ARGENTINA: SEEKING NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88R01225R000200960007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
pER1,{A,NENT File Copy
DO NOT REMOVE
Argentina:
Seeking Nuclear Independence
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
SW 85-10102X
September 1985
COPY 3 5 8
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Directorate of
Intelligence
-1 (~~ -
Argentina:
Seeking Nuclear Independency
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared b~
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. iferation Branch,
Secret
SW 85-10102X
September 1985
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Argentina:
Seeking Nuclear Independence
Key Judgments For the past 30 years Argentina has had an ambitious nuclear program
Information available that has made the country a leader in the Third World, a nuclear exporter,
as of ] August 1985 and enhanced its nuclear weapons options. Thus far, the nuclear program
was used in this report.
has been motivated by a need for prestige more than a need for energy in-
dependence or weapons. Nevertheless, important elements of Argentine
society support the nuclear program at least in part because of the weapons
options it provides.
Argentina could have the essential elements to produce unsafeguarded
fissile material for nuclear weapons by 1990, although financial cutbacks
and revisions by the Alfonsin government could lengthen the timetable.
Further, Argentina is not a party to the international nonproliferation
regime. These actions have reinforced international suspicions concerning
the ultimate objective of its nuclear program. We judge that Argentina will
have the capability to develop nuclear weapons at that time, but we have no
evidence of its intention to do so
Argentina is acquiring nuclear fuel cycle technology and facilities that will
do much to fulfill its goals of self-sufficiency in nuclear power generation
and of freeing its nuclear activities from safeguards or foreign dependency.
Although budget cuts and delays are likely because of financial difficulties
and new governmental policies, work probably will continue on indigenous
and foreign-supplied fuel cycle facilities. Argentina could have a complete
nuclear fuel cycle by the late 1980s
A spent fuel reprocessing plant that has been under construction for six
years could be completed by 1987 if suitable funding is provided. The
facility is unsafeguarded and has the capability to separate 18 to 20
kilograms of plutonium (equivalent to the amount needed for two to three
nuclear explosives) from reactor spent fuel. The only source of s ent fuel
for this purpose, however, is safeguarded power reactor fuel 125X1
Argentina has plans for two additional research reactors completely
indigenous in design and construction. If built, either of these reactors
could become a source of unsafeguarded spent fuel and allow the
separation of unsafeguarded plutonium
Argentina claims to have developed the capability to enrich uranium via
the gaseous diffusion method and plans to begin production of low-enriched
uranium by 1986. We believe that Argentina has developed a proof of
Secret
SW 85-10102X
September 1985
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principle of enrichment technology via gaseous diffusion. Technical prob-
lems, however, probably will delay production of significant quantities of
enriched uranium before the late 1980s
Despite adequate oil reserves to satisfy its needs and vast undeveloped
hydroelectric resources, Argentina has the most advanced nuclear power
program in Latin America. It has two reactors in operation, supplied by
Canada and West Germany, and a third that is under construction by
West Germany. All of the reactors are heavy water moderated and use
natural uranium fuel. The government has plans for three to four more
reactors. Although Argentina's economic situation is forcing delays in
construction of the nuclear power plant, we believe it will be completed by
1990
Argentina has enhanced its image as the leader in nuclear energy in Latin
America by developing a nuclear export capability. The nuclear exports
provide Argentina with needed foreign exchange, greater prestige through-
out the Third World, and the potential to provide technology and facilities
to countries desiring a weapons program. Although Argentina is not
required to safeguard its exports, thus far it has asked for safeguards on ex-
ports. Its customers are Peru, Algeria, and Brazil. Negotiations are under
way with Colombia, Ecuador, Romania, and China
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aecreL
Key Judgments
Naval Propulsion Reactor 3
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments 4
Uranium Processing 4
Heavy Water 5
Spent Fuel Reprocessing 6
Uranium Enrichment Project 8
Growing Export Capabilities and Nuclear Cooperation 11
Nuclear Exports 11
Nuclear Cooperation 12
Prospects for Future Cooperation 13
Argentina's Objectives as a Nuclear Supplier 13
Nonproliferation Implications 13
Nuclear Weapons Potential 13
1. Locations of Argentine Nuclear Activities
2. Argentina's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
4. Heavy Water Plant at Arroyito
5. Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant at Ezeiza Atomic Center 8
6. Gaseous Diffusion Plant-Pilca Two-at the Pilcaniyeu Nuclear
Complex 10
1. Argentine Nuclear Power and Research Reactors
2. Argentine Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
3. Argentine Nuclear Products
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Figure 1
Argentine Nuclear Activities
EZEIZA ATOMIC CENTER
Fuel fabrication plant
Fuel reprocessing plant
Research reactor
CNEA headquarters
CONSTITUYENTES ATOMIC CENTER
Alfa facility
Two research reactors
PILCANIYEU NUCLEAR COMPLEX
Gaseous diffusion plant
(under construction)
Uranium hexaflouride
conversion facility
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.K.,
claimed by Argentina)
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Provincia boundary
Secret
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Mendoza
? I
Mendoza
San
Rafael
j Argentina
Neuquen)
Arroyit 7
rrio./ Rio Negro
GolfjSan Carlos
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Argentina:
Seeking Nuclear Independence'
For the past 30 years, Argentina has had an ambitious
nuclear program that has made the country a leader
in the Third World, a nuclear exporter, and enhanced
its nuclear weapons options. Despite recurrent politi-
cal and economic problems, the Argentine commit-
ment to nuclear development has remained high. Thus
far, the program has been motivated by a need for
prestige more than a need for energy independence or
for weapons. Argentina has sufficient oil reserves to
satisfy its needs and has yet to develop fully its vast
hydroelectric potential
The program is under the direction of the National
Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), an autonomous
governmental agency answerable only to the Presi-
dent. The goals of the nuclear program as established
by the CNEA have largely been achieved. The CNEA
has made substantial progress in developing its own
nuclear technology, building a complete nuclear fuel
cycle-with minimum foreign assistance and con-
trols-to support the nuclear power program, and
developing an export capability. Figure 1 shows loca-
tions of Argentina's nuclear activities
Nuclear Power Reactors
Argentina has the most advanced nuclear power
program in Latin America. Two reactors are in
operation-one supplied by West Germany and the
other Canada-and a third is under construction by
West Germany (see table 1). The Argentine military
government had authorized construction of three
more power reactors by the year 2000. The Alfonsin
government, however, has postponed a decision on
their construction
In March 1974 Argentina became the first Latin
American country to operate a nuclear power reactor
when its Atucha I reactor reached full operation. The
reactor has a unique design employing a pressure
vessel and can be refueled while operating. It was
built by Kraftwerk Union (KWU), a subsidiary of
Siemens of West Germany. Atucha I is the only
reactor of its kind that West Germany has built for
export. Argentina's second power reactor is the
CANDU type. It is located at Embalse and became
operational in 1983. The reactor was shut down for a
number of months because Argentina was unable to
pay for needed repairs. A third nuclear power reac-
tor-designated Atucha II-is under construction by
West Germany near the Atucha I. It is scheduled to
be completed in 1990
The Atucha II contract contained clauses for in-
creased Argentine participation in design, engineer-
ing, construction of the site, and erection of the
reactor. It also called for increased technical coopera-
tion between KWU and the CNEA. As a result, a
joint nuclear engineering and development company,
Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas
(ENACE), was formed in 1980. This may allow
CNEA to acquire the Latin American license to
manufacture and export KWU heavy water type
power reactors. Argentina's participation in building 25X1
power reactors has increased from 40 percent of the
Atucha I reactor to 93 percent of the Embalse
reactor
CNEA has yet to decide which kind of heavy water
reactor technology to use for its next three power
reactors. Many CNEA engineers prefer the Canadian
CANDU type. However, because of the experience
CNEA will gain with the KWU reactors as well as
the technology transfer it will acquire under the
ENACE agreement, we believe Argentina will choose
the West German reacto 25X1
Nuclear Research Reactors
The CNEA built and put into operation Argentina's
first research reactor, the RA-1, in 1958 at the
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Table 1
Argentine Nuclear Power and Research Reactors
Date of
Operation
Safeguards
Location
Atucha I
Natural uranium fueled,
heavy water moderated
370 megawatts
electric (MWe)
Embalse
Natural uranium fueled,
heavy water moderated
630 MWe
Atucha II
Natural uranium fueled,
heavy water moderated
685 MWe
RA-1
Tank
150 kilowatts (kW)
1958
Yes
RA-0
Tank
Zero
1958
Yes
RA-2 b
Tank
Zero
1966
1982
Yes
San Carlos de
Bariloche
RA-8
Enriched (4 or 5 percent)
uranium
50 MW
RP-10
Tank
10 MW
1986
Yes
Peru
Unnamed
Tank
Unknown
Planned/projected
Yes
Algeria
Moved to Peru in 1979 and designated RP-0.
b Shut down in September 1983 because of a criticality accident.
