SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES BOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001202350005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 103
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Jay / Tonie--
DDI had no record of a response on this
document.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
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SUSPENSE 10 March 19
Date
Remarks
10 #5: Pleaaeeprepare response for signature.
Executive Secretary,
24 FEB 86
Date
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Executive Registry
February 19, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
THE UNITED NATIONS
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues Book
Attached is a copy of the book: Selected National Security
Issues. This book is a "snapshot" of US foreign policy as of the
end of December. The drafts of this book have been coordinated
throughout the Executive Branch by the National Security Council
Staff. While the National Security Issues Book is unclassified,
it should be used primarily by you and your staff for general
information, not as a specific guide to all national security
issues. I would appreciate any comments you may have.
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
The following pages represent a second revision of the Selected
National Security Issues Book first assembled in September 1984.
The book attempts to provide a concise explanation of certain
key national security-related issues of current concern to our
Government, together with an account of Administration policy
objectives, accomplishments, and suggested talking points on each
issue. The document is not intended as a comprehensive or in-
depth review of any one aspect of our national security policy;
rather, it is hoped that it will serve a useful purpose by gen-
erally illuminating the specific policy issues it discusses.
December 1985
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Selected National Security Issues
December 1985
Table of Contents
Page
Overview
Regional Issues
The Soviet Union .......................................... 4
Eastern Europe ............................
................ 9
Western Europe ............................................13
Japan........ ...........................................17
Peoples Republic of China .................................19
East Asia/Pacific Basin ...................................21
South Pacific .............................................24
Israel/Arab States/Lebanon ................................25
Iran-Iraq War .............................................28
Afghanistan/South Asia ............................ 30
Southern Africa ...........................................33
Africa: Security .................................. ...35
Africa: Development .............................. ...........38
Central America.. ...................................... ..41
Latin America/Caribbean ...................................43
International Economics ...................................46
International Energy ......................................51
Technology Security .......................................54
Terrorism .................................................57
Narcotics .................................................62
Arms Control ..............................................65
Deterrence ... .. .........................................72
Strategic Modernization ...................................74
ICBM Modernization ...... ... ..................76
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile ................. 78
Strategic Defense Initiative. .. ..........................79
ASAT Development and Arms Control .........................82
Space....... ......... .................................85
Military Capability/Readiness .............................88
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in NATO .....................91
Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons ..........................94
Revitalization of Special Operations Forces ...............96
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Overview
The Administration's record in the national security policy realm
over the past five years is one of progress and accomplishment.
o America has reasserted the kind of vigorous and prudent
leadership the Free World expects and needs.
o Because of this leadership, the world has become a safer
place.
o Because of this leadership, economic recovery in the West
has been hastened and democracy is taking root and growing
in parts of the Third World.
o Perhaps most important of all, America has regained the
sense of self-confidence that is the bedrock upon which
true national security is built.
As the result of a useful meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva this November, we have made
a fresh start in our relationship with the Soviet Union. Even
though our two governments disagree on much, we understand each
other better now, and as President Reagan has said, "that's key
to peace."
o Our policy toward the Soviets is and will continue to be
based on the principles of realism, strength, and dia-
logue.
o We have the opportunity and mandate to reduce the danger
of nuclear war by mutually agreeing on drastic cuts in our
nuclear arsenals.
o We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence
through armed intervention and subversion, and hence we
have proposed negotiated regional settlements, the with-
drawal of outside forces, and international assistance in
building economies and meeting basic human needs.
o we must defend human rights everywhere, since countries
which respect human rights are unlikely to begin wars.
o We must establish better communications between our two
societies, since misunderstandings based on poor communi-
cations make the world more dangerous.
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We have made clear and steady progress in reversing or containing
other challenges"to our security interests that we found upon
assuming office in January 1981:
o Soviet military advances--and more subtle forms of pene-
tration--into other parts of the world have been checked:
not one square inch of free territory has fallen to Comm-
unism in the past four and a half years.
o In Europe, relations.with our Allies have been put on a
stronger, steadier course.
o The leading Western industrialized nations--and many
developing nations as well--are increasingly swinging
behind President Reagan's market-oriented approach to
solving global economic problems.
o Both the Israeli and Arab sides are making serious efforts
to address their differences through a dynamic and far-
reaching U.S.-conceived Middle East peace process.
o Our consistent support and encouragement have helped
foster democratic institution-building, especially in
Latin America, where 26 of 33 countries are now democratic
or in transition toward democracy.
o In Central America, we have met the challenge of external-
ly-supported subversion of democracy head on, and thanks
in part to our support, have seen heartening progress in
building democracy in El Salvador.
o In Africa, we have seen several governments move away from
Marxist/socialist economic models toward more privately-
oriented economies, and we have led the world in providing
humanitarian aid to drought and famine-stricken millions.
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We have united the free world against repression in Poland
o We are -working with all peace-loving nations to combat
terrorism effectively, and we are fighting the interna-
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tional drug traffickers poisoning our young. people. I
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o U.S. leadership has helped to ease the threat of energy
shortages; our energy imports are down, oil reserves are
high, and we have forged effective emergency energy 11
arrangements with our allies.
o For the first time we have begun taking effective steps
toward stemming the flow of militarily-sensitive techno-
logy to the Soviet Bloc.
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Despite our achievements thus far, we know we will have to work
even harder in coming months to protect the gains already made
and to cope effectively with the other international problems we
face as a nation--and we are quite determined to do so.
o Reaching sound and realistic arms control agreements with
Moscow will continue to require much patience and effort.
The Geneva Summit showed that we also need to continue
our effort to gain Soviet acceptance of the proposition
that a system of strategic deterrence based on defensive
instead of offensive weapons would be more stabilizing
than our present system.
o President Reagan's regional peace initiative which he
described at the UN in October, proposing negotiations
among the warring parties, followed by bilateral U.S.-
Soviet discussions, and U.S. participation in the eco-
nomic reconstruction of the affected areas, will require
a long-term commitment by all parties.
o Clearly much remains to be done to reverse the spread and
deter the perpetrators of international terrorism and
drug trafficking--steps all nations must take if we are
ever to halt the growth of these twin scourges of
mankind.
o much likewise remains for us to do to foster democratic
and market-oriented economic growth in those Third World
countries looking to us for help in these areas.
o Helping the peoples of southern Africa to attain social
and political justice peacefully poses an especially
difficult challenge to us.
o Our efforts against economic protectionism and against
short-sighted approaches to the international debt
problem must be maintained if the world economy is to
flourish.
o Instabilities and conflict in many parts of the world--
the Persian Gulf, Central America, and the Middle East,
to name but a few--will continue to flare up in new
challenges to our interests that will require our best
efforts to counter effectively.
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SOVIET UNION
Issue:
How can the United States further deter Soviet direct and
indirect aggression and reduce the risk of a U.S.-Soviet
war?
Objectives:
o Build on the fresh start made at the Geneva Summit to
develop a U.S.-Soviet relationship characterized by mutual
respect, understanding, and cooperation as well as peace-
ful competition.
o Seek Soviet agreement to deep cuts in the vast stockpiles
of weapons in the world, particularly nuclear weapons, on
a balanced,- stabilizing, and verifiable basis.
o Continue to improve U.S. forces,. as well as assist our
Allies and friends, so as to provide strong deterrent and
defense capabilities.
o Defend human rights in the Soviet Union and elsewhere and
insist that the Helsinki accords and other international
agreements on human rights be obseved by all nations.
o Establish better communication between the Soviets and
ourselves in order to minimize the chances of dangerous
misunderstandings.
o Deny the Soviets the militarily significant western tech-
nology they seek to acquire.
o Block Soviet efforts to gain influence in other countries
through armed intervention and subversion."
o Counter Soviet attempts in the Third World and elsewhere
to portray their system as progressive on social and
economic issues.
In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three
guiding principles:
o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of
the world we live in and the Soviet system, and must not
sweep problems under the rug, but must deal with them
forthrightly.
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o Strength, which is more than military power; it is an
amaTg-am of political unity and will, economic health, and
an adequate defense. The Soviet Union respects strength;
it takes advantage of weakness.
o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the
problems that divide us and to work for practical and fair
solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
Accomplishments:
o By restoring our economic health, repairing our defenses,
and strenghtening our will to defend democracy, we have
created the basis for a constructive dialogue with the
Soviet Union. Therefore, the world is safer today than it
was five years ago.
o Our global alliances and traditional friendships,
essential to deterring Soviet aggression, have been
repaired and are sound.
o President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Geneva from November 19 to 21, 1985, and held intensive
and frank discussions with him on the entire range of
issues that divide us. The meetings represented an im-
portant step forward in our efforts to build the basis for
more stable and constructive East-West relations. Al-
though they disagreed on much, the two leaders succeeded
in beginning a new and direct dialogue that is to lead to
more frequent meetings between them, as well as in regular
visits and exchanges at all governmental levels.
o On arms control, although our differences with the Soviets
over the relationship between strategic offense and de-
fense remain profound, we both have agreed that a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought. We have also
agreed to accelerate work at the Geneva Nuclear and Space
Arms Talks as well as in other arms reduction efforts.
o We and the Soviets have agreed to study the question of
establishing risk reduction centers as a means of reducing
the possibility of conflict between us because of acci-
dent, misunderstanding, or miscalculation.
o other recent gains in U.S.-Soviet relations include agree-
ment on measures to promote safety on air routes in the
North Pacific; a tentative agreement on the resumption of
direct commercial air service between our two countries;
an agreement on the simultaneous opening of Consulates
General in New York and Kiev; agreement on broadening
people-to-people contacts and exchanges in the scientific,
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educational, medical, and sports areas; and agreement to
cooperate on environmental and fusion energy research.
o At the same time we have continued to make it clear that
Soviet compliance with existing agreements, including
those on arms control, human rights, and other major
issues, has an important effect on our relationship.
o By showing the superiority of free market economics in
meeting basic human and social needs, we have also begun
to challenge Soviet efforts to court the Third World.
o We have established a pattern of consultation on regional
issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of
these, consultations help us and the Soviets to avoid
actions which could escalate into direct conflict.
o We have in place a policy designed for the long term,
since management of our relations with the Soviet Union
must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of
the past, which weakened our ability to defend our
interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the
Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve
peace between us as we work toward solving-problems.
Talking Points:
o This Administration has moved decisively to contain Soviet
expansionism. No country has fallen to Soviet aggression
since 1981 and, despite its frequent saber-rattling and
truculence, Moscow has been more cautious in its military
behavior over the,past five years. This is largely due to
our refurbishing of our deterrent capacity and the
strengthening of our alliances.
o it remains essential for us to continue our currently
planned defense modernization program. If this program is
curtailed without verifiable agreements to constrain
threatening Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have
little incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the
hope of achieving their objectives without any concessions
on their part.
o Our general policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is aimed at
deterring further Soviet direct and indirect aggression in
the world and achieving a lessened reliance on the use or
threat of force, a reduction in nuclear and other arma-
ments, and a more constructive U.S.-Soviet working rela-
tionship.
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o These policy aims were significantly advanced as the
result of President Reagan's meetings with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva from November 19 to 21,
1985.
o The meetings were very worthwhile and represented a good
start toward establishing a more constructive bilateral
relationship. As the President later reported, "I can't
claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals
as ideology or national purpose--but we understand each
other better, and that's key to peace."
o The Summit featured and extensive discussion of our
differences--still admittedly profound--over the
relationship between strategic offense and defense. But
it also allowed us to make a measure of progress on a
number of other important arms control issues, including
agreement in principle on 50 percent reductions in nuclear
weapons by both sides, agreement to accelerate work at the
Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, agreement to enhance
cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and agree-
ment on the concept of a chemical weapons ban.
o Both sides also agreed at the Geneva Summit to emphasize
the importance of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and the
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and to study the
concept of establishing risk reduction centers on both
sides to minimize the chances of accidental war.
The two leaders recognized the need to build greater
confidence in dealings with each other. Accordingly, they
agreed that Secretary Gorbachev will visit the United
States in 1986 and President Reagan will visit the Soviet
Union in 1987. In addition, a regular process of Cabinet-
level exchanges is to be established, the ongoing dialogue
at the experts' level on regional trouble-spots is to be
intensified, and people-to-people contacts and exchanges
in the scientific, educational, medical, and sports fields
will be strengthened.-
o other recent gains in the bilateral relationship include
agreement on measures to promote air safety in the North
Pacific, a tentative agreement to resume direct commercial
air service between our two countries; an agreement for
the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York
and Kiev; and a pledge to cooperate on environmental and
fusion energy research.
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As positive as all these developments are--or will be, if
.implemented in good faith--we need to remain realistic.
We and the Soviets disagree on much, and the competitive
nature of our relationship will not change. But at least
both our countries agree they jointly have an overriding
responsibility to ensure that this competition remains
peaceful. We'are ready for the long effort--and steady,
course--that must be maintained to do this.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Issue:
Given the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the
Soviet campaign to reimpose more stringent controls on
Eastern Europe, how can we maintain and improve our
relations with East European countries?
Objectives:
o Differentiate our policies toward East European countries
to encourage domestic liberalization, diversity, and more
autonomous foreign policies.
o Promote security through enhanced trade, economic and
political cooperation.
o With those countries that manifest foreign policy autonomy
or domestic liberalization, stimulate and further develop
the East-West dialogue through cultural and scientific
exchanges, international meetings, high-level visits,
bilateral councils, and government-to-government contacts.
o Help foster genuine national reconciliation in'Poland that
includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the
people (especially the Polish workforce); restoration of
free trade unions; implementation of economic reform; and
an enhanced role for the Church.
o maintain our strong support for an independent, unified,
non-aligned, economically viable, and stable Yugoslavia.
o Further develop dialogue with Romania on political and
economic issues to encourage continuation of independent
policies; use this dialogue to stimulate improvement in
Romania's performance on emigration and other human rights
issues.
Accomplishments:
o In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet
controls in East Europe, we have succeeded in preventing
the deterioration of U.S. relations with several East
European countries and, in fact, have strengthened
bilateral ties with Hungary and Romania through a policy
of differentiation.
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o We have improved U.S.-Hungarian relations significantly,
as manifested in a series of mutual high-level visits,
resolution of all family reunification cases, Hungary's
adherence to the conditions of MFN status, and our support
for their membership in the IMF in 1982.
o Romania has continued its independent foreign policy,_
notably with respect to participation in the Warsaw act
on its own terms and expansion of high-level political and
military contacts in Western Europe. Emigration from
Romania to the West and to Israel continues to be high,
and.there has been progress in resolving. divided family
and other difficult emigration cases. We also have
reached agreement with the Romanian. Government on a new
procedure governing emigration from Romania to the U.S.,
which provides for orderly processing under U.S. law and
greatly reduced hardships suffered by intending emigrants
prior to their departure from Romania. We consider
improvement of religious rights an important element of
our dialogue with Romania.
o The Vice President's 'trip to Eastern Europe in September
1983 served'as a visible manifestation of our different-
iation policy and furthered bilateral dialogue with key
East European leaders.. His visits to Yugoslavia, Romania,
and Hungary provided a foundation for durable improvement
in U.S.-East European relations, and his speech in Vienna
during the trip was the first clear, high-level articula-
tion of our differentiation policy.
o In January 1985, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman led a U.S.
Government delegation to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary
to brief East European officials on the results of the
Shultz-Gromyko meetings in Geneva. The trip was a
resounding success, as we were able to provide accurate
information about U.S.-Soviet arms control positions,
counter Soviet propaganda, and foster greater -East
European interest and involvement in this vital area of
East-West relations. Similar briefings will be provided
periodically.
o Our sanctions, policy toward Poland has contributed to a
certain moderation displayed by Warsaw (i.e., in July 1984
the declaration of amnesty for all political prisoners
enabled us to respond to positive measures taken by the
Polish Government with equally significant steps). Des-
pite some backsliding on the Polish side this year, we
continue to view sanctions as an effective lever to
encourage the Polish Government toward more concrete
progress (economic reform, restoration of free trade
unions, etc.).
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o over the last three years, we have provided over $230
million in humanitarian aid to Poland. Specifically, the
Administration has assisted voluntary agencies (CRS, CARE,
and Project Hope) by providing food, medicine and other
humanitarian aid to the Polish people through nongovern-
mental channels.
o Bilateral relations with Yugoslavia have been strengthened
further by the visit of Prime Minister Planinc to Washing-
ton in May 1985, during which the Administration reiter-
ated its strong support for constructive financial assis-
tance to Yugoslavia in support of its economic stabiliza-
tion program.
Talking Points,
o We have successfully maintained, through our policy of
differentiation, good bilateral relations with several
East European countries, despite overall East-West
tensions and persistent Soviet efforts to tighten
political controls.
o we have rejected any notion of there having been a
"lawful" division of Europe. There was no agreement at
Yalta to divide Europe into "spheres of influence."
