THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE: NEW PLANES, OLD PROBLEMS, LITTLE IMPACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000200260002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Afghan Air Force:
New Planes, Old Problems,
Little Impact
An Intelligence Assessment
?Secret
?
cure(
NESA 86-10027C
IA 86-10025C
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Afghan Air Force:
New Planes, Old Problems,
Little Impact
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and
contributions frorr
Group,
Reference, and
and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
South Asia Division, NESA,
with
Analytic Support
Office of Central
Office of Near Eastern
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IA 86-10025C
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of! May 1986
was used in this report.
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The Afghan Air Force:
New Planes, Old Problems,
Little Impact
Secret
The Soviets have failed to make the Afghan Air Force into an effective
military force despite major efforts to upgrade its personnel and inventory.
Moscow has increased the Air Force inventory from about 260 to 325
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft since 1979 and replaced obsolete fixed-wing
aircraft with more advanced types, such as MIG-21s. The number of
helicopters, which have generally proved to be more effective against small
insurgent bands than fixed-wing aircraft, has increased from about 40 to
100. Air Force personnel strength has increased to as much as 10,000 men,
after lummeting from about 15,000 to 5,000 after the Soviet invasion.
Despite this progress, the Afghan Air Force's performance remains poor
because of several factors:
? A shortage of skilled pilots and technicians.
? The political unreliability of its personnel.
? Poor command and control procedures.
? Inadequate logistics and intelligence.
? Mountainous terrain, which shields insurgents, and a harsh climate,
which sometimes prevents Air Force operations.
Improved insurgent air defenses have also inhibited Air Force effective-
ness. We estimate that the Air Force has lost more than 150 aircraft since
the war began, mainly as a result of insurgent fire.
The Soviets have prevented the Afghan Air Force from playing a wider
role in the war because of its poor performance. Air Force missions have
been largely limited to supporting the Afghan army, and the Soviets, who
control nearly all Afghan air operations, do not allow the Afghans to
participate in operations involving Soviet troops. We doubt the Soviets will
overcome their suspicions about Afghan loyalty and competence enough to
let them provide cover for Soviet troops or fly the Soviets' most effective
counterinsurgency fixed-wing aircraft, the SU-25.
The Air Force's continued poor performance will force the Soviet Air
Forces to bear the brunt of the air war. The Soviet Air Forces will probably
increase their inventory in Afghanistan only gradually over the next several
years because their support structure limits their ability to station large
numbers of aircraft there. Airfield improvements north of Afghanistan,
however, will permit the Soviet Air Forces to increase use of USSR-based
aircraft for missions in northern Afghanistan.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
The Afghan Air Force Role and Performance in the War
1
Continuing Problems
2
Skilled Personnel Shortages
4
Political Unreliability
4
Party Factionalism
6
Command and Control
7
Logistics
7
Intelligence
7
Environmental Difficulties
8
Improved Insurgent Air Defenses
8
Outlook
8
Appendixes
A. Organization of the Afghan Air Force
13
B. Key Figures in the Afghan Air Force
17
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The Afghan Air Force:
New Planes, Old Problems,
Little Impact
The Afghan Air Force ' nearly collapsed in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
its strength plummeted
from about 15,000 before the Soviet invasion to about
5,000 in 1980. Moscow so distrusted the competence
and political reliability of Afghan pilots that it halted
combat missions temporarily that year. Since then,
the Soviets have increased the numbers of Afghan
aircraft, and the Air Force has increased its personnel
strength to about 10,000,
Nonetheless, we believe the Afghan Air
Force remains a weak extension of the Soviet Air
Force because of a shortage of skilled pilots and
technicians, politically unreliable personnel, and con-
tinuing operational problems.
The Afghan Air Force Role and
Performance in the War
The Afghan Air Force's primary mission is to support
the Afghan army
' The proper name of this branch of service is Air and Defense
Forces.
1
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The Air Force has increased its activitv in the last
I year mainly in the south and west. _ _
aircraft at Qandahar, Shindand, and
Herat in southern and western Afghanistan have
become more active than in the past. Aircraft at
Bagram, Kabul, and Mazar-e Sharif/Dehdadi air-
fields in eastern and northern Afghanistan have been
flying missions on most days since the Soviet invasion.
