ANALYSTS CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01332R001301470012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 31, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: (Optional)
Ana2yzt6 Con6exencea on A6ghan. titan
FROM:
DiAec for o airing an ca.t on
1026 Co6C
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1. DDA ` r --l
7D24 HQS
C\o oeN 18 No'1198$,
3.
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4.
25X1 1.FORm 79 610 oln
1.79
10
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
,P\
17 November 1986
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
8W -
This " worth a Jew minutes
to pehu a e. Ad an exampee o6
OTE hetpi.ng the production
proce6b (aee paragraph 8,
eapec&Uy) and becau?e o
Lnhen i t d n ten.e4 t in
Beaten than reading mobs Long
memos.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
William F. Donnelly
Deputy Director for Administration
TO: (OWcer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment )
The attached Memorandum for
the Record describes a jointly
sponsore. conference involving
OTE and the DI. I think it is a
good example of how OTE can
contribute to imcrovina the work
F1.O
9M 610 USED REVIOUS
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31 October 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Analysts Conference on Afghanistan
1. On 16 and 18 September, the Afghanistan Branch of the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis in conjunction with the Office of
Training and Education sponsored an analyst conference to reexamine the
intelligence problem we face in measuring the Afghan war. The conference's
main objective was to slow the thinking process down, reexamine our
assumptions, and see if by systematically taking apart the problem, we
could come up with new insights on how to measure progress or change in the
war. OTE, did a tremendous job in instructing us and
facilitating our discussions. In addition to representatives from all DDI
offices that fnllnw Afghanict.an__NESA_ SnVA. 1.nA_ nr.T__and NPTC_
a methodologist from DDS&T Office of Research and Methodology,
participated in the conference.
2. The afternoon of the 16th was largely devoted to examining our
assumptions about the war in Afghanistan and defining the question we would
be working on at the Airlee House. After much discussion, the analysts
decided to frame the intelligence problem as follows: How do we measure who
is winning the war in Afghanistan? During subsequent sessions on Thursday,
analysts split into three teams to examine the war from the perspective of
the major players: the Soviets, the Kabul regime, and the insurgents. We
were asked first to draw up a list of each player's goals in the war and to
rank these hierarchically. Next we drew up a list of indicators that would
show whether or not each player was meeting its goals. Finally, we devised
an "objective" list of indicators of progress in the war by ranking the
most important factors to all three players.
3. Each group ranked its goals as follows, in declining order of
importance:
Afghan Regime Goals:
--Defeat or contain the Insurgency.
--Build strong military and political institutions.
--Obtain more international recognition (diplomatic, aid and trade)
--Build a socialist state (modernize)
--Gain popular support.
--End outside support for the insurgents.
--Keeping Soviet support and managing it well.
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Soviet Goals in Afghanistan:
--Not losing face; keeping up its image-in Third World.
--Maintain,a buffer (border security, contain Islam, keep US out)
--Improving/Retaining Influence in the Middle East and South Asia.
--Gain military experience for its armed forces.
--Legitimize the jar to the Soviet population.
--Military victory
--Have the Afghans take over the war.
Afghan Insurgent Goals:
--Get the Soviets out (or bleed them if they stay put).
--Smash the Kabul regime (PDPA, Army, KHAD)
--Establish territorial control.
--Gain international recognition.
--Improve unity.
4. The group that evaluated insurgent goals also outlined Pakistani
and US goals (during this session only) to identify similarities and
differences with the insurgents' goals.
Pakistani Goals:
--Get the Soviets out.
--Get the refugees to return to Afghanistan.
--Establish a "friendly" government in Kabul.
--Keep the resistance fragmented.
--Keep US support.
--If the Soviets cannot be driven out, the Pakistanis would be
somewhat more willing to handle the refugee problem by negotiating a
coalition government.
US Goals:
--Get the Soviets out.
--Establish a non-aligned, if not pro-West, government.
--Bleed the Soviets.
--Keep the Pakistanis involved in supporting the war. --If the
Soviets cannot be driven out, the US would want to increase the
pressure on Moscow and gain influence in any coalition government
that is formed.
5. Each group next devised a list of indicators that would show how
well each side was meeting its goals. These were as follows:
Indicators of Afghan Regime Success:
SECRET
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--More local participation in government (PDPA, NFF, etc.)
--Increased military or political control of territory
--Firmer statements of, and follow through on, Soviet support
(economip, political, military).
--More effective national reconciliation, as measured by defections of
tribal, refugee, or resistance leaders. _
--A move toward Communism with an Islamic facade.
--More independent, successful Afghan army operations.
--Better socioeconomic conditions.
--increased acceptance of the regime in international fora.
--Decline in army desertions.
--Decline in external support for the resistance.
--A drastic change in insurgency tactics--such as a move into
terrorism--that would indicate a last ditch effort by the resistance
Indicators of Soviet Success:
--Wider international recognition of the Kabul regime; broader
international support for the Soviet position.
--Decline of support for Afghan resolutions at the NAM, UNGA, OIC.
--Less criticism of Soviets in international fora.
--Improved relations with US, Iran, PRC, Pakistan.
--Increased success of Soviet foreign policy: arms talks, Asian
security proposal, if Soviets became a major player in mideast
issues.