Constituyentes Atomic Center (CAC). CNEA then
designed and built three additional research reactors,
including its largest, a 10-megawatt (MW) radioiso-
tope production reactor. A fifth research reactor was
donated by West Germany as part of the Atucha I
power reactor agreement (see table 1). All of these
reactors are fueled with 20-percent and 90-percent
enriched uranium purchased from the United States.
Argentina's most recent research reactor technology
is the RA-6, a 550-kW tank-type reactor at the
Bariloche Atomic Center. Unlike the other research
reactors, all of the components and equipment includ-
ing instrumentation were supplied by local Argentine
firms and institutes. The RA-6 operates on partially
spent fuel from one of the earlier CNEA-built reac-
tors. CNEA plans, however, to fuel the reactor with
Soviet-supplied 20-percent enriched uranium in the
future
CNEA has also designed research reactors that are
fueled with natural uranium and use heavy water as a
moderator. The first reactor design, the RA-5, has
been scaled down from the 40- to 60-MW power level
to a zero-power research reactor. It is to be construct-
ed at the Ezeiza Atomic Center. CNEA was to begin
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Table 2
Argentine Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
Capacity
Startup
Date
NA
Salta, Cordoba, Mendo-
za, San Rafael
No
Cordoba
Uranium dioxide
150 rot
1983
Yes
Cordoba
Uranium dioxide
150 rot
1986
No
Cordoba
Fuel fabrication (of Atucha I fuel)
70 mt
1982
Yes
Ezeiza
Fuel fabrication (of Embalse reactor
fuel)
100 mt
1984
No
Ezeiza
Fuel fabrication (of Atucha II reactor 100 mt 1989
fuel)
Heavy water production
2-3 mt
1986
No
Atucha
Heavy water production
80-160 rot
?
No
Unknown
6 rot
1988
No
Ezeiza
35 mt
?
No
Ezeiza
15,000 to 20,000 kg
separative work units
(SWU) per year
1986
construction in 1982 of its largest design effort, the
RA-7. This project was canceled after the Falklands
war because of budgetary constraints. The RA-7 is
similar to West Germany's 50-MW materials testing
reactor; both use natural uranium oxide as fuel and
are heavy water moderated and coole
A design modification of the RA-7 wa
s completed in
mid-1983, and, according to a generally reliable
source, the reactor was to be constructed at the
Pilcaniyeu nuclear complex. As of July 1985, howev-
er, we have been unable to identify any reactor
construction at the comple
Naval Propulsion Reactor
We believe the Argentines have a program under way
to build a nuclear reactor to power a submarine.
the Navy commissioned
Investigaciones Aplicades S.A. (INVAP), a company
owned jointly by CNEA and the State of Rio Negro,
to design a nuclear reactor to be built by Argentina
and installed in a West German-designed submarine
modified by the Argentines. Although President Al-
fonsin ostensibly canceled the program in December
1983, funds reportedly were allocated for it in the
in June
1985 INVAP was preparing to construct a research 25X1
reactor named the RA-8 at its Pilcaniyeu site. The
RA-8 is a pressurized water reactor having a power
level of 40 to 50 MW thermal and fueled with slightly
(4 or 5 percent) enriched uranium. 25X1
25X1
e Argentine subma-
rine reportedly measures 70 meters and will have a
single pressure hull. Its propulsion system will be a
25X1
25X1
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Figure 2
Argentine Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
RRI) Under Wav Operating
UF6
conversion
facility
Uranium
dioxide
plant
Uranium
ore
concentration
Fuel
fabrication
plant
Uranium
mining
Under
Not Safeguarded ? Construction
Uranium
metal plant
Nuclear
reactor
Plutonium
metal plant
Urania rt
Dioxide nt,
fabric
plant
react ,
consolidated steam reactor similar to the West Ger-
man Otto Hahn nuclear propulsion system. The Navy
plans either to build the submarine or convert one of
its West German TR-1700 conventionally powered
submarines to nuclear power
We believe the RA-8 is intended to be the Navy's
land-based prototype propulsion reactor. It probably
can be built within the next five years. Despite severe
cutbacks in funding for other Navy projects, construc-
tion of the reactor probably will be adequately fund-
ed, because of the priority placed on Naval propul-
sion. An operational nuclear submarine probabl
could not be completed before the late
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments
Argentina's acquisition and development of a nuclear
fuel cycle has been accomplished with a mix of
foreign-supplied and indigenous facilities. Commer-
cial-scale facilities for fuel fabrication and heavy
water production are safeguarded. Pilot-scale repro-
cessing, heavy water, and uranium enrichment remain
unsafeguarded. When completed, the Argentine nu-
clear fuel cycle will assure self-sufficiency in nuclear
power generation. It will also provide fissile material
that could be used in a nuclear weapons nrogram (see