We believe the increased activity and modest im-
provements partly reflect upgrades in the Air Force
inventory.
the Soviets launched an ambitious five-year mod-
ernization program shortly after their invasion that
called for expansion of the Air Force inventory from
260 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to more than
450 by 1985 and the replacement of obsolete aircraft.
he inventory grew from
261 to 316 aircraft between 1979 and 1981, but it has
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Figure I. MIG-21
fluctuated between 310 and 325 aircraft since then. In
1979 obsolescent MIG-15s, MIG-17s, IL-28 fighter-
bombers, and IL-14 transports constituted two-thirds
of the Air Force's fixed-wing aircraft,
By the beginning of 196, nore
modern MIG-21s, SU-7s, SU-22s, L-39 trainers, and
AN-26 transports constituted 73 percent of the Air
Force's fixed-wing aircraft.
The Soviets also improved and increased the Air
Force's helicopter inventory. Helicopters, which have
generally proved to be more effective against small
insurgent bands than fixed-wing aircraft, increased
from 41 aircraft (16 percent of the inventory) in 1979
to about 100 (30 percent of the inventory) in 1986,
Moscow replaced earli-
er model Hind-A (MI-24) attack helicopters with later
model Hind-Ds (termed MI-25s by the Afghans) and
lightly armed MI-8 transport helicopters with more
heavily armed MI-17 models.
We believe that the Air Force's increased activity and
improvements also indicate some success in the So-
viets' pilot recruitment and training program.
Moscow
was actively recruiting new pilots and had sent several
hundred trainees to the USSR.
Afghan pilots are attracted by
relatively high pay scales?they earn $768 a year,
While the Afghan annual per capita income is $150.
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Continuing Problems
Despite the infusion of new aircraft, increased activi-
ty, and signs of improvement, the Air Force's role in
the war remains modest, in our view. The Afghan Air
Force remains much less active than the Soviet Air
Forces.
Soviet
tions.
authorities restrict Afghan Air Force opera-
The
Soviets have not given the Afghan Air Force the SU-
25 Frogfoot, the most effective anti-insurgency fixed-
wing aircraft in Afghanistan, presumably because of
fears of defections.
The Soviets still dominate Afghan Air Force opera-
tions. Soviet advisers,
who are present down to the squadron level, must
approve all Air Force operations and accompany
Afghan pilots on all missions near the Pakistani
border. The advisers also choose all bombing targets
and brief Afghan pilots only an hour before bombing
missions, giving only the takeoff time, target coordi-
nates, and a sketchy description of the target,
2
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Figure 3. MI-8 Hip
Skilled Personnel Shortages
The lack of qualified pilots and technicians has slowed
the expansion of the Air Force, in our view.
Afghan aircraft were
periodically grounded or flown by Soviet pilots be-
cause the Air Force did not always have a pilot for
every aircraft. We estimate the Soviets maintain a
ratio of 1.3 to 1.5 pilots for every aircraft
We believe that many Afghan pilots are incompetent.
pilot error accounts for
about 25 percent of Air Force crashes and that pilots
have particular problems flying the Air Force's more
advanced aircraft, the SU-22 and MIG-21
by 1985 the Soviets had allowe
the SU-22 inventory to dwindle to 12; they had
planned to increase the inventory to 55,
there is a 30-
percent shortage of mechanics to carry out routine
maintenance. The shortage leads to accidents because
pilots are forced to fly aircraft that are overdue for
maintenance,
Afghan mechan-
ics were not allowed to make even minor repairs
without Soviet supervision because the Soviets do not
trust their competence.
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We believe the personnel shortages are caused by
several factors:
? Many of the more competent Air Force personnel
were purged in the wake of the Communist takeover
in 1978 and Soviet invasion in 1979,
? Kabul has had problems recruiting and retaining
pilots and mechanics since then because of a con-
tinuing exodus of technically competent Afghans to
Pakistan and the West and a lack of experience with
modern machinery and high illiteracy rates in the
populace at large.
