EGYPT AND THE ARAB STATES: REINTEGRATION PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000200290001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seemt.
Intelligence 25X1
Egypt and the Arab States:
Reintegration Prospects
-sue
NESA 86-10031
June 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reintegration Prospects
Egypt and the Arab States:
NESA
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
This paper was prepared byl
Secret
NESA 86-10031
June 1986
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Egypt and the Arab States:
Reintegration Prospects
Key Judgments Near-term prospects for Egypt's formal reintegration into the Arab League
Information available are poor. Cairo's continued isolation will sharply limit President Mubarak's
as of 16 May 1986 ability to pursue independent or pro-Arab policies that conflict with US
was used in this report.
and Israeli interests. In the unlikely event a formal reintegration were to
occur, it would probably make Cairo less receptive to US influence and
would have the potential to undermine US-Egyptian military cooperation.
On the other hand, the United States could benefit to the extent
reintegration of Egypt helped strengthen the moderate Arab camp and
positioned Cairo to broker future Arab-Israeli contacts.
Syrian intransigence will be the major stumblingblock to reintegration as
long as Damascus remains outside the Middle East peace process. Presi-
dent Mubarak almost certainly will not bow to radical Arab demands that
Egypt repudiate the Camp David accords and its relations with Israel as
the price of readmittance. Recent setbacks in the peace process-in
particular the demise of the Egyptian-supported Jordanian-PLO agree-
ment-have robbed Cairo at least temporarily of a role that would allow it
to burnish its Arab credentials and help end its isolation
moderate Arab leaders appea
unlikely to follow Jordan's example of
breaking with the Arab consensus and unilaterally renewing ties. Except in
Oman, Sudan, and Somalia-states which never broke relations with
Cairo-Egypt's relations with most Arab states are handled through large
interest sections that function as embassies in all but name. Egypt has no
official presence in the radical states, including Libya and Syria.
Despite the lack of formal ties, Egypt will continue to make progress in its
informal relations with other Arab states. Since 1979 the pace of its
bilateral contacts with the moderate Arabs has quickened through ex-
changes of high-level visits and cooperation in trade and regional security
issues. Egypt also has been readmitted to the Islamic Development Bank
and the Islamic Conference Organization.
A return to the Arab camp-or even renewed bilateral relations with
another Arab state-would be highly popular with most Egyptians and
would reinforce Mubarak's political position as he tackles mounting
iii Secret
NESA 86-10031
June 1986
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domestic woes, including intractable economic problems and reduced
public confidence in his leadership. Mubarak, however, will continue to
insist that the Arab states take the initiative. For reasons of national pride
and prestige, an Egyptian diplomatic offensive for restored ties is highly
unlikely.
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Key Judgments
Mubarak and Reintegration
Obstacles to Reintegration
Poor Summit Prospects
2
Radical Opposition
3
Saudi Faintheartedness
4
Overcoming Isolation: Ties That Bind
4
Regional Security Cooperation
7
Alternative Scenarios
8
Implications for Israel and the United States
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Figure 1
Egyptian Diplomatic Representation in Arab Countries
Interest sections
No representation
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Egypt and the Arab States:
Reintegration Prospects
The Arab League states reacted harshly to Egypt's
separate peace with Israel in March 1979 by adopting
a series of punitive measures against the Egyptians.
Among these were:
? Severance of diplomatic relations.
? Imposition of an economic boycott.
? Termination of financial assistance from the Gulf
states.
? Suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab
League and affiliated organizations.
These sanctions were implemented by all League
members except Sudan, Somalia, and Oman-which
never broke relations-and led to drastically curtailed
official and, to a lesser extent, informal contacts
between Egypt and the Arab world. President Sadat
reacted with angry defiance, publicly lambasting the
"ungrateful" Arabs for their rejection of his peace
efforts. Sadat steadfastly refused to work for a resto-
ration of Cairo's Arab ties at the expense of Israel and
the peace agreement.