table 2 and figure 2)
Uranium Processing
Argentina has plentiful uranium reserves and pro-
duces 200 metric tons per year (mt/y) of yellowcake
(U3O8) at four uranium concentration plants at Salta,
Cordoba, Mendoza, and San Rafael. Production is
scheduled to increase to 900 mt/y with the completion
of a larger capacity uranium concentration facility at
25X1
25X1
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VG%A Gl
San Rafael by 1987. The additional output of U3O,
will be needed to support Argentina's nuclear power
plants and its uranium enrichment facilit o
Uranium concentrate is converted into uranium diox-
ide (UO2) at two production facilities in Cordoba. One
facility is Argentine built and produces 50 mt/y of
unsafeguarded UO2. The other facility, supplied by
West Germany in 1982 and under international safe-
guards, produces 150 mt/y of UO2. The combined
output is more than enough VO, to -fuel Ar entina's
two operating power reactor
Argentina is constructing a third UO2 production
plant in Cordoba. This plant will have an output of
150 mt/y when it comes on line in 1986. Argentina
claims the technology used in constructing this plant
is indigenous and therefore free of safeguards
Fuel Fabrication
Argentina can fabricate its own research and power
reactor fuel. This technology has been developed over
the last 20 years. In 1975 West Germany supplied
some of the equipment needed to fabricate power
reactor fuel for the West German-supplied Atucha I
power reactor. With the purchase of Soviet laminat-
ing machines and locally produced equipment, CNEA
fabricated its first nuclear power reactor fuel elements
in 197
The fuel elements were fabricated at a pilot facility
within CAC and were not subject to IAEA safe-
guards
this period, however, the indigenous elements were
safeguarded when inserted in the safeguarded Atucha
I reactor. In 1982 power reactor fuel fabrication was
transferred to the newly completed commercial-scale
fuel fabrication plant at the Ezeiza Atomic Center
(see figure
The opening of the fuel fabrication factory at the
Ezeiza Atomic Center in March 1982 marked Argen-
tina's first step to commercial manufacture of power 25X1
reactor fuel elements. The first of three fabrication
lines has a capacity of 280 Atucha-type fuel elements
a year. The first 140 fuel elements manufactured in
the factory were delivered in September 1982 to the
Atucha I reactor. The two other production lines are 25X1
to be constructed in order to supply the Embalse and
Atucha II power reactors. Production of fuel elements
for Embalse began in 1984 and is planned to begin for
Atucha II in 1986-87 25X1
CAC developed the technology of fabricating pluton- 25X1
ium/uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel elements at its
Alfa facility. In 1972 CNEA purchased 1 kilogram of
plutonium from West Germany for use in this project.
In early 1984 CNEA disclosed plans for a facility for
the production of plutonium metal. The facility, to be
called the Active Development Laboratory, will be
located at either Ezeiza Center or CAC. It will be
capable of producing 13 kilograms per year (kg/y) of
plutonium metal, as well as 100 kg/y of plutonium
oxide. Completion of the facility is to coincide with
the startup of a reprocessing plant at the Ezeiza
Center (see below
Heavy Water
The amount of heavy water Argentina will be able to
produce in the near future is limited. This capability
is critical to Argentina's plan for nuclear fuel cycle
independence because heavy water is needed for the
Argentine-designed natural-uranium-fueled reactors.
The Swiss firm Sulzer Freres is constructing a heavy
water production plant near Arroyito in Neuquen
Province that is designed to have a production capaci-
ty of 250 tons annually (see figure 4). It originally was
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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scheduled to be completed in 1984. Because of lack of
payments, the Swiss firm has stopped its assistance,
and Argentina is attempting to complete the plant on
its own. The Argentines expected to supply the initial
charge of heavy water for the Atucha II power reactor
(560 tons) from the output of this plant. Because of
construction delays of the power plant, they may not
achieve this goal. It is more likely they will get the
heavy water from a foreign sourc~
Argentina is also building an experimental indigenous
heavy water pilot plant at the Atucha complex. It is
designed to produce about 2 tons a year. The plant
was originally scheduled for completion in 1983, but
probably will become operational in 1986. If this
experimental pilot plant is successful, Argentina also
plans to construct a follow-on pilot plant that will
produce 80 to 160 tons of heavy water a year. Unlike
the Swiss-supplied plant, neither of the indigenous
heavy water plants will be safeguarded.
