ADDRESS OF THE CSIS INTERNATIONAL COUNCILLORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R001004120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
13 May 86
TO
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
{
FROM DCI/PAO
ROOM NO.
1016
BUILDING
Ames 1
~77-
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
1 FEB 56 24 1 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs Office
SUBJECT: Address of the CSIS International Councillors
PAO 86-0038
'13 May 1986
1. Action Requested: None. This is background information for your
address to the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
International Councillors, Friday, 16 May, 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. at the Dolley
Madison Ballroom in the Madison Hotel, 15th and M Streets, N.W.
Phone: [phone].
2. Arrangements: You are asked to arrive at 8:55 a.m. where you will be
met and escorted by the President of CSIS Amos "Jo" Jordan to the Dolley
Madison Ballroom. Your remarks are scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m.
Dr. Kissinger will introduce you. You are requested to share your assessment
of Soviet political developments with the CSIS International Councillors in an
informal off-the-record meeting. The proposed format is 20 - 30 minutes of
remarks followed by brief comments from the Executive Director of the Research
Institute of America, Leo Cherne, and President and CEO of the American
International Group, Maurice Greenberg. A general discussion with the
Councillors will conclude the hour. You will be seated at one end of a
hollowed group of tables with Dr. Kissinger. Approximately 30 Councillors
will be seated on the other sides of the table. Microphones will be placed
around the table and one in front of you and a neck mike will be available.
"East-West Relations: Are We At A Turning Point?" is the theme of the two day
program. The substance of the meeting will not be published in any of the
Center's publications. Your remarks will be taped by the organization for our
historical records.
Audience: You may expect approximately 30 senior business leaders from
around the world who meet twice a year to discuss the strategic implications
of economic developments. The media will not be represented. Since foreign
nationals will be present, we have requested that photographs not be taken.
Attendees are from the following countries: Switzerland, Morocco, Argentina,
Israel, Korea, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, Venezuela, and the U.S. (See opposite
list of attendees and biographies.)
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SUBJECT: Address of the CSIS International Councillors
Background: The CSIS is a separately incorporated nonprofit institution
affiliated with Georgetown University. The Center is supported by private
foundations, corporations, corporate foundations, and individuals. The
organization studies international policy issues through interdisciplinary
study of emerging world problems. The biannual meetings are sponsored by the
Center and chaired by Dr. Kissinger. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead
will have spoken to the Councillors the night before. Senator Carl Levin
(D MI), Senator John W. Warner (R VA), and Undersecretary of Defense
Fred Ikle, will address the group in the afternoon following your meeting.
(See complete agenda opposite.)
George V. Lauder
PAO/GV
13 MAY 86
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - ER 86-0252X
1 - PAO 86-0038
1-
1 - PAO Chron
1 - PAO Ames
1 - MED (Subject)
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DCI
15 May 86,
1900
I am pleased to be with this distinguished group today.
Understanding the Soviet Union has never been more important. The new,
more energetic and sophisticated Gorbachev regime continues-to challenge
US interests around the world and is engaged in an elabohate propaganda
1
and public relations campaign to manipulate world opinion.
The veil of secrecy which covers the Soviet Union has gotten only
slightly more transparent over the last 30 years,,i the
persistent of ty,~~tudying the threat
posed1jy the Soviet Union is still our greatest task -- one to which
devotes enormous effort. ~? U,,
L S , Q,t
Intelligence's first task is to prevent any surprise attack by our
enemies anywhere in the world. This charge means we follow carefully the
military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, including the
likely characteristics of weapons that may not be deployed for 10 or 15
years.
Thanks to our extraordinary technical collection resources and many
talented analysts, we do have an excellent understanding of Soviet
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weapons systems such as missiles, tanks, and strategic bombers. We can
locate, count them, and understand their capabilities. We have a good
idea of the direction the Soviets want to go in the future development
of their armed forces and how they assess Western defense capabilities.
-- We know that the Soviets are modernizing their strategic
arsenal with new and improved systems such as the SS-5 road
mobile ICBM, the rail mobile SS-4, the Blackjack bomber, the
Typhoon submarine and cruise missiles.
-- We also know a lot about Moscow's ongoing ABM development and
deployment program-and its ambitious plans for civil defense,
leadership protection and relocating in time of war. For their
top leaders, scientific and technical elite alone, the Soviets
have more than 1,500 hardened relocation and communications
centers. Reserves of vital materials are maintained in underground
structures as well as redundant industrial facilities.
-- We know that the Soviets have had their own SDI program for
almost 20 years and that this program involves some 10 R&D
facilities and more than 10,000 engineers and scientists, as
well as enormous sums of money. They have a program involving
the use of lasers that could be used immediately in an
anti-satellite weapon system. Another program involves
particle-beam weapons and they are exploring hyper-velocity
kinetic energy and radio-frequency weapons.
