area. The rapid advance of Soviet forces is intended to bring about the collapse of the enemy's defense and the destruction of his forces while the attainment of deep strate- gic objectives is sustained by the continuous commitment of follow-on forces. The Soviets are aware of the planned or pro- gramed enhancements of NATO theater forces. They believe the development of capabilities and strategies involving deep attack, such as the US Army Air-Land Battle and the NATO Follow-on Forces Attack concepts, could challenge their ability to execute i planned strategy. As a result. Soviet operational con- cepts and force planning are taking these en- hancements into account. Recent Soviet force developments are designed to provide greater mobility, firepower, sustainability, and com- mand and control capabilities to counter NATO force enhancements. Innovations in traditional Soviet operational concepts feature increased emphasis on deep operations into an opponent's rear area early in a conflict. Adapting their experience with mobile forces in World War II. the Soviets have developed Operational Maneuver Groups (0MGs) to conduct mobile warfare in the en- emy's rear area following a breakthrough of his forward defenses. The insertion of OMGs, consisting of tank-heavy formations supported by infantry fighting vehicles, mobile fire sup- port, air defense, air assault units, and avia- The Soviet 16-tube, 220-mm BM-27 multiple rocket launcher is capable of firing high- explosive conventional rounds, scattering mines, and delivering chemical warheads as far as 40 kilometers. The BM-27 is used ex- tensively in Afghanistan, where it provides intensive long-range fire support against Afghan Freedom Fighters. 71 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 t ion, is designed to isolate front-line defending forces, disrupt rear area logistics and reserves, threaten key command and control facilities and economic and population centers, and neutralize nuclear attack systems. The success- ful use of OMGs would facilitate the commit- ment of second-echelon forces and accelerate the overall rate of advance. Special Operations Forces (SPETSNAZ) The USSR maintains a complement of spe- cial operations forces, the most prominent of which are known as SPETSNAZ. These are managed by the Main Intelligence Directorate RU) of' the Soviet General Staff and are trained to conduct a variety of sensitive mis- sions, including covert actions abroad. Large numbers of' SPETSNAZ troops have been as- signed to Soviet forces in Afghanistan, where they have become known for their ruthless aggressiveness. During peacetime, the GRU carefully coordi- nates reconnaissance programs that are geared to meet the intelligence requirements for So- viet forces in war. In wartime, SPETSNAZ forces would operate far behind enemy lines for extended periods of' time where they would con- duct reconnaissance and sabotage on a wide variety of' military and political targets. The KGB is assessed to have overall respon- sibility, under Central Committee guidance, for operat loran planning, coordination, and politi- cal control of special purpose forces that Oper- ate abroad in peacetime. This was the case in the Soviet invasion of' Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of' Afghanistan in 1979. The KGB main- tains its own special operations capabilities in the form of' clandestine assets dedicated to as- sassination and wartime sabotage. Though organized into brigades, these forces would infiltrate and fight as small teams. In a war, each brij:,,ade can be expected to field about 100 SPETSNAZ teams. A typical team would be led by an officer, with a warrant offi- cer or se4,,eant as second in command. At least one team member would be fully versed in the language and customs of the target country. Other members of the team are trained as radio operators and weapons and demolition experts. In addition to normal military training, all re- ceive instruction in: ? reconnaissance and target location; ? infiltration tactics; ? sabotage methods using explosives, in- cendiaries, and chemical and biological agents; ? clandestine communications; ? hand-to-hand combat and silent killing techniques; ? psychological operations; ? language skills; and ? survival behind enemy lines. In wartime, naval SPETSNAZ teams would be transported to a target area by aircraft, sub- marine, or surface ship and would be inserted immediately prior to hostilities. Once deployed, the teams would conduct re- connaissance and tactical operations against a wide variety of targets, such as ship and subma- rine bases, airfields, command and intelligence centers, communication facilities, ports and harbors, radar sites, and of prime importance nuclear weapons facilities. Though a small force, SPETSNAZ has the potential to achieve results disproportionate to its size against such a critical, yet often vulnerable, target list. Theater Nuclear Capability The Soviets believe nuclear weapons are de- cisive in theater operations. Even if a war is fought at the non-nuclear level, the Soviets rec- ognize the constant danger of rapid escalation. If a theater operation is fought at or escalates to the nuclear level, the Soviets would employ nuclear weapons in a coordinated, massed the- ater strike which would allow the rapid attain- ment of deep theater objectives. The Soviets' capability to fight and win a theater war at the nuclear level would be predicated on three main factors: ? a formidable nuclear weapons delivery capability; ? the ability to destroy or degrade an ad- versary's nuclear systems and command and control capability while protect- ing Soviet assets during conventional operations prior to escalation; and ? a significant reconstitution capability in the post-strike period to ensure that crit- ical Soviet forces would survive NATO nuclear strikes and regenerate their own offensive force structure. Chemical Warfare The USSR has the most extensive chemical warfare capability in the world. At the end of' World War II, the Soviets captured from the Germans large stockpiles of chemical agents 72 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 as well as the technology and equipment to make the nerve agents tabun and sarin and the German plans for production of soman. Two German nerve agent production plants were dismantled and removed to the Soviet Union where they were reassembled. The Soviets have continued to develop production capabilities based on this early design and have built agent manufacturing facilities in various locations around the Soviet Union. Since the late 1960s. the Soviets have continued to test, produce, and stockpile chemical weapons. The Shikhany Chemical Warfare Proving Ground is one of the Soviets' primary chem- ical weapons test areas. It was established in the mid-1920s, and a number of chemical weapons tests were conducted in the late 1920s and 1930s. World War II reconnaissance pho- tographs confirmed that Shikhany was an ac- tive chemical weapons test facility. Since that time it has grown in size and sophistication and continues to be a highly active testing facility. Chemical agents are stored in a network of highly secure military depots located across the Soviet Union. These depots contain agents in bulk containers and agent-filled munitions as well as gas masks, protective suits, decon- tamination solutions, and decontamination ve- hicles. Many depots have rail lines allowing the rapid movement of chemical warfare ma- terials. Since the late 1960s, the amount of agents, weapons, and material in storage at these deposits has increased significantly and this buildup continues. These depots support operational forces and report to the Headquar- ters of the Soviet Chemical Troops in the Min- istry of Defense. The Soviets have developed t he dcwtrine for the use of chemical weapons, and Soviet tac- ticians have standardized the required proce- dures. If a commander determines that a particular battle situation is suited for the em- ployment of chemical weapons and once ap- proval has been granted by the highest Soviet authority, chemical strikes can be conducted against an array of targets including: ? nuclear delivery means: ? airfields: ? naval bases and selports: ? command and control facilities: ? storage depots: ? supply routes: ? troop concentrations: ? artillery and armor: and ? amphibioustheliborne landing forces. The Soviets have persistent and nonpersisi- tent chemical agents as well as a variety of delivery systems. If Soviet forces have to cross contaminated areas, specially trained troops would be available for advice, reconnaissance, and decontamination. The Soviet concept of maintaining the mo- mentum of attack presupposes the capability to decontaminate armored fighting vehicles, equipment. and personnel rapidly iind return them to combat. This begins at the unit level with a variety of decontamination devices al- lowing rapid, partial cleansing of contaminated equipment. Specialized decont aminati(m units exist at regimental level and aboVe. These units use a truck-mount( d decontamination ap- paratus to cleanse equipment and pers(mnel rapidly and thoroughly. One such item, the TMS-65, is an aircraft turbojet engine mounted The Targets for Soviet Chemical Weapons SS-23 or SCUD Missiles Tanks /c- Artillery FEBA / 1st Echelon,-- .s.,' Forces -,/,- SS-21 Missiles or FROGs , , 122/152mm , , / 2d Echelon Forces Front Line Troops Rear Area - Command and Control 73 ('hapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Burst Point Ground Wind Speed About 0.9m/s About 850m 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 4000 Meters -300 -200 -100 -0 ? -100 -200 -300 The SCUD-B ground contamination pattern superimposed on a military airbase runway. Oper- ational flights from contaminated runways are extremely hazardous and difficult. In a Soviet chemical attack against a NATO airbase, many SCUD missiles would be used to ensure coverage. on a URAL-375 truck chassis which sprays a decontamination solution on contaminated ve- hicles. Several chemical agents, toxins, and com- binations have been used by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by their client forces, the Vietnamese, in Laos and Cambodia. Chemical agents known to have been devel- oped by the Soviets include: ? nerve agents (sarin, soman, and a V-series agent); ? blister agents (mustard, lewisite, and a mixture of the two); ? a blood agent (hydrogen cyanide); ? a choking agent (phosgene); and ? one other agent not specifically identified but which causes unconsciousness for an hour or more and which has been widely reported as being used in Afghanistan. The Soviets stock both persistent and non- persistent agents. Persistent agents stay on the target from hours to days, depending on 74 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 weither conditions, unless removed by decon- tamination. while nonpersistent agents will clear the target relatively quickly. The Soviets are also investigating binary weapons systems. This type of system, in addition to its inher- ent safe handling and storage characteristics, expands the possibilities for newer agent com- binations. Complete protection from all the types of agents in the Soviet inventory requires special clothing and masks as well as rapid treatment for any exposed personnel. Almost all Soviet conventional weapons sys- tems from mortars to long-range tactical mis- siles have compatible chemical ammunition or warheads that are available to land, air, and naval forces. The Soviets have also developed the firing data required for employing chemi- cal weapons in battlefield situations. This includes the types and numbers of weapons re- quired to attack different targets under a vari- ety of weather and combat conditions. They continue to test systems with improved dis- semination, larger payloads, increased range, and better accuracy which afford them greater target flexibility and deeper strike capability. Two types of chemical warheads have been developed for tactical missiles bulk agents and small bomblets which can be dispersed over the target. The Soviets' continuing chemical weapons activities are carried out by a large and well- trained chemical warfare organization directed by the Headquarters Chemical Troops in the Ministry of Defense. This organization is head- ed by a three-star general and numbers more than 45,000 personnel in the ground forces alone. Its size is expected to double during wartime. The primary responsibilities of Soviet chemical specialists include: ? providing technical advice to front commanders: ? conducting research and development programs: ? producing and storing chemical weapons and testing and evaluating protective materUils: ? training Soviet forces in chemical weapons employment and survival on a contaminated battlefield: ? decontamination and reconnaissance, and ? operating the chemical academies. This corps of specialists also has about 30,000 Soviet Chemical Weapons Depots, Production Centers, and Storage Areas. , , ? Stored Warsaw Pact Chemical Munitions In Forward Areas ? General Locations of Chemical Warfare Agent Production Centers A Chemical Weapons Depots ? A ? A ? ? A? A ? A A 75 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 vehicles for decontamination and reconnais- sance and has more than 200 locations for teaching and training Soviet forces in chemi- cal protection and decontamination. Training includes the actual use of live chemical agents. Also, the Soviets have installed protective fil- tration systems in many combat and combat support vehicles and ships, allowing their forces to operate in a contaminated environment without wearing full protec- tive clothing. Biological Warfare The Soviet Union continues to maintain and broaden its offensive biological warfare ca- pabilities. Institutes and other facilities are rapidly acquiring, state-of-the-art developments in biotechnology. This technology is being carefully screened for its potential to improve or alter well-known disease-producing agents for biological warfare purposes. Agents the Soviets have developed for bio- logical warfare purposes include anthrax. tularemia, and various toxins including the my- cot oxi ns. Research and development on a vari- ety of toxins continues. The use of mycotox- ins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and the Sverdlovsk biological agent accident of 1979 t hat resulted in the release of anthrax from a bacteriological warfare institute show that the Soviets have violated the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Air Forces The Soviet Air Forces (SAP') are a crucial component of the USSR's theater force struc- ture. The Soviets have organized their air forces to provide dedicated aviation support to combined arms commanders from maneuver di- visions to the Supreme High Command and to allow commanders to mass high-value aviation assets at the most decisive place and time. The Soviet Air Forces have three major com- bat components: Strategic Air Armies, Air Forces of Military Districts and Groups of Forces, and Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA). The USSR dedicates high priority to up- grading each component. New generations of strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft are in the development, test, production, and deploy- ment stages. The five Strategic Air Armies include one de- signed for intercontinental and maritime strike missions and four designed to operate in con- tinental TVDs. Approximately 180 BEAR and BISON heavy bombers are assigned to the air army organized for intercontinental strikes. The four theater-oriented air armies are equipped with medium bombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters which constitute the principal deep- strike component of theater forces. The air armies are directly subordinate to the Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK) and are as- signed to operate in TVDs in accordance with the dictates of the VGK. Eighty percent of the more than 500 medium bombers are based west of the Urals and would, most likely, be employed in operations in the Western, South- western, Northwestern, and Southern TVDs. The remainder would operate in the Far Eastern TVD. There are 17 air forces in the Groups of Forces, peripheral military districts of the So- viet Union, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. These air forces are operationally subordinate to the military district, Group, or army commander (as in Afghanistan) and are comprised of com- bat fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter- bombers, and helicopters. The latter are known as Army Aviation, although the mix is not stan- dard. Fighter and fighter-bomber regiments can be organized into divisions or remain indepen- dent, reporting directly to the military districts and Groups of Forces. Reconnaissance reg- iments and squadrons are independent units, while helicopter units either report to the mili- tary districts and Groups of Forces or to armies or divisions. To ensure dedicated aviation sup- port to ground forces, tank and combined arms armies are being assigned their own aviation components consisting primarily of helicopters. In wartime, the air forces of the military dis- tricts and Groups of Forces will become the air forces of' the front. Soviet Military Transport Aviation is the third operational element of the Soviet Air Forces. Its primary responsibility is to provide airlift for the Soviet airborne forces and air assault units. It also provides air logistics sup- port for deployed Soviet and allied armed forces and supports Soviet political and economic in- terests, especially in the Third World. The Soviet Air Forces have over 700 bomber aircraft, some 6,300 fighter and fighter- bombers, and about 600 VTA transports. Of the total, the air forces of the military districts and the Groups of Forces have about 5,440 fighter- interceptors, fighter-bombers, and reconnais- 76 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 sane( and electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft deployed in nearly 140 regiments and squadrons. An additional 750 fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft are assigned to the Strategic' Air :\rmies, and some 110 are in Afghanistan. The ,tir forces of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies provide important adjuncts to the So- viets' air and air defense capabilities in the Western and Southwestern TVDs. Altogether the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have ap- proximately 2,350 fixed-wing combat aircraft. Over the past decade, the Soviets have signif- icantly enhanced the performance character- istics of their tactical combat aircraft. Older weapons systems had limited range and pay- load capabilities, short-range air intercept radars or range-only radars, little or no ca- pability to employ precision-guided munitions, and were restricted primarily to clear-weather operations. Newer fighters and interceptors. METERS 22 11 0 SPEED (MACH) RADIUS (KM) ARMAMENT Su-24 FENCER A/B/C/D WINGSPAN (M) METERS 22 11 0 SPEED (MACH) RADIUS (KM)" ARMAMENT WINGSPAN (M) 2.0 1,300' 3,000 KG Bombs 10 (Swept) F-111 however, can conduct air intercepts at beyond- visual ranges. Moreover. they can operate at greater distances from their airfields, carry Up to eight air-to-air missiles. ,ind perform in all weather conditions. The newest gen- eration of fighter-interceptors FOX IIOUN Ds, FULCRUMs, and FLANKERs has a true look- down/shoot-down capability that enables them to engage low-flying aircraft or cruise missiles. The MiG-23,./FLOGGER is by far the most numerous fig,hter-interceptor, with about 1,700 aircraft.. Other fighter-interceptors include the FOXBAT, FLAGON, FIREBAR, FIDDLER, and the new MiG-31/FOXHOUND. The FLOGGER is likely to remain in the force in substantial numbers for the next five years. Almost GOO late-model MiG-21/FISHBEDs are still opera- tional, although they are being replaced in a few regiments by the MiG-29/FULCRUM. Deployment of the new Mach-2 Mi(;-29/ FULCRUM air-superiority fighter proceeded Comparable Tactical Aircraft MiG-23 MiG-27 FLOGGER FLOGGER B/G/K D/J Su-17 FITTER D/H MiG-25 FOX BAT B/D MIG-21 M1G-29 FISHBED L FULCRUM 2.3 17 2.1 2.8 2.0 2.3 1,150 600' 550' 900 750 1,150 6 AAMs 3,000 KG 3,000 KG 4 AAMs 6 AAMs Bombs Bombs 8 (Swept) 8 (Swept) 10 (Swept) 14 7 12 F-4C/E PHANTOM II US A-7A/D CORSAIR II F-15E EAGLE Su-25 FROG FOOT 0.8 300' 2,000 KG Bombs 15 F-16A A-10A FIGHTING THUNDERBOLT II FALCON 2.5 2.0 0.9 2.5 2.0 0.6 1,100 425 800 925 1,000 460 4,000 KG 3,000 KG 2,400 KG 4,500 KG 2,000 KG 2,200 KG Bombs Bombs Bombs+ AAMs Bombs + AAMs Bombs + AAMs Bombs 10 (Swept) 12 12 13 10 17 ' Hi -Lo-Lo-F-11, with external fuel, combat radius based on armament carried. 77 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operat ions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The new Su-27/FLANKER, equipped with the look-down/shoot-down radar and weapon system, has the capability to engage low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles. throughout 1985 and into early 1986 at a steady, though still limited, rate. By the end of Jan- uary 1986, Soviet forces in East Germany and the far eastern USSR had begun to receive this aircraft. Additional regiments inside the So- viet Union west of the Urals now possess FUL- CRUMs, and an increasing pace of deliveries is expected over the next several years. The new Su-27/FLANKER also entered op- erational service by early 1986, with initial aircraft arriving in air defense regiments. The FULCRUM and FLANKER, with true look-down/shoot-down radar, carry both the beyond-visual-range AA-10 and the short-range AA-11 air-to-air missiles. These aircraft, to- gether with the FOXHOUND homeland de- fense interceptor, mark the Soviet Air Forces' transition to a new generation of far more capa- ble combat aircraft. Although not fully match- ing the avionics capabilities of corresponding current US fighter aircraft, they pose a signifi- cant wartime air-superiority threat. The Su-17/FITTER is the most common ground-attack aircraft. There are almost 800 in Soviet Air Force regiments, in military dis- tricts, or Groups of Forces. The next most numerous is the MiG-27/FLOGGER with over 700 aircraft. However, almost 700 Soviet Air Forces Su-24/FENCERs are the best (leep- interdiction aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Other regiments are comprised of MiG-23/ FLOGGERs, the new Su-25/FROGFOOT, and older MiG-21/FISHBEDs and Su-7/F1TT ER As. A new improved FENCER variant, the I) model, is currently being deployed primarily with Strategic Aviation FENCER regiments. Recon- naissance assets include MIG-21/FISHBEDs, Su- 17/FITTERs, MiG-25/FOXBATs, and Yak-28/ BREWERS. Newer aircraft are beginning to replace the BREWER, significantly increasing Soviet reconnaissance range capabilities. Over 200 Tu-16/BADGER bombers still corn- Bombing Capabilities of Soviet Tactical Ground-Attack Aircraft Metric Tons 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1985 Aircraft Types FRESCO FISHBED FITTER FLOGGER FENCER FROG FOOT 1980 1,000 1975 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Combat Radius (NM) 78 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Su-24/FENCER nuclear-capable fighter-bomber, introduced in 1974, with new variants being produced, is the USSR's best deep-interdiction tactical aircraft. prise nearly half of the Soviet medium bomber force. Approximately 150 BACKFIREs are cur- rently operational and available to support the- ater mission requirements. The remainder of the Soviet Air Forces' medium bomber force consists of 135 Tu-22/BLINDERs. The VTA aircraft force consists of almost 600 medium- and long-range cargo transports. 11-76/CANDID long-range jet transports have been replacing the older An-12/CUB medium- range turboprop transports in VTA units at a rate of about 30 per year. The CANDID offers obvious advantages over the CUB since it can carry twice the maximum payload over three times as far. The CANDID now predominates over the CUB in numbers as well as payload. The VTA holds over 290 CANDIDs and only 230 CUBs in its inventory. VTA also has about 55 1\n-22/COCK long-range turboprop transports, the only Soviet transports able to carry out- sized cargo such as main battle tanks or large missiles. Production and deployment of the new CONDOR transport will dramatically up- grade VTA's heavy-lift capability. The CON- DOR should begin arriving in VTA units in 1987 or 1988. The Warsaw Pact air forces hold a signif- icant advantage over those of NATO in the degree of hardening completed at their tacti- cal airbases. They have built several thousand concrete aircraft shelters, many of which are earth-covered for added protection and cam- ouflage. In contrast. NAT() has only about half as many aircraft shelters. A significant number of US reinforcement aircraft still lack European deployment bases until early combat attrition would free space. The Soviets have es- tablished secondary operating strips for a num- ber of their forward-based units, although they still have some space limitations for potential later reinforcements as well. The Su-25/FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft has seen extensive action in Afghanistan. It is being deployed with Soviet forces in both the western and eastern USSR and is exported to Czechoslovakia and Iraq. Air Defense Forces The basic mission of air defense is to counter air threats to the Soviet homeland as well as to deployed forces. Soviet air defense forces in- clude both strategic and tactical surface-to-air missile systems that have capabilities to en- gage aircraft, cruise missiles. and some types of ballistic missiles. Along most Soviet borders, 79 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet Mobile Tactical SAM Air Defense of the Battlefield* 25 Kilometers 20 95 15 10 5 SA-4a SA-4b SA-6 SA-7/9 I I SA-8 SA-11 ? All SAMs have a minimum effective altitude. 50 Kilometers SA-13 95 these assets are currently organized under a single command at the military district level. Soviet strategic SAMs that are deployed for harrier, area, and point defense of key instal- lations in the Soviet Union also are used to provide cover for frontal forces in garrison and at staging areas. After the deployment of the front, these SA Ms would provide defense of the rear echelon and vital supply lines. Sys- tems that are transportable (for example, the SA-2) or t ruly mobile (the SA-10 now in the pro- cess of being deployed) could also move forward with the front to establish air cover for newly occupied territory. Tactical or troop air defense SAMs, AAA, and radars are designed to counter low-altitude tIi reats and are inherently mobile. As noted in Chapter III, tactical air defense systems could be used to augment strategic systems for home- land air defense. However, these systems are principally intended to move with the front as organic elements of combined arms forma- tions. Over 4,600 tactical SAM launchers and 12,000 AAA pieces are deployed with Air De- fense Forces units at regimental through front level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder- tired SAM launchers are at battalion and com- pany level and with nondivisional units. The ant lair operation is a vital component of a theater strategic operation. Its primary objective is to disrupt or blunt enemy offensive air operations. An additional objective is to prevent hostile aircraft that are carrying out a deep-interdiction/deep-strike mission from at- tacking installations or troop concentrations. The operation is accomplished by using both air and ground assets to attack enemy aircraft either at their bases or in flight. This combined arms operation would be directed by the High Command of Forces in the TVD. Naval Forces The Soviet Navy is organized into four fleets the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Ocean Fleets and the Caspian Sea Flotilla. The navy also maintains deployed forces in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of West Africa. The Soviets also con- tinue to develop a naval and airbase at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, where they now station submarines with supporting surface combat- ants and a composite air group of BADGER strike and combat support aircraft and an air defense force of MiG-23/FLOGGERS. In addi- tion, combatant task groups often deploy to the Caribbean Sea, with stopovers at Cuban bases and ports. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Navy has evolved toward a balanced ocean-going fleet ca- pable of fighting at great distances from the USSR at nuclear and conventional levels. As recently as the mid-1970s, Soviet naval capa- bilities were configured for a short, intense war. Sustained combat was seriously restricted by the small weapon loads as well as the lim- ited capabilities and endurance of most surface 80 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 METERS 12 9 6 3 0 RANGE (KM) EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE SA-4a/b 70 MEDIUM- TO-HIGH Tactical Surface-to-Air Missiles SA-6 30 LOW-TO- MEDIUM combatants, some submarines, and naval air- craft. During this time, however, new classes of larger ships with more sophisticated weapons systems, sensors, electronics and communica- tions, as well as improved endurance capabili- ties, began to enter the fleet. In combination with marked improvements in naval aircraft and submarines, Soviet capabilities to conduct sustained antiship, antisubmarine, and antiair warfare in distant waters were increased. How- ever, the Soviets still do not have sufficient seaborne aircraft capabilities to conduct car- rier combat operations outside the range of land-based aircraft. Naval Force Growth The USSR is constructing several new and improved classes of general purpose submarines and is transitioning to new designs such as the AKULA and SIERRA. This process de- creased output of general purpose submarines in 1985, with only one new nuclear-powered at- tack submarine a VICTOR-III-Class launched. The construction of KILO-Class diesel-powered attack submarines continued. Series produc- tion of the AKULA, SIERRA, and possibly other classes is expected to begin in earnest with additional launches in 1986. New Soviet general purpose nuclear-powered submarines, characterized by significant quieting, new weapons, and new sensors, pose a formidable challenge to Western naval forces. The Soviets are also producing increasingly capable surface ships with greater displace- ment, firepower, and endurance, along with improved sensors and electronics all of which result in ships with significantly increased self- sustainability. At present? ten new classes of surface warships are being produced. SA-8 12 LOW SA-9 8 LOW SA-X-12 SA-13 100 8 LOW-TO- HIGH LOW METERS Surface-to-Air Missiles* 15 12 9 IMPROVED 6 HAWK PATRIOT 3 CHAPARRAL 0 RANGE (KM) 40 EFFECTIVE LOW-TO- ALTITUDE MEDIUM 10 80+ LOW-TO LOW HIGH ? The US units do not have a mission to provide air defense of the continental US. The most noteworthy new platform under construction is an entirely new class of aircraft carrier. Launched from Nikolayev shipyard in December 1985 and now in a two- to three-year fitting-out period prior to its initial sea trials toward the end of the decade, the new car- rier is approximately 300 meters long and will displace 65,000 tons The new ship is an evolutionary step in the Soviet Navy's aircraft carrier program. It has a larger angled flight deck than the :17,100- ton KIEV-Class carriers, has deck-edge air- craft elevators fore and aft of' the starboard island superstructure, and has a broad, upturned bow similar in configuration to a ski jump ramp used for short-take-off-and-vertical- landing aircraft. It is still too early to determine whether the new carrier will (a)n- duct over-the-bow flight operations or whether the forward area of' the flight deck will be fitted, at least initially, with surface-to-surface mis- 81 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 sue mounts similar to those aboard the KIEV- Class carrier. The aircraft for the new carrier's air wing are still under development. The test and eval- uation program for candidate aircraft contin- ues at the Saki naval airfield near the Black Sea. The Soviets are developing catapult and arresting gear systems that would be required by a carrier for launching and recovering high- performance fixed-wing aircraft. Installation of catapults and arresting gear on the new carrier cannot be confirmed, however, and the Soviets could choose to deploy this first unit with about 40 to 50 vertical take-off and landing aircraft. 