Spent Fuel Reprocessing
In early 1979 Argentina began construction of an
indigenously designed reprocessing plant called the
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~1-
Laboratory for Radiochemical Processes at the Ezeiza
Center (see figure 5). It was scheduled to be complet-
ed by 1982. We believe, however, that late 1988 is the
soonest the plant could begin operation.
It has a designed handling capacity of 6 tons of spent
fuel. This amount of fuel will yield 18 to 20 kilograms
of plutonium annually. The CNEA does not plan to
accept international safeguards on the laboratory.
However, any plutonium produced as a result of
reprocessing spent fuel from the Atucha I or Embalse
power reactors, (the only current source of spent fuel
in Argentina) will be, safeeuarded cause the fuel
itself is safeguarded
An Argentine company, Techint S.A., was the origi-
nal contractor to build the facility. In early 1981
CNEA approached the Italian nuclear engineering
firm, SNIA-Techint, for assistance in completing the 25X1
project. In February 1981 SNIA-Techint signed an
agreement with CNEA to provide a radioactive waste
treatment and storage facility for the laboratory.
25X1
25X1
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After five years of secret research and development,
the former head of CNEA, Vice Admiral (Ret.)
Carlos Castro Madero, publicly stated on 18 Novem-
ber 1983 that "Argentina has obtained the techno- 25X1
logical capability of enriching uranium by the gaseous 25X1
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diffusion method." According to Madero, testing of
the process had been carried out in pilot scale,
followed by the design and construction of a medium-
size uranium enrichment plant near Pilcaniyeu Nu-
clear Complex, 60 km from Bariloche. Madero stated
that the plant is scheduled to be completed in 1985
and would be capable of producing 500 kg/y of
uranium enriched to 20 percent. According to Made-
ro, the decision to undertake the project was made in
1978 after Argentina's supply of enriched uranium
was cut off by the United State
We believ~ I that the
Argentines have achieved at least a proof principle
of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion. The
scale of the facilities that exist and those under
construction could support operation of a plant with a
capacity of 500 kg/v of 20-percent enriched uranium.
INVAP
began experimenting with aluminum oxide diffusion
barriers in 1978. Upon successful completion of this
work, INVAP built a small-scale pilot plant at Barrio
Golf in the Bariloche area. This pilot plant used
imported equipment and materials purchased from
several West European companies through dummy
companies created by INVAP. After initial successes
with the small-scale pilot plant, INVAP began con-
struction of a larger scale pilot plant at Pilcaniyeu.
The existence of a "secret nuclear facility" at Pilcan-
iyeu has been known since 1981.
The com-
plex consists of three separate areas-Pilca one, two,
and three-named in order of their establishment.
Pilca two is the largest of the three areas and houses
the enrichment equipment (see figure 6). Two large
enrichment buildings are externally complete and
ground has been cleared for a third. Pilca two also
contains a probable uranium hexafluoride conversion
facility, a large ceramic plant (possible barrier tube
production), two electric generating plants totaling 8.5
MW, a nickel plating plant, a number of shops,
warehouses, and administrative offices
25X1
25X1
Argentina has never stated that the plant could 25X1
produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) suitable for
use in nuclear weapons, that is, uranium enriched to
90 percent. The 1,840-stage plant cannot produce
HEU when operated in a nonbatch mode from natural
uranium feed without the addition of approximately
700 more stages. Batch/recycle operations could,
however, be used to produce HEU
The projected production of 500 kg/y of 20-percent
enriched uranium equates to a gaseous diffusion plant
capacity of about 15,000 to 20,000 kg of separative
work units per year (SWU/y). Assuming that the
Argentine plant will require about 4,000-kilowatt
hours per SWU, a total of 9.5 MW of electricity
would be needed to operate the completed plant. We
estimate that approximately 8.5 MW are already
available at Pilcaniyeu. A 750,000-kilowatt hydro-
electric plant along the Limay River in Neuquen
Province is operational and can provide more than
enough electric power for the facilities at Pilcaniyeu.