Rather, the Soviet Union pledged itself to grant full
independence to Poland and other states in East Europe,
and to hold free elections. The Soviet violation of these
obligations is a root cause of East-West tensions today.
o With respect to Poland, we have maintained a measured,
effective, step-by-step approach under which we began
easing our sanctions in direct response to meaningful
liberalization measures taken by the Polish Government.
However, a sharp increase in the number of Poles detained
for political reasons has brought further progress to a
standstill for the time being. We have also provided
humanitarian aid through non-governmental channels
(totaling over $230 million) over the last three years.
It is essential that the regime move toward genuine
dialogue and reconciliation with all elements of Polish
society, including the workforce.
o With respect to Romania, we seek to encourage develop-
ment of that country's independence in foreign policy
through expansion of political and economic dialogue on a
number of issues. Emigration from Romania to the West and
Israel continues at a high level, and we are encouraged by
agreement on new procedures making emigration to the U.S.
more orderly and less disruptive to the lives of the
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emigrants themselves. We remain concerned by restrictions
on the expression of religious belief in Romania and are
engaging the Romainian.Government on this issue as part of
our bilateral dialogue.
o With respect to Yugoslavia, we have maintained good
relations through high-level visits,'continued bilateral
trade and mutually beneficial commercial activity.
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WESTERN EUROPE
How can the United States most effectively expand and
strengthen our longstanding and deep political, economic,
and military ties with and interests in Western Europe?
Objectives:.
o Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and
military relations with other western European nations.
o Neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its
West European Allies.
o Work with our Allies to improve NATO conventional defense
capabilities, as well as NATO's nuclear capabilities.
o Insure that our strategic modernization and arms control
policies are inconsonance with our European objectives.
o Stimulate further the economic recovery of our European
Allies and friends.
o Secure support for our opposition to protectionist
tendencies and for a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations.
o Ensure that Allied dependence on the Soviet Union for
energy supplies remains at a level that does not pose a
security threat.
o Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies,
products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union
and its Allies.
o Devise an effective U.S.-Allied policy to combat
international terrorism.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has put relations with our European
friends and Allies on a stronger and steadier course.
This was partly accomplished via frequent meetings between
the President and key European leaders.
o We have secured Allied consensus that free market policies
and reduced government spending will promote non-infla-
tionary growth and elimination of structural rigidities;
we also have Allied agreement on a pragmatic approach to
Third World debt problems.
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o We brought the Soviet Union back to the nuclear arms
control negotiating table in Geneva. Allied solidarity in
support of our policies played a key role in this success.
o NATO's unity on INF deployment policy has helped
neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from Europe
and has sent Moscow a strong signal of Alliance resolve
and solidarity. At the same time, we and our Allies
remain fully committed to achieving significant arms
reductions.
o We have played a major role in developing measures to
improve NATO's conventional defenses by means of several
programs, among them better utilization of emerging
technologies and enhanced arms cooperation, as in the
U.S.-FRG Patriot program.
o The Administration has successfully renewed military
basing agreements with Spain, Portugal, and Greece that
are vital to our deterrence strategy.
o The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate
non-inflationary economic growth in West European
countries. (European real GNP grew 1.3% in 1983 and 2.5%.
in 1984.)
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o Progress has been made toward launching a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations, including trade with and
among developing countries. Further trade liberalization
will strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and
Western Europe, and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
o Together with-our Allies, we have been implementing a
five-point strategy on a case-by-case basis to address the.
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o We have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet
economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering
preferential trading terms or easy credits.
We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of
products, materials, and technology which would increase
Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
o We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic
understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and
the means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.
o We have agreed with the Europeans on astrategy to reduce
European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy
supplier.
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o We have reached agreement with our Allies to explore the
possibility of a joint space station.
o We have agreed with our Allies on concrete steps to combat
international terrorism.
o We have obtained Allied support for the President's
Strategic Defense Initiative research program as a prudent
.hedge against Soviet ballistic missile defense efforts.
Talking Points:
o Our objectives in our relations with our Western European
Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our
political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist
in spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet
efforts to sow discord among us.
o The Western Alliance system has become strong again. We
have excellent relations with all of our Allies, and
President Reagan has developed strong personal ties with
many European leaders. As President Reagan said when he
met with the NATO Foreign Ministers in May 1984, "For us,
our NATO partnership is an anchor, a fixed point in a
turbulent world."
o The 40th anniversary of the end of World War II serves to
remind us of the progress our united democracies have
achieved in building strong, prosperous, democratic
nations in Europe and Asia, whose well-being is
safeguarded by our collective security Alliances. In
other words, as the President noted in his trip to Canada
in March, "freedom works."
o We continue working closely with our Allies in a number of
areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include:
the pursuit of peace and arms control with the Soviet
Union; planning cooperative responses to a possible oil
shortage; resolving the world debt problem; restricting
the flow of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and
its Allies; reducing European dependency on Soviet energy;
exploring the possibility of a joint space station; and
combating international terrorism.
o Our Allied solidarity in the face of Soviet intimidation
and threats succeeded in forcing the USSR to retreat from
its commitment not to return to the negotiating table. We
now have the opportunity of achieving verifiable
reductions of the most threatening weapons systems, the
land-based ICBMs.
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o The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the
nature of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its
Allies. Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF
missiles to counter the SS-20 deployments, has reached a
new consensus on preventing the flow of militarily
significant technologies to the East, and has undertaken a
program to enhance NATO's conventional defense capability.
o. The U.S. economic expansion has provided the impetus for
growth in West Europe. Other joint initiatives, designed
to eliminate protectionist tendencies and promote trade
with developed as well as less-developed nations, will
continue to strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S.
and West Europe and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
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Issue:
How should the United States manage the increasingly
complex relationship with Japan?
Objectives:
o Maintain and strengthen our excellent overall bilateral
relationship.
o Continue to manage our economic and trade relations in a
careful manner while increasing our efforts to get the
Japanese to open their markets more fully to U.S. goods,
especialy manufactured goods, and shift toward domestic
rather than export-led growth.
o Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared commitments for
self-defense.
o Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in
high technology.
o Seek Japanese support for our key security and other
policies in other parts of the world.
o Urge Japan to import more U.S. energy.
Accomplishments:
o At their meeting in Los Angeles on January 2, 1985, the
President and Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened their
already close personal working relationship which has led
to increased U.S.-Japanese cooperation in economic and
security areas. They mutually agreed to intensively in-
vestigate four sectors to eliminate trade barriers in
those areas.
o Prime Minister Nakasone assured President Reagan's
personal envoy on March 31 that his government would take
additional steps to help meet growing demands by the
Congress for increased U.S. access to the Japanese market
for U.S. telecommunications and other products. There
still remain, howver, some problems to be solved in the
important market access area.
o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have agreed to a
long term energy cooperation program which when fully
implemented may result in many new U.S. jobs and greater
security for both nations.
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o The Finance ministers of each country have endorsed a plan
to further open Japanese financial markets, which, by
"internationalizing" the yen, should improve the
yen-dollar relationship over the longer term. On Septem-
ber 22, Japan joined the U.S. and other major countries in
announcing its intention to take appropriate fiscal/monet-
ary steps to insure continued non-inflationary domestic
growth.
o In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded self-
defense role which, if properly funded, will aid global
and regional deterrence. On September 18, the Nakasone
cabinet approved a five-year defense program which, if
carried out, will significantly increase Japan's capa-
bility to meet its national defense goals.. The program
has official Japanese Government backing, as opposed to
its two predecessors, which were only Defense Agency
estimates that carried no weight in the government.
Talking Points:
o The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S.
policy in the Pacific.
o The President's trip to Japan in November 1983 and Prime'
Minister Nakasone's visit to the U.S. in January 1985
strengthened U.S.-Japanese-ties and the partnership for
peace existing between our two countries.
o Japan has committed itself to removing trade impediments,
encouraging more imports, and purchasing more energy
materials from the United States over the longer term.
o We see Japan's decision to identify a target figure of
18.4 trillion yen (over $76 billion) in defense spending
in connection with the five-year defense plan as a further
indication of Japan's continuing commitment to attain its
defense objectives.
We are pleased that the Japanese have shown a resolve to
improve their defense establishment, that they are com-
mitted to increase further their economic aid to the
developing world, and that they have promised to take more
market-opening measures. Nonetheless, Japan has an obli-
gation to take on even greater responsibility in*both the
military and international economic areas.
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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
How can the United States facilitate continued, steady
improvement in a long-term relationship with China?
Objectives:
o Provide conditions conducive to continued growth in our
cultural, economic, and trade relations.
o Increase our dialogue with Beijing on political and
strategic matters of joint concern.
o Demonstrate to the Chinese the parallelism of our global
objectives.
o Enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with China
without compromising our commitments to the people of
Taiwan.
Accomplishments:
o The highly successful visits of Premier Zhao and President
Li to the U.S. -and President Reagan and- Vice- President
Bush to China reflect both countries' strong determination
to improve their ties.
o Our economic relations are expanding significantly with
total trade approaching $7 billion in 1985. The U.S. is
China's third largest trading partner and second largest
foreign investor with more than $150 million in over 60
joint equity ventures and $550 million in offshore oil
exploration.
o The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-
technology products such as computers and laboratory
instruments to China.
o A number of senior U.S. military officers have visited
China in the past year. These visits and future ones
demonstrate the limited but important cooperative
relationship which has developed with the goal of
strengthening our mutual defensive capabilities. Con-
gress was notified of the first sale of defensive
equipment to China in August 1985.
o A bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation was
signed on July 23, 1985, during the visit of President Li.
When in force, it will permit U.S. cooperation in China's
energy development.
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Talking Points:
o The visits of Premier Zhao, President Reagan, and Presi-
dent Li during the past two years have shown the world how
important the relationship is to both countries and how
determined Washington and Beijing are to strengthen it.
Under President Reagan's leadership, our ties with China
have become closer than they have been since our re-estab-
lishment of relations in 1979.
o We are realistic about our relationship, frankly acknow-
ledging the fundamental differences in ideology and
institutions between our two societies. We do not mini-
mize our differences, but our ties have developed to the
point where difficulties in one area do not affect pro-
gress in others.
o We seek to enhance our mutually beneficial relationship
with China in the areas of cultural, economic and trade
relations, without compromising our commitments to the
people of Taiwan.
o U.S.-Chinese cooperation and understanding contribute to
peace and stability in Asia and in the world. We have
many parallel--foreign policy objectives. We`have begun a
limited but important cooperative arrangement designed to
strengthen Chinese defensive capability.
President Reagan feels that bilateral progress in five
areas--trade, technology, investment, student exchanges,
and exchanges of scientific and managerial expertise--is
particularly promising in assisting China's modernization
efforts.
o Our trade with each other shows great promise for the
future, particularly in areas such as machinery, techno-
logy, oil equipment, petroleum, agricultural, and manu-
facturing products.
o Americans have invested almost $700 million in. joint
ventures and offshore oil exploration in China, making the
U.S. China's largest foreign investor. Some 50 Chinese
firms have established offices or branches in the United
States, and. China has invested in several joint ventures
in the U.S.
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EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASIN
What should the United States do to facilitate the growth
of secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations,
closely associated with U.S. principles and goals, in
Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Basin?
Obiectives:
o Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin
development strategy that will enhance regional
cooperation with the U.S. throughout the area.
o Support the bilateral strengthening of U.S. economic,
political, and security ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
o Work closely with the Government of the Philippines to
improve their economy, revitalize their political insti-
tutions, and counter the growing communist insurgency.
o Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide a
U.S. force presence as well as security assistance to the
Republic of Korea.
o Encourage direct talks between North and South Korea while
discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in them.
o Resolve the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue as a matter of
the highest national priority.
o Maintain our historically close ties with Australia and
encourage New Zealand to reverse its policy with respect
to port access by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels
so that our traditional military and intelligence
cooperation with them can be restored.
o Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific
Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S.
interests.
Accomplishments:
o The President's trips to Japan, Korea, and China in 1983
and 1984, the Vice President's trip to Japan and Indonesia
in 1984, and Secretary Shultz's three visits to ASEAN and
Oceania clearly affirmed our commitment to a policy of
close cooperation with the countries of the region.
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o We have moved well along with our friends and Allies in
the region in the process of forging a Pacific Basin
development strategy. At ASEAN's July 1985 meeting in
Kuala Lumpur, the members agreed to continue to consult on
human resources development throughout the area.
o we have actively supported the economic development of the
ASEAN countries and have established excellent bilateral
relations with each of them. Singaporean Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew paid an official working visit to Washington
in October 1985.
o In seeking to resolve the problem of the American POWs and
MIAs from the Vietnam war who are still missing, we opened
direct negotiations with both the Governments of Vietnam
and Laos, which has resulted in joint crash site excava-
tions in each country and a Vietnamese commitment by
specific workplan to resolve the issue in two years.
Operating on the assumption that prisoners may still be
held, the live prisoner issue is pursued both through
negotiations and intelligence channels as a matter of
highest priority.
o U.S.-Korean relations continue on a sound basis. Security
ties continue-to be- sttrong, -alt'hough economic relations
have been strained recently because of U.S. efforts to
open selected Korean markets to U.S. business and
continued protectionist pressures from the Congress.
o This Administration has established close personal ties at
all levels with Australian'officials. Our defense ties,
including the crucial U.S.-Australian joint facilities
and frequent ship and aircraft visits, continue strong.
o Our relations with New Zealand officials, while friendly,
are restrained by the policies of the present Labor
Government, which changed the operational character of
ANZUS and led us to curtail our military and intelligence
cooperation.
o 'Bilateral treaties of.friendship with four Pacific nations
--the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and New Zealand (for
Tokelau)--were signed by the President and ratified by the
Senate. The treaties resolve conflicting territorial
claims of long standing and preserve U.S. fishing rights
and other interests. The Prime Minister of Fiji made an
official working visit to the U.S. in November 1984--the
first by any leader of a South Pacific island nation. We
have undertaken a major National Security Study of
Oceania.
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Talking Points:
o The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most
dynamic and fastest-growing economies in the Free World.
The President has noted that: "I see America and our
Pacific neighbors as nations of the future going forward
together in a mighty enterprise to build dynamic growth
economies and a safer world."
o We have strongly supported ASEAN's economic and political
activities and have simultaneously increased our security
cooperation with the individual member states. We have
encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their forward-
looking economic policies based on free trade. We are
encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the
region.
o We will continue to support ASEAN nations' efforts to
forge a Pacific Basin development concept at a pace with
which they are comfortable.
o The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated
settlement in Cambodia. At the same time we have con-
tinued to stress that the POW/MIA matter remains the most
important - bilateral_aissue..be.tween..our-se3.v.es< andA V etnaam. --
We have made it clear to the Vietnamese that this issue is
separate and humanitarian, but the American people would
not permit us to move forward to normalization without
substantial progress. They also know that real progress
would improve the atmosphere between our countries and
pre-position them for a settlement in Cambodia.
o The United States will maintain its security commitments
to the Republic of Korea. We will continue, however, to
urge North and South Korea to ease tensions by continuing
the ongoing bilateral negotiations.
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SOUTH PACIFIC
Issue:
What should the United States do in the South Pacific to
facilitate the growth of.secure, stable nations supportive
of U.S. principles and goals?
Objectives:
o Successfully conc-lude ongoing negotiations of a regional
fisheries agreement guaranteeing access to. the region's
fishery for the U.S. tuna fleet.
o Implement the Compact of Free Association for the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau.
o Respond to the newly-established South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) in a manner that protects U.S. inter-
ests but does not alienate moderate island leaders who -
support the Treaty.
Maintain access to the region's ports for U.S. warships.
Accomplishments:
We have -establish-ed "a .bilateral assistance program for Fiji
in recognition of. its long history of support.for the U.S.
on issues of vital national interest.
o we have maintained an active ship visit program in the
South Pacific, with nuclear-powered warships having called
in Western Samoa and Tonga in 1985.
Talking Points:
o The Administration is committed to passage of the Micro-
nesia Compact by the Congress and to its implementation at
the earliest possible time.
We have vigorously pursued negotiation of a regional
fisheries agreement that would guarantee American fishermen
access to the region's tuna stocks while at,the same time
bringing economic benefit to the island states.
o The President and Secretary Shultz have publicly acknow-
ledged Fiji's contribution to regional security through its
open port policy. We are equally pleased with the contrib-
utions to the region's security of Tonga, Papua New Guinea,
and Western Samoa in welcoming the visits of U.S. warships.
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ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANON
Issue:
How can the United States effectively improve prospects
for a lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors
and assist Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?
Objectives:
o End the cycle of violence among the Arab and Israeli
peoples by dealing with its underlying causes through
direct negotiations among the involved parties.
o Encourage the improvement of relations between Egypt and
Israel in accordance with their peace treaty.
o Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and
recognized international borders.
o Expand U.S. relations with selected Arab states.
o Support the development of a stable, unified, and indepen-
dent central government in Lebanon.
o Encourage the return of all Lebanese territory to sov-
ereign Lebanese control, including the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Lebanon.