82 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The new carrier is expected to begin sea trials in 1989. The Soviet Navy now has about 675 sur- face combatant ships. This total includes 280 principal surface combatants and 3 KIEV-Class aircraft carriers. It also includes 185 patrol combatants, 77 amphibious ships, and some The 14,000-ton OSCAR-Class submarine carries 24 nuclear-capable, 550-kilometer- range SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles. Three OSCAR units are now operational. 130 mine warfare ships. There are 300 under- way replenishment and material and fleet sup- port ships and 296 general purpose submarines. About 500 of these surface ships are ocean- going ships of greater than 1,000 tons displace- ment, with the remainder serving primarily in coastal defense and flank-support roles. To- gether, the navies of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have about 540 sur- face ships greater than 1,000 tons displacement, compared to more than 850 ships of this size in the navies of the United States and its NATO allies. The 37,100-ton KIEV-Class carrier is the largest operational ship in the navy's inven- tory and is the first modern Soviet-built ship to carry fixed-wing aircraft. Four have been con- structed, and the last KIEV is fitting out. Its weapons and sensors differ from previous units, and it is expected to begin sea trials soon in the Black Sea. The KIROV-Class guided-missile cruiser is the Soviet Navy's first nuclear-powered surface warship. Two, the KIROV and the FRUNZE, are now in service. Although their weapons systems differ somewhat, both have broad capa- bilities in all naval warfare areas-----antisurface, antisubmarine, and antiair. A third KIROV- Class cruiser is likely to be launched in 1986, and construction of a fourth unit is expected to begin soon. The lead ship of the newest class of Soviet cruisers, the SLA VA, is active in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. With its 16 SS-N-12 launchers, the SLAVA is mainly de- signed for antisurface warfare. It also has a modern air defense system with eight SA-N-6 launchers and two twin-armed SA-N-4 launch- ers. The second and third units are expected to begin sea trials in late 1985 and 1986, respec- tively, and a fourth unit is under construction at a Black Sea shipyard. Two guided-missile destroyer construction programs continued during 1985. The fifth SOVREMENNYY-Class guided-missile de- stroyer began sea trials last August, and five additional units are in varying stages of con- struction. The SOVREMENNYY, which has eight launchers for antiship cruise missiles-- twice as many as any other Soviet destroyer 83 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 TANGO-Class SS I- 92 Meters ) I CHARLIE II-Class SSGN 1- 102 Meters VICTOR III-Class SSN 104 Meters ALFA-Class SSN gL- 4 79 Meters 1-1 OSCAR-Class SSGN Attack Submarines Armament: Torpedoes, Possible ASW missile Propulsion: Diesel Submerged Displacement: 3,900 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1973 KILO-Class S6 1/1 150 Meters a -I 70 Meters MIKE-Class SSN I -1 e^==> 1-4 110 Meters SIERRA-Class SSN _/ I I- a 110 Meters YANKEE-Class SSN \ I < 130 Meters AKULA-Class SSN LOS ANGELES-Class SSN-688 1 ?I I-A 109 Meters P-1 Armament: Propulsion: Submerged Displacement: Initial Operational Capability Armament: Propulsion: Submerged Displacement: Torpedoes, SS-N-9 antiship cruise missile Nuclear 5,400 MT 1974 Torpedoes, SS-N-16 ASW missile Nuclear 6,300 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1979 Armament: Torpedoes, SS-N-15 ASW missile Propulsion: Nuclear Submerged Displacement: 3,700 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1978 Armament: Torpedoes, SS-N-19 antiship cruise missile Propulsion: Nuclear Submerged Displacement: 14,000 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1981 Armament: Torpedoes Propulsion: Diesel Submerged Displacement: 3,000 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1980 Armament: Torpedoes, ASW missile Propulsion: Nuclear Submerged Displacement: 6,400 MT Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials Armament: Propulsion: Submerged Displacement: Torpedoes, ASW missile Nuclear 8,200 MT Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials Armament: Torpedoes Propulsion: Nuclear Submerged Displacement: 10,000 MT Initial Operational Capability: 1984 Armament: Propulsion: Submerged Displacement: Torpedoes, ASW missile Nuclear 8,000 MT Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials Attack Submarines Armament: Torpedoes, HARPOON antiship missiles, TOMAHAWK SLCM, SUBROC ASW rocket Propulsion: Nuclear Submerged Displacement: 6,500 MT USS LOS ANGELES-Class is shown for comparison purposes. Other US attack submarine classes are STURGEON, SKIPJACK, SKATE, and PERMIT. is designed for antisurface warfare. It com- plements the ASW-configured UDALOY-Class guided-missile destroyers, which carry eight long-range cruise missile-delivered ASW weap- ons. Two UDALOYs entered the inventory dur- ing 1985, bringing the total of active units to seven. Four additional units are under construction. 84 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Surface Ship Comparisons New Class Aircraft Carrier 300 Meters Displacement 65,000 Tons KIEV-Class Guided-Missile VSTOL Aircraft Carrier 273 Meters Displacement 37,100 Tons KIROV-Class Nuclear-Powered Guided-Missile Cruiser ? pe._54 k 248 Meters Displacement 28,000 Tons SLAVA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser -187 Meters Displacement 12,000 Tons UDALOY-Class Guided-Missile Destroyer 162 Meters Displacement 8,000 Tons SOVREMENNYY-Class Guided-Missile Destroyer 156 Meters Displacement 7,300 Tons The backbone of' the navy's ASW corvette force is the GRISHA. Although first introduced into the inventory in 1968, construction of this class continues and some 40 are operational. NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier 333 Meters Displacement 91,400 Tons IOWA-Class Battleship 270 Meters Displacement 58,000 Tons VIRGINIA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser 175 Meters Displacement 11,000 Tons TICONDEROGA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser 170 Meters Displacement 9,600 Tons SPRUANCE-Class Destroyer 170 Meters Displacement 7,824 Tons OLIVER HAZARD PERRY- Class Guided-Missile Frigate 130 Meters Displacement 3,605 Tons Even with the first deployments of' the So- viets' new aircraft carrier in the 1990s, Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) will continue to he pri- marily a land-based force. Within the bornher 85 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 force, production of the BACKFIRE continues, and the C variants with improved performance have begun to enter the fleet. The BACK- FIRE, with its AS-4 air-to-surface missiles, is replacing the BADGER as the navy's primary antiship strike aircraft. The BACKFIRE sub- stantially extends the range at which SNA bombers could attack US and allied surface forces, such as aircraft carrier battle groups or amphibious task groups. With respect to ASW force developments, production of a vari- ant of the BEAR F long-range ASW aircraft has resumed. This aircraft's improved sensor system and 5,000-kilometer radius considerably enhances Soviet capabilities to conduct ASW operations at greater distances from the USSR. Soviet amphibious forces generally receive lower priority than submarine and surface war- 86 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Soviets' ability to project power into the Pacific Ocean region has increased with the deployment of the KIROV-Class nuclear- powered guided-missile cruiser FRUNZE to the Pacific Fleet. produce air cushion vehicles (ACVs) mainly for an amphibious warfare role. The USSR now maintains the world's largest force of ACVs. Those classes currently in the inventory in- clude the AIST, LEBED, TSAPLYA, UTENOK, and GUS. The first unit of the new PELIKAN- Class joined the Baltic Fleet in 1985, as did the first unit of the POMORNIK-Class. The latter craft is 56 meters long, making it the world's largest naval ACV. An additional class is also under construction. The ACV's high speed en- ables it to move troops and equipment more effi- ciently over short distances than conventional landing craft. The Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) is a small, elite force with the primary missions of con- ducting assault landings on the maritime flanks of the USSR in support of ground theater op- erations and of securing strategic straits in conjunction with other forces. Since 1979, the SNI has undergone extensive reorganization and equipment modernization. All three former SNI regiments in the west- ern fleets have been expanded to brigades, and combat support elements have been added to the single Pacific Ocean Fleet division. Fur- ther, SNI manning has increased from 14,000 to 16,000 troops. The introduction of artillery and antitank battalions as well as new equip- ment such as T-72 tank and 82-mm automatic mortars has increased SNI's organic firepower and operational capabilities. Naval Operational Concepts The USSR's concept of wartime operations appears to be influenced as much by geography 0 as by potential enemies. Soviet military plan- ners face four separate maritime frontiers Arctic/North Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific--which have necessitated the develop- ment of four different and nearly self-contained fleets. To facilitate command and control and wartime operations of the widely separated fleets and to meet the navy's varied and ex- panding wartime roles, a theater of military operations (TVD) structure encompassing the world's oceans has been established. Within these oceanic TVDs, the missions of ship programs. Although no new, large am- phibious ships have been produced since completion of the second IVAN ROGOV am- phibious assault transport dock (LPD) in 1982, construction of amphibious vehicle landing ships (LSTs) for the Soviet Navy has contin- ued in Poland, and a new, large LST class is believed to be in the planning stages. The Soviet Navy continues to develop and 87 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The Yak-36/FORGER vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) fighter is the main strike air- craft carried aboard the KIEV-Class aircraft carrier. the Soviet Navy are to contribute to Soviet de- terrence and strategic strike capability and to defend the USSR from enemy sea-based strike forces. The wartime tasks associated with these missions include: ? protecting Soviet strategic ballistic mis- sile submarines: ? countering enemy sea-based strategic forces: ? securing the sea approaches to the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries; ? conducting operations in selected areas to deny Western forces freedom of action; ? supporting Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground operations in continental TVDs; ? protecting Soviet sea lines of communica- tion; and ? interdicting enemy sea lines of communi- cation. Although the traditional fleet mission of `:Mistsuo Shibeta 88 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 strategic submarine protection and homeland defense remain dominate themes in Soviet planned wartime operations, coordinated com- bined arms/joint force operations within con- tinental TVDs, especially in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, are receiving increased em- phasis. For the most part, these continental TVD-oriented exercises appear designed to pre- pare fleet units to protect the seaward flanks of the Warsaw Pact, to seize key straits and is- lands, and to conduct amphibious assaults in support of Soviet land operations. Recent naval exercises in both the oceanic and continental TVDs have been conducted un- der realistic conditions approximating a war- time environment. In the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets, they have focused on command and control of multiple task groups and for- mations, the deployment of large numbers of warships and aircraft, and the establishment of echeloned combat zones stretching into the North Atlantic and Northwest Pacific Oceans. These exercises also reveal that Soviet naval operations are being conducted with larger and more powerful forces at increasingly greater distances from the USSR. NATO and the Warsaw Pact In 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- nization published the second edition of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Compar- isons study. Charts from the 1984 NATO study were published in Souiet Military Power 1.98,5. The following charts and tables present a US estimate of updated data for 1985. Not in- cluded in the data are forces of France and Spain. Although both nations are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, they do not par- ticipate in its integrated military structure. In an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact, France and Spain would defend their na- tional sovereignty with the following fiirces: approximately 20 divisions, 2,000 tanks, 3,000 artillery/mortars, 1,000 antitank launchers, 8,000 combat vehicles, 450 helicopters, 900 aircraft, and 100 naval warships. NATO-Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft' Fighter-Bomber Ground-Attack Interceptor- 3,450 2,100 2,300 1,400 1,170 900 NATO Fully reinforced In place 3,850 2,800 430 260 Reconnaissance Excludes France and Spain. Some interceptors can be used in ground-attack roles. US estimate of 1985 data Excludes strategic interceptors WARSAW PACT Fully reinforced In place 570 380 75 Bombers 89 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 NATO and Warsaw Pact Maritime Forces in the North Atlantic and Seas Bordering Europe, 1985* Category NATO Warsaw Pact Aircraft Carriers VSTOL Carriers 10 KIEV-Class Ships 1 Helicopter Carriers 6 2 Cruisers 16 21 Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes 303 199 Land-Based INF Aircraft Deployed at End of 1985* About 4,000 800 Coastal Escorts NATO and Fast Aircraft Patrol Boats 269 520 F-111, F-4, F-16, F-104, JAGUAR, BUCCANEER, TO Amphibious Ships -Ocean-going 50 21 - Other Ships/ Coastal Craft 69 181 Mine Warfare Ships/Craft 264 360 Total Submarines (All Types) 209 265 - Ballistic Missile Submarines 35 47 - Long -Range Attack Submarines 70 150 - Other Types 104 68 - ?/c, Submarines Nuclear Powered 50% 50% Sea-based Tactical ASW and Support Aircraft Including Helicopters 831 145 Land-Based Tactical and Support Aircraft Including Helicopters 379 575 Land-Based Anti- Submarine Warfare Fixed- Wing Aircraft and Helicopters 462 220 Excludes France and Spain ' US estimate of 1985 data WARSAW PACT Aircraft BADGER, BLINDER, FISHBED, FLAGON, FITTER, FLOGGER, FENCER, FULCRUM 'US estimate of 1985 data Numbers reflect NATO systems deployed in NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact systems opposite NATO Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Deployed at End of 1985* 3 000 NATO Missiles LANCE Artillery 155mm, 203mm WARSAW PACT Missiles FROG/SS-21 Artillery 152mm, 203mm, 240mm ? US estimate of 1985 data Numbers reflect NATO systems deployed in NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact systems opposite NATO 90 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 NATO-WARSAW PACT Comparison* Total Military Including Naval Forces 41,500 32,850 18 600 Artillery/Mortar 24,250 19,600 49 000 33,000 22,580 13,370 Division Main Equivalents Battle Tanks 74000' 1,250 47,000 Armored Personnel Carriers Fighting Vehicles NATO" In Place in Europe and Rapidly Deployable Forces NATO" Fully Reinforced Forces L 650 950" 900 Attack Helicopters 33 000 18,000 Antitank Guided Weapons Launchers Transport/Support Helicopters WARSAW PACT" In Place in Europe and Rapidly Deployable Forces WARSAW PACT" Fully Reinforced Forces Excludes France and Spain Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby obtaining similar combat power. ' US estimate of 1985 data. ?? Rapidly deployable forces?Include those US forces whose equipment is stored in Europe and high. readiness Soviet forces located in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev. and North Caucasus Military Districts. ??? Fully reinforced forces- --Include North American reinforcements and all Warsaw Pact forces located west of the Ural Mountains. Excludes armored command vehicles and other carriers. ' Excludes transport helicopters that can be configured for attack roles. 91 Chapter IV Soviet Forces for Theater Operations Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 92 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability The USSR's comprehensive commitment to support of its armed forces, in addition to the buildup and modernization of' its weapons sys- tems and forces, is reflected in programs that exercise and maintain a high degree of com- bat readiness. The development of extensive logistics bases and the expansion of strategic and theater mobility capabilities are designed to ensure that Soviet forces can make a rapid transition to war and can be moved and sup- ported in combat. A massive mobilization and combat support system underlies Soviet military power. It is de- signed to focus all the resources of' the nation on waging war. Soviet doctrine stresses that its armed forces must be prepared to engage in any type of conflict ranging from short local wars to protracted global conflicts. Therefore, the Soviets are prepared to mobilize and sustain their forces in a variety of wartime contingen- cies. Moreover, support systems and resources paralleling the growth of strategic and theater combat forces have been developed. These in- clude a trained military manpower base for ex- panding the active forces and replacing losses; a logistics system incorporating all classes of' consumable supplies; war reserve equipment.; and transport, repair, construction, and med- ical units. Soviet R&D efforts to improve theater mo- bility include the development of wing-in- ground-effect craft. The ORLAN-Class, seen here, takes advantage of the increased aero- dynamic lift that occurs when a wing oper- ating near the surface experiences a reduc- tion in induced drag. This greatly increases the craft's ability to carry heavy loads over long distances, especially over water, making it well-suited for amphibious warfare. 93 Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainahility Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Mobility Historically, the Soviet Union has possessed formidable forces suited for fighting in Europe, the Far East, and other areas contiguous to the USSR. During the past two decades, how- ever, the Soviets have enhanced their posture by steadily increasing their military forces in size, capability, range, and scope of operations beyond the periphery of the USSR. Through continuous technological advancements in air, sea, and command and control systems, they are increasingly able to maintain lines of com- munication and sustain their expanding military reach. An enhanced capability to de- ploy light, well-armed, mobile forces in support of strategic goals and national objectives in- creases the potential for Soviet power projec- tion into areas of vital interest to the Western Alliance. Existing Soviet mobility capabilities encom- pass these developments: ? the formation of strategically mobile forces and compatible military transport. assets; ? the design, modernization, and expan- sion of civilian transport systems that are easily adapted to military transport requirements; and 94 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 ? the establishment of national-level plan- ning and management bodies capable of mobilizing and assembling strategic assets from the civilian sector to meet military transport requirements. Soviet mobility is based in part on amphibi- ous assault ships and increasingly capable mil- itary air and air transport forces supplemented by civilian transport assets and associated per- sonnel. The Soviet leadership has established procedures for mobilizing civilian transport re- sources for military employment and routinely uses these assets in various military exercises. Military Transport Aviation (Voyenno- The Soviet An-124/CONDOR, with its 150- metric-ton lift capacity, surpasses the heavy- lift capability of the US C-5B transport. transportnaya aviatsia, abbreviated VTA) forces are the most visible of all the Soviet military mobility assets. In wartime, VTA forces would support airborne operations and provide logis- tic airlift to the armed forces. During peace- time, VTA aircraft make arms and equipment deliveries to client states in the Third World. VTA's worldwide presence is continually grow- ing in numbers and scope?from famine relief operations in Ethiopia to combat support oper- ations in Afghanistan. This force, comprised of about 600 aircraft, continues to modernize and improve in range, speed, and cargo capacity. VTA holdings consist of the four-engine, propellor-driven An-12/CUB and its replace- ment, the long-range jet transport I1-76/CAN- DID, which now constitutes over half of the VTA inventory. The USSR's heavy-lift ca- pability currently consists of 55 An-22/COCK aircraft. However, the Soviets are prepar- ing to deploy the new An-124/CONDOR heavy- lift transport in 1987 or 1988. This aircraft, which is comparable to the US C-SB GALAXY, will be able to carry a payload of 150 metric tons, almost twice the capacity of the An-22. This increase in heavy-lift capacity, in con- junction with the continued improvements ex- pected from additional I1-76/CANDID deploy- ments, will significantly enhance the Soviets' ability to support their commitments abroad. The CONDOR, in particular, will be able to The visor-nosed An-124/CONDOR, with its large payload capacity for outsized cargo and its drive-through feature, will add signifi- cantly to Soviet military airlift and power projection capabilities. 95 Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 carry larger quantities of outsized weapons such as the 55-20 transporter-erector-launcher, tanks, helicopters, missiles, and other critical equipment than could any of its predecessors. In peacetime, the Soviets will he able to supply client states with greater quantities of materiel in crisis situations. In wartime, the large lift capacity of the CONDOR, in conjunction with the CANDID, will facilitate the rapid move- ment of critical reserve stocks to forward areas or between theaters of' war as well as increase the flexibility of' Soviet airborne forces. The Soviets' total aircraft capacity would be significantly increased by the mobilization of' the state-owned airline, Aeroflot. These long- and medium-range transport aircraft, which number some 1,600, provide the Soviets with an immediate source of strategic air transport. METERS 75 60 45 30 15 0 An-124/CONDOR The close relationship between Soviet military and civil sectors is very apparent in the Min- istry of Civil Aviation. For example, Minister of Civil Aviation Boris P. Bugayev is an active duty general officer who holds the rank of Chief Marshal of Aviation. Additionally, several key ministry members are active duty officers, and most Aeroflot aircrews hold reserve mili- tary commissions. Sealift The USSR's military sealift capability is based on the Navy's 77 amphibious warfare ships. For strategic sealift, the Soviets, how- ever, depend on their large merchant fleet. This military-adaptable fleet has grown steadily dur- ing the past two decades. The foundations of strategic sealift consist of more than 1,700 ships Military Transport Aircraft An-22/COCK 11-76/CANDID MAX PAYLOAD (MT) 150 80 40 20 TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY 415/320 175/175 140/125 90/60 RANGE (MAX PAYLOAD) (KM) 2,900 4,200 4,600 1,400 METERS 75 60 45 30 15 0 US Military Transport Aircraft C-56 GALAXY ? C-141B STARLIFTER" C-130 A/H HERCULES MAX PAYLOAD (MT) 125 40 21 TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY 340/- 200-155 90/60 RANGE (MAX PAYLOAD) (KM) 4,200 3,950 1,850 Air refuelable 96 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 V Ill )til' C0111h1 Fled deadweight tonnage exceeds 21 million. This figure represents an increase of more than 500 percent over the past 20 years. Nearly half the cargo ships are self-sustaining and have cranes capable of lifting heavy mili- tary vehicles. Soviet ships have commercial as welI as a military utility. The Soviet merchant fleet is regularly used to support naval logistics operations. It con- sists of more than 60 roll-on/roll-off (HO/HO) and rail transport vessels. An element of the l( )i technology, specifically the loading ramp, was acquired from the West. In wartime, the merchant fleet would allow the Soviets to move forces to the most remote areas of the globe. In peacetime, it is used to transport arms and the forces of client states in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Soviet merchant ships produced over the last two decades have increasingly been constructed to military standards. Some key features they have incorporated include chemical-biological-radiological ((BR) protec- tion; increased endurance and surface speeds: improved capability in handling gear and self- servicing features: advanced communication, navigation, and electronics systems. including ident ifi ltion-frin(l-or-e (I FE) systems which are restricted to naval ships in the West. The current Soviet merchant marine ship- building program emphasizes designs hav- ing direct military applications. These in- clude roll-on"roll-off, roll-on/float-off(RO/FLO), lighter :iboard ship (LASH). and container ships. The operations of the merchant marine are closely coordinated with naval requirements from Moscow down to the smallest port facil- ity. A significant ;imount of logistic support required by the Soviet Navy in peacetime, es- pecially in distant ;ireas, is routinely provided by Soviet merchantmen. This flexibility allows Soviet merchant ships to obtain supplies for naval use in ports where warship visits might be denied. In a crisis, the highly organized, centrally controlled merchant fleet can provide military support quickly and effectively. particularly for amphibious operations, troop movements, ;ind arms shipments. For example. in support of' a military operation against Japan, the So- viet Ear East merchant fleet has the estimated capacity to transport up to seven motorized rifle or tank divisions in a single lift opera- tion, if given appropriate sea conditions and air superiority. To ensure readiness to perform 800 - 600 - 400 - 200 - Soviet Military Air Transport Force Trend CUB CANDID COCK 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 800 600 400 200 such missions. Soviet merchant ships are com- manded mostly by naval reserve officers who routinely participate in major naval exercises. Augmenting the ocean-going merchant fleet is a river-sea fleet consisting of' some 700 tank- ers flicl dry cargo carriers, with a deadweight tonnage of 2.5 million. These ships, which op- erate in coastal sea areas and in the Soviet and European inland waterway system, repre- sent an added wartime capacity to transport supplies and materiel to continental military theaters of operation. Realizing the vulnerability of their rail trans- port system, the Soviets have over the past two decades expanded their inventory of' heavy-lin transporters. especially the M AZ-5:17 tractor, with a trailer capable of carrying armored ve- hicles weighing 50 metric tons. The Soviets have more than :I,500 heavy-lift transporters available for moving military vehicles. The use of these heavy-lift transporters facilikites the movement of combat forces from the Soviet in- terior to forward areas opposite NATO, South- west Asia, China. Korea. and Japan. Heavy-lift vehicles provide the Soviets with ;1 fast and H exible transport force for the movement of' combat forces. The Mi-26/HALO. the world's largest heavy- lift helicopter, is another example of' Soviet enhancement of civil ;Ind military transport sectors through the acquisition of Western tech- nology. With its obvious military applications, it has zi payload ;Ind cargo hold capacity simi- lar to that of' the US ('-1:10. lntert heater movement of Soviet forces op- 97 Chapter X' Readiness, Nlobility, and Stistainabilily Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 posite NATO, Southwest Asia, and the Far East still is dependent on the rail system. The Soviet rail system is organized to facilitate its rapid conversion during