SOVIET MILITARY POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 161
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Bill:
1136
19 MAR 1986
On the morning of March 25, I plan to release the 1986
edition of Soviet Military Power. As you know, this publication
has been highly instrumental in fostering a greater public
awareness of the ever-expanding Soviet threat facing the United
States and our continuing need for intelligence capabilities.
The cooperation and assistance of the Central Intelligence
Agency are most appreciated. As the result of our joint efforts,
Soviet Military Power has become respected around the world as
the most comprehensive statement of Soviet military policies
and capabilities. I have forwarded a copy to the President,
noting CIA's assistance in this endeavor.
Enclosed is your personal copy of the document. I believe
this outstanding publication will serve the interests of both
the intelligence community and the nation as a whole.
Sincerely,
7:4
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SOVIET
murrittly
POWER
1986
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SOVIET
MILITARY
POWER
First Edition September 1981
Second Edition March 1983
Third Edition April 1984
Fourth Edition April 1985
Fifth Edition March 1986
For sale by Superintendent of Documents, US Government
Printing Office, Washington DC 20402
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SOVIET
MILITARY
POWER
1986
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CONTENTS
Chapter
The Soviet Military
Chapter II
Nuclear Force Operations
Chapter III
Strategic Defense and Space Operations
Chapter IV
Soviet Forces for Theater Operations
Chapter V
Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability
Chapter VI
Research, Development, and Production
Chapter VII
Global Ambitions
Chapter VIII
US Policies and Programs
7
21
,11
59
93
105
12:3
143
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PREFACE
With its introduction in 1981, Souiet Military Power gained immediate public
attention and was recognized as a detailed. frank, and authoritative report on devel-
opments within the military forces of the USSR. It provided infOrmation not m.ide
available by the Soviets themselves. Subsequent editions have detailed ongoing So-
viet military developments ill keeping with the belief that informed and free people
everywhere can best judge the merits of the policies and programs their governments
have designed to meet the Soviet challenge a challenge faced by all free nations.
Unlike citizens of the Soviet Union. peoples of democratic nations can exercise
their right to question the decisions made by their governments. Decisionmaking
within the USSR. however, is not subject to public scrutiny or debate. The So-
viet leadership can devote a large percentage of the national income to defense
programs a cost no Western nation is willing- to pay nor need incur in times of
peace. The benefits that accrue to the Soviet military cannot be overlooked or ig-
nored, and they must be examined in the light of their implications for the security
of the Free World. In order to make possible a full and precise assessment of the
Soviet challenge, both now tind during the next several years, this edition of Soule!
Military Power provides infintmation on trends in the Soviet military.
With the initial deployment of mobile SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles to
operational ICBM regiments in 1985. the Soviet Union confronted the world wit ii
further proof of its intensive drive for offensive military weapons capable of under-
writing its political objectives against the West. Deployment of the SS-2;5 violates
SALT II, and the manner in which it has been based violates SALT I.
rDie new, highly survival le. road-mobile, fifth-generation SS-25s entered service
is the deployment of the USSR's highly accurate, fOurth-genertit ion. silo-based 55-
18 Mod 4 ICBM program was reaching completion. At the same time. test firings
of the fifth-generation, rail-mobile SS-X-24 ICBM continued. Preparations were tilso
underway for test flights of three future ICBMs being- developed to build on the ca-
pabilities of the fourth and fifth generations. By the mid-1990s. nearly all of the
USSR's currently deployed strategic nuclear attack forces ICBMs. Si I UtI s. ind
manned strategic bombers will have been replaced by more advanced strtitegic
nuclear weapons systems.
Paralleling the offensive strategic developments of 1985. the Soviet [Ilion pressed
forward with advanced strateg,ic defense systems. Construction continued on new
over-the-horizon radars tmild large phased-array radars capable of tracking greater
numbers of targets with increased accuracy. Two new classes of silo-based ABM
interceptor missiles in the Moscow ABM system were in tidvanced stages of test ing.
NIore important, advanced research continued on the components that tire necessary
to achieve ti rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system. In 1985, the USSR con-
tinued to work on advanced strategic defense technology programs focused on the
development of high-energy lasers, kinetic energy weapons, radio frequency weapm ins.
tuld particle beam weapons. These programs have already produced developmental
ground-based lasers capable of interfering with satellites. By the late 1980s, the IJSSR
may well advance to the testing of lasers for targeting ballistic missiles in flight.
Over the past five years, successive editions of' Souict Mi/itury Power have ciltiled
the continuing growth and modernization of the USSR's Armed Forces across the
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cut ire spectrum of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, the Air Forces, the
Navy, and the Air Defense Forces.
? During this half-decade, Soviet ground forces have been enlarged, and the
concept for using a powerful ground force corps, almost twice the size of
tank divisions, is being evaluated for conducting large-scale, high-speed
operations.
? Main battle tanks of the T-64, T-72, and T-80 series have been entering the
Soviet operational inventory of some 52,600 tanks at a rate of 2,300 a year.
? Since 1981, the USSR has produced some 3,800 new fighter and intercep-
tor aircraft for its air forces and 47 new major surface combatants for its
expanding naval forces.
? The number of deployed, mobile SS-20 launchers, with missiles carrying
3 M IRV warheads, has almost doubled from 250 in 1981 to 441 in 1985
representing an increase from 750 to 1,323 nuclear warheads with more
warheads available on refire missiles, ready for delivery against targets in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia at ranges up to 5,000 kilometers.
Looking to the future, Moscow shows no indication of reducing the percentage
of resources dedicated to the Soviet Armed Forces; the industrial capacity devoted
to continued force modernization; research and development, as well as the theft of
Western technology, required for new generations of weapons systems; the commit-
ment to improved readiness, mobility, and sustainability to support Soviet forces;
and the continued projection of power beyond Soviet borders. Indeed, by each of'
these measures, Soviet military power continues to grow.
Within the past year:
? The Soviets, in addition to deploying the SS-25, have continued testing
the SS-X-24 rail-mobile ICBM.
? The fourth TYPHOON and the third DELTA IV-Class strategic ballistic
missile submarines were launched, adding to the number of longer range,
more capable MIRVed SLBMs in the USSR's submarine force. Additional
units are under construction. A still newer class of strategic ballistic
missile submarine is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s.
? Additional units of the new supersonic manned strategic BLACKJACK
bomber have emerged to participate in advanced flight-testing of this
new bomber, which will carry the 3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed
AS-15 cruise missile. At the same time, additional new BEAR H strate-
gic bombers have been produced, with some 40 bombers now carrying the
AS-15 cruise missile.
? Increased deployment of the strategic air-launched cruise missile has
been accompanied by advanced testing of the sea-launched and ground-
launched variants of this missile. Over the next ten years, the Soviets
are likely to deploy 2,000 to 3,000 of these nuclear-armed cruise missiles,
thereby achieving an entirely new dimension of multidirectional offensive
strategic nuclear capability.
? With the continuing deployment of the SA-10 surface-to-air missile and
the advanced stage of development of the SA-X-12 SAM system, the USSR
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has continued to build toward the nationwide deployment of advanced
systems not only with air defense capabilities against manned bombers
but also with some capabilities against cruise missiles and some types of
ballistic missiles.
? The Soviet Navy's new 65,000-ton aircraft carrier, which has half again
the displacement and aircraft carrying capacity of the KIEV-Class carri-
ers, has been launched and is being fitted out in preparation for its first
sea trials in the late 1980s.
? Both of the USSR's new generation of space-launched vehicles are mov-
ing forward with successful test flights of the new medium-lift booster that
will carry the manned space plane into orbit. Concurrently, testing is un-
derway for the heavy-lift booster designed to send aloft the USSR's space
shuttle as well as space station payloads in excess of 100 tons.
? The Mach-2, all-weather, air-superiority Su-27/FLANKER fighter/inter-
ceptor has become operational, joining the MiG-29/FULCRUM in the new
generation of highly advanced Soviet combat aircraft.
Each year Moscow has received thousands of pieces of Western equipment and
many tens of thousands of unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part
of its campaign to acquire Free World technology by legal and illegal means. Vir-
tually every Soviet military research project well over 4,000 each year in the late
1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s----benefits from these documents. Some key
Soviet armaments and equipment are based at least partly on technology acquired
from the Free World. Examples are the look-down/shoot-down capability of the new
Su-27/FLANKER and MiG-29/FULCRUM fighter/interceptors, the new heavy-lift Mi-
26/HALO helicopter, and the roll-on/roll-off capability of Soviet merchant ships that
support naval operations. The assimilation of Free World technology is so pervasive
that the United States and other Free World nations have, in effect, been subsi-
dizing the Soviet military buildup. Acknowledging this vulnerability, Free World
nations have been working together to counter Soviet attempts to acquire Western
technology.
Soviet Military Power 1986 provides a current, authoritative assessment of Soviet
global, theater, and conventional force developments, of the doctrine guiding these
developments, and of the structure dedicated to supporting the Soviet Armed Forces.
This year's edition details Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements iind
the threat to peace posed by the USSR's role in regional conflicts. Aggression by
Soviet troops or their proxies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua cannot be ignored.
Finally, Soviet Military Power 1986' reports on US policies and programs and those
measures we and our allies have undertaken to meet the continuing Soviet chal-
lenge. It also outlines the steps being taken to modernize our nuclear deterrent, the
capabilities of our conventional forces, and our research efforts within the Strategic
Defense Initiative. It is our hope that one day the threat of nuclear mass destruct ion
can be drastically reduced and eventually eliminated. In the pursuit of that goal, we
must continue to take the necessary steps-t maintain peace a-id freedom.
March 1986
C' spar 'W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
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6
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Chapter I
The Soviet
Military
During the past year. the political and mil-
itary leadership of the Soviet Union experi-
enced several key changes. These changes will
not. however. alter the growth ;ind expansion
of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. 'Hie
Soviets will continue to invest substantially
in their military and, by direction of the new
leadership. Vill applV new technologies to im-
prove the efficiency, quality, and capacity of
their industrial base and military equipment.
The USSR's heavy industry infrastructure. ini-
tiated by Stalin in the First Five-Year Plan in
1927 and still operative today, was designed to
support the Soviet military. Thus, the military
historically has been the major impetus of in-
dustrial growth. The int roduct ion of technolog-
ically advanced production techniques some
acquired from the Free \Vorld will further
enhance the capabilities of the Soviet Armed
Forces.
In addition, the USSR will 01111) tie to pur-
sue its global inihit ioils. oviet foreign pol-
icy will remain guided by Lenin's strategy of
"peaceful coexistence" (the furtherance of so-
cialist revolution and class struggle with in-
(lustrialized nations by means short of major
war). To alter this course would portend the
collapse of Communist ideology and the failure
of intermit 101101 socialism. To further national
goals, the new leadership will continue to mod-
ernize its armed forces, infuse new technolo-
gies into the country's llnlitrv-i1ldustiia1 base,
The Soviet Union's drive to achieve strate-
gic nuclear superiority has led to the deploy-
ment of the highly survivable, road-mobile
SS-25 ICBM. In strengthening its increas-
ingly more modern nuclear arsenal with the
fifth-generation ICBMs, including deployment
of the SS-25 and testing of the SS-X-24, the
USSR has violated SALT!!, which prohibits
the introduction of more than one new type
of ICBM. The manner of the SS-25's deploy-
ment violates SALT
Chapter I The 5) 1(1
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BALTIC FLEET
NORTHERN FLEET
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
45
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
1
OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS
95
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
73
SUBMARINES
45
OTHER COMBATANT SHIPS
78
NAVAL AVIATION
260
SUBMARINES
180
NAVAL AVIATION
425
? 55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW 1)-
PACT DIVISIONS
Murmansk
Olenegorsk
30 SOVIE
DIVISIONS
EASTERN EUROPE
Sevastopol
BLACK SEA FLEET/
CASPIAN FLOTILLA
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS
79
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS
99
SUBMARINES
35
NAVAL AVIATION
450
"III
88 DIVISIONS
11146141
Nikolayev
.Tyuratam
Tashkent.
DM)
&try.
Shagen
30 DIVISIONS
(4 IN AFGHANISTAN)
The symbols on the map are representational locations and are neither exact nor complete.
SOVIET
? Pechora
USSR
NUCLEAR FORCES
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
ICBMs LRINF
SLBMs
BOMBERS
SS-11
448
SS-N-5
39
BACKFIRE
270
SS-13
60
SS-N-6
304
BISON
30
SS-17
150
SS-4 112
SS-N-8
292
BEAR
150
SS-18
308
SS-20 441
-N-17
12
BADGER
262
TACTICAL
SS-19
360
SS-N-18
ISS
224
BLINDER
135
AIRCRAFT
SS-25
70
SS-N-20
80
SS-NX-23
32
The United States Government has 110t recognized the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union Other boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative
Including 125 in Soviet Naval Aviation.
Five BLACKJACK in advanced flight testing.
6,300
8
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VIILITARY FORCES
DOD
+tj
Mishelevka
nn))
I. ? Krasnoyarsk
?Komsomorsk
53 DIVISIONS
(51N MONGOLIA)
*Vladivostok
A.
Petropavlovsk
PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 83
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS
SUBMARINES
NAVAL AVIATION
120
115 ?
510
? Includes SSBNs and SSBs
NSWP Air and Naval Forces not depicted
GROUND FORCES"
MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS 142
TANK DIVISIONS 51
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS 7
COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS 1
' Totals exclude 12
mobilization divisions and
2 new Army Corps
STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES NAVAL FORCES
g ABM
RADAR
INTERCEPTORS 1,210
ABM
lASAT
SAM"
LAUNCHERS 9.000f LAUNCHERS 100
In USSR only does not include Soviet Strategic
SAMs (SA-2/3/5) in Mongolia or with Groups of Forces.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 3
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 280
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS 392
COMBATANT CRAFT 745
AUXILIARIES 300
SUBMARINES 375
NAVAL AVIATION 1,645
9 ChapterI The Sm. iv( Militao
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and pursue the expansion of Soviet influence
t h roughout t he Third world.
The Soviet Leadership
Since hecoming General Secretary in March
1985. ikhail Gorbachev has moved rapidly to
consolidate his authority and place his
personal stamp on Soviet national policy.
During his first several months in power.
Gorbachev elevated fOur men to full Politburo
status uid promoted two others, Defense Minis-
ter Sergey Sokolov and the new State Planning
Committee Chief Nikolav Talyzin, to candidate
Politburo membership. In addition, he placed
three of his supporters on the Central Com-
mittee Secretariat. Perhaps the most striking
example of Gorbachev's political strength was
his ouster of one of his main political oppo-
nents, Grigoriy Romanov, from both the Polit-
buro and the Secretariat. In addition, five of
the eleven Central Committee economic depart-
ments have changed hands. The net result has
been the emergence of i Party leadership that
owes its position and loyalty to the General
Secretary.
The swiftness with which the General Sec-
l'Ot arV }MS moved Oil 0001101111C issues reflects
a sense of urgency to formulate a strategy
for stimulating the economy. Current eco-
nomic growth rates are not high enough to
improve hot h militarV capabilities and living
standards to desired levels while simultane-
ously ensuring future economic growth. To
achieve hot h program goals, the USSR will
have to accelerate lagging economic growth
rates. Lilly indications ;ire the Soviets in-
tend to return to an intensive-growth strategy
primarily through Unproved productivity and
new technology.
The policies advocated by Gorbachev to m-
plement tile int ensive-growt h strategy
shift in investment policy, a speedup in techno-
logical advances, a program to increase worker
productivity through consumer incentives and
stepped-up worker discipline, and increased
managerial efficiency through limited decen-
tralization represent a relat ively modest
program of economic changes. None of these
proposed measures are new, nor do they rep-
resent a wholesale restructuring of the Soviet
Union's economic system. \\That is new is Gor-
bachev's forceful style, his political momen-
tum, his apparent willingness to carry through
a limited program of administrative decentral-
ization in the interest of economic efficiency,
and his intent to increase investments for in-
dustrial machinery.
The Soviet military has a strong, long-term
interest in the success of inn lot ives designed to
stimulate the economy. The military stands to
benefit if the Soviet industrial base can he mod-
ernized and if' economic performance can he
improved over the long term. If significant eco-
nomic growth can be achieved, the technolog-
ical foundation for present and future militiry
programs will be enhanced.
Soviet Doctrine and Strategy
To the Soviets, military doctrine is con-
cerned with the essence. purpose, and charac-
ter of a possible future war and the preparat ion
of' the country and its armed forces for con-
ducting such a war. Military strategy deals
with defining the strategic tasks of' the armed
forces; carrying- out measures to prepare the
armed forces, the economy, and the population
for war: determining potential adversaries; and
determining the size and composition of' mili-
tary forces necessary to wage war. The actual
practice of' preparing the country and its armed
forces for war as well as training troops for
strategic, operational. and tM'tiCal combat is
encompassed in Soviet military art the ell' ec-
tive application of' national power to achieve
political goals.
Soviet military writings state that a flit we
war would he a decisive clash on a global
scale between two diametrically opposed socio-
economic systems socialism and capitalism.
The existence of two distinct and opposing
camps means that i future world war would
he a coalition war. The Soviets believe that ;in
outcome favorable to their interests depends on
complete unificat ion of' the poi it ic;11, economic.
and military forces of all countries within the
socialist coalition. To this end, the Soviets
have concentrated On developing- and imple-
menting a single strategic policy for the entire
Warsaw Pact forces. Marshal Kulikov, Com-
mander in Chief (CIN() of' the Warsaw Pact,
has referred to his command as a unified com-
bat formation.
The Soviet approach to preparing for and
actually conducting coalition warfare is gov-
erned by the assumption that ;111V coalition, be
it military or otherwise, derives its strength
from the cohesiveness of its memhers. Con-
versely, they argue that when its unity is
10
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A RF IC TVt:
threatened or begins to erode for whatever rea-
son, the entire alliance and each member of
that alliance is placed at risk. The cohesion
of a coalition, from the Soviet perspective, is
both its greatest strength and its greatest vul-
nerability. The Soviets believe that the ability
of the Warsaw Pact to function in an effec-
tive and cohesive manner is a key factor in the
successful prosecution of a future war. In a
like manner, they argue that internal contra-
dictions plague the NATO Alliance and tend
to undermine its political and military effec-
t iveness and hence are a critical vulnerability.
The Soviets have devoted considerable en-
ergy toward building the Warsaw Pact into
a strong military alliance while at the same
time exploiting NATO's perceived vulnerabil-
ities. This effort reflects Moscow's determi-
nation to forge a cohesive coalition based on
Soviet military strategy and guided by Soviet
policy objectives, regardless of their implica-
tions for the sovereign rights of member states.
The military principles governing the conduct
of coalition warfare constitute a key element
in Soviet strategy a strategy aimed at divid-
ing and destroying an opposing coalition while
at the same time maintaining the unity of the
Warsaw Pact.
The Soviets believe that a world war could
be waged for a period of time with conven-
tional weapons only. Although general nuclear
war is not considered inevitable, the Soviets
believe it is possible that a conventional war
will escalate to a nuclear conflict. Despite the
fact that strategic nuclear forces would play
the dominant role in such a war, the Sovi-
ets recognize the crucial function of combined
arms in seizing and occupying ultimate objec-
tives. The Soviets believe that a world war
could be relatively brief or could develop into
a protracted conflict. Great importance is at-
tached to the initial phase of' a war because to
a large degree it would determine the course
of all subsequent actions. This accounts for
the extraordinary attention the Soviets pay to
their overall mobilization capability and their
perceived requirement for the rapid transition
of high-level political-military control organs
from a peacetime to a wartime footing in or-
der to take maximum advantage of the initial
period of a conflict.
Soviet doctrine envisions a future world war
of wide scope waged over vast territories. Such
a war would be characterized by an absence of'
continuous fronts, rapid and sharp changes in
the strategic situation, and deep penetrations
11
Chapter I The Soviet Military
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into rear areas of the forces involved. Forces
would rely on mobility to maneuver and wage
an intense stniggle to seize and maintain the
initiative. The Soviets emphasize the primacy
of the offensive, stating that military and po-
litical objectives are ultimately achieved only
through aggressive and continuous offensive
actions. Although defensive actions would oc-
casionally be necessary, they would be active
and innovative operations undertaken to sup-
port nearby offensive operations or to create fa-
vorable conditions for resuming the offensive.
The Soviets be that victory in war is
possible only through the combined and coordi-
nated efforts of all services and troop branches.
As a result, Soviet military strategy, which
views warfare as a series of interdependent
large-scale operations, is the same for all the
services. The Soviet concept of combined arms
warfare specifies that the various services and
independent units must be brought together un-
der a single unified commander. This permits
the most effective use of all forces and weap-
ons and ensures their united and coordinated
employment in achieving overall strategic
objectives.
Although the Soviets envision the possi-
NORTHERN FLEET'
C
AUXILIAR4S i
-- --- 95
, ARCTIC TVD
SUBMARINES 141.
NAVAL AVIATION 425
NAVAL INFANTRY
BRIGADE 1 DIV,i'SI S ,- 10
T.AP ",) , 1,400
APC IFV _ 3,130
ART LLERYI 2,000
_,-.----r, TAC ICAL SM 100
TA ICAL IRCR(AFT 22
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 73
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS 78
? NOT INCLUDING SSBNe
bility of three the iters of war Western, South-
ern, and Far Eastern they employ the
concept of theaters of military operations
(Teatr Voennykh Deistuii, abbreviated TVI)s)
in planning for strategic operations. A Eu-
ropean TVD, for example, can be a thousand
kilometers in both depth and width. Military
assets employed in a TVD vary and are usu-
ally determined by political objectives and en-
emy strength. For the conduct of actions on a
strategic scale, plans are formulated for the full
spectrum of combat for the entire geographic
area encompassed by a TVD.
The TVD organizational concept enables mil-
itary planners to work out the strategy and
tactics to achieve political objectives in the ge-
ographic region, taking into consideration the
capabilities of the missiles, aircraft, ships, and
ground forces at their disposal. While a strate-
gic operation within the various TVDs may
be conventional only, nuclear strikes are still
planned within the operational concept down
to division level.
On a global scale, the Soviets have identified
ten continental TVDs and four oceanic TVDs.
These are:
? the Western TVD, which includes
, -
c\ i, cVESTERN TV411.) ,
,-
DI ISIONS 63 (USS'
TANKS
u'l
19,450 ( , ' 9,900
APC-/LFV j 21;1, CUSS
ARTILItRY 19, (USS
TACTfAtSsM(USS
TACTICAL _
, AIRCRAFT 20 (US
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 45
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS/CRAFT 95
AUXILIARIES 45
SUBMARINES 45
NAVAL AVIATION 260
NAVAL INFANTRY
BRIGADE
'INCLUDING 6 GOLF II SSEts-
MEDIUM
LLERY = FIELD Y. Pd
Aafits. A 1?4
12
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the NATO Central Region, the Baltic
approaches, East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the western USSR:
? the Northwestern TVD, which covers the
Scandinavian Peninsula, Iceland, and the
northwestern USSR:
? the Southwestern TVD, which includes
the NATO Southern Region, the east-
ern Mediterranean. Hungary, Romania.
Bulgaria, and the southwestern USSR:
? the Southern TVD, which covers South-
west Asia including Afghanistan, Iran,
eastern Turkey, the Caucasus, inc-1 the
Turkestan region of the USSR:
? the Far Eastern TV D, which covers
Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Mongolia,
China, the Koreas. Japan, and Alaska:
? the North American, South American,
African, Australian, and Antarctic TVDs;
? the Arctic Ocean TVD, which covers
the Arctic. Ocean and the Barents and
Norwegian Seas.
? the At Ocean TVD, which cov-
ers the Atlantic Ocean south of the
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap:
? the Indian Ocean TVD: and,
? the Pacific Ocean TVD, which includes
that ocean as well as the coastal areas of
the Soviet Far East.
The contemporary Soviet concept of the the-
ater strategic operation has expanded in scope
and complexity. The Soviets now plan for a
theater operation to consist of several fronts
conduct ing dynamic. fast-moving operations to
seize strategic ground objectives located 600-
800 kilometers away. Front offensive opera-
27 (US
6,850 (
5.400 (
6,900 (U
200 (USS
10 (USSR
pktucipALs
CO AN
0-*IfER 0 AN
SHIpS s
)
,
Ei. ITEt?BANEAIV-SQUAb 1:10Ar-
AU
BMA
--NAVAL AVIA
NAVAL INFANTRY
BRIGADE
SHI ,AVERAGE 40-50 ANTPIDIHOUS
SU ARINES 7-9 WARFARE SHIPS 1-2
2-3 _MINE WARFARE
D ROVERS \ 24 S
F ATES AUXI !Afars -3-25
DIVISIONS
TANKS
APC/IFV
ARTILLERY
TACTICAL SSM
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
FA 144AST TVD
53
14,900
17,300
13,480
375
1,7
PACIFIC
T VD
ACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2
PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS 83
OTHER COMBATANT
SHIPS 120
AUXILIARIES 90
SUBMARINES 90'
NAVAL AVIATION
NAVAL INFANTRY
DIVISION
'NOT INCLUDING SSBN4
510
tions would be conducted in coordination with
air, antiair, assault (airborne, amphibious, or
joint), and naval operations. The air opera-
tion would be a massive offensive campaign
designed to gain air superiority and disrupt
and destroy an enemy's command and control
and nuclear capability. Frontal forces would
contribute to the ii r operation by attacking en-
emy air and air defense facilities with rocket,
artillery, and ground forces. In turn, the air
operation, by degrading and disrupting enemy
command, control, and communication as well
as aviation and nuclear capabilities, would cre-
ate favorable conditions for the fronts to ac-
complish their objectives quickly.
A theater-wide ant lair operation involving
tactical and strategic air defense assets coordi-
nated at the theater level would be conducted
to defend allied forces from enemy aircraft. In
addition, naval forces would operate off coastil
flanks to destroy enemy naval forces, secure
the coastal flanks of the theater, participate in
amphibious operations, and thwart the enemy's
attempt to employ amphibious forces.
If' the war escalated to the nuclear level, the
Soviets could employ nuclear strikes of' vary-
ing scale and scope. Such actions could in-
volve the coordinated use of' ground, Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF). naval, and aviation sys-
tems. Nuclear strikes would be exploited by
frontal forces taking advantage of shock and
disruption.
Specific Soviet aims in a global war would
be to:
? defeat NATO forces at any level of' con-
flict, occupy European NATO countries,
and use Europe's surviving ecommlic
assets to assist Soviet recovery:
13
Chapter I The Soviet Military
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SOUTHERN TVD
DIVISIONS
TANKS
APC/IFV
ARTILLERY
CA IAN FLOTILLA
L SUItEpE
ATAN 5
COMB ANT
SH -S 28
AUXILIARIES
30
5,400
9,100
5,800
TACTICAL SSM 185
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 985
? neutralize separately China and the
United States and its allies by disrupt-
ing and destroying their military forces;
and
? dominate the post-war world in which
socialism would replace capitalism as
the basic politico-economic system in all
nations.
From an internal viewpoint, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership
would seek to maintain its control over the
Soviet Government, civilian population, mili-
tary, police, and internal security organs. Ef-
forts would be made to minimize losses to the
Soviet leadership, essential scientific and tech-
nical personnel, to the general population, and
to the economy. Repair and recovery oper-
ations would be organized to deal with war-
related damage.
Soviet Armed Forces Structure
Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed
Forces is vested by the Soviet constitution in
the CPSU and the highest bodies of the Soviet
Government the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Party con-
trol of the military, however, is facilitated by
the existence of the Defense Council, an orga-
nization that is chaired by the CPSU General
Secretary and consists of top Party, govern-
ment, and military leaders. The Defense Coun-
cil is the most senior decisionmaking body for
all aspects of national security policy. It also
forms the nucleus of what would be expanded
in wartime to the highest Party-state body
responsible for establishing unified strategic
leadership of the USSR and providing central-
ized direction to the national economy and the
entire war effort. In this regard, it would per-
form functions similar to the USSR's World
War II State Defense Committee.
Party dominance of the Soviet Armed Forces
is assured through its decisionmaking author-
ity. The top Party leadership establishes mil-
itary doctrine and approves military strategy
as developed by the General Staff. The Defense
Council, the highest decisionmaking body for
all aspects of national security policy, reflects
the Party's wishes on all defense, budgetary, or-
ganizational, and senior personnel assignment
matters. Senior military officers are selected
from a Central Committee list, and all major
organizational changes in the Soviet military
must be approved by the Defense Council.
Direct control and administration of the
daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is
entrusted to the Ministry of Defense (MoD),
headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU)
Sergey Sokolov. As Minister of Defense, Soko-
lov is charged with maintaining the condi-
tion and overseeing the development of the
armed forces, including officer recruitment and
conscription of enlisted personnel; equipping
the forces with weapons systems and military
materiel; developing military strategy, opera-
tional art, and tactics; training the forces; and
ensuring high standards of military discipline
and political loyalty. Sokolov also is respon-
sible, in coordination with local Soviet
government organizations, for the civil
defense program.
The Ministry of Defense Collegium functions
as a consultative body and policy review board.
Chaired by Sokolov, the Collegium discusses
and resolves issues connected with the devel-
opment of the armed forces, their combat and
mobilization readiness, and the effectiveness of
military and political training. Membership in-
cludes the Deputy Ministers of Defense, the
Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and
other top military leaders.
The Minister of Defense exercises control of
the armed forces through First Deputy Minis-
ters and Deputy Ministers of Defense. The First
Deputy Ministers are: MSU Sergey Akhro-
meyev, Chief of the General Staff since Septem-
ber 1984; MSU Viktor Kulikov, Commander in
Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces since 1977:
and former C1NC of the Ground Forces, Vasiliy
Petrov. Five of the eleven Deputy Ministers
14
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161
11111;1:A
C-in-C Soviet
Armed Forces
M. S. Gorbachev
Minister of
Defense
S I Sokolov
Stavka of the Soviet
Supreme High Command
Chief of
Main Political
Directorate
tr D Lizichev
Wartime Defense Council
Chdat,,in KGB
Supreme High
Command (VGK)
First Deputy
Ministers of Defense
Chief
Main Political
Directorate
C.-in-Cs of
Soviet Forces
General Secretary
CPSU
Minister
of DeferlSe
Chief of the
General Staff
General Staff
(Executive Agent of VG K
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
S F Akhromeyev
(Chief of the
General Staff )
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
'/ G
(C iii C VVarsavv
Pact Forces)
I
?arr
- - JAI/A
First Deputy
Minister of Defense
V I Petro,
Chiutinan USSR
Council of Wester,
Chairman GOSPI AN
Other Party
and State
Figures as Required
Deputy Minister
of Defense
Deputy Minister
of Defense
Deputy
of
Minister
Defense
Deputy Minister
of Defense
Deputy Minister
of Defense
I
iC
harm,
C Ground
Foe
Y F' Makymov
f or ( Sadist,
Ri.ket Fon es)
A
C irs
I Koldimov
C Aerospace
Forces)
A N Yet ir5riy
IC -in C All Frirrsi
C
V N Cheraw!,
III CNaval Fon esi
As of February 1986
15
h apter I T he Si) \ let M ilili r
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16
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The Soviets' 441 SS-20 LRINF launchers, discussed in the nuclear forces chapter, are a constant
reminder of the growing nuclear threat from accurate and survivable mobile missile systems. At
top, the SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher is illustrated configured for operational deployment.
The photos, at left and above, are of a Soviet SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher used for crew
training and familiarization.
17
Chapt(.1. I The Sox iet
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are CINCs of' the services Strategic Rocket
Forces. Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense
Forces, and Air Forces.
The five service CINCs are responsible for
the peacetime administrative management.,
including combat and political training of the
forces. Operational control of the forces rests
with a peacetime structure of the Supreme
High Command (Vcrkhounoe Glaunokomando-
uanlye, abbreviated V( K) and is administered
by the General Staff. The other six Deputy De-
fense Ministers are in charge of civil defense,
rear services, the main in construc-
tion incl billeting. personnel, and armaments.
The most important element in the Soviet
Ministry of Defense for peacetime forces man-
agement, as well as wartime control of opera-
tional formations, is the General Staff headed
by Marshal Akhromeyev. As the central mil-
itary staff organ, the General Staff exercises
operational control over the armed forces and
is responsible for coordinating the activities of
t he main staffs of' the 5 services, the staffs of' the
16 military districts, 4 groups of forces, 4 fleets,
rear services, civil defense forces, and the main
directorates of' the Ministry of' Defense.
'rile General Staff coordinates military plan-
ning, advises the Defense Council on matters
of' in policy, develops military strategy
for approval by the Defense Council, and di-
rects functions common to all of' the services.
The major responsibilities of' the General Staff
in peacetime are to ensure that military forces
reach and sustain a high level of combat readi-
ness and to prepare strategic operation plans
in the event of war. During wartime, the Gen-
eral Staff would be the primary organization to
implement operational orders of' the Supreme
High Command,
rferritoriilly, the Soviet Armed Forces lo-
cated within the USSR are organized into 16
military districts (MDs). An MD is a high-level
administrative command element that contains
military units up to army level, training in-
stitutions, recruitment and mobilization offices
or military commissariats, and other military
establishments. The primary mission of' a mili-
tary district is to train military units to ensure
a high level of' combat readiness.
Other important responsibilities include reg-
istration and induction of draftees, mobiliza-
tion, civil defense, and premilitary and reserve
training. In the event of' war, certain mili-
tary districts, such as those on the periphery
of the USSR, could generate fronts or other
operational field forces, either singly or in com-
bination. Soviet units stationed in Eastern Eu-
rope are organized into four Groups of' Forces
located in Poland. East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Hungary.
Military districts and Groups of' Forces are
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. They
contain their own organic staff elements re-
sponsible for political affairs, personnel admin-
istration, training, rear services, construction
and billeting, and civil defense. Each MD and
Group of' Forces command staff has officers who
serve as chiefs of' their respective service com-
ponents. Soviet naval forces are assigned to
four fleets, all of' which have command and
staff organizations and relationships similar to
those of' military districts.
The structure of' the Soviet Armed Forces
extends to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces as
well. The Soviet commitment to ensure that the
military resources of' all Warsaw Pact states
will contribute effectively to a war effort is
an important element in Moscow's attempt to
achieve military superiority. The Warsaw Pact
organization has a central role in the military
effort of' the Bloc states and in the USSR's over-
all objectives. Because of' the importance of
that role, the Soviets have made sure that their
control is complete and unchallengeahle.
Through the subordination of' non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact forces the Soviets seek to guar-
antee that the coalition will act as a single
body and that the nnerests of' Eastern Europe
are the same as those of' the USSR. In terms
of' a wartime strategy, the Soviet objective of
dismantling NATO and maintaining the cohe-
sion of' the Warsaw Pact is of' primary impor-
tance. For the East European member states,
this means that their particular national in-
terests, especially in time of war, will be sub-
sumed by Soviet-defined policies. From the
Soviet perspective, such a consequence would
be the in and necessary result of
properly preparing to fight and win a coali-
tional war.
Wartime Command and Control
The Soviets believe in a rapid and efficient
transfOrmation of' their peacetime national
security organization into an operational com-
mand capable of' successfully achieving all ma-
jor political and military objectives in the
event of' general war. To this end, they have
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estaNished peacetime national security and
high-level military organizations that closely
approximate the expected wartime structure.
These peacetime or could shift their
id ivities to wartime operations with minimal
disruption and little .itignientation in mem-
bership. Party and state control would be
maintained through the relocation of selected
high-level officials to hardened emergency
facilities.
In the event of war, the current Defense
Council probably would be expanded to include
representatives of the highest Party, state, and
military leadership. It would function in a man-
ner similar to the World War II State Defense
Committee, ensuring centralized political and
economic direction of the entire war effort.
General Secretary Gorbachev would function
as wartime Defense Council Chairman and ex-
ercise direct leadership of the Soviet Armed
Forces as Supreme Commander in Chief of the
VG K and head of its General Headquarters
(.??;10 ).
The Ministry of Defense Colleg,ium would
probably provide the foundation for the war-
time Stu VGK, which would include, in ad-
dition to Gorbachev, the Minister of Defense,
the Chief of the General Staff and other First
Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the
Main Political Directorate, and the five Armed
Forces Commanders in Chief.
The General Staff would serve as operational
staff and executive agent for the Stauka VGK.
Working in conjunction with the main staffs of
the five services, the Ni am Operations Direc-
torate of the General Staff would draft strate-
gic operations plans for consideration by the
VGK. Once approved, these plans would
be issued to operational commanders as orders
of the VGK. This group would ensure timely
and precise execution of the VGK military cam-
paign plans by the operational commands.
In order to ensure centralized control of
strategic planning and decentralized battle
management of the armed forces, the Soviets in
wartime would employ intermediate High Com-
mands of Forces in TVDs that would be subor-
dinate to the VGK and would be responsible for
directing the efforts of subordinate formations.
Commanders for four of the probable TVD High
Commands are: Marshal of the Soviet Union
N.V. Ogarkov: Army General 1.A. Gerasimov:
Army General M.NI. Zaytsey: and Army Gen-
eral I.M. Treryak. In certain circumstances,
the VGK might create High Commands fOr spe-
cific strategic directions (that is. a major axis
01: avenue of attack not already under the c( n-
trol of' a High Command in a TVI)).
The Soviets also have created an elaborate
system of emergency relocation facilities. many
of' which are hardened and designed to en-
sure the survival of' Party and state control by
protecting high-level Party, government, and
military leaders. These facilities are equipped
with hardened communications equipment and
would serve as alternate command and con-
trol posts for the top leadership in wartime.
In addition, essential personnel of critical in-
dustries would he evacuated along with crit-
ical machinery out of' urban areas and away
from immediate battle areas to emergency lo-
cations to facilitate their continued operation.
All these measures are designed to provide un-
interrupted functioning of the various elements
of' Soviet strategic leadership and the national
economy in wartime, including nuclear war.
A wartime coalition command structure also
has been created for the quick transformation
of' the Warsaw Pact into an effective military
alliance capable of operating as an extension of
the Soviet Armed Forces. Since the late 1979s,
the Soviets have introduced and institu-
tionalized measures aimed at modernizing the
Warsaw Pact's unified command structure. In-
tegration would be achieved through the com-
plete wartime subordination of' the armed
forces of' the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact coun-
tries to the High Commands of Forces in the
Western and Southwestern TV Ds. These com-
mands provide a key link between the supreme
military authority vested in the VGK and the
fronts and armies operating within the var-
ious TVDs.
In keeping with the Soviet concept of' com-
bined arms operations. the TVI) commander
has at his disposal not only the assets available
in the ground forces but also the naval tt-1(1 air
assets assigned to the TVD itself. In the case
of the Western and Southwestern TV Ds, s(mie,
if' not all, of the armed fOrces of' the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact states operating in these TV Ds
will be subordinate to the Soviet TVI) com-
mands. This subordination reflects Moscow's
belief that well-equipped and we War-
saw Pact forces, under Soviet leadership, can
defeat any other coalition.
19
Chapter I Soviet Military
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2,0
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Chapter II
Nuclear Force
Operations
The Soviet Union has pressed ahead with
the development and deployment of new _._,'.(.11-
erations of increasinglv capable land. sea. and
ah' forces for nuclear attack. Nlodernizat ion of
the fourth generation of intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (I(lil\ls) is essentially complete.
In clear violation of the SALT II Trett v, de-
ployment of a fifth-generation ICBM, the SS-25.
has begun, and its deployment has been under-
taken in a manner that violates SALT I. Thi2.;
highly survivable weapon system represents
the world's first operationally deplored road-
mobile Development continue: ;ipace on
the SS-X-21. which could deployed in a rail-
mobile version this year.
'File Soviets' strategic nuclear-powered bal-
listic missile submarine (SS1N) force remains
the largest in the world. Const nal ion
continues on several new TYPHOON-Class
RNs. The SS-NX-2:1. the USSR's most ca-
pable long-range submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLII N). is nearing operational status.
It is deployed on the DELTA IV and pmbnhlv
will he deployed on DELTA III SSI1Ns.
The USSR currently has three manned
intercontinental-capable bombers ill develop-
ment and production tile lq::\ IZ I I. the
111?,\CMACK. and t BACK N(wly
built IlEAR 11 bombers are the first launch
platform for the long-range AS-15 lit.-latinched
cruise missile (ALCNI
Projections for the Years ahead are:
? Additional TYPHOON-Class suhmarines.
The USSR's forces for intercontinental nu-
clear attack include growing numbers of the
new TYPHOON-Class (lower left) and DELTA
IV-Class (center, entering tunnel) strategic
ballistic missile submarines fitted with new
generations of MIRVed missiles with greater
range, payload, and accuracy. These sub-
marines may operate from bases where tun-
nels are being constructed for protection.
21
Chapter II Nueleat Force Operat
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BLACKJACK and BEAR H bombers,
and SS-X-24 ICBMs, all carrying many
more warheads than the systems they are
replacing , will be deployed.
? Hv 1990, if' the Soviets continue to main-
tain over 2,500 missile launchers and
heavy bombers and even if' they are
within the quantitative sublimits of SALT
II, the number of deployed warheads will
grow to over 12,000.
? Although the Soviets would not necessar-
ily expand their intercontinental attack
forces beyond some 12,000 to 1:3,000 war-
heads, they clearly have the capability to
do so. Based on recent trends, even un-
der SALT, the Soviets could deploy over
15,000 warheads, or by violating SALT,
Over 20,000 warheads by the mid-1990s.
The modernization and upgrading of these
strategic forces have been paralleled by growth
and increased capabilities of the Soviets'
longer range intermediate-range nuclear force
(LRINF) and short-range ballistic missile
(SR BM) systems deployed with Soviet combat
forces. Significant improvements in nuclear-
capable aircraft as well as increases in
tactical missiles and nuclear artillery have
also occurred.
Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy
Soviet leaders since the 1960s have followed
a consistent and relentless policy for the de-
velopment of forces for nuclear attack. The
Soviet leadership recognizes the catastrophic
consequences of' a general nuclear war. How-
ever, Soviet military forces have taken actions
and exhibited behavior which indicate that
they believe a nuclear war could be fought and
won at levels below general nuclear war. The
grand strategy of' the USSR is to attain its
objectives, if possible. by means short of war
by exploiting the coercive leverage inherent in
superior forces, particularly nuclear forces, to
instill fear, to erode the West's collective secu-
rity arrangements, and to support subversion.
Thus, the primary role of' Soviet military power
is to provide the essential underpinning for the
step-by-step extension of Soviet influence and
control.
In any nuclear war, Soviet strategy would be
to destroy enemy nuclear forces before launch
or in flight to their targets, to reconstitute the
war base should nuclear weapons reach the So-
viet homeland, and to support and sustain com-
bined arms combat in different theaters of mil-
itary operations. Several overarching stratega.
wartime missions are:
? to eliminate enemy nuclear-capable forces
and related command, control, and com-
munications capabilities:
? to seize and occupy vital areas on the
Eurasian landmass: and
? to defendthe
Soviet state against attack.
These missions would involve:
? disruption and destruction of the en-
emy's essential command, control, and
communications capabilities:
? destruction or neutralization of' enemy
nuclear forces on the ground or at sea
before they could be launched: and
? protection of' the Soviet leadership and
cadres, military forces, and military and
economic assets necessary to sustain
the war.
