MEMORANDUM TO PAUL B. HENRY FROM JOHN L. HELGERSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88M00338R000100030017-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Honorable Paul B. Henry
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
This is a package of unclassified material
on Nicaragua. I think it covers most of the
subjects we discussed last week. Hope it is
helpful to you. Let me know if there is
anything more we can do.
Regards,
eigerson
iate Deputy Director
or Intelligence
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Export-of the Revolution
The Intelligence Community believes)
hat a key facet of Sandinista foreign policy
as been t e continuing export of revolution to other Latin
American countries. Nicaraguan activities include the provision
of weapons, supplies, military and political training, funds,
communications support, and satehaven. The Salvadoran rebels
have been the principal beneficiaries, but available evidence
shows that materiel and political support also has been extended
to other Central and South American radicals.
-- The FSLN committed itself to the eventual spread of
revolution throughout Latin America at a secret meeting
of party cadres in September 1979.
the policy of providing support
to lettist revolutionaries was set at the highest
levels and involves all military, intelligence, and
police organizations, including the Defense and
Interior Ministries--headed by key Sandinista leaders
Humberto Ortega and Tomas Borge.
-- Workshops reportedly were set up in Managua as early as
1979 for constructing vehicle concealment compartments
for the transfer of materiel to Salvadoran insurgents
and that guerrilla training sites were established. In
1981, Honduran authorities seized a large truck-trailer
loaded with weaponry from US stocks in Vietnam. The
truck was enroute from Nicaragua to El Salvador.
Although the volume of Managua"s material assistance to the
Salvadoran guerrillas has decreased from the high levels
delivered in late 1980, 1981, and early 1982, when the insurgents
were preparing large-scale offensives, compelling evidence has
persuaded the Intelligence Community that Nicaraguan assistance
is continuing:
-- A late-model car that crashed in Honduras in December
had five concealment compartments containing 6,700
rounds of ammunition, 86 electric blasting caps, 21
grenades, 12 tactical and command radios, and 39
communications enciphering pads, along with a manifest
listing the call signs of insurgent command posts in
Nicaragua and El Salvador.
-- The driver, who admitted he traveled over the same
route from Costa Rica through Nicaragua and Honduras to
El Salvador once before, said he had turned the vehicle
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over to a contact in Managua for a few hours, evidently
for the concealment of the supplies.
-- Last April
mi nary supplies
continue to be brought into El Salvador along its
southeastern coast via sea routes from Nicaragua.
following the US
intervention in Grenada in late 1983, the level of
supplies decreased to 30 percent of the volume received
in previous years, reflecting in part the Sandinistas'
desire to be more circumspect. The supplies from
Nicaragua nonetheless accounted for 70 percent of the
guerrillas' ammunition.
-- About two-thirds of the M-16 rifles identified in the
possession of the Salvadoran insurgents can be traced
to those consigned for use in Vietnam, according to
traces of the serial numbers of about 1,800 weapons.
Reporting substantiates our belief
that Nicaragua continues to provide a range of other assistance
to the Salvadorans.
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last summer that all STAT
eve Salvadoran guerrilla factions have houses and
office space in Managua, and are aided by Nicaraguan
security personnel.
-- Rebel communications facilities operate out of
Nicaragua, as demonstrated by the evidence found in the
car crash.
-- Reporting troml (captured Salvadoran
insurgents attests to Managua's sustained role in
providing military and political training.
Elsewhere in Central America, the Sandinistas remain
committed to aiding insurgents and other radicals. The
Intelligence Community believes these efforts are designed to
keep Nicaragua's neighbors oft-balance and to intimidate them
into abandoning support for US policies.
-- Managua has aided the infiltration of Cuban- and
Nicaraguan-trained Honduran subversives. into Honduras
three times in the last three years--most recently in
September 1985--in an attempt to set up an insurgent
network.
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Costa Rican
Communists-- part-of the Costa Rican Mora-Canas brigade
that was established in Nicaragua-- are undergoing
training in Nicaragua. The brigade has operated in the
past against insurgent forces in the south.
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are continuing to provide covert support for Guatemalan
insurgent groups as well.