wartime to a pri- mary long-distance carrier. Upon mobilization, the rail system comes under military control and operation: thus, locomotives and rolling stock are made immediately available to sup- port Soviet military needs. Construction of' the Baikal-Amur-Magistral Railroad, which will be operational in 1990, will augment the vulnera- ble Trans-Siberian Railroad in support of So- viet forces in the Far East either for action against China or against US forces operating in the Pacific area. The continued development and success of Soviet theater and strategic movement capa- bilities present a clear challenge to Western defense planners. Despite the impact that mo- bilization of the civilian transport sector would have on the economy including severe disrup- tions of normal transportation of goods and services the wartime employment of civilian assets is a major strength and key element in Soviet military power. Readiness Soviet military doctrine asserts that its armed forces must be maintained at a high state of combat readiness to ensure expeditious deployment under any conditions. Maintain- ing peacetime forces that are fully deployed at the strength required for war poses an eco- nomic burden to Soviet planners. Therefore, in peacetime many Soviet ground force units are manned at levels below their planned wartime strength. The Soviets are dependent on their well-organized and extensive mobilization sys- tem which allows a rapid fleshing out of their force structure for war. Even with extensive preparations, the War- saw Pact might experience some initial diffi- culties. Many Warsaw Pact tactical air force fighter regiments include some new pilots with limited experience. The inexperience of these pilots would limit the overall air combat po- tential of the Warsaw Pact. Further, Warsaw Pact aircrews usually fly at only about half the annual rate of US active duty aircrews. As a re- sult, Warsaw Pact aircrews usually are limited to a single role and therefore lack the flexi- bility inherent in many US and some non-US NATO units. With the reorganization of So- viet Air Forces, the growth in the number of longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles, and the high state of readi- ness of forward-deployed forces, the USSR is capable of executing the initial phase of an attack without the mobilization of additional forces. However, if the order is given to go to war, the Soviets would implement their na- tional mobilization plan, drawing upon some nine million recently trained reservists. These reservists would be used to bring understrength units, cadre units, and mobilization bases to full manning in a matter of days. While mo- bilizing and moving over 200 divisions is an extremely large and difficult task, the Soviets can assimilate the reservists, train them for combat, and be ready to conduct offensive op- erations in less than 60 days. The Soviets maintain their forces at what they term "ready" and "not-ready" levels. Ready units are manned with a high percentage of their planned wartime personnel, possess the most modern equipment, and train extensively in peacetime. They can begin combat opera- tions after only a very short period of mobi- lization and preparation. These "ready" units constitute about 40 percent of Soviet forces and include all of the Groups of Forces sta- tioned in Eastern Europe. The "not-ready" units are cadre and unmanned mobilization bases that require extensive mobilization and preparation and are generally equipped with older but still effective equipment such as T-55 or T-62 tanks. However, as increasing amounts of modern equipment are made available, many "not-ready" divisions are being equipped with the most advanced items in the Soviet inventory. The survivability of Soviet weapons systems and personnel is enhanced by a very compre- hensive dispersal system that would be exe- cuted during the transition to war. When alerted, Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact units would deploy to areas that would de- crease their vulnerability to detection and targeting. Ground forces would disperse and camouflage themselves in field assembly areas while aircraft would proceed to alternate air- fields. Surface ships and submarines would depart from their main operating bases. Personnel, equipment, and spare missiles needed for refiring ICBMs would move to field locations. Alternate command posts have been constructed, and redundant, hardened, and mo- bile communication links have been established throughout the USSR. These preparations for dispersal at the outbreak of war reflect Mos- 98 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet underway replenishment ship, on left, refueling a SOVREMENNYY-Class guided-missile destroyer during summer naval exercises. cow's perceived threat and expected deploy- ment of forces. Logistics Soviet militlrV planners continue to improve the logistic infrastructure and to enlarge the resource base available to support high- intensit y combined arms operations. Substan- tial quantities of supplies are stockpiled in forward areas for the initial stages of a conflict, and large strategic reserves exist to sustain op- erations. This comprehensive logistic support system is found in designated theaters of mili- tary Operations in Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and throughout the USSR. The Soviets have prestocked critical ammu- 99 Chapter V Readiness. Mobility. and Sustainability Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 nit ion and fuel reserves in Eastern Europe and the military districts of the western USSR. So- viet ammunition stocks intended to support combat operations against NATO in central Europe are double 1975 levels. The growth of Soviet military fuel stocks opposite central Eu- rope is also substantial. In addition, each non- Soviet Warsaw Pact country maintains large stockpiles of key military items. Moreover, the well road and rail system within the Western Theater facilitates the forward move- ment of supplies in wartime. Overall, theater logistic stockpiles in Eastern Europe and the military districts along the border of the USSR are capable of supporting Warsaw Pact mili- tary operations against NATO for 60 to 90 days. The Far East Theater encompasses the USSR's largest continental theater of military operations but historically has been of sec- ondary importance as Soviet planners have placed greater emphasis on supporting Soviet forces opposite NATO. In the last decade, how- ever, the Soviets have devoted considerably more at to increasing the sustainabil- it y of their forces in the Far East because of the long lines of communication and the need to support large theater forces opposite China and ,lapan. Storage capacities for ammunition and POI, which account for about 80 percent of the Soviets' total war materials, have in- creased significantly at many depots. The pre- positioning of such large quantities of war ma- terials in the Far East reduces the dependence on logistic assets from the western industrial centers for resupply during the initial periods of actual warfare. Soviet ground and naval fOrces can now sustain defensive conventional wartime operations for more than 100 days. The Trans-Siberian Railroad would be a crit- ical supply line to the Far East in a war ex- ceeding 100 days. This railroad is the only land transportation link to the Far East and is particularly vulnerable to interdiction where it closely parallels the Chinese border. The Baikal-Amur-Magistral Railroad, currently un- der construction, will parallel the eastern por- tion of the Trans-Siberian to the north. When completed, it will be less vulnerable to interdic- tion hut will not significantly increase overall supply capacity. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is the USSR's most far-reaching arm in the Far East and is es- pecially dependent on the Trans-Siberian for supply of' war materials. The fleet must de- fend more than 11,000 kilometers of coastline, Major Soviet Military Storage Areas ? ??? 1.. ? col? ? ? ..?. ? ?? ? ?It ? ? ? ?,? ? ?? Ammunition Depots 12 million metric tons arms/ammunition including storage in Eastern Europe Reserve Armor Storage Depots 6,000 armored vehicles (tanks/APCs) including storage in Eastern Europe 404.6 ? Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Storage Depot Concentrations 60 million metric tons including storage in Eastern Europe ?? ? 100 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the largest maritime border of any Soviet fleet. Major Soviet Military Storage Areas In order to provide logistic support to the fleet and serve as a hedge against loss of' the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Soviets have de- veloped large naval weapons and POI, storage complexes throughout the region. The fleet's . ? ? ? present logistic infrastructure is estimated to ? he capable of sustaining naval combat opera- ? ? ? ? tions beyond 150 days. . ? ? ? Although Soviet planners believe that nil!- . itary objectives in some theaters can he ? achieved within weeks, additional logistic cc- ?? sources, termed strategic reserves, have been ? ? ? established for protracted operations. The stra- . tegic reserve depots concentrated in the iii- tenor military districts of the Soviet Union Reserve Artillery Storage Depots would be used to support theater operations. 18,000 artillery and AAA pieces Some of these reserve depots store van- including storage in Eastern Europe ous types of military materiel, including spare parts, clothing, rations, and medical supplies. Major weapons systems and other war- fighting equipment have been placed in stor- age depots. These items include tanks, armored ?? personnel carriers, field artillery, and air . defense systems as well as maintenance. ?? ? ? engineer, signal, and other types of support .? ? ? equipment. Many of these systems are older ? models but are capable of performing Mice- ? tively in combat. They would be used to replace losses and create additional combat and sup- port units. This equipment thus constitutes an important addition to Soviet military power. The USSR has deployed a variety of well- Bridge Equipment Storage Depots equipped logistic units to move supplies. repair 27,000 meters of bridging materials damaged equipment, build and maintain lines including storage in Eastern Europe of communication, and treat personnel casual- ties. Motor transport units, many of which are kept loaded with ammunition and fuel during peacetime, possess large numbers of the most 4 11. modern trucks, including the very capable KA- I MAZ trucks. which were built with West ern .40' 4" technology and assistance. Tactical pipeline construction units add sub- ' stantially to fuel transport capabilities. Soviet pipelaying units are capable of installing about 80 kilometers of pipe per day using i he TUM r autorriatic pipelayer or about :30 kilometers per day manually. The high pipelaying rate is con- sistent with Soviet offensive doctrine which holds that armies are to advance up to 100 kilo- meters a day. Some 15,000 kilometers of' pipe Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Concentrations including storage in Eastern Europe are currently estimated to he available for op- erations against NATO's Central RegUm while about 12,000 kilometers of' pipeline are with logistics units in the Soviet Far East. 101 Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, .tand Susiainability Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The 12,000-ton IVAN ROGOV-Class amphibious assault transports enhance the USSR's capability to project military power beyond the Soviet Union. Equipment repair units are highly mobile and designed to move forward with rapidly ;idvancing combat formations. To facilitate the movement of combat and support forces, the USSR has bridge, rail, and road construc- tion units that would maintain critical lines of communication at strategic and tactical levels. Nledical units to treat and evacuate casualties are also part of the USSR's combat logistic support system. The Soviet Union is investing very heavily in mobilization and logistic support systems that are the underpinnings of its military capabili- ties. In the USSR's military planning process, every effort is made to ensure that the demands that would be placed upon these systems in war 102 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Symbolic of the Soviet Navy's growing ca- pability to project power is the KIEV-Class aircraft carrier. are not left to chance. The Soviets peacetime preparations indicate they have every inten- tion of meeting the support requirements in- herent in major conflicts, even those that are protracted. Mobilization System To support wartime goals, the USSR has de- veloped a mobilization system backed by an extensive manpower and logistics base that integrates the military, government, economy, and general population. Although geared to the rapid buildup and wartime commitment of military units and other resources, the sys- tem is also designed to accommodate extended and selective mobilization of all types of mili- tary and civilian assets. Mobilization may be general, in which the entire nation is placed on a wartime footing, or limited, as that con- ducted in preparation for the Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan invasions. Some 4,200 military organizations, called commissariats which are subordinate to the Soviet General Staff are crucial to the rapid mobilization of Soviet manpower and materiel. Dispersed throughout the USSR, these mili- tary commissariats have functions analogous to those of US draft boards and armed forces reserve centers in that their peacetime mis- sion is conscription, reservist registration, and training. In wartime, commissariats are responsible for mobilizing reserve manpower and equip- ment from the civilian economy to activate or create combat and combat support units. These would include motor transport, engineer, re- pair, signal, and medical units. During mo- bilization, reservists are notified, assembled, and dispatched to units with equipment drawn from the national economy and are then inte- grated into the armed forces. When executed, this system could activate several million re- servists and tens of' thousands of' trucks and other equipment within a few days. Also, sup- port systems such as the rail network, the civil airline Aeroflot, the merchant fleet, and ele- ments of the national communications system can be militarized as part of the national mobi- lization effort. Military Manpower Base All eligible Soviet youths. by law, must serve two years or, in the case of naval personnel aboard ship, three years of active duty. Con- scripts are subsequently discharged into the reserves. Thus, the Soviets have a military manpower base in which all able-bodied citizens between 18 and 50 are either on active duty or are subject to reserve service. The reserve manpower pool currently com- prises more than 55 million men subject to callup, of which 9 million have been discharged from active duty within the past five N'ears. Since only about. 2.1 million reservists, or about 5 percent of the total reserve manpower pool, are needed to bring the Soviet Armed Forces to full wartime strength, a substantial base would remain available to create new units and pro- vide replacements. The process of fleshing out units involves mostly conscripts since Soviet force structure employs a cadre system comprised of' a career officer corps of' about one million personnel al- ready in place. The career officer corps repre- sents over 20 percent of' the total Soviet Armed Forces strength of' approximately 5.7 million. Within the Soviet military establishment, women serve mainly in the enlisted ranks in auxiliary and specialist roles notably, medi- cal, administrative, communications, and other support areas. Military law in the Soviet Union also subjects women to conscription during wartime, thereby ensuring a large reservoir for expanding the forces and releasing men for combat duty. 103 Chapter V Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 104 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production The Soviet Union's evolution as a global superpower has been based primarily on its mil- itary capabilities. Realizing that numerical su- periority alone would not provide the leverage they sought in the world arena. Soviet lead- ers have endeavored to harness modern technology to make their weapons systems qualitatively equal to, or superior to. those of the Free World. This objective comple- ments the Communists dialectical perspective of history which predicts Soviet scientific as- cendancy in the 21st century. In an attempt to fulfill this destiny, the Soviets have ('ommit- ted their best scientific personnel, their hest research facilities and equipment. and the man- agement skills of their elite to military re- search and development (R&D) and production efforts, often to the detriment of their civil- ian industry and the welfare of' their populace. The Soviets have also invested large amounts of economic resources in their effort to gain military superiority. Military Expenditures Cumulative Soviet military expenditures from 1976 to 1985 greatly exceeded those of the United States. During this decade, the esti- mated dollar cost of the Soviet military program was one-th=.rd larger than the US defense outlay, using similar methods of Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air-superiority fighters, now being deployed, are equipped with a look-down/shoot-down weapon sys- tem and beyond-visual-range AA-10 missiles. The FLANKER, along with the Soviets' ex- panding inventory of new, high-performance, dual-capable MiG-29/FULCRUM supersonic fighters, is emerging from an expanding in- dustrial base that gives highest priority to military production. Chapter VI IZe,,ear('h, I)evelopment, and Product ion Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 definition. Soviet expenditures for weapons systems during this period were 50 percent higher. Increased US defense spending has nar- rowed this differential, but in critical areas such as R&D, the Soviet effort still exceeds that of the US. Moreover, there has been an upturn in Soviet weapons procurement during the past two years. Estimates of Soviet military spending in cur- rent rubles indicate a significant increase from the early 1970s to the early 1980s?at a rate significantly faster than their overall economic growth. The Soviet military effort now con- sumes an estimated 15 to 17 percent of their gross national product. The costs of the Soviets' huge military R&D effort are very high. The USSR commits about 3 percent of its gross national product (GNP) to research and development-----or about 20 per- cent of total Soviet defense outlays. The USSR has assembled the world's largest pool of sci- entists and engineers --over 900,000 working in R&D. This total plus the almost one million support personnel involved in R&D constitutes about one-fourth of the world's total. Over half of these Soviet scientists and engineers have defense-related specialties, and a large per- centage are involved in military-related R&D on a full-time basis. By their own account- ing and definitions, the Soviets employ over 12 million scientists and engineers throughout their economy. Key Military Technologies Technological gains in Soviet weapons sys- tems rely not only on the contributions of the indigenous R&D base but also on the acquisi- tion of Western technology and its timely in- corporation into Soviet weaponry. While the United States continues to lead the USSR in most basic technologies, the gap in the mili- tary application of such technologies continues to narrow. The incorporation of critical West- ern technologies is permitting the USSR to avoid costly R&D efforts and to produce Soviet weapons comparable to or superior to fielded US weapons at a much earlier date than would otherwise be possible. Materials. Driven by the increasingly de- manding requirements of advanced weapons systems, the Soviets have devoted considerable effort in all the important materials disciplines. Their capability in metal alloys such as tita- nium for the fabrication of structural elements for aerospace and naval systems is the equal of US and Soviet Procurement of Major Weapons Systems 1976-1985 US USSR ICBMs and SLBMs 700 3,350 IRBMs and MRBMs 430 1,000 Surface-to-Air Missiles 1,600 112,000 Long- and Intermediate- range Bombers 2 345 Fighters 3,500 7,850 Helicopters 1,500 5,350 Submarines 40 96 Major Surface Combatants 90 83 Tanks 7,400 24,900 Artillery 2,400 32,225 any other nation and may lead in some areas. For example, their use of titanium for subma- rine pressure hulls and for aircraft structures is most impressive. Their ability to use steel, aluminum, and most other alloys as well as ad- vanced processing techniques such as powder metallurgy and rapid solidification is as good as any in the world. They are emulating the US in applying advanced composite materials with excellent strength and stiffness ratios to aerospace structural components. The Soviets claim parity with the US in composite materi- als development and design know-how but ad- mit their deficiency in fabrication techniques. In ground weapons applications such as tank armor, the Soviets have made significant im- provements, including the use of laminated ma- terials and applique concepts to improve the ballistic protection of their newest tanks. They have conducted considerable research in ce- ramics, particularly for engine and armor ap- plications. While the US still enjoys a lead in structural materials technology, the Sovi- ets are making advances that are eroding that lead. Manufacturing. The USSR has long recog- nized the need to develop the manufacturing and fabrication capabilities that permit the mass production of weapons systems. The Sovi- ets have the world's largest forging and extru- sion presses, allowing them to fabricate large, single-piece components with considerable savings in weight and cost. To support their vigorous program in joining technologies, they graduate nearly 3,000 welding engineers each 106 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 year while the Free World has only a few schools that even offer this curriculum. The Soviets have demonstrated innovative welding techniques in such processes as electroslag, friction, electrogas, and pulsed arc welding. They are the world leader in this important in- dustrial capability. However, the Soviets con- tinue, to trail the Free World in automated manufacturing technologies such as numeri- cally controlled machine tools, flexible manu- facturing systems, robotics, automated indus- trial control systems, and high-precision equipment. Although they are improving, fur- ther Soviet development depends on the ac- quisition of knowledge and equipment from non-Communist countries. Propulsion. The Soviets continue to progress steadily in all aspects of propulsion technol- ogy. Their gas turbine aircraft engines are improving in performance and efficiency and are noted for their ruggedness and simplicity alt hough constrained by short operating life- times. Until they sent an An-124/CONDOR wide-bodied transport aircraft with a Lotarev D18T engine to the 1985 Paris Air Show, they had not displayed a high-thrust, high-bypass engine similar to those used by the US since 1969. The Soviets also have a very extensive R&D effort in all aspects of rocket propulsion. There has been a noticeable trend from liquid- to solid-propellant engines on their new land- based strategic systems, with the technology only slightly behind that of US systems. They remain the world's leader in liquid rocket propulsion though they still have not successfully applied a liquid-hydrogen, liquid- oxygen cryogenic engine to their space launch vehicles. The Soviets have consistently been at or near the forefront of world developments in applications of power engineering, particu- larly for space and marine propulsion systems. Their work in nuclear power. particularly for space and marine applications, has been very I nnovative and effective. Directed Energy. The Soviets continue ma- jor R&D efforts on all types of directed-energy weapons technologies. Their commitment to high-energy lasers began in the mid-1960s and is now considerably larger than that of the US. They have built more than six laser de- velopment and test ranges which dwarf their counterparts in the US. During the last ten years, the floorspace dedicated to this work has quadrupled. Moreover, articles by Soviet sci- entists publishing on laser research have dou- bled to approximately 12,000. The Soviets have developed several unique power sources that could support mobile or remote directed-energy weapons, including a rocket-driven magneto- hydrodynamic (MHD) device that produces 15 megawatts of pulsed power. Further, recent Soviet developments in radio frequency gen- eration devices could enable them to build weapons to degrade or destroy electronics or cause disorientation of personnel. They have generated single pulses with peak power ex- ceeding one gigawatt and repetitive pulses over 100 megawatts. Similarly, since the early 1960s the Soviets have been working on many of the technologies needed to develop particle beam weapons. In some of' the needed dis- ciplines such as powerful accelerators, their work is at the leading edge of' the state-of-the- art. They are still encountering difficult engi- neering problems, and the technology needed to build a particle beam weapon capable of' propagation for a meaningful distance requires additional research. Chemical and Biological Warfare. The USSR has a well-established, longstanding, and very extensive research, development, and test base for chemical and biological agents. It includes facilities such as the biological agent research facility at Sverdlovsk, where an accidental re- lease of a large amount of anthrax spores ill 1979 resulted in many casualties. It also in- cludes the facility at Shikhany which dates to shortly after World War I. Shikhany has been active and under almost continuous expansion since that time. The Soviets have developed a wide range of chemical agents including nerve, blister, blood, and choking substances as well as incapaci- tants that cause unconsciousness for an hour or more. They are continuing research on tox- ins and binary agents as well as ground and air delivery systems. Of great importance is the willingness of the Soviets to use the var- ious agents, both lethal and incapacitating. As demonstrated by their actions in Afghanistan, the Soviets and their surrogates have inflicted a large number of deaths and casualties on na- tive populations. These attacks have served as an excellent testing ground for the Soviets to evaluate their various chemical agents. Bioengineering,. The Soviets are also fully aware of the potential of' bioengineering for medical, agricultural, and industrial benefits. 107 Chapter VI Research. Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Further, they realize the potential of bioengi- neering to develop a predictable, controllable, and effective biological warfare agent that would offer a tempting alternative to other weapons of mass destruction. Soviet bioengi- neering has progressed very rapidly over the past five years, and policy directives of the Council of Ministers suggest continued high- level support. Free World genetic engineering is also progressing rapidly, and it is unlikely that the Soviets can keep pace in all areas. Electronics/Computers. At the end of World War 11, the Soviets' electronics capability was either extremely outdated or mostly destroyed. Since then, they have invested a large amount. of resources to reestablish their electronics R&D capability and acquire Free World know- how to meet military requirements. These investments have paid off with significant ad- vances in militarily critical systems including phased-array and over-the-horizon propagation radars, millimeter wave devices, and high- power radio frequency generators. Computers and microelectronics are of great importance in any advanced weapon system. Soviet computer technology continues to be based on US and Western developments. Al- though the Soviets have a solid understand- ing of the basic technology, they continue to have problems in transferring this knowledge to the production of' microelectronic devices and computer hardware. The low reliability and poor quality of these devices reflect con- tinuing problems with manufacturing. Soviet efforts in the crucial area of software devel- opment also suffer from fundamental problems. The Soviets' centralized economy, which is di- rected at meeting military requirements first, puts new electronics, either developed indige- nously or obtained from the Free World, in the hands of' military designers more rapidly than ours. Technology Transfer To correct shortcomings, the Soviets have come to rely heavily on Free World sources for much of' the technology employed in their military systems. This is not a random ef- fort, but a massive, centrally controlled cam- paign to obtain needed products and technical knowledge selectively through legal and ille- gal means. Virtually all of' the 5,000 ongoing Soviet research projects with military applica- tions or implications have benefitted to some extent from know-how acquired from the Free World. The Soviet technology acquisition program has two distinct but complementary aspects: ? The Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which coordinates the develop- ment and production of military systems, is also the prime coordinator for technol- ogy acquisition to support the defense in- dustrial ministries. It seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware, documen- tation, blueprints, product samples, and test gear to improve the technical levels and the capability of Soviet weapons and military equipment and associated indus- trial machinery. This is accomplished by copying or exploiting the advanced de- signs and engineering contained in the equipment and technical data acquired. The VPK coordinates the requirements of the defense industrial ministries and levies them for collection through espi- onage by the KGB and GRU. Collection is accomplished by Soviet scientists, en- gineers, and officials, by exploitation of scientific exchanges and journals, and through illegal trade diversions. The So- viets spend the equivalent of $1.4 billion per year to underwrite their acquisition effort. ? The Ministry of Foreign Trade and the intelligence services administer a trade diversion program to obtain significant numbers of manufacturing and support- ing equipment for direct use on Soviet military-industrial production lines. Al- though this effort targets many export- controlled technologies, it concentrates on microelectronics and computers, com- munications gear, robotics, and advanced machinery. Its purpose is to improve Soviet capabilities to produce reliable modern weapons. Soviet efforts to acquire foreign technology have been very successful. Under the VI'K program, over 3,500 requirements were levied each year during the late 1970s and early l 980s, and about one-third were satisfied annually. About half of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of' hardware and one-fifth of' the 100,000 docu- ments obtained each year are used by the Sovi- ets in transferring Free World technology to military research projects. During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), two prime users of ac- 108 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Electronics Communications Aviation Radar and Computers Chemical Shipbuilding Nuclear Industry and Lasers Armor and Electro-optics Electrical Equipment Projectiles and Explosives Missiles and Space Petroleum and Petrochemicals Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by Military Industrial Commission (VPK) Requirements Fulfilled, by Hardware Received, and by Rubles Saved, 1976-80 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 6/2 8/5 2/10 111/7 9/8 10/1 5/12 7/11 12/6 3/9 4/3 Number of requirements fulfilled for Western documents, hardware, or both 1/4 Ranking by hardware received/ranking by rubles saved # 0 200 400 About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were ful- filled during the 10th Five-Year Plan for Western hardware and documents were satisfied on behalf of two defense indus- tries electronics and communications. These are key areas where the Soviets' need for militarily significant technology and the West's need for better controls are greatest. The four industries receiving the most Western military hardware and dual-use products were electronics (over 6,000 pieces of equipment, a large percentage involving microelec- tronics), chemical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petro- chemicals, (over 1,500), and communications (over 1,500) ranked in that order. 