Strategic and theater forces and programs in
place or under active development designed to
accomplish these objectives include:
? hard-target-capable ICBMs, new subma-
rine-launched ballistic missiles. LRINE
ballistic missiles, and land- and sea-based
cruise missiles:
? short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)
and free rocket over ground (FRO( l)
systems deployed with combat troops:
? bombers and ALCMs designed to pene-
trate US and allied defensive systems:
? large numbers of land attack and antiship
cruise missiles on various platforms:
? antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces to
attack Western nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines:
? air and missile defenses, including early
warning satellites and radars, interceptor
aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),
antiballistic missile (ABM) radars and
interceptors, and some antiaircraft
artillery:
? antisatellite weapons:
? passive defense forces, including civil de-
fense forces and countermeasures troops
and equipment devoted to confusing in-
coming aircraft: and
? hardened facilities numbering in the
thousands, command vehicles, and evac-
uation plans designed to protect Party,
military, governmental and industrial
staffs, essential workers, and to the ex-
tent possible the general population.
22
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Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elim-
inating the US capacity to fight and support a
conflict wcmld require the capability to employ
theater and strategic. forces over a variety of
i.inges and the destruction of:
? military-associated command and control
facilities and other assets;
? war-supporting industries, ;irsc?nals. and
major military facilities:
? ports and airfields in the United States
and along air and sea routes to European
and Asian theaters of war; and
? satellite surveillance sensors, ground-
based surveillance sensors, and related
communications facilities.
Soviet nuclear forces are designed and per-
sonnel are trained to fulfill their missions un-
der all circumstances. Soviet leaders appear
tI believe that nuclear war might last weeks
or even months and have factored this possi-
bility into their force planning. Despite pub-
lic rhetoric all their commitment to no
Ii rst-use of nuclear weapons. the Soviets have
Nuclear Forces-SLBMs
?
?
?N?nosks
SS-N-5
39
SS-N-18
224
SS-N-6
304
SS-N-20
80
SS-N-8
292
SS-NX-23
32
SS-N-17
12
Test Center
A
SLBM/SSBN Port
developed extensive plans either to preempt
a nuclear attack or to launch a massive first
st rike.
The key to a successful preemptive attack
would he effective coordination of the strike
and accurate intelligence on enemy intentions.
Meet ing these demands in war requires reliable
command. control, and communications under
all conditions.
A launch-under-attack circumstance would
place great stress on attack warning systems
and launch coordination. To meet the demands
of a launch-under-attack contingency, the So-
viets have established an elaborate warning
system. Satellite, over-the-horizon radar, and
early warning systems have been huilt to pro-
vide the Soviet Union with the capahility to as-
sess accurately and respond effectively to any
nuclear attack. These warning systems could
give the Soviets time to launch their nuclear
forces very quickly.
Nuclear Forces-Bombers
? ?
? tRam?nskoy?
? ?Vladlmirovka
? ?
?
BACKFIRE
270'
BADGER
262
BISON
30
BLINDER
135
BEAR
150
Test Center
?
Bomber Base
?
? Including 125 in Soviet Naval Aviation.
Five BLACKJACK in advanced flight testing
Nuclear Forces-ICBMs
SS 17
Yedrovo
,..S 11,6',19,/
? Phiestsk
u zc...... ?.....y.L_ary? ss.Th
Oswaztany? ?,?"Ii----_-88-21$
.84-1_1119\ ?Lait,ssr?1"17 .ii
? Pervomays? T??k:v? s.s..-verithrenve SW"
S8-19 ? 88-1818 P?rm
T.fichchevo ?01101KII? Ola
Kam: tin Yssar .18. ? ....,_88........"184,
88-18 ? Niadkays
nyy ?
SS-18 Uxhur. "11
? Imeni
Nostello ?Aisy.k88-111 Drovy.811-011._ . t L11
Dornbarovskiy ?,, no,.
?Tyuratam
MISSILE/SPACE ?}S- 8
$ z Tobe
CENTER rnan g
SS-11
448
SS-18
308
SS-13
60
SS-19
360
SS-17
150
SS-25
70 ?
Test Center
?
ICBM Base
_ ?
Chapter II Nuclear Force Opt-rat ions
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Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces
Warhead Mix
1985
Estimates based on current trends.
Fix
ICBM
M id -1990s
Follow-on strikes would require the survival
of the command, control, and communications
systems as well as the weapons themselves.
The Soviets have invested heavily in providing
this survivability. 'rule 55-17, 55-18, and 55-19
ICBMs housed in the world's hardest op-
erational silos. The Soviets are building silos
for the new ABM interceptors around Moscow.
To increase its survivability, the SS-20 LRINF
missile is mobile. The mobile SS-25 ICBM is
being deployed; the development of the mo-
bile SS-X-2-1 continues; and a mobile surface-to-
air missile, the SA-X-12, with some capabilities
against certain types of ballistic. missiles, is
almost operational. The launch-control facil-
ities ho' offensive missiles are housed in very
Base support facilities for the road-mobile
SS-25, consisting of launcher garages
equipped with sliding roofs, already exist
at several bases, with more bases under
construction.
hard silos or on off-road vehicles. t't)mmuni-
cations are redundant and hardened against
both blast and electro-magnetic pulse damage.
Higher commands have multiple mobile alter-
nate command posts available for their use,
including land vehicles, trains, aircraft, and
ships. Bombers are assigned dispersal airfields.
Ballistic missile submarines could be hidden in
caves, submerged in deep fjords just off their
piers, or dispersed while being protected by
Soviet surface and submarine forces.
The belief that a nuclear war might be pro-
tracted has led to the USSR's emphasis on
nuclear weapon system survivability and sus-
tainability. For their ICBM, I.RINF, SRBM.
SLIM, and air defense forces, the Soviets have
stocked extra missiles, propellants, and war-
heads throughout the USSR. Sonic, ICBM silo
launchers could be reloaded, and provisions
have been made for the decontamination of
those launchers. Plans for the survival of' nec-
essary equipment and personnel have been de-
veloped and practiced. Resupply systems are
available to reload SSBNs in protected waters.
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The operational Soviet ICBM force consists
of' some 1,400 silo and mobile launchers, aside
from those at test sites. Some 818 of' the silo
launchers have been rebuilt since 1972; nearly
half of' these silos have been refurbished since
1979. All 818 silos have been hardened against
attack by currently operational US ICBMs.
These silos contain the 55-17 Mod (150 si-
los), the 55-18 Mod 4 (:308), and the 55-19 Mod
(360), which were the world's most modern de-
94
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Approved For Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP88G01116R000800910001-3
Although the USSR has recently completed
the deployment of its fourth-generation
ICBMs and has started deploying a fifth gen-
eration, even newer ICBMs are in develop-
ment. The Soviets' new SS-18 follow-on is
nearing the flight test stage. When deployed,
it is likely to carry at least ten warheads and
to have better accuracy and greater throw-
weight than its predecessor.
ployed ICBMs until t he more modern, mobile
SS-25 was deployed.
Each SS-18 and SS-19 ICI1M can carry more
and larger MIRVs than the Minutenmn III, the
most modern deployed US ICBM. The SS-18
'Mod carries at least ten MIRVs, and the
SS-19 Mod :1 carries six, whereas the Minute-
man Ill carries only three. 'File SS-18 Mod
was specifically designed to attack and destroy
ICBMs uid other hardened targets in the US.
The SS-18 Mod I force currently deployed has
the capability to destroy about 65 t percent
of US ICIII\1 silos. using two nuclear warheads
against each. Even after this type of attack.
over 1.000 SS-18 kvarheads would he available
for further attacks :.tgainst targets in the lJH.
The SS-19 Mod I ICBM. while not identical to
the SS-18 in accuracy. has similar capabilities.
It could be assigned similar missions and could
he used against targets in Eurasia. Although
the .`.-',S-17 is somewhat less capable than the
SS-19. it has similar target ing flexibility.
The remaining Soviet ICBM silos are fitted
primarily with the SS-11 Mod and SS-1:i
US and ICBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1970-1986
9,000 -
8,000 -
7,000 -
6,000 -
5,000 -
4,000 -
3,000 -
2,000 -
1,000 -
0
Soviet RVs
US RVs
Soviet ICBMs
US ICBMs
- 9,000
8,000
- 7,000
- 6,000
- 5,000
-4,000
-3,000
- 2.000
1,000
1970
1 974
1978 1982
0
1 986
Mod 2s. These ICBMs of older vintage are
housed in less-survivable silos and are consid-
erably less capable. Nevertheless. their de-
structive potential against softer area targets
in the United States and Eurasia is significant
in terms of many of the Soviet requirements
out lined earlier.
rrhe most recent development in the Soviets'
operational ICIIM force occurred with the de-
95
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plovment of their road-mobile SS-25 missile, in
violation of SALT I and SALT II. The SS-25 is
approximately the same size as the US Minute-
man ICBM. It carries a single reentry vehicle
and is being deployed in a road-mobile config-
uration similar to that of the 55-20. As such,
it will be highly survivable with an inherent
refire capability. Several bases for the SS-25
;ire operational. with a total of over 70 launch-
ers deployed. They consist of launcher garages
equipped with sliding roofs and several support
buildings to house the requisite mobile support
equipment.
Within the past year. the Soviets have begun
dismantling 55-11 silos in compensation for S5-
25 deployments. The Soviets are expected to
continue to dismantle SS-11 silos. By the 1111d-
1900s, all 55-11s will probably be deactivated.
Deployment programs for all of' the currently
operational silo-based Soviet ICBMs are es-
sentially complete. The command, control,
and communications system that supports the
Soviet ICBM force is modern and highly sur-
vivable, and the reliability of' the ICBMs them-
selves is regularly tested by live firings from
operational complexes.
Some silo-based ICBMs in the current force
that the Soviets decide not to replace with mod-
ified or new ICBMs will, in accord with past
Practice. be refurbished to increase their use-
ful lifetime and reliability. During this process
some system modifications also could be miide.
Fore(' Deuelopmcnts. Soviet retit'alTh and de-
velopment on ICBMs is a dynamic process in-
volving many programs. A modernized version
or a new replacement for the liquid-propelled
METERS
30
20
10
SS
-11
SS-13
ICBMs
SS-16 SS
SS
-17
-18
SS
-19 SS-X-24
SS-25
NUMBER DEPLOYED
WARHEADS
MAX RANGE (KM)
LAUNCH MODE
MOD
MOD
2
60
1
9,400
Hot
MOD
3
Undetermined 150
1 4 MIRVs
9,000 10,000
Cold Cold
MOD
4
308
10 -,MIRVs
11,000
Cold
MOD
3
360
6 MIFIVs
10,000
Hot
70
1
10,500
Cold
In
Development/
Testing
Up to 10 MIRVs
10,000
Cold
1
28
1
11,000
Hot
2
3
420
1
13,000
Hot
3 MRVs
10,600
Hot
METERS
30
20
10
TITAN II
US ICBMs
MINUTEMAN II MINUTEMAN III
PEACEKEEPER
0
NUMBER DEPLOYED
17'
450
550
In Development
WARHEADS
1
1
3
Up to 10
MAX RANGE (KM)
12,000
12,500
11,000
11,000 ,
LAUNCH MODE
Hot
Hot
Hot
Cold
' As of early 1 986
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Modernization of Soviet ICBMs
Warhead Mix
SS-11,
SS-13,
SS-25
1985
? Estimates based on current trends.
Mid-1990s?
55-18 is likely to be produced and deployed in
existing silos through the end of the century.
The Soviets appear to be planning on new
solid-propellant ICBMs to meet many fUture
mission requirements, including a counterforce
capability. The Soviets already have two new
solid-propellant ICBMs the small. mobile 55-
2r, described above. now being deployed, and
the SS-X-24. Tie medium-size SS-X-24 is well
along in its Hight test program. The S5-X-24 de-
ployment in a rail-mobile mode could begin as
early as late 198G. Silo-based deployment c?ould
occur later. Early preparations fOr the deploy-
ment of the SS-X-24 are already underway.
Activity at the Soviet ICI-3M test ranges indi-
cates that two additional new ICBMs are under
development. A new ICBM to replace the SS-
18 is nearing the Hight test stage of develop-
The rail-mobile SS-X-24 missile, carrying ten independently targetable warheads, is likely to be
deployed as early as late 1986.
97
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DELTA-I,
DELTA-II
Modernization of Soviet SLBMs
Warhead Mix
YANKEE-
Class
1985
? Estimates based on current trends.
DELTA-I, YANKEE-
DELTA-II Class
Mid-1990s?
ment. solid-propellant missile
that may be larger than the SS-X-2.1 will be-
gin flight-testing in the next few Years. lloth
of these missiles lie likely to have better accu-
racy and greater throwweight potential than
their predecessors. A third possible develop-
ment is that a NIINVed version of the SS-25
will be developed later this decade. Such a
development would further expand the already
large warhead inventory possessed by the So-
viets. lv the mid-I990s, the Soviet force
will have been almost entirely replaced with
new systems. a number of which may violate
s..\1:1, II constra,ints.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
The Soviets maintain the world's largest bal-
listic missile submarine force. As of early 1P6.
the force numbered 62 modern 55I1Ns carrying
911 SALT-accountable nuclear-tipped missiles.
Neither total includes the 11 older GOLF II
SSIIs with :19 missiles which are currently is-
signed theater missions. The GOLF III SSI1 and
HOTEL III SSIIN are only SALT-accountable
for their missile tubes. Twenty SSUNs are
fitted with :1:16 MIRVed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLI1Ms). These 20 units
have been built and deployed within the past
nine years. Two-thirds of' the ballistic missile
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines
USSR Us
YANKEE-Class
YANKEE I 130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6
YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-17
DELTA-Class
DELTA I 140m 12 Tubes SS N 8
DELTA III I55m 16 Tubes SS-N-18
DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS-N 8
-I
DELTA IV 160m 16 Tubes SS NX 23
TYPHOON-Class
1111111111
SI
TYPHOON 170m 20 Tubes SS N 20
Comparative
Cross-Sections
of SSBNs
TYPHOON-
Class
POSEIDON SSBN
11
POSEIDON 129.5m 16 Tubes
TRIDENT (OHIO-Class) SSBN
111111111,1111111J
TRIDENT 170.7m 24 Tubes
OHIO-
Class
1 3m
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186Y0S OR 170M
120YDS OR 110M
030(DOCK7C1U C17
OD(21(210(DMOC)
submarines are fitted with long-range SI.liAls,
enablitiv them to patrol in waters close to the
Soviet Union. Ilii s itfords protection from
NAT() antisubmarine warfare operations.
1\1oreover, the long-range missiles allow the So-
viets to fire from home ports and still strike
targets in the [inked States.
Vow. units of tlie modern Soviet 1)allistic
missile submarine. tlie TYPH()()N, have iI
ready been built. Each TY1)11()()N carries 20
SH-N-() AlMVed S1,11Ms. The
T171)11()()N is tlie world's largest submarine,
with a displacernent 1 third greater than that
of the US Ohio-Class. It can operate under the
Arctic Ocean icecap, ;idding further to the pro-
tection afforded by the 8,:100-kilometer range
of its SS-N-2() S1,111\1s. Three or four additional
TYI)11()()Ns lit probably now under construc-
tion, ind t lie early 1990s tile Soviets could
Football Field
Four 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class
ballistic missile submarines, each
carrying 20 long-range missiles with
MIRVed warheads, are now at sea.
have as many as eight of these pot ein wipoms
systems in their operational force.
In iccordance with the SALT I Interim
Agreement, the Soviets have. since 197. re-
moved 11 YANKF.F. I units from service as
US '
7 OHIO *
Modern SSBN Force Levels
s- US
30 LAFAYETTE
I3E N F R ANKLIN
Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
METERS
15
10
5
SS-N-6
SS
-N-8
SS
-N-17
SS
-N-18
MOD MOD
MOD
SS-N-20 SS-NX-23
A\
1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3
RV s 1 1 2 MRVs 1 1 1 3 MIRVs 1 7 MIRVs 6.9 MIRVs 10 MIRVs
RANGE (KM) 2,400 3,000 3,000 7,800 9,100 3,900 6,500 8,000 6,500 5,300 8,300
SS-N-5s not shown
USSR
22 DELTA
11 YANKEE
4 TY. PHOO N
*i
LIS
USSR
16 DELTA
9 YANKEE
POSEIDON TRIDENT
SLBM C-3 SLBM C-4
10 MIRVs
4,000
99
8 MIRVs
7,400
Chapter II Ntteluar 0111. )perat
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ballistic missile submarines. These units had
to be removed as newer submarines were pro-
duced in order for the overall Soviet 55 BN
force to stay within the 62 modern SSBN/950
SHIM limits estiblished in 1972. These YAN-
KEEs, however, have not been scrapped. Some
have been reconfigured as attack or long-range
cruise missile submarines.
Force Deivlopmcn Is. The Soviets have
launched three units two of which are cur-
rent ly accountable under SA I,T of a new class
of SS 13N. the DELTA IV, which will be fitted
with the SS-NX-2:1 SLIIM, now being flight-
tested. This large. liquid-propelled SLIIIVI will
have greater throwweight, carry more war-
heads, and be more accurate than the SS-N-18
which is currently carried on the DELTA III
SSBN. The SS-NX-2:1 is likely to be deployed on
DELTA Ills as a replacement for the SS-N-18.
The Soviets probably will beg-in flight-testing
a modified version of the SS-N-20. Additionally.
based on past Soviet practice, they probably
will develop a modified version of the SS-NX-
2:3 before the end of the decade. Both modified
:30
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versions of the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-2:1 are likely
to In, more ;tccurate than their predecessors
;Ind eventually 11MV provide the Soviets with
;1 hard-target capability for SLBMs.
To ensure communications reliability, the
Soviets tie expected to deploy an extremely
low frequency (ELF) communications system
that will enable them to contact SSI1Ns under
most operating. conditions.
Strategic Aviation
The five air armies subordinate to the
)S and SLBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1970-1986
6,000
5,000 -
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
US RVs
- 6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
Soviet SLBMs
- 1,000
US SLBMs
0
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
Supreme High Command (V( 'ik) which ('(tilt till
the Soviet strategic bombers tild strike air( ,,ft
are:
? Smolensk Air Army:
? Legnica Air Army:
? Venitza Air Army:
? Irkutsk Air Army: and
? Moscow Air Army.
The assets of the air armies include some
BEAR lild BISON bombers. 145 11ACK-
VIRE bombers. :197 medium-range BLINDER
itld BADGER bombers, and -150 shorter range
FENCER strike aircraft. The Soviets have al-
located these aircraft among five air ;irmies
to cover specific theaters of military opera-
tions (Europe, Asia, and the United Si ites) and
vet retain the flexibility to reallocate aircraft
as necessary during wartime. This flexibility
allows the Soviets to alter the use of their
strategic. ii i' assets is circumstances require.
Soviet Naval Aviation assets include some 125
BACKFIRE and 2:1() BLINDER and BAIWEH
bombers. Air army BEAR and hISON bombers
also could be made available for maritime mis-
sions. In addition, the air trinies and So-
viet Naval Aviation have a total of' some 5:10
Two units of the newest Soviet ballistic
missile submarine, the DELTA IV, are now on
sea trials.
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Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers
Weapon Mix
BISON
1985
'Estimates based on current trends.
Mid-1990s'
tanker, reconnaiance, :ind electronic warfare
:iircraft.
Soviets ;ire in the process of upgrad-
ing their long-range 1)0111 her force. The new
BEAR II bomber, which carries the AS-15 long-
range cruise missile, became operational in
1981. About ?10 of these :tircraft are now in
the inventory. 111'',AR H bombers have been
observed in training flights simulating attacks
against the North American continent.
The BEAR II is the first new production of
a strike version of the BEAR airframe in over
15 years. Additionally, the Soviets are recon-
figuring older BEAR aircraft, which carry the
subsonic AS-:1 :hit-to-surface missile (ASM), to
carry the newer supersonic AS-1. Several of
these reconfigurations, known as BEAR Gs, are
operat
Th(s Soviets have been producing the
BACKFIRE, their most modern operational
bomber, at a rate of about :10 per year. Sev-
eral modifications have been made to the air-
craft and further modifications are likely to
upgrade performance. The BACKFIRE can per-
fOrm a variety of missions including nuclear
strike, conventional att:ick, antiship strikes,
111(1 reconnaissance. Its low-altitude capabil-
ities make it a formidable platform for high-
speed military operations. Additionally, the
BACKFIRE can he equipped with a probe to
permit in-flight refueling to increase its range.
This would improve its capabilities against the
contiguous United States.
The Soviets have assigned some FENCER
strike aircraft to the air armies. The FENCER
is a supersonic, variable-geometry-wing, all-
weat her tighter-bomber that has been in oper-
ation since 197-1. Four variants have been pro-
duced, the most recent introduced in 198:1. The
FENCER is still in production, and the number
assigned to air armies is likely to increase over
the next few years.
Force Deuelopments. The BLACKJACK, a
new long-range bomber larger than the US
B-1B, is still undergoing flight-testing. The
BLACKJACK will be faster than the US B-IB
and may have about the same combat radius.
Invent? y
500
400 -
300 -
200 -
100 -
US and Intercontinental-
Capable Bombers'
Ossl;
USSR (excluding
aircraft assigned
to Naval Aviation)
0
1980 1982 1984
Inventory
- 500
- 400
- 300
- 200
- 100
0
1986
' US forces include B-52, FB-111, and B-1 B; Soviet forces include
BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE.
;19
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METERS
60
45
30
15
0
UNREFUELED
COMBAT
RADIUS (KM)
MAX SPEED
(MACH)
METERS
60
45
30
15
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Tu-95 BEAR BACKFIRE
Bomber Aircraft
BLACKJACK
11/I-TYPE
BISON
Tu-16
BADGER
Tu-22
BLINDER
8,300
4,000
7,300
5,600
3,100
2,900
08
2.0
2.0
.85
.85
1.4
Bomber Aircraft
B-1 B
B-52G/H
UNREFUELED
COMBAT
RADIUS (KM)
1,480
7,500
8,000
MAX SPEED
(MACH)
2.5
1.25
0.9
The new homher will be capable of carryinf..,,
cruise missiles. bombs, or a combination of'
hoth and could he operational as early as 1988.
It probably will he used first to replace the
much less capable BEAR A bomber and then
the BEAR (1 bomber.
For several Years the Soviet Union has been
developing the MIDAS, an aerial-re-
fueling tanker version of the 1i-76/CANDID air-
crak. When deployed in the near future, the
new tanker can be used to support tactical
and strategic operations and will expand sig-
nificantly the ability of the Soviets to conduct
longer range missions.
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
The AS-15, a small, air-launched, subsonic,
low-altitude cruise missile, became operational
in 198-4. It is similar in design to the US
Tomahawk and has a range of' about 3,000
kilometers. It is currently deployed with the
BEAR II and is expected to be carried on the
BLACKJACK when that aircraft becomes op-
erational. The BEAR H and eventually the
BLACKJACK, in combinat km with the
nuclear-armed 1S-15. will significantly increase
Soviet capabilities for strategic intercontinen-
tal air operations.
The Soviets have a sea-launched version and
a ground-launched version of the AS-15 un-
der development. The sea-launched variant,
the SS-NX-21, is small enough to be fired from
standard Soviet torpedo tubes. Possihle launch
platforms for the SS-NX-21 include tluve
VICTOR classes of' nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs): the reconfigured YANK EE-
Class SSN: and the new AKULA-, K E-, and
SIERRA-Class SSNs. The SS-NX-21 is expected
to become operational soon ;mild could he de-
ployed on submarines off US and allied coasts.
The ground-launched cruise missile variant,
the SSC-X-i, will probably become operational
this year. Its mission will he to support oper-
ations in the Eurasian theater since the Sovi-
ets are unlikely to deploy it outside the USSR
and its range is too short for intercontinental
strikes. The SSC-X-1 is being developed as a
mobile system and probably will follow opera-
tional procedures similar to the SS-20 I,RINF
system.
In addition to these variants of the
AS-15, a larger cruise missile is under devel-
opment. This missile, designated the SS-NX-2.1.
will he flight-tested from a specially converted
YANKEE-Class nuclear-powered cruise missile
;ittack submarine (SS( N). It could beet out op-
erational by 1987. A ground-based version of
this missile may be developed.
All of' these cruise missiles probably will he
equipped with nuclear warheads when first de-
ployed and will he capable of attacking hard-
ened targets. These systems could he accurate
enough to permit the use of' conventional war-
33
(' 11 al) ter II Nuclear For ce )pe r at i ()
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The BEAR H bomber is a launch platform for
the 3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-armed
AS-15 cruise missile.
heads, depending on munitions developments
and the types of guidance systems incorporated
in their designs. With such warheads and guid-
ance, cruise missiles would pose a significant
non-nuclear threat to US and Eurasian air-
fields and nuclear weapons.
US Strategic Nuclear Forces
In measuring and evaluating the continu-
ing improvements being made by the USSR's
strategic forces, it is useful to bear in mind the
status of US forces, the modernization of which
is discussed in Chapter VIII. By mid-1986, US
strategic deterrent forces will include:
? 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs;
? 17 Titan ICBMs (the Titan force will be
retired by the end of 1987);
? 240 B-52G/H model bombers plus about
2:3 aircraft undergoing maintenance and
modification;
? 56 FB-111 bombers plus some 5 aircraft
undergoing maintenance and modifica-
tion;
? 17 B-IB bombers;
? 480 Poseidon (C-3 and C-4) fleet ballistic
missile launchers; and
? 168 Trident fleet ballistic missile
launchers.
The historic and continuing objective of US
nuclear forces is deterrence of nuclear and ma-
METERS
15
10
5
SS-NX-21*
WARHEADS 1
RANGE (KM) 3,000
'In development
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
AS-15 SSC X-4"
3,000
GLCM*
SS -NX-24
3,000
1.7.5
TOMAHAWK
ALCM GLCM SLCM
1
2,500 2,500 2,500
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jor conventional aggression against the United
St at es and its allies. This policy has preserved
peace for a quarter-century and, in sharp con-
trast to the Soviet priority accorded nuclear
warfighting, is based on the conviction, widely
held in the US, that there could be no win-
ners in a nuclear conflict. The United States
does not now have a first-strike policy, nor do
we plan to acquire a first-strike capability in
the future. Rather. US deterrence policy seeks
to maintain the situation in which any poten-
tial aggressor sees little to gain and much to
lose by initiating hostilities against the United
Stites or its allies. In turn, the maintenance
of peace through deterrence provides the vital
opportunity to pursue the US goal of eliminat-
ing nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all
states.
Realizing these deterrence objectives re-
quires the development. deployment, and main-
tenance of' strategic forces whose size and
characteristics clearly indicate to an opponent
that his politico-military objectives cannot be
achieved either through the employment of' nu-
clear weapons or through political coercion
based on nuclear advantages.
Soviet Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
Longer Range
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
The Soviets began a vigorous effort to mod-
ernize and expand their intermediate-range nu-
clear force in 1977 with the deployment of' the
first SS-20 LRINF missiles. Each SS-20 is equip-
ped with three MIRVs, more than doubling the
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The Soviets have converted a YANKEE-Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine into a
cruise missile attack submarine as the test platform for the large, long-range, nuclear-tipped
SS-NX-24 cruise missile. The SS-NX-24 aboard submarines will add yet another dimension to the
Soviet strategic threat to the United States in the years ahead.
number of I R I NE warheads that existed in 1977
when the SS-20 was first deployed. The SS-20s
also have significantly greater range and accu-
racy and a much shorter reaction time than the
missiles they are replacing.
The Soviets have deployed 441 SS-20 launch-
ers It bases west of the Urals and in the So-
viet Far East. During 1984, the Soviets began
construction of more new bases for the SS-20
than in any other year. Some of this construc-
tion was to facilitate the relocation of SS-20
units that had been displaced from their for-
mer bases. (These bases are being converted to
accommodate the SS-25 mobile I( BM.) In spite
of some conversions, real growth was observed
in the SS-20 force in 1985.
The mobility of the 55-20 svstem, unlike the
55-4, allows it to operate under both on- and
:16
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Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles
METERS
24
SS
18
12
6
0
REENTRY VEHICLES
-4
SS
1 3 MIRVs
-20
PERSHING
.47'
II
GLCM
1
RANGE (KM) 2,000 5,000
1,800 2,500
DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS' 112 441 108 32
WARHEADS' 112 1,323 108 128
' As of 31 December 1985
oil-road conditions. Consequently, the surviv-
ability of the 55-20 is greatly enhanced because
of the difficulty in detecting and targeting this
system when it is field deployed. Further, the
SS-20 launcher can be reloaded and refired, and
the Soviets stockpile refire missiles.
In addition to the SS-20s, the Soviets still
maintain approximately 112 55-4 LRINF mis-
siles, all of which are located in the western
USSR opposite European NATO.
Future Force Dec,clopment. The Soviets are
Hight-testing an improved version of' the SS-20
which is expected to be more accurate than its
predecessor.
The mobile SS-20, in addition to being a more
accurate and survivable LRINF missile sys-
tem, does not require fixed sites to support
launches.
Shorter Range Missiles
Current ...;).N'SiC171:.> Ild FOrCC Lel'el.S, In 1985,
a brigade in the Belorussian Military District
became the first operational unit to receive
the 55-23 shorter range INF missile. The 55-
23. with its 500-kilometer range, miresents
marked improvement in range and accuracy
over the 300-kilometer SS-1 ,SCUD h surface-t
surface missile it is now beginning to replace.
If the SS-23 follows the same sequence of de-
ployment seen with the SCUD B, the Western
Military Districts will receive it first, followed
by deployment to the Group of Soviet Forces.
Germany.
Each front commander also may have a hri-
gade of 12 to 18 SCALEBOARD missiles avail-
able that are more accurate than the older
missiles they replaced. Over 70 SCALEBOA RD
launchers are opposite European NATO and
40 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border. There
is a battalion opposite southwest Asia/eastern
Turkey, and one brigade is maintained in
strategic reserve. Because of their greatly
increased accuracy. the new short-range mis-
siles can also he employed effectively with non-
nuclear warheads.
In 1984, the Soviets forward-deployed the
SCALEBOARD short-range ballistic missile to
Eastern Europe. These front-level weapins.
which normally accompany Soviet combined
arms formations, are now in position to strike
deep into Western Europe.
Sea-Based Forces
The Soviets also maintain and operate 13
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GOLF II-Class ballistic missile submarines
equipped with :355-N-5 SI.BMs each. Six GOLF
Ils are based in the Baltic, where they pose a
threat to most of Europe, while the remaining
seven patrol the Sea of Japan, where they can
he employed against targets in the Far East.
Short-Range Nuclear Forces
Current Systems and Force Levels. Soviet
armies and fronts have missile brigades equip-
ped with 12 to 18 55-1C SCUD SRBMs. Over
500 SCUD launchers are located opposite Eu-
ropean NATO, and over 100 are opposite the
Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East. Additi-
onally, about 75 are opposite southwest Asia
and eastern Turkey, with one brigade held
in strategic reserve.
The Soviet division commander has a variety
of nuclear assets available to him. The most
predominant such system at division level is
the unguided free rocket over ground (FROG),
which is deployed in a battalion of four launch-
ers. The Soviets are replacing FROGs with the
more accurate, longer range SS-21s in some
divisions opposite NATO. There are now 500
FROG and SS-21 launchers opposite NATO.
Soviet Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Deployments*
LEGEND
Reentry
Vehicles
SS-4
SS-5
SS-20
? Does not count retires
800 -
600 -
400 -
-
200 -
-
Deployment and
Target Coverage
1986
- 1,600
- 1,400
- 1,200
- 1,000
- 800
- 600
- 400
- 200
1982
1983 1984
1985 1986
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the forward edge of' the battle area and at
greater depths within the military theater of'
operations
US Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
Longer Range
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
The initial deployment of' Pershing its and
ground-launched cruise missiles (GL('Ms) be-
gan in Europe in late 1983. According to the
agreed schedule, the number of' US LRINF
missiles deployed in Europe on 31 December
1985 totaled 236 missiles on 140 launchers.
These consist of' 108 Pershing- It missiles on
108 launchers and 128 GI,CNIs on 32 launchers.
The deployment of' US Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles responds to the Soviet
N F missile threat to NATO.
Shorter Range
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Kilometers
6.000 -
5,000 -
4,000 -
3,000
2,000 -
1,000 -
Land
-Based
Ranges
Missiles/Aircraft
Kilometers
6,000
- 5,000
- 4,000
- 3,000
- 2,000
- 1,000
LRINF
Up to
5,500 km
SRINF
to
km
SNF
Up
1.800
Under
500 km
Another 215 FROG launchers are opposite the
Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; about
100 are opposite southwest Asia and eastern
Turkey; and about 75 are in strategic reserve.
Front commanders also have available
nuclear-capable artillery tubes. Three new self-
propelled, nuclear-capable artillery pieces are
being added to the inventory: a 152-mm gun, a
203-mm self-propelled gun, and a 240-mm self-
propelled mortar. When fully deployed, the
total number of these new nuclear-capable ar-
tillery tubes plus older I52-mm howitzers that
are also capable of' firing nuclear rounds will
exceed 10,000.
Force Deuelopments. As in all other nu-
clear attack forces, the Soviets probably will
continue to seek ways to improve the capa-
bilities of' their tactical missiles and nuclear
artillery. These improvements will be accom-
plished through incremental modernization of
existing systems as well as through the intro-
duction of entirely new systems.
The Soviets probably will continue to seek
improvements for their short-range ballistic
missile force. Advancements in warhead capa-
bilities, accuracy, and reliability are expected.
Combined arms commanders would then have
enhanced non-nuclear targeting options and
more flexible and survivable SRHYls. These
systems will be capable of' delivering nuclear,
chemical, or conventional warheads closer to
With the removal of' US Pershing Is and
the Soviet SS-23s replacing SCUDs in Europe,
the Soviet Union will maintain its substantial
numerical superiority in shorter range non-
strategic nuclear missiles while improving the
qualitative characteristics of its forces. The
USSR also has a significant numerical advan-
tage in SRINF aircraft and is reducing the
qualitative advantage NATO has enjoyed. This
is occurring despite NATO's SRINF aircraft
modernization program, in which older aircraft
are being replaced by the F-16 and Tc an ado.
Short-Range Nuclear Forces
Short-range nuclear f'orces (SNF) consist of'
tube artillery and missiles of' much shorter
range than INF. The United States' SNF is
made up of Lance tactical missiles and nuclear
artillery. Although SNF artillery traditionally
has been an area of NATO advantage, the bal-
ance has shifted dramatically in favor of the
Soviets in recent years. The Soviets also have
achieved parity in overall numbers of SNF
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Chapter III
Strategic Defense
and Space
Operations
Over the last 25 years. the Soviets have in-
creased their active and passive defenses in a
clear and determined it to blunt the ef-
fect of any attack on the Soviet Union. The
USSR has major passive defense programs, in-
cluding civil defense and structural hardening,
designed to protect important assets from at
It also has extensive active defense sys-
tems which utilize weapons systems to protect
national territory, military forces, or key as-
sets. Soviet developments in the area of active
defenses fall into three major categories: air de-
fense; ballistic missile defense based on current
technologies; and research and development on
advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.
Important recent activities in the Soviet
Strategic Defense Program (SSDP) include:
? upgrading and expanding tile world's only
operational ABM system around Moscow;
? construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballis-
tic missile detection and tracking radar,
which violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
? extensive research into 'tdvanced tech-
nologies for defense against ballistic
missiles, including laser weapons, par-
ticle beam weapons, and kinetic energy
weapons;
? maintaining the world's only operational
antisatellite (ASAT) system;
The Soviet Strategic Defense Program is
involved in extensive research on advanced
technologies for defense against ballistic mis-
siles, including work on particle beam
weapons, kinetic energy weapons, and laser
weapons. The USSR already has ground-
based lasers, conceptually illustrated here,
capable of interfering with some US satellites
and could have prototypes for ground-based
lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by
the late 1980s.
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? modernizing their strategic air defense
forces: and
? improving passive defenses by maintain-
ing- deep bunkers and blast shelters for
key personnel and enhancing the surviv-
ability of some offensive systems through
mobility and hardening.
Evidence of the importance the Soviets at-
tach to defensive damage limitation can be
traced to the beginning of the nuclear age.
The National Air Def'ense Forces became an in-
dependent service in the late 1950s and since
1959 have generally ranked third in prece-
dence within the Soviet Armed Forces, fol-
lowing the Strategic Rocket Forces and the
Ground Forces.
By the mid-1900s, two new mission areas
ASAI operations and ABM defense were
added to the National Air Defense mission.
As a result, Soviet strategic defense against
ballistic missiles includes the world's only op-
erational ABM system and a large and ex-
panding research and development program. In
addition, the Soviets have the world's only op-
erational antisatellite system, which has the
capability to destroy critical US and other
satellites in low-earth orbit.
The Soviet emphasis on the necessity of' re-
search on ballistic missile defense was demon-
strated in 1972 by then-Minister of Defense
Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM
Treaty. Speaking to the Soviet Presidium, he
said that the Treaty "places no limitations
whatsoever On the conducting of research and
experimental work directed towards solving
the problem of defending the country from nu-
clear missile st rikes.-
The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is
firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine md
strategy. In the event of nuclear war, Soviet
offensive forces are to:
? destroy or disrupt enemy nuclear-
associated command, control, and commu-
nications: and
? destroy or neutralize as many of' the en-
emy's nuclear weapons as possible on
the ground or at sea before they are
launched.
Soviet defensive forces, lending greater cred-
ibility to offensive forces, are to:
? intercept and destroy surviving weapons
aircraft and missiles before they reach
t heir targets; and
? protect the Party, the state, military
forces, industrial infrastructure, and the
essential working population with ac-
tive and passive measures against those
weapons that survive attacks hy Soviet
offensive forces.
In pursuit of' these goals, the USSR places
considerable stress on the need for effective
strategic defenses as well as offensive forces. In
the Soviet view, the USSR could best achieve
its aims in a nuclear war if' it attacks first, de-
stroying much of the US and allied capability
for retaliation. Defensive measures, both ic-
tive and passive, would in turn prevent those
enemy forces that survived a Soviet first strike
from destroying targets in the USSR.
In Military Strategy originally published in
1962 Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy defined the
aim of Soviet strategic defenses in this way:
''They have the task of creating an invincible
system for the defense of' the entire country....
While, in the last war, it was sufficient to de-
stroy 15-20 percent of' the attacking air Opera-
tion, now it is necessary to assure, essentially,
100 percent destruction of' all attacking air-
planes and missiles.- Soviet defensive force de-
velopments over the past 25 years demonstrate
that the strategy articulated by Sokolovskiy
still applies.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The world's only operational ABM system is
maintained tround Moscow. In 1978, the Sovi-
ABM Interceptor Coverage
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Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management Radars
HEN HOUSE radars
DOG HOUSE CAT HOUSE radars
New large phased-array radars
Krasnoyarsk radar
els began to upgrade and expand that system
to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The original single-layer Moscow ABM system
included bI reloadahle above-ground launch-
ers at 4 complexes and DOG HOUSE and CAT
HOUSE battle management radars south of
Nloscow. Each complex consisted of TRY ADD
tracking and guidance radars and GALOSH
exoatmospheric interceptors (nuclear-armed,
ground-based missiles designed to intercept
warheads in space shortly before they reenter
the Earth's at
When completed, the modernized Moscow
ABM system will he a two-layer defense com-
posed of silo-based, long-range, modified GA-
LOS11 interceptors; silo-based GAZELLE
high-acceleration endoatmospheric interceptors
designed to engage targets within the atmo-
sphere; associated engagement, guiclance and
battle management radar systems; and a new
large radar at Pushkino designed to control
ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers
may he reloadable. The new system will have
the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the ABM
Treaty and could be fully operational by 1987.
The Soviet system for detection and tracking
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of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch-
detection satellite network, over-the-horizon
radars, and a series of large phased-array
radars.
The current launch-detection satellite net-
work can provide about 30 minutes warning
after any US ICBM launch and can determine
the general on of the missile. Two over-the-
horizon radars directed at the US ICBM fields
also could give the same 30 minutes warning.
The next operational layer of ballistic mis-
sile detection consists of' l large HEN HOUSE
ballistic missile early warning radars at 6 lo-
cations on the periphery of the USSR. These
radars can distinguish the size of an attack,
confirm the warning from the satellite and
over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide
target-tracking data in support of antiballistic
missile forces. The capability of these radars
has been improved since the signing of' the
ABM Treaty.
The Soviets are now constructing a network
The 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, top left, at 6 locations on the
periphery of the USSR, provide warning and target-tracking data in support of the Soviet ABM
system. The DOG HOUSE radar, top right, provides battle management for the antiballistic mis-
sile interceptors around Moscow. The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the sit-
ing, orientation, and capability of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking
radar at Krasnoyarsk, bottom left. The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballis-
tic missile detection and tracking radar at Pechora are shown at bottom right. The design of the
Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora radar. Unlike the Pechora radar,
however, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not meet the ABM Treaty requirement that early warning
radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be oriented outward.
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of six new large phased-array radars that can
track more ballistic missiles with greater accu-
racy than the existing H EN HOUSE network.
Five of these radars duplicate or supplement
the coverage of the HEN HOUSE network,
but with greatly enhanced capability. The
sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in
Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early
warning radar coverage against ballistic mis-
sile at Together, the six new large phased-
array radars form an arc of coverage from
the Kola Peninsula in the northwest Soviet
Union, around Siberia. to the Caucasus in the
sout hwest.
The United States is now constructing new
ballistic missile early warning radars, known
as PAVE PAWS, that are located on the pe-
riphery of our territory and oriented outward.
These radars are much less capable than Soviet
large phased-array radars. Both the US and
the USSR, in signing the ABM Treaty, recog-
nized the need for ballistic. missile early warn-
ing radars. At the same time, they recognized
that ballistic missile early warning radars can
detect and track warheads at great distances
incl therefore have a significant antiballistic
missile potential. Such an ABM capability
would play :in important role in a nationwide
ABM defense, which the treaty was designed
to prevent. As a result, the US and the So-
viet Union agreed that future ballistic missile
early warning radars must be located on a na-
ticin's periphery and be oriented outward. In
that way, the desirable and legitimate goal of'
early warning could be advanced while mini-
mizing the danger that an effective nationwide
battle management network could result.
The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for bal-
listic missile detection and tracking, including
ballistic missile early warning. It violates the
1.)72 ABM Treaty as it is not located within
a 150-kilometer radius of the national capi-
tal (Moscow) as required of ABM radars, nor
is it located on the periphery of the Soviet.
Union and pointed outward as required for
early warning radars. It is 3,700 kilometers
from Moscow and is situated some 750 kilome-
ters from the nearest border Mongolia. More-
over, it is oriented not toward that border, but.
across approximately 4,099 kilometers of Soviet
territ.w.y to the northeast..
The Soviet Union has claimed that the Kras-
noyarsk radar is designed for space tracking,
rather than ballistic missile early warning, and
therefore does not violate the ABM Treaty.