Since assuming power in October 1981, President
Hosni Mubarak has adopted a more conciliatory
approach than his predecessor. He has worked quietly
to end Cairo's isolation by emphasizing Egypt's long-
standing support and sacrifices for Arab causes-
particularly Palestinian rights and the Iraqi war effort
against Iran-while criticizing Israeli actions in Leb-
anon and on the West Bank. At the same time he has
maintained Sadat's adherence to the Camp David
accords and the peace treaty with Israel as key
elements of Egyptian foreign policy.
bilateral contacts with moderate Arab states has
quickened through exchanges of high-level visits and
cooperation in trade and regional security issues. We
believe these contacts have helped lay a solid ground-
work for more formal ties.)
Nonetheless, Cairo has a long way to go. Opinion in
the Arab world varies considerably on the issue of
Egypt's reintegration, according to Arab press and
US Embassy reports, and Egyptian officials no longer
predict optimistically that formal rapprochement is
imminent. Despite its improved informal contacts,
Egypt remains suspended from the Arab League, and
only Jordan has restored full diplomatic relations with
Cairo. Embassy reporting indicates that, even though
formally readmitted to the Islamic Conference Orga-
nization, Egypt remains on the fringes of its power
structure and cannot thwart radical machinations
within the organization. F__1
Mubarak publicly shows little concern about Egypt's
Although he would welcome a resump-
tion of ties, Mubarak insists that the Arabs must take
the initiative without preconditions. To encourage the
Arabs to act, he has indicated clearly that Egypt
would not regard renewed ties by any Arab state as a
Mubarak's two-pronged strategy has paid dividends.
In November 1983 Egypt was elected-with Saudi
acquiescence and overt support from some Gulf
states-to a UN Security Council seat, and the
following February Cairo was reinstated in the Islam-
ic Conference Organization. Since then, it has been
invited to rejoin the Islamic Development Bank (Feb-
ruary 1985) and a few lesser organizations such as the
Arab Sports Union (August 1985). The pace of
tacit recognition of the Camp David accords.
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US Embassy reporting and press commentaries indi-
cate they resent their political isolation and believe it
denies them the formal status they are due.
An official return to Arab good graces would offer
both Egypt and Mubarak a number of advantages,
including:
? A strong boost both for Egypt's prestige and
Mubarak's status as a leader.
? Enhanced opportunity to influence events in the
Arab world and resume a leadership role.
? The possibility of additional income in the form of
increased trade, investments, and aid.
? Reduced vulnerability to regional crises and schem-
ing by radical Arab states.
? A public vindication of Cairo's commitment to
Middle East peace negotiations consistent with and
based on its treaty with Israel.
We believe a return to the Arab camp-or even
renewed diplomatic relations with one or more impor-
tant Arab states-would be highly popular with most
Egyptians and would boost Mubarak's confidence and
public support as he tackles domestic economic nrob-
Mubarak would benefit significant-
ly from a diplomatic triumph that would boost his
In our view, a formal rapprochement with the Arab
mainstream would be especially well received among
those groups most critical of Mubarak. The largest
opposition forces-the Muslim Brotherhood and other
Islamic fundamentalist groups on the right and the
loosely organized Nasirite left-have all advocated
closer ties to the Arabs. We believe Mubarak would
be best served by a rapprochement undertaken at
Arab initiative because this would justify Egypt's
inherent sense of indispensability in Arab councils
and bolster his position as an Arab leader.
Several factors argue against Egypt's undertaking
diplomatic initiatives specifically aimed at gaining
readmittance. A visible Egyptian public relations
offensive to woo Arab support would not be well
received by the prideful Egyptian public.
many Egyptians have
become tired of unrewarded efforts to play up to their
fellow Arabs-particularly the PLO-and to support
Arab causes and believe that the Mubarak govern-
ment should focus instead on what they consider
legitimate Egyptian interests such as the faltering
economy.
Mubarak is unlikely to initiate such policies for fear
of visible failure and embarrassment that could fur-
ther erode his political support. Embassy and press
reporting indicates that the recent spate of setbacks
has heightened Mubarak's sensitivity to crises that
could focus popular discontent on his leadership and
has reinforced his natural tendency toward caution.
Obstacles to Reintegration
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Poor Summit Prospects
Formal reintegration into the Arab League would
require the consensus of the membership at an Arab
summit meeting, but near-term prospects for such a
gathering-the next is to be held in Saudi Arabia-
are dim. According to Embassy reports, Riyadh views
such meetings as opportunities to shore up Arab unity
by seeking to heal inter-Arab strains. The highly
cautious Saudis, however, are unlikely to convene a 25X1
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summit meeting as long as they believe widening
conflicts in the region and hardline opposition will
prevent a successful outcome
DAn extraordinary summit meeting held last
August in Morocco accomplished little because of the
absence of several key states, according to the US
Embassy in Rabat. Another meeting called in early
May 1986 after the US attack on Libya never even
convened for lack of an agreed agenda.