? Fear of improved insurgent air defenses may hinder
pilot recruitment.
Political Unreliability
Sabotage and defections plague the Air Force,
Dissident Air Force offi-
cers blew up 19 Afghan aircraft at Shindand Airbase
in June 1985?the most spectacular sabotage since
the Soviet invasion.
Afghan pilots, including one who had won the Air
Force's highest medal, and crews have frequently
defected to Pakistan. Pilots defected with two MI-25
helicopters in 1985, an AN-26 transport plane in
1984, an SU-7 fighter in 1983, and an MI-8 helicop-
ter in 1981.
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continuing Soviet domina-
tion of the Air Force is the most important cause of
Air Force unrest. Afghan personnel resent both the
disparaging remarks that the Soviets often make
about their capabilities and the presence of Soviet
advisers
Sympathy for the insurgents also contributes to the
Air Force's political unreliability, in our view.
Afghan pilots sometimes do not attack insurgent
convoys or report them to their superiors because the
pilots support the insurgents,
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Party Factionalism
We believe that political infighting between the
Khalqi faction of the ruling Afghan Communist
party, who are mainly rural ethnic Pushtuns, and the
Parchami faction, who are mainly urban Pushtuns
and non-Pushtuns, feeds internal unrest in the Air
Force. each faction blamed
the other rather than insurgent sympathizers for the
Shindand sabotage in 1985.
We believe these tensions are in-
creased by the imbalance between the Parchami-
dominated Air Force high command and the rank and
file, where Khalqis outnumber Parchamis 2 to 1,
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Command and Control
The Air Force's cumbersome command and control
procedures, characteristic of Soviet-trained air forces,
are probably its most serious operational problem.
We believe that the Air Force has made only modest
progress in overcoming its command and control
problems. A Soviet AN-26 aircraft, reconfigured as
an airborne command post, began to participate in
Afghan air and ground operations in 1982 or 1983,
enabling senior
Soviet Air Forces commanders to maintain simulta-
neous communication with Afghan army commanders
and Air Force pilots. The presence of an observation
aircraft, however, warns insurgents of imminent oper-
ations. Attempts to delegate authority have had a
limited impact, in our view.
Logistics
We believe that the priority given to the Soviet Air
Forces' fuel and munition needs, insurgent attacks on
convoys, and poor roads inhibit Air Force support for
the Afghan army.
7
The Soviets have made moderate progress in improv-
ing logistics, in our view.
Moscow has extended a fuel pipeline from the
Soviet border to Bagram and Shindand, but there is
no evidence of plans to extend it to other airfields. We
believe that road security is somewhat better than it
was and that Soviet technicians repair damage to fuel
pipelines more quickly than they did in the past.
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Environmental Difficulties
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain and harsh climate
add to the operational problems of the Afghan?and
Soviet?Air Forces. jet
fighters have poor maneuverability in the numerous
narrow mountain valleys of eastern and northern
Afghanistan and often must attack targets from high
altitudes, reducing accuracy. We believe that rugged
terrain makes aerial observation of small insurgent
groups difficult and often interferes with communica-
tions between pilots and air controllers. In summer,
hot weather causes helicopters to overheat. In winter,
hazardous storms and poor visibility caused by rain
and snow hamper operations.
Improved Insurgent Air Defenses
We believe that improved insurgent air defenses have
had a major impact on Air Force operations.
Afghan pilots have adopted more
cautious tactics, such as spending less time over
targets and attacking from higher altitudes, in the
face of better insurgent tactics and weapons.
The insurgents have improved their air defense inven-
tory. some insurgent bands
that previously had one heavy machinegun and no
SA-7 portable, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles
now have two or three heavy machineguns and mis-
siles. Heavy machineguns (12.7- and 14.5-mm) are
useful because they are relatively easy to operate and
maintain. Although we estimate that surface-to-air
missiles account for only about 5 percent of Afghan
Secret
Figure 7. MI-8 Hip that was shot down
air losses, they have an important psychological im-
pact because Afghan pilots tend to avoid insurgent
bands that they believe may be armed with missiles,
Outlook
We believe the Soviets will not make major progress
on these problems and that the performance of the
Afghan Air Force will continue to suffer:
? It will remain difficult to recruit and retain quali-
fied pilots and mechanics.
