LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN FROM G. A. KEYWORTH, II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000903020003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 17, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE WHITE HOUSE
December 17, 1985
Dear Mr. President,
Beginning with your second, foreign-policy debate
with Walter Mondale and, again, in many of your public
comments before the-Geneva talks, your repeated emphasis
on 'sharing' the fruits of the SDI with the Soviets has
prompted ae to explore the implications of that concept
with our White House Science Council, Bill Casey and a
number of defense experts. Before I conclude as your
science advisor, I want to offer you my thoughts on
this subject. I believe sharing the SDI represents an
opportunity to bring about the new stability you seek
and to banish the cobwebs of tortured logic that have
encumbered so ouch of the public debate on strategic
defense.
A trend of eroding stability began in the 1960s
with the-advent of the counter-force era -- the intro-
duction of missiles so accurate that the opponent's
hardened silos could be targetted with confidence. This
new precision, combined with large numbers of warheads
deliverable with KIR9'd missiles, ushered in the
'window of vulnerability' and the attendant perception
that a preemptive first-strike is possible. '
Modernisation of O.S. strategic forces was an
essential step toward steaming -- but not toward
repairing -- the eroding stability. Your SDI offers
today the only opportunity to repair the diminished
stability that counterforce weapons introduced. To
fully appreciate the role of the SDI in this picture,
one need only imagine a world where strategic defenses
are prohibited. one could only attempt to stem the
erosion, with no hope of repair. Without the SDI, the
situation would be analogous to entering a competition
with plans only to avoid losing, rather than planning
to win! -
Let we nog be scars specific about 'has SDI could be
shared. And pardon my.brief lapse into a technician's
perspective.
Imagine strategic defenses to be divided into two
types -- what I will call 'global' and *sovereign*.
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Global defenses are the main thrust of the SDI program,
the so-called boost-phase defenses that are designed to
destroy the missiles themselves, shortly after launch.
The tern, 'global' is chosen because all targets on the
globe would share in the protection, wherever they may
be -- whether Washington, Moscow, Peking or Baghdad.
In contrast, sovereign defenses are those more traditional
defenses -- terminal defenses -- that are designed to
protect silos or, perhaps, cities. The U.S.S.R. is
currently developing both types, whereas the principal
emphasis of the SDI is to explore opportunities for the
global, boost-phase defenses that could make ballistic
missiles effectively obsolete by making then simply
unreliable as delivery ysth: ?ssencss these
defenses that, to set capture
the SDI, as well as
original purpose for beginning
providing tools that could be shared to repair the
erosion- in the nuclear balance.
You have proposed to share the technology of SDI,
the components of SDI and, esteth~t youZ,goalseanebest
strategic defenses. I sugfl
be met by sharing the control of strategic defenses --
and by using the Summit iscussions with Kr. Gorbachev
And
to develop Joint management of global defenses.
this could a put ort as a logical extension of Paul
liitze's Strategic Concept as the Joint Strategic Concept.
the Concept would
The objective of the Joint Strategic
be to ensure that neither aid* plit me tools sa
to possess a first-strike capsb Y
joint management would not be the mechanismsefs~~s~ ~lsaborats.
but rather their control
Any global defense system presently envisioned
would comprise a number of elements, including those
for launch detection, aiming and tracking, battle
management and interception. But the cotroop mechanism
would require an enablement switch* pr is, ro
r
control of the chief executive you. s mat
would possess the authority to enable those defenses
if and when heightened tensions catitt ~a ~aableaent,
attack preparations should be iadieatsO raters, whose
control would be transferred to comp
instructions are codified as soteraine theaaset of and
pre-defined instructions that the
extent of a missile attack and how best to deploy
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to U.S.U.S.S.R. vthe S.iSr and pro)ouzect
defenses to negate `h: attack.
to jointly develop
global defenses to destroy any missiles that represented
an act of aggression, be they U.S., D.S.S.A. or third-
country in origin, would ensure that any act of nuclear
aggression would be deterred. Further, accompanying a
proposal for joint oversight or joint development of
the control software with a proposal to share the
enabling switch itself -- so that you Mr. Gorbachev
or other national leaders
vouldcould,
servet,toeplacedballistic
those shared defenses
missiles in a category with smallpox. Just as sharing
smallpox vaccine has msaefen.es~couldrrender ballistic
sharing global missile
missiles obsolete.
Such a proposal, radical as it may at first appear,
can be achieved simply by recognising that defenessre
not threatening. Fach side could continue to posses
and control its own defenses while achieving additional
benefit from participating in joint global defenses. That is, each side could onlylbenefit
from compliance. And compliance could
A number of test launches,
verified by random tests. permit any party to
simulating real attacks, would penable the global defensendto~n`~ii~ofttiareef emus ?
to verify the jointly developed
sharing defenses in this manner can be accomplished
i
safely, without risking our own security. And
fundajwntal difference
nature the
and the more the nature of
nature re of f defenses
our present dependence on offense for deterrence would
be starkly revealed.
I believe the lack of appreciation of the signifi-
canes of your proposal to 'share SDI arises ro'msphasis
emphasis upon not losing, rather than upon your
upon seeking stability. And it is further encumbered
by 'fussy' thinking about arms control, resulting from
decades of failed expects practically and from could to
Geneva
just bow easily and pract Y sharing lishould be
accomplished. Your own recent accomp inning in arms
have shown to many skeptics that a new beg s
oin armtiatiins
control is possible. You have refocused offal negotiations
onto the essental. ~e s~ssagebtha~I,z Ocrived was that
nuclear stability.
you are committed to restoring a stable fnlancs and to reducing the avsome role that nuc ear weapons play today
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in our view of the world -- not just in a relative-
number-of-sissiles game. In your future discussions
with Mr. Gorbachev, sharing SDI can, II itylievt,eanintain,
focus on that sole essential n
or even negate his expressed fears of an eventual U.S.
first-strike capability. And it can capture the support
of free people at both ends of the political spectrum
by clearing away the cobwebs that flexible response,
SALT I , the ABM Treaty and a generation of tailed
expectations for arms control have woven.
Mr. President, I believe your offer to share SDI
with the Soviets and further, with the world, would
both strike at and remedy the moral dilemma that the
nuclear age presents and that the counterforce era has
worsened. I also believe that the present emphasis upon
developing global, or boost-phase, defenses to destroy
whole missiles shortly after launch, rather than to
attempt to intercept warheads among thousands of decoys
during just seconds before they strike, offers us the
opportunity to manage jointly with the U.S. . the
inevitable obsolescence of the very ICBK's that have so;
eroded the stablity our citizens expect. !iou have an
opportunity to retain the arms control focus where it
belongs -- on stability -- and to step up to the line
and truly manage the nuclear dilemma.
With great respect,
0#r
G. A. Beyworth, II
The honorable Ronald Reagan
The president of the United States
Washington, D.L. 20500
P.S. It has been an honor and a pleasure to serve you,
and to be even a small part of what Dave Packard called
possibly the most important act of genuine leadership
in the twentieth century' -- the SDI. I only regret
that I was unable coPerh Ps Patti be energy
is safe and reliable.
more convincing.
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