Even if a summit meeting were convened this year, we
believe that the custom of consensus decisionmaking
would allow the Syrian-led hardliners to veto any
action on Egypt's reintegration that was backed by
the moderate majority of Arab states. Tentative ef-
forts by Jordan and other moderate states to change
the consensus requirement and adopt majority rule in
the Arab League are unlikely to bear fruit. Consensus
remains popular because it offers protection for the
weak against pressure and threats of retaliation by the
powerful. We believe the smaller states view the need
for such protection as especially great when divisions
within the region run deep and there is no strong state
or combination of states that can build a dominant
coalition. Egypt is best suited to build such an
alliance, but it needs to be readmitted first.
Radical Opposition
We believe Egypt's return to the Arab fold would be
anathema to the Syrian and Libyan hardliners. Al-
though President Assad has claimed that Syria sup-
ports Egypt's reintegration, we believe he will go to
considerable lengths to keep Cairo out. A strength-
ened moderate coalition led by Egypt would challenge
Syria's claim to leadership in the Arab world and
further isolate it along with Libya. Of all the Arab
states, Syria felt the most betrayed by Egypt's peace
with Israel. In our view, Damascus continues to
believe that Cairo's peace move left Syria alone in the
war against Israel and amounted to the desertion of
an ally.
President Assad appears to have put a high price on
improved ties to Egypt, fully recognizing that Mu-
barak cannot pay it.
Moderate Ambivalence
Most moderate Arab leaders appear increasingly
eager-at least in private-for Egypt to return to the
Arab community, according to press statements and
US Embassy reports. At different times the Iraqis,
the Algerians, the North Yemenis, the Saudis, and
the Gulf states have told Egyptian officials that they
would welcome such a move. In our view, these states
would welcome the support a reintegrated Egypt
would bring to the moderate element in inter-Arab
deliberations.
We believe the moderates fear the regional conse-
quences of an unstable Egypt and might endorse
reintegration if they saw it as essential to strengthen-
ing Mubarak's hold on power.
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Tariq Aziz visited Cairo in early March to reassure
Mubarak of Baghdad's continued support, according
to US Embassy analyses. The Saudis for the first time
issued public statements in support of Cairo
Private expressions of support for Egypt, however,
have not been matched by public efforts in Cairo's
behalf. Although the moderates universally favor
Egypt's return through a consensus vote in the Arab
League, according to reporting from US Embassies,
none is willing to risk trouble with other Arabs by
raising this issue publicly. Nor are Egypt's efforts to
prod moderate regimes into unilaterally renewing ties
to Cairo likely to bear fruit. Steadfast Egyptian
backing of Arab causes and extensive economic and
military ties to the moderate Arabs have helped
reinforce Cairo's Arab credentials and reduce its
isolation. This support is increasingly being taken for
granted by the moderates, especially Iraq, who see
little more to be gained-and much to be lost-by
breaking with the consensus and unilaterally recog-
nizing Egypt.
that, in the past, Cairo has accused the Saudis of
deliberately working to prevent Egypt's reintegration
in order to preserve an Arab leadership role for
themselves and avoid provoking Damascus. More
recent Embassy reporting suggests these accusations
have been overly harsh and indicates that Riyadh has
taken steps to shore up the bilateral relationship and
to boost Mubarak's confidence.
Nonetheless, we believe the Saudis will follow-not
lead-the Arab consensus to end Cairo's diplomatic
quarantine. Only ironclad assurances of support from
Syria-which we consider highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future-would prompt them to champion
openly Egypt's reintegration. We believe Saudi pas-
sivity also will discourage the other moderates from
unilaterally recognizing Egypt as Jordan did in Sep-
tember 1984. Most of the smaller Persian Gulf states
are inclined to follow Riyadh's lead on this matter,
and Iraq-dependent on Saudi aid and reluctant to
break the consensus-is unlikely to challenge the
Saudis.