Its design, however, is not suited for a space-
tracking role, and the radar would, in any
event, contribute little to the existing Soviet
space-tracking network. Indeed, the design of
the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical
to that of other radars that are known and
acknowledged by the Soviets to be for ballis-
tic missile detection and tracking, including
ballistic missile early warning.
The growing Soviet network of' large phased-
array, ballistic missile detection and tracking
radars, of which the Krasnoyarsk radar is a
part, is of particular concern when linked with
other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take
years to construct and their existence might
allow the Soviet Union to move rather quickly
to construct a nationwide ABM defense if it.
chooses to do so.
The Soviets also are developing components
of a new ABM system that would allow them to
construct individual ABM sites in a matter of'
months rather than the years that are required
for more traditional ABM systems. Soviet ac-
tivities in this regard potentially violate the
ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development
of' a mobile land-based ABM system or compo-
nents. We estimate that by using these com-
ponents the Soviets could by the early 1990s
quickly deploy an ABM system to strengthen
the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets
in the western USSR and east of' the Urals.
In addition, the Soviets have probably vio-
lated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air
missile (SAM) components in an ABM mode by
conducting tests involving the use of SAM air
defense radars in ABM-related testing activi-
ties. Moreover, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 SAM
systems may have the potential to intercept
some types of strategic ballistic missiles.
Taken together, all of' the Soviet Union's
ABM and ABM-related activities are more sig-
nificant and more ominous than any one
considered individually. Cumulatively, they
suggest. that the USSR may be preparing to de-
ploy rapidly an ABM defense of' its national ter-
ritory, contrary to the provisions of' the ABM
Treaty.
Advanced ABM Technologies
In the late 1960s, in line with its longstand-
ing emphasis On strategic defense, the Soviet
Union initiated i substantial research program
into advanced technologies, some of' which are
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applicable for defense against ballistic missiles.
That program covers many of the same tech-
nologies involved in the US Strategic Defense
Initiative but represents a far greater invest-
ment of plant space, capital, and manpower.
Laser Weapons
The USSR's laser program is much larger
than US efforts and involves over 10,000
scientists and engineers and more than a half-
dozen major research and development facili-
ties and test ranges. Much of this research
takes place at the Sary Shag-an Missile Test
Center where the Soviets also conduct tradi-
tional ABM research. Facilities there are es-
timated to have several lasers for air defense,
lasers capable of' damaging some components
of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be
used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile
defense applications. A laser weapons program
of' the magnitude of' the Soviet Union's effort
would cost roughly $1 billion per year in the
United States.
The Soviets are conducting research on
three types of gas lasers considered promis-
ing for weapons applications the gas-dynamic
laser, the electric discharge laser, and the
chemical laser. Soviet achievements in this
area, in terms of' output power, have been
impressive. The Soviets also are aware of' the
military potential of' visible and very short
wave-length lasers. They are investigating
excimer, free-electron, and x-ray lasers and
have been developing argon-ion lasers for over
a decade.
The Soviets appear generally capable of sup-
plying the prime power, energy storage, and
auxiliary components needed for most laser
and other directed-energy weapons. They have
developed a rocket-driven magnetohydro-
dynamic generator which produces over 15
megawatts of electrical power a device that
has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets
may also have the capability to develop the
optical systems necessary for laser weapons to
track and attack their targets. They produced
a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an astrophys-
ical telescope in 1978 and claimed that this was
Launch Detection
Moscow
ABM
Long-Range
Radars
Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs
Satellites
Radars
Original
System
New System
HEN HOUSE
Rapidly Deployable ABM
Krasnoyarsk Type
Ground-Based Laser ABM Weapon
ASAT
Space Weapons
R&D phase
Direct Ascent
Capability"
Co-Orbital
Ground-Based Laser
I
Deployment phase
I
Laser
Particle Beam
ABM
Treaty
President's
SDI
Speech
1955 1965 1975
Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space-based weapons, were in place prior
to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, US ABM/Space Defense
research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested.
'Potential capability of the Moscow ABM system.
1985
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Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection
and Tracking Systems
Launch-detection satellites
Over-the-horizon radars
EW radars
L_1
a prototype for a 25-meter mirror. A large mir-
ror is considered necessary for a space-based
laser weapon.
Unlike the US, the USSR has now progressed
in some cases beyond technology research. It
already has ground-based lasers that have a
limited capability to attack US satellites and
could have prototype space-based antisatellite
laser weapons by the end of the decade. The
Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based
lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by
the late 1980s and could begin testing compo-
nents for a large-scale deployment system in
the early 1990s.
The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper-
ational system will require more development
time. An operational ground-based laser for
defense against ballistic missiles probably could
not be deployed until the late 1990s or after the
year 2000. If technolog-y developments prove
successful, the Soviets may deploy operational
space-based antisatellite lasers in the mid-to-
late 1990s and might be able to deploy space-
based laser systems for defense against ballistic
missiles after the year 2000. The Soviets' ef-
forts to develop high-energy air defense laser
weapons are likely to lead to ground-based de-
ployments in the early 1990s and naval deploy-
ments in the mid-1990s.
Particle Beam Weapons
Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
involved in research to explore the feasibility
of space-based weapons that would use parti-
cle beams. We estimate that they may be able
to test a prototype particle beam weapon in-
tended to disrupt the electronics of satellites
in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy
satellites could follow later. A weapon capa-
ble of physically destroying missile boosters or
warheads probably would require several addi-
tional years of research and development.
Soviet efforts in particle beams. and par-
ticularly ion sources and radio frequency
quadrapole accelerators for part icle beams, are
very impressive. In fact, much of the US under-
standing of how particle beams could be made
into practical defensive weapons is based on
Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
Radio Frequency Weapons
The USSR has conducted research in the use
of strong radio frequency signals that have the
potential to interfere with or destroy crith-al
electronic components of ballistic missile war-
heads or satellites. The Soviets could test a
ground-based radio frequency weapon capable
of damaging satellites in the 1990s.
Kinetic Energy Weapons
The Soviets also have a variety of research
programs underway in the area of kinetic en-
ergy weapons, using the high-speed collision of
a small mass with the target as the kill mech-
anism. In the 1960s. the USSR developed an
experimental "gun- that could shoot streams
of particles of a heavy metiil such as tungsten
or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 2.5 kilome-
ters per second in air and over 60 kilometers
per second in a vacuum.
Long-range, space-based kinetic energy sys-
tems for defense against ballistic missiles
probably could not be developed until the in
or even later. The USSR could, however,
deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-
based system useful for satellite space
station defense or for close-in attack by it
maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in
guidance and control systems probably are ad-
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The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor designed to destroy space targets with a multi-
pellet blast is launched from the Tyuratam Space Complex, where two launch pads and storage
for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available.
equate for effective kinetic. energy weapons for
use igainst some objects in space.
Computer and Sensor Technology
Advanced technology weapons programs
including potential advanced defenses against
ballistic. missiles and ASATs are dependent
on remote sensor and computer technologies,
areas in which the West currently leads the So-
viet Union. 'Me Soviets, therefore, are devot-
ing considerable resources to acquiring
Western know-how and improving their ahili-
ties and expertise in these technologies. An
important part of that effort involves the in-
creasing exploitation of' open and clandestine
access to Western technology. Vol. example,
the Soviets have long been engaged in a well
effort to purchase illegally US high-
technology computers, test and calibration
equipment, and sensors through third parties.
Antisatellite Operations
The USSR has had for more than a dozen
years the world's only operational ant isatellite
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system, which is launched into the sube orbit
as its target satellite and, when it gets close
enough, destroys the satellite by exploding a
conventional warhead. Given the complexity
of launch, target tracking, and radar-guided
METERS
60
40
20
SL-3
intercept, the Soviet ASAT system is far from
primitive. Soviet ASAT tests have been largely
successful, indicating an operational system
fully capable of' performing its mission. In
addition, the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM
Soviet Space Launch Vehicles
SL-4
LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)'
290,000
310,000
LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)'
410,000
420,000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)'
6,300
7,500
METERS
80
SL-X-16
MEDIUM-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE2
60
SL-6
SL-8
SL-11
120,000
180,000
310,000
420,000
160,000
280,000
2,100
1,700
4,000
REUSABLE
SPACE PLANE
IN DEVELOPMENT
40
20
SL-W
SHUTTLE2
SL-12 SL-13
680,000
900,000
670,000
900,000
19,500
SL-14
190,000
280,000
5,500
SL-W
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE2
LIFT-OFF WEIGHT (KG)'
400,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
LIFT-OFF THRUST (KG)'
600,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KM (KG)'
15,000+
30,000
100,000
' Approximate.
2 In final stages of development.
49
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interceptor deployed around 'Moscow has an
inherent ASAT capability, and Soviet ground-
based lasers may he ible to damage some com-
ponents of satellites. Furthermore. as noted
previously, the Soviets are engaged in research
and. in some cases, development of we:11)(01s
which ultimately may serve as ballistic missile
defense systems but probably will first provide
ASAT capabilities.
Operations in Space
The Soviets operate several space systems
that support both military and civil users. These
include manned spacecraft, reconnaissance and
surveillance vehicles, new space boosters. and
a variety of other support systems. The Soviets
have made progress in their space plane and
space shuttle programs, with the first flight of
a Soviet shuttle expected in late 1080 or 1987.
The primary focus of Soviet space operations
is military, as evidenced by the fact that at
least 70 percent of Soviet space launches are
purely military in nature and support both of-
fensive and defensive operations. The tJSSR
attempts to mask the true nature of most of its
space programs by declaring that launches are
"scientific,- usually without providing details
on what kind of "scientific- mission is being
conducted. The results of these "scientific-
missions are rarely published or even disclosed.
Military Support from Space
The Soviets are increasing their efforts to
develop and deploy space systems to SlIpport
military operations. They now operate sev-
eral space-based reconnaissance and sur-
veillance systems, two of' which have no US
counterpart. The latter are the nuclear-
powered Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satel-
lite (RORSAT) and the Electronic Intelligence
As part of its efforts to militarize space, the
USSR has pressed forward with an active re-
search and development program, centered
at Tyuratam, to deploy increasingly capable
space-based reconnaissance and surveillance
satellites as well as space-based military com-
munications systems. Soviet achievements in
manned space operations are typified by their
continued use of the SALYUT-7 space sta-
tion and development of their soon-to-be-
tested space shuttle, seen here mated to the
heavy-lift launch vehicle.
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Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT),
hoth of which are used to locate and target
naval forces. Two RORSATs were launched
in August 1085 in time to support a Soviet
naval exercise in September. This was not
the first time RORSAT launchings have taken
place prior to military exercises.
The Soviet satellite reconnaissance program
has matured and has incorporated significant
enhancements. The Soviets have improved
I heir satellite imagery reconnaissance capabil-
ity and are gradually improving their space-
based electronic intelligence assets as well.
They have demonstrated great versatility and
flexibility in launching and maintaining sev-
eral surveillance systems in orbit and are capa-
ble of redirecting them for worldwide missions
ls situations dictate.
The Soviets continue to operate an extensive
network of' satellites for missile launch detec-
tion and attack warning missions. For a num-
ber of years, the USSR has had the capability
to monitor US ICBM fields.
The Soviets have also pressed ahead with the
development and deployment of a global nav-
igation satellite system known as GLONASS.
When fully developed, this system will provide
three-dimensional (latitude, longitude, and al-
titude) positioning data.
New Launch Systems
Souiet Military Power 1985 reported two new
space launch vehicles under development, it
heavy-lift system and a medium-lift system.
Launch pad compatibility testing has contin-
ued on the heavy-lift vehicle, a Saturn V-C lass
booster, and the Soviets have flight-tested the
Titan III-Class medium-lift vehicle.
The heavy-lift booster system apparently will
be used to launch the Soviet shuttle orbiter,
a craft similar to the US space shuttle or-
biter. This launch system will also be able
to carry very heavy payloads of about 100,000
kilograms, enabling the Soviets to assemble
very large modular space stations in orbit. This
type of system could also be instrumental in
the launch of other heavy payloads, such as
directed-energy ASAT and ballistic missile de-
Rinse weapons.
The medium-lift booster may be used to
I aunch the Soviet space plane, which is a differ-
ent program from the space shuttle. This small,
manned ciraf't could be used Rw real-time recon-
naissance missions, satellite repair and main-
tenance, crew transport, space station defense,
and enemy satellite inspection or destruction.
When these new launch systems become op-
erational, the Soviets will have ten different.
types of' expendable launch vehicles and two
reusable manned space vehicles. These sys-
tems will give the Soviets a versatile and re-
dundant capability to conduct and augment.
military operations in space. In addition, the
Soviets would have a distinct advantage dur-
ing times of crises or hostilities because of' the
launch surge capability provided by their large
number of' launch vehicles.
Manned Operations
In early 1985, the Soviets experienced trou-
ble with their SALYUT-7 space station that
resulted in failure of its electrical system. They
announced in March it had fulfilled its mission
and was being "mothballed.- In June, how-
ever, two cosmonauts were launched from Tyu-
ratam aboard SOYUZ T-13. Using manual ren-
dezvous procedures, the cosmonauts succeeded
in docking with the inactive station. Efforts
to revive the space station commenced, and
within two weeks the crew was operating the
station normally and was probably conducting
military-related experiments. This repair mis-
sion provided valuable experience in space sta-
tion maintenance that will contribute greatly
to Soviet efforts to achieve a significant, per-
110-
100 -
90-
70
60
50
40
30 -
20
10-
0
1960
S and Space Launches
USSR
\ US
A
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
-10
1965 1970
1975 1980 1985
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manent manned presence in near-Earth orbit.
Last September, the Soviets conducted the
first space station crew rotation in the history
of manned space flight when SOYUZ T-14 deliv-
ered three additional cosmonauts to SALYUT-
7. One T-13 cosmonaut and one T-14 cosmonaut
subsequently deorbited on SOYUZ T-13. Crew
rotation will become commonplace when the
Soviets deploy their first large modular space
station, which is likely to he launched in the
late 1980s. 'Elle Soviets took a major step to-
ward this capability with the launch of an ad-
vanced SALYUT station with six docking ports
in earl v 1986.
Further progress toward a deployment of a
new station was demonstrated by COSMOS-
Iti86, which docked with SALYUT-7 in early
October 1985. Such modules have a high-
capacity cargo transport capability and could
be outfitted as reconnaissance platforms, nu-
clear power "substations,- or laboratories for
various types of research and experimentation.
These modules will serve as interchange-
able (.omponents of future large modular space
stations, and each is capable of autonomous
operation. Once deployed, this space station
will provide the Soviets with a manned space-
based military capability for missions such as
II connaissance, command and control, ASAT,
and ballistic missile defense support operations
as well as satellite maintenance and repair.
Such space stations will probably be serviced
and supported by the Soviet shuttle and
space plane.
The Soviets have realized that men in space
can significantly contribute to military opera-
tions. Soviet cosmonauts aboard a space sta-
tion in low-earth orbit can observe large areas
of the Earth's surface and transmit real-time
infOrmation to military forces below. From the
altitude at which SALYUT operates, much of'
the Earth's surface can be seen with great clar-
ity. If supported with optics, a cosmonaut could
make out details such as airfields, port facil-
ities, major transportation routes, and ships
at sea.
Passive Defenses
In the more traditional areas of strategic de-
fense, Soviet military doctrine calls for passive
and active defenses to act in conjunction to
ensure wartime survival. Physical hardening
of in assets to make them more resistant
to attack is an important passive defense tech-
nique. The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos,
launch facilities, and key command and con-
trol centers to an unprecedented degree. Much
of' the current US retaliatory force would be
ineffective against these hardened targets.
Soviet leaders and managers at all levels
of' the government and Communist Party are
provided hardened alternate command posts
located well away from urban centers in ad-
dition to many deep bunkers and blast shel-
ters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and
redundant system, patterned after a similar
system designed for the Soviet Armed Forces,
provides more than 1,500 hardened alternate fa-
cilities for more than 1753)00 key Party and
government personnel throughout the USSR.
In contrast, the US passive defense effort is far
smaller and more limited: it is in no way com-
parable to the comprehensive Soviet program.
Elaborate plans also have been made for the
full mobilization of' the national economy in
support of the war effort. Reserves of vital
materials are maintained, many in hardened
underground structures. Redundant industrial
facilities are in active production. Industrial
and other economic facilities have been equip-
ed with blast shelters for the work force, and
detailed procedures have been developed for
the relocation of' selected production capabil-
ities. By planning for the survival of' the essen-
tial work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute
vital production programs using those indus-
trial components that could be redirected or
salvaged after an attack.
In addition, the USSR has greatly empha-
sized mobility as a means of' enhancing the
survivability of' military assets. The SS-20 and
SS-25 missiles, for example, are mobile. Rail-
mobile deployment of' the SS-X-24 is expected
soon. The Soviets are also developing an ex-
tensive network of mobile command, control,
and communications facilities.
Air Defense
The Soviet Union has since the 1950s in-
vested enormous resources in a wide array of
strategic air defense weapons systems. Taken
together, the Soviet strategic air defense net
is a potent and increasingly capable force
which would attempt to limit the retaliatory
capability of' our strategic bombers and cruise
missiles. With the emergence of' the Soviet
cruise missile and the enhanced horn her threat
to the United States, the US has under-
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METERS
30
20
10
0
Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
Tu-128*
FIDDLER B
MG-25 Su-15 Su-27
FOXBAT A/E FLAGON E/F FLANKER
SPEED (MACH)
RADIUS (KM)**
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
METERS
20
10
0
SPEED (MACH)
RADIUS (KM)"
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
2.8
1,450
4 AAMs
14
M1G-29 M1G-31
YaK-28* MiG-23 FULCRUM FOXHOUND
FIREBAR FLOGGER B/G
2.0
1,000
4 AAMs
9
2.0
1,500
6 AAMs
14
1.5
1,500
4 AAMs
18
18
900
2 AAMs
12
2.3
1,150
6 AAMs
8 (Swept)
North American Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
F-106A F-15A F-15C***
DELTA DART EAGLE EAGLE
2.0
1,110
5.AAMs
12
2.5
1,200
8 AAMs
13
No external fuel ? Conformal tanks
?? Subsonic area intercept with external fuel ***** Canadian
taken measures to improve its air defense
IP hi lit i es
The Soviets have deployed numerous strate-
gic air defense systems with capabilities
against aircraft flying at medium and high al-
titudes. They are now in the midst of a major
program to improve their capabilities against
aircraft and cruise missiles flying at low alti-
tudes. That effort includes partial integration
of strategic and tactical air defense assets, the
upgt?ading of early warning and surveillance
capabilities, the deployment of more efficient
data transmission systems, and the develop-
ment and initial deployment of' new aircraft,
;issociated ;iir-to-air missiles, surface-to-air mis-
siles (ANI s). and airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) aircraft.
Currently, the Soviets have more than 9,000
strategic SAM hiunchers, over 4,600 tactical
SAM launchers, and some 10,000 air defense
radars. More than 1,200 Air Defense Forces
interceptor aircraft are dedicated to strategic
defense. An additional 2,800 interceptors as-
2.5
1,770
8 AAMs
13
2.3
1,150
6 AAMs
12
CF-18****
HORNET
1.8
1,170
6 AAMs
12
2.4
2,100
8 AAMs
14
signed to Soviet Air Forces (SAE) will be drawn
upon for strategic defense missions. Collec-
tively, these assets present a formidable de-
fense barrier against any attack.
The most capable Soviet air defense inter-
ceptor aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a
look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target en-
gagement capability. More than 100 FOX-
H OUNDs are now operationally deployed at
several locations from the Arkhangelsk area in
the northwestern USSR to the Far East Mili-
tary District. Two new fighter interceptors, the
Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM,
also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities
and are designed to be highly maneuverable in
air-to-air combat. The look-down/shoot-down
capability was acquired from the US through
espionage. The Soviets have deployed over
100 MiG-29/FULCRUM aircraft to operational
units and have recently begun to deploy the Su-
27/FLANKER. These three ;iircraft ;ire
equipped with two new air-to-air missiles the
long-range AA-9 (for the FOXHOUND) and
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the medium-range AA-10 (for the FULCRUM
mid FLANK ER) that can be used against low-
flying targets.
The USSR is also deploying the MAINSTAY
AWACS aircraft which will improve substan-
tially Soviet capabilities for early warning and
air combat command and control, especially
against low-flying aircraft. The MIDAS, a
tanker variant of the [1-76/CANDID which
should he operational soon, will significantly
increase the endurance of' the new air defense
aircraft, particularly the MAINSTAY and some
of the new fighters if' an air refueling capabil-
ity for them is incorporated.
The Soviets maintain the world's most exten-
sive early warning system for air defense. It is
composed of' a widespread network of' ground-
based radars linked operationally with those of
their Warsaw Pact allies. As previously noted,
more than 10,000 surveillance radars of var-
ious types provide virtually complete cover-
Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability
FOXHOUND
FULCRUM
FLOGGER
FOX BAT
FIR EBAR
FIDDLER
FLAGON
1985
No
Look-down
FOXHOUND
FLANKER
FULCRUM
FLOGGER
FOXBAT
FLAGON
1988 estimate
FOXHOUND
FLANKER
FULCRUM
FLOGGER
FOX BAT
1992 estimate
Limited True Look-down
Look-down L_I Shoot down
100%
age at medium-to-high altitudes over the USSR
and, in some areas, well beyond the Soviet
Union's borders. Three over-the-horizon radars
for ballistic missile detection could provide ad-
ditional warning of the approach of high-flying
aircraft.
The USSR also has an active research and
development program to improve its air surveil-
lance network. In 198;I, it began to deploy
two new types of air surveillance radars which
will enhance Soviet capabilities for air defense,
electronic warfare, and early warning of cruise
The new generation of all-weather air defense interceptors equipped with a true look-down/
shoot-down radar includes the MiG-29/FULCRUM, armed with the AA-10 missile, top left, and
the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, armed with the AA-9 missile, above.
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The mobile version of the SA-10 SAM is in
the process of being deployed.
missile and bomber attacks. The Soviets are
also continuing to deploy improved air surveil-
lance data systems that can rapidly pass data
from outlying radars through the air surveil-
lance network to ground-controlled intercept
sites and SAM command posts.
Soviet strategic surface-to-air missiles pro-
vide low-to-high-altitude barrier, area, and ter-
minal defenses under all weather conditions.
Five systems are now operational: the SA-I,
SA-2, and SA-3, and the more capable SA-5 and
SA-10. The recent Soviet air defense reorga-
nization permits more efficient integration of
strategic and tactical SAM systems. Although
most tactical SAMs have a shorter range than
their strategic counterparts, many have bet-
ter capabilities against targets flying at low
altitudes.
The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high-
performance aircraft at all altitudes, will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles,
and may have the potential to engage some types of strategic ballistic missiles.
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METERS
12
9
6
3
0
RANGE (KM)
EFFECTIVE
ALTITUDE
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SA-1
50
MEDIUM
Soviet Strategic Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-2 SA-5
50
MEDIUM
SA-3
20
LOW-TO-
MEDIUM
300
MEDIUM-
TO-HIGH
SA-10
m.4
100
LOW-TO-
HIGH
SA-X-12
100
LOW-TO-
HIGH
Soviet Strategic SAM Air Defense Barrier Illustrated from Fixed Sites*
Kilometers
30
20-
10-
0
300
SA-1
SA-2
SA-3
150
SA-5
SA-10, SA-X-12
Kilometers 0
150
300
'All SAMs have a minimum effective altitude.
Over the years the Soviets have continued
to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have repeat-
edly modified this system. Further deployment
and upgrading are probable to enhance the
SA-5's capability to work in conjunction with
low-altitude systems like the SA-10.
The SA-10 has some capability against low-
altitude targets with small radar cross-sections,
such as cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site was
operational in 1980. Over 60 sites are now op-
erational, and work is progressing on at least
another 30. More than half of these sites are lo-
cated near Moscow: this emphasis on Moscow
and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites
suggest a first priority on terminal defense of
command and control, military, and key indus-
trial complexes.
In keeping with their drive toward mobility
as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets
are in the process of deploying a mobile ver-
sion of the SA-10. This mobile version could
be used to support Soviet theater forces and
to permit periodic changes in the location of
SA-10 sites within the USSR to counter US
retaliatory forces more effectively.
The Soviets are also flight-testing another
important mobile SAM system, the SA-X-12,
which is capable of intercepting aircraft at all
altitudes as well as cruise missiles and short-
range ballistic missiles. As previously noted,
the SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential
to intercept some types of strategic ballistic
missiles as well. This is a serious development
because these systems are expected to be de-
ployed widely throughout the Soviet Union in
the 1980s. They could, if properly supported,
add significant point-target defense coverage
to a nationwide Soviet ABM deployment.
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Chapter IV
Soviet Forces
for Theater
Operations
Control of theater operations rests with the
Soviet Supreme High Command (V( N). Niajor
elements of all five of t he rSSN's branches of
the armed forces (ground, naval, air. air de-
fense. tri(1 Strategic Rocket Forces) would be
(1(.votvd to the,0(..r warfium A iarg,, (Thripo_
nent of these forces would he retained imme-
diately under the control of the \( I\ to he
employed or allocated at its discretion. These
elements include strategic aviation air irniies.
SS-1 and SS-20 units of the Strategic Rocket
Forces. airborne forces. military transport ayi-
ition, a large strategic reserve of ground furces
(primarily units stationed in the interior mili-
tary districts of the USSR). and an extensive
logistic support structure.
A High Command of Forces in the TVI)
would have primary responsibility for conduct-
ing the theater strategic operation. rider its
control would he several fronts, a naval fleet
(if applicable). strategic ail' defense elements
in the TVD. and ;tny strategic air army and
tirborne elements allocated by the V( K.
The front is the basic comhined arms compo-
nent of theater forces responsible for land op-
erations. The closest NATO equivalent would
he an .triny group with organic. tictical avia-
tion. A front consists of several combined arms
The USSR maintains the world's largest
stockpile of chemical warfare agents. Vir-
tually all Soviet conventional weapons
systems mortars, artillery pieces, helicopters
such as these Mi-24/HINDs, aircraft, and
long-range tactical missiles--can deliver
chemical munitions in the forward battle zone
and against rear areas. Furthermore, Soviet
research institutes are engaged in develop-
ing new chemical agents with even greater
lethality and are investigating binary weapons
systems that would reduce the hazards asso-
ciated with handling and storage.
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and tank ;irmies, a large assigned aviation ele-
ment called the Air Forces of the Front, and an
extensive support structure including several
surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades, an ar-
tillery division, and several surface-to-surface
missile (SSM) brigades. Armies have a com-
bined arms structure similar to a front, with
three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions
constituting their basic maneuver elements. A
tank army has a preponderance of tank divi-
sions while a combined arms army has a pre-
ponderance of motorized rifle divisions.
Theater Warfare Capabilities
A command system that will ensure effec-
tive control of diverse operations is essential
to the conduct of theater strategic operations.
The Soviets have made a significant investment
in the control structure of' their various TVDs,
including the construction of several hundred
hardened, hunkered command posts and com-
munications centers; the creation of an exten-
sive communications system in peacetime; and
the establishment of numerous, well-equipped
mobile signal and headquarters support units.
In wartime, the Soviets would field a robust
and survivable command system featuring nu-
merous hardened, fixed, and mobile command
posts; a dense communications network pro-
viding redundant channels between command
posts; and extensive camouflage, concealment,
and deception.
In 1985, the Soviets began activating peace-
time High Commands within the TVDs with
high-ranking officers appointed as permanent
commanders in chief (CINCs). This increased
the readiness of' Soviet forces by moving the
peacetime command structure much closer to
the wartime mode. Marshal Ogarkov, the
former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, is
believed to have been appointed head of the
crucial Western TVD oriented against NATO's
Central Region.
The Soviets are increasing the speed and
effectiveness of their command, control, and
communications (C") system by introducing nu-
merous computer systems and other automated
aids. Commanders and staffs are being as-
sisted in rapid decisionmaking by computerized
combat models resulting from a large military
operations research effort. The Soviets have
also employed the results of' numerous Western
operations research efforts published in open-
source journals.
Planned TVD Operations
As expressed in their literature, the Soviets
believe that the Western TVD would be the
scene of the decisive conflict between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, they have
deployed a very large force there that includes
their best equipped and most ready units. So-
viet ground forces in the theater have the most
modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and
self-propelled artillery in the Soviet inventory.
Moreover, air forces in the TVD comprise over
37 percent of' all the Soviet tactical aviation
assets.
Within the Western TVD, deep-interdiction
attacks against NATO airfields and other deep
targets would be conducted by FENCER air-
craft as well as almost 400 Strategic Aviation
BACKFIRE B/C, BLINDER, and BADGER G
medium bombers stationed in the western So-
viet Union. Force capabilities will continue
to improve as additional BACKFIREs replace
older BADG E Rs.
The combined Baltic Fleet, consisting of' the
Soviet Baltic Fleet plus the East German and
Polish navies, has a substantial force of' prin-
cipal surface combatants and relatively large
numbers of missile-capable minor combatants.
The Polish and East German navies are partic-
ularly strong in amphibious warfare and would
contribute substantially to Soviet amphibious
operations in the Baltic.
The Soviets envision a complex theater strat-
egic operation involving a rapid advance across
West Germany, Denmark, and the low coun-
tries to immediate objectives on the French
border, the North Sea coast, and the Danish
straits. This advance would be made possible
by a massive air operation to paralyze NATO's
air, air defense, theater nuclear, and command
and control capabilities and by an amphibious
operation to secure the Danish straits. Con-
tinued operations across France would then be
conducted after immediate strategic objectives
are attained. The Soviets would hope to win
a quick victory through speed and surprise in
this theater before NATO could fully mobilize
or bring in reinforcements.
Operations in the Northwest and the South-
west TVDs are considered secondary to the
decisive operations in the Western Theater in
Soviet plans. The Northwestern TVD con-
tains Soviet Northern Fleet bases with numer-
ous strategic submarines. Soviet theater
operations would be conducted to protect the
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WESTERN TVD
44EN STRATEGIC
DIRECTION
OPERATIONAL
DIRECTION
MOSCOW
Soviet strategic attack assets ifictl to support
naval operations in the Arctic and Atlantic
Ocean TV Ds. The objective of land operations
in the Northwestern TVD would be to seize vi-
tal air and naval facilities in northern Norway,
using the most favorable avenues of approach.
Soviet control of northern Norway is impor-
tant to the protection of' Northern Fleet bases
and assets, particularly ballistic missile sub-
marines, and to the movement of Soviet naval
and air forces into the Norwegian Sea and the
North Atlantic Ocean. Soviet plans also call
for a land offensive operation through Finland
and possibly Swedish territory.
The Northern Fleet would conduct combat
operations in the Arctic and Atlantic Ocean
TV Ds and on the seaward Hanks of' the North-
western TVD. The vast majority of the North-
ern Fleet's assets would be dedicated to the
Arctic Theater, which encompasses the Arctic
Ocean and the Norwegian. Barents, and Green-
land Seas the main operating areas for strate-
gic ballistic missile submarines. In addition
to providing the ballistic missile submarine as-
sets for strategic operations during conflict, the
other tasks of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic
Ocean TVD would be:
? to protect the USSR from sea-based at-
tacks by establishing naval superiority
in the Arctic, Barents, Greenland, and
Norwegian Seas: and
? to conduct ASW operations against
NATO ballistic missile and general pur-
pose submarines within this geographic
area.
Combat operations in the At hintic Ocean
TVD would be considered less cruciiil by the
Soviet military leadership than those in the
Arctic. In the Atlantic TVD, the Northern
Fleet would be tasked to conduct operations
against NATO ballistic missile submarines and
to interdict NATO sea lanes carrying reinforce-
ments and supplies from North America to Eu-
rope. Soviet attack submarines would conduct
most of these operations, which would proba-
bly entail minelaying and patrols off key North
American, United Kingdom, and West Euro-
pean ports and bases. Some Naval Aviation and
Air Force bombers probably would participate
in these interdiction operations.
The Soviets plan operations in the South-
western TVD to support their advance in the
Western Theater and to establish dominance
in NATO's Southern Region. In wartime, So-
viet plans for offensive operations in the re-
gion include an attack through neutral Austria
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into southern (let-many and northern Italy. So-
viet plans also include operations to seize the
Bosporus and Dardanelles. Efforts to seize the
Turkish straits would be accomplished by coor-
dinated ground. airborne, iiid Imphibious
operations. Warsaw Pact naval forces in the
theater organized into i combined Black Sea
Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
would attempt to clear the Black Sea of NATO
naval forces and would at to prevent Al-
lied forces from using the eastern Mediter-
ranean to reinforce their defenses.
Soviet interest in the Southern TVD has
been increased by the collapse of the pro-
Western regime of the Shah in Iran as well as
STRATEGIC
DIRECTION
OPE RATIONAL
DIRECTION
NORTHWESTERN
TVD
by other developments in the turbulent Middle
East. The Soviets wish to establish dominance
in this region and to deny the West access to
its vital oil resources in wartime. Soviet forces
are now engaged in combat in Afghanistan to
ensure the success of t he Communist regime in-
stalled by Moscow and to reduce that nation
to a client state. In wartime. the Soviets would
probably plan to conduct offensive operations
from the USSR :ind Afghanistan through Iran
to the Persian (lull' in order to obtain a stran-
glehold on the West's oil supplies. Also, the
Soviets could use Afghanistan as a base from
which to launch an attack on Pakistan.
The Far Eastern TVD is the largest continen-
tal TVD. Since the 1970s and into this decade,
the Soviets have increased their forces in this
SOUTHWESTERN
TVD
STRATEGIC
DIRECTION
OPERATIONAL
DIRECTION
area. In this theater. priority for the assign-
ment of new equipment is second only to the
vital Western TVD. The Far Eastern TVD also
contains the bases of the USSR's Pacific Fleet.
In a war with NATO, the Soviets would hope
to deter Chinese entrance into the conflict. If
deterrence failed, the Soviets probably would
engage in rapid offensive operations to seize
relatively limited objectives in China in order
to force a quick termination of the war on the
eastern front. In this way the Soviets would
hope to avoid a two-front war as well as be-
coming enmeshed in a prolonged conventional
ground war in China.
The Pacific Ocean Fleet is tasked with con-
ducting operations in the Far Eastern. the
SOUTHERN TVD
STRATEGIC
DIRECTION
OPERATIONAL
DIRECTION
(i2
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cific Ocean. and Indian Ocean TVDs. The
Pacific Ocean Fleet is the largest of the four
Soviet fleets. Its size can he ;Ittributed to its
wartime missions, the increasing importance
of the Pacific Basin in trade and commerce,
and its .2,Tographic isolation from the western
fleets and the major shipbuilding centers in
the USSR. This remoteness would make rein-
forcement exceedingly difficult during wartime.
The Pacific Ocean Fleet's wartime operations
would be concentrated mainly in the northwest
Pacific. In addition to protecting ballistic mis-
sil(i submarine assets, the Pacific Fleet's tasks
would include:
? protecting the USSR from sea-based at-
tacks by establishing naval superiority in
the Sea of Japan. Sea of Okhotsk, along
the Kuril Islands, and off the Kamchatka
Peninsula:
? conducting operations against enemy sea-
based strategic platforms: and
? interdicting enemy sea lines of communi-
cation.
The Pacific Heet's sea-control effort would
entail extensive surface ship, submarine, and
naval aircraft ASW and Out operations
along the Soviet Far East periphery. Control
of these seas would also be crucial to defending
Soviet territory against possibl(? US carrier-
based anistrikes or iimphibious assaults.
To complement its sea-control mission, the
fleet would deploy attack and cruise missile
submarines iind strike iiircraft into the north-
west Pacific to engage US forces. In essence,
the fleet would attempt to establish an ech-
eloned defense of' the Soviet Far East. Sub-
marines and strike aircraft would spearhead
the outer defense in the northwest Pacific: and
surface combatants in combination with sub-
marines and strike aircraft would form an in-
ner defense along the Soviet coast.
Soviet attack submarines probably would de-
ploy for ASW and possibly minelaying oper-
ations off' the US ballistic missile submarine
base at Bangor. Washington. Additionally, a
few submarines might attempt to deploy near
ports and bases off the US west coast and the
Hawaiian Islands.
Operating primarily out of Cam Ranh Bay.
Soviet naval forces would conduct antiship
strikes against transiting enemy forces, inter-
dict sea lines of communication in the South
China Sea, and possibly attack US facilities in
the region.
FAR EAST TVD
STRATEGIC
DIRECTION
OPERATIONAL
DIRECTION
In the Far East TVD, the Soviets have
strengthened ground forces oriented against
US allies. They have deployed a coastal de-
fense division to the Japanese Northern Terri-
tories (south of' the Kuril Islands) to the north-
east of the Japanese island of' Hokkaido. Four
Soviet divisions are now deployed on the Pa-
cific ;ipproaches to the USSR the Northern
Territories, Kurils, Sakhalin Island, ;111(1 Kam-
chatka Peninsula. These divisions t bus con-
stitute the ground component of' the Soviets'
maritime strategy in the Pacific. In addition,
those forces on the Northern Territories. Kurils
and Sakhalin Island could threaten J a pmi.
To support their operations in the various
TVDs, the Soviets have amassed large mu )u
of ground. air. naval, and air defense equip-
ment and forces. These vast quantities in part
reflect Soviet military planning to employ over-
whelming power to achieve their objectives.
They also reflect the offensive nature of' Soviet
military doctrine and strateg,y in that at
forces are believed to require at least a
5:1 force ratio in anticipation of' high losses
inherent in offensive operations.
Wartime Air Force Employment
Since the mid-1960s. the Soviets have moved
toward a doctrine and force capability to fight
decisively at all levels of conflict. with or with-
out nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear option,
however, still requires a force posture capable
of negating. or at least reducing, an enemy's
air and nuclear resources. To achieve this,
the Soviets have again looked to their histor-
ical experiences and developed a modernized
version of the air operations of World War II.
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The Soviets would, under non-nuclear condi-
tions, substitute the mass employment of avi-
ation forces for an initial mass nuclear strike.
Such an operation would be performed simulta-
neously within the sectors of several fronts in
an attempt to achieve air superiority and de-
stroy or weaken an enemy's air and nuclear
resources. The air operation has been devel-
oped into a crucial component of the theater
strategic operation. The success of' this oper-
ation is critical to the outcome of the theater
campaign.
The principal targets of an air operation
would be the enemy's aviation, nuclear re-
sources, air defense, and command, control,
and communications (C") facilities. Airstrikes
would be directed to destroy tactical nuclear
capabilities, disrupt any coordinated defense,
and assure air superiority by neutralizing the
main force of enemy aviation at the outset of'
hostilities.
The Soviet Union envisions an air operation
lasting three or more days that would involve
from three to seven mass strikes over the pe-
riod. Two or three mass strikes would occur
on the first day, with one or two additional
mass strikes on subsequent days. Wartime em-
ployment of' fixed-wing, tactical ground-attack
airpower after completion of the air operation
would probably fall into small and large strike
packages. The small attacks would be two to
fOur aircraft Hying close support for troops,
defense suppression, or perhaps armed recon-
naissance missions. Large strike packages, on
the order of' 50 to 100 aircraft, would conduct
major strike missions against nuclear storage
depots, airfields. C" facilities, ports, and rear
area logistics and support bases. All Soviet air
operations would occur as part of' a planned
and coordinated combined arms operation in-
tended to achieve Soviet war aims. Pre- and
post-strike reconnaissance, electronic counter-
measures (ECM) escort support, and air de-
fense support would be closely integrated with
strike aircraft in major combat operations.
Soviet Military Transport Aviation's
( Voyen no-transportnoya aulatsiya, abhrev i at ed
VTA) wartime functions would remain primar-
ily paradrop and the landing of combat units
as well as the provision of' logistics support
to all Soviet Armed Forces as needed. This
could include rapid reinforcement. and aerial
resupply, nuclear weapons resupply, and med-
ical evacuation. VIA, along with the mobi-
lized Soviet Civil Aviation (Aeroflot) and the
air transports of' the other Soviet military ele-
ments, would probably provide sufficient. num-
bers of' a? transport assets to perform their
missions. especially since all Eurasian conti-
nental TVDs are accessible by rail and highway
transportation networks.
Ground Forces
The USSR has traditionally in
large, well-equipped ground forces as a pri-
mary component of military power. The ground
forces are the largest of the USSR's five
branches of' the armed forces. An ambitious
force development program is underway involv-
ing expansion, equipment modernization, train-
ing improvements, innovative tactics and
operational concepts, and enhancement of' com-
mand and control capabilities.
In peacetime, Soviet ground force personnel
USSR Selected Artillery
2S3 2S1 M-1975 M-1975
2S5
M-1976
TOWED/
Self-
Self-
Self-
Self-
Self-
Towed
SELF-PROPELLED
Propelled
Propelled
Propelled
Propelled
Propelled
CALIBER/TYPE
152-mm Howitzer
122-mm Howitzer
203-mm Gun
240-mm Mortar
152-mm Gun
152-mm Gun
MAXIMUM
RANGE (M)
17,200
15,300
30,000
12,000
27,000
27,000
NUCLEAR?
CAPABLE
Probably
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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number approximately 1.9 million. Their com-
bat power resides in 213 maneuver divisions,
including 12 mobilization base divisions (un-
manned equipment that will be activated as di-
vi:-;ions upon mobilization), with two additional
divisions expanded to corps-type structures.
In peacetime, the ground forces within the
USSR are subordinate to the 16 military dis-
tricts, except for the 7 airborne divisions which
are directly subordinate to Airborne Forces
Headquarters in Moscow. Forces deployed in
Eastern Europe are organized into four Soviet
Groups of Forces, one each in East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Soviet
forces in Mongolia and Afghanistan are each
organized into an army subordinate to the ad-
jacent military district. Assets of the Groups
of Forces and military districts would be con-
verted to fronts in wartime.
Tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions
comprise the basic maneuver elements of So-
viet ground forces. Tank and motorized rifle
divisions are highly mobile armored forces. The
Soviet tank division, which has 11,000 men,
is comprised of three tank regiments and one
motorized rifle regiment, while the motorized
rifle division (13,000 men) is based on three mo-
torized rifle regiments and one tank regiment.
Both tank and motorized rifle divisions have
a full complement of' support elements, includ-
ing aviation, artillery, air defense, signal, engi-
neer, chemical, reconnaissance, maintenance,
motor transport, and medical units.
The Soviet Union maintains the world's
largest airborne force, currently seven divi-
sions. Elements of an eighth division are oper-
ating in Afghanistan. Soviet airborne divisions
do not have the same degree of land mobil-
ity as tank or motorized rifle divisions but are
T-54/55
significantly more mobile than a US airhorne
division. They consist of three parachute reg-
iments with airborne amphibious combat vehi-
cles (BMDs) plus combat support and service
units. In addition to the regular airborne di-
visions, the Soviets have formed air assault
brigades at front level and air assault battal-
ions at army level.
Current developments in Soviet ground forces
are highlighted below:
? Tank and motorized rifle divisions are
being expanded and reorganized. The re-
sultant divisions are larger, more capable,
and are configured for high-speed, com-
bined arms operations on a conventional
or nuclear battlefield.