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-- We know that the Soviets have a well-developed capability to
engage in chemical and biological weapons. They employ the
largest group of chemical specialists and genetic engineers in
the world and have built the most extensive plants, training
sites, and test facilities. They store chemical weapons in
Eastern Europe, and continue to develop new, more hideous
chemical and biological and genetic agents. They have two
major research centers where thousands of technical people
research new biotechnical agents and develop these half a dozen
plants capable of producing them. They have, moreover, used
such chemical and toxic weapons -- by their own forces in
Afghanistan and by their client forces in Laos and Cambodia.
We know that the Soviets have spared no efforts to create a
large arsenal of conventional weapons the majority of which
are opposite NATO. Their conventional arsenal includes 50,000
tanks, some 7,000 offensive tactical helicopters and aircraft,
nearly 400 submarines, aircraft carriers, thousands of
artillery pieces and rocket launchers, and more than 200
motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions.
We know, finally, that for almost every strategic and
conventional weapons currently deployed, there is one or two
new versions under development. The dimensions of their defense
industrial base is staggering--hundreds of facilities and the
best of their scientific talent are devoted to developing
and producing new weapons. They have expanded and modernized
nearly all their key facilities in the past 10 years.
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Despite deep and serious economic problems, the Soviets are
increasing the share of GNP devoted to defense. Their willingness and
ability to ask more and more sacrifices from their peo le in the name of
protecting the "Motherland" is a concept Amei+cans kind hard to grasp.
Yet it is occurring. We estimate a growth rate of some 5 to 7 percent a
year for strategic programs and a 3 percent annual growth rate for
conventional programs. In the past 5 years, they have outspent the U.S.
by some $165 billion dollars.
We also see no evidence that Moscow i presently willing to share in strategically
significant constraints -amr-~rol Instead, they view arms control
as an important factor in advancing their strategy of achieving strategic
advantage. They will negotiate restraints on force improvements and
deployments -- when it serves their advantage.
At present, the Soviets are trying to use arms control discussions
as a means of delaying or undercutting the US SDI program. SDI is
probably the most serious challenge to Soviet military strategy as well
as deployment and production patterns ever. In the Soviet view, it could
force them into a very costly, open-ended technology race -- one they
feel ill-equipped to handle. Thus, Gorbachev wants to slacken Western
resolve and defense efforts by airing one after another grandiose arms
control proposal without explaining how to implement any of these plans.
Lower-level Soviet negotiators, in turn, refuse to even discuss such
plans in practical terms.
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The Chernobyl' (cher-NO-bil) nuclear power plant disaster was a
shocking lesson to those who hoped or believed that Gorbachev would bring
about a fundamental change in Soviet domestic or international behavior.
Instead the unfortunate, and still ongoing, crisis is a vivid reminder of
the continuity rather than evolution in the regime's attitudes and
reactions -- no matter how smoothly Gorbachev handles himself in public.
Gorbachev, despite his new looks, is the product of the Soviet
system -- he is an experienced and successful party man. His political
skills have served him well within an ideological system which, from all
accounts, he truly believes in. His handling of the Chernobyl crisis
is a vivid reminder that we have to deal with the Soviet Union as it is
-- not on the basis of our hopes or the images carefully crafted by
Soviet propaganda.
Gorbachev does, however, genuinely want to reform certain aspects of
Soviet society. He wants to provide more effective leadership from
Moscow, bring a new sense of optimism to the Soviet people, boost
economic growth and stimulate technological progress. He has and will
continue to take measures to achieve these goals but only those which
preserve the essential features of the Soviet power structure -- at home
and abroad -- as well as the perogatives of the ruling class.
He is promoting better managers, penalizing flagrant corruption,
cracking down on drinking, and talking alot about striving harder. There
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is a renewed emphasis on exports for hard currency and stealing the
West's best technology. These measures probably will boost economic
performance somewhat; but the effects are not likely to be sustainable
over the longer-term without more fundamental reform. They fail to
address to roots of Soviet economic problems -- technological
backwardness, lack of incentives, burdensome secretiveness, and so
forth. Moreover, the recent sharp declines in oil prices will hurt the
Soviets total export earnings.
simultaneously undermining the power of the party, the material
privileges of the political elite, and, ultimately, Communist ideology.
,J ~~ ~ ~L~ -(,L C4~
~..~ Gorbachev is faced, the 4Ure, with incompatible objectives. The 4A--t-
Soviets cannot undertake true, effective, economic reforms without ".V-4
We have no evidence, however, that those at the pinnacle of the Soviet
power pyramid have yet really understood or faced up to this
incompatibility. Even Gorbachev's regime -- which seemed to hint of true
change at the beginning -- is likely to only tinker with the system.