-- Weapons captured from the insurgents in Guatemala can
also be traced to stocks the US sent to Vietnam.
Managua also has maintained contact with and in certain
cases actively supported South American radicals.
-- In the aftermath of the M-19 seizure of the Palace of
Justice in Bogota last November, Colombian authorities
recovered six rifles that can be traced to Nicaragua--
tour from stocks of the former Somoza regime and two
from supplies sent to the Sandinistas by Venezuela in
1979. One M-16--and possibly two others--could be
traced to stocks the US had previously sent to Vietnam.
-- During the past year, numerous Chilean tar leftists
trained in Nicaragua returned to Chile, and a leader of
a Chilean leftist group was a featured speaker at a
recent Latin American political parties congress in
Managua.
Latin American guerrillas receive military training by
fighting as members of Nicaraguan Army units against
anti-Sandinista rebels.
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Nicaraguan Military Buildup
The Intelligence Community has closely monitored the
Nicaraguan buildup, which was launched immediately after the
Sandinista takeover. With the aid of Cuba and the Soviet Bloc,
the Sandinistas have transformed their guerrilla band of some
5,000 into the largest and best-equipped conventional force in
Central America, fundamentally altering the military balance in
the region.
-- The armed forces now number some 65,000 regulars and
45,000 reserves.
-- Nicaragua has more armored vehicles, artillery, and air
defense weapons than all other Central American
countries combined. These include a force of about 150
tanks--including Soviet-built T-54s and T- 55s--and 200
other armored vehicles. No other nation in the region,
including Mexico, has comparable tanks or similar
numbers of armored personnel carriers.
-- Since 1980, Cuban construction crews have helped
Nicaragua build some 40 new military bases at a cost we
estimate at more than $300 million.
The influx of new weaponry began in early 1981, long before
any significant guerrilla activity or US involvement with the
insurgents. Two prominent members of the opposition--Arturo Cruz
and Eden Pastora--were still part of the Nicaraguan Government at
that time, and the United States was still providing economic
assistance.
-- Cuba, which had provided arms and training to the
Sandinistas prior to Somoza's overthrow, signed a
secret military agreement with the new regime in 1979
and contributed air defense artillery that same year.
-- Algeria, apparently acting as intermediary for the
USSR, delivered the first battalion of tanks--as well
as armored personnel carriers, artillery, and SA-7
surface-to-air missiles--between April and June of
1981.
-- Libya provided surtace-to-air-missles, rocket
launchers, helicopters, and three light attack aircraft
in 1982. A shipment containing an L-39 jet fighter and
other equipment was turned back when discovered en
route by Brazilian authorities in April 1983.
-- With Soviet encouragement, Bulgaria was the principal
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supplier between 1982 and late 1984, and Moscow
initiated direct-shipments in November 1984, when it
delivered MI-25 helicopter gunships.
-- In 1985,?"deliveries shifted away from new weapons--in
part because the Sandinistas were having difficulty
absorbing what they already had--to thousands of
trucks, spare parts, and other military-associated
equipment.
-- As was the case with Cuba and Grenada, much of this
military hardware was provided by the Soviets tree of
charge, either as military aid grants or on long-term
credit with little prospect of repayment.
-- Nonetheless, military expenses associated with the
buildup and the war consumed 50 percent of the
Nicaraguan Government's budget in 1985 and may exceed
60 percent this year.
The Intelligence Community believes that only pressure from
the United States has prevented the Sandinistas from receiving
MiG fighters or other high performance jet combat aircraft.
-- The new military airfield at Punta Huete, designed and
built by Cuba, has a 3,000-meter runway--capable of
accommodating any aircraft in the Soviet inventory--and
16 tighter-sized revetments. Although construction of
support facilities and some revetments is incomplete,
the airfield is already operational.
Nicaraguans had been sent to the
USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Libya to train as
pilots, aircraft maintenance crewmen, and air defense
gunners.
-- Senior Sandinista officials have publicly asserted
their intention to acquire tighter aircraft, and one
comandante said last year that Nicaragua would soon
import new air defense missiles of a type never before
seen in Central America.
