IRAQ'S WARTIME GOVERNMENT: POWER SHIFTS IN THE REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000200300001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Power Shifts in the Regime
Iraq's Wartime Government:
NESA 86-10032
Ju1v1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Power Shifts in the Regime
Iraq's Wartime Government:
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared b
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution b Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 86-10032
July 1986
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Iraq's Wartime Government:
Power Shifts in the Regime
Summary The unexpected length and costs of the war with Iran have forced
Information available significant changes in decisionmaking within the Iraqi leadership. Unable
as of 19 June 1986 to bring the conflict to an end quickly, Iraq's President Saddam Husayn
was used in this report.
has been forced to share power more broadly with his senior colleagues to
bolster his sagging political support and to spread responsibility for war
policy. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has emerged as the
apex of the Iraqi power structure. It is headed by Saddam, who, along with
eight other top political leaders, makes all decisions of significance.
Baghdad's shift to collegial rule benefits the United States by making Iraq
a more stable country and enhancing the influence of Iraqi officials who fa-
vor strengthened ties to the West.
The regime relies on four main pillars of support-the ruling Bath Party,
in which all but one of the current RCC members got their political start;
the bureaucracy, increasingly dominated by technocrats; the security
services, run in part by relatives of Saddam; and the military, which the re-
gime strictly controls, even to the tactical decisionmaking level.
The Bath Party is the key avenue for political advancement. No longer
dominated by ideologues, the party is led by men who have proved their
ability to mold public opinion and to organize and broaden popular
support-particularly among Iraqi Shias. Iraq's next generation of leaders
probably will be drawn primarily from the ranks of the regional party
bosses. Technocrats also are gaining political stature, and many may
become leaders in Iraq's postwar society, using their expertise to rebuild
the war-ravaged economy.
If the regime remains intact throughout the war with Iran, collegial rule
will probably continue. The leadership recognizes the collective approach is
the most effective way to rule the country as long as the war lasts.
Moreover, Iraqi leaders know any shakeup of the system would weaken
public confidence in the regime, risk damaging already low public morale,
and impair the functioning of the government. Although there are
differences of opinion within the RCC about how to deal with the war, the
regime's leaders continue to act as one on policy toward the nearly six-year
conflict. This reflects, in part, concerns that open squabbling would only
play into Iranian hands.
iii Secret
NESA 86-10032
July 1986
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If the war ends with the present regime intact, we see two possible
scenarios for leadership politics-a continuation of the collegial style that
could, over the long run, lead to a permanent restructuring of the political
system with a lessening of the President's influence; or a return to strict
one-man rule, probably through a purge by Saddam or as a result of a
struggle among his successors.
US-Iraqi relations would be more likely to flourish under continued
collegial leadership in Baghdad than if one-man rule reemerged. Collective
leadership has produced a more open society and led to the first modern
constituencies in the country's history. Some of these constituencies-in
particular the technocrats-are well disposed toward the United States.
Collegial rule is also more likely to promote stability in Iraq, which in turn
would promote greater stability in the Persian Gulf region. A reversion to
one-man rule would probably lead to recurrent violence and turmoil.
Secret iv
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Tariq `Aziz
5
The Party
7
The Intelligence and Security Services
10
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
Iraq's Wartime Government
Bureaucracy
Ministries
Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC)
Party Apparatus
Area and Functional Bureaus
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Iraq's Wartime Government:
Power Shifts in the Regime
During the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq was one of the most
unstable countries in the Middle East. Various strong-
men fought each other to assert their absolute author-
ity over the country, producing a succession of bloody
coups and a long, costly civil war from 1961 until
1975 between Arab Iraqis and the Kurdish popula-
tion.
The Bath Party seized power in 1968, eliminating
rival claimants and organizing a repressive security
apparatus that turned the country into a police state.
Iraq's present ruler, Saddam Husayn, became Presi-
dent in 1979 and, according to US diplomats, intensi-
fied repression throughout the country. He also ap-
pointed a number of family members to powerful
government posts to solidify his regime's grip on
power, a move that antagonized many Bath leaders.