? The Soviets are unlikely to modify rigid command
and control procedures.
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we estimate the
Afghan Air Force has lost a minimum of 150 aircraft
to insurgent antiaircraft fire and sabotage since the
war began.
We estimated that the Afghan Air Force would have
at least 273 more aircraft than observed in its
functioning inventory if all confirmed deliveries
are taken into account. Not all of the
missing aircr t were shot down by insurgents or
pilots have defected with five aircraft since 1981.
This leaves an estimated 134 aircraft lost away from
the airfields. Because pilot error accounts for about
one-fourth of all air losses, we estimate that about
100 of these aircraft were shot down by the insur-
gents. The minimum number of losses, therefore, is
estimated at about 150
sabotaged.
113 of the missing or
nonfunctioning aircr t are 'erelict. We judge that
about one-fourth of them, or about 28, became
derelict because of combat damage or sabotage, while
attrition and accidents accounted for the remainder.
another 21 aircraft were
sabotaged in 1985, and
We believe, however, that the Afehan Air Force has
lost more than 150 aircraft, and
losses could be as high as 230.
We undoubtedly have missed some deliveries
and the daily
variation of aircraft totals at airfields, although we
are fairly certain that we can detect all large deliver-
ies (squadron size or larger-10 to 20 aircraft).
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? Fuel shortages will remain a problem, particularly
at Qandahar and the smaller airports, and Soviet
aircraft will continue to receive priority for fuel.
? Air Force intelligence will remain erratic.
? We do not believe that Moscow will permit the Air
Force to participate in operations involving Soviet
troops or to transfer to the Afghans its most effec-
tive fixed-wing aircraft in Afghanistan, the SU-25
Frogfoot, because of fears of pilot defections.
We estimate, however, that the Air Force may receive
more advanced weapons, such as the precision-guided
air-to-surface missiles that were introduced into the
Soviet inventory in 1985, and fuel-air explosives to
replace iron bombs. The new weapons would be
particularly useful in attacking targets?such as in-
surgent positions protected by rock outcroppings or in
caves?where greater accuracy and penetrability
would be required. Afghan helicopters and most
fixed-wing aircraft could use laser designators to
deliver precision-guided munitions accurately against
even small targets from altitudes as high as 1,500
meters?beyond the reach of heavy machinegun fire.
Effective use of precision-guided weapons, however,
would require better intelligence on the locations of
resistance targets as well as extensive training.
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The Soviets probably will further increase and up-
grade the Afghan Air Force inventory, especially
helicopters. New parking areas for helicopters can be
built quicklyH 20 hardstands for
a squadron of Soviet helicopters were completed in
less than three months at Qandahar. But airfield
capacities, rear service deficiencies, and the continued
vulnerability of supply lines to insurgent attacks make
it difficult to support an increase in large numbers of
Afghan fixed-wing aircraft.
We expect that the Air Force's limitations will force
the Soviets to continue to bear the brunt of the air
war. We believe the Soviet Air Forces will continue to
increase their inventory in Afghanistan only gradually
over the next several years because their support
infrastructure restricts their ability to station large
numbers of aircraft there. We believe that airfield
improvements north of Afghanistan will permit the
Soviets to increase their use of USSR-based aircraft
for missions in northern Afghanistan.
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Appendix A
Organization of the
Afghan Air Force
Most of the Afghan Air Force's approximately 325
aircraft are organized into five regimental-size fighter
wings, one helicopter regiment, and one fixed-wing
transport regiment. These units are located at
Afghanistan's seven major airfields. Kabul is the Air
Force's headquarters. Aircraft periodically deploy to
smaller airfields such as Gardeyz, Khowst, Ghazni;
and Asadabad
Kabul
Kabul, the home airfield for the 377th Helicopter
Regiment and the 373rd Fixed-Wing Transport Regi-
ment, is the only airfield where Afghan aircraft
consistently outnumber Soviet aircraft.