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Cuban and Soviet Bloc Military and Economic Support
Military
Cuba has been'the dominant external influence on the
development of the Sandinista military, increasingly assisted .by
equipment deliveries from the USSR and Eastern Europe.
-- Cuba has sent some 3,000 military and security advisers
to Nicaragua, and some have taken part in combat
operations, including piloting attack helicopters.
They are commanded by a Cuban general with combat
experience in Africa.
-- Cuba also has repaired and refurbished Nicaraguan
aircraft, helicopters, and patrol boats, as well as
provided construction crews for military projects such
as Punta Huete airfield and the Matagalpa-Puerto
Cabezas road.
The Soviets and East Europeans have concentrated on
equipment deliveries while keeping their official presence at a
low level.
-- The Intelligence Community estimates the value of
Soviet Bloc military deliveries during 1981-85 at some
$600 million. The tonnage of military cargoes sent to
Nicaragua rose more than 50 percent during 1985,
although the value was down because of the near total
absence of major weapons systems delivered--unlike
1984, when MI-25 helicopter gunships arrived.
Economic
After coming to power in 1979, the Sandinistas began
fundamentally to shift Nicaragua's economic relations away from
the West and toward the Soviet Bloc.,
Within a year of the Sandinista victory, Managua announced a
number of economic, cultural, and technical agreements with the
USSR, setting the framework for widening trade and broad
financial assistance.
--
Trade data available to the Intelligence Community show
non-military transactions with the Bloc began to
immediately after Somoza's fall and by 1984 had
to over a quarter billion dollars, or one fourth
Nicaragua's trade.
rise
climbed
of
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In 1985, Bloc countries supplanted Nicaragua's Latin
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neighbors as Managua's key trading partners.
-- We estimate Soviet commitments tor economic support
through 1985 at more than $600 million, with most in
the form- of long-term credits.
The increased aid last year reflected higher oil deliveries
and generous help with imports and hard-currency requirements.
-- Moscow has covered virtually all of Nicaragua's oil
needs since Mexico halted shipments last summer.
-- A bilateral economic cooperation meeting in Managua
last December resulted in new Soviet commitments to
provide $90 million to develop about 90,000 acres near
Managua for cotton and grain.
Economic assistance from Cuba and Eastern Europe also has
been generous.
-- Havana has provided more than $300 million in economic
aid since the revolution, mostly on a grant basis.
-- Eastern Europe has provided another $400 million--about
half from East Germany and most of the rest from
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
-- Following a CEMA meeting in Managua last October, Cuba
and the East European countries announced they were
involved in 44 economic development projects and
pledged substantial increases in aid.
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Cuban, Soviet Bloc, and Radical Regime Presence In Nicaragua
It is the Intelligence Community's assessment that about
7,000 to 8,000 Cuban, Soviet Bloc, and radical regime military
and civilian advisers have been in Nicaragua during the past two
years. Their mission has been to assist the Sandinista military
and government and. engage in a wide variety of military,
agricultural, and industrial projects.
The Cuban contingent is by tar the largest. In addition to
some 3,000 military advisers, there are nearly 4,000 civilians
present as well.
The estimated 300 to 400 Soviet military and civilian
advisers maintain a low profile. They generally are assigned to
high-level positions with the government and military.
The East Europeans number some 200 to 250.
-- East Germans and Bulgarians are most numerous and are
assigned mainly to the security and intelligence
services and some key construction projects such as the
new port expansion at El Bluft on the Caribbean coast.
In addition, small numbers of North Koreans, Libyans,
Iranians, and Palestinians are providing similar assistance.
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The Consolidation of Sandinista Rule
Since coming to power in Nicaragua in July 1979, the
Sandinistas--even as they have proclaimed their commitment to
political pluralism, a mixed economy, and nonalignment--have
followed a gradualist strategy for the establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist state closely patterned on the Cuban model.
-- The incremental pace is intended to limit domestic
backlash, avoid a harsh US response, and retain Western
political and economic support.
-- Most of the elements of the regime's plan to build a
Communist state were, with Soviet Bloc assistance, in
place within the first two years, but the Sandinistas
have used the insurgency to justify increasing internal
repression.