600 800 1,000 1,200 The top four industries saving the most rubles in research project development costs in terms of manpower and other resources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost 20 percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project costs) and the aviation, communications, and electonics in- dustries. These four industries consistently appear to be the Soviet leaders in requesting, absorbing, and generally get- ting the most use out of Western hardware and documents. In some cases, such as in the armor area, the Soviets are using Western technology not to catch up, but to enhance a capabil- ity that already is equal to or better than that of the West. (wired technologies, the Ministries of Defense Industry (armor and electro-optics) and Avia- t ion Industry, estimated that they saved almost one-half billion rubles in research project costs, translating to over 100,000 man-years of scien- tific resea rch To cite one significant example. by using doc- umentation on the US F-18 fighter, Soviet avia- tion and radar industries saved some five years of development time and :35 million rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity would he $55 million) in project manpower and other developmental costs. The manpower p()r- tion of these savings probably represented over a thousand man-years of scientific research effort and was one of' the most successful individual exploitations ever of Western tech- nology. The documentation on the F-18 fire control radar served as the technical basis for new look-down/shoot-down engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet fighters, including the MiG-29/FULCRUM and the Su- 27/FLANKER. US methods of component de- sign, fast-Fourier-transform algorithms. terrain 109 Chapter VI Research. Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects Average yearly percent Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s of all research project that benefited 0 Electronics Armor and Electro-optics Aviation Missiles and Space Projectiles and Explosives Communications Chemicals Radars and Computers Electrical Equipment Shipbuilding Nuclear Industry and Lasers Petroleum and Petrochemicals 2 4 6 10 12 14 35 40 45 Projects whose technical levels were raised Projects whose research stages were eliminated or shortened Projects whose technical approaches were redirected plus new research projects started 0 2 4 6 8 The assimilation of Western technology into Soviet indus- tries conducting military research is considerable. The greatest beneficiaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics industries, which accounted for over 50 percent (equaling thou- sands) of all military research projects benefiting from Western technology in the early 1980s. 10 12 14 35 40 The general distribution points out the rather broad effect that Western documents and hardware have just on raising the technical levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly true for the top three industries, where advanced technology and innovative design concepts play a significant role in weapons developments. 45 mapping functions, and real-time resolution- enhancement techniques were cited as key elements incorporated into the Soviet counterpart. Moreover. F-18 and F-14 documentation served as the impetus for two long-term re- search projects to design from scratch a new radar-guided air-to-air missile system. The doc- umentation also was instrumental in formu- lating concrete specifications to develop new Soviet airborne radar countermeasures equip- ment against the F-18 and F-14. Hundreds of Soviet military systems and weapons of the 1980s and 1990s have benefited or will benefit from technologies obtained from the Free World. In the early 1970s. the techni- cal levels of some 66 percent of their military research projects were raised and 27 percent of' the completion dates were accelerated princi- pally because the Soviets have copied concepts embodied in Western technical documents, mil- itary hardware, or dual-use products. US and allied efforts to counter this are covered in Chapter VIII. The Soviets are not exclusively dependent on Free World technology to advance the quality of their military systems. Innovation, new con- cepts, new directions, higher technical levels of research, accelerated development of more advanced weapons, and the avoidance of major 110 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 pitfalls are among the benefits the Soviet mil- itary derives from US military R&D projects. Free World technology gives the Soviet de- signer another option, often better than his own research establishment can produce, from which to choose. The Soviet practice of incor- porating technology in small bits from many systems, however, permits the efficient, rapid assimilation of equipment or knowledge ob- tained from the West. The Soviet R&D Base Capital investment in research laboratories, design bureaus, key military technologies, and test facilities has kept pace with the drive for military technological supremacy. The USSR's military R&D capability, which is concentrated within nine defense industrial ministries, has grown about 28 percent during the last ten years. Some sectors involved in high-priority, high-technology projects such as directed- energy weapons and electro-optics have shown an even more dramatic growth rate. The So- viets have concurrently developed a full range of well-equipped, comprehensive test facilities permitting them to evaluate military systems under realistic conditions. This capability ex- tends from subsystems to full-scale systems and includes all types of aerospace, ground, and naval components. This focus on military R&D has not always been evenly applied. Various sectors have re- ceived special emphasis because of leadership perspectives of foreign military threats, mis- sion requirements, and/or high-level patron- age. Consequently, certain weapons systems have received concentrated developmental sup- port. However, as high-level support has shifted, the Soviets typically did not trans- fer resources but rather added incremental re- sources so that previously emphasized sectors continued to receive strong support. The cumu- lative effect of this trend has been to provide the Soviets with a huge, broad-based R&D ca- pability which can and does provide weapons for all segments of the Soviet arsenal. To manage their massive R&D effort, the Soviets have evolved a complex, effective, if not always efficient, organizational structure. This structure operates within the framework of two interlocking bureaucracies, the Commu- nist Party and the government. Military R&D programs are marked by top-level involvement and strong centralized management. The De- fense Council, which is chaired by General Sec- retary Gorbachev, is comprised of top leaders of the Party, government, and military who make the important decisions on major weapons pro- grams and R&D policies. Approval of resource commitments for re- search programs is influenced by the technical bent of many senior Soviet leaders. Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov, while lacking the long, detailed experience in military-industrial programs of his predecessor Marshal Ustinov, is quite knowledgeable regarding the manage- ment of these complex projects. Additionally, the personnel changes General Secretary Gor- bachev has implemented have brought more technocrats into positions of power. More than three-fourths of the Politburo and the Coun- cil of Ministers have technical backgrounds which create an environment conducive to understanding resource and managerial requirements. The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) is a powerful supraministerial agency which coordinates all the efforts of the defense in- dustrial ministries and centrally supervises all weapons programs. Operating across ministe- rial lines, the VPK is charged with implement- ing the joint resolutions of the Politburo and Council of Ministers which approve weapons programs. These resolutions provide one-time, multiyear approval for the entire duration of the program, including, in some cases, follow- on modifications. Under such a resolution, any state asset- that is, any individual or resource regardless of affiliation can be coopted to sup- port a particular weapons program. This in- cludes the Soviets' 127,000 senior scientists and the resources of the academies of sciences and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Educa- tion (MinVUZ). The academies of sciences are charged with conducting basic research to support the na- tional economy. The MinVUZ supports the national R&D effort by conducting exploratory research and educating the scientists and engineers who will fill its ranks. Both the academies and MinVUZ are becoming increas- ingly involved in military R&D in cases where development is dependent on advanced technol- ogy or where their specific expertise is needed. The Ministry of Defense, as the prime con- sumer of the defense industries' products, also enjoys the unique privilege of direct quality control. Its representatives participate in ev- 111 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 ery aspect of the process, including require- ments generation, design, testing, production monitoring, and deployment. The powerful State Nanning Commission integrates the mil- itary's R&D resource requirements into na- tional plans. The system integTator in the Soviet military R&D structure is the design bureau within the defense industrial ministry assigned to build the system. Each design bureau usually takes the name of' the chief designer and has a spe- cialty on which it concentrates. It works closely with the ministerial research institutes to translate their discoveries into practical ap- plications. The design bureau staff then con- ducts the needed engineering, documentation, prototype construction, and testing to develop the new or improved system. The staff also coordinates with the production plants to fa- cilitate series production. Design teams are formed in response to a requirement for a specific system and remain with the program from inception to completion and often through follow-on systems. Soviet weapons designers have historically adhered to strict state industrial standards, used off-the-shelf components, and employed proven design methods detailed in official hand- books to ensure producibility, maintainability, and ease of operation. They build large num- bers of' weapons that are technologically ad- equate and well-engineered to meet mission requirements. Technological advances are usually assimilated in small steps, with the un- derlying assumption that new or improved com- ponents or subsystems will be incorporated in follow-on modifications or new systems. As a result, the Soviets produce many more new and significantly modified weapons systems than the US. Their weapons often reflect functional, single-mission designs that can be manufactured in labor-intensive fac- tories. They take a somewhat different approach to maintenance than the US by planning and designing for limited field main- tenance by relatively unskilled personnel while emphasizing frequent depot maintenance by specialists. Despite their tendency toward design conser- vatism, the Soviets have been quite successful in raising the relative technological stature of' their weapons systems. The weapons they are Kharko Dnepropetrovs Nikolayev? Zaporozhye Pavlograd A Rostov Leningrad ? ?Minsk Key Soviet Military Production Centers ? Severodvinsk Zagorsk Mo$kvaAA KOVIVV Ki Bryansk ? A rovA ?Kiev Gorkiy AA arm ?Nizhnyaya Tura Voronezh Kazan A Nizhniy Tagil ? Votkinsk l'Sverdlovsk Chelyabinsk??Kurgan Ulyanovsk A ? Kuybyshev Volgograd KemerovoA ? Krasnoyarsk Omsk ? ?Novosibirsk ?Biysk Irkutsk ? ? Ulan-ude Komsornorsk A Arsenyev 112 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 currently deploying which incorporate technol- ogy they developed or acquired from the Free World in the mid-1970s have narrowed, and in some cases, eliminated the Free World's qual- itative lead. Particularly ominous is the fact that the Soviets have not yet fully realized the advantages of the last ten years' economic in- vestments because of the timelag between re- sources committed and actual production. As resources and knowledge obtained from Free World sources further enhance Soviet capabil- ities, the West's qualitative edge could further erode and, in some critical military capabili- ties, result in Soviet superiority. Military Industrial Production General Secretary Gorbachev's industrial modernization program for the 12th Five-Year Plan seeks to raise the technological level of the machinery and equipment manufactur- ing sector, which provides the basis for So- viet economic and military might. Key areas within this sector that are likely to receive pri- ority investments and undergo rapid growth include electronics, computers, robotics, ma- chine tools, and instruments. Soviet military authorities widely agree that military re- quirements have moved into thwarena of high- technology and that without a strong, techno- logically advanced industrial base, the Soviet economy will have difficulty producing the complex weaponry required in the 1990s and beyond. The ultimate beneficiary of Gor- bachev's modernization program will be the So- Equipment Type Tanks Other Armored Fighting Vehicles Towed Field Artillery Self-Propelled Field Artillery Multiple Rocket Launchers Self-Propelled AA Artillery Towed AA Artillery Soviet Military Industrial Expansion Floorspace/Waylength Meters (millions) 60 - 50 - 40 - 30 - 20 - 10 - 0 Naval (waylength) Missiles (floorspace) Aircraft (floorspace) Ground Force Weapons and : Armored Vehicles (ffoorapaps) Meters (millions) - 60 - 50 40 r- 30 - 20 1970 1975 1980 1985 10 viet military-industrial complex. Wide-spread modernization of the Soviet industrial base will ensure future military production capabilities. Critical Industries Metals. The dramatic increases in Soviet metals production underscore the USSR's emphasis on crucial materials to build their in- dustrial base. Historically, the Soviets have exploited their impressive national resource base of strategic minerals, thereby assuring in- dependence from foreign manipulation. The Production of Ground Forces Materiel USSR/NSWP and NATO' USSR NSWP USSR NSWP USSR NSWP 1983 1984 3,000 550 3,200 450 5,000 1,300 3,800 1,200 1,800 300 1,900 250 950 200 1,000 300 900 100 900 100 100 0 50 0 150 0 225 1985 1983 3,000 700 1,600 3,500 1,200 1,700 2,000 200 650 1,000 350 600 700 100 50 100 10 0 225 25 NATO ' Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes United States; excludes France and Spain. 1984 1985 1,800 2,700 1,600 2,500 450 550 250 300 75 75 50 25 25 I 0 113 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet shipyards continue to produce new generations of major surface combatants with greater firepower including, from top to bottom, UDALOY- and SOVREMENNYY-Class destroyers, and KIROV-, and SLAVA-Class cruisers. recent introduction of' modern processing and fabricating techniques has further strength- ened the Soviets industrial autonomy. To overcome their tendency for emphasiz- ing only quantity in industrial production, the Soviets have designated sectors within each basic industry to develop the best state-of-the- art materials for advanced weapons systems. As would be expected, they are controlled and operated by the military ministries. Producers of strategic metals such as aluminum and tita- nium are totally merged with industries pro- ducing weapons for the Soviet arsenal. For example, the Ministry of Aviation Industry runs the metal fabrication plants of the alu- minum industry. These plants produce compo- nents for aerospace industries and are located near the final assembly plants. This system streamlines production and delivery to assem- bly plants and ensures continuity of supplies for critical aerospace programs. Similarly, the titanium industry has been heavily influenced by military requirements, particularly for the production of titanium-hulled submarines. Energy. The USSR is the only major in- dustrial nation that is energy-independent. It is also the world's foremost producer and ex- porter of petroleum, with the largest proven oil reserves outside the Persian Gulf'. Soviet natural gas reserves are even more impressive. Comprising over 37 trillion cubic meters and equivalent to about 200 billion barrels of' oil, these reserves represent about 40 percent of' the world's total, enabling the Soviets to continue as the largest producer and exporter of natu- ral gas. The substitution of natural gas for petroleum f'or industrial and consumer use is well underway in the USSR, assuring the avail- ability of large quantities of oil for exports to both Eastern and Western Europe. The Soviet fuel and electric power base continues to expand and to provide surplus quantities of these most valuable commodities. Though dedicated primarily to supporting the military and related industries, the fuels and energy base provides over 50 percent of Soviet export earnings and fills the bulk of require- ments of Soviet client states for imported en- ergy as well. Growing fuels and energy exports to Western Europe could potentially provide the Soviet Union with economic leverage over some nations. If this condition were to evolve, it could have significant implications for the unity and viability of NATO. 1M Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Military Production The USSR has consistently allocated a larger share of its national resources, both nat- ural and industrial, to the peacetime produc- tion of military systems than any other country in modern history. Despite recent increases in output, by the US, the Soviet Union still turns out roughly half of all weapons systems pro- duced in the world and up to three-quarters of some types of military-related materiel. This phenomenal output has been achieved through the investment, of huge amounts of money, raw materials, and manpower. The Soviets are im- plementing a three-pronged approach for mil- itary production. First, there is a thrust to use the huge R&D base they have assembled to upgrade the quality of their weapons and to produce more capable equipment. Second, the Soviet Union is expanding existing factories, building new ones, and providing on a priority basis new and modern manufacturing technolo- gies to those industries that support military- related production. Finally, the Soviets are further integrating East European industries into their military-industrial complex. The Soviet thrust, toward increased weapons sophistication and modernization of the na- tion's military-industrial capacity has caused some decrease in the number of weapons sys- tems being produced during the 1980s as well as an extension of their procurement cycles. De- spite this current emphasis on intensive rather than extensive growth, the trend toward the production of' more and more sophisticated weapons will not only continue but also prob- ably increase in the 1990s. Huge numbers of each system will probably not be produced as in the past as Soviet military strategy assimilates the advanced capabilities of newer systems. The vast number of' industrial facilities com- mn ted to military requirements ensures that the Soviets will meet most production goals, even though some schedules may slip. At present there are over 150 major factories and shipyards producing weapons, armored vehi- cles, ships, aircraft, missiles, ammunition, and explosives. Additionally, 150 other plants pro- vide combat, support equipment such as radar, trucks, and communications gear. These ma- jor facilities, in turn, draw on literally thou- sands of parts and components factories. These facilities are continually being expanded and modernized; since 1970 they have increased in size by over 50 percent. This growth has been From top to bottom, the OSCAR, SIERRA, AKULA, and KILO classes of attack and cruise missile submarines are currently in production. 115 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet production of large-bore self-propelled artillery includes, from top to bottom, 240-mm mortars, 203-mm guns, and 152-mm and 122-mm howitzers. well-balanced across the entire spectrum of military equipment. For example, in recent years, the ammunition industry has been greatly expanded. At the Severodvinsk Shipyard, the world's largest submarine production yard, shop space has increased by over 50 percent and covered building space by over 85 percent since 1965. Severodvinsk is only one of five Soviet ship- yards producing submarines. Since 1970, the 24 naval construction yards that produce most Soviet naval ships have enjoyed a 16-percent increase in new building ways. The Soviet aircraft industry, while producing huge num- bers of aircraft annually, continues to reflect growth and modernization. A notable exam- ple is the new plant at Ulyanovsk which will produce heavy-lift transports. Industrial Modernization The Soviet leadership has shown the same inclination to upgrade the country's industrial capacity, particularly the military sector, as it has for military systems by the introduction of new technologies. Since the 1960s, a concerted effort has been made to introduce computers and automation, and programs started in the 1970s have already resulted in the introduc- tion of thousands of computer-aided design and automated production control systems. The current emphasis is on applying robotics and sophisticated machine tools as widely as pos- sible. This objective is totally compatible with the production of technologically sophisticated weapons. If they succeed, the Soviets will real- ize increased efficiency in all phases of indus- trial production. Ground Forces Equipment The USSR continues to be the world's largest producer of ground forces equipment. Cur- rently, emphasis is being placed on improving capabilities by incorporating new technologies into the equipment as well as into the means of production. Tanks and Armored Vehicles. Overall tank production in 1985 included the T-72, T-64, and newer T-80 models. The time required for manu- facturing modern tanks such as the T-80 exceeds that of their simpler predecessors. The tank plant in Nizhniy Tagil is supported by at least three other plants in Kharkov, Omsk, and Chelyabinsk. T-72s are also produced in Eastern Europe. Output of' the 1'4w tank is 116 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 expected to increase. Production of other ar- mored vehicles in 1985 included eight different types manufactured at seven Soviet plants as well as at two factories in Eastern Europe. The most important of these are the BMP in- fantry combat vehicle (ICV) series, the BMD airborne ICV, the BTR-70 and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and the BRDM-2 ar- mored reconnaissance vehicle. Currently, the last two are produced only for export. Soviet BTR-70 and BMP production is supplemented by imports from other Warsaw Pact nations. Artillery. Approximately 4,000 artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launch- ers were manufactured in 1985. Included were towed 85-mm and 100-mm antitank guns, 122- mm and 152-mm howitzers, and 130-mm and 152-mm field guns. Overall output of towed artillery increased. Self-propelled models in- cluded 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers and guns up to 20:3mm. Little change was noted in the output of three models of rocket launchers-- two 122-mm models and a 220-mm piece are being built. Production of antiaircraft artillery increased as a new self-propelled model entered production. Most artillery production is ac- complished at plants in Sverdlovsk and Perm. Helicopters. The Soviets excel in design and production of these important weapons sys- tems, producing over 800 per year since 1982. Five helicopters are now in production. The HIP, HIND, HALO, HAZE, HELIX, and at least two others are nearing production at five dif- ferent airframe plants. The Mi-26/HALO is the world's largest helicopter. The HALO's lift capability is comparable to the US C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The HIP is built at plants in Kazan and Ulan Ude. Thou- sands of these helicopters have been produced, including four new specialized military vari- ants. Over 2,300 Mi-24 HIND helicopters designed to attack enemy tanks have been pro- duced in Arsenyev and Rostov. A new at- tack helicopter, the HAVOC, which has a mis- sion similar to the US AH-64 Apache, and the HOKUM, the world's first fighter helicopter, are in prototype testing and may enter produc- tion in 1986. Naval Forces Soviet naval production in 1985 continued at a high level. Unit completion numbers and tonnage produced in the principal surface com- batant and small surface combatant categories Besides manufacturing the new FLANKER and FULCRUM fighters, Soviet aircraft produc- tion includes, from top to bottom, the FROG- FOOT and FOXBAT tactical aircraft as well as BEAR H and BACKFIRE bombers. 117 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 set this pattern. Quantitatively, submarine pro- duction was at about the 1984 level while auxil- iary ships were built at the same rate observed since 1980. Submarines. The Soviets continue to series- produce a variety of' submarine classes. At present, they are building two classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) the TYPHOON and the DELTA IV. A third unit of the OSCAR-Class nuclear- powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN) class has joined the fleet, and further production is expected. Activity is also proceeding on four classes of' nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Lead ships of three impressive new classes also continue to undergo trials and evaluation. These include the MIKE as well as the SIERRA and the AKULA. The latter two probably will replace the VICTOR III as stand- ard fleet SSNs. Construction of the KILO- Class diesel-powered submarine (SS) now is underway at three different shipyards, indicat- ing that it is intended to replace the FOXTROT as the standard fleet diesel-powered submarine. In addition, the Soviets are also producing experimental submarines and are converting SSBNs dismantled under the SALT accords. Surface Ships. Soviet shipyards have ten classes of major surface combatants under se- ries production. The third KIROV-Class nuclear-powered cruiser (CGN) is under construction. Construction proceeds on the second, third, and fourth units of the SLAVA- Class guided-missile cruiser (CG) and the out- Naval Ship Construction USSR and NATO' Ship USSR NATO Type 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 Submarines 10 9 8 8 12 8 Major Combatants 10 9 8 23 19 16 Minor Combatants 50 50 50 30 34 30 Auxiliaries 6 5 5 7 11 5 Revised to reflect current total production information, Includes United States; excludes France and Spain. A VICTOR III-Class nuclear-powered attack submarine, in foreground, and an OSCAR-Class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine participated in the Soviets' major naval exercise in the North Atlantic in 1985. 118 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet BACKFIRE bombers, being produced at the rate of about 30 per year, are in service with Soviet Air Forces and Soviet Naval Aviation. fitting of the fourth unit of the KIEV-Class guided-missile aircraft carrier (CVHG). Series construction continues on the SOVREMENNY. UDALOY, and Mod KASHIN classes of guided- missile destroyers (IMGs) at about one ship per class, per year. The Mod KASHIN, as well as the KONI-Class frigate (FF), are only for export. A variety of smaller combatant and auxiliary classes are also under construction. The first of a new class carrier was launched at the Nikolayev shipyard. Use of this new ship to accommodate high-performance aircraft. possibly conventional take-off and landing (CTOI.) has been widely suggested. The ul- timate flight deck configuration and the type of aircraft to be embarked are, however, still undetermined. It is possible that the Soviets intend to deploy the ship initially as a verti- cal/short take off and landing (V/STOL) carrier for Yak-:l($/FORGER aircraft as well as for hel- icopters, but could later perform modifications to accommodate modern, high-performance air- craft. The propulsion system is probably a combined conventional/nuclear plant similar to that of the K1ROV-Class CGN. Sea trials of this unit are expected by early 1989. East European nations have continued to contribute to Soviet naval power by providing additional ship construction. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have produced approxi- mately 75 percent of Soviet amphibious binding ships and roughly :35 percent of' Soviet naval Aircraft The USSR is second only to the US in to- tal aircraft production, but in the category of military aircraft is the world's number-one pro- ducer. This has allowed the Soviets to build and modernize the world's largest military air force. In addition, the continuous high output of all types of' aircraft has enabled the Soviets 119 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Aircraft Production USSR and NATO' Aircraft Type 1983 USSR 1984 1985 1983 NATO 19841-1985 Bombers 35 50 50 0 0 2 Fighters/ Fighter- Bombers 950 800 650 650 550 550 Transports 250 250 250 290 250 300 ASW 5 5 5 15 -+ 10 ?5 Helicopters 550 600 600 725 720 525 Utility/ Trainers 10 10 0 425 305 300 ' Revised to reflect current total production information United States: excludes France and Spain. Includes to amass the world's largest state-owned civil air fleet. The Soviet Union is also a major ex- porter of both civilian and military aircraft to the Third World. Bombers. The USSR currently has three intercontinental-capable bombers in or near- ing production: the BACKFIRE, the BEAR H, and the new BLACKJACK. The BACKFIRE is built at the huge plant at Kazan. The BEAR H, which carries the AS-15 long-range cruise missile, is being produced at Kuybyshev. Devel- opment of the latest advanced Soviet strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK, is progressing, and series production is expected at a massive new complex at the Kazan Airframe Plant. Fighters. Overall Soviet fighter aircraft out- put has declined over the past several years, dropping from approximately 1,300 units in 1980 to about 650 in 1985. Output of newer fighters such as FULCRUM and FLANKER is not expected to offset production cutbacks in older, longstanding programs such as FLOG- GER. F1SHBED, and FITTER. Other active fighter production programs in 1985 included the FOXHOUND, FOXBAT, FROGFOOT, FENCER, and FORGER. The FOXHOUND in- terceptor, the FULCRUM counterair fighter, and the FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft, produced at Gorkiy, Moscow, and Tbilisi, re- spectively, have achieved operational status during the last five years. In addition, four improved variants of older Soviet fighters, two each of FENCER and FITTER, have been in production since 1980. Deployment of the new MiG-29/FULCRUM is finally beginning to quicken, with Soviet units in Eastern Europe now receiving this aircraft. The latest Soviet fighter, the Su-27/FLANK- ER air-superiority fighter, built in Komsomolsk, achieved operational status early in 1986. The first Su-27s have begun arriving at operational bases in the USSR, after developmental difficul- ties delayed their introduction into the Soviet Air Force for a few years. Further, the So- viets probably have at least one new entirely different fighter design and several upgraded variants of existing models in different stages of development. Transports. The Soviet Ministry of Avi- ation Industry ensures that all domestically produced high-performance transport aircraft meet military requirements. About 85 of the 250 transports produced in 1985 were for mili- tary use, primarily the I1-76/CANDID and the An-26/CURL, and, for foreign air forces, the An-32/CLINE. The CANDID is built at a huge facility in Tashkent. The Soviets produce two militarily important variants of this aircraft, an aerial refueling tanker and an airborne warning and control aircraft designated MAIN- STAY. Other transports in production include CLASSIC, CRUSTY, CARELESS, CLOBBER, and CAMBER. Series production for the An- 124/CONDOR heavy transport will probably start in 1987 or 1988. Six plants in the USSR manufacture transport aircraft as their main product. They, together with several other plants making multiple types of aerospace prod- ucts, are expected to turn out an average of about 250 transports annually for the next sev- eral years. Missiles The Soviet missile industry has one of the highest priorities assigned to military pro- grams and is engaged in continuous expansion and modernization. This results in not only Missile Production USSR and NATO' Missile USSR NATO Type 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 ICBMs 150 75 100 0 0 0 LRINF 125 125 125 110 80t 175 SRBMs 500 500 450 50 25 50 SLCMs 650 700 700 1,300 1,100 800 SLBIVIs 100 50 100 75 70 75 ' Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes United States; excludes France and Spain. 120 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 more advanced but also more classes of missiles being produced at more than 20 plants. ICBMs. The Soviets continue to manufac- ture liquid-propellant ICBMs for troop training and to sustain the deployed force, producing approximately 100 during 1985. For the fu- ture, the Soviets are developing a new liquid- propellant ICBM to replace their SS-18 sys- tems. A new solid-propellant ICBM (SS-25) now is in series production, and a second model (SS-X-24) is in prototype production. SLBMs. Currently only the SS-N-20 for the TYPHOON SSBN is in series production, but developmental or prototype production on newer models is underway. Cruise Missiles. The Soviets are serially pro- ducing six antiship naval cruise missiles the SS-N-2, SS-N-3, SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, and SS-N-22 and three antisubmarine models SS- N-14, SS-N-15, and SS-N-16--at an annual rate of about 700. This production program stretches from plants in the Far East maritime provinces to the Ukraine. The AS-15, a long-range air-launched cruise missile designed to attack land-based targets as far as 3,000 kilometers from its BEAR H and BLACKJACK launch platforms, can be deliv- ered against targets in the US and Eurasia. Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (LRINF). Production of LRINF has in- creased since 1980 and totaled approximately 125 missiles in 1985. The SS-20 is still in series production. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). The output of these systems has more than dou- bled since 1979. This increase is evidence of a major modernization effort to replace the thou- sands of FROG and SCUD missiles with new, more accurate SS-21s and SS-23s plus improved SCALEBOARDs. SAMs. The USSR continues to turn out the world's largest variety of strategic and tac- tical surface-to-air missiles. The SA-10 and SA-11, which are now in series production, and the SA-X-12 are sophisticated, effective weapons. Soviet SAM production remains at more than 40,000 units of 12 systems from plants in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, and Kovrov. Radar and Military Support Items Radar. The Soviets are currently developing approximately 20 new radars while those now in production include technological advances made or acquired during the 1970s. They con- tinue to reflect Soviet doctrine to use more types of radars than Western forces. They embrace the full spectrum of systems, includ- ing mobile and transportable ground-based air defense radars, large fixed-site phased-array radars, as well as older ballistic missile radars. What probably is a new over-the-horizon radar under construction in the Far East could have an early warning capability against US SLBMs launched from the Pacific. Trucks. Truck production in the USSR has increased over 20 percent during the past decade--from approximately 665,000 in 1974 to over 800,000 in 1985. The number of medium trucks procured by Soviet forces during this period decreased while the numbers of light and heavy trucks have been increasing. Of the more than 800,000 trucks produced by Soviet plants during 1985, some 25 to 30 percent were acquired by the military. The Future Despite extraordinary technological ad- vances, the Soviet leadership is aware of the country's economic shortcomings. General Sec- retary Gorbachev has taken aggressive actions to accelerate technological changes and has pledged to enhance productivity and spur mod- ernization and economic progress through in- tensive growth. Gorbachev has charged the scientific community, particularly its manage- ment, to bridge the longstanding gap between research and production. Concurrently, he has pledged to improve the quality and availability of consumer goods for the beleaguered Soviet populace, which even today has had to endure rationing and shortages. Satisfying the needs of both the civilian and military sectors of the economy, however, cannot be achieved simul- taneously. Gorbachev, however, knows that military strength is the basis of the USSR's ex- istence. He has explicitly expressed his contin- uing support for the Soviet military and is very unlikely to make shifts in resource allocations that would challenge the entrenched power of the Ministry of Defense or defense industries. It is very likely, therefore, that civilian pro- grams will continue to suffer as the Soviet thrust for military technological supremacy focuses on qualitative improvements. 121 Chapter VI Research, Development, and Production Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Since the accession to power of General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have char- acterized his foreign policy as more effective in dealing with the "dangerous situation- in the world and more responsive to international problems than that of the USSR's major ad- versaries. The new leader has been skillful in projecting a robust and decisive media image. Moreover, he has cultivated an impression of dynamism in foreign policy and has injected a more persuasive tone in the Kremlin's public diplomacy. While proclaiming domestic reform to be his top priority, he has also maintained a heavy schedule of meetings with foreign dele- gations and has repeatedly proposed arms con- trol and peace initiatives. The new General Secretary inherited power- ful military forces as well as an effective and assertive foreign policy establishment. Parts of this establishment are the Central Committee departments, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Soviet intelligence and security ser- vices. All of these entities have proven their ability to advance and defend Soviet interests throughout the world. There is little chance that the General Secretary's moves to improve the Soviet economy portend a modification of Moscow's fundamental goals. The USSR still seeks to divide the West and destabilize much of the Third World through its foreign policy and military actions. A large percentage of the weapons systems the USSR exports to client states, Third World proxies, and repressive regimes flows from the enormous military port at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. SA-5/GAMMON surface- to-air missiles for Libya and helicopter gun- ships and tanks for Angola and Nicaragua are among the hundreds of thousands of tons of weaponry being shipped each year from the port's steadily expanding facilities dedicated to military cargo. 123 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Soviet Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft Operating Areas-1965 The Soviet Union has concentrated on cas- tigating the United States and pushing highly publicized, skillfully timed, but one-sided arms control schemes. The Soviets are attempting to foment discord between the US and its NATO and Pacific allies, to strengthen their hold over Eastern Europe, and generally to pose as the champion of Third World interests. By resur- recting an array of one-sided arms reduction concepts, the Soviets have sought to portray the US as intransigent and bellicose and there- fore a threat to European security and world peace. Moscow continues to pursue actively the normalization of ties with China and to WOO some Western allies while maintaining a stream of press invectives against others such as Japan and West Germany. Third World af- fairs have occupied little of Gorbachev's pub- lic time, although these regions remain prime targets for continued exploitation. The Soviet leader has insisted that the Kremlin will not look at the world "solely through the prism" of US-Soviet relations. The Soviets will con- tinue their efforts to undermine US support for the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. In East Asia, the Soviet-North Korean rela- tionship has expanded significantly in recent months. The Philippine political situation and the Southwest Pacific continue to offer poten- tial opportunities for exploitation. Attention has been paid to shoring up what Moscow calls its "special relationship" with India and ex- panding its support to Vietnam. Initial indi- cations are that the war in Afghanistan will be prosecuted with greater vigor, and Moscow has increased pressure on Pakistan to reduce Soviet Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft Operating Areas-1986 qt. Ill Olf 4,4 ) ( AILII h- OCE AN Punta Huete, Nicaragua' 7: AN 7/C ?/N ? 0(.7E:AN I ,P7E(.7F A N Staging Bases ? Newly constructed airfield capable of handling Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft. its support for the Mujahideen. There are also signs of increased Soviet efforts to improve re- lations with Japan. In the Middle East, the USSR has courted moderate states like Egypt, Jordan, and Ku- wait while strengthening ties with Syria, es- tablishing relations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates, and continuing to insist on a role in the peace process. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the scene of the USSR's greatest Third World gains in the 1970s, the Soviets con- tinue to concentrate on Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique while attempting to exploit tur- moil in South Africa. Meanwhile, Latin Amer- ica continues to offer an opportunity for the Soviets to foment conflict. Nicaragua has al- ready received additional assurances of direct Soviet support. Overall, Soviet global ambitions are expect- ed to be pursued through an active foreign policy. Attention will remain focused on the US-Soviet strategic relationship coupled with a renewed emphasis on Third World affairs. Soviet Support to Terrorism The Soviets have a long history of main- taining relations with groups that are linked to terrorism. Moscow's historical experience with the use of terror as an instrument of inter- nal state control suggests its leadership is not averse to creating and exploiting opportunities for covert support to terrorists and insurgents. Within the broader context of foreign policy objectives, the Soviets seek to achieve specific goals through support of violence, insurgen- cies, and wars of "national liberation." In the Third World, they seek the creation and 124 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 exploitation of instability in pro-Western and anti-Soviet regimes. Consequently, the acces- sion to power of a pro-Soviet regime anywhere in the Third World would lessen Western po- litical and economic influence and thus make access to raw materials less secure. Another Soviet objective is to weaken NATO and fo- ment discord in the Western democracies that would lead to disunity and increased security problems. Publicly, the Soviets have disavowed any connection with international terrorist groups and individual acts of terrorism. However, the Soviets openly support wars of national libera- tion and leftist insurgent groups as an integral element of foreign policy. Moreover, the fact that acts of terrorism or revolutionary violence are appendages to insurgent activities does not hinder Soviet support and backing in light of Leninist doctrine. Soviet subversive activities are orchestrated by the Communist Party Central Committee's International Department. Support to terror- ism involves the intelligence and security services specifically Department 8, Director- ate 5, of the KGB's First Chief Directorate and the GRU's "Special Branch- and "Spe- cial Center.- Additional aid is provided by various state ministries as well as by Soviet diplomatic, military assistance, aid, trade, and cultural missions abroad. Terrorist training activities are carried out by the International Department in conjunction with the KGB and the GRU. Complementing this apparatus are similar organizations in East European states and Cuba. Other countries and groups with regional objectives that have mutual interests with the Soviets in destabilizing Western- oriented regimes also receive Soviet support. These nations, such as Libya and South Yemen, in turn harbor, train, and equip selected ter- rorist groups, sometimes in cooperation with the Soviets but often for their own purposes. They also fund and coordinate certain terrorist activities. The best documented links between Soviet intelligence and security services (the KGB and (I RU) to international terrorism are through the training, funds, and weapons pro- vided by the Soviet Union and its East Euro- pe inand non-Bloc allies to Third World and Western "revolutionaries.- The Soviets spend large sums of money training such personnel worldwide. Instruction in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, assassination, terror, and espionage occurs at special Soviet training facilities and camps near Moscow and locations along the southern Soviet border. Some evidence ex- ists that terrorist training is also conducted in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Thousands of Palestinians, other Arab re- cruits, and selected non-Arabs and members of the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) have received training in insurgency and terrorist techniques at facilities in the Soviet Union. Additionally, arms shipments from Eastern Europe as well as arms purchases on the open market by terrorist groups using funds derived from Soviet proxies and clients are significant indicators of Soviet support. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, through their state-controlled arms shipment agencies, have originated arms transfers that end up in terror- ists' hands. The passage of terrorists through and their maintenance of temporary residence in Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria, highlight Soviet Bloc security service collusion in sanctioning terrorist activities. Soviet support for terrorist training camps in South Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon has been the clearest evidence of substantial Soviet investment in terrorism in the Middle East. These training camps have been used International Terrorist Incidents 700 - ,- 700 600 - - 600 500 - - 500 400 - -400 300 - - 300 200 - 200 100 - -100 0 I I I I I 0 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 125 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 United States Mexico Citribbean (3-4 ShiRs, Av*rage) Dual El Salvador rea MOWS Dominican?iR.pubiic jamaIca St. L?ucis , St. Vinunt and Costa Mei' stfan?3? ,Colombia Ecuador SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD (Est.) Latin America (including Cuba) 7,900 Sub-Saharan Africa 3 600/4,000 Mideast and North Africa . 8 , 000-9,000 Asia (including Vietnam) 3,500 Afghanistan 118,000 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD Latin America 3.000 Sub-Saharan Africa 42,000 Mideast and North Africa 500 Barbados _,TrInidea and Tobago SOVIET GLOBAL Greenland - Greenland (Den.) Venezuela . Peru yena Sur name ch Guiana (Fr.) Brazil Chile Argentina r_ uay Ireton Not Den United Kingdom N.4. Lu . France Mon el Andorra - Portu;a7spain Mediterranean (40-50 Ships, Average) morocc Western Sahari Cape Verdet San ga Gamble Am. Guinea- is sau Sierra , Leone Merl Togo Sao Tom* and PrInclpe,fr Equate. Gains West Africa (5-8 Ships, Average) Soviet Arms Transfers (1980-1985) $5 billion?S10 billion $1 billion-45 bation $100 million?S1 billion Soviet Treaties of Friendship Soviet Military Personnel (Excluding Military Attaches) Mutual Defense Treaties 126 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 POWER PROJECTION 1 Finland wadan Poland Yugo. t Marino Alb , ' , Soviet Union ? ----. Turkey Matta ypms ? ' 4 Le lire Iran China uwait Saltrala ?Qatar ) Chad an Burma 'etnarn S. Karel - Japan Kong (U K ) Macao (Port.) South China Sea Sri Lanka on Zaire Torr South Africa Santana Maldives Indian Ocean (20-25 Ships, Average) Seychelles Comoros Madagascar MauritluS ambique waziland SOtho Major Cuban Presence Major Soviet Naval Operating Areas Deployed Soviet Naval Forces SSB/SSBN Operating Areas Soviet Naval Access L.1 Airfield Access (20-25 Ships, Average) , Malay * Soviet Airfield and Naval Base 'Singe si Cam Ranh Bay ? - Nauru Indonesia plow' New ?ulnas Solomon , Islands Tuvalu Fiji Kiribati Western Samoa Tonga Australia New Zealand 127 Chapter VII Global .1mbitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 extensively by radical elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as by guerrillas and terrorists from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Libya, in particu- lar, has emerged as a pivotal force in world terrorism. On the opposite side of the globe, Cuban leader Fidel Castro has provided terrorist groups millions of dollars in arms and supplies to escalate and foment insurgency and revolu- tionary violence throughout Central and South America. While the evidence indicates that the Soviets bear a substantial responsibility for fostering international terrorism, they appear to believe that direct Soviet control is not desirable or po- litically expedient in terrorist activities as long as terrorist aims and objectives parallel or com- plement Soviet goals. A substantial amount of the weapons and training support for terrorist groups originates with the Soviet Union and its clients or allies. Soviet support for revolu- tionary violence and international terrorism is expected to continue and perhaps escalate as a means of challenging the West. Latin America Central and South America remain impor- tant regions of the Third World in Moscow's pursuit of its global ambitions. Moscow seeks to build its own influence throughout Latin America while diminishing that of the US. By developing political and military relations and supporting subversion, the Soviets can chal- lenge the US and gain access to military fa- cilities. Also, securing economic ties in Latin America provides markets for Soviet goods and ensures supplies of grain and raw materials. Cuba The preeminent importance of Cuba to Moscow is evident in the vast amounts of So- viet military and economic support that have been provided to Castro's regime. Cuba has re- ceived nearly $6 billion worth of military aid from Moscow since 1960. Only Vietnam and East Germany among the Communist countries have received more. Economic assistance has reached almost $4 billion per year and is bol- stered by the presence of possibly as many as 8,000 civilian advisors and technicians. Throughout this decade, the Soviets have made an accelerated effort to upgrade Cuba's armed forces. Nearly 60 percent of all Soviet military assistance to Cuba has been delivered since 1980. In 1985, this small island nation received 5 percent of all Soviet military assis- tance worldwide. Significant weapons systems noted in 1985 include the SA-13 and shoulder- fired SA-14 surface-to-air missile systems and STENKA-Class fast patrol craft. Soviet aid and the efforts of 2,800 military advisors have led to across-the-board improvements in Cuban mili- tary capabilities that pose a significant threat to maritime commerce routes in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Growth Trends in Cuban Forces Air Force 1975 1980 1985 MiG 23s 0 12 45 MIG 21s 95 140 160 L-39 trainers 0 0 30 SAM launchers 105 165 215 An-26 transports 2 25 30 11-76 transports 0 0 2 Navy FOXTROT submarines 0 2 3 KONI frigates 0 2 Missile patrol boats 22 18 20 TURYA hydrofoils 4 9 POLNOCNY landing ships 0 2 Army T-54/55 and T-62 tanks 300 720 1,000 Other armored vehicles 120 1,000 1,200 Artillery 500" 1,400 1,500 ?Estimated In addition to military advisors, permanent Soviet military presence in Cuba is represented by a 2,800-man combat brigade and a major communications intercept site at Lourdes. This facility enables Moscow to monitor sensitive US maritime, military, and space communica- tions as well as US domestic telephone calls. Furthermore, Cuban ports and airfields sup- port Caribbean deployments by Soviet naval task forces and long-range naval aviation air- craft. The 25th naval task group to visit the Caribbean was active in Cuban waters and the Gulf of Mexico from late-September to mid- November 1985. There were seven deployments of Tu-95/BEAR D naval reconnaissance air- craft and six deployments of Tu-142/BEAR F antisubmarine warfare aircraft during 1985. Castro provides cadre training, advisors, and material support to many regional subversive 128 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 C? - Bahamas Soa Guantanamo 12 Medium Tanks Alt 35 Medium Tanks Soviet intelligence-collection facility at Lourdes, top, near Havana, Cuba. This listening post, the largest such facility outside the USSR, enables the Soviets to monitor sensitive US maritime, military, and space communications as well as telephone conversations in the United States. The Mariel port facility, bottom, serves as the primary Cuban port for the delivery of military hardware. In 1985, over 35,000 metric tons of Soviet/Soviet Bloc equipment were delivered to Cuba. Military hardware for Nicaragua is transshipped from this port facility. 199 (Al:utter VII ( l)hal Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 groups and insurgencies, capitalizing on com- mon Hispanic ethnic and regional associations to develop inroads that would otherwise be closed to the Soviets. For some time, Cuba has been seeking increased contacts with left- ist parties and labor unions in the Caribbean, urging them to merge to oppose democratic governments in future elections. In Central America, Cuba remains heavily involved in supporting the Nicaraguan regime and pro- vides about 3,000 military and :3,000-4,000 economic and technical advisors. Castro con- tinues to undermine the legitimate government of El Salvador by providing logistical support as well as military and terrorist training to insurgents at bases in Nicaragua and Cuba. In 1985, Castro achieved significant politi- cal and diplomatic successes in South Amer- ica. He reestablished diplomatic relations with Uruguay, established the foundations for diplo- matic relations with Brazil, and received a new Bolivian ambassador, marking the first official Bolivian presence in Cuba in several years. Peru, under President Alan Garcia Perez, plans to normalize relations with Cuba in 1986. Cas- tro has loaned two deep-sea fishing vessels to Peru in an effort to increase commercial ties. Cuba hosted Ecuadorean President Febres Corder? while cultural, scientific, and techni- cal cooperation between Argentina and Cuba grew. Castro sought to capture Latin America's at- tention with his emphasis on the longstanding debt crisis. In July and August 1985, Cuba hosted a conference on the Latin American debt that was attended by several leftist lead- ers from the region. The conference blamed the US for the Latin American debt problem and called for a moratorium on payment of Ameri- can loans. In addition, Cuba maintains ties with sev- eral guerrilla groups, including Colombia's M-19, the Chilean Movement of the Revolu- tionary Left, and militant Ecuadorean groups. At the same time, however, Castro is trying to improve diplomatic relations and cultural ties with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Suriname, Guyana, and Bolivia. Nicaragua Moscow is gradually and cautiously consoli- dating its ties with Nicaragua. Of the $580 mil- SHERSHEN-Class torpedo boats, left, and OSA-Class missile attack boats, below, being delivered aboard a Soviet RO/FLO. Units of both boats have been sold to eight different Third World nations. 