US diplomats have suggested that these appointments
backfired on Saddam, essentially leading to a narrow-
ing of his support both within the party and the
population at large.
We believe that Saddam launched the war against
Iran in 1980 partly in the hope that a decisive victory
would bolster his sagging prestige. Iraq's early suc-
cesses shored up Saddam's political fortunes, but the
growing public realization that the war would be a
long one led to a further erosion of Saddam's support.
US diplomats state that by mid-1982 the President
feared enemies within the party were about to over-
throw him.
In response, Saddam moved to buttress his position by
purging nine of the Ba'th's 17 leaders at a hastily
convened party congress in June 1982. According to
US diplomats, he promised to consult with the seven
loyalists who survived on all important policy matters
if they would continue to support his presidency. The
remaining seven, along with Saddam and one other
nonparty member, constitute the present leadership
and represent the Bath Party, the bureaucracy, the
military, and the intelligence and security services-
Changes in Leadership in Iraq
Since Iraq's revolution against the monarchy in /958, the country's
leadership has changed hands six times:
Leader
Dates in
Power
How Removed
Gen. Abd al-Karim
Qasim
1958-63
Assassinated in a
coup
Gen. Abd al-Salam
Are!
1963-66
Killed in helicopter
crash
Gen. Abd al-Rahman
Are!
1966-68
Overthrown by
Ba'th
Gen. Ahmad Hasan
Bakr
1968-79
Replaced by
Saddam Husayn
We believe that Saddam's turn toward more collegial
decisionmaking has helped stabilize Iraq's political
system. The party leaders who joined Saddam all
represent important constituencies, and this has
broadened the regime's power base. In addition, US
diplomats argue that the regime is remarkably cohe-
sive, although Saddam and his colleagues may have
merely suppressed their feuding because they know
that Iran will take advantage of such differences in its
effort to drive them from power.
The Revolutionary Command Council
the four key pillars of the regime.
All the leaders who agreed to support Saddam in 1982
sit with him on the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), the ultimate decisionmaking body in Iraq. The
dominance of the RCC is in part obscured by the
confusing Iraqi edifice of power, which has several
seemingly important bodies that ostensibly check the
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For most of this century, Iraqi politics have tended to
be dominated by particular provincial groups. Since
the rise to power of the Bath Party, the Tikritis have
been one of the more influential of these regional
blocs. Tikrit, a city north of Baghdad, has given Iraq
two presidents-Saddam and his predecessor
Gen. Ahmad Hasan Bakr. Other important Tikriti
politicians include Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayral-
lah and Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother,
the former head of Iraqi intelligence. The Tikritis,
though powerful, are not popular in Iraq. Pursuing
narrow regional interests, many are reputed to be
bigots, committed to the supremacy of Iraq's Arab
Sunni minority. The Kurds are deeply suspicious of
the Tikritis.
Barzan, while he was in office, was despised by
Kurdish tribal leaders. The Shias also mistrust the
Tikritis. Under General Bakr's tenure as President,
the weight of the Shias in the party was drastically
reduced. Only with the rise to power of Saddam did
the Shias begin to overcome their second-class status.
Saddam has tried to make himself the leader of all
areas and groups in Iraq.
authority of the RCC.' In fact, these other bodies are
virtually powerless; there is no rival to the RCC. The
members of the Council include-in order of our
assessment of their importance and influence-
Saddam Husayn, First Deputy Prime Minister Taha
Yasin Ramadan, Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, RCC
Vice Chairman Izzat Ibrahim, Interior Minister
Sa'dun Shakir, Trade Minister Hassan Ali, Chairman
of the Popular Progressive National Front Na'im
Haddad, Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayrallah, and
Iraqi Vice President Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf 2 (see
appendix).
' For example, the system includes a so-called National Command
Council and Regional Command Council, whose authority suppos-
edly equals that of the Revolutionary Command Council. In fact,
US diplomats have described the National Command as practically
moribund and the Regional Command as merely an instrument for
implementing decrees of the RCC.
' Ma'ruf was appointed to the RCC to curry favor with Iraq's
Kurdish community. The Kurds make up 20 percent of the
population and are largely disaffected from the central government.