? Two corps-type structures have been
formed. These units are divisions ex-
panded to almost twice the size of' a tank
division. The new formations contain
over 450 tanks, 600 infantry fighting ve-
hicles and armored personnel carriers
(APCs), and 300 artillery pieces and mul-
tiple rocket launchers. They are ideally
US Main Battle Tanks
M -60A1 /3
PATTON
M-1/M -1A1
ABRAMS
WEIGHT (MT)
51
55
SPEED (KM/HR)
50
70
MAIN ARMAMENT
105-mm
105-mm/120-mm
MUZZLE VELOCITY
1,500
1,500/1,660
(MPS)
Main Battle Tanks
T-62 T-64
T-72
T-80
WEIGHT (MT)
36
37
35
41
42
SPEED (KM/HR)
50
50
50
60
60
MAIN ARMAMENT
100-mm
115-mm
125-mm
125-mm
125-mm
MUZZLE VELOCITY
1,500
1,600
1,750
1,750
1,750
(MPS)
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Trends in Soviet Artillery, Tanks,
and Armored Vehicles
100,000 -
100,000
80,000 -
- 80,000
60,000 -
- 60,000
40,000 -
- 40,000
20,000 -
- 20,000
Artillery
?Estimated
1985 1990"
Tanks
Armored
Vehicles
Trends in US Artillery, Tanks,
and Armored Vehicles
Artillery
? Estimated
1985
Tanks
1990*
Armored
Vehicles
suited to act as an Operational Maneu-
ver Group (OMG), conducting high-speed
operations deep in an enemy's rear area.
Additional units of this type are expected
to be formed once testing and evaluation
are completed.
? Nondivisional artillery support for ma-
neuver forces is also being expanded.
Some army-level regiments are being ex-
panded to brigade size with the addition
of a fourth battalion. Battalions are con-
currently expanding from 18 to 24 guns
each. These changes have resulted in a
40-percent increase in artillery pieces in
the brigades and are occurring primarily
in units opposite NATO. New artillery
units are also being formed; for exam-
ple, two new artillery divisions have been
formed since 1984.
Helicopters. To support ground operations,
the Soviets continue to emphasize their heli-
copter forces, which are being expanded and
modernized. At division level, helicopter de-
tachments continue to expand to squadrons,
and in some squadrons the number of HIND
attack helicopters has been increased. At army
level about 20 attack regiments have been
formed, with up to 60 HIP and HIND attack
helicopters in each. Over half of these are de-
ployed opposite NATO forces. Most attack heli-
copters are the heavily armed Mi-24/HIND D/E
and Mi-8/HIP E. Soviet emphasis on a heavy-
lift helicopter transport capability is reflected
in the development and recent appearance of
the Mi-26/HALO. It is the world's largest pro-
duction helicopter and is capable of carrying
internally two airborne infantry combat vehi-
cles or about 85 combat-ready troops. Much of
the technology and hardware used in its pro-
duction was obtained from the West.
The Soviets are now equipping their heli-
copters with infrared (IR) jammers and sup-
pressors, IR decoy dispensers, and additional
armor, thereby increasing their survivability
The Mi-28/HAVOC, the USSR's newest at-
tack helicopter, will be deployed in the near
future.
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Mi-28/HAVOC
Combat and Support Helicopters
SPEED (KM 'H)
300
RADIUS (KM)
240
TROOP LIFT
0
HOKUM
SPEED KM H)
350
RADIUS (KM)
250
Mi-24/HIND
SPEED (KM 'HI
RADIUS (KM)
TROOP LIFT
Mi-8/HIP
SPEED (KM/H)
RADIUS (KM)
TROOP LIFT
Mi-6/HOOK
SPEED (KM/H)
RADIUS (KM)
TROOP LIFT
Mi-26/HALO
SPEED (KWH)
RADIUS (KM)
TROOP LIFT
Ka-27/HELIX
SPEED (KM/H) 260
RADIUS (KM) 300
NAVAL AIR VARIANTS
Ka-25/HORMONE
SPEED (KM/H) 220--
RADIUS (KM) 250
NAVAL AIR VARIANTS
METERS 0
10 20 30 40
probably as a result of lessons learned in Af-
ghanistan. A new attack helicopter, the Mi-
28/HAVOC, similar to the US Army Apache,
is expected to be deployed soon. The new
HOKUM helicopter, which has no current West-
ern counterpart, may give the Soviets a sig-
nificant rotary-wing air-superiority capability.
The Soviets are also employing helicopters as
airborne command posts and electronic jam-
ming platforms, as well as attack and transport
platforms.
Soviet Ground Force Equipment
Armor
Soviet ground forces have some 52,600 main
battle tanks in their active inventory, of which
more than a third are the latest models, the
T-64/72/80 series. These new tanks feature in-
creased firepower, with a 125-mm main gun and
Combat and Support Helicopters
AH-64/APACHE
SPEED (KM/H) 30044
RADIUS (KM) 240
TROOP LIFT 0
AH-IT/SEA COBRA
SPEED (KM/H)
260
RADIUS (KM)
340
TROOP LIFT
0
AH-IS/HUEY COBRA
SPEED (KM/H) 26-0-2z
RADIUS (KM) 230
TROOP LIFT 0
CH-46E/SEA KNIGHT
SPEED (KM/H)
240
RADIUS (KM)
190
TROOP LIFT
24
UH-IN/IROQUOIS
SPEED (KM/H)
200
RADIUS (KM)
200
TROOP LIFT
9
CH-53E/SUPER SEA
STALLION
SPEED (KM/H) 280
RADIUS (KM) 460
TROOP LIFT 35
UH-60A/BLACK HAWK
SPEED (KM/H) 260
RADIUS (KM) 300
TROOP LIFT 13
CH-47D/CHINOOK
SPEED (KM/H) 260
RADIUS (KM) 190
TROOP LIFT 33
METERS
10 20
30 40
improved fire control systems, including a laser
range finder on some versions. Both the T-80
and a variant of the T-64 can fire an antitank
guided missile through the main gun. Surviv-
ability has been increased through the use of
improved armor incorporating laminates and
composites. Several thousand tanks currently
not in the active inventory are also available
if necessary.
The USSR's ground forces have about 59,000
armored personnel carriers and infantry fight-
ing vehicles (IFVs) in their active inventory,
with about 20,000 armored vehicles in reserve.
Most of the inventory consists of the BTR-60
wheeled APC and the tracked BMP IFV. The
BTR-80, which is a follow-on to the BTR-70 and
BTR-60, is being fielded in limited numbers. It
has an improved engine and drive train and bet-
ter off-road performance. The improved BMP-2
is augmenting and replacing the BMP. It has
67
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SCALEBOARD Coverage from the USSR and
Eastern Europe
Potential SS-23 and SCA LEBOARD Missile
Coverage in an Advance Across Europe
/
SciilintoARcr-7)
SS-23
The Soviets' new main battle tank, the T-80, on field maneuvers.
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RANGE (KM)
DEPLOYMENT
LEVEL
USSR Short-Range Missiles
FROG-7 SS-21
70
Division
Ittoo
120
Division
SS-1
SCUD B
MEW ?
?*461Viittrw) de'
Soviet SS-21 short-range missile on
transporter-erector-launcher.
a 30-mm rapid-fire gun in place of the 73-mm
gun on the original BM P and carries the AT-
5 antitank guided missile (ATGM). In addition
to the Kilt-BA/Ps, the Soviets have fielded the
BM D with airborne and air assault units and a
number of light-ground-pressure vehicles such
as the GT-T/MTLB series for use in areas of
or trafficability.
Shorter Range Missiles
The Soviets have about 1,600 tactical and
shorter range intermediate-range nuclear
force (SRI NF) ballistic missile launchers
in their inventory. In 1985, the Soviets
began to deploy their newest SRINF missile
system, the SS-23. This missile, which has a
longer range and improved accuracy over the
SCUD, is expected to replace the latter at army
and front levels. The front commander may
also have a brigade of 12 to 18 SCALEBOARD
missiles available. A more accurate version
of the SCALEBOARD has been deployed. In
1984, the Soviets deployed the SCALEBOARD
to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, marking
300
Army/Front
SS-23
?
Oro
500
Army/Front
SCALEBOARD
900
Front/Theater
New 120-mm airborne amphibious
combat vehicle.
the first time this missile has been stationed
outside the USSR. Much of Western Europe is
now within range of these 900-kilometer
missiles. The new generation of short-range
missiles can be employed effectively with con-
ventional warheads because of increased ac-
curacy. Deployment will give the Soviets a
formidable conventional deep-strike system.
In the area of short-range nuclear forces
(SNF). Soviet armies and fronts have missile
brigades equipped with from 12 to 18 SS-IC
SCUD missile launchers. At division level, the
predominant SNF weapon is the unguided free
rocket over ground (FROG) found in a battal-
ion of four launchers. The Soviets have begun
to replace the FROG with the more accurate,
longer range SS-21 missile in some divisions
opposite European NATO.
Fire Support
The Soviets have traditionally placed great
emphasis on fire support and currently have
over 39,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs) greater than 100mm in cal-
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iber in their active inventory, with about 10,000
held in reserve. The ground forces are now
fielding large numbers of self-propelled artillery
at all levels.
Developing Operational Concepts
Soviet improvements in equipment and weap-
ons developments reflect concepts to accom-
plish longstanding operational goals. The rapid
penetration of forward enemy defenses on se-
lected axes is designed to ensure that the fo-
cus of decisive action is shifted to an adver-
sary's rear area. The rapid advance of Soviet
forces is intended to bring about the collapse
of the enemy's defense and the destruction of
his forces while the attainment of deep strate-
gic objectives is sustained by the continuous
commitment of follow-on forces.
The Soviets are aware of the planned or pro-
gramed enhancements of NATO theater forces.
They believe the development of capabilities
and strategies involving deep attack, such as
the US Army Air-Land Battle and the NATO
Follow-on Forces Attack concepts, could
challenge their ability to execute i planned
strategy. As a result. Soviet operational con-
cepts and force planning are taking these en-
hancements into account. Recent Soviet force
developments are designed to provide greater
mobility, firepower, sustainability, and com-
mand and control capabilities to counter NATO
force enhancements.
Innovations in traditional Soviet operational
concepts feature increased emphasis on deep
operations into an opponent's rear area early
in a conflict. Adapting their experience with
mobile forces in World War II. the Soviets
have developed Operational Maneuver Groups
(0MGs) to conduct mobile warfare in the en-
emy's rear area following a breakthrough of
his forward defenses. The insertion of OMGs,
consisting of tank-heavy formations supported
by infantry fighting vehicles, mobile fire sup-
port, air defense, air assault units, and avia-
The Soviet 16-tube, 220-mm BM-27 multiple
rocket launcher is capable of firing high-
explosive conventional rounds, scattering
mines, and delivering chemical warheads as
far as 40 kilometers. The BM-27 is used ex-
tensively in Afghanistan, where it provides
intensive long-range fire support against
Afghan Freedom Fighters.
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t ion, is designed to isolate front-line defending
forces, disrupt rear area logistics and reserves,
threaten key command and control facilities
and economic and population centers, and
neutralize nuclear attack systems. The success-
ful use of OMGs would facilitate the commit-
ment of second-echelon forces and accelerate
the overall rate of advance.
Special Operations Forces (SPETSNAZ)
The USSR maintains a complement of spe-
cial operations forces, the most prominent of
which are known as SPETSNAZ. These are
managed by the Main Intelligence Directorate
RU) of' the Soviet General Staff and are
trained to conduct a variety of sensitive mis-
sions, including covert actions abroad. Large
numbers of' SPETSNAZ troops have been as-
signed to Soviet forces in Afghanistan, where
they have become known for their ruthless
aggressiveness.
During peacetime, the GRU carefully coordi-
nates reconnaissance programs that are geared
to meet the intelligence requirements for So-
viet forces in war. In wartime, SPETSNAZ
forces would operate far behind enemy lines for
extended periods of' time where they would con-
duct reconnaissance and sabotage on a wide
variety of' military and political targets.
The KGB is assessed to have overall respon-
sibility, under Central Committee guidance, for
operat loran planning, coordination, and politi-
cal control of special purpose forces that Oper-
ate abroad in peacetime. This was the case in
the Soviet invasion of' Czechoslovakia in 1968
and of' Afghanistan in 1979. The KGB main-
tains its own special operations capabilities in
the form of' clandestine assets dedicated to as-
sassination and wartime sabotage.
Though organized into brigades, these forces
would infiltrate and fight as small teams. In
a war, each brij:,,ade can be expected to field
about 100 SPETSNAZ teams. A typical team
would be led by an officer, with a warrant offi-
cer or se4,,eant as second in command. At least
one team member would be fully versed in the
language and customs of the target country.
Other members of the team are trained as radio
operators and weapons and demolition experts.
In addition to normal military training, all re-
ceive instruction in:
? reconnaissance and target location;
? infiltration tactics;
? sabotage methods using explosives, in-
cendiaries, and chemical and biological
agents;
? clandestine communications;
? hand-to-hand combat and silent killing
techniques;
? psychological operations;
? language skills; and
? survival behind enemy lines.
In wartime, naval SPETSNAZ teams would
be transported to a target area by aircraft, sub-
marine, or surface ship and would be inserted
immediately prior to hostilities.
Once deployed, the teams would conduct re-
connaissance and tactical operations against a
wide variety of targets, such as ship and subma-
rine bases, airfields, command and intelligence
centers, communication facilities, ports and
harbors, radar sites, and of prime importance
nuclear weapons facilities. Though a small
force, SPETSNAZ has the potential to achieve
results disproportionate to its size against such
a critical, yet often vulnerable, target list.
Theater Nuclear Capability
The Soviets believe nuclear weapons are de-
cisive in theater operations. Even if a war is
fought at the non-nuclear level, the Soviets rec-
ognize the constant danger of rapid escalation.
If a theater operation is fought at or escalates
to the nuclear level, the Soviets would employ
nuclear weapons in a coordinated, massed the-
ater strike which would allow the rapid attain-
ment of deep theater objectives. The Soviets'
capability to fight and win a theater war at
the nuclear level would be predicated on three
main factors:
? a formidable nuclear weapons delivery
capability;
? the ability to destroy or degrade an ad-
versary's nuclear systems and command
and control capability while protect-
ing Soviet assets during conventional
operations prior to escalation; and
? a significant reconstitution capability in
the post-strike period to ensure that crit-
ical Soviet forces would survive NATO
nuclear strikes and regenerate their own
offensive force structure.
Chemical Warfare
The USSR has the most extensive chemical
warfare capability in the world. At the end of'
World War II, the Soviets captured from the
Germans large stockpiles of chemical agents
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as well as the technology and equipment to
make the nerve agents tabun and sarin and the
German plans for production of soman. Two
German nerve agent production plants were
dismantled and removed to the Soviet Union
where they were reassembled. The Soviets have
continued to develop production capabilities
based on this early design and have built agent
manufacturing facilities in various locations
around the Soviet Union. Since the late 1960s.
the Soviets have continued to test, produce,
and stockpile chemical weapons.
The Shikhany Chemical Warfare Proving
Ground is one of the Soviets' primary chem-
ical weapons test areas. It was established
in the mid-1920s, and a number of chemical
weapons tests were conducted in the late 1920s
and 1930s. World War II reconnaissance pho-
tographs confirmed that Shikhany was an ac-
tive chemical weapons test facility. Since that
time it has grown in size and sophistication and
continues to be a highly active testing facility.
Chemical agents are stored in a network of
highly secure military depots located across
the Soviet Union. These depots contain agents
in bulk containers and agent-filled munitions
as well as gas masks, protective suits, decon-
tamination solutions, and decontamination ve-
hicles. Many depots have rail lines allowing
the rapid movement of chemical warfare ma-
terials. Since the late 1960s, the amount of
agents, weapons, and material in storage at
these deposits has increased significantly and
this buildup continues. These depots support
operational forces and report to the Headquar-
ters of the Soviet Chemical Troops in the Min-
istry of Defense.
The Soviets have developed t he dcwtrine for
the use of chemical weapons, and Soviet tac-
ticians have standardized the required proce-
dures. If a commander determines that a
particular battle situation is suited for the em-
ployment of chemical weapons and once ap-
proval has been granted by the highest Soviet
authority, chemical strikes can be conducted
against an array of targets including:
? nuclear delivery means:
? airfields:
? naval bases and selports:
? command and control facilities:
? storage depots:
? supply routes:
? troop concentrations:
? artillery and armor: and
? amphibioustheliborne landing forces.
The Soviets have persistent and nonpersisi-
tent chemical agents as well as a variety of
delivery systems. If Soviet forces have to cross
contaminated areas, specially trained troops
would be available for advice, reconnaissance,
and decontamination.
The Soviet concept of maintaining the mo-
mentum of attack presupposes the capability
to decontaminate armored fighting vehicles,
equipment. and personnel rapidly iind return
them to combat. This begins at the unit level
with a variety of decontamination devices al-
lowing rapid, partial cleansing of contaminated
equipment. Specialized decont aminati(m units
exist at regimental level and aboVe. These
units use a truck-mount( d decontamination ap-
paratus to cleanse equipment and pers(mnel
rapidly and thoroughly. One such item, the
TMS-65, is an aircraft turbojet engine mounted
The Targets for Soviet Chemical Weapons
SS-23 or SCUD Missiles
Tanks
/c-
Artillery
FEBA
/
1st Echelon,--
.s.,' Forces -,/,-
SS-21 Missiles or FROGs
, ,
122/152mm
,
,
/
2d Echelon Forces
Front Line Troops Rear Area
-
Command
and
Control
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Burst Point
Ground Wind Speed
About 0.9m/s
About
850m
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 4000
Meters
-300
-200
-100
-0 ?
-100
-200
-300
The SCUD-B ground contamination pattern superimposed on a military airbase runway. Oper-
ational flights from contaminated runways are extremely hazardous and difficult. In a Soviet
chemical attack against a NATO airbase, many SCUD missiles would be used to ensure coverage.
on a URAL-375 truck chassis which sprays a
decontamination solution on contaminated ve-
hicles.
Several chemical agents, toxins, and com-
binations have been used by the Soviets in
Afghanistan and by their client forces, the
Vietnamese, in Laos and Cambodia.
Chemical agents known to have been devel-
oped by the Soviets include:
? nerve agents (sarin, soman, and a V-series
agent);
? blister agents (mustard, lewisite, and a
mixture of the two);
? a blood agent (hydrogen cyanide);
? a choking agent (phosgene); and
? one other agent not specifically identified
but which causes unconsciousness for an
hour or more and which has been widely
reported as being used in Afghanistan.
The Soviets stock both persistent and non-
persistent agents. Persistent agents stay on
the target from hours to days, depending on
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weither conditions, unless removed by decon-
tamination. while nonpersistent agents will
clear the target relatively quickly. The Soviets
are also investigating binary weapons systems.
This type of system, in addition to its inher-
ent safe handling and storage characteristics,
expands the possibilities for newer agent com-
binations. Complete protection from all the
types of agents in the Soviet inventory requires
special clothing and masks as well as rapid
treatment for any exposed personnel.
Almost all Soviet conventional weapons sys-
tems from mortars to long-range tactical mis-
siles have compatible chemical ammunition or
warheads that are available to land, air, and
naval forces. The Soviets have also developed
the firing data required for employing chemi-
cal weapons in battlefield situations. This
includes the types and numbers of weapons re-
quired to attack different targets under a vari-
ety of weather and combat conditions. They
continue to test systems with improved dis-
semination, larger payloads, increased range,
and better accuracy which afford them greater
target flexibility and deeper strike capability.
Two types of chemical warheads have been
developed for tactical missiles bulk agents
and small bomblets which can be dispersed
over the target.
The Soviets' continuing chemical weapons
activities are carried out by a large and well-
trained chemical warfare organization directed
by the Headquarters Chemical Troops in the
Ministry of Defense. This organization is head-
ed by a three-star general and numbers more
than 45,000 personnel in the ground forces
alone. Its size is expected to double during
wartime. The primary responsibilities of Soviet
chemical specialists include:
? providing technical advice to front
commanders:
? conducting research and development
programs:
? producing and storing chemical weapons
and testing and evaluating protective
materUils:
? training Soviet forces in chemical
weapons employment and survival on a
contaminated battlefield:
? decontamination and reconnaissance, and
? operating the chemical academies.
This corps of specialists also has about 30,000
Soviet Chemical Weapons Depots, Production Centers, and Storage Areas.
,
,
? Stored Warsaw Pact Chemical Munitions In Forward Areas
? General Locations of Chemical Warfare
Agent Production Centers
A Chemical Weapons Depots
?
A
?
A
?
?
A?
A
?
A
A
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vehicles for decontamination and reconnais-
sance and has more than 200 locations for
teaching and training Soviet forces in chemi-
cal protection and decontamination. Training
includes the actual use of live chemical agents.
Also, the Soviets have installed protective fil-
tration systems in many combat and combat
support vehicles and ships, allowing their
forces to operate in a contaminated
environment without wearing full protec-
tive clothing.
Biological Warfare
The Soviet Union continues to maintain and
broaden its offensive biological warfare ca-
pabilities. Institutes and other facilities are
rapidly acquiring, state-of-the-art developments
in biotechnology. This technology is being
carefully screened for its potential to improve
or alter well-known disease-producing agents
for biological warfare purposes.
Agents the Soviets have developed for bio-
logical warfare purposes include anthrax.
tularemia, and various toxins including the my-
cot oxi ns. Research and development on a vari-
ety of toxins continues. The use of mycotox-
ins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and the
Sverdlovsk biological agent accident of 1979
t hat resulted in the release of anthrax from a
bacteriological warfare institute show that the
Soviets have violated the Biological Weapons
Convention of 1972.
Air Forces
The Soviet Air Forces (SAP') are a crucial
component of the USSR's theater force struc-
ture. The Soviets have organized their air
forces to provide dedicated aviation support to
combined arms commanders from maneuver di-
visions to the Supreme High Command and to
allow commanders to mass high-value aviation
assets at the most decisive place and time.
The Soviet Air Forces have three major com-
bat components: Strategic Air Armies, Air
Forces of Military Districts and Groups of
Forces, and Soviet Military Transport Aviation
(VTA). The USSR dedicates high priority to up-
grading each component. New generations of
strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft are in
the development, test, production, and deploy-
ment stages.
The five Strategic Air Armies include one de-
signed for intercontinental and maritime strike
missions and four designed to operate in con-
tinental TVDs. Approximately 180 BEAR and
BISON heavy bombers are assigned to the air
army organized for intercontinental strikes.
The four theater-oriented air armies are
equipped with medium bombers, fighter-bombers,
and fighters which constitute the principal deep-
strike component of theater forces. The air
armies are directly subordinate to the Soviet
Supreme High Command (VGK) and are as-
signed to operate in TVDs in accordance with
the dictates of the VGK. Eighty percent of
the more than 500 medium bombers are based
west of the Urals and would, most likely, be
employed in operations in the Western, South-
western, Northwestern, and Southern TVDs.
The remainder would operate in the Far
Eastern TVD.
There are 17 air forces in the Groups of
Forces, peripheral military districts of the So-
viet Union, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. These
air forces are operationally subordinate to the
military district, Group, or army commander
(as in Afghanistan) and are comprised of com-
bat fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-
bombers, and helicopters. The latter are known
as Army Aviation, although the mix is not stan-
dard. Fighter and fighter-bomber regiments can
be organized into divisions or remain indepen-
dent, reporting directly to the military districts
and Groups of Forces. Reconnaissance reg-
iments and squadrons are independent units,
while helicopter units either report to the mili-
tary districts and Groups of Forces or to armies
or divisions. To ensure dedicated aviation sup-
port to ground forces, tank and combined arms
armies are being assigned their own aviation
components consisting primarily of helicopters.
In wartime, the air forces of the military dis-
tricts and Groups of Forces will become the air
forces of' the front.
Soviet Military Transport Aviation is the
third operational element of the Soviet Air
Forces. Its primary responsibility is to provide
airlift for the Soviet airborne forces and air
assault units. It also provides air logistics sup-
port for deployed Soviet and allied armed forces
and supports Soviet political and economic in-
terests, especially in the Third World.
The Soviet Air Forces have over 700 bomber
aircraft, some 6,300 fighter and fighter-
bombers, and about 600 VTA transports. Of the
total, the air forces of the military districts and
the Groups of Forces have about 5,440 fighter-
interceptors, fighter-bombers, and reconnais-
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sane( and electronic countermeasures (ECM)
aircraft deployed in nearly 140 regiments and
squadrons. An additional 750 fighter and
fighter-bomber aircraft are assigned to the
Strategic' Air :\rmies, and some 110 are in
Afghanistan.
The ,tir forces of the USSR's Warsaw Pact
allies provide important adjuncts to the So-
viets' air and air defense capabilities in the
Western and Southwestern TVDs. Altogether
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have ap-
proximately 2,350 fixed-wing combat aircraft.
Over the past decade, the Soviets have signif-
icantly enhanced the performance character-
istics of their tactical combat aircraft. Older
weapons systems had limited range and pay-
load capabilities, short-range air intercept
radars or range-only radars, little or no ca-
pability to employ precision-guided munitions,
and were restricted primarily to clear-weather
operations. Newer fighters and interceptors.
METERS
22
11
0
SPEED (MACH)
RADIUS (KM)
ARMAMENT
Su-24
FENCER
A/B/C/D
WINGSPAN (M)
METERS
22
11
0
SPEED (MACH)
RADIUS (KM)"
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
2.0
1,300'
3,000 KG
Bombs
10 (Swept)
F-111
however, can conduct air intercepts at beyond-
visual ranges. Moreover. they can operate
at greater distances from their airfields, carry
Up to eight air-to-air missiles. ,ind perform
in all weather conditions. The newest gen-
eration of fighter-interceptors FOX IIOUN Ds,
FULCRUMs, and FLANKERs has a true look-
down/shoot-down capability that enables them
to engage low-flying aircraft or cruise missiles.
The MiG-23,./FLOGGER is by far the most
numerous fig,hter-interceptor, with about 1,700
aircraft.. Other fighter-interceptors include the
FOXBAT, FLAGON, FIREBAR, FIDDLER, and
the new MiG-31/FOXHOUND. The FLOGGER
is likely to remain in the force in substantial
numbers for the next five years. Almost GOO
late-model MiG-21/FISHBEDs are still opera-
tional, although they are being replaced in a
few regiments by the MiG-29/FULCRUM.
Deployment of the new Mach-2 Mi(;-29/
FULCRUM air-superiority fighter proceeded
Comparable Tactical Aircraft
MiG-23 MiG-27
FLOGGER FLOGGER
B/G/K D/J
Su-17
FITTER D/H
MiG-25
FOX BAT B/D
MIG-21 M1G-29
FISHBED L FULCRUM
2.3
17
2.1
2.8
2.0
2.3
1,150
600'
550'
900
750
1,150
6 AAMs
3,000 KG
3,000 KG
4 AAMs
6 AAMs
Bombs
Bombs
8 (Swept)
8 (Swept)
10 (Swept)
14
7
12
F-4C/E
PHANTOM II
US
A-7A/D
CORSAIR II
F-15E
EAGLE
Su-25
FROG FOOT
0.8
300'
2,000 KG
Bombs
15
F-16A A-10A
FIGHTING THUNDERBOLT II
FALCON
2.5
2.0
0.9
2.5
2.0
0.6
1,100
425
800
925
1,000
460
4,000 KG
3,000 KG
2,400 KG
4,500 KG
2,000 KG
2,200 KG
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs+ AAMs
Bombs + AAMs
Bombs + AAMs
Bombs
10 (Swept)
12
12
13
10
17
' Hi -Lo-Lo-F-11, with external fuel, combat radius based on armament carried.
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The new Su-27/FLANKER, equipped with the look-down/shoot-down radar and weapon system,
has the capability to engage low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles.
throughout 1985 and into early 1986 at a steady,
though still limited, rate. By the end of Jan-
uary 1986, Soviet forces in East Germany and
the far eastern USSR had begun to receive this
aircraft. Additional regiments inside the So-
viet Union west of the Urals now possess FUL-
CRUMs, and an increasing pace of deliveries is
expected over the next several years.
The new Su-27/FLANKER also entered op-
erational service by early 1986, with initial
aircraft arriving in air defense regiments.
The FULCRUM and FLANKER, with true
look-down/shoot-down radar, carry both the
beyond-visual-range AA-10 and the short-range
AA-11 air-to-air missiles. These aircraft, to-
gether with the FOXHOUND homeland de-
fense interceptor, mark the Soviet Air Forces'
transition to a new generation of far more capa-
ble combat aircraft. Although not fully match-
ing the avionics capabilities of corresponding
current US fighter aircraft, they pose a signifi-
cant wartime air-superiority threat.
The Su-17/FITTER is the most common
ground-attack aircraft. There are almost 800
in Soviet Air Force regiments, in military dis-
tricts, or Groups of Forces. The next most
numerous is the MiG-27/FLOGGER with over
700 aircraft. However, almost 700 Soviet Air
Forces Su-24/FENCERs are the best (leep-
interdiction aircraft in the Soviet inventory.
Other regiments are comprised of MiG-23/
FLOGGERs, the new Su-25/FROGFOOT, and
older MiG-21/FISHBEDs and Su-7/F1TT ER As.
A new improved FENCER variant, the I) model,
is currently being deployed primarily with
Strategic Aviation FENCER regiments. Recon-
naissance assets include MIG-21/FISHBEDs, Su-
17/FITTERs, MiG-25/FOXBATs, and Yak-28/
BREWERS. Newer aircraft are beginning to
replace the BREWER, significantly increasing
Soviet reconnaissance range capabilities.
Over 200 Tu-16/BADGER bombers still corn-
Bombing Capabilities of
Soviet Tactical Ground-Attack Aircraft
Metric
Tons
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1985
Aircraft Types
FRESCO
FISHBED
FITTER
FLOGGER
FENCER
FROG FOOT
1980
1,000
1975
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Combat Radius (NM)
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The Su-24/FENCER nuclear-capable fighter-bomber, introduced in 1974, with new variants being
produced, is
the USSR's best deep-interdiction tactical aircraft.
prise nearly half of the Soviet medium bomber
force. Approximately 150 BACKFIREs are cur-
rently operational and available to support the-
ater mission requirements. The remainder of
the Soviet Air Forces' medium bomber force
consists of 135 Tu-22/BLINDERs.
The VTA aircraft force consists of almost
600 medium- and long-range cargo transports.
11-76/CANDID long-range jet transports have
been replacing the older An-12/CUB medium-
range turboprop transports in VTA units at a
rate of about 30 per year. The CANDID offers
obvious advantages over the CUB since it can
carry twice the maximum payload over three
times as far. The CANDID now predominates
over the CUB in numbers as well as payload.
The VTA holds over 290 CANDIDs and only 230
CUBs in its inventory. VTA also has about 55
1\n-22/COCK long-range turboprop transports,
the only Soviet transports able to carry out-
sized cargo such as main battle tanks or large
missiles. Production and deployment of the
new CONDOR transport will dramatically up-
grade VTA's heavy-lift capability. The CON-
DOR should begin arriving in VTA units in
1987 or 1988.
The Warsaw Pact air forces hold a signif-
icant advantage over those of NATO in the
degree of hardening completed at their tacti-
cal airbases. They have built several thousand
concrete aircraft shelters, many of which are
earth-covered for added protection and cam-
ouflage. In contrast. NAT() has only about
half as many aircraft shelters. A significant
number of US reinforcement aircraft still lack
European deployment bases until early combat
attrition would free space. The Soviets have es-
tablished secondary operating strips for a num-
ber of their forward-based units, although they
still have some space limitations for potential
later reinforcements as well.
The Su-25/FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft
has seen extensive action in Afghanistan. It is
being deployed with Soviet forces in both the
western and eastern USSR and is exported to
Czechoslovakia and Iraq.
Air Defense Forces
The basic mission of air defense is to counter
air threats to the Soviet homeland as well as
to deployed forces. Soviet air defense forces in-
clude both strategic and tactical surface-to-air
missile systems that have capabilities to en-
gage aircraft, cruise missiles. and some types
of ballistic missiles. Along most Soviet borders,
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Soviet Mobile Tactical SAM Air Defense of the Battlefield*
25 Kilometers
20
95
15
10
5
SA-4a
SA-4b
SA-6
SA-7/9
I I
SA-8
SA-11
? All SAMs have a minimum effective altitude.
50
Kilometers
SA-13
95
these assets are currently organized under a
single command at the military district level.
Soviet strategic SAMs that are deployed for
harrier, area, and point defense of key instal-
lations in the Soviet Union also are used to
provide cover for frontal forces in garrison and
at staging areas. After the deployment of the
front, these SA Ms would provide defense of
the rear echelon and vital supply lines. Sys-
tems that are transportable (for example, the
SA-2) or t ruly mobile (the SA-10 now in the pro-
cess of being deployed) could also move forward
with the front to establish air cover for newly
occupied territory.
Tactical or troop air defense SAMs, AAA,
and radars are designed to counter low-altitude
tIi reats and are inherently mobile. As noted in
Chapter III, tactical air defense systems could
be used to augment strategic systems for home-
land air defense. However, these systems are
principally intended to move with the front
as organic elements of combined arms forma-
tions. Over 4,600 tactical SAM launchers and
12,000 AAA pieces are deployed with Air De-
fense Forces units at regimental through front
level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder-
tired SAM launchers are at battalion and com-
pany level and with nondivisional units.
The ant lair operation is a vital component
of a theater strategic operation. Its primary
objective is to disrupt or blunt enemy offensive
air operations. An additional objective is to
prevent hostile aircraft that are carrying out
a deep-interdiction/deep-strike mission from at-
tacking installations or troop concentrations.
The operation is accomplished by using both
air and ground assets to attack enemy aircraft
either at their bases or in flight. This combined
arms operation would be directed by the High
Command of Forces in the TVD.
Naval Forces
The Soviet Navy is organized into four fleets
the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific
Ocean Fleets and the Caspian Sea Flotilla.
The navy also maintains deployed forces in the
Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off
the coast of West Africa. The Soviets also con-
tinue to develop a naval and airbase at Cam
Ranh Bay, Vietnam, where they now station
submarines with supporting surface combat-
ants and a composite air group of BADGER
strike and combat support aircraft and an air
defense force of MiG-23/FLOGGERS. In addi-
tion, combatant task groups often deploy to the
Caribbean Sea, with stopovers at Cuban bases
and ports.
Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Navy has
evolved toward a balanced ocean-going fleet ca-
pable of fighting at great distances from the
USSR at nuclear and conventional levels. As
recently as the mid-1970s, Soviet naval capa-
bilities were configured for a short, intense
war. Sustained combat was seriously restricted
by the small weapon loads as well as the lim-
ited capabilities and endurance of most surface
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METERS
12
9
6
3
0
RANGE (KM)
EFFECTIVE
ALTITUDE
SA-4a/b
70
MEDIUM-
TO-HIGH
Tactical Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-6
30
LOW-TO-
MEDIUM
combatants, some submarines, and naval air-
craft. During this time, however, new classes of
larger ships with more sophisticated weapons
systems, sensors, electronics and communica-
tions, as well as improved endurance capabili-
ties, began to enter the fleet. In combination
with marked improvements in naval aircraft
and submarines, Soviet capabilities to conduct
sustained antiship, antisubmarine, and antiair
warfare in distant waters were increased. How-
ever, the Soviets still do not have sufficient
seaborne aircraft capabilities to conduct car-
rier combat operations outside the range of
land-based aircraft.
Naval Force Growth
The USSR is constructing several new and
improved classes of general purpose submarines
and is transitioning to new designs such as
the AKULA and SIERRA. This process de-
creased output of general purpose submarines
in 1985, with only one new nuclear-powered at-
tack submarine a VICTOR-III-Class launched.
The construction of KILO-Class diesel-powered
attack submarines continued. Series produc-
tion of the AKULA, SIERRA, and possibly
other classes is expected to begin in earnest
with additional launches in 1986. New Soviet
general purpose nuclear-powered submarines,
characterized by significant quieting, new
weapons, and new sensors, pose a formidable
challenge to Western naval forces.
The Soviets are also producing increasingly
capable surface ships with greater displace-
ment, firepower, and endurance, along with
improved sensors and electronics all of which
result in ships with significantly increased self-
sustainability. At present? ten new classes of
surface warships are being produced.
SA-8
12
LOW
SA-9
8
LOW
SA-X-12
SA-13
100 8
LOW-TO-
HIGH
LOW
METERS
Surface-to-Air Missiles*
15
12
9
IMPROVED
6
HAWK
PATRIOT
3
CHAPARRAL
0
RANGE (KM) 40
EFFECTIVE LOW-TO-
ALTITUDE MEDIUM
10 80+
LOW-TO
LOW HIGH
? The US units do not have a mission to provide air defense of the
continental US.
The most noteworthy new platform under
construction is an entirely new class of aircraft
carrier. Launched from Nikolayev shipyard in
December 1985 and now in a two- to three-year
fitting-out period prior to its initial sea trials
toward the end of the decade, the new car-
rier is approximately 300 meters long and will
displace 65,000 tons
The new ship is an evolutionary step in the
Soviet Navy's aircraft carrier program. It has
a larger angled flight deck than the :17,100-
ton KIEV-Class carriers, has deck-edge air-
craft elevators fore and aft of' the starboard
island superstructure, and has a broad,
upturned bow similar in configuration to a ski
jump ramp used for short-take-off-and-vertical-
landing aircraft. It is still too early to
determine whether the new carrier will (a)n-
duct over-the-bow flight operations or whether
the forward area of' the flight deck will be fitted,
at least initially, with surface-to-surface mis-
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sue mounts similar to those aboard the KIEV-
Class carrier.
The aircraft for the new carrier's air wing
are still under development. The test and eval-
uation program for candidate aircraft contin-
ues at the Saki naval airfield near the Black
Sea. The Soviets are developing catapult and
arresting gear systems that would be required
by a carrier for launching and recovering high-
performance fixed-wing aircraft. Installation of
catapults and arresting gear on the new carrier
cannot be confirmed, however, and the Soviets
could choose to deploy this first unit with about
40 to 50 vertical take-off and landing aircraft.
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The new carrier is expected to begin sea
trials in 1989.
The Soviet Navy now has about 675 sur-
face combatant ships. This total includes 280
principal surface combatants and 3 KIEV-Class
aircraft carriers. It also includes 185 patrol
combatants, 77 amphibious ships, and some
The 14,000-ton OSCAR-Class submarine
carries 24 nuclear-capable, 550-kilometer-
range SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles. Three
OSCAR units are now operational.
130 mine warfare ships. There are 300 under-
way replenishment and material and fleet sup-
port ships and 296 general purpose submarines.
About 500 of these surface ships are ocean-
going ships of greater than 1,000 tons displace-
ment, with the remainder serving primarily in
coastal defense and flank-support roles. To-
gether, the navies of the Soviet Union and
its Warsaw Pact allies have about 540 sur-
face ships greater than 1,000 tons displacement,
compared to more than 850 ships of this size in
the navies of the United States and its NATO
allies. The 37,100-ton KIEV-Class carrier is the
largest operational ship in the navy's inven-
tory and is the first modern Soviet-built ship to
carry fixed-wing aircraft. Four have been con-
structed, and the last KIEV is fitting out. Its
weapons and sensors differ from previous units,
and it is expected to begin sea trials soon in the
Black Sea.
The KIROV-Class guided-missile cruiser is
the Soviet Navy's first nuclear-powered surface
warship. Two, the KIROV and the FRUNZE,
are now in service. Although their weapons
systems differ somewhat, both have broad capa-
bilities in all naval warfare areas-----antisurface,
antisubmarine, and antiair. A third KIROV-
Class cruiser is likely to be launched in 1986,
and construction of a fourth unit is expected to
begin soon. The lead ship of the newest class
of Soviet cruisers, the SLA VA, is active in the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean. With its 16
SS-N-12 launchers, the SLAVA is mainly de-
signed for antisurface warfare. It also has a
modern air defense system with eight SA-N-6
launchers and two twin-armed SA-N-4 launch-
ers. The second and third units are expected to
begin sea trials in late 1985 and 1986, respec-
tively, and a fourth unit is under construction
at a Black Sea shipyard.
Two guided-missile destroyer construction
programs continued during 1985. The fifth
SOVREMENNYY-Class guided-missile de-
stroyer began sea trials last August, and five
additional units are in varying stages of con-
struction. The SOVREMENNYY, which has
eight launchers for antiship cruise missiles--
twice as many as any other Soviet destroyer
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TANGO-Class SS
I- 92 Meters ) I
CHARLIE II-Class SSGN
1- 102 Meters
VICTOR III-Class SSN
104 Meters
ALFA-Class SSN
gL-
4
79 Meters 1-1
OSCAR-Class SSGN
Attack Submarines
Armament: Torpedoes, Possible ASW missile
Propulsion: Diesel
Submerged Displacement: 3,900 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1973
KILO-Class S6
1/1
150 Meters a -I
70 Meters
MIKE-Class SSN
I -1
e^==>
1-4 110 Meters
SIERRA-Class SSN
_/ I
I- a 110 Meters
YANKEE-Class SSN
\
I < 130 Meters
AKULA-Class SSN
LOS ANGELES-Class SSN-688
1 ?I
I-A
109 Meters P-1
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Torpedoes, SS-N-9 antiship cruise missile
Nuclear
5,400 MT
1974
Torpedoes, SS-N-16 ASW missile
Nuclear
6,300 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1979
Armament: Torpedoes, SS-N-15 ASW missile
Propulsion: Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 3,700 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1978
Armament: Torpedoes, SS-N-19 antiship cruise missile
Propulsion: Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 14,000 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1981
Armament: Torpedoes
Propulsion: Diesel
Submerged Displacement: 3,000 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1980
Armament: Torpedoes, ASW missile
Propulsion: Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 6,400 MT
Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Torpedoes, ASW missile
Nuclear
8,200 MT
Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials
Armament: Torpedoes
Propulsion: Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 10,000 MT
Initial Operational Capability: 1984
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Torpedoes, ASW missile
Nuclear
8,000 MT
Initial Operational Capability: Still on sea trials
Attack Submarines
Armament: Torpedoes, HARPOON antiship missiles,
TOMAHAWK SLCM, SUBROC ASW rocket
Propulsion: Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 6,500 MT
USS LOS ANGELES-Class is shown for comparison purposes. Other US attack submarine classes are
STURGEON, SKIPJACK, SKATE, and PERMIT.
is designed for antisurface warfare. It com-
plements the ASW-configured UDALOY-Class
guided-missile destroyers, which carry eight
long-range cruise missile-delivered ASW weap-
ons. Two UDALOYs entered the inventory dur-
ing 1985, bringing the total of active units
to seven. Four additional units are under
construction.