Accomplishments:
o The United States took the lead in setting up the
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The
success of this venture made it possible to return the
Sinai to Egypt.
o The President's peace initiative of September 1, 1982 set
forth a balanced set of positions which the parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon
as negotiations are resumed.
o our contacts with all factions in Lebanon 1}ave allowed us
to be an important force for restraint at critical
moments.
o The presence of our Embassy in Beirut and our continuing
economic and military assistance programs are important,
concrete indications of our support for the central
government.
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o We have begun to engage more actively in the Middle East
peace process through a continuing series of discussions
with regional leaders, both here in Washington and during
Secretary Shultz's trip to the Middle East in May and
Assistant Secretary Murphy's trips to the region.
o We are pleased by the recent high-level contacts between
Israel and Egypt to achieve a resolution of the Taba dis-
pute. We intend to help the parties bridge their differ-
ences if we can.
o Last year, at the request of the Government of Egypt and
in cooperation with other nations, we assisted in mine-
clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez following the
mining of this vital waterway by an unknown party. We
also assisted the Saudi Government in like manner in their
waters near Jidda and Yanbu.
o We reached agreement-with Israel in late 1983 to set up a
Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate
strategic cooperation, and the group now meets on a regu-
lar basis.
o on the economic'-side-,.---we'-have -concluded a free trade area
agreement which went into effect on September 1. Negotia-
tions are currently. underway for the establishment of a
VOA/RFE transmitter in Israel.
Talking Points:
o Israel and her Arab neighbors (other than Egypt) have been
in conflict since the'State of Israel was founded in 1948.
Ever since that time, it has been our policy both to help
Israel survive and defend itself and to work with Israel
and the Arab States to help them resolve their differences
peacefully. This Administration has reaffirmed and re-
emphasized these two key aspects of our overall Middle
East policy while attempting to enhance our security coop-
eration with all parties as an essential element in
achieving our mutual goal of peace in the region.
o As a nation, we have invested a great deal in working for
peace in the Middle East. Although not all these
investments. have yet paid tangible-dividends, they serve
to demonstrate our deep interest in helping. bring peace,
freedom, and.prosperity.to.all the peoples of the region.,
o We have been encouraged by recent positive trends toward a
peaceful resolution of Middle Eastern problems, and are.
working with the parties involved to help them move toward
direct negotiations.
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o American-Israeli relations, always close, are at an
especially--high level. JPMG and the FTA are examples of
our deepening relationship.
o Israel faces serious economic problems that only she,
through serious efforts of economic discipline, can solve,
but we will back those efforts. In this regard, we
strongly support the economic measures that have been
introduced by the government, and we look forward to their
prompt and effective implementation.
o We support Lebanese efforts to obtain the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from their country. We believe that
any settlement between Lebanon and Israel should be reach-
ed through direct negotiations and should ensure the
security of Israel's northern border while respecting
Lebanese sovereignty.
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IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Issue:
How can the United States contribute to international
efforts to improve the security of the Persian Gulf
region and find a solution to end the five-year old
Iran-Iraq war?
Objectives:
o Support diplomatic efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and
prevent its spread to the Persian Gulf and other
countries.
o Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate
self-defense needs in the event that the Iran-Iraq
conflict expands.
o Reduce Soviet opportunities to exploit the conflict and
further destabilize the region.
o Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to
international shipping.
o Within the framework of U.S. neutrality, continue to
develop our political and economic relationship with Iraq
in support of its nonaligned status.
o Maintain our current state of military readiness to deter,
and if necessary, defend against possible escalation of
the conflict, thereby reducing the threat to
non-belligerent oil and shipping interests.
o Continue to urge our Allies and regional states to
cooperate in the event of a crisis to avoid panic
oil-buying and subsequent oil price increases and
shortages.
Accomplishments:
o By encouraging restraint by both combatants, by not
supplying arms to either side, and by discouraging the
sale of military equipment to Iran by Western suppliers,
we have helped prevent a widening of the war.
o By providing U.S. AWACS and surface-to-air missile systems
to Saudi Arabia, we have demonstrated to our friends in
the Gulf that we are committed to helping them meet their
legitimate self-defense needs.
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o In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.
led a process within the International Energy Agency to
improve international energy emergency preparedness. An
IEA decision (July 1984) calls for a coordinated stock
draw in the event of a crisis coupled with other measures
(demand restraint, increases in indigenous production) to
avoid a rush to the spot market. In addition, all nations
which do not have adequate stocks have agreed to make best
efforts to increase them.
o The Soviets have not yet improved their position in this
important region.
o Last December, we re-established normal diplomatic rela-
tions with Iraq after a 17-year break.
Talking Points:
o The United States is and has been concerned about this
five-year old conflict because it threatens the security
of the other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of
Gulf oil to the West, and it increases the opportunities
for Soviet meddling.
o We have?continued-our-efforts to-prevent a widening of the
Gulf war and to bring about a negotiated settlement,
working closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the
conflict and to prepare for any temporary disruption of
the flow of oil from the region. We also have been -
working with the UN to try to develop a formula for
restraint leading to a comprehensive settlement.
o We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet
their legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the
Gulf open to the shipping of non-belligerents.
o We are attempting--so far successfully--to avoid direct
Soviet or other external involvement that would further
destabilize the region.
o We have made it absolutely clear to the Iraqi Government
that we abhor its use of chemical weapons against Iran,
and we have reminded both sides of our neutrality, as
attacks on shipping and Iranian stop-and-search efforts
have increased.
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AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
Issue:
What should the United States do to help end the Soviet
military occupation of Afghanistan, enhance Pakistani
security against external aggression, and encourage
peaceful relations among all South Asian nations?
Objectives:
Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
o Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's
neutral and non-aligned status, self-determination for the
Afghan people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to
return home in peace, freedom, and honor.
o Help project the international image of the Afghan resist-
ance as a national liberation movement.
o Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian
countries.
Promote regional understanding and cooperation in order to
reduce the possibility of an all-out arms buildup,
especially in nuclear weaponry, in the area.
o Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure despite the
threats posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
o Take advantage of the opportunities opened by Rajiv
Gandhi's accession to power and his successful visit to
Washington to improve U.S.-Indian relations.
Accomplishments:
o We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan before world public opinion; there is
overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior
there.
o The United States has contributed heavily to the support
of the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their
homeland; we are the largest contributor to the refugee
relief effort in Pakistan.
o we have also participated in a program of cross-border
assistance designed to help the Afghan civilian population
better sustain itself inside Afghanistan.
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o We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging
a political settlement that would allow the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan.
o Thanks largely to the provision of $3.2 billion in
American aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
o. We are exploring ways to improve our relationship with
India and have generally improved bilateral relations with
all South Asian countries.
o We are urging the Jayawardene government in Sri Lanka to
be conciliatory toward the island's Tamil minority and
seek peaceful solutions of the communal problems there.
o we continue to urge Pakistan and India to peacefully
resolve all tensions and frictions between them.
Talking Points:
o U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening Paki-
stan's security against potential Soviet aggression, im-
proving..,r_elatians .,w.Ltth.-Znd.ia, h.and-p-romoting., regiona-1- South
Asian peace and understanding.
o Our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 117 nations
which have consistently voted with us on UN General
Assembly resolutions regarding Afghanistan. We have also
helped promote the search for peace by supporting
Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to the
Afghan dilemma through the good offices of the UN
Secretary General.
o The Afghan national liberation movement, like others which
struggle against regimes imposed by Soviet imperialism,
cannot be defeated by force of arms. Like the colonial
powers earlier in. this century, the Soviet Union must
recognize that the tide of history is against them in
Afghanistan.
o we have made a strong commitment to help Pakistan protect
itself, providing it with $3.2 billion over the next
several years in economic and military assistance.
o We have worked through the International Atomic Energy
Agency and other organizations to reduce chances of
nuclear weapons proliferation into the region.
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o We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State level
with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh in
the last three years. Our contacts have also continued at
other levels.
o We have attempted, with some success, to improve relations
with India.
--o We have encouraged South Asian countries in general, and
India and Pakistan in particular, to develop strong and
peaceful relations..
o We have supported efforts to improve regional ties such as
the South Asia Regional Cooperation forum. We see these
efforts as being the best way to build future stability in
the area.
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SOUTHERN AFRICA
Issue:
How can the United States best use its influence to help
establish racial and political democracy in southern
Africa and avoid bloodshed, revolution, and susceptibil-
ity to extremist solutions?
Objectives:
Our policy approach is regional and has the following goals:
o Eliminate apartheid.
o Promote the need for dialogue and negotiations between
the South African Government and representative black
leaders.
o Lessen regional violence.
o Achieve Namibian independence.
o Enhance U.S. influence and reduce Soviet and Soviet-
proxy influence --i-n . sout fern ? Africa .- ? --
Accomplishments:
o Despite recent backsliding by South Africa, a framework
has been established for the reduction of cross-border
violence in the region. The Nkomati Accord between
Mozambique and South Africa, and the Lusaka Agreement
between Angola and South Africa--both reached with
facilitative efforts by us--provide the basis for
contact among the parties aimed at lessening cross-
border tension. Continued efforts by all the parties
are, of course, necessary to make the agreements work.
o Limited progress has been made on Namibian independence,
including all parties' commitment to UN Security Council
Resolution 435 as the basis of settlement, and Angolan
acceptance in principle of the need for Cuban troop
withdrawal.
o On September 9, President Reagan issued Executive order
12532, which formalizes the U.S. rejection of apartheid.
As the President said when he signed it, the Order "puts
in place a set of measures designed and aimed against
the machinery of apartheid without indiscriminately
punishing the people who are victims of that system."
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Under the Order, U.S. loans and credits to apartheid-
enforcing agencies of the South African Government are
banned.
Talking Points:
o We remain convinced that current U.S. policy offers the
best opportunity for us to help foster racial and polit-
ical justice, minimize bloodshed, and protect U.S.
security interests throughout the region as a whole.
o The President has determined that our policy of active
engagement in South Africa and the region is correct and
that we are to stay the course.
President Reagan's Executive Order of September 9 under-
lines our abhorrence of apartheid and violence in South
Africa. It puts into effect a series of measures struc-
tured to avoid economic damage to the region while send-
ing the appropriate signals. It targets apartheid and
.apartheid-enforcing agencies.
o Our diplomatic efforts to foster change are bolstered by
a $15 million assistance program directed exclusively at
the South _:.Af:r-ican_-p-black-- co mun?ity ----~lt~t is- aimed '-at'
furthering education and training, promoting human
rights, and assisting the black private sector.
We work closely with the business community in encourag-
ing adherence to the Sullivan Principles of fair employ-
ment practice, and these principles (or more stringent
ones) are applied to the South African employees of all
U.S. Government agencies. Further, the Executive Order
requires U.S. firms in South Africa employing at least
25 persons to implement these principles by the end of
1985, or face loss of U.S. export assistance.
o The U.S. business community engaged in South Africa has
formed a corporate council under GM's Roger Smith and
Burroughs' Mike Blumenthal, which is designed to
actively promote efforts to end apartheid and speed
racial reform.
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AFRICA: SECURITY
How can the United States respond most effectively to
requests from friendly-African states for help in
resisting outside aggression and promoting peaceful
solutions to local conflicts?
Obiectives:
o Increase security assistance on a selective basis to those
countries under threat of external aggression.
o Promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional
conflicts through diplomatic means.
o Attack the root causes of instability through economic
development assistance and promotion of local private
sectors which create growth and jobs.
o Continue working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from the southern African region as part of our
multifaceted initiative to create a security framework
under which all states of the region can live in peace.
Accomplishments:
o we have blunted the Soviet projection of power in Africa.
No sizable new influx of Soviet or surrogate forces has
occurred, and Moscow has gained no new African allies
since 1981. Mozambique and other African governments
allied with the Soviets in the 1970's have begun dialogues
with us and have begun moving away from Soviet influence
toward genuine non-alignment.
o We have been a catalyst facilitating the peaceful
resolution of local disputes. Specific examples include
the improvement in relations between Kenya and Somalia,
the March 1984 non-aggression pact between South Africa
and Mozambique, and the February 1984 Lusaka agreement
providing for disengagement and withdrawal of South
African forces from Angola. (Recent events in southern
Africa nevertheless show that there are continuing
problems in maintaining regional accords.)
o Faced with deteriorating economic situations, a number of
African governments have signalled the U.S. their dis-
pleasure with Marxist/socialist economic models, and their
willingness to move toward more privately-oriented
economies.
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o Timely U.S. security assistance and military air deploy-
ments helped counter Libyan aggression in Chad and Sudan
in 1983 and helped Somalia stop an armed incursion from
Soviet-aligned Ethiopia in 1982. U.S.-made equipment such
as C-130 transport aircraft permitted Zaire to quell rebel
attacks in the eastern part of the country in late 1984;
continued U.S. military and economic assistance to Sudan
following the downfall of the Nimeiri government has
helped the new government to maintain a course toward the
re-establishment of a civilian democracy and elections
next year.
o We have obtained agreement by all parties on
implementation of the UN plan for Namibia, pending only
Angolan agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal. We have
established a reputation as an honest broker in our
diplomatic work on this most difficult of Africa's
problems.
o we have played a quiet but vital part in bringing about
general diminution of cross-border violence in southern
Africa.
Talking Points:
o The United States has a significant geopolitical and
strategic stake in the security of the African continent
and the seas around it. Our interests are seriously
affected when Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to expand
their influence in the region by force or by exploitation
of instability.
.o The late 1970's saw Africa become increasingly exploited
by the Soviet Union and its allies. Violence in southern
Africa and the Horn of Africa was escalating, insurgencies
were growing in eight African countries, and cross-border
armed raids by opposition groups were occurring elsewhere
on the continent. Feeding on these conflicts, the Soviet
Union poured almost $5 billion in arms into Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique and fielded almost 5,000 military
"advisors" in Africa. Two Cuban expeditionary forces,
totaling almost 40,000 combat troops, were garrisoned in
Ethiopia and Angola. Libyan-sponsored subversion against
neighboring African states was on the increase and in
1980-81 a Libyan military force of 8,000 occupied Chad.
o Thanks in large part to U.S. policies and efforts in the
area, the Soviets have added no new national converts in
Africa since 1981 nor have they dispatched new surrogate
troop contingents to Africa. Several African governments
which were counted as Soviet allies in 1980 have moved
closer to real non-alignment.
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o U.S. military assistance to Africa has increased from
$94.7 million (FY 81 actual) to $170 million (FY 85 est-
imated). The bulk of the program has been converted to
grant aid in recognition of the difficult economic sit-
uations of the recipients. We nonetheless have maintained
a 4:1 ratio of economic assistance to security assistance
in Africa in recognition of the fundamental security role
economic stability and progress plays. This ratio favors
non-military assistance even more when emergency fund aid
is taken into account.
o There has been a significant increase in dialogue among
neighboring states in southern Africa. This process has
led, with the U.S. acting as a catalyst, to a non-aggress-
ion pact between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984
and a landmark force disengagement agreement between South
Africa and Angola formalized in Lusaka in February 1984.
o We have undertaken a special regional security initiative
for southern Africa. Specific components include a com-
plex diplomatic initiative to lead to an internationally
recognized settlement of the Namibia problem and Namibian
independence; support for regional economic development;
withdrawal of foreign forces from the area; and support
for peac-efirr- pragress?"rrrvtrdin'g apartheid in South Africa.
o There is a growing dynamic for change in South Africa and
the last few years have seen important, fundamental
changes: institutionalization of black trade unions,
legitimization of black residence in urban areas, the
enfranchisement of coloreds and Asians, major increases in
expenditures for black education, and the beginning of
black municipal and local self-government. We have played
a quiet but real part in encouraging and facilitating such
constructive forces for peaceful, positive change.
o We are concerned about recent increased Soviet military
assistance to Angola and the violence this fuels in Angola
and the region. Our policy is to continue efforts to
promote national reconciliation in Angola, and as a matter
of principle, to support UNITA's efforts to resist Soviet
designs in Angola.
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AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT
What should the United States do to help the African'
countries most severely affected by economic crisis and
famine, and how can we assist them in coming to grips with
their critical economic and developmental problems?
Objectives: .
o Work with other nations and organizations to combat famine
by providing food relief assistance and follow-on recovery
and rehabilitation programs.
o Induce African governments to make serious and sustained
efforts to help themselves by undertaking substantial
structural reforms which provide incentives to the indi-_
genous private sector, so that broad-based, equitable
growth can be attained.
o Persuade African governments that economic development
goals can best be pursued through mechanisms and,
incentives which incorporate the principles of private
enterprise and free trade.
o. Encourage and assist the IMF to devise a solution to the
debt problem.