We believe the uranium enrichment plant will not be
fully operational until 1987-88. Argentina plans to
begin test runs of the plant by the end of 1985, and
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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production is scheduled to begin sometime in 1986.
This is a very optimistic schedule. It is doubtful that
the plant will be able to produce the large quantity of
500 kg of 20-percent enriched uranium during 1986.
On the basis of the experience of other countries that
have developed the gaseous diffusion process, we
believe Argentina will have to overcome several tech-
nical problems before the facility operates successful-
ly. For example, other countries have also had diffi-
culties with welding the equipment adequately to
prevent leakage of uranium hexafluoride gas. Also,
during initial operation, vibrational problems have
caused the barrier tubes to break. The barrier tubes
can also n1up, causing arative work
capacity
Once the plant is fully operational, Argentina will
have a facility that can serve many purposes. Argenti-
na will have a supply of fuel for its research and power
reactors, as well as be able to provide enrichment
services as part of its growing nuclear export capabili-
ty. Argentina will also have the capability to produce
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons develop-
ment
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ct
Table 3
Argentine Nuclear Products
Arroyito Heavy Water Plant
1987/88
Yes
Atucha Heavy Water Plant
1985
No
Uranium Concentration
In operation
NA
Uranium Conversion, Cordoba
(West Germany)
In operation
Yes
Uranium Conversion, Cordoba
(NTL Line)
1987
Fuel Element Fabrication,
Ezeiza
In operation
Fuel Element Fabrication,
Ezeiza
In operation
Plutonium Reprocessing,
Ezeiza
1988
No
Uranium Enrichment,
Pilcaniyeu
1985 (phase I)
RA-1 Research Reactor,
Constituyentes
In operation
LEU Fuel Fabrication,
Constituyentes
1985
RA-3 Research Reactor,
Ezeiza
In operation
Heavy water, 250 tons per year
Heavy water, 3 tons per year
Yellowcake, 180 tons per year
Uranium dioxide, 180 tons per
year
Uranium dioxide, 150 tons per
year
Plutonium, 15 kilograms per
year
20-percent enriched uranium,
500 kilograms per year; urani-
um hexafluoride; zirconium
sponge; sulfur hexafluoride
Growing Export Capabilities
and Nuclear Cooperation'
Nuclear Exports
Argentina's 30-year vision of becoming Latin Ameri-
ca's first nuclear supplier is approaching reality.
Through nuclear exports, the country hopes to gain
international prestige and political leverage as well as
to realize earnings. Recently concluded agreements
with China and Algeria gave a much-wanted boost to
Argentina's nuclear industry. And althbugh Argenti-
na has little chance of competing broadly with tradi-
tional nuclear supplier countries, political factors,
including Argentine Government nonproliferation
policies, make Argentina an attractive alternate in
some cases
At present, Argentina can export nuclear materials
such as yellowcake (natural uranium), uranium diox-
ide, zircalloy tubing, and radioisotopes for research,
medicine, and agriculture. Exports of nuclear services
include basic training of nuclear physicists and engi-
neers in Argentina, radiological protection and safety
techniques, and postgraduate research for foreigners
in Argentina's nuclear laboratories. Argentina also
exports research and training reactors, production
plants for radioisotopes, and physics, chemistry, and
biology laboratories (see table 3f ~ 25X1
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In the near future, Argentina hopes to be capable of
exporting enriched uranium (1986), plutonium (1988),
and heavy water (1987). The Argentines will also add
the capability to export low-enriched fuel elements for
research reactors (1986) and of producing small- and
medium-power reactors (up to 300 MW) by the end of
the century
Nuclear Cooperation
Argentina has nuclear cooperation accords with a
number of countries. Although many of the agree-
ments are inactive, Argentina is supplying significant
nuclear training, technology, and material to several
countries:
? Algeria. Argentina will construct in Algeria a nucle-
ar research reactor similar to the RA-6 training/re-
search reactor at the atomic center in Bariloche.
The bilateral agreement also provides for coopera-
tion in the production and utilization of radioiso-
topes in medicine, industry, and agriculture, as well
as CNEA grants to Algerian scientists for training
in Argentina.
? Brazil. In addition to the basic nuclear accord, there
are agreements between the atomic energy commis-
sions of Brazil and Argentina for human resources
training and technical information exchange. Ar-
gentina loaned 240 tons of yellowcake and is provid-
ing 140,000 meters of zircalloy tubing for Brazil's
Angra fuel elements. Brazil is fabricating the pres-
sure vessel for the Argentine Atucha II reactor.