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Surface Ship Comparisons
New Class Aircraft Carrier
300 Meters
Displacement 65,000 Tons
KIEV-Class Guided-Missile VSTOL Aircraft Carrier
273 Meters
Displacement 37,100 Tons
KIROV-Class Nuclear-Powered Guided-Missile Cruiser
?
pe._54
k
248 Meters
Displacement 28,000 Tons
SLAVA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser
-187 Meters
Displacement 12,000 Tons
UDALOY-Class Guided-Missile Destroyer
162 Meters
Displacement 8,000 Tons
SOVREMENNYY-Class Guided-Missile Destroyer
156 Meters
Displacement 7,300 Tons
The backbone of' the navy's ASW corvette
force is the GRISHA. Although first introduced
into the inventory in 1968, construction of this
class continues and some 40 are operational.
NIMITZ-Class Aircraft Carrier
333 Meters
Displacement 91,400 Tons
IOWA-Class Battleship
270 Meters
Displacement 58,000 Tons
VIRGINIA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser
175 Meters
Displacement 11,000 Tons
TICONDEROGA-Class Guided-Missile Cruiser
170 Meters
Displacement 9,600 Tons
SPRUANCE-Class Destroyer
170 Meters
Displacement 7,824 Tons
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY- Class Guided-Missile Frigate
130 Meters
Displacement 3,605 Tons
Even with the first deployments of' the So-
viets' new aircraft carrier in the 1990s, Soviet
Naval Aviation (SNA) will continue to he pri-
marily a land-based force. Within the bornher
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force, production of the BACKFIRE continues,
and the C variants with improved performance
have begun to enter the fleet. The BACK-
FIRE, with its AS-4 air-to-surface missiles, is
replacing the BADGER as the navy's primary
antiship strike aircraft. The BACKFIRE sub-
stantially extends the range at which SNA
bombers could attack US and allied surface
forces, such as aircraft carrier battle groups
or amphibious task groups. With respect to
ASW force developments, production of a vari-
ant of the BEAR F long-range ASW aircraft
has resumed. This aircraft's improved sensor
system and 5,000-kilometer radius considerably
enhances Soviet capabilities to conduct ASW
operations at greater distances from the USSR.
Soviet amphibious forces generally receive
lower priority than submarine and surface war-
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The Soviets' ability to project power into the
Pacific Ocean region has increased with the
deployment of the KIROV-Class nuclear-
powered guided-missile cruiser FRUNZE to
the Pacific Fleet.
produce air cushion vehicles (ACVs) mainly for
an amphibious warfare role. The USSR now
maintains the world's largest force of ACVs.
Those classes currently in the inventory in-
clude the AIST, LEBED, TSAPLYA, UTENOK,
and GUS. The first unit of the new PELIKAN-
Class joined the Baltic Fleet in 1985, as did the
first unit of the POMORNIK-Class. The latter
craft is 56 meters long, making it the world's
largest naval ACV. An additional class is also
under construction. The ACV's high speed en-
ables it to move troops and equipment more effi-
ciently over short distances than conventional
landing craft.
The Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) is a small,
elite force with the primary missions of con-
ducting assault landings on the maritime flanks
of the USSR in support of ground theater op-
erations and of securing strategic straits in
conjunction with other forces.
Since 1979, the SNI has undergone extensive
reorganization and equipment modernization.
All three former SNI regiments in the west-
ern fleets have been expanded to brigades, and
combat support elements have been added to
the single Pacific Ocean Fleet division. Fur-
ther, SNI manning has increased from 14,000
to 16,000 troops. The introduction of artillery
and antitank battalions as well as new equip-
ment such as T-72 tank and 82-mm automatic
mortars has increased SNI's organic firepower
and operational capabilities.
Naval Operational Concepts
The USSR's concept of wartime operations
appears to be influenced as much by geography
0
as by potential enemies. Soviet military plan-
ners face four separate maritime frontiers
Arctic/North Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea, and
Pacific--which have necessitated the develop-
ment of four different and nearly self-contained
fleets. To facilitate command and control and
wartime operations of the widely separated
fleets and to meet the navy's varied and ex-
panding wartime roles, a theater of military
operations (TVD) structure encompassing the
world's oceans has been established.
Within these oceanic TVDs, the missions of
ship programs. Although no new, large am-
phibious ships have been produced since
completion of the second IVAN ROGOV am-
phibious assault transport dock (LPD) in 1982,
construction of amphibious vehicle landing
ships (LSTs) for the Soviet Navy has contin-
ued in Poland, and a new, large LST class is
believed to be in the planning stages.
The Soviet Navy continues to develop and
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The Yak-36/FORGER vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) fighter is the main strike air-
craft carried aboard the KIEV-Class aircraft carrier.
the Soviet Navy are to contribute to Soviet de-
terrence and strategic strike capability and to
defend the USSR from enemy sea-based strike
forces. The wartime tasks associated with these
missions include:
? protecting Soviet strategic ballistic mis-
sile submarines:
? countering enemy sea-based strategic
forces:
? securing the sea approaches to the USSR
and Warsaw Pact countries;
? conducting operations in selected areas
to deny Western forces freedom of action;
? supporting Soviet and Warsaw Pact
ground operations in continental TVDs;
? protecting Soviet sea lines of communica-
tion; and
? interdicting enemy sea lines of communi-
cation.
Although the traditional fleet mission of
`:Mistsuo Shibeta
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strategic submarine protection and homeland
defense remain dominate themes in Soviet
planned wartime operations, coordinated com-
bined arms/joint force operations within con-
tinental TVDs, especially in the Baltic and
Black Sea Fleets, are receiving increased em-
phasis. For the most part, these continental
TVD-oriented exercises appear designed to pre-
pare fleet units to protect the seaward flanks
of the Warsaw Pact, to seize key straits and is-
lands, and to conduct amphibious assaults in
support of Soviet land operations.
Recent naval exercises in both the oceanic
and continental TVDs have been conducted un-
der realistic conditions approximating a war-
time environment. In the Northern and Pacific
Ocean Fleets, they have focused on command
and control of multiple task groups and for-
mations, the deployment of large numbers of
warships and aircraft, and the establishment
of echeloned combat zones stretching into the
North Atlantic and Northwest Pacific Oceans.
These exercises also reveal that Soviet naval
operations are being conducted with larger and
more powerful forces at increasingly greater
distances from the USSR.
NATO and the Warsaw Pact
In 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization published the second edition of the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Compar-
isons study. Charts from the 1984 NATO study
were published in Souiet Military Power 1.98,5.
The following charts and tables present a
US estimate of updated data for 1985. Not in-
cluded in the data are forces of France and
Spain. Although both nations are members of
the North Atlantic Alliance, they do not par-
ticipate in its integrated military structure. In
an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw
Pact, France and Spain would defend their na-
tional sovereignty with the following fiirces:
approximately 20 divisions, 2,000 tanks, 3,000
artillery/mortars, 1,000 antitank launchers,
8,000 combat vehicles, 450 helicopters, 900
aircraft, and 100 naval warships.
NATO-Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft'
Fighter-Bomber
Ground-Attack Interceptor-
3,450
2,100
2,300
1,400
1,170
900
NATO
Fully reinforced
In place
3,850
2,800
430
260
Reconnaissance
Excludes France and Spain.
Some interceptors can be used in ground-attack roles.
US estimate of 1985 data
Excludes strategic interceptors
WARSAW PACT
Fully reinforced
In place
570
380
75
Bombers
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NATO and Warsaw Pact Maritime Forces in
the North Atlantic and Seas Bordering Europe,
1985*
Category
NATO Warsaw Pact
Aircraft Carriers
VSTOL Carriers 10
KIEV-Class Ships 1
Helicopter Carriers 6 2
Cruisers 16 21
Destroyers,
Frigates, Corvettes 303 199
Land-Based INF Aircraft Deployed
at End of 1985*
About 4,000
800
Coastal Escorts NATO
and Fast Aircraft
Patrol Boats 269 520 F-111, F-4, F-16, F-104,
JAGUAR, BUCCANEER,
TO
Amphibious Ships
-Ocean-going 50 21
- Other Ships/
Coastal Craft 69 181
Mine Warfare
Ships/Craft 264 360
Total Submarines
(All Types) 209 265
- Ballistic Missile
Submarines 35 47
- Long -Range
Attack
Submarines 70 150
- Other Types 104 68
- ?/c, Submarines
Nuclear
Powered 50% 50%
Sea-based Tactical
ASW and Support
Aircraft Including
Helicopters 831 145
Land-Based
Tactical and
Support Aircraft
Including
Helicopters 379 575
Land-Based Anti-
Submarine
Warfare Fixed-
Wing Aircraft
and Helicopters 462 220
Excludes France and Spain
' US estimate of 1985 data
WARSAW PACT
Aircraft
BADGER, BLINDER, FISHBED, FLAGON,
FITTER, FLOGGER, FENCER, FULCRUM
'US estimate of 1985 data
Numbers reflect NATO systems deployed in NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact systems
opposite NATO
Short-Range Nuclear Forces
(SNF) Deployed at End of 1985*
3 000
NATO
Missiles
LANCE
Artillery
155mm, 203mm
WARSAW PACT
Missiles
FROG/SS-21
Artillery
152mm, 203mm, 240mm
? US estimate of 1985 data
Numbers reflect NATO systems deployed in NATO Europe and Warsaw Pact systems
opposite NATO
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NATO-WARSAW PACT Comparison*
Total Military
Including Naval Forces
41,500
32,850
18 600
Artillery/Mortar
24,250
19,600
49 000
33,000
22,580
13,370
Division Main
Equivalents Battle Tanks
74000' 1,250
47,000
Armored Personnel Carriers
Fighting Vehicles
NATO"
In Place in Europe and
Rapidly Deployable Forces
NATO"
Fully Reinforced Forces
L
650
950"
900
Attack Helicopters
33 000
18,000
Antitank Guided
Weapons Launchers
Transport/Support
Helicopters
WARSAW PACT"
In Place in Europe and
Rapidly Deployable Forces
WARSAW PACT"
Fully Reinforced Forces
Excludes France and Spain
Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions but contain
more tanks and artillery, thereby obtaining similar combat power.
' US estimate of 1985 data.
?? Rapidly deployable forces?Include those US forces whose equipment is stored in Europe and high.
readiness Soviet forces located in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev. and North
Caucasus Military Districts.
??? Fully reinforced forces- --Include North American reinforcements and all Warsaw Pact forces located
west of the Ural Mountains.
Excludes armored command vehicles and other carriers.
' Excludes transport helicopters that can be configured for attack roles.
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Chapter V
Readiness,
Mobility, and
Sustainability
The USSR's comprehensive commitment to
support of its armed forces, in addition to the
buildup and modernization of' its weapons sys-
tems and forces, is reflected in programs that
exercise and maintain a high degree of com-
bat readiness. The development of extensive
logistics bases and the expansion of strategic
and theater mobility capabilities are designed
to ensure that Soviet forces can make a rapid
transition to war and can be moved and sup-
ported in combat.
A massive mobilization and combat support
system underlies Soviet military power. It is de-
signed to focus all the resources of' the nation
on waging war. Soviet doctrine stresses that its
armed forces must be prepared to engage in any
type of conflict ranging from short local wars
to protracted global conflicts. Therefore, the
Soviets are prepared to mobilize and sustain
their forces in a variety of wartime contingen-
cies. Moreover, support systems and resources
paralleling the growth of strategic and theater
combat forces have been developed. These in-
clude a trained military manpower base for ex-
panding the active forces and replacing losses;
a logistics system incorporating all classes of'
consumable supplies; war reserve equipment.;
and transport, repair, construction, and med-
ical units.
Soviet R&D efforts to improve theater mo-
bility include the development of wing-in-
ground-effect craft. The ORLAN-Class, seen
here, takes advantage of the increased aero-
dynamic lift that occurs when a wing oper-
ating near the surface experiences a reduc-
tion in induced drag. This greatly increases
the craft's ability to carry heavy loads over
long distances, especially over water, making
it well-suited for amphibious warfare.
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Mobility
Historically, the Soviet Union has possessed
formidable forces suited for fighting in Europe,
the Far East, and other areas contiguous to
the USSR. During the past two decades, how-
ever, the Soviets have enhanced their posture
by steadily increasing their military forces in
size, capability, range, and scope of operations
beyond the periphery of the USSR. Through
continuous technological advancements in air,
sea, and command and control systems, they
are increasingly able to maintain lines of com-
munication and sustain their expanding
military reach. An enhanced capability to de-
ploy light, well-armed, mobile forces in support
of strategic goals and national objectives in-
creases the potential for Soviet power projec-
tion into areas of vital interest to the Western
Alliance.
Existing Soviet mobility capabilities encom-
pass these developments:
? the formation of strategically mobile
forces and compatible military transport.
assets;
? the design, modernization, and expan-
sion of civilian transport systems that
are easily adapted to military transport
requirements; and
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? the establishment of national-level plan-
ning and management bodies capable
of mobilizing and assembling strategic
assets from the civilian sector to meet
military transport requirements.
Soviet mobility is based in part on amphibi-
ous assault ships and increasingly capable mil-
itary air and air transport forces supplemented
by civilian transport assets and associated per-
sonnel. The Soviet leadership has established
procedures for mobilizing civilian transport re-
sources for military employment and routinely
uses these assets in various military exercises.
Military Transport Aviation (Voyenno-
The Soviet An-124/CONDOR, with its 150-
metric-ton lift capacity, surpasses the heavy-
lift capability of the US C-5B transport.
transportnaya aviatsia, abbreviated VTA) forces
are the most visible of all the Soviet military
mobility assets. In wartime, VTA forces would
support airborne operations and provide logis-
tic airlift to the armed forces. During peace-
time, VTA aircraft make arms and equipment
deliveries to client states in the Third World.
VTA's worldwide presence is continually grow-
ing in numbers and scope?from famine relief
operations in Ethiopia to combat support oper-
ations in Afghanistan. This force, comprised of
about 600 aircraft, continues to modernize and
improve in range, speed, and cargo capacity.
VTA holdings consist of the four-engine,
propellor-driven An-12/CUB and its replace-
ment, the long-range jet transport I1-76/CAN-
DID, which now constitutes over half of the
VTA inventory. The USSR's heavy-lift ca-
pability currently consists of 55 An-22/COCK
aircraft. However, the Soviets are prepar-
ing to deploy the new An-124/CONDOR heavy-
lift transport in 1987 or 1988. This aircraft,
which is comparable to the US C-SB GALAXY,
will be able to carry a payload of 150 metric
tons, almost twice the capacity of the An-22.
This increase in heavy-lift capacity, in con-
junction with the continued improvements ex-
pected from additional I1-76/CANDID deploy-
ments, will significantly enhance the Soviets'
ability to support their commitments abroad.
The CONDOR, in particular, will be able to
The visor-nosed An-124/CONDOR, with its
large payload capacity for outsized cargo and
its drive-through feature, will add signifi-
cantly to Soviet military airlift and power
projection capabilities.
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carry larger quantities of outsized weapons
such as the 55-20 transporter-erector-launcher,
tanks, helicopters, missiles, and other critical
equipment than could any of its predecessors.
In peacetime, the Soviets will he able to supply
client states with greater quantities of materiel
in crisis situations. In wartime, the large lift
capacity of the CONDOR, in conjunction with
the CANDID, will facilitate the rapid move-
ment of critical reserve stocks to forward areas
or between theaters of' war as well as increase
the flexibility of' Soviet airborne forces.
The Soviets' total aircraft capacity would be
significantly increased by the mobilization of'
the state-owned airline, Aeroflot. These long-
and medium-range transport aircraft, which
number some 1,600, provide the Soviets with
an immediate source of strategic air transport.
METERS
75
60
45
30
15
0
An-124/CONDOR
The close relationship between Soviet military
and civil sectors is very apparent in the Min-
istry of Civil Aviation. For example, Minister
of Civil Aviation Boris P. Bugayev is an active
duty general officer who holds the rank of Chief
Marshal of Aviation. Additionally, several key
ministry members are active duty officers, and
most Aeroflot aircrews hold reserve mili-
tary commissions.
Sealift
The USSR's military sealift capability is
based on the Navy's 77 amphibious warfare
ships. For strategic sealift, the Soviets, how-
ever, depend on their large merchant fleet. This
military-adaptable fleet has grown steadily dur-
ing the past two decades. The foundations of
strategic sealift consist of more than 1,700 ships
Military Transport Aircraft
An-22/COCK
11-76/CANDID
MAX PAYLOAD (MT)
150
80
40
20
TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY
415/320
175/175
140/125
90/60
RANGE (MAX PAYLOAD) (KM)
2,900
4,200
4,600
1,400
METERS
75
60
45
30
15
0
US Military Transport Aircraft
C-56 GALAXY ?
C-141B STARLIFTER"
C-130 A/H HERCULES
MAX PAYLOAD (MT)
125
40
21
TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY
340/-
200-155
90/60
RANGE (MAX PAYLOAD) (KM)
4,200
3,950
1,850
Air refuelable
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V Ill )til' C0111h1 Fled deadweight tonnage exceeds
21 million. This figure represents an increase
of more than 500 percent over the past 20 years.
Nearly half the cargo ships are self-sustaining
and have cranes capable of lifting heavy mili-
tary vehicles. Soviet ships have commercial as
welI as a military utility.
The Soviet merchant fleet is regularly used
to support naval logistics operations. It con-
sists of more than 60 roll-on/roll-off (HO/HO)
and rail transport vessels. An element of the
l( )i technology, specifically the loading
ramp, was acquired from the West. In wartime,
the merchant fleet would allow the Soviets to
move forces to the most remote areas of the
globe. In peacetime, it is used to transport
arms and the forces of client states in support
of Soviet foreign policy objectives.
Soviet merchant ships produced over the
last two decades have increasingly been
constructed to military standards. Some
key features they have incorporated include
chemical-biological-radiological ((BR) protec-
tion; increased endurance and surface speeds:
improved capability in handling gear and self-
servicing features: advanced communication,
navigation, and electronics systems. including
ident ifi ltion-frin(l-or-e (I FE) systems which
are restricted to naval ships in the West.
The current Soviet merchant marine ship-
building program emphasizes designs hav-
ing direct military applications. These in-
clude roll-on"roll-off, roll-on/float-off(RO/FLO),
lighter :iboard ship (LASH). and container ships.
The operations of the merchant marine are
closely coordinated with naval requirements
from Moscow down to the smallest port facil-
ity. A significant ;imount of logistic support
required by the Soviet Navy in peacetime, es-
pecially in distant ;ireas, is routinely provided
by Soviet merchantmen. This flexibility allows
Soviet merchant ships to obtain supplies for
naval use in ports where warship visits might
be denied.
In a crisis, the highly organized, centrally
controlled merchant fleet can provide military
support quickly and effectively. particularly
for amphibious operations, troop movements,
;ind arms shipments. For example. in support
of' a military operation against Japan, the So-
viet Ear East merchant fleet has the estimated
capacity to transport up to seven motorized
rifle or tank divisions in a single lift opera-
tion, if given appropriate sea conditions and
air superiority. To ensure readiness to perform
800 -
600 -
400 -
200 -
Soviet Military Air Transport
Force Trend
CUB
CANDID
COCK
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
800
600
400
200
such missions. Soviet merchant ships are com-
manded mostly by naval reserve officers who
routinely participate in major naval exercises.
Augmenting the ocean-going merchant fleet
is a river-sea fleet consisting of' some 700 tank-
ers flicl dry cargo carriers, with a deadweight
tonnage of 2.5 million. These ships, which op-
erate in coastal sea areas and in the Soviet
and European inland waterway system, repre-
sent an added wartime capacity to transport
supplies and materiel to continental military
theaters of operation.
Realizing the vulnerability of their rail trans-
port system, the Soviets have over the past two
decades expanded their inventory of' heavy-lin
transporters. especially the M AZ-5:17 tractor,
with a trailer capable of carrying armored ve-
hicles weighing 50 metric tons. The Soviets
have more than :I,500 heavy-lift transporters
available for moving military vehicles. The use
of these heavy-lift transporters facilikites the
movement of combat forces from the Soviet in-
terior to forward areas opposite NATO, South-
west Asia, China. Korea. and Japan. Heavy-lift
vehicles provide the Soviets with ;1 fast and
H exible transport force for the movement of'
combat forces.
The Mi-26/HALO. the world's largest heavy-
lift helicopter, is another example of' Soviet
enhancement of civil ;Ind military transport
sectors through the acquisition of Western tech-
nology. With its obvious military applications,
it has zi payload ;Ind cargo hold capacity simi-
lar to that of' the US ('-1:10.
lntert heater movement of Soviet forces op-
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posite NATO, Southwest Asia, and the Far
East still is dependent on the rail system. The
Soviet rail system is organized to facilitate
its rapid conversion during wartime to a pri-
mary long-distance carrier. Upon mobilization,
the rail system comes under military control
and operation: thus, locomotives and rolling
stock are made immediately available to sup-
port Soviet military needs. Construction of' the
Baikal-Amur-Magistral Railroad, which will be
operational in 1990, will augment the vulnera-
ble Trans-Siberian Railroad in support of So-
viet forces in the Far East either for action
against China or against US forces operating
in the Pacific area.
The continued development and success of
Soviet theater and strategic movement capa-
bilities present a clear challenge to Western
defense planners. Despite the impact that mo-
bilization of the civilian transport sector would
have on the economy including severe disrup-
tions of normal transportation of goods and
services the wartime employment of civilian
assets is a major strength and key element in
Soviet military power.
Readiness
Soviet military doctrine asserts that its
armed forces must be maintained at a high
state of combat readiness to ensure expeditious
deployment under any conditions. Maintain-
ing peacetime forces that are fully deployed
at the strength required for war poses an eco-
nomic burden to Soviet planners. Therefore, in
peacetime many Soviet ground force units are
manned at levels below their planned wartime
strength. The Soviets are dependent on their
well-organized and extensive mobilization sys-
tem which allows a rapid fleshing out of their
force structure for war.
Even with extensive preparations, the War-
saw Pact might experience some initial diffi-
culties. Many Warsaw Pact tactical air force
fighter regiments include some new pilots with
limited experience. The inexperience of these
pilots would limit the overall air combat po-
tential of the Warsaw Pact. Further, Warsaw
Pact aircrews usually fly at only about half the
annual rate of US active duty aircrews. As a re-
sult, Warsaw Pact aircrews usually are limited
to a single role and therefore lack the flexi-
bility inherent in many US and some non-US
NATO units. With the reorganization of So-
viet Air Forces, the growth in the number of
longer range intermediate-range nuclear force
(LRINF) missiles, and the high state of readi-
ness of forward-deployed forces, the USSR is
capable of executing the initial phase of an
attack without the mobilization of additional
forces. However, if the order is given to go
to war, the Soviets would implement their na-
tional mobilization plan, drawing upon some
nine million recently trained reservists. These
reservists would be used to bring understrength
units, cadre units, and mobilization bases to
full manning in a matter of days. While mo-
bilizing and moving over 200 divisions is an
extremely large and difficult task, the Soviets
can assimilate the reservists, train them for
combat, and be ready to conduct offensive op-
erations in less than 60 days.
The Soviets maintain their forces at what
they term "ready" and "not-ready" levels.
Ready units are manned with a high percentage
of their planned wartime personnel, possess the
most modern equipment, and train extensively
in peacetime. They can begin combat opera-
tions after only a very short period of mobi-
lization and preparation. These "ready" units
constitute about 40 percent of Soviet forces
and include all of the Groups of Forces sta-
tioned in Eastern Europe. The "not-ready"
units are cadre and unmanned mobilization
bases that require extensive mobilization and
preparation and are generally equipped with
older but still effective equipment such as T-55
or T-62 tanks. However, as increasing amounts
of modern equipment are made available, many
"not-ready" divisions are being equipped with
the most advanced items in the Soviet
inventory.
The survivability of Soviet weapons systems
and personnel is enhanced by a very compre-
hensive dispersal system that would be exe-
cuted during the transition to war. When
alerted, Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
units would deploy to areas that would de-
crease their vulnerability to detection and
targeting. Ground forces would disperse and
camouflage themselves in field assembly areas
while aircraft would proceed to alternate air-
fields. Surface ships and submarines would
depart from their main operating bases.
Personnel, equipment, and spare missiles
needed for refiring ICBMs would move to field
locations. Alternate command posts have been
constructed, and redundant, hardened, and mo-
bile communication links have been established
throughout the USSR. These preparations for
dispersal at the outbreak of war reflect Mos-
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Soviet underway replenishment ship, on left, refueling a SOVREMENNYY-Class guided-missile
destroyer during summer naval exercises.
cow's perceived threat and expected deploy-
ment of forces.
Logistics
Soviet militlrV planners continue to improve
the logistic infrastructure and to enlarge the
resource base available to support high-
intensit y combined arms operations. Substan-
tial quantities of supplies are stockpiled in
forward areas for the initial stages of a conflict,
and large strategic reserves exist to sustain op-
erations. This comprehensive logistic support
system is found in designated theaters of mili-
tary Operations in Eastern Europe, Mongolia,
and throughout the USSR.
The Soviets have prestocked critical ammu-
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nit ion and fuel reserves in Eastern Europe and
the military districts of the western USSR. So-
viet ammunition stocks intended to support
combat operations against NATO in central
Europe are double 1975 levels. The growth of
Soviet military fuel stocks opposite central Eu-
rope is also substantial. In addition, each non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact country maintains large
stockpiles of key military items. Moreover, the
well road and rail system within the
Western Theater facilitates the forward move-
ment of supplies in wartime. Overall, theater
logistic stockpiles in Eastern Europe and the
military districts along the border of the USSR
are capable of supporting Warsaw Pact mili-
tary operations against NATO for 60 to 90 days.
The Far East Theater encompasses the
USSR's largest continental theater of military
operations but historically has been of sec-
ondary importance as Soviet planners have
placed greater emphasis on supporting Soviet
forces opposite NATO. In the last decade, how-
ever, the Soviets have devoted considerably
more at to increasing the sustainabil-
it y of their forces in the Far East because of
the long lines of communication and the need
to support large theater forces opposite China
and ,lapan. Storage capacities for ammunition
and POI, which account for about 80 percent
of the Soviets' total war materials, have in-
creased significantly at many depots. The pre-
positioning of such large quantities of war ma-
terials in the Far East reduces the dependence
on logistic assets from the western industrial
centers for resupply during the initial periods
of actual warfare. Soviet ground and naval
fOrces can now sustain defensive conventional
wartime operations for more than 100 days.
The Trans-Siberian Railroad would be a crit-
ical supply line to the Far East in a war ex-
ceeding 100 days. This railroad is the only
land transportation link to the Far East and
is particularly vulnerable to interdiction where
it closely parallels the Chinese border. The
Baikal-Amur-Magistral Railroad, currently un-
der construction, will parallel the eastern por-
tion of the Trans-Siberian to the north. When
completed, it will be less vulnerable to interdic-
tion hut will not significantly increase overall
supply capacity.
The Pacific Ocean Fleet is the USSR's most
far-reaching arm in the Far East and is es-
pecially dependent on the Trans-Siberian for
supply of' war materials. The fleet must de-
fend more than 11,000 kilometers of coastline,
Major Soviet Military Storage Areas
?
??? 1..
? col? ? ? ..?. ?
?? ? ?It
?
? ? ?,?
? ??
Ammunition Depots
12 million metric tons arms/ammunition
including storage in Eastern Europe
Reserve Armor Storage Depots
6,000 armored vehicles (tanks/APCs)
including storage in Eastern Europe
404.6
?
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
Storage Depot Concentrations
60 million metric tons
including storage in Eastern Europe
??
?
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the largest maritime border of any Soviet fleet.
Major Soviet Military Storage Areas In order to provide logistic support to the
fleet and serve as a hedge against loss of' the
Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Soviets have de-
veloped large naval weapons and POI, storage
complexes throughout the region. The fleet's
. ?
? ? present logistic infrastructure is estimated to
? he capable of sustaining naval combat opera-
? ? ? ?
tions beyond 150 days.
. ?
? ? Although Soviet planners believe that nil!-
. itary objectives in some theaters can he
? achieved within weeks, additional logistic cc-
?? sources, termed strategic reserves, have been
? ? ?
established for protracted operations. The stra-
.
tegic reserve depots concentrated in the iii-
tenor military districts of the Soviet Union
Reserve Artillery Storage Depots would be used to support theater operations.
18,000 artillery and AAA pieces Some of these reserve depots store van-
including storage in Eastern Europe ous types of military materiel, including spare
parts, clothing, rations, and medical supplies.
Major weapons systems and other war-
fighting equipment have been placed in stor-
age depots. These items include tanks, armored
?? personnel carriers, field artillery, and air
.
defense systems as well as maintenance.
?? ? ? engineer, signal, and other types of support
.? ? ? equipment. Many of these systems are older
?
models but are capable of performing Mice-
?
tively in combat. They would be used to replace
losses and create additional combat and sup-
port units. This equipment thus constitutes an
important addition to Soviet military power.
The USSR has deployed a variety of well-
Bridge Equipment Storage Depots
equipped logistic units to move supplies. repair
27,000 meters of bridging materials damaged equipment, build and maintain lines
including storage in Eastern Europe
of communication, and treat personnel casual-
ties. Motor transport units, many of which are
kept loaded with ammunition and fuel during
peacetime, possess large numbers of the most
4
11. modern trucks, including the very capable KA-
I MAZ trucks. which were built with West ern
.40' 4" technology and assistance.
Tactical pipeline construction units add sub-
'
stantially to fuel transport capabilities. Soviet
pipelaying units are capable of installing about
80 kilometers of pipe per day using i he TUM
r
autorriatic pipelayer or about :30 kilometers per
day manually. The high pipelaying rate is con-
sistent with Soviet offensive doctrine which
holds that armies are to advance up to 100 kilo-
meters a day. Some 15,000 kilometers of' pipe
Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Concentrations
including storage in Eastern Europe are currently estimated to he available for op-
erations against NATO's Central RegUm while
about 12,000 kilometers of' pipeline are with
logistics units in the Soviet Far East.
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The 12,000-ton IVAN ROGOV-Class amphibious assault transports enhance the USSR's
capability to project military power beyond the Soviet Union.
Equipment repair units are highly mobile
and designed to move forward with rapidly
;idvancing combat formations. To facilitate
the movement of combat and support forces,
the USSR has bridge, rail, and road construc-
tion units that would maintain critical lines of
communication at strategic and tactical levels.
Nledical units to treat and evacuate casualties
are also part of the USSR's combat logistic
support system.
The Soviet Union is investing very heavily in
mobilization and logistic support systems that
are the underpinnings of its military capabili-
ties. In the USSR's military planning process,
every effort is made to ensure that the demands
that would be placed upon these systems in war
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Symbolic of the Soviet Navy's growing ca-
pability to project power is the KIEV-Class
aircraft carrier.
are not left to chance. The Soviets peacetime
preparations indicate they have every inten-
tion of meeting the support requirements in-
herent in major conflicts, even those that are
protracted.
Mobilization System
To support wartime goals, the USSR has de-
veloped a mobilization system backed by an
extensive manpower and logistics base that
integrates the military, government, economy,
and general population. Although geared to
the rapid buildup and wartime commitment of
military units and other resources, the sys-
tem is also designed to accommodate extended
and selective mobilization of all types of mili-
tary and civilian assets. Mobilization may be
general, in which the entire nation is placed
on a wartime footing, or limited, as that con-
ducted in preparation for the Czechoslovakia
and Afghanistan invasions.
Some 4,200 military organizations, called
commissariats which are subordinate to the
Soviet General Staff are crucial to the rapid
mobilization of Soviet manpower and materiel.
Dispersed throughout the USSR, these mili-
tary commissariats have functions analogous
to those of US draft boards and armed forces
reserve centers in that their peacetime mis-
sion is conscription, reservist registration,
and training.
In wartime, commissariats are responsible
for mobilizing reserve manpower and equip-
ment from the civilian economy to activate or
create combat and combat support units. These
would include motor transport, engineer, re-
pair, signal, and medical units. During mo-
bilization, reservists are notified, assembled,
and dispatched to units with equipment drawn
from the national economy and are then inte-
grated into the armed forces. When executed,
this system could activate several million re-
servists and tens of' thousands of' trucks and
other equipment within a few days. Also, sup-
port systems such as the rail network, the civil
airline Aeroflot, the merchant fleet, and ele-
ments of the national communications system
can be militarized as part of the national mobi-
lization effort.
Military Manpower Base
All eligible Soviet youths. by law, must serve
two years or, in the case of naval personnel
aboard ship, three years of active duty. Con-
scripts are subsequently discharged into the
reserves. Thus, the Soviets have a military
manpower base in which all able-bodied
citizens between 18 and 50 are either on active
duty or are subject to reserve service.
The reserve manpower pool currently com-
prises more than 55 million men subject to
callup, of which 9 million have been discharged
from active duty within the past five N'ears.
Since only about. 2.1 million reservists, or about
5 percent of the total reserve manpower pool,
are needed to bring the Soviet Armed Forces to
full wartime strength, a substantial base would
remain available to create new units and pro-
vide replacements.
The process of fleshing out units involves
mostly conscripts since Soviet force structure
employs a cadre system comprised of' a career
officer corps of' about one million personnel al-
ready in place. The career officer corps repre-
sents over 20 percent of' the total Soviet Armed
Forces strength of' approximately 5.7 million.
Within the Soviet military establishment,
women serve mainly in the enlisted ranks in
auxiliary and specialist roles notably, medi-
cal, administrative, communications, and other
support areas. Military law in the Soviet Union
also subjects women to conscription during
wartime, thereby ensuring a large reservoir
for expanding the forces and releasing men for
combat duty.
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Chapter VI
Research,
Development,
and Production
The Soviet Union's evolution as a global
superpower has been based primarily on its mil-
itary capabilities. Realizing that numerical su-
periority alone would not provide the leverage
they sought in the world arena. Soviet lead-
ers have endeavored to harness modern
technology to make their weapons systems
qualitatively equal to, or superior to. those
of the Free World. This objective comple-
ments the Communists dialectical perspective
of history which predicts Soviet scientific as-
cendancy in the 21st century. In an attempt
to fulfill this destiny, the Soviets have ('ommit-
ted their best scientific personnel, their hest
research facilities and equipment. and the man-
agement skills of their elite to military re-
search and development (R&D) and production
efforts, often to the detriment of their civil-
ian industry and the welfare of' their populace.
The Soviets have also invested large amounts
of economic resources in their effort to gain
military superiority.
Military Expenditures
Cumulative Soviet military expenditures
from 1976 to 1985 greatly exceeded those of the
United States. During this decade, the esti-
mated dollar cost of the Soviet military
program was one-th=.rd larger than the US
defense outlay, using similar methods of
Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air-superiority
fighters, now being deployed, are equipped
with a look-down/shoot-down weapon sys-
tem and beyond-visual-range AA-10 missiles.
The FLANKER, along with the Soviets' ex-
panding inventory of new, high-performance,
dual-capable MiG-29/FULCRUM supersonic
fighters, is emerging from an expanding in-
dustrial base that gives highest priority to
military production.
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definition. Soviet expenditures for weapons
systems during this period were 50 percent
higher. Increased US defense spending has nar-
rowed this differential, but in critical areas
such as R&D, the Soviet effort still exceeds that
of the US. Moreover, there has been an upturn
in Soviet weapons procurement during the past
two years.
Estimates of Soviet military spending in cur-
rent rubles indicate a significant increase from
the early 1970s to the early 1980s?at a rate
significantly faster than their overall economic
growth. The Soviet military effort now con-
sumes an estimated 15 to 17 percent of their
gross national product.
The costs of the Soviets' huge military R&D
effort are very high. The USSR commits about
3 percent of its gross national product (GNP)
to research and development-----or about 20 per-
cent of total Soviet defense outlays. The USSR
has assembled the world's largest pool of sci-
entists and engineers --over 900,000 working
in R&D. This total plus the almost one million
support personnel involved in R&D constitutes
about one-fourth of the world's total. Over half
of these Soviet scientists and engineers have
defense-related specialties, and a large per-
centage are involved in military-related R&D
on a full-time basis. By their own account-
ing and definitions, the Soviets employ over
12 million scientists and engineers throughout
their economy.
Key Military Technologies
Technological gains in Soviet weapons sys-
tems rely not only on the contributions of the
indigenous R&D base but also on the acquisi-
tion of Western technology and its timely in-
corporation into Soviet weaponry. While the
United States continues to lead the USSR in
most basic technologies, the gap in the mili-
tary application of such technologies continues
to narrow. The incorporation of critical West-
ern technologies is permitting the USSR to
avoid costly R&D efforts and to produce Soviet
weapons comparable to or superior to fielded
US weapons at a much earlier date than would
otherwise be possible.
Materials. Driven by the increasingly de-
manding requirements of advanced weapons
systems, the Soviets have devoted considerable
effort in all the important materials disciplines.
Their capability in metal alloys such as tita-
nium for the fabrication of structural elements
for aerospace and naval systems is the equal of
US and Soviet Procurement
of Major Weapons Systems 1976-1985
US
USSR
ICBMs and SLBMs
700
3,350
IRBMs and MRBMs
430
1,000
Surface-to-Air Missiles
1,600
112,000
Long- and Intermediate-
range Bombers
2
345
Fighters
3,500
7,850
Helicopters
1,500
5,350
Submarines
40
96
Major Surface
Combatants
90
83
Tanks
7,400
24,900
Artillery
2,400
32,225
any other nation and may lead in some areas.
For example, their use of titanium for subma-
rine pressure hulls and for aircraft structures
is most impressive. Their ability to use steel,
aluminum, and most other alloys as well as ad-
vanced processing techniques such as powder
metallurgy and rapid solidification is as good
as any in the world. They are emulating the
US in applying advanced composite materials
with excellent strength and stiffness ratios to
aerospace structural components. The Soviets
claim parity with the US in composite materi-
als development and design know-how but ad-
mit their deficiency in fabrication techniques.
In ground weapons applications such as tank
armor, the Soviets have made significant im-
provements, including the use of laminated ma-
terials and applique concepts to improve the
ballistic protection of their newest tanks. They
have conducted considerable research in ce-
ramics, particularly for engine and armor ap-
plications. While the US still enjoys a lead
in structural materials technology, the Sovi-
ets are making advances that are eroding that
lead.
Manufacturing. The USSR has long recog-
nized the need to develop the manufacturing
and fabrication capabilities that permit the
mass production of weapons systems. The Sovi-
ets have the world's largest forging and extru-
sion presses, allowing them to fabricate large,
single-piece components with considerable
savings in weight and cost. To support their
vigorous program in joining technologies, they
graduate nearly 3,000 welding engineers each
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year while the Free World has only a few
schools that even offer this curriculum. The
Soviets have demonstrated innovative welding
techniques in such processes as electroslag,
friction, electrogas, and pulsed arc welding.
They are the world leader in this important in-
dustrial capability. However, the Soviets con-
tinue, to trail the Free World in automated
manufacturing technologies such as numeri-
cally controlled machine tools, flexible manu-
facturing systems, robotics, automated indus-
trial control systems, and high-precision
equipment. Although they are improving, fur-
ther Soviet development depends on the ac-
quisition of knowledge and equipment from
non-Communist countries.
Propulsion. The Soviets continue to progress
steadily in all aspects of propulsion technol-
ogy. Their gas turbine aircraft engines are
improving in performance and efficiency and
are noted for their ruggedness and simplicity
alt hough constrained by short operating life-
times. Until they sent an An-124/CONDOR
wide-bodied transport aircraft with a Lotarev
D18T engine to the 1985 Paris Air Show, they
had not displayed a high-thrust, high-bypass
engine similar to those used by the US since
1969. The Soviets also have a very extensive
R&D effort in all aspects of rocket propulsion.
There has been a noticeable trend from liquid-
to solid-propellant engines on their new land-
based strategic systems, with the technology
only slightly behind that of US systems.
They remain the world's leader in liquid
rocket propulsion though they still have not
successfully applied a liquid-hydrogen, liquid-
oxygen cryogenic engine to their space launch
vehicles. The Soviets have consistently been
at or near the forefront of world developments
in applications of power engineering, particu-
larly for space and marine propulsion systems.
Their work in nuclear power. particularly for
space and marine applications, has been very
I nnovative and effective.
Directed Energy. The Soviets continue ma-
jor R&D efforts on all types of directed-energy
weapons technologies. Their commitment to
high-energy lasers began in the mid-1960s and
is now considerably larger than that of the
US. They have built more than six laser de-
velopment and test ranges which dwarf their
counterparts in the US. During the last ten
years, the floorspace dedicated to this work has
quadrupled. Moreover, articles by Soviet sci-
entists publishing on laser research have dou-
bled to approximately 12,000. The Soviets have
developed several unique power sources that
could support mobile or remote directed-energy
weapons, including a rocket-driven magneto-
hydrodynamic (MHD) device that produces 15
megawatts of pulsed power. Further, recent
Soviet developments in radio frequency gen-
eration devices could enable them to build
weapons to degrade or destroy electronics or
cause disorientation of personnel. They have
generated single pulses with peak power ex-
ceeding one gigawatt and repetitive pulses over
100 megawatts. Similarly, since the early 1960s
the Soviets have been working on many of
the technologies needed to develop particle
beam weapons. In some of' the needed dis-
ciplines such as powerful accelerators, their
work is at the leading edge of' the state-of-the-
art. They are still encountering difficult engi-
neering problems, and the technology needed
to build a particle beam weapon capable of'
propagation for a meaningful distance requires
additional research.
Chemical and Biological Warfare. The USSR
has a well-established, longstanding, and very
extensive research, development, and test base
for chemical and biological agents. It includes
facilities such as the biological agent research
facility at Sverdlovsk, where an accidental re-
lease of a large amount of anthrax spores ill
1979 resulted in many casualties. It also in-
cludes the facility at Shikhany which dates to
shortly after World War I. Shikhany has been
active and under almost continuous expansion
since that time.
The Soviets have developed a wide range of
chemical agents including nerve, blister, blood,
and choking substances as well as incapaci-
tants that cause unconsciousness for an hour
or more. They are continuing research on tox-
ins and binary agents as well as ground and
air delivery systems. Of great importance is
the willingness of the Soviets to use the var-
ious agents, both lethal and incapacitating. As
demonstrated by their actions in Afghanistan,
the Soviets and their surrogates have inflicted
a large number of deaths and casualties on na-
tive populations. These attacks have served as
an excellent testing ground for the Soviets to
evaluate their various chemical agents.
Bioengineering,. The Soviets are also fully
aware of the potential of' bioengineering for
medical, agricultural, and industrial benefits.
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Further, they realize the potential of bioengi-
neering to develop a predictable, controllable,
and effective biological warfare agent that
would offer a tempting alternative to other
weapons of mass destruction. Soviet bioengi-
neering has progressed very rapidly over the
past five years, and policy directives of the
Council of Ministers suggest continued high-
level support. Free World genetic engineering
is also progressing rapidly, and it is unlikely
that the Soviets can keep pace in all areas.
Electronics/Computers. At the end of World
War 11, the Soviets' electronics capability was
either extremely outdated or mostly destroyed.
Since then, they have invested a large amount.
of resources to reestablish their electronics
R&D capability and acquire Free World know-
how to meet military requirements. These
investments have paid off with significant ad-
vances in militarily critical systems including
phased-array and over-the-horizon propagation
radars, millimeter wave devices, and high-
power radio frequency generators.
Computers and microelectronics are of great
importance in any advanced weapon system.