Accomplishments:
o We are providing nearly $2 billion in regular and emer-
gency food aid this year.
o We have led the world in providing humanitarian aid to
.African refugees.
o Our regular, non-food economic assistance will increase to
almost $800 million this year, of which. over half will
support economic reform, primarily in agriculture.
o We have joined the African Development Bank and increased
our support to the African Development Fund..
o We have initiated an African Policy Reform Initiative and
are proposing a "Food for Progress" program that will
assist African nations to make the transition from social-
ist, centrally-controlled economies to ones based more on
freer markets and private incentives.
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o We have placed major stress on the need for private sector
development in Africa, recognizing that the unleashing of
the indigenous private sector holds the key to long-term
economic development.
o we have seen major economic reforms take hold in Zaire
and Ghana, where recovery is beginning.
o We have seen agricultural production raised dramatically
in Somalia when centralized controls were lifted.
o We have seen food self-sufficiency attained in Niger
during normal rainfall years, owing to remunerative
producer prices.
o We have seen every self-described Marxist and Marxist-Len-
inist government in Africa (except Ethiopia and Angola)
approach Western donors for increased aid in return for
fundamental reversals in economic policy, including de-
control of the economy and freeing of the private sector.
Talking Points:
o Virtually all 45 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
rapidly growing population that now totals 400 million,
continue to face an economic crisis of stark proportions.
Per capita food production has fallen by 20 percent in the
last 20 years; real per capita income has decreased 2-3
percent per year over the past three years. Refugees
number over two million. A recession that has touched
every African nation began with the 1979 oil crisis and
has not yet ended.
o While recent rains have at least temporarily ended the
drought that caused famine and ecological damage over vast
areas of Africa, recovery and rehabilitation will require
years of concerted effort, reform, and international
assistance.
o The economic crisis has many causes--drought, the flow-
through effect of recession in the developed world,
effects of the 1979 oil price increase, civil wars--but
the World Bank identifies the prime cause as the failure
of inappropriate domestic price incentives. Too many
African governments have held too long to failed policies
which stifle domestic production, chief among them being
the rigid hewing to central planning and control precepts
and practices.
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o The unprecedented economic crisis in Africa threatens U.S.
interests on several levels. Unless alleviated, African
leaders may increasingly look to authoritarian political
strategies. Moreover, economic malaise breeds political
instability that opens opportunities for Soviet, Cuban,
and Libyan meddling.
o The African debt problem, though. small compared to other
areas, puts strain on the international financial system.
Unchecked crisis will lead to greater famine and civil
strife. The U.S is working with the IMF and the World
Bank to ease Africa's debt situation and to stimulate
economic growth.
o We remain committed to indigenous private sector develop-
ment in Africa, and Western private investment and trade,
as the long-term answer to the continent's development
needs. We see agricultural self-sufficiency as the first
order of economic recovery and development there. We
fully support the international financial organizations in
requiring structural reforms in return for renewed finan-
cial assistance.
o The efficiency and success of our efforts so far may be
measured by the fact that--nearly all the centrally-planned
economies in Africa have undertaken positive change in the
direction of providing incentives to the private sector.
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CENTRAL AMERICA
Issue:
What should the United States do to eliminate Nicaraguan,
Cuban, and Soviet subversion and military adventurism in
the region and promote democratic and economic develop-
ment efforts?
Objectives:
o Encourage the strengthening of democratic governments in
Central America and support genuinely democratic groups
throughout the region.
o Improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of the
area.
o Help friendly Central American countries to defend them-
selves against Nicaraguan, Cuban, and other outside-
supported aggression and subversion.
o Support diplomatic efforts to achieve effective, fully
verifiable regional political solutions.
Accomplishments:--
o The United States has worked diligently through regular
and special diplomatic channels to pursue realistic
solutions to Central America's problems. Our efforts have
included several trips to the region by the President,
Vice President, and Secretary of State, and the consecu-
tive appointments of two Special Envoys to Central Amer-
ica. The current envoy has made 34 separate foreign trips
dealing with the region's problems. We have also con-
tinuously supported the peace-seeking process initiated by
the Contadora countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and
Venezuela).
o The Administration has taken the lead in formulating a
major, comprehensive regional assistance and development
plan for the area in January 1984. Called the President's
Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initia-
tive, the program implements the January 1984 recommenda-
tions of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. We are continuing efforts to obtain Congress-
ional approval for the full amount of resources recommend-
ed by the Commission.
o Central America is a major recipient of U.S. financial and
other economic assistance, which comprises 80 percent of
all U.S. assistance to the region.
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o our support for the democratic resistance effort in Nica-
ragua was greatly enhanced in August 1985 when the Con-
gress provided an additional $27 million in humanitarian
aid. In addition to material assistance, it represents a
major shift by the Congress in favor of the President's
policies in central America.
o Our defense assistance to El Salvador has been modest
(about $472 million) over the past six years) but crucial
in helping that country begin to turn the tide against the
anti-democratic guerrilla insurgency. Democracy in El
Salvador has taken root, and our defense assistance is
vital in helping nourish it.
o U.S. military exercises in Honduras and provision of U.S.
.military training and assistance to Honduran forces have
helped limit aggression by Nicaraguan forces, which number
120,000 persons, including reserves, and which have be-
come increasingly active near the Honduran border.
Talking Points:
o Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Soviet-assisted subversion and
-Communist aggression., have - created----a,- crisis 'in Central--
America, particularly within Nicaragua-itself and in El
.Salvador. Should Communist gains continue unchecked, we
could face the threat, as. the President has stated, that
"100 million people from Panama to the open border on our
south would come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes."
We are countering this threat by helping those people to
defend themselves.
o In. addition to our modest military assistance to the
region, our contribution in economic and developmental
assistance is substantial. Through the President's
Central America Democracy, Peace,'and Development Init-
iative, our commitment to help the free peoples of the
area in speeding their economic growth is becoming larger
and, we believe, more effective.
o Our support for the democratic.resistance in Nicaragua was
enhanced by the action of the Congress in August 1985 in
approving an additional $27.million in humanitarian aid
for those forces..
o We continue. to support the efforts of the Contadora
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) to
arrange a peaceful, verifiable solution of Central
America's security. problems.
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LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively assist Latin
American and Caribbean democracy, economic improvement,
and ability to resist outside aggression and subversion?
Objectives:
o Support democratic governments where they already exist
and encourage the few non-democratic governments remaining
to make the transition to democracy.
o Help improve the economic well-being of the free peoples
of Latin America and the Caribbean.
o Encourage the adoption of sound market-led economic
policies in order to establish the basis for long-term
growth.
o Assist friendly, democratic governments and governments
making the transition to democracy in the region in
defending themselves against externally-supported comm-
unist subversion and--aggr% ss a r-
o Ensure that the historically close U.S.-Latin American
relationship continues.
o Support democracy by encouraging respect for human rights
and improvement in the administration of justice.
Accomplishments:
o We have provided consistent support and encouragement for
democratic institution building: today 26 of 33 countries
with 90% of the population are democratic or in transition
toward democracy. Since November 1980 there have been
over 40 free national elections in 25 countries, virtually
all with very high voter participation, including El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, the Domin-
ican Republic, Grenada, and Peru. The Administration has
provided tangible support for democratic labor unions and
democratic institution-building through programs, such as
the new National Endowment for Democracy proposed by Pres-
ident Reagan in 1982 and passed by the Congress in 1983.
o We have been working with the area's public and private
sectors and the International Monetary Fund to encourage
involved parties to work effectively to resolve the $380
billion Latin American debt problem.
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o We have also worked actively with our hemispheric neigh-
bors to address a growing and pervasive threat: produc-
tion and trafficking in illegal narcotics. Our efforts
are beginning to pay off. Recent successful actions by
the Governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and
others in. disrupting shipments and destroying processing
facilities show that the region is actively involved in
the effort.
Under the leadership of this Administration, U.S. economic
assistance to the Latin America-Caribbean' region has more
than doubled. In addition to our major Central American
development program, we devised and are implementing
another innovative regional assistance and development
plan, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which offers partic-
ipating countries increased access to the U.S. market for
12 years and can create many jobs and sources of income.
o Our most dramatic Caribbean accomplishment was to join, in
October 1983, with the East Caribbean democracies at their
request to rescue their and our citizens in Grenada,
remove the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence from Grenada, and
facilitate the process leading to the restoration of
democratic institutions` in' ~Gena~3a ` nce that time, the
U.S. and other military forces have left, free elections
were held, and Grenada has joined the Regional Security
System that the U.S. is helping area nations to build.
o In South America we have consistently supported democratic
governments politically and economically as they have
worked to strengthen their institutions and generate eco-
nomic growth. Our assistance has helped assure that no
country that was democratic six years ago has lost its
freedom.
o We are also supporting-an orderly transition to democracy
in Chile through such means as endorsing the National
Accord signed in September 1985 by 11 Chilean political
parties.
Talking Points:
o The United States is linked by history, proximity; and
special ties of friendship:withthe 33 independent
countries and 380 million people of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Objectives of this Administration have been to
encourage democracy, support economic improvement, use
active diplomacy-to solve disputes, and provide security
assistance so that governments threatened by Soviet bloc,
Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion'could defend themselves.
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o For the region as a whole, a highly encouraging recent
trend has been the return of several countries to
democratic government. Today, 26 of 33 countries are
democratic or in a defined process of democratization.
These account for 90% of the area's population. The
Administration has consistently encouraged the process of
democratic institution-building in the area.
o In addition to our modest military assistance to the
region, our contribution in economic and developmental
help has been substantial. Through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the President's Central America Democracy,
Peace, and Development Initiative, our commitment to help
speed the process of economic growth in those areas will
become even larger and, we believe, more effective.
o We are continuing to work with friendly governments in the
region to help them cope with their severe debt problems.
o We are also working with friendly governments to bring
drug traffickers to justice and destroy their production
facilities and transport networks.
o In Grenada, the* United St'a"te _-a z3' "th~`"Ca ibbean demo- ..
cracies rescued a nation from Soviet bloc and Cuban con-
trol and internal repression and helped it return to a
democratic course. Free elections were held there in
December 1984, and the last troops from the U.S. and other
regional countries helping Grenada to rebuild its own
security forces were able to leave earlier this year.
o In South America we are helping governments strengthen
their democratic institutions and generate economic
growth. The result: no country that was democratic six
years ago has lost its freedom.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
What should the United States do to help sustain and
extend world economic recovery; better coordinate
international economic policy; help debtor nations help
themselves; assist the developing countries to begin to
c realize substantial, lasting economic growth; and promote
free and fair trade?
Objectives:
o Formulate and implement sensible economic policies at home
aimed at holding down inflation and reducing government
spending.
o Develop a Free World consensus on policies designed to
achieve enduring, non-inflationary economic recovery,
financial stability, and liberalized trade.
o Encourage an effective IMF-based economic adjustment
?process for debtor nations including sufficient private
and public financing and selective reschedulings to ease
the debt burden- -on :-LDC'--s?--and---to -restore-=?condit-ions"?fo~?=
sustainable economic growth.
o Heighten Allied attention to the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations including theforging-of
common objectives in NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM.
o Obtain global progress toward free trade, including
reversing protectionist pressures here and abroad,
eliminating unfair trade practices, and initiating a GATT
round on reducing trade barriers.
Accomplishments:
This Administration has succeeded in rebuilding a strong
domestic economy which has pulled much of the world out of
recession and into recovery: annual GNP growth rose from
more than 1% in 1981 to 6.8% for 1984; average inflation
of 13.5% in 1981 was cut to 4.3% last-year; more than 6
million American jobs were created in the past two years
alone.
o A consensus among the Allies has developed which reaffirms
the economic policies espoused by President Reagan:
market-oriented adjustment in the domestic and global
economies.
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o We have begun implementing a sensible five-part strategy
to handle the debt problem that was developed at the
Williamsburg Summit, embodied in the Williamsburg
Declaration, and later reaffirmed at the London Summit.
o Administration leadership on the trade agenda has recently
included Presidential statements warning of veto action
against protectionist legislation, self-initiation of
several Section 301 unfair trade practices cases against
foreign governments, and our participation in a meeting of
Allied finance ministers in September to discuss means of
bringing the dollar into line with other currencies.
o At a meeting of GATT Contracting Parties on October 3, the
U.S. succeeded in getting GATT to continue considering a
new trade round whose agenda would include issues, such as
services, that are of particular interest to us. GATT is
expected to create a committee in late November to prepare
for a new round with a 1986 commencement date.
o Substantial progress has been made in domestic and
international energy emergency preparedness through the
accelerated buildup of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR) and-an-ZEA-Magreement--'among the-Al.tte's"for-..,early .use.'--
of petroleum stocks and demand restraint to avoid
unnecessary volatility in the spot market.
o An historic Allied consensus on East-West economic
relations has been achieved which has led to elimination
of preferential terms on credits to the USSR; reduction of
the political/economic/security risk of Western European
dependence on Soviet energy resources; and strengthened
measures in COCOM to reduce the availability to the
Soviets of strategically important Western technology.
Talking Points:
o The President inherited a fractious and deteriorating
international economic order characterized by record
inflation, high unemployment and severe recession.
o From the outset, the President emphasized the importance
of sensible domestic economic policies designed to halt
inflation, increase employment, and stem the tide of
increased government spending.
o The President has repeatedly demonstrated his strong and
visionary leadership in advancing a common Allied approach
to key economic, trade, financial and security objectives
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through bilateral meetings in Washington and abroad,
annual economic Summit meetings and in international'fora
such as OECD, IEA, NATO, and COCOM.
o The President first put forward his economic policies at
the Ottawa Economic Summit in 1981. By the time President
Reagan hosted the Williamsburg Summit two years later, it
was clear that his policies were leading the'-U.S. and the
free world on the path to full economic recovery. Under
the President's leadership the Summit leaders agreed to
coordinate policies to promote sustainable, noninflation-
ary growth and to forge a consensus on the security dimen-
sions of East-West economic relations which had proved
elusive in the past.
This was followed up a year later by the successes of the
London Economic Summit which reinforced the importance of
free market economics, open markets, and management of the
debt problem. Agreement was also reached on important
-political statements on East-West relations, terrorism,
democratic values and the volatile Persian Gulf situation.
o The participants at last spring's Bonn summit reiterated
the goals that had been set forth at earlier meetings and
reaffirmed ,the importance....of:.-.pursu-ng--on-i-n-fla-tonary; ,,rv-?-?r
growth-stimulating, market-oriented policies.
o Working closely with our NATO Allies and Japan, we have
made major gains in correcting the serious imbalance of
the past between the advantages of trading with the USSR
and our common security requirements. We have reached
agreement with the Allies on eliminating preferential
terms on credits to the USSR and reducing the substantial
risk of Western European dependence on Soviet energy
resources.
o In working closely with the COCOM countries, we have met
head-on the challenge of stopping the flow of militarily-
relevant Western technology to the USSR through the up-
-grading of, the COCOM review process, the harmonization and
tightening of national licensing and enforcement proced-
ures, and the monitoring of the potential military appli-
cation of emerging technologies.
o The President has taken important steps to assure that we
can manage the impact of any temporary energy disruption.
Our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been. increased
fourfold and IEA member countries have agreed to coordi-
nate the use of, their stocks in an energy emergency..
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o The five-part debt strategy adopted by the Summit leaders
at Williamsburg, and reaffirmed in London, has success-
fully contained the debt crisis. The Administration has
also encouraged modification of the strategy, to include
such measures as multi-year reschedulings for those
responsible debtor countries which have performed well
under IMF programs. We have also supported an increased
flow of long-term direct investment to debtor nations and
endorsed closer cooperation between the IMF and World
Bank.
o Through the leadership of President Reagan in the Summit
process, the Allies have dedicated themselves to the
expansion of international trade by the reduction of trade
barriers.
o The President has given major new impetus to American
economic ties with Asia by reaching out to the
economically dynamic Pacific Basin nations, including a
significant improvement in bilateral relations with Japan,
and strengthening relations with China, South Korea, and
other countries of this vital region.
o The improvementtaf?^tht=ti~3"~eCBl~"bmy; -led by the U.S., and
Allied agreement to resist protectionist trade policies
and to assist struggling, developing nations through
encouraging IMF-based economic adjustment, government and
private sector financing and increased investment have
begun to restore economic and financial stability to a
number of Third World countries.
o In our own hemisphere, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and
the Central American Peace Initiative have helped open up
markets for the exports of our neighbors and Allies. Our
efforts to help Grenada rebuild its economy, as illus-
trated by our commitment to complete the airport at Point
Salines, and our active support of U.S. private sector
initiatives to expand Grenadian investment and trading
potential are demonstrating the benefits of a return to
democracy.
o The President has initiated a major Administration effort
to increase the effectiveness of resource allocations to
meet the urgent problem of world hunger by providing help
to build new infrastructure where needed, and by taking
other measures to speed up the impact of relief measures.
o The President also has initiated a trade policy action
plan based on five principles: free trade and fair trade
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are in the best interest of the citizens of the U.S.; the
U.S.. plays the critical role in ensuring and promoting an
open trading system; our trading partners should join us
in working to improve the trading system that has bene-
fited us all; and the U.S. will fight unfair trade prac-
tices.
o Although there has been substantial progress on the debt
problem, new realities such as slowing exports, protec-
tionism, and recovery to only moderate domestic economic
growth rates is making adherence to the current.debt
strategy difficult for many debtor country governments.