Despite these obstacles, we expect Egypt to continue
searching for ways to underscore its regional impor-
tance and to strengthen existing ties in hopes of laying
the groundwork for an eventual Arab reintegration
effort. We also expect Cairo to continue looking for
issues that demonstrate Egypt's "indispensability" as
a leader of the Arab world. Since 1979 Egypt has
employed a number of vehicles-including bilateral
economic and commercial relations and security coop-
eration initiatives-to reduce its isolation.
Indeed, Egypt's ties to the Arabs were never com-
pletely severed. Cairo retains diplomatic links to most
other Arab states through large interest sections that
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Jordan Renews Ties:
Egypt's Only Breakthrough
function as de facto embassies and which are headed
by professional diplomats, many of whom carry the
personal rank of ambassador. Discreet diplomatic
contacts began almost immediately after the initial
storm of anti-Camp David emotions cooled.
The Peace Process
We believe that an active and visible role in the peace
process-coupled with staunch support for Palestinian
rights-remains the most promising vehicle for easing
Egypt's return to the Arab League. We believe Egypt
intends to play a major role in future peace negotia-
tions, no matter how they evolve. In our view, Mu-
barak also hopes that progress on this issue will
demonstrate to the Egyptian people that Camp David
was a necessary precursor to the process and not a
separate peace.
Mubarak has too much prestige invested in the search
for a comprehensive Middle East peace to abandon
the effort, but we believe his ability to move the
process will be constrained by several factors. On the
domestic side, we expect him to become increasingly
preoccupied with shoring up Egypt's faltering econo-
my and coping with political challenges from Islamic
fundamentalist groups seeking to exploit popular dis-
content.
Egypt's reintegration effort received its most substan-
tial boost when King Hussein of Jordan restored
relations with Cairo in September 1984. We believe
Hussein had long been convinced that Egypt must be
brought back into Arab decisionmaking to strengthen
the position of the Arab moderates in the peace
process. He calculated that resuming diplomatic rela-
tions with Egypt would increase his leverage against
Syria and enlist Mubarak's backing for his effort to
forge a Jordanian-Palestinian peace strategy. For
Mubarak, the Jordanian initiative offered Egypt a
role in building a new Arab majority against the
rejectionists and an opportunity to earn reacceptance
into Arab ranks. It also helped vindicate Egypt's
policy of adhering to the peace treaty with Israel and
refusing to accept preconditions for the restoration of
Egyptian-Arab ties.
Since the restoration, bilateral relations have flour-
ished, according to Embassy reporting. Mubarak and
Hussein have met nearly a dozen times. In addition,
they confer frequently by telephone to exchange views
on Arab issues and coordinate policies toward the
peace process. These contacts are covered extensively
in the Egyptian media.
Recent consultations between senior Egyptian and
Jordanian officials have produced bilateral coopera-
tion agreements in such areas as trade, communica-
tions, transportation, and labor exchanges. The polit-
ical implications of these agreements, however,
appear more important than their substance. Trade
prospects have been inflated in press reports-the
$250 million target set for 1986 appears particularly
unrealistic, given the roughly $18 million level
achieved in 1984-but commercial relations help
identify and reinforce common interests.
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Regionally, prospects for new initiatives appear bleak.
We believe Mubarak will not risk exposure by float-
ing peace initiatives on his own, preferring instead to
act in the safer role of broker while others take the
lead. According to Embassy reporting, Mubarak had
hoped that renewed ties to Jordan would permit him
to play such a role. The collapse in February 1986 of
the Jordan-PLO dialogue-which Egypt actively
championed-appears to have dealt a serious blow to
Cairo's hopes of a breakthrough. Even King Hussein
has become skeptical that Egypt has any real role to
play, according to US Embassy officers in Amman.
The Embassy's contacts claim Hussein has become
especially frustrated with Mubarak's apparent inabil-
ity to parlay his staunch support of Arafat into
leverage over the wily PLO leader.