Soviet computer technology continues to be
based on US and Western developments. Al-
though the Soviets have a solid understand-
ing of the basic technology, they continue to
have problems in transferring this knowledge
to the production of' microelectronic devices
and computer hardware. The low reliability
and poor quality of these devices reflect con-
tinuing problems with manufacturing. Soviet
efforts in the crucial area of software devel-
opment also suffer from fundamental problems.
The Soviets' centralized economy, which is di-
rected at meeting military requirements first,
puts new electronics, either developed indige-
nously or obtained from the Free World, in
the hands of' military designers more rapidly
than ours.
Technology Transfer
To correct shortcomings, the Soviets have
come to rely heavily on Free World sources
for much of' the technology employed in their
military systems. This is not a random ef-
fort, but a massive, centrally controlled cam-
paign to obtain needed products and technical
knowledge selectively through legal and ille-
gal means. Virtually all of' the 5,000 ongoing
Soviet research projects with military applica-
tions or implications have benefitted to some
extent from know-how acquired from the
Free World.
The Soviet technology acquisition program
has two distinct but complementary aspects:
? The Military-Industrial Commission
(VPK), which coordinates the develop-
ment and production of military systems,
is also the prime coordinator for technol-
ogy acquisition to support the defense in-
dustrial ministries. It seeks one-of-a-kind
military and dual-use hardware, documen-
tation, blueprints, product samples, and
test gear to improve the technical levels
and the capability of Soviet weapons and
military equipment and associated indus-
trial machinery. This is accomplished by
copying or exploiting the advanced de-
signs and engineering contained in the
equipment and technical data acquired.
The VPK coordinates the requirements
of the defense industrial ministries and
levies them for collection through espi-
onage by the KGB and GRU. Collection
is accomplished by Soviet scientists, en-
gineers, and officials, by exploitation of
scientific exchanges and journals, and
through illegal trade diversions. The So-
viets spend the equivalent of $1.4 billion
per year to underwrite their acquisition
effort.
? The Ministry of Foreign Trade and the
intelligence services administer a trade
diversion program to obtain significant
numbers of manufacturing and support-
ing equipment for direct use on Soviet
military-industrial production lines. Al-
though this effort targets many export-
controlled technologies, it concentrates
on microelectronics and computers, com-
munications gear, robotics, and advanced
machinery. Its purpose is to improve
Soviet capabilities to produce reliable
modern weapons.
Soviet efforts to acquire foreign technology
have been very successful. Under the VI'K
program, over 3,500 requirements were levied
each year during the late 1970s and early l 980s,
and about one-third were satisfied annually.
About half of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of'
hardware and one-fifth of' the 100,000 docu-
ments obtained each year are used by the Sovi-
ets in transferring Free World technology to
military research projects. During the 10th
Five-Year Plan (1976-80), two prime users of ac-
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Electronics
Communications
Aviation
Radar and
Computers
Chemical
Shipbuilding
Nuclear Industry
and Lasers
Armor and
Electro-optics
Electrical
Equipment
Projectiles and
Explosives
Missiles and
Space
Petroleum and
Petrochemicals
Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by Military Industrial Commission
(VPK) Requirements Fulfilled, by Hardware Received,
and by Rubles Saved, 1976-80
0
200 400
600 800
1,000 1,200
6/2
8/5
2/10
111/7
9/8
10/1
5/12
7/11
12/6
3/9
4/3
Number of requirements fulfilled for
Western documents, hardware, or both
1/4
Ranking by hardware received/ranking by
rubles saved #
0 200 400
About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were ful-
filled during the 10th Five-Year Plan for Western hardware
and documents were satisfied on behalf of two defense indus-
tries electronics and communications. These are key areas
where the Soviets' need for militarily significant technology
and the West's need for better controls are greatest.
The four industries receiving the most Western military
hardware and dual-use products were electronics (over 6,000
pieces of equipment, a large percentage involving microelec-
tronics), chemical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petro-
chemicals, (over 1,500), and communications (over 1,500)
ranked in that order.
600 800 1,000 1,200
The top four industries saving the most rubles in research
project development costs in terms of manpower and other
resources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost
20 percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project
costs) and the aviation, communications, and electonics in-
dustries. These four industries consistently appear to be the
Soviet leaders in requesting, absorbing, and generally get-
ting the most use out of Western hardware and documents.
In some cases, such as in the armor area, the Soviets are using
Western technology not to catch up, but to enhance a capabil-
ity that already is equal to or better than that of the West.
(wired technologies, the Ministries of Defense
Industry (armor and electro-optics) and Avia-
t ion Industry, estimated that they saved almost
one-half billion rubles in research project costs,
translating to over 100,000 man-years of scien-
tific resea rch
To cite one significant example. by using doc-
umentation on the US F-18 fighter, Soviet avia-
tion and radar industries saved some five years
of development time and :35 million rubles (the
1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity
would he $55 million) in project manpower and
other developmental costs. The manpower p()r-
tion of these savings probably represented over
a thousand man-years of scientific research
effort and was one of' the most successful
individual exploitations ever of Western tech-
nology. The documentation on the F-18 fire
control radar served as the technical basis for
new look-down/shoot-down engagement radars
for the latest generation of Soviet fighters,
including the MiG-29/FULCRUM and the Su-
27/FLANKER. US methods of component de-
sign, fast-Fourier-transform algorithms. terrain
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Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects
Average yearly percent Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s
of all research
project that
benefited 0
Electronics
Armor and
Electro-optics
Aviation
Missiles and
Space
Projectiles and
Explosives
Communications
Chemicals
Radars and
Computers
Electrical
Equipment
Shipbuilding
Nuclear Industry
and Lasers
Petroleum and
Petrochemicals
2 4
6
10 12 14
35
40 45
Projects whose technical levels
were raised
Projects whose research stages
were eliminated or shortened
Projects whose technical approaches
were redirected plus new research
projects started
0
2
4
6
8
The assimilation of Western technology into Soviet indus-
tries conducting military research is considerable. The greatest
beneficiaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics
industries, which accounted for over 50 percent (equaling thou-
sands) of all military research projects benefiting from Western
technology in the early 1980s.
10 12 14 35 40
The general distribution points out the rather broad effect
that Western documents and hardware have just on raising the
technical levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly
true for the top three industries, where advanced technology
and innovative design concepts play a significant role in
weapons developments.
45
mapping functions, and real-time resolution-
enhancement techniques were cited as key
elements incorporated into the Soviet
counterpart.
Moreover. F-18 and F-14 documentation
served as the impetus for two long-term re-
search projects to design from scratch a new
radar-guided air-to-air missile system. The doc-
umentation also was instrumental in formu-
lating concrete specifications to develop new
Soviet airborne radar countermeasures equip-
ment against the F-18 and F-14.
Hundreds of Soviet military systems and
weapons of the 1980s and 1990s have benefited
or will benefit from technologies obtained from
the Free World. In the early 1970s. the techni-
cal levels of some 66 percent of their military
research projects were raised and 27 percent of'
the completion dates were accelerated princi-
pally because the Soviets have copied concepts
embodied in Western technical documents, mil-
itary hardware, or dual-use products. US and
allied efforts to counter this are covered in
Chapter VIII.
The Soviets are not exclusively dependent on
Free World technology to advance the quality
of their military systems. Innovation, new con-
cepts, new directions, higher technical levels
of research, accelerated development of more
advanced weapons, and the avoidance of major
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pitfalls are among the benefits the Soviet mil-
itary derives from US military R&D projects.
Free World technology gives the Soviet de-
signer another option, often better than his
own research establishment can produce, from
which to choose. The Soviet practice of incor-
porating technology in small bits from many
systems, however, permits the efficient, rapid
assimilation of equipment or knowledge ob-
tained from the West.
The Soviet R&D Base
Capital investment in research laboratories,
design bureaus, key military technologies, and
test facilities has kept pace with the drive for
military technological supremacy. The USSR's
military R&D capability, which is concentrated
within nine defense industrial ministries, has
grown about 28 percent during the last ten
years. Some sectors involved in high-priority,
high-technology projects such as directed-
energy weapons and electro-optics have shown
an even more dramatic growth rate. The So-
viets have concurrently developed a full range
of well-equipped, comprehensive test facilities
permitting them to evaluate military systems
under realistic conditions. This capability ex-
tends from subsystems to full-scale systems and
includes all types of aerospace, ground, and
naval components.
This focus on military R&D has not always
been evenly applied. Various sectors have re-
ceived special emphasis because of leadership
perspectives of foreign military threats, mis-
sion requirements, and/or high-level patron-
age. Consequently, certain weapons systems
have received concentrated developmental sup-
port. However, as high-level support has
shifted, the Soviets typically did not trans-
fer resources but rather added incremental re-
sources so that previously emphasized sectors
continued to receive strong support. The cumu-
lative effect of this trend has been to provide
the Soviets with a huge, broad-based R&D ca-
pability which can and does provide weapons
for all segments of the Soviet arsenal.
To manage their massive R&D effort, the
Soviets have evolved a complex, effective, if
not always efficient, organizational structure.
This structure operates within the framework
of two interlocking bureaucracies, the Commu-
nist Party and the government. Military R&D
programs are marked by top-level involvement
and strong centralized management. The De-
fense Council, which is chaired by General Sec-
retary Gorbachev, is comprised of top leaders of
the Party, government, and military who make
the important decisions on major weapons pro-
grams and R&D policies.
Approval of resource commitments for re-
search programs is influenced by the technical
bent of many senior Soviet leaders. Defense
Minister Marshal Sokolov, while lacking the
long, detailed experience in military-industrial
programs of his predecessor Marshal Ustinov,
is quite knowledgeable regarding the manage-
ment of these complex projects. Additionally,
the personnel changes General Secretary Gor-
bachev has implemented have brought more
technocrats into positions of power. More than
three-fourths of the Politburo and the Coun-
cil of Ministers have technical backgrounds
which create an environment conducive to
understanding resource and managerial
requirements.
The Military Industrial Commission (VPK)
is a powerful supraministerial agency which
coordinates all the efforts of the defense in-
dustrial ministries and centrally supervises all
weapons programs. Operating across ministe-
rial lines, the VPK is charged with implement-
ing the joint resolutions of the Politburo and
Council of Ministers which approve weapons
programs. These resolutions provide one-time,
multiyear approval for the entire duration of
the program, including, in some cases, follow-
on modifications. Under such a resolution, any
state asset- that is, any individual or resource
regardless of affiliation can be coopted to sup-
port a particular weapons program. This in-
cludes the Soviets' 127,000 senior scientists and
the resources of the academies of sciences and
the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Educa-
tion (MinVUZ).
The academies of sciences are charged with
conducting basic research to support the na-
tional economy. The MinVUZ supports the
national R&D effort by conducting exploratory
research and educating the scientists and
engineers who will fill its ranks. Both the
academies and MinVUZ are becoming increas-
ingly involved in military R&D in cases where
development is dependent on advanced technol-
ogy or where their specific expertise is needed.
The Ministry of Defense, as the prime con-
sumer of the defense industries' products, also
enjoys the unique privilege of direct quality
control. Its representatives participate in ev-
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ery aspect of the process, including require-
ments generation, design, testing, production
monitoring, and deployment. The powerful
State Nanning Commission integrates the mil-
itary's R&D resource requirements into na-
tional plans.
The system integTator in the Soviet military
R&D structure is the design bureau within the
defense industrial ministry assigned to build
the system. Each design bureau usually takes
the name of' the chief designer and has a spe-
cialty on which it concentrates. It works
closely with the ministerial research institutes
to translate their discoveries into practical ap-
plications. The design bureau staff then con-
ducts the needed engineering, documentation,
prototype construction, and testing to develop
the new or improved system. The staff also
coordinates with the production plants to fa-
cilitate series production. Design teams are
formed in response to a requirement for a
specific system and remain with the program
from inception to completion and often through
follow-on systems.
Soviet weapons designers have historically
adhered to strict state industrial standards,
used off-the-shelf components, and employed
proven design methods detailed in official hand-
books to ensure producibility, maintainability,
and ease of operation. They build large num-
bers of' weapons that are technologically ad-
equate and well-engineered to meet mission
requirements. Technological advances are
usually assimilated in small steps, with the un-
derlying assumption that new or improved com-
ponents or subsystems will be incorporated in
follow-on modifications or new systems.
As a result, the Soviets produce many more
new and significantly modified weapons
systems than the US. Their weapons often
reflect functional, single-mission designs that
can be manufactured in labor-intensive fac-
tories. They take a somewhat different
approach to maintenance than the US by
planning and designing for limited field main-
tenance by relatively unskilled personnel while
emphasizing frequent depot maintenance by
specialists.
Despite their tendency toward design conser-
vatism, the Soviets have been quite successful
in raising the relative technological stature of'
their weapons systems. The weapons they are
Kharko
Dnepropetrovs
Nikolayev?
Zaporozhye
Pavlograd A
Rostov
Leningrad ?
?Minsk
Key Soviet Military Production Centers
?
Severodvinsk
Zagorsk
Mo$kvaAA KOVIVV
Ki
Bryansk ? A rovA
?Kiev Gorkiy AA
arm
?Nizhnyaya Tura
Voronezh Kazan A Nizhniy Tagil
? Votkinsk l'Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk??Kurgan
Ulyanovsk A
? Kuybyshev
Volgograd
KemerovoA ? Krasnoyarsk
Omsk ? ?Novosibirsk
?Biysk
Irkutsk ? ? Ulan-ude
Komsornorsk A
Arsenyev
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currently deploying which incorporate technol-
ogy they developed or acquired from the Free
World in the mid-1970s have narrowed, and in
some cases, eliminated the Free World's qual-
itative lead. Particularly ominous is the fact
that the Soviets have not yet fully realized the
advantages of the last ten years' economic in-
vestments because of the timelag between re-
sources committed and actual production. As
resources and knowledge obtained from Free
World sources further enhance Soviet capabil-
ities, the West's qualitative edge could further
erode and, in some critical military capabili-
ties, result in Soviet superiority.
Military Industrial Production
General Secretary Gorbachev's industrial
modernization program for the 12th Five-Year
Plan seeks to raise the technological level
of the machinery and equipment manufactur-
ing sector, which provides the basis for So-
viet economic and military might. Key areas
within this sector that are likely to receive pri-
ority investments and undergo rapid growth
include electronics, computers, robotics, ma-
chine tools, and instruments. Soviet military
authorities widely agree that military re-
quirements have moved into thwarena of high-
technology and that without a strong, techno-
logically advanced industrial base, the
Soviet economy will have difficulty producing
the complex weaponry required in the 1990s
and beyond. The ultimate beneficiary of Gor-
bachev's modernization program will be the So-
Equipment
Type
Tanks
Other Armored
Fighting Vehicles
Towed Field Artillery
Self-Propelled Field
Artillery
Multiple Rocket
Launchers
Self-Propelled AA
Artillery
Towed AA Artillery
Soviet Military Industrial Expansion
Floorspace/Waylength
Meters
(millions)
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
0
Naval (waylength)
Missiles (floorspace)
Aircraft (floorspace)
Ground Force Weapons and :
Armored Vehicles (ffoorapaps)
Meters
(millions)
- 60
- 50
40
r- 30
- 20
1970
1975 1980
1985
10
viet military-industrial complex. Wide-spread
modernization of the Soviet industrial base will
ensure future military production capabilities.
Critical Industries
Metals. The dramatic increases in Soviet
metals production underscore the USSR's
emphasis on crucial materials to build their in-
dustrial base. Historically, the Soviets have
exploited their impressive national resource
base of strategic minerals, thereby assuring in-
dependence from foreign manipulation. The
Production of Ground Forces Materiel
USSR/NSWP and NATO'
USSR NSWP USSR NSWP
USSR NSWP
1983
1984
3,000
550
3,200
450
5,000
1,300
3,800
1,200
1,800
300
1,900
250
950
200
1,000
300
900
100
900
100
100
0
50
0
150
0
225
1985
1983
3,000
700
1,600
3,500
1,200
1,700
2,000
200
650
1,000
350
600
700
100
50
100
10
0
225
25
NATO
' Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes United States; excludes France and Spain.
1984
1985
1,800
2,700
1,600
2,500
450
550
250
300
75
75
50
25
25 I
0
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Soviet shipyards continue to produce new
generations of major surface combatants
with greater firepower including, from top to
bottom, UDALOY- and SOVREMENNYY-Class
destroyers, and KIROV-, and SLAVA-Class
cruisers.
recent introduction of' modern processing and
fabricating techniques has further strength-
ened the Soviets industrial autonomy.
To overcome their tendency for emphasiz-
ing only quantity in industrial production, the
Soviets have designated sectors within each
basic industry to develop the best state-of-the-
art materials for advanced weapons systems.
As would be expected, they are controlled and
operated by the military ministries. Producers
of strategic metals such as aluminum and tita-
nium are totally merged with industries pro-
ducing weapons for the Soviet arsenal. For
example, the Ministry of Aviation Industry
runs the metal fabrication plants of the alu-
minum industry. These plants produce compo-
nents for aerospace industries and are located
near the final assembly plants. This system
streamlines production and delivery to assem-
bly plants and ensures continuity of supplies
for critical aerospace programs. Similarly, the
titanium industry has been heavily influenced
by military requirements, particularly for the
production of titanium-hulled submarines.
Energy. The USSR is the only major in-
dustrial nation that is energy-independent. It
is also the world's foremost producer and ex-
porter of petroleum, with the largest proven
oil reserves outside the Persian Gulf'. Soviet
natural gas reserves are even more impressive.
Comprising over 37 trillion cubic meters and
equivalent to about 200 billion barrels of' oil,
these reserves represent about 40 percent of' the
world's total, enabling the Soviets to continue
as the largest producer and exporter of natu-
ral gas. The substitution of natural gas for
petroleum f'or industrial and consumer use is
well underway in the USSR, assuring the avail-
ability of large quantities of oil for exports to
both Eastern and Western Europe.
The Soviet fuel and electric power base
continues to expand and to provide surplus
quantities of these most valuable commodities.
Though dedicated primarily to supporting the
military and related industries, the fuels and
energy base provides over 50 percent of Soviet
export earnings and fills the bulk of require-
ments of Soviet client states for imported en-
ergy as well. Growing fuels and energy exports
to Western Europe could potentially provide
the Soviet Union with economic leverage over
some nations. If this condition were to evolve,
it could have significant implications for the
unity and viability of NATO.
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Military Production
The USSR has consistently allocated a
larger share of its national resources, both nat-
ural and industrial, to the peacetime produc-
tion of military systems than any other country
in modern history. Despite recent increases in
output, by the US, the Soviet Union still turns
out roughly half of all weapons systems pro-
duced in the world and up to three-quarters of
some types of military-related materiel. This
phenomenal output has been achieved through
the investment, of huge amounts of money, raw
materials, and manpower. The Soviets are im-
plementing a three-pronged approach for mil-
itary production. First, there is a thrust to
use the huge R&D base they have assembled
to upgrade the quality of their weapons and to
produce more capable equipment. Second, the
Soviet Union is expanding existing factories,
building new ones, and providing on a priority
basis new and modern manufacturing technolo-
gies to those industries that support military-
related production. Finally, the Soviets are
further integrating East European industries
into their military-industrial complex.
The Soviet thrust, toward increased weapons
sophistication and modernization of the na-
tion's military-industrial capacity has caused
some decrease in the number of weapons sys-
tems being produced during the 1980s as well as
an extension of their procurement cycles. De-
spite this current emphasis on intensive rather
than extensive growth, the trend toward the
production of' more and more sophisticated
weapons will not only continue but also prob-
ably increase in the 1990s. Huge numbers of
each system will probably not be produced as in
the past as Soviet military strategy assimilates
the advanced capabilities of newer systems.
The vast number of' industrial facilities com-
mn ted to military requirements ensures that
the Soviets will meet most production goals,
even though some schedules may slip. At
present there are over 150 major factories and
shipyards producing weapons, armored vehi-
cles, ships, aircraft, missiles, ammunition, and
explosives. Additionally, 150 other plants pro-
vide combat, support equipment such as radar,
trucks, and communications gear. These ma-
jor facilities, in turn, draw on literally thou-
sands of parts and components factories. These
facilities are continually being expanded and
modernized; since 1970 they have increased in
size by over 50 percent. This growth has been
From top to bottom, the OSCAR, SIERRA,
AKULA, and KILO classes of attack and
cruise missile submarines are currently in
production.
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Soviet production of large-bore self-propelled
artillery includes, from top to bottom,
240-mm mortars, 203-mm guns, and 152-mm
and 122-mm howitzers.
well-balanced across the entire spectrum of
military equipment. For example, in recent
years, the ammunition industry has been
greatly expanded.
At the Severodvinsk Shipyard, the world's
largest submarine production yard, shop space
has increased by over 50 percent and covered
building space by over 85 percent since 1965.
Severodvinsk is only one of five Soviet ship-
yards producing submarines. Since 1970, the
24 naval construction yards that produce most
Soviet naval ships have enjoyed a 16-percent
increase in new building ways. The Soviet
aircraft industry, while producing huge num-
bers of aircraft annually, continues to reflect
growth and modernization. A notable exam-
ple is the new plant at Ulyanovsk which will
produce heavy-lift transports.
Industrial Modernization
The Soviet leadership has shown the same
inclination to upgrade the country's industrial
capacity, particularly the military sector, as it
has for military systems by the introduction of
new technologies. Since the 1960s, a concerted
effort has been made to introduce computers
and automation, and programs started in the
1970s have already resulted in the introduc-
tion of thousands of computer-aided design and
automated production control systems. The
current emphasis is on applying robotics and
sophisticated machine tools as widely as pos-
sible. This objective is totally compatible with
the production of technologically sophisticated
weapons. If they succeed, the Soviets will real-
ize increased efficiency in all phases of indus-
trial production.
Ground Forces Equipment
The USSR continues to be the world's largest
producer of ground forces equipment. Cur-
rently, emphasis is being placed on improving
capabilities by incorporating new technologies
into the equipment as well as into the means of
production.
Tanks and Armored Vehicles. Overall tank
production in 1985 included the T-72, T-64, and
newer T-80 models. The time required for manu-
facturing modern tanks such as the T-80
exceeds that of their simpler predecessors.
The tank plant in Nizhniy Tagil is supported by
at least three other plants in Kharkov, Omsk,
and Chelyabinsk. T-72s are also produced in
Eastern Europe. Output of' the 1'4w tank is
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expected to increase. Production of other ar-
mored vehicles in 1985 included eight different
types manufactured at seven Soviet plants as
well as at two factories in Eastern Europe.
The most important of these are the BMP in-
fantry combat vehicle (ICV) series, the BMD
airborne ICV, the BTR-70 and BTR-60 armored
personnel carriers (APCs), and the BRDM-2 ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle. Currently, the
last two are produced only for export. Soviet
BTR-70 and BMP production is supplemented
by imports from other Warsaw Pact nations.
Artillery. Approximately 4,000 artillery
pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launch-
ers were manufactured in 1985. Included were
towed 85-mm and 100-mm antitank guns, 122-
mm and 152-mm howitzers, and 130-mm and
152-mm field guns. Overall output of towed
artillery increased. Self-propelled models in-
cluded 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers and guns
up to 20:3mm. Little change was noted in the
output of three models of rocket launchers--
two 122-mm models and a 220-mm piece are
being built. Production of antiaircraft artillery
increased as a new self-propelled model entered
production. Most artillery production is ac-
complished at plants in Sverdlovsk and Perm.
Helicopters. The Soviets excel in design and
production of these important weapons sys-
tems, producing over 800 per year since 1982.
Five helicopters are now in production. The
HIP, HIND, HALO, HAZE, HELIX, and at least
two others are nearing production at five dif-
ferent airframe plants. The Mi-26/HALO is the
world's largest helicopter. The HALO's lift
capability is comparable to the US C-130
Hercules transport aircraft. The HIP is
built at plants in Kazan and Ulan Ude. Thou-
sands of these helicopters have been produced,
including four new specialized military vari-
ants. Over 2,300 Mi-24 HIND helicopters
designed to attack enemy tanks have been pro-
duced in Arsenyev and Rostov. A new at-
tack helicopter, the HAVOC, which has a mis-
sion similar to the US AH-64 Apache, and the
HOKUM, the world's first fighter helicopter,
are in prototype testing and may enter produc-
tion in 1986.
Naval Forces
Soviet naval production in 1985 continued
at a high level. Unit completion numbers and
tonnage produced in the principal surface com-
batant and small surface combatant categories
Besides manufacturing the new FLANKER and
FULCRUM fighters, Soviet aircraft produc-
tion includes, from top to bottom, the FROG-
FOOT and FOXBAT tactical aircraft as well as
BEAR H and BACKFIRE bombers.
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set this pattern. Quantitatively, submarine pro-
duction was at about the 1984 level while auxil-
iary ships were built at the same rate observed
since 1980.
Submarines. The Soviets continue to series-
produce a variety of' submarine classes. At
present, they are building two classes of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) the TYPHOON and the DELTA IV.
A third unit of the OSCAR-Class nuclear-
powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN) class
has joined the fleet, and further production is
expected. Activity is also proceeding on four
classes of' nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs). Lead ships of three impressive new
classes also continue to undergo trials and
evaluation. These include the MIKE as well as
the SIERRA and the AKULA. The latter two
probably will replace the VICTOR III as stand-
ard fleet SSNs. Construction of the KILO-
Class diesel-powered submarine (SS) now is
underway at three different shipyards, indicat-
ing that it is intended to replace the
FOXTROT as the standard fleet diesel-powered
submarine. In addition, the Soviets are also
producing experimental submarines and are
converting SSBNs dismantled under the SALT
accords.
Surface Ships. Soviet shipyards have ten
classes of major surface combatants under se-
ries production. The third KIROV-Class
nuclear-powered cruiser (CGN) is under
construction. Construction proceeds on the
second, third, and fourth units of the SLAVA-
Class guided-missile cruiser (CG) and the out-
Naval Ship Construction
USSR and NATO'
Ship
USSR
NATO
Type
1983
1984
1985
1983
1984
1985
Submarines
10
9
8
8
12
8
Major
Combatants
10
9
8
23
19
16
Minor
Combatants
50
50
50
30
34
30
Auxiliaries
6
5
5
7
11
5
Revised to reflect current total production information, Includes
United States; excludes France and Spain.
A VICTOR III-Class nuclear-powered attack submarine, in foreground, and an OSCAR-Class
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine participated in the Soviets' major naval exercise in the
North Atlantic in 1985.
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Soviet BACKFIRE bombers, being produced at the rate of about 30 per year, are in service
with Soviet Air Forces and Soviet Naval Aviation.
fitting of the fourth unit of the KIEV-Class
guided-missile aircraft carrier (CVHG). Series
construction continues on the SOVREMENNY.
UDALOY, and Mod KASHIN classes of guided-
missile destroyers (IMGs) at about one ship per
class, per year. The Mod KASHIN, as well
as the KONI-Class frigate (FF), are only for
export. A variety of smaller combatant and
auxiliary classes are also under construction.
The first of a new class carrier was launched
at the Nikolayev shipyard. Use of this new ship
to accommodate high-performance aircraft.
possibly conventional take-off and landing
(CTOI.) has been widely suggested. The ul-
timate flight deck configuration and the type
of aircraft to be embarked are, however, still
undetermined. It is possible that the Soviets
intend to deploy the ship initially as a verti-
cal/short take off and landing (V/STOL) carrier
for Yak-:l($/FORGER aircraft as well as for hel-
icopters, but could later perform modifications
to accommodate modern, high-performance air-
craft. The propulsion system is probably a
combined conventional/nuclear plant similar
to that of the K1ROV-Class CGN. Sea trials of
this unit are expected by early 1989.
East European nations have continued to
contribute to Soviet naval power by providing
additional ship construction. The non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries have produced approxi-
mately 75 percent of Soviet amphibious binding
ships and roughly :35 percent of' Soviet naval
Aircraft
The USSR is second only to the US in to-
tal aircraft production, but in the category of
military aircraft is the world's number-one pro-
ducer. This has allowed the Soviets to build
and modernize the world's largest military air
force. In addition, the continuous high output
of all types of' aircraft has enabled the Soviets
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Aircraft Production
USSR and NATO'
Aircraft
Type
1983
USSR
1984
1985
1983
NATO
19841-1985
Bombers
35
50
50
0
0
2
Fighters/
Fighter-
Bombers
950
800
650
650
550
550
Transports
250
250
250
290
250
300
ASW
5
5
5
15 -+
10
?5
Helicopters
550
600
600
725
720
525
Utility/
Trainers
10
10
0
425
305
300
' Revised to reflect current total production information
United States: excludes France and Spain.
Includes
to amass the world's largest state-owned civil
air fleet. The Soviet Union is also a major ex-
porter of both civilian and military aircraft to
the Third World.
Bombers. The USSR currently has three
intercontinental-capable bombers in or near-
ing production: the BACKFIRE, the BEAR H,
and the new BLACKJACK. The BACKFIRE is
built at the huge plant at Kazan. The BEAR
H, which carries the AS-15 long-range cruise
missile, is being produced at Kuybyshev. Devel-
opment of the latest advanced Soviet strategic
bomber, the BLACKJACK, is progressing, and
series production is expected at a massive new
complex at the Kazan Airframe Plant.
Fighters. Overall Soviet fighter aircraft out-
put has declined over the past several years,
dropping from approximately 1,300 units in
1980 to about 650 in 1985. Output of newer
fighters such as FULCRUM and FLANKER is
not expected to offset production cutbacks in
older, longstanding programs such as FLOG-
GER. F1SHBED, and FITTER. Other active
fighter production programs in 1985 included
the FOXHOUND, FOXBAT, FROGFOOT,
FENCER, and FORGER. The FOXHOUND in-
terceptor, the FULCRUM counterair fighter,
and the FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft,
produced at Gorkiy, Moscow, and Tbilisi, re-
spectively, have achieved operational status
during the last five years. In addition, four
improved variants of older Soviet fighters, two
each of FENCER and FITTER, have been in
production since 1980. Deployment of the new
MiG-29/FULCRUM is finally beginning to
quicken, with Soviet units in Eastern Europe
now receiving this aircraft.
The latest Soviet fighter, the Su-27/FLANK-
ER air-superiority fighter, built in Komsomolsk,
achieved operational status early in 1986. The
first Su-27s have begun arriving at operational
bases in the USSR, after developmental difficul-
ties delayed their introduction into the Soviet
Air Force for a few years. Further, the So-
viets probably have at least one new entirely
different fighter design and several upgraded
variants of existing models in different stages
of development.
Transports. The Soviet Ministry of Avi-
ation Industry ensures that all domestically
produced high-performance transport aircraft
meet military requirements. About 85 of the
250 transports produced in 1985 were for mili-
tary use, primarily the I1-76/CANDID and the
An-26/CURL, and, for foreign air forces, the
An-32/CLINE. The CANDID is built at a huge
facility in Tashkent. The Soviets produce two
militarily important variants of this aircraft,
an aerial refueling tanker and an airborne
warning and control aircraft designated MAIN-
STAY. Other transports in production include
CLASSIC, CRUSTY, CARELESS, CLOBBER,
and CAMBER. Series production for the An-
124/CONDOR heavy transport will probably
start in 1987 or 1988. Six plants in the USSR
manufacture transport aircraft as their main
product. They, together with several other
plants making multiple types of aerospace prod-
ucts, are expected to turn out an average of
about 250 transports annually for the next sev-
eral years.
Missiles
The Soviet missile industry has one of the
highest priorities assigned to military pro-
grams and is engaged in continuous expansion
and modernization. This results in not only
Missile Production
USSR and NATO'
Missile
USSR
NATO
Type
1983
1984
1985
1983
1984 1985
ICBMs
150
75
100
0
0 0
LRINF
125
125
125
110
80t
175
SRBMs
500
500
450
50
25
50
SLCMs
650
700
700
1,300
1,100
800
SLBIVIs
100
50
100
75
70
75
' Revised to reflect current total production information. Includes
United States; excludes France and Spain.
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more advanced but also more classes of missiles
being produced at more than 20 plants.
ICBMs. The Soviets continue to manufac-
ture liquid-propellant ICBMs for troop training
and to sustain the deployed force, producing
approximately 100 during 1985. For the fu-
ture, the Soviets are developing a new liquid-
propellant ICBM to replace their SS-18 sys-
tems. A new solid-propellant ICBM (SS-25) now
is in series production, and a second model
(SS-X-24) is in prototype production.
SLBMs. Currently only the SS-N-20 for
the TYPHOON SSBN is in series production,
but developmental or prototype production on
newer models is underway.
Cruise Missiles. The Soviets are serially pro-
ducing six antiship naval cruise missiles the
SS-N-2, SS-N-3, SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, and
SS-N-22 and three antisubmarine models SS-
N-14, SS-N-15, and SS-N-16--at an annual rate
of about 700. This production program stretches
from plants in the Far East maritime provinces
to the Ukraine.
The AS-15, a long-range air-launched cruise
missile designed to attack land-based targets as
far as 3,000 kilometers from its BEAR H and
BLACKJACK launch platforms, can be deliv-
ered against targets in the US and Eurasia.
Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (LRINF). Production of LRINF has in-
creased since 1980 and totaled approximately
125 missiles in 1985. The SS-20 is still in series
production.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). The
output of these systems has more than dou-
bled since 1979. This increase is evidence of a
major modernization effort to replace the thou-
sands of FROG and SCUD missiles with new,
more accurate SS-21s and SS-23s plus improved
SCALEBOARDs.
SAMs. The USSR continues to turn out
the world's largest variety of strategic and tac-
tical surface-to-air missiles. The SA-10 and
SA-11, which are now in series production,
and the SA-X-12 are sophisticated, effective
weapons. Soviet SAM production remains at
more than 40,000 units of 12 systems from
plants in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk,
Kirov, and Kovrov.
Radar and Military Support Items
Radar. The Soviets are currently developing
approximately 20 new radars while those now
in production include technological advances
made or acquired during the 1970s. They con-
tinue to reflect Soviet doctrine to use more
types of radars than Western forces. They
embrace the full spectrum of systems, includ-
ing mobile and transportable ground-based air
defense radars, large fixed-site phased-array
radars, as well as older ballistic missile radars.
What probably is a new over-the-horizon radar
under construction in the Far East could have
an early warning capability against US SLBMs
launched from the Pacific.
Trucks. Truck production in the USSR has
increased over 20 percent during the past
decade--from approximately 665,000 in 1974 to
over 800,000 in 1985. The number of medium
trucks procured by Soviet forces during this
period decreased while the numbers of light
and heavy trucks have been increasing. Of the
more than 800,000 trucks produced by Soviet
plants during 1985, some 25 to 30 percent were
acquired by the military.
The Future
Despite extraordinary technological ad-
vances, the Soviet leadership is aware of the
country's economic shortcomings. General Sec-
retary Gorbachev has taken aggressive actions
to accelerate technological changes and has
pledged to enhance productivity and spur mod-
ernization and economic progress through in-
tensive growth. Gorbachev has charged the
scientific community, particularly its manage-
ment, to bridge the longstanding gap between
research and production. Concurrently, he has
pledged to improve the quality and availability
of consumer goods for the beleaguered Soviet
populace, which even today has had to endure
rationing and shortages. Satisfying the needs
of both the civilian and military sectors of the
economy, however, cannot be achieved simul-
taneously. Gorbachev, however, knows that
military strength is the basis of the USSR's ex-
istence. He has explicitly expressed his contin-
uing support for the Soviet military and is very
unlikely to make shifts in resource allocations
that would challenge the entrenched power of
the Ministry of Defense or defense industries.
It is very likely, therefore, that civilian pro-
grams will continue to suffer as the Soviet
thrust for military technological supremacy
focuses on qualitative improvements.
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Chapter VII
Global
Ambitions
Since the accession to power of General
Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have char-
acterized his foreign policy as more effective
in dealing with the "dangerous situation- in
the world and more responsive to international
problems than that of the USSR's major ad-
versaries. The new leader has been skillful in
projecting a robust and decisive media image.
Moreover, he has cultivated an impression of
dynamism in foreign policy and has injected a
more persuasive tone in the Kremlin's public
diplomacy. While proclaiming domestic reform
to be his top priority, he has also maintained a
heavy schedule of meetings with foreign dele-
gations and has repeatedly proposed arms con-
trol and peace initiatives.
The new General Secretary inherited power-
ful military forces as well as an effective and
assertive foreign policy establishment. Parts of
this establishment are the Central Committee
departments, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
and the Soviet intelligence and security ser-
vices. All of these entities have proven their
ability to advance and defend Soviet interests
throughout the world. There is little chance
that the General Secretary's moves to improve
the Soviet economy portend a modification of
Moscow's fundamental goals. The USSR still
seeks to divide the West and destabilize much
of the Third World through its foreign policy
and military actions.
A large percentage of the weapons systems
the USSR exports to client states, Third
World proxies, and repressive regimes flows
from the enormous military port at Nikolayev
on the Black Sea. SA-5/GAMMON surface-
to-air missiles for Libya and helicopter gun-
ships and tanks for Angola and Nicaragua are
among the hundreds of thousands of tons of
weaponry being shipped each year from the
port's steadily expanding facilities dedicated
to military cargo.
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Soviet Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft
Operating Areas-1965
The Soviet Union has concentrated on cas-
tigating the United States and pushing highly
publicized, skillfully timed, but one-sided arms
control schemes. The Soviets are attempting to
foment discord between the US and its NATO
and Pacific allies, to strengthen their hold over
Eastern Europe, and generally to pose as the
champion of Third World interests. By resur-
recting an array of one-sided arms reduction
concepts, the Soviets have sought to portray
the US as intransigent and bellicose and there-
fore a threat to European security and world
peace. Moscow continues to pursue actively
the normalization of ties with China and to
WOO some Western allies while maintaining a
stream of press invectives against others such
as Japan and West Germany. Third World af-
fairs have occupied little of Gorbachev's pub-
lic time, although these regions remain prime
targets for continued exploitation. The Soviet
leader has insisted that the Kremlin will not
look at the world "solely through the prism"
of US-Soviet relations. The Soviets will con-
tinue their efforts to undermine US support
for the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan and
Nicaragua.
In East Asia, the Soviet-North Korean rela-
tionship has expanded significantly in recent
months. The Philippine political situation and
the Southwest Pacific continue to offer poten-
tial opportunities for exploitation. Attention
has been paid to shoring up what Moscow calls
its "special relationship" with India and ex-
panding its support to Vietnam. Initial indi-
cations are that the war in Afghanistan will
be prosecuted with greater vigor, and Moscow
has increased pressure on Pakistan to reduce
Soviet Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft
Operating Areas-1986
qt. Ill Olf 4,4
)
( AILII h-
OCE AN
Punta Huete,
Nicaragua'
7: AN 7/C
?/N
?
0(.7E:AN
I ,P7E(.7F A N
Staging Bases
? Newly constructed airfield capable of handling
Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft.
its support for the Mujahideen. There are also
signs of increased Soviet efforts to improve re-
lations with Japan.
In the Middle East, the USSR has courted
moderate states like Egypt, Jordan, and Ku-
wait while strengthening ties with Syria, es-
tablishing relations with Oman and the United
Arab Emirates, and continuing to insist on
a role in the peace process. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, the scene of the USSR's greatest Third
World gains in the 1970s, the Soviets con-
tinue to concentrate on Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique while attempting to exploit tur-
moil in South Africa. Meanwhile, Latin Amer-
ica continues to offer an opportunity for the
Soviets to foment conflict. Nicaragua has al-
ready received additional assurances of direct
Soviet support.
Overall, Soviet global ambitions are expect-
ed to be pursued through an active foreign
policy. Attention will remain focused on the
US-Soviet strategic relationship coupled with
a renewed emphasis on Third World affairs.
Soviet Support to Terrorism
The Soviets have a long history of main-
taining relations with groups that are linked
to terrorism. Moscow's historical experience
with the use of terror as an instrument of inter-
nal state control suggests its leadership is not
averse to creating and exploiting opportunities
for covert support to terrorists and insurgents.
Within the broader context of foreign policy
objectives, the Soviets seek to achieve specific
goals through support of violence, insurgen-
cies, and wars of "national liberation." In
the Third World, they seek the creation and
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exploitation of instability in pro-Western and
anti-Soviet regimes. Consequently, the acces-
sion to power of a pro-Soviet regime anywhere
in the Third World would lessen Western po-
litical and economic influence and thus make
access to raw materials less secure. Another
Soviet objective is to weaken NATO and fo-
ment discord in the Western democracies that
would lead to disunity and increased security
problems.
Publicly, the Soviets have disavowed any
connection with international terrorist groups
and individual acts of terrorism. However, the
Soviets openly support wars of national libera-
tion and leftist insurgent groups as an integral
element of foreign policy. Moreover, the fact
that acts of terrorism or revolutionary violence
are appendages to insurgent activities does not
hinder Soviet support and backing in light of
Leninist doctrine.
Soviet subversive activities are orchestrated
by the Communist Party Central Committee's
International Department. Support to terror-
ism involves the intelligence and security
services specifically Department 8, Director-
ate 5, of the KGB's First Chief Directorate
and the GRU's "Special Branch- and "Spe-
cial Center.- Additional aid is provided by
various state ministries as well as by Soviet
diplomatic, military assistance, aid, trade, and
cultural missions abroad. Terrorist training
activities are carried out by the International
Department in conjunction with the KGB and
the GRU. Complementing this apparatus are
similar organizations in East European states
and Cuba. Other countries and groups with
regional objectives that have mutual interests
with the Soviets in destabilizing Western-
oriented regimes also receive Soviet support.
These nations, such as Libya and South Yemen,
in turn harbor, train, and equip selected ter-
rorist groups, sometimes in cooperation with
the Soviets but often for their own purposes.
They also fund and coordinate certain terrorist
activities.
The best documented links between Soviet
intelligence and security services (the KGB
and (I RU) to international terrorism are
through the training, funds, and weapons pro-
vided by the Soviet Union and its East Euro-
pe inand non-Bloc allies to Third World and
Western "revolutionaries.- The Soviets spend
large sums of money training such personnel
worldwide. Instruction in guerrilla warfare,
sabotage, assassination, terror, and espionage
occurs at special Soviet training facilities and
camps near Moscow and locations along the
southern Soviet border. Some evidence ex-
ists that terrorist training is also conducted in
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany.
Thousands of Palestinians, other Arab re-
cruits, and selected non-Arabs and members of
the South West African Peoples' Organization
(SWAPO) and the African National Congress
(ANC) have received training in insurgency
and terrorist techniques at facilities in the
Soviet Union. Additionally, arms shipments
from Eastern Europe as well as arms purchases
on the open market by terrorist groups using
funds derived from Soviet proxies and clients
are significant indicators of Soviet support.
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, through their
state-controlled arms shipment agencies, have
originated arms transfers that end up in terror-
ists' hands. The passage of terrorists through
and their maintenance of temporary residence
in Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Bulgaria, highlight Soviet
Bloc security service collusion in sanctioning
terrorist activities.