--Decrease in anti-Soviet propaganda.
In winning the war:
--Improvements in DRA Army performance.
--Decline in support for the insurgents.
--Decline in insurgent supplies.
--Decline in Soviet combat losses.
--Better urban security.
--More defections to the regime (as an indicater of more popular
support for the regime)
--Decline in influence of Islam.
--Decline in insurgent unity.
--Decline in insurgent fighting.
--Return of the Afghan refugees from Pakistan &/or Iran.
In Domestic Support for War:
--Less draft dodging.
--Less appeal for Islam.,
--More economic resources.
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--Less casualties.
--Less need for non-military aid.
Indicaters of Ipsurgent Success:
--Improved military capability, as shown by casualties on DRA/Soviet
side, DRA/Soviet aircraft losses, mujahidin territorial gains,
better intelligence
--More popular support.
--Availability of supplies and ability to mobilize them (both n food
and weapons)
--More international recognition (at UN, OIC, etc.)
--Better cooperation and leadership.
--Economic performance of DRA. i.e. their inability to deliver goods
and services.
6. Analysts next developed a "grand model" of progress in the war by
selecting the ten most important, "objective" indicators of who was winning
the war. Each analyst submitted his/her list and the votes were tallied.
The following indicators were selected:
--Increased Afghan regime combat effectiveness.
--Decreased Soviet combat losses (casualties, equipment)
--Better Afghan military and political control of territory.
--Better international recognition for the DRA.
--Better Mujahidin military capability (hold territory, inflict
losses)
--Better Mujahidin cooperation and leadership.
--Availability of supplies to resistance and its ability to move them.
--Better international support for the Mujahidin.
--More credible defectors to the regime (refugee, resistance, tribal).
--Regime ability to move along socialist oast in an "Islamic" mode (as
a measure of popular support).
7. The analysts then tried to determine what, if anything, has changed
in each of these indicators in the last six months to a year.
--Although analysts noted that there were less people in the rural
areas than there used to be, all agreed that the regime's position
had on balance declined. Kabul media admitted its own failures in
achieving national reconciliation and the replacement of Babrak
Karmal had increased party factionalism. The insurgents had also
suffered some, although less significant, declines in support as
shown by their need to carry food to civilians in-country, tensions
in the NWFP, and some signs of w,:ir weariness among the civilian
population.
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--Analysts agreed there was no improvement in DRA combat capability.
Analysts noted some better equipment for the DRA army, but no major
battlefield successes; even the temporary takeover of the resistance
base camp at Zhawar Kili was bought at great cost.
--There was a difference of views as to whether insurgent combat
capability was slightly better or slightly worse. OIA argued that
there was a slight decrease in capability--as measured by Commander
Masood's departure from the Panjsher--but that it was perhaps not a
significant one. Other analysts felt that there was a slight
improvement in the insurgent position, as noted by more and better
equipment and training, a more effective choice of dramatic targets,
and a strong insurgent performance in Qandahar and Herat. All
agreed that it is getting more costly to keep supply routes open.
--Analysts agreed that the DRA has gained nothing in the international
sphere.
--Insurgent unity was judged to be a mixed bag. Analysts noted that
the alliance has survived--something which we perhaps would not have
judged with confidence a year ago--and had appeared at the UNGA and
the 0IC. Tactical cooperation is improving in-country, but alliance
political infighting continues unabated. Analysts judged that
perhaps there was a slight net gain for the insurgents.
--International support for the insurgents. Some gains were noted,
particularly the fact that Pakistani support remains stable and that
the resistance alliance had a presence at the UNGA and the OIC. The
Rabbani-led delegation to US, Saudi Arabia and France--although
fractious from the point of view of alliance politics--was received
at high level abroad and irked Moscow.
--Analysts judged that territorial control had not changed much and
was not really important to the insurgents at this stage of the
conflict. Denial of regime control was significant.
--Soviet military successes. Analysts judged that Moscow was probably
satisfied with certain aspects of its strategy, particularly its
ability to interdict insurgent supply lines. But regime leadership
weaknesses and the poor performance of the Afghan army were
significant liabilities for the Soviets.
8. In conclusion, the most interesting insights from the conference
derived from the initial delineation of goals--a simple exercise that fed a
series of later insights and judgments. Most analysts were surprised to
s the sharp divergence between Afghan regime and Soviet goals--a theme
which came up again and again during the conference. The divergence of
S'Fr. TI I
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these objectives suggests that there is room for the US to exploit the
inherent tensions in the relationship between Moscow and Kabul. It also
exposes Moscow's most important dilemma in Afghanistan--its INABILITY TO
DISENGAGE EVEN IF IT WANTED TO because of the weaknesses of its client.
Analysts agreed that the most effective way of RAISING THE COSTS FOR MOSCOW
involved HITTING REGIME TARGETS FIRST, then Soviet targets, and denying the
Soviets a legitimate client state. In this regard, Moscow viewed the
costs insurgent alliance diplomatic activities as disproportionately
greater than we might objectively assess them. On balance, analysts did
not believe that there were significant "turning points" in the war during
the last year or so--the conflict remains an increasingly bloody and
difficult stalemate, with no single side gaining a decisive edge.
Afghanistan ranch
Office of Near Eastern & South Asian Analysis
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