Economic Relations
Active economic contacts have helped blunt the ef-
fects of the 1979 sanctions against Egypt. Although
Arab aid to Egypt has remained suspended, trade
levels and commercial contacts have increased, ac-
cording to press and US Embassy reports and at least
one major US academic study. In addition to Jordan,
Egypt has signed economic and technical agreements
with Iraq. Trade officials travel frequently between
the two countries, and bilateral cooperation has be-
come substantial in such areas as labor, youth, and
cultural affairs. In July 1983, for example, Cairo and
Baghdad signed a technical cooperation protocol on
irrigation. Six months earlier, an Egyptian delegation
visited Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emir-
ates, and Qatar to promote trade. The US Embassies
in Cairo and Baghdad estimate that approximately
2.2 million skilled Egyptian expatriate workers-a
major source of foreign earnings-are employed in
the Arab states.
Despite the increased economic contacts, Egypt's
ability to strengthen economic ties to its Arab neigh-
bors will be limited, in our view, because the Arab
states are not natural trading partners. In addition,
Egypt's expatriate workers probably will return home
in increasing numbers as the oil states run short of
funds to pay them. Although documentation is
sketchy, we believe the economic downturn in the
Gulf oil economies has already begun to affect expa-
triate earnings. Saudi Arabia is attempting to cut its
expatriate work force to boost domestic employment,
according to US Embassy reporting.
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Regional Security Cooperation
We believe that Egypt's expanding military relations
with the moderate Arabs-supported by growing
arms shipments,
are calculated to help end Cairo's isolation.
Egypt would like to become a center of defense
production for the Arab states to bolster its claims to
regional leadership, in our view, but it is facing
increasingly stiff competition from countries like Yu-
goslavia that are not afflicted by Egypt's high produc-
tion costs. In addition, Egypt's Minister of Defense
recently told US officials that some Egyptian Air
Force technicians in the Gulf have been replaced by
Indians and Pakistanis. Nonetheless, Cairo almost
certainly intends to exploit improved relations with
Kuwait, for example, to secure markets for its. defense
products and to develop more extensive economic ties.'
Libyan threats to stability in North Africa have
encouraged Algeria and Tunisia to mend fences with
Cairo. Recent visits by Egyptian presidential envoy
Osama al-Baz to Algiers and Tunis have paved the
way for increased security coordination among the
three capitals, but the opening is likely to have more
Egyptian Military Aid to Iraq
but we believe deliveries have not yet begun.
Egyptian moral and material support for the Iraqi
war effort has probably improved Cairo's reintegra-
tion prospects by ingratiating Egypt with Baghdad
and the Gulf states, which share common concerns
about Iran. Between 1981 and 1983, Egypt sold
Baghdad almost $1 billion worth of military equip-
ment before the Soviets reopened their arms pipeline
to Baghdad. The sales consisted largely of ordnance
and spare parts for Soviet-supplied equipment but
have included at least 50 overhauled Soviet-made
T-54/55 tanks. Press reports indicate that Iraq has
contracted to buy 80 coproduced Brazilian Tucano
aircraft from Egypt-valued at about $150 million-
political significance than operational substance.[
in October 1985 Algeria publicly proposed an
urgent Arab summit meeting to discuss the issue of
restoring relations with Egypt. We believe, however,
that neither Tunis nor Algiers is likely to recognize
Egypt formally, and substantive improvements-par-
ticularly with Tunisia-will vary directly with pre-
vailing levels of apprehension about Qadhafi.
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We believe Egypt's formal return to the Arab fold is a
long way off and anticipate little movement on the
issue in the coming months. We expect increasing
polarization between Arab moderates and radicals on
regional issues to continue to hinder the consensus
necessary simply to convene a summit meeting, let
alone produce agreement to act on Egypt's behalf. As
long as the peace process remains stalled, Cairo will
be deprived of its most promising mechanism for
achieving a breakthrough.
Prospects for bilateral recognition of Egypt by indi-
vidual Arab states appear somewhat brighter, but
fears of breaking the Arab consensus will continue to
discourage such initiatives. Any bandwagon effect
almost certainly would require a quiet nod from the
Saudis, which we consider unlikely. Still, we expect
Cairo to continue efforts aimed at forging new eco-
nomic and security ties to the Arab moderates-a
trend that we expect will further reduce Egyptian
feelings of isolation.
Egypt realistically can do little to hasten the reinte-
gration process, in our judgment. Mubarak's shaky
leadership position and increasing preoccupation with
domestic issues will reinforce his tendency toward
caution. In our view, he will continue the main lines of
his regional policy-publicly minimizing reintegration
prospects while staunchly backing Palestinian rights
and quietly exploiting opportunities to cement bilater-
al ties-because he sees no workable alternatives that
do not carry an unacceptable risk of failure.