Soviet support for terrorist training camps
in South Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon
has been the clearest evidence of substantial
Soviet investment in terrorism in the Middle
East. These training camps have been used
International Terrorist Incidents
700 -
,- 700
600 -
- 600
500 -
- 500
400 -
-400
300 -
- 300
200
- 200
100 -
-100
0 I I I I I 0
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
125
Chapter VII Global Ambitions
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United States
Mexico
Citribbean
(3-4 ShiRs, Av*rage)
Dual
El Salvador
rea
MOWS
Dominican?iR.pubiic
jamaIca St. L?ucis ,
St. Vinunt and
Costa Mei' stfan?3?
,Colombia
Ecuador
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD
(Est.)
Latin America (including Cuba) 7,900
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 600/4,000
Mideast and North Africa . 8 , 000-9,000
Asia (including Vietnam) 3,500
Afghanistan 118,000
CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD
Latin America 3.000
Sub-Saharan Africa 42,000
Mideast and North Africa 500
Barbados
_,TrInidea and Tobago
SOVIET GLOBAL
Greenland
-
Greenland
(Den.)
Venezuela
. Peru
yena
Sur name
ch Guiana (Fr.)
Brazil
Chile
Argentina
r_ uay
Ireton
Not
Den
United
Kingdom N.4.
Lu .
France
Mon el
Andorra -
Portu;a7spain
Mediterranean
(40-50 Ships, Average)
morocc
Western
Sahari
Cape Verdet San ga
Gamble Am.
Guinea-
is sau
Sierra ,
Leone
Merl Togo
Sao Tom* and PrInclpe,fr
Equate.
Gains
West Africa
(5-8 Ships, Average)
Soviet Arms Transfers (1980-1985)
$5 billion?S10 billion
$1 billion-45 bation
$100 million?S1 billion
Soviet Treaties of Friendship
Soviet Military Personnel
(Excluding Military Attaches)
Mutual Defense Treaties
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POWER PROJECTION
1 Finland
wadan
Poland
Yugo.
t Marino
Alb ,
'
,
Soviet Union
? ----.
Turkey
Matta ypms
? ' 4
Le
lire
Iran
China
uwait
Saltrala
?Qatar
) Chad
an
Burma
'etnarn
S. Karel
- Japan
Kong (U K )
Macao (Port.) South China Sea
Sri Lanka
on
Zaire
Torr
South
Africa
Santana
Maldives
Indian Ocean
(20-25 Ships, Average)
Seychelles
Comoros
Madagascar
MauritluS
ambique
waziland
SOtho
Major Cuban Presence
Major Soviet Naval Operating Areas
Deployed Soviet Naval Forces
SSB/SSBN Operating Areas
Soviet Naval Access
L.1
Airfield Access
(20-25 Ships, Average)
,
Malay * Soviet Airfield and Naval Base
'Singe si
Cam Ranh Bay
? - Nauru
Indonesia
plow'
New ?ulnas
Solomon
, Islands
Tuvalu
Fiji
Kiribati
Western
Samoa
Tonga
Australia
New
Zealand
127
Chapter VII Global .1mbitions
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extensively by radical elements of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as by
guerrillas and terrorists from Latin America,
Africa, Asia, and Europe. Libya, in particu-
lar, has emerged as a pivotal force in world
terrorism.
On the opposite side of the globe, Cuban
leader Fidel Castro has provided terrorist
groups millions of dollars in arms and supplies
to escalate and foment insurgency and revolu-
tionary violence throughout Central and South
America.
While the evidence indicates that the Soviets
bear a substantial responsibility for fostering
international terrorism, they appear to believe
that direct Soviet control is not desirable or po-
litically expedient in terrorist activities as long
as terrorist aims and objectives parallel or com-
plement Soviet goals. A substantial amount of
the weapons and training support for terrorist
groups originates with the Soviet Union and
its clients or allies. Soviet support for revolu-
tionary violence and international terrorism is
expected to continue and perhaps escalate as a
means of challenging the West.
Latin America
Central and South America remain impor-
tant regions of the Third World in Moscow's
pursuit of its global ambitions. Moscow seeks
to build its own influence throughout Latin
America while diminishing that of the US. By
developing political and military relations and
supporting subversion, the Soviets can chal-
lenge the US and gain access to military fa-
cilities. Also, securing economic ties in Latin
America provides markets for Soviet goods and
ensures supplies of grain and raw materials.
Cuba
The preeminent importance of Cuba to
Moscow is evident in the vast amounts of So-
viet military and economic support that have
been provided to Castro's regime. Cuba has re-
ceived nearly $6 billion worth of military aid
from Moscow since 1960. Only Vietnam and
East Germany among the Communist countries
have received more. Economic assistance has
reached almost $4 billion per year and is bol-
stered by the presence of possibly as many as
8,000 civilian advisors and technicians.
Throughout this decade, the Soviets have
made an accelerated effort to upgrade Cuba's
armed forces. Nearly 60 percent of all Soviet
military assistance to Cuba has been delivered
since 1980. In 1985, this small island nation
received 5 percent of all Soviet military assis-
tance worldwide. Significant weapons systems
noted in 1985 include the SA-13 and shoulder-
fired SA-14 surface-to-air missile systems and
STENKA-Class fast patrol craft. Soviet aid and
the efforts of 2,800 military advisors have led to
across-the-board improvements in Cuban mili-
tary capabilities that pose a significant threat
to maritime commerce routes in the Caribbean
Sea and Gulf of Mexico.
Growth Trends in Cuban Forces
Air Force
1975
1980
1985
MiG 23s
0
12
45
MIG 21s
95
140
160
L-39 trainers
0
0
30
SAM launchers
105
165
215
An-26 transports
2
25
30
11-76 transports
0
0
2
Navy
FOXTROT submarines
0
2
3
KONI frigates
0
2
Missile patrol boats
22
18
20
TURYA hydrofoils
4
9
POLNOCNY landing ships
0
2
Army
T-54/55 and T-62 tanks
300
720
1,000
Other armored vehicles
120
1,000
1,200
Artillery
500"
1,400
1,500
?Estimated
In addition to military advisors, permanent
Soviet military presence in Cuba is represented
by a 2,800-man combat brigade and a major
communications intercept site at Lourdes. This
facility enables Moscow to monitor sensitive
US maritime, military, and space communica-
tions as well as US domestic telephone calls.
Furthermore, Cuban ports and airfields sup-
port Caribbean deployments by Soviet naval
task forces and long-range naval aviation air-
craft. The 25th naval task group to visit the
Caribbean was active in Cuban waters and the
Gulf of Mexico from late-September to mid-
November 1985. There were seven deployments
of Tu-95/BEAR D naval reconnaissance air-
craft and six deployments of Tu-142/BEAR F
antisubmarine warfare aircraft during 1985.
Castro provides cadre training, advisors, and
material support to many regional subversive
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C? - Bahamas
Soa
Guantanamo
12 Medium
Tanks
Alt
35 Medium
Tanks
Soviet intelligence-collection facility at Lourdes, top, near Havana, Cuba. This listening post, the
largest such facility outside the USSR, enables the Soviets to monitor sensitive US maritime,
military, and space communications as well as telephone conversations in the United States.
The Mariel port facility, bottom, serves as the primary Cuban port for the delivery of military
hardware. In 1985, over 35,000 metric tons of Soviet/Soviet Bloc equipment were delivered to
Cuba. Military hardware for Nicaragua is transshipped from this port facility.
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groups and insurgencies, capitalizing on com-
mon Hispanic ethnic and regional associations
to develop inroads that would otherwise be
closed to the Soviets. For some time, Cuba
has been seeking increased contacts with left-
ist parties and labor unions in the Caribbean,
urging them to merge to oppose democratic
governments in future elections. In Central
America, Cuba remains heavily involved in
supporting the Nicaraguan regime and pro-
vides about 3,000 military and :3,000-4,000
economic and technical advisors. Castro con-
tinues to undermine the legitimate government
of El Salvador by providing logistical support
as well as military and terrorist training to
insurgents at bases in Nicaragua and Cuba.
In 1985, Castro achieved significant politi-
cal and diplomatic successes in South Amer-
ica. He reestablished diplomatic relations with
Uruguay, established the foundations for diplo-
matic relations with Brazil, and received a new
Bolivian ambassador, marking the first official
Bolivian presence in Cuba in several years.
Peru, under President Alan Garcia Perez, plans
to normalize relations with Cuba in 1986. Cas-
tro has loaned two deep-sea fishing vessels
to Peru in an effort to increase commercial
ties. Cuba hosted Ecuadorean President Febres
Corder? while cultural, scientific, and techni-
cal cooperation between Argentina and Cuba
grew.
Castro sought to capture Latin America's at-
tention with his emphasis on the longstanding
debt crisis. In July and August 1985, Cuba
hosted a conference on the Latin American
debt that was attended by several leftist lead-
ers from the region. The conference blamed the
US for the Latin American debt problem and
called for a moratorium on payment of Ameri-
can loans.
In addition, Cuba maintains ties with sev-
eral guerrilla groups, including Colombia's
M-19, the Chilean Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left, and militant Ecuadorean groups.
At the same time, however, Castro is trying
to improve diplomatic relations and cultural
ties with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela,
Uruguay, Suriname, Guyana, and Bolivia.
Nicaragua
Moscow is gradually and cautiously consoli-
dating its ties with Nicaragua. Of the $580 mil-
SHERSHEN-Class torpedo boats, left, and
OSA-Class missile attack boats, below,
being delivered aboard a Soviet RO/FLO.
Units of both boats have been sold to eight
different Third World nations.
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lion in Communist military aid delivered since
1980, Moscow's share has been about $240 mil-
lion. New military equipment, along with 50
to 70 Soviet and 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military
and security advisors, has helped to create the
largest armed forces in Central America.
The regime in Nicaragua poses both a mil-
itary and psychological threat to neighboring
countries like Honduras and Costa Rica. The
governments of El Salvador and, to a lesser
degree. Guatemala, are threatened by Soviet-
and Cuban-supported insurgents trained in
Nicaragua.
The Kremlin is also making a substantial ef-
fort to bolster the Sandinistas economically.
Moscow now provides, directly or indirectly,
about 80 percent of Nicaragua's petroleum re-
quirements. The Soviets also have provided
significant amounts of grant food aid and
disaster-relief assistance and have signed
agreements to extend economic cooperation.
South America
Throughout South America, the Soviets pa-
tiently persist in their efforts to develop eco-
nomic, political, and military relations while
engaging in anti-US propaganda and covert
measures. However, Moscow's relations are
mostly limited to economic activity. Mos-
cow's closest ties are with Peru, the only South
American country to have purchased large
amounts of Soviet military equipment. Since
1973, the value of Soviet military assistance to
Peru has totaled about $1.5 billion. Peruvian
ports support nearly 200 Soviet fishing vessels
in South American waters, resulting in $120
million in revenues. Peru also provides the So-
viet state airline, Aeroflot, a point of entry into
South America.
Sub-Saharan Africa/Indian Ocean
Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa
over the past year has been significant in two
important respects. Moscow has increased its
support to the counterinsurgency efforts of its
client states Angola. Ethiopia, and Mozam-
bique. It has also continued its efforts to ex-
ploit discord and instability in South Africa.
Angola
Moscow is concerned about the survival of
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) regime. Luanda is one of
the largest and best natural harbors on the
west coast of Africa and is the main support
base for the Soviet Navy's West Africa Pa-
trol. Other assets there include a floating dry-
dock, a communications station, and access for
Tu-95/BEAR Ds, which patrol the South At-
lantic sealanes. To assure the survival of
MPLA control, Moscow has significantly in-
creased the amount of military aid provided
to the MPLA. In 1985, the Angolans received
Mi-24/HIND and Mi-17/Hip H helicopters, icl-
ditional Su-22/FITTERs, N1iG-23/FLOGGERs,
and SA-13 SAMs. Angola has deployed the
MiG-23s and SA-13 SAMs to the south to help
detect and defend against alleged South African
Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World 1980-1985 *
Near East
and
South Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Latin
America
East Asia
and
Pacific
Total
Tanks/Self-propelled Guns
3,600
630
505
280
5,015
Light Armor
6,565
1,000
280
250
8,095
Artillery
3,810
2,050
895
390
7,145
Major Surface Combatants
26
4
4
5
39
Minor Surface Combatants
27
21
49
48
145
Submarines
7
0
2
0
9
Missile Attack Boats
16
9
6
6
37
Supersonic Aircraft
1,340
340
135
270
2,085
Subsonic Aircraft
120
5
0
5
130
Helicopters
695
190
80
75
1,040
Other Combat Aircraft
250
70
40
80
440
Surface-to-Air Missiles
10,400
1,890
1,300
430
14,020
'Revised to reflect current information
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aircrafi supporting the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Prior
to 1985, the Angolans also received an early
warning radar net that covers almost the en-
tire sout hwest ern part of the country and other
equipment intended to improve intelligence-
gathering capabilities against UNITA. Luanda
was visited last September by a Soviet task
group, including a K I ROV-C lass nuclear-
powered guided-missile cruiser and two new
guided-missile destroyers, an UDALOY and
SOVREMENNYY, transiting to the Soviet Pa-
cific Ocean Fleet. In addition, i squadron of So-
viet An-12/CUll transports has been supporting
Angolan government f'orces for several years.
Iletween August and October, Angolan forces
launched an ambitious offensive against the
guerrillas in the southeast. While this oper-
ation achieved mixed results, the tactics and
weapons used indicate a more direct Soviet role
in Angolan military operations.
Ethiopia
Et hiopia remains the USSR's most impor-
tint East African client, a fact reinforced by
Ethiopian leader Mengistu's favorable treat-
ment in Moscow in November 1985 and by
the provision of almost $4 billion in Soviet
arms. The delivery of' equipment to the port
of Aseb for the 1985 campaign in Eritrea con-
sisted of' A PCs, T-55 tinks, and additional MiG-
2:1/HPGGER fighters. The Ethiopian rede-
ployment of 50,000 troops in less than three
weeks in August at the height of the rainy sea-
son was facil it it ed by direct Soviet logistic and
itlyisory assistance, resulting in the success-
ful capture of' an important Eritrean line of
communication from Sudan and the key town
of Ilarentu. Despite such aid, however, a sec-
ond offensive made little headway against the
insurgent stronghold of Nakfa.
Seychelles, Mozambique, and Madagascar
The Kremlin's push for access to Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean is re-
lentless, particularly in the Seychelles. Mozam-
bique, and Madag,ascar. Permanent access
would provide Moscow with significant advan-
tages: a partial counterbalance to the US
presence on Diego Garcia, greater staging ca-
pability for military airlift flights to southern
Africa. inc.1 more intelligence-gathering oppor-
tunities against Western naval activity in the
Indian Ocean,
The Soviets continue to seek regular mil-
itary access to port and air facilities in the
Seychelles. The USSR is the Seychelles' largest
arms supplier, having delivered some $18 mil-
lion in weapons and related equipment. ('on-
tinuing Soviet ship visits indicate Moscow's
resolve to maintain some influence in the SeV-
chelles. Previously, during periods of' insta-
bility or President Rene's absence, the Soviets
have sent naval vessels to support the regime.
Since February 198:3, Soviet transport aircraft,
many of which may be military, also have been
making stopovers at the Seychelles' main air-
port on Mahe en route ti) southern Africa.
However, the number of' Soviet military advi-
sors has decreased in the past year to only
10 down from 25 as the Seychelles attempts
to balance its foreign policy to) ensure Western
economic assistance and improve tourism.
The USSR has continued to) pay significant
attention to the Samora Machel regime in Mo-
zambique, largely because of' Maputo's inabil-
ity to quell the insurgency of' the National
Resistance of' Mozambique (RENAMO). Mos-
cow has provided about $1 billion in military
aid. Among the significant 1985 deliveries were
Mi-24/HIND helicopters, several PT-76 light
tanks, BTR-60 APCs, artillery pieces. BM-24
multiple rocket launchers, SA-3 launchers,
YENGENYA-Class minesweepers, and SO-1 pa-
trol boats. The approximately 850 Soviet
id-
visors and technicians are heavily involved in
planning and supporting Mozambican opera-
tions against RENAMO.
Since Mozambique is not near the normal op-
erating areas of the Indian Ocean Squadron,
Soviet combatants visit its ports infrequently:
however, hydrographic research ships are of-
ten present in the Mozambique Channel. Arms
carriers have unloaded their cargoes at Nacala
several times in 1985, and a small contingent of'
An-12/CUBs has rotated to and from the USSR.
Although the Soviets deployed two) II-38/MAYs
to Mozambique in early 1985 and continue to)
make substantial improvements at Nacala air-
field, they appear unable to gain more frequent
access.
In 1983 and 1984, relations between the USSR
and Madagascar suffered a setback as Presi-
dent Ratsiraka pursued a more balanced for-
eign policy. Madagascar provided a concrete
demonstration of' moving toward genuine non-
alignment, and in 1985 a small US security as-
sistance program was initiated. In an effort to)
shore up its ties to Madagascar, the Soviets in
November 1984 provided $20 million in military
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equipment, including the first multiple rocket
launchers in the Malagasy inventory. Soviet
advisors number about 100. Although military
access has not been granted, the Soviets proba-
bly continue to view the harbor of Diego Suarez
(Antsiranana) and the airfield at Andrakaka,
both on the northern tip of the island, as highly
desirable locations.
South Africa
In addition to working for South Africa's
diplomatic isolation, the USSR seeks to exploit
internal discord in that country. Although do-
mestic opposition to the South African Gov-
ernment is not united. Moscow attempts to
influence events through:
? deliveries of weapons to and the mili-
tary training of armed forces located
in regional countries hostile to South
Africa:
? ties with the South African Communist
Party: and
? support of the African National
Congress, a group that seeks to topple the
present government.
Uv supplying in equipment to opposition
.2,Toups, whether ideologically tied to commu-
nism or independently seeking equality and
democratic reform, the Soviets hope to gain
greater influence in the area.
Middle East/North Africa
Arms sales are the Soviets' principal means
of gaining leverage in the Middle East and
provide Moscow with its most effective entree
into regional politics. The Soviets have pro-
vided sonic icivanced models of' weapons sys-
tems not yet deployed to their Warsaw Pact
allies. Moscow has relied almost exclusively
on its major arms clients, particularly Syria
and Iraq, to further its regional influence. The
USSR also provides large quantities of' arms to
Libya, although this does little to enhance its
standing among the other Aral) states. The So-
viets have also stepped up efforts to improve
r(hit ions with Aral) moderates, notably Jordan,
tIi rough arms sales. Recent military agree-
ments with Jordan, worth some $300 million,
include '/5 L1-21/4 antiaircraft guns and SA-ft
-13 and -11 defense missiles.
Moscow persists in its efforts to expand its
presence in Egypt. Since the restoration of'
ambassadorial-level relations in September
198,1, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in re-
solving debt and trade problems with Egypt
and have thus been unable to exploit Cairo's
economic problems and its need for militaFV
spare parts. At the same time. Moscow contin-
ues policies designed to undermine not only the
Camp David peace agreement but also to sab-
otage the current Egyptian-supported Amman
accords between Jordan and the PLO. Thus,
while proclaiming its unswerving desire for
peace, the Soviet Union continues its attempts
to sabotage the peace process.
The Soviets continue their buildup of naval
and airlift capabilities in the region, both to
project power and to support their political ob-
jectives. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
(SOVMEDRON). which averages-40-50 ships, is
the Kremlin's most powerful naval f(irce per-
manently operating outside its home waters.
Soviet naval access, from port visits to perma-
nent presence, occurs at sonic 12 locations in
the Mediterranean. SOVMEDRON units have
held combined exercises with both Syria and
Libya, and Soviet Naval Aviation deployments
to those countries have increased dramatically.
Syria
Syria is the largest Soviet arms client in the
Third World, having contracted for ali(mt Si
billion in military hardware. There are more
Soviet military advisors in Syria ?1,000 than
in any other Third World country. These ;uIvi-
sors assist the Syrians in operating and main-
taining equipment and provide training in
military tactics and doctrine. Particular atten-
tion is directed to Syrian air defense systems,
highlighted by advanced SA-5/(iAMMON mis-
sile complexes at three locations.
The Soviets also have provided extensive
economic assistance to Syria. although less
than that given to Damascus by other Arab
nations. This aid has focused on large-scale
projects such as the Euphrates hydroelectric
complex, the Tartus-Floms railway, and various
land reclamation and oil development projects.
New projects include the development of nu-
clear power and research facilities. Over 1,000
Soviet economic technicians work in Syria to
support these programs. Moscow Ims extended
over $1 billion in economic credits since 198:1.
indicating a significant expansion in Soviet-
Syrian economic ties.
The foundation of' the relationship. how-
ever, remains Soviet military support to Dam-
ascus. Recent deliveries include helicopters,
SA-5 air defense missiles, patrol boats. STYX
and SEPAL antiship missiles, additional
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T-72 tanks, and attack submarines. Mi(-29/
FULCRUM aircraft are expected by 1987.
In return for military and economic assis-
tance, the Syrians provide the Soviets access
to the ports of Latakia and Tartus as well as to
the airfield at Tiyas. Tartus has become the
primary maintenance facility for Soviet sub-
marines operating in the Mediterranean, with
a submarine tender, oiler, and water tanker
located there. Additionally, Moscow receives
political support from Damascus on many inter-
national issues, particularly regarding Soviet
actions in Afghanistan.
Libya
The basis for Soviet-Libyan relations is
largely military. Since 1970, Libya has re-
ceived over $10 billion in Soviet military equip-
ment. About 2,000 Soviet military advisors
are in Libya as well as approximately 1,200
East European advisors and technicians. The
Soviet advisory mission assists with the as-
sembly and maintenance of advanced Soviet
equipment such as MiG-25/FOXBAT fighters
and NIi-24/LIIND helicopters. The Soviets also
The large military production capability of the
Soviet Union has made it one of the world's
largest suppliers of all types of major arms
for Third World clients.
provide pilot instruction and assist in training
Libyan military personnel. Despite its large
surplus of arms, Libya continues to receive
modern military equipment. Recent deliveries
have included the long-range, medium-to-high-
altitude surface-to-air missile, the SA-5. The
Libyans are building at least two SA-,5 sites, en-
abling them to attack aircraft operating close
to or over the Gulf of Sidra. In return for
supplying Libya with arms, the Soviet have re-
ceived additional access to Libyan ports and
airfields, thereby enhancing Soviet military ca-
pabilities in the region. The number of So-
viet naval combatant port visits and 11-:38/MAY
antisubmarine warfare aircraft deployments to
Libya has risen over the past few years. In
January 1986, following the Rome and Vienna
airport terrorist attacks, the Soviet cruiser,
SLA VA, deployed into the Mediterranean to
join the guided-missile cruiser, GROZNYY, in
providing a Soviet presence during the ten-
sions.
Algeria
Algeria's relationship with the Soviet Union
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is tied to continued dependence on Soviet mil-
itary equipment. Soviet-supplied equipment in-
cludes T-02 and T-72 tanks, NliG-21/FISHBED,
NI i(1-23/ FLOG( ;ER, and M iG-25/FOX BAT fight-
ers, as well as Soviet air defense missiles such
as the SA-2/G Ul DE LINE, -3/GOA, -6/GAINFUL,
-8/(1,ECKO. and -9/GASKIN. By the end of 1985.
Soviet equipment deliveries will have virtually
fulfilled a $1.5 billion arms agreement signed in
1980.
For the near- term, Algeria will remain de-
ptquient on Soviet arms and military assis-
tance, especially for spare parts. but has
indicated a willingness to diversify to Western
sources. In keeping with its policy of nonalign-
ment, Algeria has consistently refused Soviet
requests for permanent base rights and com-
bined military exercises. Further, the number
of Soviet advisors has fallen from a high of
2,500 in early 1980 to ;ipproximately 800 in 1985.
Southwest Asia
The USSR is pursuing a cautious, calcu-
lated ;ipproach to cultivate its role as a major
participant in the affairs of Southwest Asia.
Moscow considers this region strategically im-
portant because it borders the Soviet Union
and possesses large petroleum and gas reserves
needed by the West. Throughout 1985, the So-
viets used military assistance and diplomacy
as their primary means of developing influence
in the region. Overall. since 1954 the USSR
has provided more than $19 billion in military
hardware and supplies to various countries in
Southwest Asia. In addition, the Soviets have
;in estimated 2,500 military advisors stationed
in the region who perform maintenance on and
provide training for Soviet-supplied military
equipment.
Iran
Soviet-Iranian ties have been very strained
for the past several years over the issues of'
Moscow's supplying arms to Iraq and its mil-
itary activities in Afghanistan. In addition,
Moscow has been at odds with Iran over its
unwillingness to agree to a cease-fire and ne-
gotiations with Iraq. Nevertheless, the Soviets
remain interested in expanding ties with Iran
despite strong ;Intl-Communist attitudes of the
clerical regime in Tehran.
Early in 1985, political activity appeared to
herald an improvement in relations between
Moscow and Tehran. Rapprochement peaked
in April, when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromy-
ko received the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter, the highest ranking Iranian visitor to the
USSR in over three years. In the end, however,
Nloscow concluded that the Khomeini regime
was seeking to curtail Soviet support to Iraq
in its war with Iran without making signifi-
cant concessions in return. Nloscow has repeat-
edly made it clear that relations can improve
only if Tehran ends its anti-Soviet propaganda,
its support to the Afghan insurgents, and its
repression of the Communist Tudeh Party
actions the present regime is unlikely to take.
Moscow believes improved relations can occur
only after Khomeini's death.
Iraq
The USSR has sought to maintain its influ-
ence in Iraq through large deliveries of' mil-
itary aid, including- very modern equipment.
In 1984, Iraq received $2.5 hill ion in military
assistance and in 1985 took delivery of the Su-
25/FRO(lFOOT ground-attack aircraft. Iraq is
the first country to acquire this ;Iircraft out-
side the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also deliv-
ered SA-13/GOPH ER SAM systems to Iraq. The
Soviets intend to keep Baghdad supplied with
highly sophisticated weapons at levels neces-
sary to maintain its position in the war with
Tehran. The USSR and Iraq signed a signifi-
cant new arms ticcord in December during Pres-
ident Hussein's visit to Moscow. In addition.
Moscow has tried to limit the shipment of' arms
by other nations to Iran.
South Yemen
Since 1977, South Yemen has been the pri-
mary focus of' Soviet efforts to expand its in-
fluence in the Arabian Peninsula. Moscow
has succeeded in creating an authentic patron-
client relationship with Aden, based primarily
On the provision of over $2 billion in military
assistance. In return, the Yemeni Socialist
Party has loyally responded to a variety of' So-
viet policies such as the export of' revolution,
support for terrorism, and subversion in North
Yemen and Oman.
The Soviets' opportunism in South Yemen
was highlighted by their role in the violent
overthrow of the government in January 1986.
Initially, the Soviets announced support fin- the
established leadership, which had moderated
its policies toward its neighbors in an effort
to gain new sources of' economic aid. Then,
they at to mediate a cease-fire between
the two factions, both of' which were Marxist.
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and pro-Soviet. Moscow eventually backed the
hardline rebels when they began to consolidate
power. If they are to maintain their military
iccess, the Soviets will have to provide consid-
erable assistance to South Yemen to repair the
widespread damage done to the country during
the fighting. Moreover, recent Soviet gains in
the Persian Gulf region may be undermined if
a new reginie pursues radical policies toward
its neighbors. The Soviet role in the fighting
in South Yemen will also rekindle Arab suspi-
cions of Soviet ambitions in the Third World.
North Yemen
The Soviets have relied on military issis-
tance as their primary means of gaining influ-
ence in North Yemen. Moscow has delivered
approximately billion worth of arms since
19?2, including a shipment of 16 T-62 tanks
in mid-1985. The Soviets maintain a 500-man
military advisory group that provides mainte-
nance, repair, and training for North Yemen's
Soviet-made military hardware. Over the past
year, however. the North Yemenis have become
increasingly displeased with the quality, and
perhaps quantity, of the Soviet military aid
program. This it combined with North
Yemen's recent oil discoveries and its intense
suspicion about the Soviet role in the -January
coup in South Yemen, could weaken Moscow's
standing in Sana.
Gulf Cooperation Council Members
For a long time. Kuwait was the only mem-
ber of the Gulf Cooperation Council ((ICC)
with which the Soviets maintained relations.
Ilowever, Moscow has readily responded to po-
litical openings that have recently come about
within some (ICC countries by undertaking
cultural exchange programs. Last August, the
Soviets sent a tourism official to Bahrain. Mos-
cow also had contact with Qatar and Saudi
Arabia when those countries sent delegations
to participate in the opening ceremonies of the
Youth Games held in the USSR during the
same month. Nloscow's increasing focus on
the conservative Persian Gulf stites has been
rewarded. In September and again in Novem-
ber, it was announced that diplomatic. rela-
tions would be established with Oman and the
United Arab Emirates. The Soviets could use
this entree to try to undermine Oman's security
relationship with the US. Moscow is likely to
try to continue to expand its influence among
the other Arab principalities in the Gulf.
South Asia
India
Soviet influence in South Asia stems primar-
ily from its close relationship with the region's
largest power, India. Moscow employs sev-
eral measures to sustain its influence in New
Delhi but relies primarily on military assis-
tance. In order to ensure continued Indian
reliance on Soviet irrns, the USSR has prcy-
vide(' sonic of its most modern weapons systems
it excellent prices with low interest rates and
long-term repayment schedules. Moscow's de-
termination to limit New Delhi's arms diversi-
fication efforts has led to Soviet acceptance of
payment in Indian rupees rather than a hard
currency incl to agreements for Indian copro-
duction rights.
Since 1980, Soviet arms deliveries to New
Delhi have totaled over $,:1 billion, enabling In-
dia's armed forces, the fOurth largest in the
world, to undergo i massive modernization pro-
gram. Over 500 Soviet T-72 tanks have been
delivered. providing New Delhi with a main
battle tank superior to that of any other na-
tion in South Asia. Recent aircraft deliveries
include the Mi(1-27/FIA)GGER. During 1985,
the Soviet Union ilso provided the Indian Air
Force with three II-76/CANDID military trans-
port aircraft while continuing its deliveries of'
the An-32/CLINE twin-turboprop transport.
Delivery of one of the Soviet Union's most
icivanced fighters the high-performance,
;ill-weather MiG-29/FULCRUM interceptor is
expected in 1986, is is delivery of the first
KILO-Class attack submarine. Neither weapon
system has previously been exported by the So-
viet Union.
The new leaders of' both countries have un-
derscored the continuity of' the Indo-Soviet
relationship. Following the assassinat ion of' In-
dira Gandhi, Moscow reaffirmed Soviet-Indian
ties, expressing support for Rajiv Gandhi and
praising his election victory. Moscow sched-
uled i series of high-level visits between the
two nations and successfully lobbied for Ra-
jiv Gandhi to visit the Soviet Union before Ins
scheduled June 1985 trip to the United States.
Gandhi's visit to Moscow in May provided an
opportunity to cultivate further ties with New
Delhi.
Afghanistan
In December 1985, the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan entered its seventh year still op-
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posed by widespread and popular resistance.
Soviet control continues to be limited to urban
areas, primarily the capital, Kabul. Neverthe-
less, Soviet forces, which now number 118,000,
luiye become steadily more effective in attack-
ing- the Mujahideen, and a coherent Soviet
c(mnterinsurgency strategy designed to break
the military stalemate appears to be emerging.
List year Soviet forces in Afghanistan con-
tinued to focus on establishing control over
major urban areas and on protecting vital lines
of communication. The security of' Soviet gar-
risons and airfield defense continued to receive
priority attention. However, during 1985 So-
viet forces also were employed with greater
frequency in assault operations against resis-
tance strong-holds designed to crush insurgent
Initiative throughout Afghanistan.
During one such operation in the Konar
Valley, Soviet forces advanced with unusual
speed and effectiveness, temporarily lifting a
nine-month siege of' an Afghan Army border
outpost. rl'he Soviet Army demonstrated a
considerablv improved ability to concentrate
and employ forces quickly against suspected
insurgent positions. Resistance forces were
also confronted by the Soviet ability to in-
sert air issatilt forces into areas previously
considered inaccessible to Soviet formations.
Soviet troops in combat vehicles patrol the
streets of Kabul, maintaining security and en-
forcing Moscow's control of the capital.
This significant improvement in force projec-
tion has been enhanced by the introduction of
several Special Purpose (SPETSNAZ) battal-
ions into Afghanistan. Trained to operate in
small teams behind enemy lines. SPETSNAZ
units exemplify the continuing- Soviet effort to
tailor forces in Afghanistan to counterinsur-
gency operat ions.
Soviet attacks on Afghanistan's rural popula-
tion have become commonplace. Moscow has
employed "scorched earth" measures calcu-
lated to destroy the Freedom Fighters' sup-
port structure, such as the village above.
As part of its qualitative improvement, the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan has buroduced
new weapons systems, focusing on those with
greater mobility uid increased lethality. So-
viet airborne forces have been upgraded with
the introduction of wheeled BTR-60/70 ffinored
personnel carriers (AP('s), more capable of ne-
gotiating Afghanistan's rugged terrain. The
introduction of' BI-1 multiple rocket launch-
ers (MRI,$) and M1981'82 120-mm self-propelled
artillery has provided airborne forces with the
ability to strike the insurgents more accurately
and at greater range. Soviet motorized rifle
divisions have also received new systems, in-
cluding the BM-27 NMI, and self-propelled ar-
tillery. 'Me introduction of' these systems has
largely offset recent improvements in NI u-
jahideen weaponry.
In icldition to specialized troops and im-
proved equipment. Moscow has continued to
implement "scorched earth- measures directed
at restricting Mujahideen access to civilian
support. Throughout areas of' eastern Afghani-
stan, Soviet forces appear to have implemented
a free-fire zone policy. Villages in the region
are frequently bombed or fired upon without
warning in an ipparent effort to depopulate
areas thought to be pro-Mujahideen.
However, the 1985 Soviet campaign suffered
several setbacks. Insurgent forces ill the Pan-
slier Valley under Shah Akmad Masood over-
ran an Afghan Army outpost, t;iking large
numbers of' prisoners. In the fall, a Soviet any
depot near Kabul was destroyed by
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the insurgents. Endemic desertion and wide-
spread collaboration with the resistance have
continued to frustrate Soviet efforts to improve
the size and effectiveness of the Afghan Army
essential to Moscow's long-term strategy in
Afghanistan. In response, the Soviet command
replaced the Afghan Minister of Defense.
Afghan Air Force officers have generally
been perceived as more responsive to Soviet di-
rectives. However, in mid-1985 pro-resistance
officers in the Afghan Air Force dealt a major
blow to Soviet airpower in Afghanistan by de-
stroying about 20 Soviet-built combat aircraft.
In July 1985, the Afghan pilots of two Soviet-
built Mi-24/HIND helicopters flew to Pakistan
and requested asylum.
With the war now in its seventh year, the
Kremlin is finding it increasingly difficult to
maintain the fiction domestically that the So-
viet presence in Afghanistan is merely a
"limited contingent- of troops involved in
peace corps-type missions and fighting "ban-
dits.- The Soviet media has increasingly ac-
knowledged the difficulties of combat in
Afghanistan, often making strained compar-
isons with the struggle against Nazi fascism.
One Soviet spokesman even noted the training
advantages afforded by actual combat.
The Kremlin, nevertheless, is clearly preparing
its populace for a long war.
Southeast Asia
Vietnam
Since the 1978 signing of' the Soviet-
Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooper-
ation, the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia
has expanded dramatically. This development
is primarily the result of vastly increased So-
viet support for Vietnam as well as for Laos and
Cambodia. Vietnam has become almost totally
dependent on Moscow and its East European
allies for economic, military, and political as-
sistance to support its economy, maintain its
occupation of Cambodia, and counter Chinese
military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese
border. From 1978 through 1985, the Sovi-
ets have provided over $5 billion in arms aid
to Hanoi along with direct aid to Cambodia.
Over 2?500 Soviet military advisors are in Viet-
nam to support this program, and a contin-
gent of An-12/CUBs has operated in Vietnam.
Laos, and Cambodia since 1979. In addition to
more than $7 billion in Soviet economic assis-
tance through 1984. Vietnamese membership in
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA) obligates the Soviet Union's East Eu-
ropean allies to provide aid to Vietnam.
In return. Moscow has gained access to Viet-
namese military facilities. Cam Ranh Bay
has become the largest Soviet naval f'orward-
deplovment base outside the USSR. The
installation includes a naval base, a compos-
ite air unit, and a growing communications,
intelligence-collection, and logistics support in-
frastructure. The three or four attack and
cruise missile submarines operating from Cam
Ranh Bay conduct patrols in the South China
Sea and are well situated to operate against
sea lines of' communication in the region. If
necessary, Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay can
augment the Indian Ocean Squadron. These
facilities service the 20 to 25 Soviet ships rou-
tinely deployed to the South China Sea. In
addition, since late 1984 a Soviet air unit com-
prised of 16 naval Tu-16/BADGER and 8 BEAR
D/F aircraft, as well as a squadron of MiG-
23/FLOGGER C/Gs, has been deployed at Cam
Ranh Bay airfield. The BEAR and BADGER
aircraft conduct reconnaissance, intelligence-
collection, and ASW missions throughout the
South China Sea. The BADGERs' strike range
from Cam Ranh Bay includes not (mly regional
states but also the Philippines, Guam,
Palau and Yap the western portion of Mi-
cronesia. These military forces indicate the in-
creasing reach of' Moscow's military power and
the potential political influence of' the USSR on
regional decisions.
ASEAN
Moscow has increased its efforts to improve
relations with the states of' the Association of'
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through
expanded trade and cultural ties as well as by
stressing issues of' regional concern. Increased
economic ties are attractive to these states, es-
pecially Indonesia and Malaysia, as they seek
ways to increase non-oil exports to improve
their trade positions. The Soviets have also
continued their efforts to sell military equip-
ment in the region but without positive results.
South Pacific
After almost a decade of' relative inactivity,
the Soviet Union has renewed its efforts to im-
prove relations with the South Pacific island
states and to increase its maritime access to
that region. These efforts are designed to dis-
rupt Western maritime mobility. To achieve
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The AGI MARSHAL NEDELIN, lead ship of the
newest class of Soviet space support ships,
is equipped to support both missile tests and
space launch activities. It currently operates
in the Western Pacific.
The PRIMORYE-Class intelligence-collection
ship is equipped with a versatile array of col-
lection, electronic warfare, and communica-
tions equipment. The PRIMORYE is one of
the Soviets' most sophisticated intelligence-
collection ships and has conducted operations
against US facilities on the Kwajalein atoll.
this strategic objective, the Soviets are rely-
ing on both commercial and scientific programs
to gain influence and access. For example, So-
viet interest in hydrographic research reflects
their desire to improve their submarine oper-
ations and develop methods to counter US un-
dersea military activities in the region. It could
also assist them in acquiring strategic minerals
from deep seabed mining areas.
Since September 1984, Moscow has offered
to negotiate fishing access agreements, includ-
ing substantial Soviet hard currency payments,
with Fiji, Kiribati. Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu,
and Vanuatu. Kiribati concluded an agreement
in August !Or an annual Soviet licensing pay-
ment of about $1.7 million. This agreement not
only allows the Soviets access to a wide area
of the mid-Pacific adjacent to the US missile
testing range at Kwajalein. it also could in-
fluence other island states to follow Kiribati's
lead. Further, Soviet inroads could create a po-
litical environment that would give them the
ability to intimidate and bring the smaller Pa-
cific island states under their influence.
Moscow has also sought to exploit the anti-
nuclear sentiment in the Pacific island states,
Australia, and New Zealand through calls for
nuclear-free zones that would have a much
greater impact on US ships and aircraft than
on those of the Soviets. This, coupled with
their efforts to have states in this area deny
access to the US, could prove to be damaging
to Western strategic interests.
Northeast Asia
()ver the last two decades, the Far East
and Northeast Asia in particular has become
second in importance only to Western Europe
for Soviet political-military policy. The Soviets
cite geography and the rapid economic. develop-
ment of the Soviet Far East as justification for
their claim that the USSR is an Asian power
and should therefore play a major role in the
Pacific. The primary Soviet concern, however,
is security. Moscow has focused on ichieving
superior military power in the region through
the quantitative and qualitative improvement
of Soviet forces in the Far East. These forces
include over 50 divisions along the Sino-Soviet
border and northeast Asia, some 1,700 tactical
aircraft excluding BACKFIRE bombers and
more than one-third of' the Soviet mobile SS-
20 missile force. The effective Soviet use of'
other overt instruments of' foreign policy, such
as diplomacy, aid, and trade, has been hindered
by the Soviet military buildup which has led to
a widespread regional perception of' the Soviet
Union as a threat to peace.
One characteristic of the Gorbachev ap-
proach to foreign policy has been the advo-
cacy of an updated version of' Brezhnev's Asian
Collective Security proposal. Gorbachev first
made this new proposal during Rajiv Gandhi's
visit to Moscow in May 1985. The proposal
calls for convening an All-Asian Security Fo-
rum modeled after the European security con-
ference that led to the 1975 Helsinki Accords.
This Asian conference would focus on peace
and disarmament issues. Unlike the earlier
Brezhnev proposal, Gorbachev's scheme is di-
rected less against China than against the US
security presence in Asia. Moscow has been
persistent in its advocacy of this purposefully
vague proposal with Asian governments.
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China
China remains the major focus of Soviet
activities in Asia. Although the overall rela-
tionship remains adversarial, Moscow has in-
centives to preserve and deepen the current
Sino-Soviet dialo.2,-tie. which began in October
1982. Even a slight improvement in bilateral
relations is interpreted by Moscow as a loss
for the US on the global balance sheet and an
enhancement of Moscow's image.
Moscow undertook several initiatives dur-
ing Chernenko's funeral to maintain the mo-
mentum of Sino-Soviet relations. Gorbachev
al111011need Nloscow's desire "to have a seri-
ous improvement in relations- with Beijing
and that, given "reciprocity.- such improve-
ment was "possible.- This statement is con-
sistent with the longstanding Soviet position
that Beijing must make the first substantive
concessions. In addition, Gorbachev met with
Vice Premier 1,i Peng. marking the first such
high-level c?ont act between Soviet incl Chinese
leaders since 1969. In response, China publicly
acknowledged the Soviet Union as "socialist
for the first time since 1967.
Despite these overtures, Sino-Soviet rela-
tions reflect a pattern of a gradual expansion
of economic and cultural ties with no move-
ment on fundament il strategic issues. The
long-anticipated visit to Moscow of Chinese
Deputy Premier Yao Yilin took place in -July
1985 and resulted in the signing of' a five-
year economic agreement intended to produce
reciprocal trade totaling $3.5 billion by 1990.
Normalization talks also occurred in April and
October 1985, hut with no new overtures by
either side. Moscow is unlikely to accede to
Beijing's demands that normalization of rela-
tions he preceded by the withdrawal of So-
viet forces from Afghanistan, the withdrawal
of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. and the
removal of' Soviet military forces from the Chi-
nese border and Mongolia.
North Korea
Soviet-North Korean relations have expand-
ed markedly since President Kim ll-song vis-
ited Moscow in NIav 1984, resulting in the most
dramatic change in Pyongyang's foreign policy
since the early 1970s. To date, these changes
have had a military focus, with increased So-
viet military assistance in exchange for ex-
panded cooperation in intelligence-collection
act ivit ies.