Recently, the two countries agreed to increase mu-
tual access to each other's nuclear facilities.
? Chile. In 1983 Argentina and Chile signed a supple-
mentary nuclear agreement, under which radioiso-
topes produced in Chile's research reactor will be
provided to Argentina when the latter's RA-3 reac-
tor is out of service. The accord also calls for
cooperation in fuel cycle and heavy water technol-
ogy, areas of Argentine expertise. In August 1984
the two countries concluded an agreement for assis-
tance in the manufacture of nuclear fuel elements
for research reactors, the training of Chilean per-
sonnel, and the construction of an experimental
fuels manufacturing plant.
? China. Although no details have yet been formulat-
ed, Argentina and China are studying cooperation
in nuclear power plants, the nuclear fuel cycle, low-
power reactors, and technician training.
? Colombia. In December 1981 Argentina and Co-
lombia agreed on a two-year action plan, extended
in 1983, for nuclear cooperation calling for ex-
changes of nuclear experts and scholarships and for
training Colombian scientists in Argentina. Argen-
tina completed an evaluation study for the installa-
tion in Colombia of a pilot plant for the treatment of
uranium ore and the production of yellowcake. The
Colombian Institute for Nuclear Affairs also adopt-
ed in 1982 an Argentine proposal for the installation
of a 3-MW research, training, and radioisotope
production reactor, including a radioisotope-
handling facility and associated laboratories, at an
estimated cost of $50 million. Aside from some
technical contacts, no action has been taken to
implement the project because of Colombian budget
restrictions.
? Peru. Initiated in 1977, "Project Peru" commenced
with the installation in laboratories in Lima of a
zero-power reactor for research and training. A
second phase, presently under way, involves the
construction of a 10-MW reactor at the nuclear
research center being constructed at Huarangal. In
addition to the reactor, Argentina is building a
radioisotope production facility and laboratories for
radioisotopes, radiological protection and safety,
and nuclear physics and chemistry research. Argen-
tine financing includes a $90 million loan. Enriched
uranium for the reactor is being provided by the
Soviet Union and has already been delivered to
Argentina for fabrication into fuel elements. The
project suffers from delays caused by Peruvian and
Argentine economic difficulties; completion of the
project is scheduled for the end of 1986.
tists in CNEA facilities and supplies radioisotopes
for use in medicine and agricultur
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Prospects for Future Cooperation
According to CNEA's director of international coop-
eration, Roberto Ornstein, agreements are under ne-
gotiation with four additional countries. Nuclear dis-
cussions have taken place with Guatemala and
Turkey, according to press reports. Under present
agreements, the Argentines have discussed building a
subcritical facility for Bolivia and are undertaking a
feasibility study for the construction of a nuclear
center for Uruguay. According to Ornstein, Argenti-
na is also discussing additional nuclear cooperation
with India
Government sources indicate CNEA President Con-
stantini recently concluded a confidential agreement
with KWU under which CNEA is to act as the KWU
representative for Latin America. Reportedly signed
in West Germany following the October 1984 IAEA
meeting in Vienna, the agreement authorizes CNEA
to export nuclear reactor parts designed with West
German technology
The Argentine nuclear industry is also intensely inter-
ested in participating in the Chinese nuclear power
program, and there have been several Argentine visits
to China to discuss possible participation. In addition,
Argentine participation with West Germany in China
was discussed during recent CNEA visits to West
Germany. The results of the Argentine-German con-
sultations reportedly were "very positive.
Argentina's Objectives as a Nuclear Supplier
Argentina hopes to become the nuclear supplier of
choice for Latin America, offering the full range of
nuclear services, including research reactors, heavy
water, low-enriched fuel elements, and eventually the
construction of small-power (150 to 200 MW) reactors
(the Argentines believe these will be easier to con-
struct and be more useful for the smaller electric
networks found in Latin countries.) Through such
exports, the Argentine Government hopes to realize
earnings to justify years of heavy investment in its
nuclear program
More important, many in CNEA and the nuclear
industry see nuclear cooperation and exports as the
only way to guarantee Argentine freedom of nuclear
action internationally and to assure the very survival
of the nuclear industry. Argentina also sees its role as
a nuclear supplier as a means to increase its leader-
ship role in the region, furthering political interests by
reinforcing cooperative ties.