Alternative Scenarios
Our analysis of King Fahd's recent adoption of bold
positions on oil production levels and the Iran-Iraq
war suggests he may be embarking on a more aggres-
sive foreign policy course. If he encounters no signifi-
cant reverses, we believe his willingness to grapple
vigorously with difficult regional issues may increase
in the months ahead. Although dramatic Saudi action
is unlikely, Fahd may endorse Egypt's return to the
Arab League if he calculates that Syrian acquies-
cence can be bought.
Iraqi setbacks in its war with Iran could provide the
incentive for Saudi action. We believe that a string of
Iranian military successes against Iraq would force
the Saudis to act if Riyadh and the Gulf states
became convinced that an Iranian victory were near.
Saudi Arabia and the neighboring emirates have long
feared the spread of Iran's Islamic revolution and
might view Egypt's military strength as the only
effective check to Iranian advances. If this scenario
were to unfold, we would expect the Saudis and the
other moderates to renew bilateral ties to Cairo,
bypassing the complications a summit meeting would
entail.
Cairo's continued isolation will sharply limit Mubar-
ak's ability to pursue independent or pro-Arab policies
on matters of importance to Tel Aviv and Washing-
ton, according to our analysis. It also will undercut his
ability to parry domestic and Arab criticism that he is
a stooge of Israel and the United States, especially if
future crises force him to choose between supporting
Arab causes and endangering vital Egyptian interests
in peace and US aid flows.
The effect of an Egyptian-Arab rapprochement on
Israel and the United States would depend on how it
is accomplished and Mubarak's political health at the
time. US policy would be seriously undercut if Egypt
returned to the Arab fold by repudiating Camp David
and severing diplomatic relations with Israel. Such a
move could provoke Israeli annexation of the West
Bank and Gaza and would seriously complicate future
peace efforts. We believe Mubarak would take this
drastic course only as a last resort to protect his
domestic political position. As much as he would
prefer to preserve relations with Israel, Mubarak
would be hard pressed if Tel Aviv were to initiate
hostilities or launch a series of unprovoked attacks
against an Arab neighbor.
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On the other hand, a reintegration undertaken on
Arab initiative without a renunciation of Camp David
would benefit Washington by strengthening the mod-
erate Arabs and possibly positioning Egypt to broker
future Arab-Israeli contacts. Mubarak's political for-
tunes would receive a welcome boost that could have
both positive and negative implications. A more se-
cure political position could permit him to be more
flexible in attempts to normalize relations with Israel.
Reducing his isolation, however, would make him less
receptive to US influence, and US-Egyptian military
cooperation could suffer if Mubarak concluded that
such activity would reduce the benefits of rapproche-
ment. He also might choose to downgrade relations
with Tel Aviv to harmonize his policy with public
opinion.
We believe a healthy working relationship with Israel
and close ties to the United States are likely to remain
pillars of Egyptian foreign policy whether or not
reintegration occurs. Mubarak has stated repeatedly
that Egypt will adhere to the Camp David accords
and that there is no alternative to peace with Israel.
Despite a growing anti-Israeli mood among Egyp-
tians, peace is popular, even within the military.
Although Mubarak, under pressure from fellow Ar-
abs and domestic critics, is eager to reduce his
dependence on the United States, he has nowhere else
to go for the vast sums-$2.3 billion last year-
necessary to keep the Egyptian economy afloat. We
believe that prospects for increased Arab aid in the
event of rapprochement are dim, although many
Egyptians-including Mubarak-appear to count on
renewed financial assistance as a logical outgrowth of
restored ties. Between 1974 and 1978, Arab states
disbursed $6.4 billion in economic aid and $2.8 billion
in military aid to Egypt. At present, however, the Gulf
Arabs are in the midst of their own financial crisis
because of falling oil revenues. In our view, they
remain preoccupied with more immediate problems-
in particular Iraq's struggle against Iran-and are
neither able nor inclined to provide the additional aid
Egypt will require.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP88T00096R000200290001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP88T00096R000200290001-9
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP88T00096R000200290001-9