The delivery of MiG-23/FLOGGER aircraft
to North Korea has been the most signifi-
cant trend in the improving bilateral relation-
ship. There are presently 26 Ni i( in North
Korea. A total of' some :15 to 45 such air-
craft expected to be delivered. A lim-
ited number of' surface-to-air missiles, probably
SA-3s/GOAs, have been delivered to North Ko-
rea. These arms transfers reflect Moscow's c(m-
elusion that Pyongyang is seriously prepared
to improve bilateral relations. This is the first
concrete evidence of' an agreement by Moscow
to renew deliveries of sophisticated new mili-
tary equipment to North Korea.
In exchange, it appears that the Soviets have
received permission to make military over-
flights of North Korea. Increased ictivity is
expected for both intelligence collection and
strike mission simulation. These flights have
been made by Tu-16/11ADGER reconnaissince
aircraft, Tu-95/BEAR ( strike aircraft, and Tu-
95/BEAR I) naval intelligence collectors.
One important result of' Soviet support has
been an improvement in overall military re-
lations. To mark the end of' World War II
in Europe, Soviet and North Korean fighter
units in earlv May conducted their first ex-
change visits. In late summer, to commemorate
the 40th inniversary of' the liberation of Korea
from Japan, the Soviets sent a record number of'
delegates and three naval combatants one
KARA-Class guided-missile cruiser and two
KRIVAK-Class guided-missile frigates. This
visit was the first such port call to North Korea
by major Soviet naval combatants.
Japan
Soviet military policies continue to domi-
nate relations with Japan to the detriment
of Moscow's political and economic ties with
Tokyo. Soviet-Japanese relations are also
clouded by the ongoing dispute over the North-
ern Territories (south of the Kuril Islands).
Moscow denies and refuses to discuss the
,Japanese claim to these illegally occupied is-
lands and continues its military buildup there
with the deployment of' MiG-2:1/HAMGERs to
Etorofu Island. While the Soviets seek to im-
prove economic ties with Japan to obtain tech-
nology and capital to develop Siberia, Moscow's
military buildup and antagonistic policies have
only encouraged Tokyo to strengthen its ties
with the United States and to continue upgrad-
ing its own military self-defense capabilities.
Throughout hist year, bilateral meetings
have occurred in response to changes in the
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The second ship of the KIROV-Class of nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers, the FRUNZE,
on its way to join the expanding number of major combatants in the Pacific Fleet.
Soviet approach. Building on the meeting be-
tween Prime Minister Nakasone and Premier
Tikhonov during the November 1984 funeral
of Indira Gandhi- the first heads-of-state meet-
ing between the two countries in 11 years?
Tokyo has responded favorably to Moscow's
overtures. Most notably, Prime Minister Naka-
sone met with General Secretary Gorbachev
during the March 1985 funeral for Chernenko.
In mid-January 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Tokyo.
This was the first Soviet foreign ministerial
visit to Tokyo since 1973 and resulted in a joint
communique that implicitly allows for future
discussion of the Territories issue.
Concurrently, Moscow has intensified its
propaganda campaign, criticizing Tokyo for its
interest in the US Strategic Defense Initiative
program and charging Prime Minister Naka-
sone with seeking to remilitarize Japan. This
propaganda effort, coupled with the persistent,
obstacle of the Northern Territories, points to
continuing tensions despite the recent improve-
ment in relations.
Outlook
Moscow's use of all the instruments of for-
eign policy--military assistance, diplomacy,
trade, aid, propaganda, and overt and covert
activities demonstrates a determined effort to
extend Soviet power and influence and to pro-
mote the USSR as the dominant world force.
Its quest for overseas bases, coupled with its
improving capabilities in strategic mobility, re-
flects Moscow's desire to advance the ideologi-
cal goal of a Communist world order.
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Chapter VIII
US Policies
and Programs
The preceding chapters have documented de-
velopments in Soviet military power by de-
scribing the continuing major military buildup
that has been sustained over the past quarter-
century. The increase in Soviet military power
presents a serious challenge to the United
States and our allies and friends, stemming in
part from three major developments:
? the quantitative and qualitative Soviet.
military buildup, which has produced a
major shift in the nuclear and conven-
tional balance;
? the dramatic increase in Soviet military
offensive capabilities; and
? improvements in the global reach of
Soviet military forces, enhancing the
Kremlin's ability to project influence
and power.
The US response to the Soviet challenge
has involved a spectrum of security policies
aimed at deterrence and defense. The basis for
these measures stems from a hard look at our
strategic concept to preserve peace not only for
today but also for future generations. Some
of the measures undertaken to assure peace
are: arms control initiatives; modernization of
our nuclear and conventional forces; efforts to-
ward strategic defense research; improvements
in the readiness, mobility, and sustainability
of our forces; protection of our technology:
improvements in our industrial base; strength-
ening our alliances and capabilities for coali-
tion warfare; and providing security assistance
By the end of the 1980s. the Soviet strate-
gic nuclear threat will include regiments of
BLACKJACK bombers armed with the
3,000-kilometer-range, nuclear-tipped AS-15
air-launched cruise missile. With new and
more capable nuclear attack systems con-
tinuing to enter the USSR's Armed Forces,
the Soviet Union's military challenge to the
United States and the Free World contin-
ues unabated.
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to our allies and friends. These are essential
measures if world peace is to be maintained.
Unlike the Soviet Union, we do not seek to win
any political or territorial advantage by force
of arms. At the same time, we must face the
sobering fact that our vital interests cannot be
protected if the Soviets enjoy an advantage in
every category of military strength.
The following discussion summarizes the
United States' policies and programs initiated
to meet the Soviet challenge. A more compre-
hensive report on these developments is regu-
larly made available to the public in such pub-
lications as the Annual Report to the Congress
by the Secretary of Defense and the Military
Posture Statement of the Chairman of the joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Deterrence and Arms Control
The primary security objective of the United
States is to defend our right, and that of our
allies, to live in freedom. Since World War II,
we have sought to accomplish this objective
by maintaining military forces capable of de-
terring Soviet military aggression and of frus-
trating their attempts to use military strength
for political intimidation. And while we be-
lieve that, in the words of President Reagan,
"a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought," effective deterrence requires that
we must be perceived as able and prepared, if
Soviet aggression does take place, to impose
unacceptable damage on key elements of Soviet
power.
At the same time. the United States is com-
mitted to an arms control process that, if it
were to lead to equitable and verifiable agree-
ments, could strengthen deterrence and en-
hance stability while radically reducing the
numbers and destructive power of Soviet and
American nuclear weapons. Our proposals
made to the Soviets at the Nuclear and Space
Talks (NST) in Geneva reflect that commit-
ment. We are also working to lower the risk
of conventional war through the Conference
on Security and Confidence-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks
(M BFR) in Vienna.
Deterrence and stability, however, are con-
ditions that can result only from a balance be-
tween Soviet and American forces. Given the
Soviets' massive buildup of both offensive and
defensive capabilities as documented in pre-
vious chapters --failure by the United States
to modernize its own forces and to proceed
with its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) re-
search program would weaken deterrence and
increase the risk of war.
Similarly, arms control agreements must be
complied with and cannot be isolated from
the underlying competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Thus, an arms
control agreement that preserved areas of So-
viet advantage while placing unfair and uni-
lateral restrictions on the United States would
threaten Western security and wreck any hope
for extensive, equitable, and verifiable arms
reductions in the future. The situation will
worsen if the Soviets continue their violations
and probable violations of the letter and spirit
of numerous existing arms control agreements.
For these reasons, the United States has care-
fully constructed its defense modernization and
arms control policies to be an integrated and
mutually reinforcing approach to preserving
Western security in the face of an evolving
Soviet threat.
Arms Control Compliance
As part of our continuing efforts to put the
arms control process on a firm and lasting ba-
sis, we have paid close attention to the ques-
tion of compliance while the Soviets have not.
The pattern of Soviet violations and probable
violations raises serious questions concerning
the integrity of the arms control process and its
ability to guarantee a more stable and secure
international environment. We have stated our
readiness to "go the extra mile" in giving the
Soviets an opportunity to correct their activi-
ties involving noncompliance. But we cannot
accept a double standard that amounts to uni-
lateral treaty compliance and restraint by the
United States.
The list of Soviet violations and likely vi-
olations of both the letter and spirit of arms
control agreements is long and getting longer.
A few of the significant examples include:
? Construction of a large phased-array, bal-
listic missile detection and tracking radar
at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia in di-
rect violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty
requirement that such early warning
radars be located on the periphery of the
Soviet Union and be oriented outward.
? Deployment of the SS-25 single-warhead,
road-mobile ICBM in direct violation of
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the Soviets' political commitment to re-
frain from undercutting the 1979 SALT II
agreement, which limits each side to just
one new type of "light- ICBM. The Sovi-
ets previously said that their soon-to-be-
deployed SS-X-24 multiple warhead ICBM
was their one allowable new missile.
? Encryption of ballistic missile telemetry
in direct violation of SALT II provisions
prohibiting deliberate concealment mea-
sures that impede verification of compli-
ance by national technical means.
? Maintenance of an offensive biological
warfare program and capability in di-
rect violation of the 1972 Biological and
Toxic Weapons Convention and involve-
ment in the production, transfer, and
use of chemical and toxic substances for
hostile purposes in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan in direct violation of the
1925 Geneva Protocol.
? Underground nuclear testing activities
that constitute a probable violation of
legal obligations under the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which prohibits
underground nuclear tests with yields
exceeding 150 kilotons.
In December 1985, the President again re-
ported to the Congress concerning Soviet non-
compliance with arms control agreements. The
report reaffirmed previous findings concerning
Soviet violations and announced several addi-
tional findings. In relation to the SALT I and
11 Treaties, the additional findings were:
? Soviet violation of SALT I Interim Agree-
ment by using facilities remaining at dis-
mantled or destroyed SS-7 sites to store,
support, or launch ICBMs;
? Soviet violation of the SALT II strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles limit;
? Soviet violation of the SALT II prohibi-
tion on concealment of missile/launcher
association;
? Soviet action inconsistent with BACK-
FIRE bomber commitment -Arctic
staging; and
? evidence of BACKFIRE production at
slightly more than the permitted 30 from
1979 to 1984 and production at slightly
less than 30 from 1984 to 1985.
In the case of the ABM Treaty, it was de-
termined that Soviet activities associated with
rapid reload were ambiguous in relation to
treaty compliance but were a serious concern.
Soviet activities relating to ABM-capable
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were also held
to be ambiguous.
The expanding pattern of Soviet violations
is clear and has important political and mili-
tary implications. Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk
radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM
Treaty. It appears even more menacing when
considered in the context of other Soviet ABM-
related activities. Together, they cause con-
cern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an
ABM territorial defense. Moreover, most wor-
risome is the technical argument by which the
Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, for it might
be applied to additional prohibited ICBMs in
the future.
Soviet violation of the Geneva Protocol and
the Biological Weapons Convention has given
them a prohibited biological warfare capabil-
ity which we do not have and against which
we have no defense. Soviet violations of the
SALT II verification provisions have impeded
our ability to verify Soviet compliance with
existing treaties, present special obstacles to
maintaining existing arms control agreements,
and are indicative of a Soviet attitude contrary
to the fundamentals of sound arms control
agreements.
The United States is seeking through diplo-
matic channels to obtain Soviet explanations,
clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective
actions. So far, the Soviets have refused to
address seriously our compliance concerns. In
addition, some Soviet violations ---for example,
the flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25
are, by their very nature, irreversible. For
these reasons, in June 1985 President Reagan
directed the Department of Defense to identify
specific actions that could be taken in propor-
tionate response to, and as a hedge against the
military consequences of, those violations that
the Soviets fail to correct.
Modernization Programs
Strategic Modernization
In 1981, President Reagan committed the
United States to reversing the potentially dan-
gerous erosion of the credibility of our strate-
gic nuclear deterrent that resulted from the
massive expansion and modernization of Soviet
strategic forces during the 1970s.
The net result of the combination of Soviet
modernization and deployment programs for
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their nuclear attack forces and US restraint
in modernizing its offensive nuclear forces was
to allow the Soviet Union a "sanctuary" for
its ICBM force and for the other key assets
that were protected by hardening. This, com-
bined with the Soviets' ability to attack our
Minuteman force, using only a portion of their
ICBMs, significantly eased the problems of So-
viet nuclear planners. They could begin to
envision a potential nuclear confrontation in
which they could threaten to destroy a very
large part of our force in a first strike while
retaining overwhelming nuclear forces to deter
any retaliation we could carry out.
This ability to conduct a first strike also
threatened to make less credible the deterrent
linkage between our strategic nuclear force
and our forward-deployed conventional and nu-
clear forces. In addition, the increasing Soviet
emphasis on blunting the effects of US retal-
iation held open the prospect of undercutting
deterrence further because the Soviet leader-
ship could come to believe that their hardening
programs would permit them to emerge from
a major conflict with their forces, command
and control system, and other support systems
damaged but still functioning.
Since 1981, the Soviets have continued to
press ahead with development and deployment
of new generations of ICBMs, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and air-
craft capable of strategic missions. However,
over the last five years, the United States has
begun significant improvements in its strate-
gic triad which if carried to completion
will help restore high confidence among both
friends and adversaries in the credibility of our
deterrent forces. The purpose of our modern-
ization programs is not to achieve strategic su-
periority over the Soviets but to frustrate their
determined efforts to shift the strategic balance
irrevocably in their favor.
Our strategic modernization programs con-
sist of four key elements:
? In response to the threat posed by Soviet
fourth-generation deployments and to the
survivability and retaliatory capability of
our land-based ICBMs, we will begin de-
ploying a limited number of Peacekeeper
missiles in selected Minuteman silos in
1986. Research and development will also
continue 00 a new, single-warhead ICBM.
? To replace our aging Poseidon nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) force, which will face block ob-
solescence in the 1990s, the United States
is building Trident submarines at the rate
of one per year. Deployment of the D-5
missile in the Trident in the late 1980s
will strengthen our vital sea-based deter-
rent by giving it a hard-target capability
not possessed by existing SLBMs.
? The usefulness of our B-52 bombers the
newest of which was built 23 years ago
has been extended for a few more years
owing to the standoff capability of the
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) being
deployed on selected B-52s. Introduction
of the B-1B will ensure a continued pene-
tration capability against Soviet defenses,
at least until the deployment of a new
advanced-technology bomber in the 1990s.
At that time the B-1B will assume the
role of ALCM carrier.
? In addition to fielding more survivable
delivery vehicles, we are improving the
survivability, endurance, and effective-
ness of our command, control, and com-
munications systems. This strengthens
stability by making it less attractive to
the Soviets to attempt a preemptive at-
tack against our command system. Also,
these improvements will further ensure
our capability to manage our strategic
forces effectively.
Our strategic modernization programs do
much more than deter Soviet aggression
against the United States. They also serve, as
they have for the past four decades, to deny the
Soviets the ability either real or perceived
to use or threaten to use their strategic forces
against our allies and friends.
Non-Strategic Modernization
The growth over the past decade of Soviet
theater nuclear capabilities in particular,
their SS-20 deployments has posed a unique
challenge for the United States. Although
these weapons do not threaten contiguous US
territory, they do affect our vital national se-
curity interests because they significantly in-
crease the threat to our friends and allies in
Europe and Asia. It has been necessary, there-
fore, to respond to this threat by formulating
and implementing a collective Western
response.
Our NATO allies are meeting the challenge.
In accordance with its 1979 dual-track decision,
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NATo has completed deployment of the Per-
shing II, and deployment of ground-launched
cruise missiles continues on schedule. At the
same time, the United States, in close consul-
tation with NATO allies, is seeking to nego-
t Mte an agreement with the Soviets at Geneva
that would totally eliminate, or at least greatly
reduce to equal global warhead limits, the en-
tire class of longer range intermediate-range
nuclear force (MINI?) missiles.
NATO is also following through on the 1983
Montebello decision to withdraw 1,400 nuclear
weapons from the NATO stockpile within the
next few years. Taken together with the 1,000
warheads already withdrawn, the number of
nuclear warheads in the Alliance's stockpile
will be reduced to the lowest point in 20 years.
This is in stark contrast to the massive Soviet
buildup of nuclear forces facing NATO.
Space Command
On 2:I September 1985, the United States
Space Command was activated in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. This new unified command
has operational control over the US Air Force
Space Command, the US Naval Space Com-
mand, and the US Army Space Planning Group.
The new command provides centralized plan-
ning- and daily mission operations for space
systems support of US military forces world-
wide. Additionally. the mission of integrated
warning of strategic attack against the con-
tinental United States has been assigned to
this command. The formation of this command
recognizes the importance of space systems in
safeguarding the interests of' the United States
and its allies and is not directly related to the
St nitegic Defense Initiative research program.
Conventional Forces Modernization
Land Forces
To meet the Soviet threat., the United States
is working to improve the antiarmor capabili-
ties and tactical mobility of' our ground forces
as well as to provide better command, control,
and communications (CH') support. Over 400
modernized combat systems are being fielded,
including the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/3
Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BEV) equipped with
TOW ant iarmor missiles, the Multiple Launch
Rocket System, and the AH-64/Apache attack
helicopter, which carries Hellfire anti-
armor missiles. In addition, many support
systems such as the Black Hawk helicopter
and the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicle have improved the effectiveness of our
land forces. We have stepped up the pace of
our ground force modernization programs,
adding more Mls, BEVs, and AH-64s to the
procurement levels planned by the previous
administration.
The effective use of' tactical mobility can
help counter a numerically superior opposing
force by permitting the rapid concentration of'
personnel and materiel at places where they
can best exploit enemy vulnerabilities. A new
generation of highly mobile helicopters and
support vehicles will allow us to make bet-
ter use of this tactic. For example, the UH-
60/Black Hawk helicopter, which proved its
worth in Grenada, is larger. more agile, and
more reliable than the UH-1 it replaces.
Also supporting our ground forces are highly
capable new weapons such as the Multiple-
Launch Rocket System (M LRS). In less than
a minute. a single launcher can fire 12 rock-
ets beyond cannon range, covering an area the
size of 6 football fields with approximately 7,700
grenade-like submunit ions that are effective
against both personnel and lightly armored tar-
gets. Additionally. the MLRS is an excellent
example of US-NATO armaments cooperation.
Complementing these improvements in com-
bat systems are upgrades to the command and
control systems that would support our forces
in battle. During the mid-to-late 1980s. our com-
manders will receive lightweight, jam-resistant
CH' equipment to assist them in managing their
forces on a high-technology battlefield.
Maritime Forces
Strong maritime forces are needed to support
our forward defense strategy, to fulfill the re-
sponsibilities associated with our network of
overseas alliances, and to protect the vital sea
lanes linking the US to Europe, Southwest
Asia, and Northeast Asia. We rely heavily on
maritime forces to respond to a wide variety
of crises a role for which their global reach,
rapid responsiveness, and integrated combat
power are particularly well suited.
The warfighting capability of our naval
forces has improved markedly, with substan-
tial increases in the quality and quantity of
our ships, which numbered 540 in October 1985
and which are now well along toward our goal
of a force of 600 ships. Modern aircraft car-
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rier battle groups enable our naval forces to
respond rapidly to crises throughout the world
and to conduct sustained operations in areas
where we do not have access to airfields or
other major land bases.
With the delivery of 3 new nuclear-powered
Nimitz-Class carriers over the next six years,
we will expand to a force of 15 aircraft carriers.
Four Iowa-Class battleships, now being refur-
bished and armed with long-range Tomahawk
and Harpoon cruise missiles, are rejoining the
fleet and will provide a potent supplement to
our carrier force. At the same time, we are
arming a variety of surface ships, attack sub-
marines, and combat aircraft with Tomahawk
and Harpoon weapons systems, giving them
greater effectiveness against a wide array of
targets.
To enhance our amphibious assault capa-
bilities, we are building new high-speed air-
cushion landing craft and two new classes of
amphibious ships. By the middle of the next
decade, our amphibious lift capability will have
expanded by one-third. Ship-to-shore mobility
will also be improved by the powerful CH-53E
helicopter, now joining the force in large num-
bers, and by the new MV-22A Osprey tilt-rotor
aircraft, currently under development. The
combination of these assets will permit assaults
to be launched from points over the horizon,
thereby reducing vulnerability and increasing
the likelihood of surprise. Once ashore, our
Marines will be provided greater mobility and
firepower by the addition of the Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV).
We are working hard to improve our abil-
ity to locate and combat enemy submarines.
One example is a new attack submarine sched-
uled for production near the end of this decade.
A key design objective is to build a quieter
boat with better sensors, enabling it to hunt
down and engage enemy forces while remain-
ing undetected. At the same time, we are con-
tinuing to construct improved versions of the
Los Angeles-Class attack submarine as replace-
ments for older boats that are approaching ob-
solescence; some 33 of the 52 Los Angeles-Class
boats authorized to date are now operational.
In addition, LAMPS helicopters, new towed-
array sonar systems, and lightweight torpedoes
are upgrading the antisubmarine capabilities
of our naval surface and air forces.
Our defense against antiship missiles will be
improved by the wide-area surveillance systems
now under development and by strengthened
area air defense systems. Central to these ef-
forts is the development of tactical over-the-
horizon radars that can detect enemy aircraft
hundreds of miles away, thus enabling our
land- and carrier-based interceptors to mount a
more effective defense of our ships at sea. Like-
wise, the deployment of new CG-47 cruisers and
DDG-51 destroyers, both of which incorporate
the Aegis air defense system, will improve our
ability to intercept high-speed cruise missiles
and aircraft at extended ranges. Ultimately, we
plan to build 27 CG-47 cruisers and 29 DDG-51
destroyers.
Tactical Air Forces
Well-trained and properly equipped tactical
air forces can quickly destroy targets on land
and at sea as well as provide an air defense
umbrella in support of ground and naval forces
worldwide. To retain our qualitative edge in
this area, we must continue to improve our
tactical aircraft. To that end, we are acquir-
ing systems that will allow for rapid, multi-
ple engagements beyond visual range while be-
ing highly maneuverable and lethal at close-in
ranges. The overall capability of our tactical
air forces to destroy enemy forces in the air
and on the ground has improved substantially.
The Navy is modernizing its carrier-based
force of combat aircraft. The F-14, our pri-
mary fleet air-defense fighter, and the long-
range Phoenix missiles it carries are being
upgraded. By the end of the decade, all the
Navy's fighter and medium-attack squadrons
will be equipped with F-14s and A-6Es, and the
F/A-18 will have replaced almost 80 percent of
the A-7E light-attack inventory.
The Air Force is continuing to modernize its
tactical fighter forces with the new model F-
15 and F-16 aircraft. Since 1980, it has more
than doubled its inventory of F-15s and F-16s,
bringing the combined total to nearly 1,400
aircraft. New, more durable, and easier-to-
maintain engines, scheduled for installation on
these aircraft in the early 1990s, will further en-
hance their combat effectiveness. These high-
performance engines will enable the upgraded
but heavier models of our fighters to keep
pace with the new generation of Soviet-built
fighters.
The Air Force also is upgrading its ground
attack systems. Currently in development are
a new airborne targeting system, the Low-
Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared
System for Night (LANTIRN), and new in-
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frared air-to-surface missiles that will allow
F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s to strike enemy tar-
gets whenever they present themselves. In
addition, much-needed improvements in air-to-
ground munitions have been initiated which
will bring munitions effectiveness up to the
high level of quality represented by these air-
craft. Finally, some squadrons of B-52G aircraft
have been assigned general purpose missions,
such as minelaying, sea surveillance, antiship
attack, and conventional bombing, supplement-
ing their strategic duties.
Overall, our inventory of tactical aircraft
has grown by the equivalent of two wings over
the past four years. Over the next five years,
we plan to buy 1,284 fighter and attack aircraft
for the Air Force and 954 for the Navy and the
Marine Corps. This will allow us to reach our
goal of 14 carrier air wings by 1987 and about
40 Air Force tactical fighter wings by the early
1990s.
The deployability of Air Force tactical com-
bat aircraft will be increased significantly
during the next several years as the recently
approved NATO acceleration of European air-
base facilities comes to fruition. Additional
bases and much-needed concrete shelters will
greatly increase the initial effectiveness of our
reinforcement aircraft in a European crisis.
Special Operations Forces
The United States must be prepared to re-
spond to low-intensity conflict when it threat-
ens our vital national interests. The Soviets
and their surrogates, as a matter of policy,
have both encouraged and supported this form
of aggression as a way of achieving their ob-
jectives without direct confrontation with the
Free World. Today, more than 20 insurgen-
cies are threatening peace in the Third World,
and one out of every four countries around the
globe is engaged in some form of conflict.
Low-level conflict will likely be the most per-
vasive threat to Free World security for the
rest of this century. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) provide us the ability to respond to a
range of crises in a flexible manner. They con-
tribute to our ability to deter and defeat a ma-
jor conventional attack by their capability to
disrupt the enemy's lines of communication, en-
gage in unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, counterterrorism actions, or intel-
ligence missions.
By the end of the decade, the capability of
our Special Operations Forces will be enhanced
by the addition of a Special Forces Group and
a Navy SEAL team. Additionally, mobility will
be improved through submarine dry deck shel-
ters, patrol craft, and a significant increase
in medium- and long-range SOF-configured air-
craft. Readiness and sustainability for these
forces will benefit by the emphasis being placed
on spare parts procurement, communications
equipment, and foreign language training.
Strategic Defense
As previous chapters have shown, the na-
ture of the Soviet military threat has grown
during the past quarter-century and will con-
tinue to grow during the next. Unless we adapt
our response, deterrence will become much less
stable and our susceptibility to coercion will in-
crease dramatically. Recognition of these facts
is the basis of our strategic and nonstrategic
modernization programs and arms control poli-
cies. It also is the basis for the Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) announced by President
Reagan in March 1983.
The SDI research program is designed to
determine whether advanced defensive tech-
nologies could contribute to a future in which
nations could live secure in the knowledge that
their national security did not rest solely upon
the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather
on the ability to defend against potential at-
tacks. Specifically, the SDI is examining the
possibility of effective defense against ballistic
missiles.
At a minimum, the SDI is a prudent response
to the very active Soviet efforts in offensive
and defensive forces. The Soviets have de-
ployed around Moscow the only operational
ABM system in the world. The Soviets also
have an active research and development pro-
gram in both traditional and advanced defenses
against ballistic missiles. If they were to have
a monopoly on advanced defenses against bal-
listic missiles, in addition to their large and
growing offensive and defensive forces, they
might come to believe that they could launch a
nuclear first-strike attack against the United
States or our allies without fear of effective
retaliation.
It is too early in our research program to
speculate on the kinds of defensive systems
whether sea-based, ground-based, or space-
based and with what capabilities that might
prove feasible and desirable to develop. But
we currently see genuine merit in the poten-
tial of advanced technologies providing for a
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layered defense, with the possibility of negat-
ing a ballistic missile at various points after
launch. Because the security of the United
States and that of our allies remains indi-
visible, we are working on technologies with
applications for defense against long-range bal-
listic missiles and against short-range ballistic
missiles that threaten our allies.
Although several years of' research will prob-
ably be necessary before a determination can
be made whether to proceed with development
and deployment of' defense systems against bal-
listic missiles, key criteria have been identified
by which the results of' SDI research will be
judged. First, any system to be developed and
deployed must be survivable so that the Sovi-
ets would not have an incentive in a crisis to
strike first. Second. any defensive system to be
developed and deployed must he cost-effective
relative to offensive forces meaning that the
defensive system must be able to maintain its
effectiveness against the possible proliferation
of offensive forces or the introduction of offen-
sive countermeasures. Indeed, defenses would
provide a significant incentive for deep reduc-
tions because they would significantly reduce
or even eliminate the military effectiveness of
ballistic missiles.
The SDI research program is being conduct-
ed in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If
and when our research yields positive results,
we will consult with our allies about potential
next steps, and we will consult and negotiate,
as appropriate, with the Soviet Union pursuant
to the terms of' the ABM Treaty.
US Strategic Mobility
Our capability to move troops and equip-
ment by air is unmatched by any country in the
world. US airlift assets include the transports
of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) aug-
mented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
in time of' emergency. Current MAC strate-
gic mobility transports include 70 C-5 and 234
C-111 aircraft. Under the CRAF program, US
civilian airlines augment the military with an
additional 68 cargo and 237 intercontinental
passenger aircraft. The combined cargo-
carrying capability of these aircraft is more
than twice that of the Soviet Union's military
and civilian aircraft. However, when distance
to a region of' possible conflict is considered,
this 2:1 ratio favoring the US changes signif-
icantly in terms of maximum number of tons
deliverable per day.
In any major overseas deployment, sealift
will deliver about 95 percent of all dry cargo
and 99 percent of all petroleum products. The
US-flag merchant marine's decline necessi-
tates a large pool of government-owned ship-
ping, such as the Ready Reserve Force (RRF),
to provide additional tonnage in time of mobi-
lization. The RRF provides the surge shipping
needed early for a deployment. The 66 dry-
cargo ships and 8 tankers in the RRF are being
maintained in a 5-, 10-, or 20-day readiness sta-
tus at 3 primary anchorages in the US. Another
set of government-owned ships, those in the
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), are a
valuable but aging asset and are capable of pro-
viding approximately 140 ships for sustainment
requirements.
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) cur-
rently has under charter only enough ships to
meet the peacetime needs of our deployed naval
forces. Included under MSC long-term charter
are the 25 ships of the afloat pre-positioning
programs. Afloat pre-positioning programs con-
sist of two parts: the Maritime Pre-positioning
Ships (MPS) program and the Pre-positioning
(PREPO) ships program (formerly Near-term
Pre-positioning Force),
The MPS program is designed to combine the
responsiveness of airlifted troops with sealift
delivery of pre-positioned equipment. The 13
ships involved in the program will be orga-
nized into 3 MPS squadrons that can carry
equipment and 30 days of supplies for 3 Marine
amphibious brigades. The first MPS squadron
has deployed to the US Atlantic Command's
area; the second has deployed to Diego Garcia
in the Indian Ocean; and the third squadron
will deploy to US Pacific Command sometime
this year.
The 12 PREPO ships consist of' those ves-
sels in the Mediterranean Sea, Pacific Ocean,
and Indian Ocean that carry equipment and
supplies for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Readiness
The capability of US military forces has im-
proved measurably over the past five years and
will continue to do so as more new weapons
systems and modern equipment are introduced
into the operating forces. In absolute terms, we
now have the most effective peacetime military
force in US history. However, we cannot afford
to determine national security requirements on
the basis of our military strength alone; we
must consider the strength and objectives of
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our potential adversary. Since ours is funda-
mentally a defensive strategy, it is essential
that we maintain our readiness at or above that
of' potential aggressors.
Our forces are better prepared to accomplish
their warfighting tasks because they are bet-
ter equipped, trained, and manned with highly
motivated people who are confident in their
ability to get the job done. Despite the progress
made, we cannot lull ourselves into believing
that our work is complete: much remains to
be done. Readiness quickly becomes a perish-
able commodity without sustained support and
funding.
Sustainability and Logistics
We recognize that our forces, even with a
high degree of readiness, might become a "hol-
low- deterrent if we cannot sustain them in
combat. Adequate logistics support for our
forces munitions, fuel, equipment, and repair
parts is necessary for successful deterrence
and defense.
Our current level of sustainability is barely
adequate for credible deterrence. In Europe,
for example, our sustainability remains inferior
to that of the Warsaw Pact. We will continue,
in conjunction with our allies, to emphasize in-
creases in sustainability to fortify the deterrent
value of our forces. Building upon the gains
made during the past five years, we seek a level
of conventional sustainability to ensure deter-
rence of the Soviet threat. Besides providing
sufficient quantities of stocks to maintain our
staying power in combat, we seek forces of su-
perior quality equipped with our most modern
and effective conventional munitions.
The pre-positioning of US equipment in Eu-
rope began in the 1960s in response to US and
European concerns that the forces in the the-
ater were inadequate to meet the Warsaw Pact
threat. The Army has pre-positioned in Europe
heavy equipment for four divisions and sup-
porting- units and is currently pre-positioning
equipment for two more divisions. The Air
Force pre-positions rapid runway repair equip-
ment, ground support equipment, munitions,
fuel, and other consumables. The levels of pre-
positioned fuel and munitions, however, con-
tinue to fall short of objectives. The US goal
is to possess sufficient war reserve stocks to
sustain wartime activity until industrial pro-
duction can provide the required support. Our
long-range goal is to correct the NATO-Warsaw
Pact sustainability imbalance by the 1990s.
Reserve Forces
The US maintains slightly above one million
personnel in the Selected Reserve and about
470,000 Individual Ready Reserves. The Se-
lected Reserve, consisting of National Guard
and Reserve units, constitutes approximately
45 percent of the total force structure. Al-
though Selected Reserve manning has improv-
ed significantly in recent years, it does not
approach the numbers of' trained reserves in
the USSR. US Selected Reserves include:
? one-third of the Army's combat divisions;
? one-half of the nation's strategic airlift
crews:
? one-third of the Military Airlift Com-
mand's medical evacuation aircraft: and
? one-fourth of the Marine Corps' infantry
divisions, aircraft wings, and force ser-
vice support groups.
Technology Security
The purpose of the United States' technol-
og,y security policy is to offset the Soviets'
numerical advantages in weapons and man-
power by protecting our strong suit superior
high-technology. The Soviet program of' acquir-
ing Free World technology is pervasive and
aimed at improving the quality and effective-
ness of their weapons by using the results of'
the Free World's research and development.
We can maintain our technological superiority
only if we continue to strengthen our research
and development base and deny Soviet access
to our militarily critical technology. The De-
partment of Defense (Don) is a key player in
a government-wide domestic and international
effort to safeguard our technological lead.
Participation in the export license applica-
tion review process, which is governed by the
Export Administration Act and the Arms Ex-
port Control Act, is the cornerstone of the
domestic portion of Do D's Technology Security
Program. The Defense Technology Security
Administration (DTSA). a newly established
DoT) field activity, oversees this responsibility.
Along with increased automation and other
management initiatives. DTSA has greatly im-
proved service to the exporting community
while safeguarding our technology. DTSA also
has raised the level of public support for the
Technology Security Program through in-
dustry briefings and industry participation
in many vital issues related to technology
security.
The Militarily Critical Technologies List,
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first published in 1980 and continually updated,
is used by export license officials as a reference
guide to detail the potential military applica-
tions of a large number of technologies. The
unclassified version of the list enables the busi-
ness community to see clearly what technology
areas Dol) has identified as militarily critical.
This document also aids business in its own
technology security programs.
The effectiveness of our technology secu-
rity program in the United States is insepara-
ble from similar efforts by other Free World
nations. The United States is committed to
strengthening the existing multilateral export
control organization known as COCOM, or the
Coordinating Committee on Export Controls.
Based in Paris. COCOM is the only organiza-
tion through which Japan and the NATO na-
tions (except Iceland) determine what should
not be exported to Warsaw Pact countries and
a few other destinations. COCOM is much
more effective now than it was five years ago
owing to a persistent US-led effort to make it
a credible technology security force. In the fall
of 1985. Spain announced that it would join
COCOM, making it the first new member since
1954, when Japan joined at the suggestion of
the United States.
Since not all technologically advanced na-
tions are members of COCOM, the United
States is negotiating agreements with various
governments to establish a COCOM-level of
protection for US and for indigenous technol-
ogy within other countries.
'Nis effort is underway both within and out-
side the European Theater. And it will grow
in importance as the US continues to increase
its trade with industrializing countries, partic-
ularly in the Far East. Soviet military presence
and extension of influence in this part of the
world is growing dramatically, making technol-
ogy security efforts increasingly important.
It is clearly in our national interest to en-
courage both industry and our research insti-
tutions to remain innovative while expanding
our rich industrial base. Our Technology Se-
curity Program will continue to be focused on
protecting the applied technologies that can
be incorporated into defense-related systems.
Technology security controls are not intended
to thwart our traditions of free expression and
academic freedom in basic research. Neither
are they designed to distance us from our al-
lies and other friendly countries when it is in
our national interest, and in the interest of
mutual security, to share militarily significant
technology.
Doffs Technology Security Program is one
of the most cost-effective means of protecting
national security. It has had a marked effect
on the ability of the Soviets to use our tech-
nology for their military benefit. They have
been forced to spend more of their resources on
military research and development than would
have been the case if our improved controls had
not been in place. Moreover, our own defense
budget reflects a lower level of expenditures
than would have been necessary if the Soviets
had acquired certain US technical capabilities.
Technology security is a vital component of
our national defense effort. Without the West's
technological lead, our ability to maintain an
effective deterrence would be seriously jeopar-
dized. The institutionalization of the Technol-
ogy Security Program at DoD builds a strong
foundation for the future.
US Industrial Base
The US defense industrial base is comprised
of both private sector and government-owned
industrial facilities that provide production
and maintenance of defense materiel needed
to support the armed forces. Government-
owned facilities are minimal since public law
requires maximum reliance on the private sec-
tor for defense goods and services. Conse-
quently, government-owned facilities in most
cases are dedicated to the production of unique
defense-related materials such as munitions,
artillery tubes, and tracked combat vehicles.
The current US Government-owned base con-
sists of 72 production and 43 maintenance
facilities.
The US has initiated a number of impor-
tant industrial preparedness measures aimed
at preserving, modernizing, and expanding the
defense industrial base. "Seed money'' con-
cepts and other contract incentive programs
have stimulated private sector investment in
advancing process technologies and plant-wide
capital investments. Production programs are
being developed to provide a rapid production
surge during crisis situations. Sustained em-
phasis on vitalizing the defense industrial base
is recognized by both Congress and DoD as an
integral part of' achieving our defense goals.
Alliance Security Structures
The United States has joined with many
other Free World nations in alliances designed
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to deter aggression and provide the ability
to defend common interests should deterrence
fail. These alliances contribute to deterrence
by allowing us to share the burdens with-
out matching the Soviets weapon system for
weapon system. Beyond formal alliances, we
have established relations with other friendly
states to promote common security objectives.
The vitality of these alliances and friendships
luis helped to impede Soviet territorial expan-
sion and thwart the Soviet ambition of becom-
ing the dominant world force.
We and our allies and friends are work-
ing together to improve our common security
through a variety of programs. Maintaining
solidarity among free and independent states
particularly when faced with Soviet efforts to
divide and intimidate them is essential for
successful alliances and requires careful atten-
tion and willingness to consider each other's
views and concerns. Maintaining strong mil-
itary forces for defense and improving them
and our capabilities for coalition warfare in
the face of a growing threat remain a top pri-
ority. Beyond this, we are pursuing many
political-military programs, such as coopera-
tive efforts toward arms control and prevent-
ing the USSR and its allies from obtaining our
m flit ary-related technology.
NATO was established to respond to Soviet
expansion in Eastern Europe. A strong NATO
is essential to meeting the Soviet and Warsaw
Pact challenge. To help meet the threat of
Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression or intim-
idation, NATO is pursuing new initiatives to
improve its conventional forces while it con-
tinues to improve its strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear f'orces.
In May 1985, NATO Defense Ministers ap-
proved a report that identified critical deficien-
cies in NATO's conventional defense structure
and out a plan to overcome those short-
comings. The task remains to carry out this
plan. Last December, NATO Defense Minis-
ters endorsed a conceptual military framework
for long-term defense planning. Another key
program in NATO is to increase the degree
of cooperation in research. development, and
production of armaments, including exploit-
ing emerging technologies to improve conven-
tUmal defenses so that the Alliance has the best
equipment and makes the best use of resources
available.
We have also strengthened our friendship
ties in Asia and the Pacific, regions of vital
importance for our defense and for the eco-
nomic well-being of the Free World. We look to
Japan to carry out fully its defense missions
including territorial, air, and sealane defense'
to 1,000 miles by completing implementation
of its 1986-1990 defense program. We are also
working with Korea and Thailand to assist
them in meeting threats on their borders. In the
Philippines, we are encouraging reforms and
economic development to strengthen that ally.
With regard to the Australia, New Zealand,
United States (ANZUS) Pact., are working with
our allies to overcome the difficulties caused by
New Zealand's port access policy.
We continue to strengthen our relations with
nations in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia in a continuing effort to deter Soviet ag-
gression and maintain access to that region's
resources while promoting the search for a last-
ing Arab-Israeli peace. Although we have no
formal alliances in the Middle East, we are
gradually expanding our security relationships
with regional states in pursuit of mutual inter-
ests. We have expanded our cooperation with
Egypt, Jordan. and Pakistan and have moved
forward on military cooperation with Israel.
In Africa and Latin America, we have seen
the threat that low-intensity conflict and ter-
rorism pose to developing nations that are
struggling to build democratic institutions.
Since formal alliances are not always practi-
cal in these circumstances, security assist ince
programs have become the basis for ensuring
regional security and the stability of friendly
nations. Despite the efforts of' the Soviets and
their proxies to disrupt fragile economies and
undermine democratic development, leaders in
countries like El Salvador have demonstrated
their willingness to resist aggression.
Security Assistance
Security assistance strengthens formal al-
liances and helps ensure stability in regions
where formal alliances are not possible. Our
security assistance programs have been instru-
mental in improving stability in ('entral Amer-
ica, preventing the spread of' the Iran-Iraq war,
and strengthening the posture of our friends
and il lies in Europe, Asia, Africa, :Ind Lat in
America. The economic burden we bear in pro-
viding this assistance to our friends is worth-
while because it is far more effective and less
costly for indigenous forces to protect their
own freedoms than for the United States to at-
tempt to perform these missions on their behalf.
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Our programs are designed to preserve the lib-
erty and independence of the states that receive
this assistance.
We develop our security assistance pro-
grams from a hierarchy of strategic consider-
ations. Starting with global US strategic ob-
jectives, we formulate programs appropriate to
each region in which we have major interests.
These regional objectives are weighed together
with the country-specific threats and military
requirements in order to plan, with the coun-
try, the details of each country's program. Of
special note are the new programs for Pak-
istan, increased funding for Israel, Egypt, and
Turkey, and a vigorous response in Central
America.
Security assistance contributes to our for-
eign policy and defense objectives and to on-
going diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in
areas such as the Middle East. US security
assistance programs also play a crucial role
in bilateral and coalition efforts to contain or
deter conflicts in areas of concern to the US.
Conclusion
The United States, together with our allies
and friends, must maintain the military ca-
pabilities required to deter and, if necessary,
defeat Soviet aggression against our vital in-
terests. We do not seek to match the Soviet
Union in defense spending or in the acquisition
of specific armaments. We must, however, con-
tinually assess the global military balance in
which Soviet forces are a major factor. Real-
izing that the perceptions of the Soviets, our
allies, and other nations are affected by the
balance, we cannot accept a position of mili-
tary inferiority. Maintaining a strong military
capability over the long term will require the
United States to invest in its defense structure
while pursuing genuine, verifiable, and equi-
table negotiated arms reductions. We and our
allies and friends must have a full and pre-
cise understanding of the Soviet challenge. The
publication of this edition of Soviet Military
Power is a step in that direction as we pursue
our transcending goal of peace and security.
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