1:30 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 lion in Communist military aid delivered since 1980, Moscow's share has been about $240 mil- lion. New military equipment, along with 50 to 70 Soviet and 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military and security advisors, has helped to create the largest armed forces in Central America. The regime in Nicaragua poses both a mil- itary and psychological threat to neighboring countries like Honduras and Costa Rica. The governments of El Salvador and, to a lesser degree. Guatemala, are threatened by Soviet- and Cuban-supported insurgents trained in Nicaragua. The Kremlin is also making a substantial ef- fort to bolster the Sandinistas economically. Moscow now provides, directly or indirectly, about 80 percent of Nicaragua's petroleum re- quirements. The Soviets also have provided significant amounts of grant food aid and disaster-relief assistance and have signed agreements to extend economic cooperation. South America Throughout South America, the Soviets pa- tiently persist in their efforts to develop eco- nomic, political, and military relations while engaging in anti-US propaganda and covert measures. However, Moscow's relations are mostly limited to economic activity. Mos- cow's closest ties are with Peru, the only South American country to have purchased large amounts of Soviet military equipment. Since 1973, the value of Soviet military assistance to Peru has totaled about $1.5 billion. Peruvian ports support nearly 200 Soviet fishing vessels in South American waters, resulting in $120 million in revenues. Peru also provides the So- viet state airline, Aeroflot, a point of entry into South America. Sub-Saharan Africa/Indian Ocean Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past year has been significant in two important respects. Moscow has increased its support to the counterinsurgency efforts of its client states Angola. Ethiopia, and Mozam- bique. It has also continued its efforts to ex- ploit discord and instability in South Africa. Angola Moscow is concerned about the survival of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime. Luanda is one of the largest and best natural harbors on the west coast of Africa and is the main support base for the Soviet Navy's West Africa Pa- trol. Other assets there include a floating dry- dock, a communications station, and access for Tu-95/BEAR Ds, which patrol the South At- lantic sealanes. To assure the survival of MPLA control, Moscow has significantly in- creased the amount of military aid provided to the MPLA. In 1985, the Angolans received Mi-24/HIND and Mi-17/Hip H helicopters, icl- ditional Su-22/FITTERs, N1iG-23/FLOGGERs, and SA-13 SAMs. Angola has deployed the MiG-23s and SA-13 SAMs to the south to help detect and defend against alleged South African Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World 1980-1985 * Near East and South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America East Asia and Pacific Total Tanks/Self-propelled Guns 3,600 630 505 280 5,015 Light Armor 6,565 1,000 280 250 8,095 Artillery 3,810 2,050 895 390 7,145 Major Surface Combatants 26 4 4 5 39 Minor Surface Combatants 27 21 49 48 145 Submarines 7 0 2 0 9 Missile Attack Boats 16 9 6 6 37 Supersonic Aircraft 1,340 340 135 270 2,085 Subsonic Aircraft 120 5 0 5 130 Helicopters 695 190 80 75 1,040 Other Combat Aircraft 250 70 40 80 440 Surface-to-Air Missiles 10,400 1,890 1,300 430 14,020 'Revised to reflect current information 131 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 aircrafi supporting the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Prior to 1985, the Angolans also received an early warning radar net that covers almost the en- tire sout hwest ern part of the country and other equipment intended to improve intelligence- gathering capabilities against UNITA. Luanda was visited last September by a Soviet task group, including a K I ROV-C lass nuclear- powered guided-missile cruiser and two new guided-missile destroyers, an UDALOY and SOVREMENNYY, transiting to the Soviet Pa- cific Ocean Fleet. In addition, i squadron of So- viet An-12/CUll transports has been supporting Angolan government f'orces for several years. Iletween August and October, Angolan forces launched an ambitious offensive against the guerrillas in the southeast. While this oper- ation achieved mixed results, the tactics and weapons used indicate a more direct Soviet role in Angolan military operations. Ethiopia Et hiopia remains the USSR's most impor- tint East African client, a fact reinforced by Ethiopian leader Mengistu's favorable treat- ment in Moscow in November 1985 and by the provision of almost $4 billion in Soviet arms. The delivery of' equipment to the port of Aseb for the 1985 campaign in Eritrea con- sisted of' A PCs, T-55 tinks, and additional MiG- 2:1/HPGGER fighters. The Ethiopian rede- ployment of 50,000 troops in less than three weeks in August at the height of the rainy sea- son was facil it it ed by direct Soviet logistic and itlyisory assistance, resulting in the success- ful capture of' an important Eritrean line of communication from Sudan and the key town of Ilarentu. Despite such aid, however, a sec- ond offensive made little headway against the insurgent stronghold of Nakfa. Seychelles, Mozambique, and Madagascar The Kremlin's push for access to Sub- Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean is re- lentless, particularly in the Seychelles. Mozam- bique, and Madag,ascar. Permanent access would provide Moscow with significant advan- tages: a partial counterbalance to the US presence on Diego Garcia, greater staging ca- pability for military airlift flights to southern Africa. inc.1 more intelligence-gathering oppor- tunities against Western naval activity in the Indian Ocean, The Soviets continue to seek regular mil- itary access to port and air facilities in the Seychelles. The USSR is the Seychelles' largest arms supplier, having delivered some $18 mil- lion in weapons and related equipment. ('on- tinuing Soviet ship visits indicate Moscow's resolve to maintain some influence in the SeV- chelles. Previously, during periods of' insta- bility or President Rene's absence, the Soviets have sent naval vessels to support the regime. Since February 198:3, Soviet transport aircraft, many of which may be military, also have been making stopovers at the Seychelles' main air- port on Mahe en route ti) southern Africa. However, the number of' Soviet military advi- sors has decreased in the past year to only 10 down from 25 as the Seychelles attempts to balance its foreign policy to) ensure Western economic assistance and improve tourism. The USSR has continued to) pay significant attention to the Samora Machel regime in Mo- zambique, largely because of' Maputo's inabil- ity to quell the insurgency of' the National Resistance of' Mozambique (RENAMO). Mos- cow has provided about $1 billion in military aid. Among the significant 1985 deliveries were Mi-24/HIND helicopters, several PT-76 light tanks, BTR-60 APCs, artillery pieces. BM-24 multiple rocket launchers, SA-3 launchers, YENGENYA-Class minesweepers, and SO-1 pa- trol boats. The approximately 850 Soviet id- visors and technicians are heavily involved in planning and supporting Mozambican opera- tions against RENAMO. Since Mozambique is not near the normal op- erating areas of the Indian Ocean Squadron, Soviet combatants visit its ports infrequently: however, hydrographic research ships are of- ten present in the Mozambique Channel. Arms carriers have unloaded their cargoes at Nacala several times in 1985, and a small contingent of' An-12/CUBs has rotated to and from the USSR. Although the Soviets deployed two) II-38/MAYs to Mozambique in early 1985 and continue to) make substantial improvements at Nacala air- field, they appear unable to gain more frequent access. In 1983 and 1984, relations between the USSR and Madagascar suffered a setback as Presi- dent Ratsiraka pursued a more balanced for- eign policy. Madagascar provided a concrete demonstration of' moving toward genuine non- alignment, and in 1985 a small US security as- sistance program was initiated. In an effort to) shore up its ties to Madagascar, the Soviets in November 1984 provided $20 million in military 132 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 equipment, including the first multiple rocket launchers in the Malagasy inventory. Soviet advisors number about 100. Although military access has not been granted, the Soviets proba- bly continue to view the harbor of Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) and the airfield at Andrakaka, both on the northern tip of the island, as highly desirable locations. South Africa In addition to working for South Africa's diplomatic isolation, the USSR seeks to exploit internal discord in that country. Although do- mestic opposition to the South African Gov- ernment is not united. Moscow attempts to influence events through: ? deliveries of weapons to and the mili- tary training of armed forces located in regional countries hostile to South Africa: ? ties with the South African Communist Party: and ? support of the African National Congress, a group that seeks to topple the present government. Uv supplying in equipment to opposition .2,Toups, whether ideologically tied to commu- nism or independently seeking equality and democratic reform, the Soviets hope to gain greater influence in the area. Middle East/North Africa Arms sales are the Soviets' principal means of gaining leverage in the Middle East and provide Moscow with its most effective entree into regional politics. The Soviets have pro- vided sonic icivanced models of' weapons sys- tems not yet deployed to their Warsaw Pact allies. Moscow has relied almost exclusively on its major arms clients, particularly Syria and Iraq, to further its regional influence. The USSR also provides large quantities of' arms to Libya, although this does little to enhance its standing among the other Aral) states. The So- viets have also stepped up efforts to improve r(hit ions with Aral) moderates, notably Jordan, tIi rough arms sales. Recent military agree- ments with Jordan, worth some $300 million, include '/5 L1-21/4 antiaircraft guns and SA-ft -13 and -11 defense missiles. Moscow persists in its efforts to expand its presence in Egypt. Since the restoration of' ambassadorial-level relations in September 198,1, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in re- solving debt and trade problems with Egypt and have thus been unable to exploit Cairo's economic problems and its need for militaFV spare parts. At the same time. Moscow contin- ues policies designed to undermine not only the Camp David peace agreement but also to sab- otage the current Egyptian-supported Amman accords between Jordan and the PLO. Thus, while proclaiming its unswerving desire for peace, the Soviet Union continues its attempts to sabotage the peace process. The Soviets continue their buildup of naval and airlift capabilities in the region, both to project power and to support their political ob- jectives. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON). which averages-40-50 ships, is the Kremlin's most powerful naval f(irce per- manently operating outside its home waters. Soviet naval access, from port visits to perma- nent presence, occurs at sonic 12 locations in the Mediterranean. SOVMEDRON units have held combined exercises with both Syria and Libya, and Soviet Naval Aviation deployments to those countries have increased dramatically. Syria Syria is the largest Soviet arms client in the Third World, having contracted for ali(mt Si billion in military hardware. There are more Soviet military advisors in Syria ?1,000 than in any other Third World country. These ;uIvi- sors assist the Syrians in operating and main- taining equipment and provide training in military tactics and doctrine. Particular atten- tion is directed to Syrian air defense systems, highlighted by advanced SA-5/(iAMMON mis- sile complexes at three locations. The Soviets also have provided extensive economic assistance to Syria. although less than that given to Damascus by other Arab nations. This aid has focused on large-scale projects such as the Euphrates hydroelectric complex, the Tartus-Floms railway, and various land reclamation and oil development projects. New projects include the development of nu- clear power and research facilities. Over 1,000 Soviet economic technicians work in Syria to support these programs. Moscow Ims extended over $1 billion in economic credits since 198:1. indicating a significant expansion in Soviet- Syrian economic ties. The foundation of' the relationship. how- ever, remains Soviet military support to Dam- ascus. Recent deliveries include helicopters, SA-5 air defense missiles, patrol boats. STYX and SEPAL antiship missiles, additional 1:13 (Thaptur VII Global .\ nthitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 T-72 tanks, and attack submarines. Mi(-29/ FULCRUM aircraft are expected by 1987. In return for military and economic assis- tance, the Syrians provide the Soviets access to the ports of Latakia and Tartus as well as to the airfield at Tiyas. Tartus has become the primary maintenance facility for Soviet sub- marines operating in the Mediterranean, with a submarine tender, oiler, and water tanker located there. Additionally, Moscow receives political support from Damascus on many inter- national issues, particularly regarding Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Libya The basis for Soviet-Libyan relations is largely military. Since 1970, Libya has re- ceived over $10 billion in Soviet military equip- ment. About 2,000 Soviet military advisors are in Libya as well as approximately 1,200 East European advisors and technicians. The Soviet advisory mission assists with the as- sembly and maintenance of advanced Soviet equipment such as MiG-25/FOXBAT fighters and NIi-24/LIIND helicopters. The Soviets also The large military production capability of the Soviet Union has made it one of the world's largest suppliers of all types of major arms for Third World clients. provide pilot instruction and assist in training Libyan military personnel. Despite its large surplus of arms, Libya continues to receive modern military equipment. Recent deliveries have included the long-range, medium-to-high- altitude surface-to-air missile, the SA-5. The Libyans are building at least two SA-,5 sites, en- abling them to attack aircraft operating close to or over the Gulf of Sidra. In return for supplying Libya with arms, the Soviet have re- ceived additional access to Libyan ports and airfields, thereby enhancing Soviet military ca- pabilities in the region. The number of So- viet naval combatant port visits and 11-:38/MAY antisubmarine warfare aircraft deployments to Libya has risen over the past few years. In January 1986, following the Rome and Vienna airport terrorist attacks, the Soviet cruiser, SLA VA, deployed into the Mediterranean to join the guided-missile cruiser, GROZNYY, in providing a Soviet presence during the ten- sions. Algeria Algeria's relationship with the Soviet Union 134 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 is tied to continued dependence on Soviet mil- itary equipment. Soviet-supplied equipment in- cludes T-02 and T-72 tanks, NliG-21/FISHBED, NI i(1-23/ FLOG( ;ER, and M iG-25/FOX BAT fight- ers, as well as Soviet air defense missiles such as the SA-2/G Ul DE LINE, -3/GOA, -6/GAINFUL, -8/(1,ECKO. and -9/GASKIN. By the end of 1985. Soviet equipment deliveries will have virtually fulfilled a $1.5 billion arms agreement signed in 1980. For the near- term, Algeria will remain de- ptquient on Soviet arms and military assis- tance, especially for spare parts. but has indicated a willingness to diversify to Western sources. In keeping with its policy of nonalign- ment, Algeria has consistently refused Soviet requests for permanent base rights and com- bined military exercises. Further, the number of Soviet advisors has fallen from a high of 2,500 in early 1980 to ;ipproximately 800 in 1985. Southwest Asia The USSR is pursuing a cautious, calcu- lated ;ipproach to cultivate its role as a major participant in the affairs of Southwest Asia. Moscow considers this region strategically im- portant because it borders the Soviet Union and possesses large petroleum and gas reserves needed by the West. Throughout 1985, the So- viets used military assistance and diplomacy as their primary means of developing influence in the region. Overall. since 1954 the USSR has provided more than $19 billion in military hardware and supplies to various countries in Southwest Asia. In addition, the Soviets have ;in estimated 2,500 military advisors stationed in the region who perform maintenance on and provide training for Soviet-supplied military equipment. Iran Soviet-Iranian ties have been very strained for the past several years over the issues of' Moscow's supplying arms to Iraq and its mil- itary activities in Afghanistan. In addition, Moscow has been at odds with Iran over its unwillingness to agree to a cease-fire and ne- gotiations with Iraq. Nevertheless, the Soviets remain interested in expanding ties with Iran despite strong ;Intl-Communist attitudes of the clerical regime in Tehran. Early in 1985, political activity appeared to herald an improvement in relations between Moscow and Tehran. Rapprochement peaked in April, when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromy- ko received the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minis- ter, the highest ranking Iranian visitor to the USSR in over three years. In the end, however, Nloscow concluded that the Khomeini regime was seeking to curtail Soviet support to Iraq in its war with Iran without making signifi- cant concessions in return. Nloscow has repeat- edly made it clear that relations can improve only if Tehran ends its anti-Soviet propaganda, its support to the Afghan insurgents, and its repression of the Communist Tudeh Party actions the present regime is unlikely to take. Moscow believes improved relations can occur only after Khomeini's death. Iraq The USSR has sought to maintain its influ- ence in Iraq through large deliveries of' mil- itary aid, including- very modern equipment. In 1984, Iraq received $2.5 hill ion in military assistance and in 1985 took delivery of the Su- 25/FRO(lFOOT ground-attack aircraft. Iraq is the first country to acquire this ;Iircraft out- side the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also deliv- ered SA-13/GOPH ER SAM systems to Iraq. The Soviets intend to keep Baghdad supplied with highly sophisticated weapons at levels neces- sary to maintain its position in the war with Tehran. The USSR and Iraq signed a signifi- cant new arms ticcord in December during Pres- ident Hussein's visit to Moscow. In addition. Moscow has tried to limit the shipment of' arms by other nations to Iran. South Yemen Since 1977, South Yemen has been the pri- mary focus of' Soviet efforts to expand its in- fluence in the Arabian Peninsula. Moscow has succeeded in creating an authentic patron- client relationship with Aden, based primarily On the provision of over $2 billion in military assistance. In return, the Yemeni Socialist Party has loyally responded to a variety of' So- viet policies such as the export of' revolution, support for terrorism, and subversion in North Yemen and Oman. The Soviets' opportunism in South Yemen was highlighted by their role in the violent overthrow of the government in January 1986. Initially, the Soviets announced support fin- the established leadership, which had moderated its policies toward its neighbors in an effort to gain new sources of' economic aid. Then, they at to mediate a cease-fire between the two factions, both of' which were Marxist. 135 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 and pro-Soviet. Moscow eventually backed the hardline rebels when they began to consolidate power. If they are to maintain their military iccess, the Soviets will have to provide consid- erable assistance to South Yemen to repair the widespread damage done to the country during the fighting. Moreover, recent Soviet gains in the Persian Gulf region may be undermined if a new reginie pursues radical policies toward its neighbors. The Soviet role in the fighting in South Yemen will also rekindle Arab suspi- cions of Soviet ambitions in the Third World. North Yemen The Soviets have relied on military issis- tance as their primary means of gaining influ- ence in North Yemen. Moscow has delivered approximately billion worth of arms since 19?2, including a shipment of 16 T-62 tanks in mid-1985. The Soviets maintain a 500-man military advisory group that provides mainte- nance, repair, and training for North Yemen's Soviet-made military hardware. Over the past year, however. the North Yemenis have become increasingly displeased with the quality, and perhaps quantity, of the Soviet military aid program. This it combined with North Yemen's recent oil discoveries and its intense suspicion about the Soviet role in the -January coup in South Yemen, could weaken Moscow's standing in Sana. Gulf Cooperation Council Members For a long time. Kuwait was the only mem- ber of the Gulf Cooperation Council ((ICC) with which the Soviets maintained relations. Ilowever, Moscow has readily responded to po- litical openings that have recently come about within some (ICC countries by undertaking cultural exchange programs. Last August, the Soviets sent a tourism official to Bahrain. Mos- cow also had contact with Qatar and Saudi Arabia when those countries sent delegations to participate in the opening ceremonies of the Youth Games held in the USSR during the same month. Nloscow's increasing focus on the conservative Persian Gulf stites has been rewarded. In September and again in Novem- ber, it was announced that diplomatic. rela- tions would be established with Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The Soviets could use this entree to try to undermine Oman's security relationship with the US. Moscow is likely to try to continue to expand its influence among the other Arab principalities in the Gulf. South Asia India Soviet influence in South Asia stems primar- ily from its close relationship with the region's largest power, India. Moscow employs sev- eral measures to sustain its influence in New Delhi but relies primarily on military assis- tance. In order to ensure continued Indian reliance on Soviet irrns, the USSR has prcy- vide(' sonic of its most modern weapons systems it excellent prices with low interest rates and long-term repayment schedules. Moscow's de- termination to limit New Delhi's arms diversi- fication efforts has led to Soviet acceptance of payment in Indian rupees rather than a hard currency incl to agreements for Indian copro- duction rights. Since 1980, Soviet arms deliveries to New Delhi have totaled over $,:1 billion, enabling In- dia's armed forces, the fOurth largest in the world, to undergo i massive modernization pro- gram. Over 500 Soviet T-72 tanks have been delivered. providing New Delhi with a main battle tank superior to that of any other na- tion in South Asia. Recent aircraft deliveries include the Mi(1-27/FIA)GGER. During 1985, the Soviet Union ilso provided the Indian Air Force with three II-76/CANDID military trans- port aircraft while continuing its deliveries of' the An-32/CLINE twin-turboprop transport. Delivery of one of the Soviet Union's most icivanced fighters the high-performance, ;ill-weather MiG-29/FULCRUM interceptor is expected in 1986, is is delivery of the first KILO-Class attack submarine. Neither weapon system has previously been exported by the So- viet Union. The new leaders of' both countries have un- derscored the continuity of' the Indo-Soviet relationship. Following the assassinat ion of' In- dira Gandhi, Moscow reaffirmed Soviet-Indian ties, expressing support for Rajiv Gandhi and praising his election victory. Moscow sched- uled i series of high-level visits between the two nations and successfully lobbied for Ra- jiv Gandhi to visit the Soviet Union before Ins scheduled June 1985 trip to the United States. Gandhi's visit to Moscow in May provided an opportunity to cultivate further ties with New Delhi. Afghanistan In December 1985, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan entered its seventh year still op- 136 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 posed by widespread and popular resistance. Soviet control continues to be limited to urban areas, primarily the capital, Kabul. Neverthe- less, Soviet forces, which now number 118,000, luiye become steadily more effective in attack- ing- the Mujahideen, and a coherent Soviet c(mnterinsurgency strategy designed to break the military stalemate appears to be emerging. List year Soviet forces in Afghanistan con- tinued to focus on establishing control over major urban areas and on protecting vital lines of communication. The security of' Soviet gar- risons and airfield defense continued to receive priority attention. However, during 1985 So- viet forces also were employed with greater frequency in assault operations against resis- tance strong-holds designed to crush insurgent Initiative throughout Afghanistan. During one such operation in the Konar Valley, Soviet forces advanced with unusual speed and effectiveness, temporarily lifting a nine-month siege of' an Afghan Army border outpost. rl'he Soviet Army demonstrated a considerablv improved ability to concentrate and employ forces quickly against suspected insurgent positions. Resistance forces were also confronted by the Soviet ability to in- sert air issatilt forces into areas previously considered inaccessible to Soviet formations. Soviet troops in combat vehicles patrol the streets of Kabul, maintaining security and en- forcing Moscow's control of the capital. This significant improvement in force projec- tion has been enhanced by the introduction of several Special Purpose (SPETSNAZ) battal- ions into Afghanistan. Trained to operate in small teams behind enemy lines. SPETSNAZ units exemplify the continuing- Soviet effort to tailor forces in Afghanistan to counterinsur- gency operat ions. Soviet attacks on Afghanistan's rural popula- tion have become commonplace. Moscow has employed "scorched earth" measures calcu- lated to destroy the Freedom Fighters' sup- port structure, such as the village above. As part of its qualitative improvement, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan has buroduced new weapons systems, focusing on those with greater mobility uid increased lethality. So- viet airborne forces have been upgraded with the introduction of wheeled BTR-60/70 ffinored personnel carriers (AP('s), more capable of ne- gotiating Afghanistan's rugged terrain. The introduction of' BI-1 multiple rocket launch- ers (MRI,$) and M1981'82 120-mm self-propelled artillery has provided airborne forces with the ability to strike the insurgents more accurately and at greater range. Soviet motorized rifle divisions have also received new systems, in- cluding the BM-27 NMI, and self-propelled ar- tillery. 'Me introduction of' these systems has largely offset recent improvements in NI u- jahideen weaponry. In icldition to specialized troops and im- proved equipment. Moscow has continued to implement "scorched earth- measures directed at restricting Mujahideen access to civilian support. Throughout areas of' eastern Afghani- stan, Soviet forces appear to have implemented a free-fire zone policy. Villages in the region are frequently bombed or fired upon without warning in an ipparent effort to depopulate areas thought to be pro-Mujahideen. However, the 1985 Soviet campaign suffered several setbacks. Insurgent forces ill the Pan- slier Valley under Shah Akmad Masood over- ran an Afghan Army outpost, t;iking large numbers of' prisoners. In the fall, a Soviet any depot near Kabul was destroyed by 1:17 ta. VI I Global Ambit Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the insurgents. Endemic desertion and wide- spread collaboration with the resistance have continued to frustrate Soviet efforts to improve the size and effectiveness of the Afghan Army essential to Moscow's long-term strategy in Afghanistan. In response, the Soviet command replaced the Afghan Minister of Defense. Afghan Air Force officers have generally been perceived as more responsive to Soviet di- rectives. However, in mid-1985 pro-resistance officers in the Afghan Air Force dealt a major blow to Soviet airpower in Afghanistan by de- stroying about 20 Soviet-built combat aircraft. In July 1985, the Afghan pilots of two Soviet- built Mi-24/HIND helicopters flew to Pakistan and requested asylum. With the war now in its seventh year, the Kremlin is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction domestically that the So- viet presence in Afghanistan is merely a "limited contingent- of troops involved in peace corps-type missions and fighting "ban- dits.- The Soviet media has increasingly ac- knowledged the difficulties of combat in Afghanistan, often making strained compar- isons with the struggle against Nazi fascism. One Soviet spokesman even noted the training advantages afforded by actual combat. The Kremlin, nevertheless, is clearly preparing its populace for a long war. Southeast Asia Vietnam Since the 1978 signing of' the Soviet- Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooper- ation, the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia has expanded dramatically. This development is primarily the result of vastly increased So- viet support for Vietnam as well as for Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam has become almost totally dependent on Moscow and its East European allies for economic, military, and political as- sistance to support its economy, maintain its occupation of Cambodia, and counter Chinese military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border. From 1978 through 1985, the Sovi- ets have provided over $5 billion in arms aid to Hanoi along with direct aid to Cambodia. Over 2?500 Soviet military advisors are in Viet- nam to support this program, and a contin- gent of An-12/CUBs has operated in Vietnam. Laos, and Cambodia since 1979. In addition to more than $7 billion in Soviet economic assis- tance through 1984. Vietnamese membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) obligates the Soviet Union's East Eu- ropean allies to provide aid to Vietnam. In return. Moscow has gained access to Viet- namese military facilities. Cam Ranh Bay has become the largest Soviet naval f'orward- deplovment base outside the USSR. The installation includes a naval base, a compos- ite air unit, and a growing communications, intelligence-collection, and logistics support in- frastructure. The three or four attack and cruise missile submarines operating from Cam Ranh Bay conduct patrols in the South China Sea and are well situated to operate against sea lines of' communication in the region. If necessary, Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay can augment the Indian Ocean Squadron. These facilities service the 20 to 25 Soviet ships rou- tinely deployed to the South China Sea. In addition, since late 1984 a Soviet air unit com- prised of 16 naval Tu-16/BADGER and 8 BEAR D/F aircraft, as well as a squadron of MiG- 23/FLOGGER C/Gs, has been deployed at Cam Ranh Bay airfield. The BEAR and BADGER aircraft conduct reconnaissance, intelligence- collection, and ASW missions throughout the South China Sea. The BADGERs' strike range from Cam Ranh Bay includes not (mly regional states but also the Philippines, Guam, Palau and Yap the western portion of Mi- cronesia. These military forces indicate the in- creasing reach of' Moscow's military power and the potential political influence of' the USSR on regional decisions. ASEAN Moscow has increased its efforts to improve relations with the states of' the Association of' South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through expanded trade and cultural ties as well as by stressing issues of' regional concern. Increased economic ties are attractive to these states, es- pecially Indonesia and Malaysia, as they seek ways to increase non-oil exports to improve their trade positions. The Soviets have also continued their efforts to sell military equip- ment in the region but without positive results. South Pacific After almost a decade of' relative inactivity, the Soviet Union has renewed its efforts to im- prove relations with the South Pacific island states and to increase its maritime access to that region. These efforts are designed to dis- rupt Western maritime mobility. To achieve 138 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The AGI MARSHAL NEDELIN, lead ship of the newest class of Soviet space support ships, is equipped to support both missile tests and space launch activities. It currently operates in the Western Pacific. The PRIMORYE-Class intelligence-collection ship is equipped with a versatile array of col- lection, electronic warfare, and communica- tions equipment. The PRIMORYE is one of the Soviets' most sophisticated intelligence- collection ships and has conducted operations against US facilities on the Kwajalein atoll. this strategic objective, the Soviets are rely- ing on both commercial and scientific programs to gain influence and access. For example, So- viet interest in hydrographic research reflects their desire to improve their submarine oper- ations and develop methods to counter US un- dersea military activities in the region. It could also assist them in acquiring strategic minerals from deep seabed mining areas. Since September 1984, Moscow has offered to negotiate fishing access agreements, includ- ing substantial Soviet hard currency payments, with Fiji, Kiribati. Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Kiribati concluded an agreement in August !Or an annual Soviet licensing pay- ment of about $1.7 million. This agreement not only allows the Soviets access to a wide area of the mid-Pacific adjacent to the US missile testing range at Kwajalein. it also could in- fluence other island states to follow Kiribati's lead. Further, Soviet inroads could create a po- litical environment that would give them the ability to intimidate and bring the smaller Pa- cific island states under their influence. Moscow has also sought to exploit the anti- nuclear sentiment in the Pacific island states, Australia, and New Zealand through calls for nuclear-free zones that would have a much greater impact on US ships and aircraft than on those of the Soviets. This, coupled with their efforts to have states in this area deny access to the US, could prove to be damaging to Western strategic interests. Northeast Asia ()ver the last two decades, the Far East and Northeast Asia in particular has become second in importance only to Western Europe for Soviet political-military policy. The Soviets cite geography and the rapid economic. develop- ment of the Soviet Far East as justification for their claim that the USSR is an Asian power and should therefore play a major role in the Pacific. The primary Soviet concern, however, is security. Moscow has focused on ichieving superior military power in the region through the quantitative and qualitative improvement of Soviet forces in the Far East. These forces include over 50 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border and northeast Asia, some 1,700 tactical aircraft excluding BACKFIRE bombers and more than one-third of' the Soviet mobile SS- 20 missile force. The effective Soviet use of' other overt instruments of' foreign policy, such as diplomacy, aid, and trade, has been hindered by the Soviet military buildup which has led to a widespread regional perception of' the Soviet Union as a threat to peace. One characteristic of the Gorbachev ap- proach to foreign policy has been the advo- cacy of an updated version of' Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security proposal. Gorbachev first made this new proposal during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow in May 1985. The proposal calls for convening an All-Asian Security Fo- rum modeled after the European security con- ference that led to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. This Asian conference would focus on peace and disarmament issues. Unlike the earlier Brezhnev proposal, Gorbachev's scheme is di- rected less against China than against the US security presence in Asia. Moscow has been persistent in its advocacy of this purposefully vague proposal with Asian governments. 1:39 Chapter VII tilonal Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 China China remains the major focus of Soviet activities in Asia. Although the overall rela- tionship remains adversarial, Moscow has in- centives to preserve and deepen the current Sino-Soviet dialo.2,-tie. which began in October 1982. Even a slight improvement in bilateral relations is interpreted by Moscow as a loss for the US on the global balance sheet and an enhancement of Moscow's image. Moscow undertook several initiatives dur- ing Chernenko's funeral to maintain the mo- mentum of Sino-Soviet relations. Gorbachev al111011need Nloscow's desire "to have a seri- ous improvement in relations- with Beijing and that, given "reciprocity.- such improve- ment was "possible.- This statement is con- sistent with the longstanding Soviet position that Beijing must make the first substantive concessions. In addition, Gorbachev met with Vice Premier 1,i Peng. marking the first such high-level c?ont act between Soviet incl Chinese leaders since 1969. In response, China publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union as "socialist for the first time since 1967. Despite these overtures, Sino-Soviet rela- tions reflect a pattern of a gradual expansion of economic and cultural ties with no move- ment on fundament il strategic issues. The long-anticipated visit to Moscow of Chinese Deputy Premier Yao Yilin took place in -July 1985 and resulted in the signing of' a five- year economic agreement intended to produce reciprocal trade totaling $3.5 billion by 1990. Normalization talks also occurred in April and October 1985, hut with no new overtures by either side. Moscow is unlikely to accede to Beijing's demands that normalization of rela- tions he preceded by the withdrawal of So- viet forces from Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. and the removal of' Soviet military forces from the Chi- nese border and Mongolia. North Korea Soviet-North Korean relations have expand- ed markedly since President Kim ll-song vis- ited Moscow in NIav 1984, resulting in the most dramatic change in Pyongyang's foreign policy since the early 1970s. To date, these changes have had a military focus, with increased So- viet military assistance in exchange for ex- panded cooperation in intelligence-collection act ivit ies. The delivery of MiG-23/FLOGGER aircraft to North Korea has been the most signifi- cant trend in the improving bilateral relation- ship. There are presently 26 Ni i( in North Korea. A total of' some :15 to 45 such air- craft expected to be delivered. A lim- ited number of' surface-to-air missiles, probably SA-3s/GOAs, have been delivered to North Ko- rea. These arms transfers reflect Moscow's c(m- elusion that Pyongyang is seriously prepared to improve bilateral relations. This is the first concrete evidence of' an agreement by Moscow to renew deliveries of sophisticated new mili- tary equipment to North Korea. In exchange, it appears that the Soviets have received permission to make military over- flights of North Korea. Increased ictivity is expected for both intelligence collection and strike mission simulation. These flights have been made by Tu-16/11ADGER reconnaissince aircraft, Tu-95/BEAR ( strike aircraft, and Tu- 95/BEAR I) naval intelligence collectors. One important result of' Soviet support has been an improvement in overall military re- lations. To mark the end of' World War II in Europe, Soviet and North Korean fighter units in earlv May conducted their first ex- change visits. In late summer, to commemorate the 40th inniversary of' the liberation of Korea from Japan, the Soviets sent a record number of' delegates and three naval combatants one KARA-Class guided-missile cruiser and two KRIVAK-Class guided-missile frigates. This visit was the first such port call to North Korea by major Soviet naval combatants. Japan Soviet military policies continue to domi- nate relations with Japan to the detriment of Moscow's political and economic ties with Tokyo. Soviet-Japanese relations are also clouded by the ongoing dispute over the North- ern Territories (south of the Kuril Islands). Moscow denies and refuses to discuss the ,Japanese claim to these illegally occupied is- lands and continues its military buildup there with the deployment of' MiG-2:1/HAMGERs to Etorofu Island. While the Soviets seek to im- prove economic ties with Japan to obtain tech- nology and capital to develop Siberia, Moscow's military buildup and antagonistic policies have only encouraged Tokyo to strengthen its ties with the United States and to continue upgrad- ing its own military self-defense capabilities. Throughout hist year, bilateral meetings have occurred in response to changes in the 140 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 The second ship of the KIROV-Class of nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers, the FRUNZE, on its way to join the expanding number of major combatants in the Pacific Fleet. Soviet approach. Building on the meeting be- tween Prime Minister Nakasone and Premier Tikhonov during the November 1984 funeral of Indira Gandhi- the first heads-of-state meet- ing between the two countries in 11 years? Tokyo has responded favorably to Moscow's overtures. Most notably, Prime Minister Naka- sone met with General Secretary Gorbachev during the March 1985 funeral for Chernenko. In mid-January 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Tokyo. This was the first Soviet foreign ministerial visit to Tokyo since 1973 and resulted in a joint communique that implicitly allows for future discussion of the Territories issue. Concurrently, Moscow has intensified its propaganda campaign, criticizing Tokyo for its interest in the US Strategic Defense Initiative program and charging Prime Minister Naka- sone with seeking to remilitarize Japan. This propaganda effort, coupled with the persistent, obstacle of the Northern Territories, points to continuing tensions despite the recent improve- ment in relations. Outlook Moscow's use of all the instruments of for- eign policy--military assistance, diplomacy, trade, aid, propaganda, and overt and covert activities demonstrates a determined effort to extend Soviet power and influence and to pro- mote the USSR as the dominant world force. Its quest for overseas bases, coupled with its improving capabilities in strategic mobility, re- flects Moscow's desire to advance the ideologi- cal goal of a Communist world order. 141 Chapter VII Global Ambitions Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 142 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs The preceding chapters have documented de- velopments in Soviet military power by de- scribing the continuing major military buildup that has been sustained over the past quarter- century. The increase in Soviet military power presents a serious challenge to the United States and our allies and friends, stemming in part from three major developments: ? the quantitative and qualitative Soviet. military buildup, which has produced a major shift in the nuclear and conven- tional balance; ? the dramatic increase in Soviet military offensive capabilities; and ? improvements in the global reach of Soviet military forces, enhancing the Kremlin's ability to project influence and power. The US response to the Soviet challenge has involved a spectrum of security policies aimed at deterrence and defense. The basis for these measures stems from a hard look at our strategic concept to preserve peace not only for today but also for future generations. Some of the measures undertaken to assure peace are: arms control initiatives; modernization of our nuclear and conventional forces; efforts to- ward strategic defense research; improvements in the readiness, mobility, and sustainability of our forces; protection of our technology: improvements in our industrial base; strength- ening our alliances and capabilities for coali- tion warfare; and providing security assistance By the end of the 1980s. the Soviet strate- gic nuclear threat will include regiments of BLACKJACK bombers armed with the 3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-tipped AS-15 air-launched cruise missile. With new and more capable nuclear attack systems con- tinuing to enter the USSR's Armed Forces, the Soviet Union's military challenge to the United States and the Free World contin- ues unabated. 14:3 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 to our allies and friends. These are essential measures if world peace is to be maintained. Unlike the Soviet Union, we do not seek to win any political or territorial advantage by force of arms. At the same time, we must face the sobering fact that our vital interests cannot be protected if the Soviets enjoy an advantage in every category of military strength. The following discussion summarizes the United States' policies and programs initiated to meet the Soviet challenge. A more compre- hensive report on these developments is regu- larly made available to the public in such pub- lications as the Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff. Deterrence and Arms Control The primary security objective of the United States is to defend our right, and that of our allies, to live in freedom. Since World War II, we have sought to accomplish this objective by maintaining military forces capable of de- terring Soviet military aggression and of frus- trating their attempts to use military strength for political intimidation. And while we be- lieve that, in the words of President Reagan, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," effective deterrence requires that we must be perceived as able and prepared, if Soviet aggression does take place, to impose unacceptable damage on key elements of Soviet power. At the same time. the United States is com- mitted to an arms control process that, if it were to lead to equitable and verifiable agree- ments, could strengthen deterrence and en- hance stability while radically reducing the numbers and destructive power of Soviet and American nuclear weapons. Our proposals made to the Soviets at the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva reflect that commit- ment. We are also working to lower the risk of conventional war through the Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (M BFR) in Vienna. Deterrence and stability, however, are con- ditions that can result only from a balance be- tween Soviet and American forces. Given the Soviets' massive buildup of both offensive and defensive capabilities as documented in pre- vious chapters --failure by the United States to modernize its own forces and to proceed with its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) re- search program would weaken deterrence and increase the risk of war. Similarly, arms control agreements must be complied with and cannot be isolated from the underlying competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, an arms control agreement that preserved areas of So- viet advantage while placing unfair and uni- lateral restrictions on the United States would threaten Western security and wreck any hope for extensive, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions in the future. The situation will worsen if the Soviets continue their violations and probable violations of the letter and spirit of numerous existing arms control agreements. For these reasons, the United States has care- fully constructed its defense modernization and arms control policies to be an integrated and mutually reinforcing approach to preserving Western security in the face of an evolving Soviet threat. Arms Control Compliance As part of our continuing efforts to put the arms control process on a firm and lasting ba- sis, we have paid close attention to the ques- tion of compliance while the Soviets have not. The pattern of Soviet violations and probable violations raises serious questions concerning the integrity of the arms control process and its ability to guarantee a more stable and secure international environment. We have stated our readiness to "go the extra mile" in giving the Soviets an opportunity to correct their activi- ties involving noncompliance. But we cannot accept a double standard that amounts to uni- lateral treaty compliance and restraint by the United States. The list of Soviet violations and likely vi- olations of both the letter and spirit of arms control agreements is long and getting longer. A few of the significant examples include: ? Construction of a large phased-array, bal- listic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia in di- rect violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty requirement that such early warning radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be oriented outward. ? Deployment of the SS-25 single-warhead, road-mobile ICBM in direct violation of 144 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 the Soviets' political commitment to re- frain from undercutting the 1979 SALT II agreement, which limits each side to just one new type of "light- ICBM. The Sovi- ets previously said that their soon-to-be- deployed SS-X-24 multiple warhead ICBM was their one allowable new missile. ? Encryption of ballistic missile telemetry in direct violation of SALT II provisions prohibiting deliberate concealment mea- sures that impede verification of compli- ance by national technical means. ? Maintenance of an offensive biological warfare program and capability in di- rect violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and involve- ment in the production, transfer, and use of chemical and toxic substances for hostile purposes in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in direct violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. ? Underground nuclear testing activities that constitute a probable violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which prohibits underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. In December 1985, the President again re- ported to the Congress concerning Soviet non- compliance with arms control agreements. The report reaffirmed previous findings concerning Soviet violations and announced several addi- tional findings. In relation to the SALT I and 11 Treaties, the additional findings were: ? Soviet violation of SALT I Interim Agree- ment by using facilities remaining at dis- mantled or destroyed SS-7 sites to store, support, or launch ICBMs; ? Soviet violation of the SALT II strategic nuclear delivery vehicles limit; ? Soviet violation of the SALT II prohibi- tion on concealment of missile/launcher association; ? Soviet action inconsistent with BACK- FIRE bomber commitment -Arctic staging; and ? evidence of BACKFIRE production at slightly more than the permitted 30 from 1979 to 1984 and production at slightly less than 30 from 1984 to 1985. In the case of the ABM Treaty, it was de- termined that Soviet activities associated with rapid reload were ambiguous in relation to treaty compliance but were a serious concern. Soviet activities relating to ABM-capable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were also held to be ambiguous. The expanding pattern of Soviet violations is clear and has important political and mili- tary implications. Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. It appears even more menacing when considered in the context of other Soviet ABM- related activities. Together, they cause con- cern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM territorial defense. Moreover, most wor- risome is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, for it might be applied to additional prohibited ICBMs in the future. Soviet violation of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention has given them a prohibited biological warfare capabil- ity which we do not have and against which we have no defense. Soviet violations of the SALT II verification provisions have impeded our ability to verify Soviet compliance with existing treaties, present special obstacles to maintaining existing arms control agreements, and are indicative of a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements. The United States is seeking through diplo- matic channels to obtain Soviet explanations, clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective actions. So far, the Soviets have refused to address seriously our compliance concerns. In addition, some Soviet violations ---for example, the flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25 are, by their very nature, irreversible. For these reasons, in June 1985 President Reagan directed the Department of Defense to identify specific actions that could be taken in propor- tionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those violations that the Soviets fail to correct. Modernization Programs Strategic Modernization In 1981, President Reagan committed the United States to reversing the potentially dan- gerous erosion of the credibility of our strate- gic nuclear deterrent that resulted from the massive expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic forces during the 1970s. The net result of the combination of Soviet modernization and deployment programs for 145 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 their nuclear attack forces and US restraint in modernizing its offensive nuclear forces was to allow the Soviet Union a "sanctuary" for its ICBM force and for the other key assets that were protected by hardening. This, com- bined with the Soviets' ability to attack our Minuteman force, using only a portion of their ICBMs, significantly eased the problems of So- viet nuclear planners. They could begin to envision a potential nuclear confrontation in which they could threaten to destroy a very large part of our force in a first strike while retaining overwhelming nuclear forces to deter any retaliation we could carry out. This ability to conduct a first strike also threatened to make less credible the deterrent linkage between our strategic nuclear force and our forward-deployed conventional and nu- clear forces. In addition, the increasing Soviet emphasis on blunting the effects of US retal- iation held open the prospect of undercutting deterrence further because the Soviet leader- ship could come to believe that their hardening programs would permit them to emerge from a major conflict with their forces, command and control system, and other support systems damaged but still functioning. Since 1981, the Soviets have continued to press ahead with development and deployment of new generations of ICBMs, submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and air- craft capable of strategic missions. However, over the last five years, the United States has begun significant improvements in its strate- gic triad which if carried to completion will help restore high confidence among both friends and adversaries in the credibility of our deterrent forces. The purpose of our modern- ization programs is not to achieve strategic su- periority over the Soviets but to frustrate their determined efforts to shift the strategic balance irrevocably in their favor. Our strategic modernization programs con- sist of four key elements: ? In response to the threat posed by Soviet fourth-generation deployments and to the survivability and retaliatory capability of our land-based ICBMs, we will begin de- ploying a limited number of Peacekeeper missiles in selected Minuteman silos in 1986. Research and development will also continue 00 a new, single-warhead ICBM. ? To replace our aging Poseidon nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, which will face block ob- solescence in the 1990s, the United States is building Trident submarines at the rate of one per year. Deployment of the D-5 missile in the Trident in the late 1980s will strengthen our vital sea-based deter- rent by giving it a hard-target capability not possessed by existing SLBMs. ? The usefulness of our B-52 bombers the newest of which was built 23 years ago has been extended for a few more years owing to the standoff capability of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) being deployed on selected B-52s. Introduction of the B-1B will ensure a continued pene- tration capability against Soviet defenses, at least until the deployment of a new advanced-technology bomber in the 1990s. At that time the B-1B will assume the role of ALCM carrier. ? In addition to fielding more survivable delivery vehicles, we are improving the survivability, endurance, and effective- ness of our command, control, and com- munications systems. This strengthens stability by making it less attractive to the Soviets to attempt a preemptive at- tack against our command system. Also, these improvements will further ensure our capability to manage our strategic forces effectively. Our strategic modernization programs do much more than deter Soviet aggression against the United States. They also serve, as they have for the past four decades, to deny the Soviets the ability either real or perceived to use or threaten to use their strategic forces against our allies and friends. Non-Strategic Modernization The growth over the past decade of Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in particular, their SS-20 deployments has posed a unique challenge for the United States. Although these weapons do not threaten contiguous US territory, they do affect our vital national se- curity interests because they significantly in- crease the threat to our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. It has been necessary, there- fore, to respond to this threat by formulating and implementing a collective Western response. Our NATO allies are meeting the challenge. In accordance with its 1979 dual-track decision, 146 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 NATo has completed deployment of the Per- shing II, and deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles continues on schedule. At the same time, the United States, in close consul- tation with NATO allies, is seeking to nego- t Mte an agreement with the Soviets at Geneva that would totally eliminate, or at least greatly reduce to equal global warhead limits, the en- tire class of longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (MINI?) missiles. NATO is also following through on the 1983 Montebello decision to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from the NATO stockpile within the next few years. Taken together with the 1,000 warheads already withdrawn, the number of nuclear warheads in the Alliance's stockpile will be reduced to the lowest point in 20 years. This is in stark contrast to the massive Soviet buildup of nuclear forces facing NATO. Space Command On 2:I September 1985, the United States Space Command was activated in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This new unified command has operational control over the US Air Force Space Command, the US Naval Space Com- mand, and the US Army Space Planning Group. The new command provides centralized plan- ning- and daily mission operations for space systems support of US military forces world- wide. Additionally. the mission of integrated warning of strategic attack against the con- tinental United States has been assigned to this command. The formation of this command recognizes the importance of space systems in safeguarding the interests of' the United States and its allies and is not directly related to the St nitegic Defense Initiative research program. Conventional Forces Modernization Land Forces To meet the Soviet threat., the United States is working to improve the antiarmor capabili- ties and tactical mobility of' our ground forces as well as to provide better command, control, and communications (CH') support. Over 400 modernized combat systems are being fielded, including the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BEV) equipped with TOW ant iarmor missiles, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the AH-64/Apache attack helicopter, which carries Hellfire anti- armor missiles. In addition, many support systems such as the Black Hawk helicopter and the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle have improved the effectiveness of our land forces. We have stepped up the pace of our ground force modernization programs, adding more Mls, BEVs, and AH-64s to the procurement levels planned by the previous administration. The effective use of' tactical mobility can help counter a numerically superior opposing force by permitting the rapid concentration of' personnel and materiel at places where they can best exploit enemy vulnerabilities. A new generation of highly mobile helicopters and support vehicles will allow us to make bet- ter use of this tactic. For example, the UH- 60/Black Hawk helicopter, which proved its worth in Grenada, is larger. more agile, and more reliable than the UH-1 it replaces. Also supporting our ground forces are highly capable new weapons such as the Multiple- Launch Rocket System (M LRS). In less than a minute. a single launcher can fire 12 rock- ets beyond cannon range, covering an area the size of 6 football fields with approximately 7,700 grenade-like submunit ions that are effective against both personnel and lightly armored tar- gets. Additionally. the MLRS is an excellent example of US-NATO armaments cooperation. Complementing these improvements in com- bat systems are upgrades to the command and control systems that would support our forces in battle. During the mid-to-late 1980s. our com- manders will receive lightweight, jam-resistant CH' equipment to assist them in managing their forces on a high-technology battlefield. Maritime Forces Strong maritime forces are needed to support our forward defense strategy, to fulfill the re- sponsibilities associated with our network of overseas alliances, and to protect the vital sea lanes linking the US to Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. We rely heavily on maritime forces to respond to a wide variety of crises a role for which their global reach, rapid responsiveness, and integrated combat power are particularly well suited. The warfighting capability of our naval forces has improved markedly, with substan- tial increases in the quality and quantity of our ships, which numbered 540 in October 1985 and which are now well along toward our goal of a force of 600 ships. Modern aircraft car- 147 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 rier battle groups enable our naval forces to respond rapidly to crises throughout the world and to conduct sustained operations in areas where we do not have access to airfields or other major land bases. With the delivery of 3 new nuclear-powered Nimitz-Class carriers over the next six years, we will expand to a force of 15 aircraft carriers. Four