We should be careful not to underestimate, however, the impact
changes in style can have in certain Western circles. Gorbachev will be
the most determined, energetic, and sophisticated Soviet leader that the
US and the West has yet encountered. Thus, the US will be faced with a
military superpower, under enormous economic pressure, bent on
maintaining -- and where possible expanding -- its power abroad. The
combination of superpower military capabilities and domestic stresses
could be a very dangerous combination indeed.
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The scope of Soviet efforts to project their power an influence abroad
is truly global. We are reasonably well informed about Soviet naval activities
worldwide, as well as their military operations in areas such as Afghanistan.
We are familiar with their force deployments along the Chinese border.
We know in some detail the nature of their relationships with surrogate
and client states such as Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cuba. We know,
for example, that at a time of economic stringency at home, the Soviet
commitment to these countries is such that just last winter, the Soviets
extended another billion dollars worth of economic assistance to Vietnam,
$600 million in new credits to Nicaragua, and in the last two years has
provided nearly $2 billion worth of arms to the Angolan regime. While we are
by no means aware of every covert Soviet program, we know a good deal about
Soviet disinformation efforts worldwide, and their efforts to subvert and control
various international organizations. We track their sale and shipment of
weapons and military supplies all over the world.
A hallmark of the Gorbachev regime is intensified efforts to nail down
these beachheads.
We see the Soviets working, using Cubans in direct front-line roles, to
bring in more sophisticated in order to. knock out the counter resistance
there and to consolidate the Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua. If
successful, they will have helped build the first Communist base on the
American continental mainland. As history has demonstrated such bases are
used for further expansion.
In Africa, the preservation and expansion of the Marxist regime in
Ethiopia has taken precedence over even the feeding of starving people.
In Angola the Soviets have brought in $1.5 billion in military and economic
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aid to the Angolan regime and more actively committed Cuban and Russian
troops and advisers to knock out Savimbi. They are also shoring up and trying
to reestablish their hold on Mozambique.
the Soviets see as an essential element in Soviet long-term strategic
goals:
-- Soviet maneuvering in South Yemen helped to bring about the
recent bloody coup. Moscow sat by cynically until it appeared
the pro-Soviet rebels were gaining the upper hand. Then it
intervened with weapons and political support.
-- The invasion in Afghanistan drags on despite some 30,000 Soviet
casualties. Soviet forces in Afghanistan now stand at 115,000 men.
During the past two years, the Soviets have focused on improving
their airpower and firepower, and have made increasing use of
small commando-type units, including at least 7 battalions of
special forces or "Spetsnaz" to attack insurgents supply lines
and base camps. At times, the Soviets talk as though they are
interested in a negotiated political settlement but, in reality, we
have witnessed an intensification of Soviet military efforts as well
as stepped up pressure on Pakistan and across the border, harsher
internal police measures, and political minipulation of the Kabul
regime. ~.j
In short, we do not see any significant retrenchment of Soviet interest
and involvement in the Third World under Gorbachev. Once again, the hallmark
of their policy is continuity not revision. Soviet Third
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World activities are a vital part of their status as a global superpower
and near the very center of the Kremlin's leaders cherished view of
themselves.
Admittedly this is a grim assessmen' of the current Soviet regime. But there is good news for the Free World. The Soviet Union can be
effectively resisted by: determined diplomacy, sustained defense
programs, and by support to those who are actually fighting Soviet forces
or Soviet proxies. Sustained Free World resolve in these areas might,
over time, force the regime to reassess its strategy and priorities --
perhaps perhaps facing, for the first time, the incompatible objectives I
mentioned before. Out of such a reassessment might come a true emphasis
/
on domestic welfare and a deemphasis on military aggrandizement. ~~h--~-~,
n 6!
Moreover, the West has many things to offer the World that the S
iet
d
ov
s
o
not--technology, scientific know how, an example of a viable and free
press, and proven democratic political systems. We can, therefore,
compete very effectively with the Soviets in the developing world.
Finally, let me just note that although the Soviet Union is still
our key intelligence priority, the US Intelligence Community is looking
at a far greater range of issues -- many that cross national boundaries
-- than ever before. Such issues include: international terrorism,
narcotics, world debt, population problems, explosive urbanization, and
technology transfer. We have significantly expanded our intelligence
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efforts to monitor and anticipate instability and unrest in countries of
key importance to the US. We are keeping our national leaders well
informed about a wide range of economic developments and the interplay of
economic problems with political unrest.
Our profession looks a lot different than it did just 10 years ago.
We have new collection techniques, more highly trained analysts, and a
whole array of new technologies. We have also been engage in a broad
based effort to draw upon the expertise in the private sector and
academia -- talent such as evident at this meeting today. And we are
getting results. For instance, we have been able to prevent hundreds of
terrorist attacks and illegal technology deals in the last few years.
Nevertheless, the world moves on without regard for past
achievements or budget stringencies. We are still worried about our
ability to keep pace with new Soviet weapons programs especially as the
Soviets use more and more measures to deny us critical information. We
are in better shape than ever before but we are sobered by the growing
challenges.
I
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