New strategies to make continued austerity and economic
reform more palatable are needed; without them, it is not
unthinkable that one or more of the major LDC debtors
might decide in the face of a severe liquidity crunch to
declare a moratorium rather than opt for the rescue
.,methods utilized in 1982-83. Conditional responses to
such a scenario might be warranted because of the severe
ramifications if it were to come about.
o Stemming the tide of protectionist actions is still of
paramount importance. Rising protectionism threatens the
effectiveness~of the multilateral. trading system under
GATT;gen'erata-s"-ret&liatory measures directed against
"non-protected" sectors; and stymies LDC efforts to obtain
real boosts in exports.
o Despite the rapid U.S. growth of 1984, full global econ-
omic recovery remains elusive, especially in Europe and
the Third World. Lack of recovery in these areas adverse-
ly affects their stability and aggravates U.S. trade
problems.
The major industrial countries have not fully achieved
effective and timely coordination of international mone-
tary policies. Making progress toward greater convergence
of monetary and economic policies will help smooth the ex-
treme fluctuations of internationally-traded currencies.
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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
How can the United States best guarantee a reliable and
adequate supply of the energy resources needed for
national and international security and economic
well-being?
Obiectives:
o Reduce government intervention in the energy sector and in
energy trade through increased reliance on market mechan-
isms.
o Improve the energy security of the U.S. and its Allies by
action to reduce both the probability of future
disruptions and the impact such supply interruptions might
have on our economics.
o Promote free energy markets.
o Urge key Allies to diversify their energy resources so
that they are not dependent on single supplier nations,
particularly in the -case. of--gas...imports,.-from ?the-SoLvietr
Union.
o Promote a balanced and mixed energy resource system that
avoids undue dependence on any single energy source.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration's decision to deregulate oil prices has
stimulated domestic production and reduced oil imports to
35 percent of our oil needs.
o The partial decontrol of natural gas prices on January 1,
1985 has helped maintain gas production without causing a
price increase. More than one-half of U.S. gas production
is now sold at market prices.
o The Strategic Petroleum Reserve contains 489 million
barrels of oil, the equivalent of 108 days of net oil
imports.
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o The U.S. has led initiatives within the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to-limit Western European reliance on
Soviet natural gas, including Ministerial decisions in
1983 and 1985 to avoid undue dependence on any one source
of gas imports and to emphasize indigenous OECD sources.
We have formed a consensus that Western Europe will need
additional supplies of natural gas-in the mid-1990s.
Commercial negotiations to fulfill part of that demand
from the Netherlands have been completed. Commercial
negotiations to develop Norwegian sources have begun And
are reportedly progressing, well.
o In July 1984 the IEA agreed to a policy of coordinating
stock draw and other measures early in a supply disruption
in order to counter a sharp run-up of prices and protect
economic growth and stability.
o President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed in
November 1983 to a program to increase energy trade
between the United States and Japan. Over the long run,
this effort can create thousands of new jobs for Americans
and greater energy efficiency for both our nations.
o Ministers at the July _1985.: IEA -Ministerial agreed .to,. .W_
"pursue expeditiously a common approach whereby they would
maintain or create conditions such that imported refined
products could go to the markets of different IEA
countries and regions on the basis of supply-and demand as
determined by market forces."
Talking Points:
o U.S.'Administrations since the 1973/1974 oil embargo have
seen energy supply as a constraint on economic systems.
The present Administration sees energy supply as an
opportunity to promote economic growth and prosperity.
o Action to deregulate oil and gas prices has encouraged
domestic production and as a result, U.S. net oil imports
have declined to 4.7 million barrels per day, roughly 35
percent of our oil needs; gas production has not'declined
as anticipated.
o With the maintenance of oil and gas production as well as
increased coal use and nuclear power, we now produce about
87 percent of the energy we use.
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o We have urged our Allies in Europe and the Pacific to
consider -buying more U.S. coal, thereby reducing their
dependency on more uncertain supplies of energy. Prime
Minister Nakasone and President Reagan have endorsed
increased energy trade between the United States and
Japan, which can mean jobs for citizens and greater
security for both nations.
o In addition, we have led a process in the IEA to improve
cooperation in more efficient use and supply of energy,and
in special arrangements for emergency sharing among key
industrialized countries to ensure that we can mini-
mize the possibility or effects of any future oil
shortage.
o The SPR would be our first line of defense in an oil
supply disruption, and we are committed to its early use
in large quantities in coordination with other IEA
members, whom we expect to take complementary actions.
o IEA members at the May 1983 Ministerial agreed that member
countries should avoid undue dependence on any one source
of gas imports and obtain future gas supplies from secure
sources-,. with, emphasis.. on.- ind-igenois- OECD- sour"-s,,e--Th"
emphasis on natural gas security was reaffirmed at the
July 1985 IEA Ministerial.
o At the July 1985 IEA Ministerial, member states agreed to
pursue a common approach to maintain or create conditions
so that refined products go to markets on the basis of
supply and demand as determined by market forces without
distortions.
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TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
Issue:
How can the United States and its Allies resolve their own
disparate views and devise a comprehensive means of
preventing the Soviet Union and its Allies from acquiring
sensitive technology?
Objectives:
o Reach agreement with our Allies and other friendly nations
on the nature of the threat posed. by the uncontrolled
transfer of militarily significant technologies to the
Warsaw Pact.
o Introduce new countermeasures and constraints on a
multilateral basis, whenever possible, to impede if not
prevent such losses.
o Continue to improve our intelligence on technology
transfer matters.
o Curb the loss of militarily sensitive technology without
slowing down the development o.f_-new _. t.echnolog,ies_.i.n....the.
West and without bringing undue hardship to U.S. and
Allied economic interests.
Accomplishments
o The Reagan Administration is the first to fully recognize
the security risk posed by technology transfer. It has
taken many steps toward. stemming the flow of militarily
sensitive know-how and hardware to the Soviet Bloc.
o Domestic U.S. procedures in both intelligence-gathering
and export control have been strengthened-and made more
effective.
o Through a government-wide outreach plan, U.S. industry has
been made more aware of the threat and encouraged to
institute its own technology security measures.
o Under U.S. initiatives, COCOM procedures have been made
more effective and the list of multilaterally controlled
items has been brought up to date.
o Bilateral arrangement's are in place or being negotiated
with a number of non-COCOM countries for the protection of
U.S. and indigenous technologies.
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o The effectiveness of our technology security program has
increased _?dramatically. The results are being seen in
court cases and convictions for diversion and espionage.
o Both U.S. Customs and the Commerce Department have
significantly increased their enforcement work, and since
1980, technology security has become an area of priority
An our intelligence effort. Good relationships with
-Customs' counterparts abroad have resulted in the foiling
of large number of diversion attempts.
o The security services of our Allies have uncovered and had
expelled many Soviet Bloc intelligence collectors of mil-
itarily sensitive technology, a result partially attribut-
able to U.S. efforts to highlight this issue. Also, the
U.S. has closed down many means previously used by the
Soviets to acquire technical information.
Talking Points:
o The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies, using espionage
as well as legal and illegal trade channels, have sustain-
ed a large-scale effort for some time to obtain Western
technical information and hardware to-improve their
weapons and-the-i-r'ntilitary's supporting industrial base.
The Soviets are well behind the U.S. in many technologies
having military use, e.g., computers and microprocessor
technology, and thus require Western, and especially U.S.,
information to meet weapons requirements.
o Europe and Japan are, like ourselves, innovative and
scientifically advanced. Our Allies have a vested common
concern in stemming technology loss, as this loss leads to
higher defense budgets for all, while concurrently
weakening deterrence. On the other hand, each ally has
its own view of its economic relationship with Bloc
countries; there is, therefore, a tension of competing
interests among our Allies over economic gain versus the
provision of technology to the Bloc. At issue is how to
resolve these disparate views.
o Despite progress, a problem so complex as the loss of
technology cannot quickly be remedied. The Soviets are
very skilled in their collection techniques. Acquisition
of technical information has been a long-standing cam-
paign, with numerous avenues of collection. Awareness of
Soviet methods and their effects is the cornerstone of our
response to their campaign.
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o The U.S. is an open society with a heritage of free
expression. This freedom of expression is exploited by
the Soviets in their collection program; the U.S.
Government must ensure proper protection of militarily
sensitive information while not impeding the rights and
traditions of free expression.
.o The effort to slow or stop the loss of strategic
technology must be a persistent, long-term undertaking.
It is essential both for ourselves and our Allies that the
threat continue to be highlighted and exposed for the
danger that it poses, and that unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral countermeasures be kept in place and support-
ed by.the highest levels in the Administration. A great
deal of progress has been made, and this progress must be
sustained and enhanced by organizational, legal, and
technical means.
o At the same time that we have been working to slow or stop
technology losses, we have been working to reduce the
delays imposed on.the private sector when export licenses
are reviewed as part of our control efforts. This has won
the increased support of U.S. industry for the Government-
wide technology security program.
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TERRORISM
Issue:
How can the United States improve its ability to deter,
protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks?
Objectives:
o Improve international cooperation to detect and combat
terrorism bilaterally with allies, and multilaterally in
groupings of like-minded states and other international
fora.
o Enhance operational capabilities and inter-governmental
coordinating mechanisms to prevent and respond to
terrorist attacks.
o Continue refinement of legal instruments and agreements to
counter terrorism, including steps for the extradition and
prosecution of persons involved in terrorism.
Accomplishments:
o Over 90 planned terrorist.-attacks-.pupon-.U.S...c.itiaens,,.ar.,Y - -
facilities abroad were identified and pre-empted during
the past year by improved intelligence and stronger
security and cooperation with other governments.
o We resolved successfully and peacefully the TWA 847
hijacking and obtained the release of the hostages without
violating our policy against deals with terrorists.
o Through the Summit Seven experts group, we promoted the
revitalization of the Bonn Declaration, its expansion into
civil aviation and airport security, and the examinationof
other non-civil aviation issues for joint action.
o The U.S. hosted high-level multi-agency delegations from
the U.K., Italy, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, and about
18 other states where closer cooperation in fighting
terrorism was discussed under the auspices of the Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program.
o We developed a coordinated interagency training and assis-
tance effort, using reprogrammed funds, to counter threats
against Americans by Colombian narcotics traffickers.
This effective program serves as a model for the new anti-
terrorism program planned for Central America.
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o Some 1,243 persons from 13 countries have been brought to
the United States for specialized counter-terrorism
training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.
o We have established a system of coordinated threat alerts
from all members of the U.S. intelligence community to
provide more timely and accurate information on terrorist
threats to our overseas-Missions, reducing the problem of
duplicate warnings and reporting.
Closer ties have been developed between the Interdepart-
mental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the intelligence
community. organizations that focus on terrorism.
o An interagency understanding has been developed concerning
the composition, leadership, and utilization of special
teams to send to the scene of a terrorist incident to
assist. the Ambassador or the host government.
o we have created an Anti-Terrorism Assistance Coordination
Committee under the IG/T to coordinate all U.S. Government
assistance in the field of counter-terrorism, ensure maxi-
mum efficiency, and eliminate waste in counter-terrorism
assistance-. ..--
o A Public Diplomacy Working Group has been established
under the joint sponsorship of the IG/T and the Inter-
national Information Committee. The Group aims to gen-
erate greater global understanding of the threat from
terrorism and the importance of intensive efforts to
resist the threat.
o we have developed new procedures for producing Emergency
Action Plans at overseas posts, increasing compliance from
less than 25 percent to more than 96 percent during the
year.
o We have begun-implementing the recommendations of the
Inman Panel, which call for sweeping organizational
changes in State Department security and counter-terrorism
functions to meet. the USG's security challenges overseas
more effectively and,to develop a dynamic and anticipatory
security program. A. new Bureau of Diplomatic Security
will be created and an Ambassador-at-Large for counter-
terrorism will be appointed.
o A major program to enhance physical and operational secur-
ity at 112 diplomatic posts abroad has been initiated,
with spending at the $55 million level this fiscal year
and requesting $391 million and $331 million for FY 86 and
FY 87 respectively. This will raise all U.S. diplomatic
facilities abroad to higher minimum security standards.
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o As authorized in 1984 legislation, we have established
procedures for a rewards program. The first rewards were
offered for information about the murderers of the six
Americans in El Salvador in June.
o We have negotiated an extradition treaty with the U.K.
which includes language about political offenses. The
treaty was submitted.to the Senate in August and will be
the model for other similar treaties.
o Implementation has begun of a number of important anti-
terrorism provisions in the Foreign Aid Authorization bill
for 1986 and 1987, which Congress passed and the President
signed into law in August. These provide for additional
sanctions against countries supporting terrorism or main-
taining unsafe airports and authorize additional funds for
the ATA program and research and development on equipment
to detect explosives.
o Other bills passed during the 1984 session include an
omnibus crime bill enabling federal authorities to prose-
cute in certain conspiracy cases, including possible
terrorism plots, and legislation implementing the Montreal
Convention -against=..Airyc-r..aaf Sabertage...-arid 4'he?, UN -Convent ivon x, u..._ .,,.r.
against the Taking of Hostages.
Talking Points:
o Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon which is becoming in-
creasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported.
Terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the
international political landscape for the rest of the
century.
o The nature of the international terrorist threat is
evolving. Recent developments include the rise of
international Shia and Sikh terrorist movements, and a
resurgence in Western Europe of coordinated leftist
terrorist activity against NATO-related targets.
o The overall threat is increasing. There were more than
600 terrorist incidents last year, compared with an annual
average of about 500 in previous years. The number of
incidents continues to rise this year. During recent
months we have seen the hijackings of TWA Flight 847 and a
Jordanian airliner, the hijacking of the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro, explosives planted aboard other air-
liners, bombings at airports, the kidnapping of more
persons in Lebanon, and attacks on the Emir of Kuwait.
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o Terrorist attacks are likely to become increasingly vio-
lent. The number of casualties and fatalities generally
has grown with the number of incidents.
o A broader spectrum of citizens are likely to be the
victims of terrorism, as exemplified in .the Achille Lauro
and TWA 847 incidents. Prominent public figures may
remain the central focus, but trends in recent years show
that diplomats and-military personnel represent a declin-
ing share of the victims, while travelers, businessmen,
journalists, and even clergymen are increasingly the
targets of attack.
.o The U.S. is a prime-target of terrorist acts overseas due
to our extensive official and commercial global presence.
Our citizens and facilities are readily accessible; our
policies are directly opposed to. the interests.of many
terrorist groups; and we frequently support governments
which terrorists are trying to destabilize.
o U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocable: we will make
no concessions to terrorists. We pay no ransoms, nor do
we permit releases of prisoners or agree to other acts
which might ?eracoua-ageaddi-t>i,orra-l?---t-error-ism: We._ma.ke-.no"- ? ...._
changes.in U.S. policy because of terrorists' threats or
acts. in countering terrorism, we are prepared to con-
sider a wide range of actions appropriate to the situation
at hand.
o The peaceful resolution of the TWA 847 hijacking, and the
swift detention of the four hijackers of the Achille Lauro
demonstrate the increasing effectiveness of current U.S.
policy on terrorism.
o The Department of State has been assigned the lead inter-
agency role in combatting terrorism outside the U.S.
State's Office for Counter-Terrorism deals with the prob-
lems of international terrorism on two levels: in its
coordinating role within the Department of State, and in
its similar role as head of the. Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism.
o As part of the continuing high priority given to counter-
ing terrorism, President Reagan recently asked Vice Pres-
ident Bush to convene a Task Force headed by Admiral
Holloway to concentrate on strengthening and supplementing
U.S. policy on terrorism.
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o Efforts to counter international terrorism include a major
effort within the U.S. Government and with friendly gov-
ernments to improve our intelligence on the identity,
objectives, plans, capabilities, and locations of terror-
ist organizations. We have increased efforts to inform
the public, both here and abroad, about the international
terrorist threat and the need to be alert in helping to
combat it.
o Additional unilateral efforts to counter terrorism include
continuing to improve the security of U.S. installations
overseas, stepped-up training for U.S employees, and
improvements in the collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion of intelligence information. Laws passed in recent
years, such as the 1984 Act to Combat International
Terrorism (which offers rewards for the arrest and
conviction of terrorists), and certain provisions of the
Export Administration Act (regulating sales to countries
supporting terrorists), have also strengthened the anti-
terrorism effort.
o Multilateral steps include the Hague Convention on air-
craft hijacking and the Montreal Convention on aircraft
sabotage; UN conventions against attacks oa~dipl a.ts ar d.fT ?
the taking of hostages, and the Summit Seven's Bonn
Declaration, which provides for concentrated action
against states that fail to take appropriate legal action
against hijackers.
o International cooperation in countering terrorism is im-
perative. We cannot succeed alone when the threat orig-
inates and is carried out abroad where other governments
have the major responsibility.
o We continue to encourage other countries to overcome their
reluctance to take an active stand--through diplomatic,
legal, and economic means--against terrorism. They are,
after all, frequently as much the victims of such attacks
as we.