The Sandinistas first declared a state of emergency in 1982,
providing the legal framework for repressing dissent. Although
Managua may make tactical concessions to preserve its
international backing, we see little prospect for any shift in
the Sandinistas' long-term objectives or for any change in their
opposition to negotiations with the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force. The regime also will probably adhere to its tough stance
in Contadora, refusing to sign any accord with enforceable
provisions that would threaten its grip on power.
The Sandinistas' plans for political consolidation,
conceived well before their victory, were laid out clearly only
weeks after they came to power in the so-called "72-hour
document," the result of a three-day meeting of party cadres in
September 1979.
-- The document revealed the Sandinistas' intention to
squeeze out moderates who had backed the revolution,
centralize the economy, and draw closer to "anti-
imperialist" forces--that is, the Soviet Bloc. These
objectives would be achieved gradually to avoid
alienating the private sector and potential
international backers.
-- During their first months in power, the Sandinistas
violated agreements with moderates by unilaterally
giving themselves a majority on the quasilegislative
Council of State and postponing elections until 1985.
They also signed a party cooperation agreement with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and placed key
ministries under direct FSLN control.
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-- A detailed comparison by the Intelligence Community of
the Nicaraguan revolution with other Third World
Marxist-Leninist states demonstrates that such measures
are consistent with a common pattern in the
consolidation of power.
From the outset, Cuba and Soviet Bloc allies were
instrumental in shaping the Sandinista internal security
apparatus.
-- By October 1979, at least 100 Bloc
security/intelligence advisers were working with the
regime.
Meanwhile, the regime placed increasingly tighter controls
on non-Sandinista political activity, culminating in the
declaration of a state of emergency in March 1982, which provided
the legal framework for expanding government restrictions on the
press and opposition parties.
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hecklers disrupted the Pope's visit in 1983.
-- As a result of the decree, many political moderates
abandoned Nicaragua, further weakening the opposition.
Imprisonment, torture, and the execution of opponents have
been an important part of the Sandinistas' consolidation
strategy.
Interior Minister Borge authorized the execution of
dissidents, including private sector leader Jorge
Salazar in 1980, and protected the perpetrators.
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under Borge's direction,
regime security forces murdered several hundred Miskito
Indians who resisted the regime's plans to relocate
them away from their villages near the Honduran border.
-- In addition,
Interior Minister Borge is personally responsible
establishing general procedures tor, and covering
executions of many other regime opponents.
for
up,
During the past two years, the Sandinistas have continued to
consolidate political and economic power while trying to enhance
their legitimacy by holding a national election, drafting a new
constitution, and periodically loosening restrictions to
demonstrate their moderation.
In May 1984, Directorate member Arce, speaking
privately to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, said that
the election was being held only to defuse
"imperialist" criticism of the regime. It was intended
to legitimize Sandinista rule and provide a framework
for building socialism.
After briefly loosening constraints during the 1984
campaign, the Sandinistas reimposed political
restrictions after the election.
In October 1985, the Sandinistas, responding to
stepped-up criticism by the Church and political
parties, expanded the state of emergency--placing
additional controls on the media, suspending many civil
liberties, and providing the justification tor the
detention of hundreds of opponents.
The Church, which the regime views as its most potent
adversary, has been especially hard hit by the decree;
the government closed the Church radio station,
confiscated its newspaper, and occupied its social
services office.
-- La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in Nicaragua,
has been forced to close down from time to time because
of government restrictions and resultant economic
hardships.
The Sandinistas are unlikely to loosen their grip and
probably will continue to chip away at resistance to their
political hegemony. Nonetheless, in keeping with their long-
range strategy, they probably will continue trying to deflect
international criticism by making flexibility gestures toward the
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opposition, easing constraints periodically, and promulgating a
new constitution by early 1987. They may renew their dialogue
with the unarmed opposition, although they will continue to
reject similar meetings with the main armed resistance group, the
Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO). Moreover, the Sandinistas
are unlikely to sign any Contadora agreement that includes tough
provisions tor national reconciliation. Several regime leaders
have characterized such a step as political suicide.
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