Iowa-Class battleships, now being refur- bished and armed with long-range Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles, are rejoining the fleet and will provide a potent supplement to our carrier force. At the same time, we are arming a variety of surface ships, attack sub- marines, and combat aircraft with Tomahawk and Harpoon weapons systems, giving them greater effectiveness against a wide array of targets. To enhance our amphibious assault capa- bilities, we are building new high-speed air- cushion landing craft and two new classes of amphibious ships. By the middle of the next decade, our amphibious lift capability will have expanded by one-third. Ship-to-shore mobility will also be improved by the powerful CH-53E helicopter, now joining the force in large num- bers, and by the new MV-22A Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, currently under development. The combination of these assets will permit assaults to be launched from points over the horizon, thereby reducing vulnerability and increasing the likelihood of surprise. Once ashore, our Marines will be provided greater mobility and firepower by the addition of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). We are working hard to improve our abil- ity to locate and combat enemy submarines. One example is a new attack submarine sched- uled for production near the end of this decade. A key design objective is to build a quieter boat with better sensors, enabling it to hunt down and engage enemy forces while remain- ing undetected. At the same time, we are con- tinuing to construct improved versions of the Los Angeles-Class attack submarine as replace- ments for older boats that are approaching ob- solescence; some 33 of the 52 Los Angeles-Class boats authorized to date are now operational. In addition, LAMPS helicopters, new towed- array sonar systems, and lightweight torpedoes are upgrading the antisubmarine capabilities of our naval surface and air forces. Our defense against antiship missiles will be improved by the wide-area surveillance systems now under development and by strengthened area air defense systems. Central to these ef- forts is the development of tactical over-the- horizon radars that can detect enemy aircraft hundreds of miles away, thus enabling our land- and carrier-based interceptors to mount a more effective defense of our ships at sea. Like- wise, the deployment of new CG-47 cruisers and DDG-51 destroyers, both of which incorporate the Aegis air defense system, will improve our ability to intercept high-speed cruise missiles and aircraft at extended ranges. Ultimately, we plan to build 27 CG-47 cruisers and 29 DDG-51 destroyers. Tactical Air Forces Well-trained and properly equipped tactical air forces can quickly destroy targets on land and at sea as well as provide an air defense umbrella in support of ground and naval forces worldwide. To retain our qualitative edge in this area, we must continue to improve our tactical aircraft. To that end, we are acquir- ing systems that will allow for rapid, multi- ple engagements beyond visual range while be- ing highly maneuverable and lethal at close-in ranges. The overall capability of our tactical air forces to destroy enemy forces in the air and on the ground has improved substantially. The Navy is modernizing its carrier-based force of combat aircraft. The F-14, our pri- mary fleet air-defense fighter, and the long- range Phoenix missiles it carries are being upgraded. By the end of the decade, all the Navy's fighter and medium-attack squadrons will be equipped with F-14s and A-6Es, and the F/A-18 will have replaced almost 80 percent of the A-7E light-attack inventory. The Air Force is continuing to modernize its tactical fighter forces with the new model F- 15 and F-16 aircraft. Since 1980, it has more than doubled its inventory of F-15s and F-16s, bringing the combined total to nearly 1,400 aircraft. New, more durable, and easier-to- maintain engines, scheduled for installation on these aircraft in the early 1990s, will further en- hance their combat effectiveness. These high- performance engines will enable the upgraded but heavier models of our fighters to keep pace with the new generation of Soviet-built fighters. The Air Force also is upgrading its ground attack systems. Currently in development are a new airborne targeting system, the Low- Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN), and new in- 148 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 frared air-to-surface missiles that will allow F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s to strike enemy tar- gets whenever they present themselves. In addition, much-needed improvements in air-to- ground munitions have been initiated which will bring munitions effectiveness up to the high level of quality represented by these air- craft. Finally, some squadrons of B-52G aircraft have been assigned general purpose missions, such as minelaying, sea surveillance, antiship attack, and conventional bombing, supplement- ing their strategic duties. Overall, our inventory of tactical aircraft has grown by the equivalent of two wings over the past four years. Over the next five years, we plan to buy 1,284 fighter and attack aircraft for the Air Force and 954 for the Navy and the Marine Corps. This will allow us to reach our goal of 14 carrier air wings by 1987 and about 40 Air Force tactical fighter wings by the early 1990s. The deployability of Air Force tactical com- bat aircraft will be increased significantly during the next several years as the recently approved NATO acceleration of European air- base facilities comes to fruition. Additional bases and much-needed concrete shelters will greatly increase the initial effectiveness of our reinforcement aircraft in a European crisis. Special Operations Forces The United States must be prepared to re- spond to low-intensity conflict when it threat- ens our vital national interests. The Soviets and their surrogates, as a matter of policy, have both encouraged and supported this form of aggression as a way of achieving their ob- jectives without direct confrontation with the Free World. Today, more than 20 insurgen- cies are threatening peace in the Third World, and one out of every four countries around the globe is engaged in some form of conflict. Low-level conflict will likely be the most per- vasive threat to Free World security for the rest of this century. Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide us the ability to respond to a range of crises in a flexible manner. They con- tribute to our ability to deter and defeat a ma- jor conventional attack by their capability to disrupt the enemy's lines of communication, en- gage in unconventional warfare, psychological operations, counterterrorism actions, or intel- ligence missions. By the end of the decade, the capability of our Special Operations Forces will be enhanced by the addition of a Special Forces Group and a Navy SEAL team. Additionally, mobility will be improved through submarine dry deck shel- ters, patrol craft, and a significant increase in medium- and long-range SOF-configured air- craft. Readiness and sustainability for these forces will benefit by the emphasis being placed on spare parts procurement, communications equipment, and foreign language training. Strategic Defense As previous chapters have shown, the na- ture of the Soviet military threat has grown during the past quarter-century and will con- tinue to grow during the next. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will in- crease dramatically. Recognition of these facts is the basis of our strategic and nonstrategic modernization programs and arms control poli- cies. It also is the basis for the Strategic De- fense Initiative (SDI) announced by President Reagan in March 1983. The SDI research program is designed to determine whether advanced defensive tech- nologies could contribute to a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest solely upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential at- tacks. Specifically, the SDI is examining the possibility of effective defense against ballistic missiles. At a minimum, the SDI is a prudent response to the very active Soviet efforts in offensive and defensive forces. The Soviets have de- ployed around Moscow the only operational ABM system in the world. The Soviets also have an active research and development pro- gram in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. If they were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against bal- listic missiles, in addition to their large and growing offensive and defensive forces, they might come to believe that they could launch a nuclear first-strike attack against the United States or our allies without fear of effective retaliation. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems whether sea-based, ground-based, or space- based and with what capabilities that might prove feasible and desirable to develop. But we currently see genuine merit in the poten- tial of advanced technologies providing for a 149 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 layered defense, with the possibility of negat- ing a ballistic missile at various points after launch. Because the security of the United States and that of our allies remains indi- visible, we are working on technologies with applications for defense against long-range bal- listic missiles and against short-range ballistic missiles that threaten our allies. Although several years of' research will prob- ably be necessary before a determination can be made whether to proceed with development and deployment of' defense systems against bal- listic missiles, key criteria have been identified by which the results of' SDI research will be judged. First, any system to be developed and deployed must be survivable so that the Sovi- ets would not have an incentive in a crisis to strike first. Second. any defensive system to be developed and deployed must he cost-effective relative to offensive forces meaning that the defensive system must be able to maintain its effectiveness against the possible proliferation of offensive forces or the introduction of offen- sive countermeasures. Indeed, defenses would provide a significant incentive for deep reduc- tions because they would significantly reduce or even eliminate the military effectiveness of ballistic missiles. The SDI research program is being conduct- ed in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If and when our research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about potential next steps, and we will consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union pursuant to the terms of' the ABM Treaty. US Strategic Mobility Our capability to move troops and equip- ment by air is unmatched by any country in the world. US airlift assets include the transports of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) aug- mented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in time of' emergency. Current MAC strate- gic mobility transports include 70 C-5 and 234 C-111 aircraft. Under the CRAF program, US civilian airlines augment the military with an additional 68 cargo and 237 intercontinental passenger aircraft. The combined cargo- carrying capability of these aircraft is more than twice that of the Soviet Union's military and civilian aircraft. However, when distance to a region of' possible conflict is considered, this 2:1 ratio favoring the US changes signif- icantly in terms of maximum number of tons deliverable per day. In any major overseas deployment, sealift will deliver about 95 percent of all dry cargo and 99 percent of all petroleum products. The US-flag merchant marine's decline necessi- tates a large pool of government-owned ship- ping, such as the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), to provide additional tonnage in time of mobi- lization. The RRF provides the surge shipping needed early for a deployment. The 66 dry- cargo ships and 8 tankers in the RRF are being maintained in a 5-, 10-, or 20-day readiness sta- tus at 3 primary anchorages in the US. Another set of government-owned ships, those in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), are a valuable but aging asset and are capable of pro- viding approximately 140 ships for sustainment requirements. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) cur- rently has under charter only enough ships to meet the peacetime needs of our deployed naval forces. Included under MSC long-term charter are the 25 ships of the afloat pre-positioning programs. Afloat pre-positioning programs con- sist of two parts: the Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) program and the Pre-positioning (PREPO) ships program (formerly Near-term Pre-positioning Force), The MPS program is designed to combine the responsiveness of airlifted troops with sealift delivery of pre-positioned equipment. The 13 ships involved in the program will be orga- nized into 3 MPS squadrons that can carry equipment and 30 days of supplies for 3 Marine amphibious brigades. The first MPS squadron has deployed to the US Atlantic Command's area; the second has deployed to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; and the third squadron will deploy to US Pacific Command sometime this year. The 12 PREPO ships consist of' those ves- sels in the Mediterranean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Indian Ocean that carry equipment and supplies for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Readiness The capability of US military forces has im- proved measurably over the past five years and will continue to do so as more new weapons systems and modern equipment are introduced into the operating forces. In absolute terms, we now have the most effective peacetime military force in US history. However, we cannot afford to determine national security requirements on the basis of our military strength alone; we must consider the strength and objectives of 150 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 our potential adversary. Since ours is funda- mentally a defensive strategy, it is essential that we maintain our readiness at or above that of' potential aggressors. Our forces are better prepared to accomplish their warfighting tasks because they are bet- ter equipped, trained, and manned with highly motivated people who are confident in their ability to get the job done. Despite the progress made, we cannot lull ourselves into believing that our work is complete: much remains to be done. Readiness quickly becomes a perish- able commodity without sustained support and funding. Sustainability and Logistics We recognize that our forces, even with a high degree of readiness, might become a "hol- low- deterrent if we cannot sustain them in combat. Adequate logistics support for our forces munitions, fuel, equipment, and repair parts is necessary for successful deterrence and defense. Our current level of sustainability is barely adequate for credible deterrence. In Europe, for example, our sustainability remains inferior to that of the Warsaw Pact. We will continue, in conjunction with our allies, to emphasize in- creases in sustainability to fortify the deterrent value of our forces. Building upon the gains made during the past five years, we seek a level of conventional sustainability to ensure deter- rence of the Soviet threat. Besides providing sufficient quantities of stocks to maintain our staying power in combat, we seek forces of su- perior quality equipped with our most modern and effective conventional munitions. The pre-positioning of US equipment in Eu- rope began in the 1960s in response to US and European concerns that the forces in the the- ater were inadequate to meet the Warsaw Pact threat. The Army has pre-positioned in Europe heavy equipment for four divisions and sup- porting- units and is currently pre-positioning equipment for two more divisions. The Air Force pre-positions rapid runway repair equip- ment, ground support equipment, munitions, fuel, and other consumables. The levels of pre- positioned fuel and munitions, however, con- tinue to fall short of objectives. The US goal is to possess sufficient war reserve stocks to sustain wartime activity until industrial pro- duction can provide the required support. Our long-range goal is to correct the NATO-Warsaw Pact sustainability imbalance by the 1990s. Reserve Forces The US maintains slightly above one million personnel in the Selected Reserve and about 470,000 Individual Ready Reserves. The Se- lected Reserve, consisting of National Guard and Reserve units, constitutes approximately 45 percent of the total force structure. Al- though Selected Reserve manning has improv- ed significantly in recent years, it does not approach the numbers of' trained reserves in the USSR. US Selected Reserves include: ? one-third of the Army's combat divisions; ? one-half of the nation's strategic airlift crews: ? one-third of the Military Airlift Com- mand's medical evacuation aircraft: and ? one-fourth of the Marine Corps' infantry divisions, aircraft wings, and force ser- vice support groups. Technology Security The purpose of the United States' technol- og,y security policy is to offset the Soviets' numerical advantages in weapons and man- power by protecting our strong suit superior high-technology. The Soviet program of' acquir- ing Free World technology is pervasive and aimed at improving the quality and effective- ness of their weapons by using the results of' the Free World's research and development. We can maintain our technological superiority only if we continue to strengthen our research and development base and deny Soviet access to our militarily critical technology. The De- partment of Defense (Don) is a key player in a government-wide domestic and international effort to safeguard our technological lead. Participation in the export license applica- tion review process, which is governed by the Export Administration Act and the Arms Ex- port Control Act, is the cornerstone of the domestic portion of Do D's Technology Security Program. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). a newly established DoT) field activity, oversees this responsibility. Along with increased automation and other management initiatives. DTSA has greatly im- proved service to the exporting community while safeguarding our technology. DTSA also has raised the level of public support for the Technology Security Program through in- dustry briefings and industry participation in many vital issues related to technology security. The Militarily Critical Technologies List, 151 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 first published in 1980 and continually updated, is used by export license officials as a reference guide to detail the potential military applica- tions of a large number of technologies. The unclassified version of the list enables the busi- ness community to see clearly what technology areas Dol) has identified as militarily critical. This document also aids business in its own technology security programs. The effectiveness of our technology secu- rity program in the United States is insepara- ble from similar efforts by other Free World nations. The United States is committed to strengthening the existing multilateral export control organization known as COCOM, or the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls. Based in Paris. COCOM is the only organiza- tion through which Japan and the NATO na- tions (except Iceland) determine what should not be exported to Warsaw Pact countries and a few other destinations. COCOM is much more effective now than it was five years ago owing to a persistent US-led effort to make it a credible technology security force. In the fall of 1985. Spain announced that it would join COCOM, making it the first new member since 1954, when Japan joined at the suggestion of the United States. Since not all technologically advanced na- tions are members of COCOM, the United States is negotiating agreements with various governments to establish a COCOM-level of protection for US and for indigenous technol- ogy within other countries. 'Nis effort is underway both within and out- side the European Theater. And it will grow in importance as the US continues to increase its trade with industrializing countries, partic- ularly in the Far East. Soviet military presence and extension of influence in this part of the world is growing dramatically, making technol- ogy security efforts increasingly important. It is clearly in our national interest to en- courage both industry and our research insti- tutions to remain innovative while expanding our rich industrial base. Our Technology Se- curity Program will continue to be focused on protecting the applied technologies that can be incorporated into defense-related systems. Technology security controls are not intended to thwart our traditions of free expression and academic freedom in basic research. Neither are they designed to distance us from our al- lies and other friendly countries when it is in our national interest, and in the interest of mutual security, to share militarily significant technology. Doffs Technology Security Program is one of the most cost-effective means of protecting national security. It has had a marked effect on the ability of the Soviets to use our tech- nology for their military benefit. They have been forced to spend more of their resources on military research and development than would have been the case if our improved controls had not been in place. Moreover, our own defense budget reflects a lower level of expenditures than would have been necessary if the Soviets had acquired certain US technical capabilities. Technology security is a vital component of our national defense effort. Without the West's technological lead, our ability to maintain an effective deterrence would be seriously jeopar- dized. The institutionalization of the Technol- ogy Security Program at DoD builds a strong foundation for the future. US Industrial Base The US defense industrial base is comprised of both private sector and government-owned industrial facilities that provide production and maintenance of defense materiel needed to support the armed forces. Government- owned facilities are minimal since public law requires maximum reliance on the private sec- tor for defense goods and services. Conse- quently, government-owned facilities in most cases are dedicated to the production of unique defense-related materials such as munitions, artillery tubes, and tracked combat vehicles. The current US Government-owned base con- sists of 72 production and 43 maintenance facilities. The US has initiated a number of impor- tant industrial preparedness measures aimed at preserving, modernizing, and expanding the defense industrial base. "Seed money'' con- cepts and other contract incentive programs have stimulated private sector investment in advancing process technologies and plant-wide capital investments. Production programs are being developed to provide a rapid production surge during crisis situations. Sustained em- phasis on vitalizing the defense industrial base is recognized by both Congress and DoD as an integral part of' achieving our defense goals. Alliance Security Structures The United States has joined with many other Free World nations in alliances designed 154 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 to deter aggression and provide the ability to defend common interests should deterrence fail. These alliances contribute to deterrence by allowing us to share the burdens with- out matching the Soviets weapon system for weapon system. Beyond formal alliances, we have established relations with other friendly states to promote common security objectives. The vitality of these alliances and friendships luis helped to impede Soviet territorial expan- sion and thwart the Soviet ambition of becom- ing the dominant world force. We and our allies and friends are work- ing together to improve our common security through a variety of programs. Maintaining solidarity among free and independent states particularly when faced with Soviet efforts to divide and intimidate them is essential for successful alliances and requires careful atten- tion and willingness to consider each other's views and concerns. Maintaining strong mil- itary forces for defense and improving them and our capabilities for coalition warfare in the face of a growing threat remain a top pri- ority. Beyond this, we are pursuing many political-military programs, such as coopera- tive efforts toward arms control and prevent- ing the USSR and its allies from obtaining our m flit ary-related technology. NATO was established to respond to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe. A strong NATO is essential to meeting the Soviet and Warsaw Pact challenge. To help meet the threat of Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression or intim- idation, NATO is pursuing new initiatives to improve its conventional forces while it con- tinues to improve its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear f'orces. In May 1985, NATO Defense Ministers ap- proved a report that identified critical deficien- cies in NATO's conventional defense structure and out a plan to overcome those short- comings. The task remains to carry out this plan. Last December, NATO Defense Minis- ters endorsed a conceptual military framework for long-term defense planning. Another key program in NATO is to increase the degree of cooperation in research. development, and production of armaments, including exploit- ing emerging technologies to improve conven- tUmal defenses so that the Alliance has the best equipment and makes the best use of resources available. We have also strengthened our friendship ties in Asia and the Pacific, regions of vital importance for our defense and for the eco- nomic well-being of the Free World. We look to Japan to carry out fully its defense missions including territorial, air, and sealane defense' to 1,000 miles by completing implementation of its 1986-1990 defense program. We are also working with Korea and Thailand to assist them in meeting threats on their borders. In the Philippines, we are encouraging reforms and economic development to strengthen that ally. With regard to the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Pact., are working with our allies to overcome the difficulties caused by New Zealand's port access policy. We continue to strengthen our relations with nations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in a continuing effort to deter Soviet ag- gression and maintain access to that region's resources while promoting the search for a last- ing Arab-Israeli peace. Although we have no formal alliances in the Middle East, we are gradually expanding our security relationships with regional states in pursuit of mutual inter- ests. We have expanded our cooperation with Egypt, Jordan. and Pakistan and have moved forward on military cooperation with Israel. In Africa and Latin America, we have seen the threat that low-intensity conflict and ter- rorism pose to developing nations that are struggling to build democratic institutions. Since formal alliances are not always practi- cal in these circumstances, security assist ince programs have become the basis for ensuring regional security and the stability of friendly nations. Despite the efforts of' the Soviets and their proxies to disrupt fragile economies and undermine democratic development, leaders in countries like El Salvador have demonstrated their willingness to resist aggression. Security Assistance Security assistance strengthens formal al- liances and helps ensure stability in regions where formal alliances are not possible. Our security assistance programs have been instru- mental in improving stability in ('entral Amer- ica, preventing the spread of' the Iran-Iraq war, and strengthening the posture of our friends and il lies in Europe, Asia, Africa, :Ind Lat in America. The economic burden we bear in pro- viding this assistance to our friends is worth- while because it is far more effective and less costly for indigenous forces to protect their own freedoms than for the United States to at- tempt to perform these missions on their behalf. 155 Chapter VIII US Policies and Programs Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Our programs are designed to preserve the lib- erty and independence of the states that receive this assistance. We develop our security assistance pro- grams from a hierarchy of strategic consider- ations. Starting with global US strategic ob- jectives, we formulate programs appropriate to each region in which we have major interests. These regional objectives are weighed together with the country-specific threats and military requirements in order to plan, with the coun- try, the details of each country's program. Of special note are the new programs for Pak- istan, increased funding for Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, and a vigorous response in Central America. Security assistance contributes to our for- eign policy and defense objectives and to on- going diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in areas such as the Middle East. US security assistance programs also play a crucial role in bilateral and coalition efforts to contain or deter conflicts in areas of concern to the US. Conclusion The United States, together with our allies and friends, must maintain the military ca- pabilities required to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet aggression against our vital in- terests. We do not seek to match the Soviet Union in defense spending or in the acquisition of specific armaments. We must, however, con- tinually assess the global military balance in which Soviet forces are a major factor. Real- izing that the perceptions of the Soviets, our allies, and other nations are affected by the balance, we cannot accept a position of mili- tary inferiority. Maintaining a strong military capability over the long term will require the United States to invest in its defense structure while pursuing genuine, verifiable, and equi- table negotiated arms reductions. We and our allies and friends must have a full and pre- cise understanding of the Soviet challenge. The publication of this edition of Soviet Military Power is a step in that direction as we pursue our transcending goal of peace and security. 156 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3 Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3