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NARCOTICS
Issue:
How can the United States reduce the flow of illicit nar-
cotics from foreign drug-producing and transit countries?
Objectives:
o Increase the awareness of our young people and others of
the dangers of drug usage.
Continue to promote and fund crop eradication and inter-
diction operations in source countries.
o Promote and improve international and regional cooperation
in combating drug trafficking.
o Enhance the. enforcement and operational capabilities of
drug law enforcement agencies to counter the growing
sophistication of the drug industry.
Accomplishments:
...Successful -crop erat~ catit fl' `:prograiris kfiave been carried out
in several producing countries, and aerial surveys, a
necessary first step toward future eradication programs,
have been completed in others. .
o Carefully targeted and U.S.-supported interdiction opera-
tions in Latin America have resulted in unprecedented
seizures of cocaine and destruction of processing labora-
tories.
o The President's establishment of the National Narcotics
Border Interdiction System has greatly improved the col-
lection, assessing, and sharing of narcotics information
and has resulted in improved interdiction operations in
the Caribbean.
o The Congress significantly strengthened U.S. narcotics
enforcement efforts last year when it enacted the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act. Among its important drug-
related provisions, the law establishes a Cabinet-level
board to develop Government-wide drug enforcement programs
and coordinate the efforts of the. various federal
agencies; increases the penalties for drug offenses to
include up to 20 years of imprisonment and fines of
$250,000 for offenses, involving even small amounts of
heroin, cocaine, and certain hallucinogens; revises
criminal and civil forfeiture laws to'permit forfeiture in
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all felony drug cases and allow the Government to seize
more property; and strengthens the Government's efforts to
detect and-deter drug money-laundering.
o Two First Ladies' Conferences here on drug abuse in April
and October 1985 have helped to raise awareness of the
growing internationalization of the drug trade and have
resulted in many first ladies becoming actively involved
in promoting drug control in their countries.
o A number of countries have begun pushing for greater UN
involvement in drug control, and the issue is expected to
be an important item on this fall's General Assembly
agenda.
o cooperation against drug trafficking will be the lead item
on the agenda of the Economic Summit meeting next spring.
Talking Points:
o Despite more successful U.S. and foreign drug interdiction
efforts, the amount of drugs entering the United States
continues to rise. The criminal trafficking organizations
behind this increase are using the wealth acquired through-..._-,
narcoticv-'subve'rt"drug control and economic, political,
and security institutions in many countries.
o Drug crop production is expanding in many countries and is
spreading to others not equipped to halt it. Growers are
developing more scientific techniques and obtaining higher
yields than ever before.
o Several countries have initiated successful crop control
and eradication programs that have substantially reduced
harvests. These gains have been offset by resurgent
narcotics activities in countries whose once-successful
control programs were subverted by graft, violence, and
other countermeasures, and in countries whose governments
have little or no control over the countryside.
o The immense profits realized by the drug trade have
prompted criminal trafficking organizations to resort to
violence to protect their industry. These organizations
strike at U.S. and foreign symbols of law and order at all
levels to intimidate governments and thwart control
programs.
o Governments of drug-afflicted nations also face threats to
their security from terrorist and insurgent involvement in
drug trafficking. These groups use narcotics as a lucra-
tive and usually non-traceable method of obtaining funds
to further their anti-government goals.
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o The narcotics trade's activities across national borders
are stimulating bilateral and regional cooperation against
it. Several Latin American countries have already dealt
setbacks to growers and traffickers by staging joint
operations against them.
o Rising drug abuse has now affected many Western and other
consuming countries, prompting them to seek international
solutions., Although an effective and coordinated world-
wide strategy is still several years away, the increased
attention devoted to the narcotics issue has already led
to tougher laws and more effective enforcement in many
countries.
o Two First Ladies' Conferences on drug abuse hosted by Mrs.
Reagan this year have helped to raise awareness at home
and abroad of the gowing internationalization of the drug
trade and the dangers it poses to the world's young
people.
o Effective drug control will require patience and a long-
term commitment, and its goals will sometimes be affected
,by competing foreign policy objectives. Because those who
traffic in''-drugs "are- -soT dept at' exploiting weaknesses and
vulnerabilities, gains in one country will frequently be
offset by setbacks in others. Unless we persevere despite
the'inevitable setbacks, however, the international drug
trade will have the potential to undermine our society and
that of other friendly governments.
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ARMS CONTROL
The United States is seeking to negotiate meaningful,
verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union
that reduce the arsenals and risks of war and enhance U.S.
security.
Objectives:
o Reduce the risks of war between East and West, partic-
ularly nuclear war, while maintaining our freedom and that
of our allies.
o Negotiate arms control agreements which, in the
President's words, provide for "deep cuts, no first-strike
advantages, defensive research--because defense is much
safer than offense--and no cheating."
o Ensure that arms control remains an integral component of
a comprehensive, coherent security policy that includes
the maintenance of credible deterrent forces.
o Promote compliance with- existing arms- coat-ro.L.acco.rds....._
o Ensure that the panoply of arms control efforts deals with
the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
systems.
o Support expanded membership in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explos-
ives to additional countries.
Accomplishments:
o This Administration has the most far-reaching arms control
agenda in U.S. history. Arms control issues were exten-
sively discussed when President Reagan met with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985.
o Even though our two nations still profoundly disagree over
the relationship between strategic offense and defense, we
made some progress at the Geneva Summit on arms control
issues. Both sides agreed in principle on 50 percent
reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, on accel-
erating our work at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms
Talks, and on seeking an interim agreement on limiting
Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) missile systems.
We also agreed in principle on the need for progress in
other arms control-related areas as spelled out below.
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o When the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed in January 1985 to
resume arms reduction negotiations at Geneva, the Admin-
istration developed a three-phased strategic concept as
the heart of its approach to the Nuclear and Space Arms
Talks: (1) near-term significant reductions in nuclear
arms and the stabilization of the offense-defense rela-
tionship; '(2) a period of transition to a more stable
world. with a reduced reliance on nuclear arms'and greater
reliance on non-nuclear defenses against nuclear arms; and
(3) the-eventual complete elimination of nuclear arms.
o START: The highest U.S. priority stemming from this long-
term goal remains to strengthen stability through substan-
tial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic
forces below the levels set in SALT II, focusing on the
most destabilizing elements (the ballistic missiles and
their warheads). The U.S. has proposed a cut of about
one-half in land- and sea-based strategic ballistic
missiles and a cut of about one-third in the warheads on
such missiles. In addition, the U.S. proposed reducing
heavy bombers and the number of ALCMs they carry. U.S.
negotiators have unprecedented flexibility to explore
alternative methods of reduction, to explore tradeoffs
which would not_ dictate Soviet or U.S. force structur-e,- --.-
- and" to'discuss1Soviet proposals in areas where differences
exist.
o INF: We proposed far-reaching arms control accords in the
negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces prior to
the Soviet walkout in November 1983 and reiterated those
proposals when INF talks resumed in March 1985. There are
now nearly 600 Soviet longer-range INF missiles (LRINF),
including well over 400 SS-20 missiles, each equipped with
three highly accurate warheads. As of March 1985, the
United States had deployed 134 of the 572 Pershing II and
cruise missiles envisioned in the 1979 dual-track deci-
sion. We have continued at Geneva to seek the elimination
of all LRINF missiles or the reduction to the lowest poss-
ible equal global levels of warheads. We are also pre-
pared to: consider a commitment not to deploy in Europe
all of the LRINF missiles to which we would.be entitled
under equal global ceilings; apportion reductions approp-
riately between Pershing Its and GLCMs; discuss LRINF
aircraft limitations; explore different approaches leading
to a zero global ceiling; and consider serious Soviet
proposals that meet U.S. and Allied security concerns.
o Defense ands pace: In the Defense and Space negotiations,
we are examining ways to strengthen deterrence by moving
away from sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retalia-
tion and toward greater reliance on defenses which will
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threaten no one. We also have been discussing our view of
the offense-defense relationship, Soviet actions which are
eroding the ABM Treaty, and Soviet non-compliance with
this and other existing agreements with respect to both
offensive and defensive forces. We will continue to press
for Soviet compliance and corrective action in cases where
there is non-compliance. While some issues posed by SDI
are for the future, we are nonetheless prepared now to
discuss defense and space arms and the broader question of
strategic defense, including existing Soviet defenses and
systems based in space as well as systems based on earth
which can reach space.
o MBFR: In 1982 and again in the spring of 1984, the U.S.
and NATO proposed in the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna major new initiatives to
resolve disagreements over the size of conventional
forces, and their reduction, in Central Europe. Our
proposals envisage major troop reductions to equal NATO
and Warsaw Pact levels and effective verification
procedures. In February 1985, the East made a move which
essentially repackaged its 1983 proposals. The move did
not address the central issues of data and verification
nor respond to the offer of flexibility-in the West's 1984
proposal. The U.S.-and -NATO'-are-1,KSstl tng- the'Eastern
proposal and other broader factors in their continued
efforts to move the talks forward. At the November 1985
Summit, President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev empha-
sized the importance they attach to progress in these
talks.
o CDE: At the 35-nation Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)
that opened in Stockholm in January, 1984, the U.S. and
other Western nations proposed a package of concrete
measures that would make military activities in Europe
more open and would make it more difficult to launch a
surprise attack or intimidate others by using military
force. In June 1984, the President announced that we
would consider a Soviet proposal on non-use of force in
Europe if the Soviets would seriously negotiate with us on
the Western package of confidence-building measures. In
May 1985 the President repeated this offer in his address
to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Also in 1985,
the U.S. and NATO presented their complete package of
confidence and security-building measures in language
appropriate for a final agreement. These measures, if
adopted by the Conference,p would give concrete, new
meaning to the non-use of force principle enshrined in the
UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. At the November
1985 Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to work
with the other CDE participants toward an early and
successful conclusion of the Conference.
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o CW: In April, 1984, the U.S. proposed to the 40-nation
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a comprehensive
treaty banning development, production, use, transfer, and
stockpiling of chemical weapons, to be monitored through
far-reaching challenge inspection procedures. The Soviets
have yet to make a serious, detailed response to the U.S.
draft treaty, but they agreed at the Geneva Summit in
November 1985 to join us in accelerating work to conclude
an effective and verifiable international convention on
this issue and to intensify bilateral discussions at the
experts level on all aspects (including verification) of
such a ban.
Nuclear Testing: The U.S. has three times within the past
two years sought to work with the Soviet Union in
strengthening verification provisions of the signed, but
unratified, Threshold Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting nuclear
tests exceeding 150 kilotons) and Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaty. The Soviets have rejected such efforts,
even as we have received evidence of likely Soviet noncom-
pliance with these threshold agreements and with the Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty that obliges the parties not to con-
duct an underground nuclear test if the explosion would
cause radioactive debris to be present outside the borders
of the state conducting the explosion.. They have also
failed to respond positively to the President's proposal
at the September 1984 UNGA to exchange U.S. and Soviet
experts to measure tests at each other's test sites in
order to facilitate required verification improvements.
Finally, they have failed to accept the President's
unconditional invitation extended in June 1985 to send a
Soviet team to measure the yield of a nuclear test at a
U.S. test site with such equipment as they deemed necess-
ary, in order to increase confidence in the verifiability
of test limitations.
o The U.S. has also supported discussion but not negotia-
tions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, of
verification and compliance issues related to a
comprehensive test.ban. Such a ban is a long-term U.S.
objective in the context of broad, deep, and equitable
arms reductions, improved verification capabilities,
enhanced confidence-building measures., and peace at a time
when a nuclear deterrent is no longer essential for
national security as it is today.
o Non-Proliferation: We continue to seek strengthened
international safeguards to prevent. further proliferation.
The NPT review conference that met in Geneva in September
1985 produced a consensus document strongly endorsing the
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Treaty, an action that serves to strengthen U.S. non-pro-
liferation efforts. President Reagan and Secretary Gor-
bachev reaffirmed both countries' commitment to the Treaty
at the Geneva Summit in November 1985. They also agreed
to additional measures to enhance the Treaty's effective-
ness, including enlarging its membership and strengthening
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
o other Confidence-Building Measures: In June 1984, the
U.S. renewed the U.S.-Soviet agreement to prevent inci-
dents at sea. In July 1984, a new agreement was signed
with the Soviet Union to improve the Direct Communications
Link, or "Hot Line," by adding a facsimile capability; an
agreement on the transfer of U.S. upgrade equipment to the
Soviets was signed in September 1985. In July 1985, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a "Common Understanding"
to the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement clarifying
their obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear
incident involving unknown or unauthorized parties,
including terrorists. President Reagan and Secretary
Gorbachev agreed at the Geneva Summit in November 1985 to
study the concept of establishing risk reduction centers
to further reduce the chances of conflict between us.
General Talking Points:
o Nuclear War: The President and his Administration have no
higher priority than reducing the risks of war. Nuclear
war in particular, as the President has said repeatedly,
and as both he and General Secretary Gorbachev explicitly
agreed at Geneva in November 1985, "cannot be won and must
never be fought." We seek arms control agreements that
truly enhance stability and security.
o Arms Control: Although we and the Soviets still pro-
foundly disagree over the relationship between strategic
offense and defense, we did make some progress at the
Geneva Summit on arms control issues. The Administration
has a broad arms control agenda involving far-reaching
proposals for arms reductions, constraints, and confi-
dence-building measures. We are seeking agreements that
are militarily significant, equitable, and verifiable. In
each of our efforts, including a number of major negotia-
tions, the U.S. and our Western Allies have made forthcom-
ing new proposals in an effort to achieve progress.
o Geneva Negotiations: Both sides agreed at the Geneva
Summit to accelerate work at the Geneva Nuclear and Space
Arms Talks. We still have a long road and tough issues
ahead. Patient and persistent dialogue will continue to
be required. We hope that through this dialogue, we can
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eventually translate the Summit agreement in principle on
an equitable, verifiable 50 percent reduction in both
sides 'nuclear weapons into agreements that will pave the
way for further deep cuts.
o we have carefully examined the new Soviet counterpropos-
al presented at Geneva on September 30. We find it dis-
appointingly one-sided, since it calls for deep reductions
in U.S. aircraft and INF systems without offering parallel
cuts in comparable Soviet systems. U.S.modernization
would be restricted while Soviet modernization would be
preserved, and the proposal would maintain the Soviet
monopoly in antisatellite programs. Nevertheless, while
it falls significantly short in several key areas, Mos-
cow's. proposal contained certain positive seeds which we
wish to nurture. We have now presented a new proposal of
our own which builds upon these positive elements and
calls for very significant, even-handed reductions of
comparable'nuclear systems, particularly the most destab-
ilizing ones.
o In the negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet Union agree that
there is a relationship among all the different types of
arms to be addressed. Offensive and defensive. systems are
closely related and cannot be considered in isolation'from
each other. However, progress in any of the three Geneva
forums should not be held hostage to progress in another.
A vital task before us is to strengthen stability by
moving over time to a different kind of strategic rela-
tionship, one less dependent on the threat of nuclear
devastation and more dependent on defensive systems that
threaten no one.
o Other Negotiations: In addition, we are actively involved
in a number of other serious arms control efforts. These
include the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR), the Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive chemical weapons
ban, as well as discussions at the CD on limits on nuclear
testing, on outer space, and on other areas of bilateral
and multilateral concern. Both sides agreed at the Geneva
Summit to increase their efforts to reach effective agree-
ments in these areas.
o Verification: Verification and compliance are the pacing
elements of arms control today. The primary systems of
verification are the National Technical Means of. each
side. U.S. verification capabilities have improved since
the late 1970s. In the future, arms control accords will
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continue relying on National Technical Means as the prim-
ary verification tools, but they will also require on-site
inspection, a form of verification of proven value which
both Governments have long accepted.
o Compliance: The U.S. is seriously concerned about Soviet
noncompliance with existing agreements. In the Presi-
dent's February 1985 Report to the Congress on Soviet Non-
compliance with Arms Control Agreements, the U.S. Govern-
ment reaffirmed the conclusions of its January 1984 report
that the Soviet Union has violated the Helsinki Final Act,
the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two provisions of SALT
II (telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization), the ABM
Treaty (through the siting, orientation, and capability of
the Krasnoyarsk Radar and through testing of SAM and ABM
components) and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. the U.S.