Nonproliferation Implications
Alfonsin's government this year committed itself to
IAEA safeguards on all nuclear exports but, in con-
formity with the Argentine Government's policy on its
own program, has not chosen to seek full-scope safe-
guards as a condition of supply. The government sees
this policy as contributing to Argentine export com-
petitiveness. For example, the government's willing-
ness to export nuclear technology to Algeria without
requiring full-scope safeguards probably was a factor
in its winning a contract to build a nuclear reactor
over US competition
Even with safeguards, Argentine exports of sensitive
nuclear material, such as enriched uranium and heavy
water, would affect US interests if exports were made
to Middle and Far Eastern countries such as Libya,
Iran, or Pakistan. This is unlikely under Alfonsin; we
cannot rule it out, however, under future Argentine
governments. Thus, US efforts to win Argentina's
acceptance of full-scope safeguards on its own pro-
gram, as well as to promote a responsible Argentine
attitude toward nuclear exports, are increasingly im-
portant as Argentina's capabilities as a nuclear suppli-
er grow
Although we have no evidence that CNEA has em-
barked on a specific nuclear weapons program, Ar-
gentina continues to develop the necessary facilities
and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons
development effort. If the Argentines decide to pursue
a nuclear weapons development program, they would
have to acquire sufficient fissile material for a nuclear
device-either plutonium or highly enriched urani-
um-and develop the high-explosive (HE) and nonnu-
clear components of a nuclear device
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Argentina could acquire fissile material in the near
term (before 1990) only by diverting safeguarded
spent fuel from its two operating power reactors and
by reprocessing it to obtain plutonium. If a diversion
of spent fuel were accomplished and the fuel repro-
cessed, late 1988 is the earliest plutonium would be
available and 1989 the earliest a nuclear explosive
device could be built
Because safeguards have been ineffectively enforced
on the Atucha I reactor,2 CNEA may believe that
spent fuel or stored plutonium could be diverted from
its power reactors without detection by IAEA inspec-
tors. However, a large amount of spent fuel would
have to be diverted from Atucha I to acquire enough
plutonium for a device-on the order of 50 fuel rods.
The Argentines probably would find it necessary to
disregard safeguards openly in order to separate
sufficient material
becomes operational and experience is acquired by
plant personnel, Argentina may attempt to produce
highly enriched uranium
In addition to producing fissile material for a weapons
program, Argentina would have to design and develop
technology for the HE and other components of a
nuclear device. If plutonium is used as the fissile
material, the Argentines will have to develop an HE
implosion system, a complex design. On the other
hand, if uranium is used, a simpler gun-type system
could be developed
Argentina would also have to produce, fabricate, and
test HE components, such as TNT, RDX, or PETN.
Argentina has such capabilities. Most of Argentina's
major explosives research and development occurs at
two plants-Jose de la Quintana and Villa Maria,
both in Cordoba Province. The more modern facility
is the Jose de la Quintana explosives plant. This plant
can produce RDX and PETN. The production facili-
ties, mothballed before the Falklands war, were acti-
vated during the conflict. The plant is the only known
Argentine HE production facility with an HE test
point. The test point, however, is too small for testing
25X1
25X1
When completed, the gaseous diffusion plant has the
potential to provide CNEA with the highly enriched
uranium necessary for nuclear weapons. The plant
could be operated to produce a lower-enriched (3
percent) uranium. This could then be used as feed to
produce 90-percent enriched uranium. Alternatively,
Argentina could purchase 3-percent enriched uranium
from past suppliers as feed to reach highly enriched
levels. These choices will require some time and
operating experience on the part of the Argentines
and cannot be attempted as soon as the gaseous
diffusion plant becomes operational. After the plant
' Since its startup in 1974, the Atucha I reactor has had extensive
lapses in IAEA inspection because of faulty camera coverage. In
September 1981 the IAEA noted that the reactor had never been
under effective safeguards and doubted that a diversion of spent
the amounts necessary for nuclear design work. No
such testing has ever been observed at the plan
The explosives and solid-propellant production plant
at Villa Maria produces a variety of explosives,
including nitrocellulose, nitroglycerine, TNT, dyna-
mite, RDX, and military munitions. It also produces
propellants that are used by the Argentine Air Force
in its missile program. Although the plant can pro-
duce sophisticated explosives, we have not observed
any HE test points at the plant. However, Argentina
could build clandestine HE test facilities that would
be difficult to detect
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