Bagram Airfield
Bagram is the home airfield for the 355th Fighter
Wing, which has about 42 MIG-21 Fishbeds, and the
322nd Fighter Wing, which has about 12 SU-22
Fitters. The 355th's relatively
stable inventory suggest that it is one of the Air
Force's better units.
13
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Qandahar Airfield
Qandahar Airfield is the home base for the 366th
Fighter Wing and the 379th Independent Helicopter
Battalion. The 366th Fighter Wing was an active unit
until the sabotage at Shindand in June 1985. The
subsequent decrease in activity probably reflects in-
creased security precautions.
Shindand Airfield
Shindand is the home base for the 335th Fighter-
Bomber Wing and the 375th Independent Helicopter
Battalion. The 335th Wing has been relatively inac-
tive.
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Figure 9
Organization of Afghan Air Force/Air Defense Command
Air Force and
Air Defense
Command
Chief,
Radar Command
Deputy, Air
and Air Defense
Command
1?=?111?1?LIIi
Force Chief of Staff
Air Force
Command
Chief, Political
Chief, Air Defense
KHAD Department
Department, Air
Logistics Missile Command
Air Force and Air
Force and Air
Defense Commatzd
Defense Command
Air Defense
Artillery Command
Chief Surgeon, Chief, Air Academy
Air Force Training Command
.,
309162 6-86
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Herat Airfield
Herat is the home of the 376th Independent Helicop-
ter Battalion, which has only two MI-8 Hip helicop-
ters. The unit probably exists mainly to transport
high-level party and military officials.
Dehdadi/Mazar-e Sharif Airfields
These two airfields are the main pilot training bases
for the Afghan Air Force.
The unit more
than doubled in size during the period 1984-85,
possibly because of a shift in trainin from the Soviet
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Figure 10
Major Afghan Airfields and Landing Strips, April 1986
Soy! Union
Feyzabaq,
Mazar-e
Dehd?LjSharif KondOz
Towraghondr
0 Pol-e Khomri
BAGRAM
..----------,-
Asadabad,,
?Herat Kabul @ --,-
Jalalebad
A)ji)hanis an @
SHINDAND Gardeyz,
la)
Khowsq,
..Ette fire
C
Lashkar Gah
oi Qandahar
Concrete surface?
Asphalt surface
Compact-earth surface
Helicopter landing strip
a Concrete airfield surfaces are capable of
accommodating the heaviest of aircraft.
707753 (A01776) 5-86
Boundary representation is
not necesearily authoritative.
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Appendix B
Key Figures in the
Afghan Air Force
Maj. Gen. Abdul Qader, 50, is the Commander in
Chief for Air and Defense Forces and the head of the
Afghan Air Force, according to the US Embassy.
Qader, a Khalqi, has an engineering background and
was the Air Force Chief of Staff from 1980 to 1984.
He commanded Bagram Airfield before the Soviet
invasion. An Embassy source reports that Kabul
would have preferred a pilot for the top position, but
the likely candidates were considered to be too young.
Qader replaced Maj. Gen. Nazar Mohammad, who
became chief of the Armed Forces General Staff in
1984 and subsequently was named Defense Minister.
The rise of Maj. Gen. Abdul Fatah, who is Air Force
commander and in charge of day-to-day operations,
reflects the growth of Parchami power, according to
the US Embassy. Since Fatah replaced a Khalqi in
1983, he has worked to relegate Khalqis to inconse-
quential positions. We believe that Fatah, an alternate
member of the Communist party Central Committee,
may carry more weight than Qader in Afghan politi-
cal circles because of his Parchami connections.
Fatah is a Soviet-
trained SU-22 pilot who commanded Bagram Airfield
before becoming Air Force commander.
The Air Force's political commissar, Mohammad
Karim Azizi, and the commander of Air Defense
Forces?antiaircraft and related units?Maj. Gen.
Abdul Qayum Samadi, are also Parchamis,
Azizi replaced a Khalqi in 1983.
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