Government has also reaffirmed its previous conclusion
that Moscow probably has violated the SS-16 deployment
prohibition of SALT II. In addition, we are concerned
about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM
defense. We must insist that the Soviets rectify those
areas where they are in violation as their failure to do
so has serious consequences for the arms. cont.ro.l_ pr-ocess-.
For our part, we are continuing to carry out our own
obligations and commitments, and will continue to seek
effective verification and compliance measures in all arms
control efforts we undertake.
o Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint: In order to
foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to
serious negotiation in Geneva, in June 1985 the President
announced the U.S. decision not to undercut the SALT I or
SALT II agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised
equal restraint. On this basis, the U.S. retired a
Polaris submarine in the summer at the time of Trident
deployment and in compliance with SALT.
o Confidence Building Measures: The U.S. has raised and
will continue to pursue with the Soviet Union a wide range
of CBM proposals at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms
Talks, at the MBFR negotiations, and at the CDE as well
as in other fora to help to ensure that war does not erupt
because of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.
In July 1984, the Soviet Union signed what we hope will be
the first of several agreements to this end: an agreement
to upgrade the hotline. At the Geneva Summit, both sides
agreed to study the concept of establishing risk reduction
centers to further reduce the possibility of conflict
between us. We hope that, over time, the Soviets will
agree to build on this to establish a much broader-based
means of ensuring against accidental nuclear war.
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DETERRENCE
Issue:
How can we maintain our ability to deter attack on the US
and our allies while moving toward a more stable world
with lower levels of nuclear forces?
Objectives:
o Maintain our ability to deter war today and to reduce the
risk of war or coercion by the threat to use force.
o Move away from deterrence based exclusively on the threat
of nuclear retaliation to an enhanced deterrence based on
the increasing contribution of defensive systems,
primarily non-nuclear systems, that threaten no one.
Accomplishments:
o Through our strategic, intermediate-range nuclear, and
conventional forces modernization programs, we have begun
to remedy the significant vulnerabilities in those forces
--as in C31 capabilities--which were inherited in 1981.
This will permit us to maintain deterrence today. and,- into_
the near future.
o The Strategic Defense Initiative, a broad-based research
program, will provide future options for moving away from
deterrence based on nuclear retaliation and towards a
safer, more secure and more stable deterrent.
Talking Points:
o Deterrence is the cornerstone of US national security
policy. We deter by ensuring that the leadership of all
potential aggressors is aware of our policy to maintain
forces adequate to deny an aggressor his basic war aims
and, through retaliation, make the costs of aggression far
outweigh any potential benefits.
o The President has emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought. Our recognition of this
fact is not sufficient to prevent nuclear war; we must be
certain that the Soviet leadership understands it as well.
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o Deterrence based on nuclear retaliation has worked for
over 30 years. However, Soviet improvements in both their
offensive forces and their own strategic defenses, if
unanswered, will erode deterrence.
o Our strategic modernization program is designed to ensure
our ability to deter today. The SDI program seeks to
create a better basis for deterrence in the future.
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STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States close the gap between its
strategic capabilities and those of the Soviet Union?
Objectives:
o Redress the most serious weaknesses in our current
strategic posture. -
o Provide incentive to the Soviets to negotiate meaningful
arms reductions that promote strategic stability.
Accomplishments:
o The President early-on recognized the need for strategic
modernization and as a result proposed a five-element
mutually reinforcing program to restore the strategic
balance.
o The five-point program directed the Department of Defense
to: design and produce a cost-effective Peacekeeper
intercontinental ballistic missile; refine and improve the
basic design of the-B-1 strategic bomber and place it into
series production; select a design and develop an Advanced
Technology Bomber (ATB) to complete the basic
modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force
of the 1990s and beyond; deploy a-Trident submarine and
develop an improved Trident II/D-5 submarine-launched
ballistic missile system and a nuclear-armed SLCM; and
design and deploy improvements to our command-and-control
system to ensure positive control to further reduce the
risk of war.
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o A major change to the President's program was incorporated l
after its initiation: at the recommendation of the
Scowcroft Commission, work was initiated on a Small ICBM
for deployment in the 1990s in addition to the Peace-
keeper.
o Significant progress has been made on~all five of the
Strategic Initiatives.
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o Improvements to the Strategic Command-and-Control system
are being implemented. E
o The B-1 is now being deployed~to operational bases months
ahead of schedule and below cost. Research on the ATB is
on or ahead of schedule.
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o The first 42 Peacekeeper missiles are in production, and
the Peacekeeper missile has had nine successful test
launches,__including the first test from a silo.
o Research on the D-5 missile is on schedule and the
nuclear-armed SLCM has been deployed.
o Improvements to our strategic air defenses are being
implemented.
Talking Points:
o Strategic modernization is required to redress the serious
weaknesses in our strategic posture caused by the massive
Soviet build-up of strategic forces over the past 10-15
years, a period of U.S. restraint in deployment of
strategic systems. It is also needed to restore our
deterrent strength and to provide strong incentives to the
Soviets to negotiate genuine arms reductions.
o Under President Reagan's leadership, a multi-element,
mutually reinforcing strategic modernization program has
been initiated. Significant progress has already been
made in a number of areas.
o strategic communications-and-control systems are being
improved to ensure that we could employ our nuclear forces
effectively, which is essential to a credible deterrent.
o Bomber modernization is underway to reduce the risks
associated with the aging and potentially vulnerable B-52
force.
o Sea-based forces, currently the most survivable leg of our
strategic Triad, are being modernized and a new Trident
has been deployed.
o Our land-based missile force is being modernized to remedy
an important part of the strategic imbalance. This mod-
ernization is critical because of the important contribu-
tions of the ICBM which include: prompt hard target capa-
bility; secure command-control-and-communications; rapid
re-targeting; high alert rate; and low operations and sup-
port costs (12 percent of the total for the entire Triad).
o The President's strategic modernization program is an
essential element in helping us meet our arms control
objectives. We have stated that we are willing to
negotiate trade-offs in each side's advantages and a
build-down of strategic systems leading to significantly
lower and more stable strategic forces. We seek to reach
an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement in the
talks under way in Geneva.
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76
ICBM MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States maximize the effectiveness of
the ground-based portion of the strategic Triad in support
of credible deterrence?
Objectives:
o modernize the aging ICBM force through the deployment of
100 Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a new
small mobile ICBM.
Accomplishments:
o The Peacekeeper test program has been an outstanding
success: all test objectives have been met or exceeded,
and accuracy/reliability results have been excellent.
o 50.Peacekeeper missiles have been approved for silo
deployment. Research is underway for a more survivable
basing mode for an additional 50, pursuant to the FY 1986
Defense Authorization Act.
o Production has been approved and initiated on the first 42
Peacekeeper missiles, and work in connection with the
deployment of the first 50 missiles in existing minuteman
silos at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, is progress-
ing on schedule. All other requirements for an operation-
al deployment of Peacekeeper in 1986 are on schedule.
Development of the small ICBM has begun and is on schedule
for a possible deployment in the early 1990's.
Talking Points:
o ICBM modernization is essential to the viability of the
strategic Triad of bombers, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and ICBMs that has kept the peace for well over
two decades.
o The President has endorsed the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission to deploy the Peacekeeper
missile as soon as possible and develop a small ICBM,
while vigorously pursuing arms control.
o Peacekeeper is the only near-term ICBM that can help
restore the strategic- imbalance that developed as the
Soviets modernized during a period of U.S. restraint.
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o Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have modernized their
ICBM force through the addition of a new generation of
MIRVed ICBMs, 150 SS-17 missiles, 308 SS-18 missiles and
360 SS-19 missiles. The U.S. has deployed no new systems
during this period.
o Peacekeeper deployment is an important element in
demonstrating U.S. resolve to maintain its modernization
program consistent with national security objectives while
pursuing deep reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals
at the Geneva talks. Failure to deploy Peacekeeper would
provide no incentive for the Soviets to undertake serious
negotiations aimed at limiting and reducing strategic
systems.
o Peacekeeper deployment is a vital first step in a logical,
comprehensive, and progressive approach toward permitting
us and encouraging the Soviets to move toward smaller,
survivable, and more stable systems at lower levels of
forces. Without Peacekeeper, the Soviets have little
incentive to move in this direction in the near term.
With ICBM modernization, stability and deterrence will be
enhanced well into the Twenty-First Century.
o A new single. warhead.-.small __ICBM. is-also. rAqui r.ed..4., ,Each af .-
these ICBMs represents a low-target value from a Soviet
attack-plan perspective. A flexible and survivable basing
mode is being developed as a complement to a small ICBM.
(Current emphasis is on a hard mobile concept.)
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NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
Issue:
How can the United. States most effectively modernize the
Navy's deterrent capability?
Objectives.:
o Offset the threat posed by the Soviet Union's large force
of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
o Enhance the U.S. deterrent posture.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration announced the decision to deploy
nuclear SLCM as part of its October 1981 Strategic
Modernization Program. The nuclear-armed SLCM contributes
to our nuclear reserve force and the modernization of our
worldwide naval deterrent capability.
o Funding of the SLCM program first was approved by the
Congress in FY 1981 and has continued without interruption
ever since, enabling ..the grog.ram...tome.a-t,-its??-schedulted--,...,.z_
initial deployment date of July 1984.
Talking Points:
o In the early 1970's the U.S. decided to develop conven-
tional and nuclear-armed SLCMs to improve our deterrent
posture and to offset the threat posed by Soviet SLCMs.
o The nuclear-armed SLCM provides badly-needed modernization
of our Navy's deterrent capability. When deployed'on
surface ships or submarines, it is a highly survivable
system. It is a highly accurate weapon, and its
procurement costs are relatively low.
o The SLCM program actually offsets a Soviet capability that
has existed since the early 1960's,'when their first sea-
..launched cruise missiles were deployed. Moscow now has
seven operational SLCM systems, six of which are dual-
capable--i.e., are currently deployed in both conventional
and nuclear-armed configurations. At least two of these
.systems feature weapons with ranges in excess of 400
kilometers that can threaten many coastal U.S. cities.
o Nuclear arms control regimes involving SLCMs must enhance
stability, strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, and be effectively verifiable. Limitations
which fail to meet these criteria are not in the U.S.
national security interest.
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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Issue:
How can the United States attain its long-range goal of
making ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete?
Objective:
o Research the potential of advanced defensive technologies
which could support a future U.S. decision on whether to
develop and deploy an effective defense against ballistic
missiles.
Accomplishments:
o on March 23, 1983, the President directed that research
within the limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty go forward
on neutralizing the ballistic missile threat.
o Early feasibility studies determined that advanced
technologies showed promise for providing an effective
anti-ballistic missile defense and that such defenses
could enhance deterrence, stability, and prospects for
arms reductions.. The studies recognized that uncertain-
ties could only be'resolved through further research. As
a result, defense experts recommended a vigorous research
program designed to answer the remaining questions as to
whether an effective defense is feasible.
o After consulting Congressional leaders and our Allies, the
President directed that an accelerated research effort be
conducted. The objective is to provide answers that will
permit us to make an informed decision in the future on
whether to proceed with developing such defensive systems.
All research will be fully compliant with our treaty
obligations.
o In recognition of the importance of SDI both to the United
States and our Allies, the U.S. extended an offer to our
Allies to participate in the SDI program. We have follow-
ed up the offer by holding detailed discussions with
several of the Allies.
Talking Points:
o The President's Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to
explore the potential of emerging defensive technologies
to enhance deterrence and improve stability by
significantly reducing the military effectiveness of
ballistic missiles.
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o The pace of the Soviet offensive and defensive buildup has
upset the..balance in the areas of greatest importance
during crises. Their modernization of offensive nuclear
forces has been particularly striking.
o when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, it was agreed that
a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of
indefinite duration should parallel it. It was hoped that
such a treaty could be concluded in two years, and
certainly within five years. This has not occurred.
o The SALT I Interim Agreement, which was concluded at the
same time as the ABM Treaty and anticipated this further
progress on offensive force limitation, simply froze each
side's ballistic missile forces at unequal levels.
o However, in the thirteen years since that agreement was .
signed, the Soviet Union has modernized its offensive
forces in an unprecedented manner while the U.S. has
exhibited relative restraint.
o over time, the quantitative advantage the Soviets were
granted through the SALT I Interim Agreement has evolved
into a qualitative advantage, as well. Furt.her,_._t.he_heav.y-
emphasis that their offensive force structure places on
ICBMs, with increased accuracies and massive throw-weight
capacity,. now represents a serious threat.
o The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic
missile forces has steadily eroded the survivability of
our land-based retaliatory forces.
o The President's Strategic Defense initiative addresses his
deep conviction that "certainly, there should be a better
way to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away
from a future that relies so heavily on the prospect of
rapid and massive retaliation and toward greater reliance
on defensive systems which threaten no one."
o On March 2.3, 1983, President Reagan announced his decision
to take an important first step toward this goal by
directing the establishment of the Strategic Defense
Initiative research program.
o The extensive Soviet activities in strategic defense have
eroded the foundation on which deterrence has long rested.
In concert with their massive and newly modernized
offensive forces and already impressive air and passive
defense capabilities, such a move poses a serious new
threat to U.S. and Allied security. .
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o At a minimum, the SDI program is a prudent response to the
very active Soviet research and development activities in
this field, and it provides insurance against Soviet
efforts to develop and deploy unilaterally an advanced
defensive system. But the SDI program is designed to do
more than this.
o This vigorous research program emphasizes advanced,
non-nuclear defensive technologies, with the aim of
finding better ways of deterring aggression, strengthening
stability, and increasing the security of the United
States and its Allies.
o The research will provide to a future President and a
future Congress, possibly in the early 1990s, the
technical knowledge required to support a decision on
whether to develop and later deploy advanced strategic
defensive systems.
o SDI offers us, our Allies, and the world in general the
possibility of radically altering today's dangerous trends
by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence.
It would allow us to move away from reliance on the threat
of nuclear.retaliati.on-_t:o--deter-- a.ggression,,-aad.-towards; an
enhanced deterrence based upon defensive capability that
threatens no one.
o In the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, our priority is in
obtaining Soviet agreement to significant reductions in
offensive nuclear weapons and in reversing the erosion of
the ABM Treaty. We also seek to engage the Soviets in
discussion of the offense-defense relationship and our
view of how a transition to increased reliance on defense
could enhance mutual security and strategic stability.
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ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT)'DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
How can the United States best protect.its interests in
space and strengthen deterrence?
Objectives:
o Ensure that we have a full range of options for protecting
our military and civil systems deployed in space.
o Deploy a U.S. anti-satellite capability (the MV -.
Miniature Vehicle System) and develop other space systems
and capabilities as well as negotiate agreements that
maintain and strengthen deterrence in these areas.
Accomplishments:
o U.S. National Space Policy, announced by the President on
July 4, 1982, states that the United States will consider
verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would
ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific
weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with
U.S. national security.
o With U.S. support, a specialized ad hoc committee to
consider issues relevant to space arms control, without a
negotiating mandate, was formed in the forty-nation
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The mandate for this
Committee is largely. that proposed by the U.S. and its
Allies over a year ago and focuses on legal and verifica-
tion issues.
o In March 1984, the'Administration submitted a
comprehensive report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on
ASAT Arms Control which pointed out factors that impede
identification of effective ASAT arms control measures.
These include verification difficulties, diverse sources
of threats to U.S. and Allied satellites, and threats
posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites.
The report also indicated that the U.S. would continue to
study selected limits on specific types of systems or
activities.
o The Soviets introduced their ASAT system over a decade
ago. It is today the world's only operational ASAT
system..
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o The U.S. ASAT Program under development has made
significant technical progress: the ASAT Boost System and
its miniature vehicle have been tested in space; and a
successful test has been made against a satellite target
in space.
o Research continues on technologies with potential for ASAT
use, including directed energy weapons and space tracking
technology.
o Survivability of U.S. space assets is being upgraded
through the development of measures which reduce or
eliminate the effectiveness of Soviet ASAT systems.
o On March 12, 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union
began talks on space and nuclear arms with the objectives
of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on
earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at
strengthening strategic stability.
Talking Points:
o Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational
orbital- interceptor -systemgronnd based---tet 1ln'art' with
probable ASAT capabilities; possibly the nuclear-armed
Galosh ABM interceptors (if modified); and the technolog-
ical capability for electronic warfare (jamming) against
space systems.
o The operational Soviet ASAT system threatens U.S. low-
altitude satellites.
o The 1978-1979 ASAT arms control talks revealed major
U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought
space arms control issues into sharper focus. Problems in
space arms control include: verification difficulties;
high risk of Soviet break-out due to existing Soviet ASAT
capabilities and research; difficulties in defining space
weapons, since many ground-based systems have space
capability and manned space systems have extreme
flexibility; and the fact the Soviets have deployed
systems whereas we have not.
o The Soviets' proposal in the 1983 UNGA for an ASAT arms
control treaty lacked provisions for effective verifica-
tion, was unclear with regard to Soviet targeting satel-
lites, and did not deal with residual ASAT capabilities.
This moratorium proposal seemed clearly designed to block
tests of the U.S. ASAT while allowing the USSR to maintain
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its monopoly with the world's only operational ASAT inter-
ceptor system. (In June 1984, in connection with their
proposal _for talks in Vienna in September 1984, the
Soviets essentially reiterated these same proposals.)
o The U.S. is prepared in the Defense and Space Negotiations
Group in the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to consider
Soviet proposals and to present ideas of its own on this
complex subject. So far. the Soviet proposal for a ban
on ASAT testing and deployment suffers from the same
defects as their earlier proposal.
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Issue:
How can the United States capitalize on the full potential
of the medium of space in satisfying overall national
interests?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the security of the United States.
o Maintain U.S. space leadership.
o Benefit economically and scientifically by exploiting
space.
o Expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in
civil space-related activities.
o Promote international cooperative activities in space that
are in the national interest.
o Work with other nations to preserve the freedom of space
for all activities that enhance the security and welfare
of mankind.
Accomplishments:
o On July 4, 1982, President Reagan signed the National
Space Policy to guide the conduct of our space program.
The policy states that our space program will be conducted
according to a set of principles.
o We are committed to the exploration and use of space by
all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
mankind.
o We reject any claims to sovereignty by any nation over
outer space, celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
reject any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire
data from space.
o We consider the space systems of any nation to be national
property with the right of passage through and operations
in space without interference.
o We encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities, technology, and systems for national
economic benefit.
o We will conduct international cooperative space-related
activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political,
economic, or national security benefits for the nation.
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o Our space program will be comprised of two separate,
distinct, and strongly interacting programs-- national
security and civil..
o The Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space
launch system for both national security and civil
government missions.
o We will pursue activities in space in support of our right
of self-defense.
o We will continue to study space arms control options.
o Our Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy, which was
issued on August 6, 1982, promulgates broad U.S.
objectives in international space cooperation and provides
policy on space launch and technology assistance.
o The President has directed the maintenance of orbiter
production through manufacturing structural and component
spares.
o In May 1983, the President established a policy to
facilitate the commercialization of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs). A Senior Interdepartmental Group (.Space).
study subsequently led to establishing procedures for
licensing commercial space launches and giving lead-agency
responsibility to the Department of Transportation.
o Following the completion of an interdepartmental study,
the President announced in his State of the Union Address
on January 25, 1984, that developing the frontier of space
would be one of the four major goals for the U.S. in the
1980s. In this context he announced that: the U.S. will
develop a permanently-manned space station and place it-in
orbit within a decade; our friends and Allies are invited
to join us, and we have now included allied scientists in
the program; and we would implement a number of initia-,
tives designed to promote private sector investment in
space.
o At the Bonn Economic Summit in May 1985, we received posi-
tive responses from the European Space'Agency, Canada, and
Japan to participate in the U.S.-manned Space Station
program.
o on July 20, 1984, the President announced 13 initiatives
to encourage commercial activity in space.
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o On August 15, 1984 the President approved a National Space
Strategy. The Strategy implements the National Space
Policy by providing 17 priorities for the U.S. Space
Program in the STS, Civil Space, Commercial Space, and
National Security Space areas. Seven follow-on efforts to
further implement the policy are directed.
o On February 25, 1985, the National Security Launch
Strategy was issued. It authorizes the Department of
Defense to procure a limited number of ELVs in order to
maintain assured access to space. It also directs a joint
Defense-NASA study on the development of a
second-generation space transportation system that would
be a follow-on to the Shuttle.
o On July 30, 1985, the President approved a plan for
implementing full cost recovery of foreign and commercial
Shuttle flights occurring after October 1, 1988. In
approving this plan, the President directed that the price
charged to DOD for Shuttle flights would be negotiated
separately from that charged under the foreign and commer-
cial policy, and would include appropriate compensation
for DOD services rendered in connection with Shuttle
flights.
Talking Points:
o A vigorous and forward-looking space program is one of the
most highly visible and tangible demonstrations of world
leadership.
o Few other national endeavors have equaled the potential of
the U.S. Space Program to: perform functions in the
national security, domestic and private sectors that
either cannot be performed any other way or cannot be
performed as economically or as well; advance the
state-of-the-art in high technology; and elevate the human
spirit, capture our imaginations, demonstrate our
pioneering initiative, and hold out hope for a progressive
future for our nation and all mankind.
o Since announcement of his National Space Policy on July 4,
1982, President Reagan has issued approximately eight
directives and made numerous decisions that will help
implement this broad policy. The Senior Interdepartmental
Group (SIG) for Space was established to coordinate the
implementation.
o Much remains to be done to set the U.S. Space Program on a
course that ensures U.S. leadership in the decades ahead.
By the President's direction, a National Space Strategy
has been completed which establishes broad priorities for
the U.S. Space Program and identifies potential issues to
be resolved through follow-on studies.
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MILITARY CAPABILITY/READINESS
Issue:
Are our armed forces more "ready" than in 1980?
Objectives:
o Continue to improve training and skill levels of U.S-.
forces.
Reduce longstanding shortages in combat sustainability,
including stock levels of critical consumables.
o Provide modern equipment to enhance combat effectiveness
and survivability.
o Provide better capability to deploy and support forces
over long distances.
o Blend equipment, sustainability, logistics, and manpower
improvements into more combat-capable armed forces.
Accomplishments:
'In force readiness (i.e., the ability of forces, weapons
systems, etc. to deliver outputs--without unacceptable
delay--for which they were designed), substantial progress
has' been made in the past three years and steady
improvement is projected for the future.
o Since FY 1980 there has been an almost 16 percent increase
in the number of enlisted personnel with four or more
years of service, and the percentage of recruits with high
school diplomas has increased from 68 percent to 93
percent.
o While trends in average training hours/flying
days/steaming days have been steady or have improved
slightly since 1980, the quality of training has improved
considerably.
o Trends in the material condition (i.e-., mission-capable
rates) of most major weapons categories have been steady
or slightly improving since FY 1980. Now, however, we are
supporting larger numbers of more sophisticated and
complex weapons, operating them for longer periods, and'
still realizing readiness improvements in some areas.
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o In force sustainability (the staying power of our forces
in combat)., because of the long lead times involved in
procurement, our increased funding from FY 1982-84 for
sustainability has not yet been fully translated into
significantly increased inventories. However, we have
increased the budget allocation by 100 percent over the
1980 level, which will result in increased sustainabil-
ity.
o In force structure (i.e., the numbers, size, and
composition of our forces), we have provided for
significant increases in the numbers of some units
(divisions, battalions, tactical fighter wings, Navy
aircraft squadrons, and ship battle groups) over the past
four years. The need to provide balance among the
components of military capability within finite resources
has required, however, that revisions in force structure
receive a somewhat lower priority than modernization,
readiness, and sustainability.
o In strategic mobility, we can deliver 25 percent more
tonnage to Europe by air. We have done more to improve
sealift since 1981 than in all the years since WW II.
o In force modernization, we have obtained appropriations of
over billion for construction of 34 new major combat
ships. We have funded a substantial increase for
procurement of modern weapons systems for the Army and
Marine Corps, e.g., for some 3,769 M-1 Abrams tanks; 2,855
Bradley Fighting Vehicles; 315 AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters; 720 Light Armored Amphibious Vehicles; and
11,057 Stinger missiles. We can provide 62 percent more
air sorties in Europe, sorties whose individual effective-
ness is improved because they are flown by newer aircraft
carrying more accurate weapons.
o The introduction of more modern, capable, and effective
weapons systems has in some cases been accompanied by a
period of lower apparent readiness, in terms of equipment
fill, during the period of transition when not all of the
ancillary support equipment has been delivered and there
are no suitable substitutes to offset the shortage. This
apparent reduction in readiness, however, is only
temporary and is more than offset by modernization
improvements that enhance overall capability.
o The Bottom Line: In the professional judgment of each
U.S. Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief, his command
is indeed far more ready "by every measure of common
sense" than it was four years ago.
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Talking Points:
o This Administration inherited several acute defense
problems which required immediate attention: There was no
comprehensive plan for strategic modernization; production
rates for many important procurement programs were grossly
inefficient; war reserves were extremely low; and there
was an ongoing "hemorrhage" of skilled manpower. The
commitment to address and resolve these problems appeared
to have been woefully inadequate.
o This Administration's primary objectives have thus been to
improve near-term training, readiness, and manpower
problems; integrate the modernization of strategic forces;
increase conventional force modernization; and make
inroads in the. longstanding deficiencies in combat
sustainability.
o overall, substantial progress has been made-in many
aspects of these problems in the past four years, and
gradual but steady improvement is projected in the future.
We have more and better people; they are better trained;
and our men and materiel are better supported.
o It has never been our--.-view -that all the problems-die
inherited could be solved within four years. But we have
shown that it is possible to set defense priorities and to
make balanced progress in improving overall military
capabilities.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN NATO
Issue:
How can the United States best advance the process of
modernizing NATO's weapons to provide an effective and
credible deterrent which supports NATO strategy while
preserving the Alliance's unified approach to
modernization?
Objectives
o Continue, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to
deploy long-range intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF) in
accord with the 1979 NATO Decision.
o maintain an effective and credible nuclear deterrent in
NATO which supports NATO strategy and objectives at the
lowest reasonable inventory level.
o Enhance the utility, survivability, and safety of nuclear
weapons in NATO.
Accomplishments
o The NATO nuclear weapons inventory has been reduced to its
lowest level in twenty years. Following a withdrawal of
1,000 warheads in 1980 as part of the 1979 Dual-Track
Decision, we reached further agreement in 1983 to withdraw
1,400 additional weapons.
o Alliance unity has been maintained through extensive
consultations throughout INF negotiations. We agree on
negotiating positions and on adherence to measured
deployment of 572 LRINF weapons in the absence of a
verifiable, equitable arms control agreement. Deployment
has proceeded on schedule in the U.K., the FRG, Belgium,
and Italy.
o Following Belgian Prime Minister Martens' visit here in
January 1985 and President Reagan's letter to the Prime
Minister in early March, the Belgian Government decided to
proceed immediately with the scheduled deployment of 16
cruise missiles on its soil.
o we continue to explore ways to reach the lowest inventory
level and weapons mix consistent with a credible and
effective nuclear deterrent.
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o we have obtained Allied recognition of and support for
improvements in conventional defense capabilities to
permit less reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.
U.S. defense improvements have led the way in reducing the
need for early resort to nuclear weapons.
o ?A limited but effective modernization program for shorter-
range systems has been developed, to provide needed capa-.
bilities at reduced inventory levels. Modernization also
enhances the accuracy, flexibility, and security of stock-
pile warheads.
Talking Points
o Over the last four years, progress in NATO nuclear weapons
modernization has been substantial. We have reduced the
overall weapons inventory to the lowest level in twenty
years, and in 1983 we reached agreement in the Alliance to
withdraw another 1,400 warheads, plus an additional
warhead for each.Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise
Missile deployed.
o We have maintained Alliance unity in pursuit of both
tracks of the 1979 Dual-Track Decision. We have
negotiated constructively and flexibly on INF, with full
Alliance accord on our position; we have adhered to a
limited and gradual deployment of Pershing II and Ground-
Launched Cruise Missiles in the absence of an equitable
and verifiable INF arms control agreement.
o We have pursued.a limited modernization program for other
short-range nuclear warheads, which will allow us and NATO
to maintain a credible, effective theater nuclear
deterrent at the lowest possible inventory level.
o We have led the.way in conventional defense improvements
in NATO, and thereis allied agreement on the wisdom of
improving conventional forces and reducing. reliance on
nuclear weapons if deterrence. fails.
o The.United States has undertaken a sustained, expanded,
and in some cases unprecedented, level of consultations
with its NATO Allies.
o The NATO Special Consultative Group(SCG), chaired by the
U.S., meets regularly and often to review and coordinate
our INF negotiating efforts.
o The NATO High-Level Group (HLG), also chaired by the U.S.,
also meets frequently to examine critical nuclear issues
facing the Alliance, providing the analysis on which NATO
decisions on these issues have been based.
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o The Ministerial-level Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), of
which the U.S. is a participant, meets semiannually to
discuss nuclear issues in the Alliance.
o The U.S. also has participated in a series of bilateral
High Level Defense Group meetings with various NATO
partners which have resulted in improved understanding of
defense matters.
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NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
How should the United States respond to pressures to
renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict?
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Objectives:
o Support NATO strategy of not being the first to use force
of.any kind.
o Protect our ability to deter attack by avoiding
categorical assurances that we will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons.
o Deflate the claim that a declaratory policy forswearing
the first-use of nuclear weapons is verifiable or
militarily meaningful or that it enhances rather than
undercuts stability and security.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the
principle, embodied in both the UN Charter and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter, that we will not be
the first to resort to force of any kind.
o In consultation with our NATO Allies, we also have
revalidated the strategy of flexible response as first and
foremost a deterrence strategy, not an aggressive
strategy.
o The U.S. has offered to discuss, in CDE, a reaffirmation
of the principle of non-use of force if the Soviets will
enter serious negotiations about taking concrete steps
toward substantive and verifiable confidence-building
measures which enhance security and lessen the possibility
of an outbreak of war. The Soviets have not yet done so.
Talking Points:
o America's policy on how to promote world peace has
consistently been more inclusive--and thus potentially
more productive -- than any one declaration on a specific
kind of weapon: we are pledged not to be the first to use
force "of any.kind. We are also seeking agreements on
major reductions in U.S..and Soviet nuclear arsenals, in
limiting conventional forces, and in banning chemical
weapons.
o Our policy on this issue has been developed in close
consultation with our Allies, especially the other NATO
members. We approach this issue in concert.
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o A declaration about non-first-use of nuclear weapons would
undermine the credibility of our deterrent strategy, which
is designed to prevent any aggression, nuclear or conven-
tional, against the Western democracies, especially in
view of the Warsaw Pact's preponderance in non-nuclear
forces.
o Over the last four years, we have devoted considerable
energy and resources to improving conventional defense
capabilities. This will allow us to reduce our reliance
on nuclear weapons and maintain a credible overall
deterrent -- but from a posture which enhances overall
security rather than placing it at risk.
o Signaling in advance to a potential aggressor who clearly
enjoys a substantial advantage in conventional and
chemical forces how we might -- or might not -- respond to
his aggression could encourage him to see how far he might
be able to go. This would undercut NATO's longstanding
deterrence strategy, thereby actually increasing the
chances of nuclear war.
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96
REVITALIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Issue:
Why is it necessary to expand and improve U.S, military
Special Operations Forces (SOF)?
Objectives:
o Rebuild and maintain SOF capable of conducting the full
range of assigned missions at all levels of conflict on a
worldwide basis.
o Provide the National Command Authority a flexible military
force for use in pursuit of strategic national objectives,
especially in situations in which the use of conventional
forces would be inappropriate or infeasible.
o Answer the challenge of Soviet-sponsored or encouraged .
destabilization in the Third World by maintaining the.
ability to help others build their nations and counter
low-level aggression.
o Ensure that the process of revitalization.is fully
completed by 1990.
Accomplishments:
o The Reagan Administration has made SOF revitalization one
of its highest defense priorities.
o management of the SOF revitalization effort has been
enhanced by the creation of the Joint Special Operations
Agency under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
o Command and control has been improved through the
establishment of the Army's 1st Special.Operations Command
and the Air Force's 23rd Air Force (MAC).
o SOF force structure is being expanded with the activation
of new Special Forces Groups, Ranger battalions, and SEAL
Teams. Existing understrength units are being filled.
o We are procuring new special operations aircraft and Naval
Special Warfare Craft and replacing outdated equipment
such as weapons and radios.
o We are undating and revising SOF doctrine and expanding
and improving specialized training.
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o we are working to ensure that those who serve in special
operations have opportunities for career advancement equal
to those of their peers in other branches of service.
Talking Points:
o The Reagan Administration inherited SOF debilitated by a
decade of neglect and deep cuts in funding and manpower.
o Our determination to revitalize these forces is based on
the recognition of the strategic role they can play at all
levels of conflict.
o In particular, we are concerned about the threat to our
security posed by low-intensity conflict. Since Cuba went
communist, 17 countries have fallen to this form of
aggression, and today one out of four countries in the
world is engaged in some form of hostilities. More
importantly, because the nuclear and conventional defenses
of the Free World have deterred direct Soviet aggression,
the Soviets have turned to destabilization as a more
subtle means to achieve their expansionist goals.
o SOF have a unique role to play in countering this threat.
Because of their specialized skills, they are ideally
suited to train others to act in their own defense and
build their nations so peace and freedom can prevail. In
so doing, they are reducing the likelihood of more
widespread aggression.
o Since 1975, SOF have been involved in more than 500 Mobile
Training Teams deployed to some 60 countries around the
world. Today they account for more than one-quarter of
such teams and are the most heavily committed of our
military forces.
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