Ma'ruf is not a Ba'th Party member, and we believe he has little
The Cohesiveness of the RCC
With the exception of Ma'ruf, the members of the
RCC have shared the same formative political experi-
ences and appear to be well disposed toward each
other. Their political attitudes were shaped in the
1950s when they participated in street battles against
both the monarchists and the Communists. They all
have served prison terms and spent years in hiding,
either underground in Iraq or in exile
US diplomats state that the members still consider
themselves "revolutionaries," imbued with the princi-
ples of the pan-Arabism formulated in the writings of
Michael Aflaq, the founder of Ba'thism. They support
Palestinian nationalism and regard Israel as expan-
sionist. They are-to varying degrees-committed to
socialism as both a political and economic model.
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We believe that the similar backgrounds of the RCC
members explain, in part, why the Council has been
able to move toward a more collegial approach. 25X1
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Principles of the Bath Party
The Bath Party, founded in the late 1940s, was
based on Arab nationalism and has proved-com-
pared with other Arab political parties-quite suc-
cessful. Today it holds power in Iraq and Syria and
has followings in Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and North
Yemen. The party's three main tenets are Arab unity,
freedom, and socialism. Ba'thists have long promoted
Arab unification and were briefly successful in form-
ing a federation of Iraq and Syria in 1963. The Iraqi
and Syrian Ba'thists eventually split, however, in part
because of strong opposition to union inside Iraq-
mainly by Shias and Kurds. With the boom in world
oil prices in 1973, the Iraqi Ba'thists turned away
from unification efforts and focused instead on using
Iraq's oil wealth to build a strong Iraqi nation.
Washington and Moscow.
Despite the general cohesiveness of the RCC, there
are differences between members over policy toward
Na'im Haddad apparently dislikes
the United States. Foreign Minister `Aziz, on the
other hand, makes no secret of his admiration for the
West and the United States in particular. Saddam has
had a stormy relationship with the Soviet Union,
dating from the early 1980s, when, according to US
Embassy reporting, he infuriated Soviet leaders by
attacking Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. The
diplomats say First Deputy Prime Minister Rama-
dan's attitude toward the United States recently has
undergone a transformation. He formerly was sharply
at odds with Washington, but, since the United States
agreed to assist Iraqi efforts to cut off arms to Iran, he
has granted a number of interviews to US visitors and
praised US-Iraqi relations, calling for greater contacts
between the two countries.
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Freedom is a Ba'thist code word for anti-imperial-
ism. In the 1950s the major imperialist power in
Ba'thist eyes was Great Britain. After the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, however, the United States assumed this
role. To a lesser extent, Ba'thists view the Soviet
Union as imperialist. Despite Baghdad's reliance on
Moscow for much of its military hardware, Iraqi
Ba'thists have been particularly suspicious of the
Soviet Union since Moscow temporarily cut off arms
supplies to Iraq in the first days of the Iran-Iraq war.
Ba'thist notions of socialism tend to be fairly simplis-
tic-socialism, First Deputy Prime Minister Rama-
dan told a Western academic, is seeing to it that
everybody has bread. Before the Iran-Iraq war, the
Ba'thists generally were successful in raising living
standards and literacy rates among Iraqis. The good
will engendered by these moves has benefited the
regime during the war years-Iraqis appear to believe
that, if they can defeat Iran, the postwar period will
bring renewed prosperity.
Our information is sketchy, but it suggests that RCC
members differ on other issues as well. For example,
Embassy officials report that a minority of RCC
members consistently has refused to make concessions
to the Kurds, despite Saddam's inclination to grant
them greater autonomy. Other Embassy reporting
indicates that Foreign Minister `Aziz failed in 1984 to
talk First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan into
supporting a plan for an oil pipeline from Iraq to
Jordan. Public statements by `Aziz and Ramadan
show that the two men hold conflicting views toward
ending the war-'Aziz for a long period believed the
leadership in Iran eventually would propose negotia-
tions; Ramadan regards the leadership in Tehran as
fanatical and says the war will not end until Khomeini
dies and the Iranian leadership breaks apart.
The Personalities of the RCC
Saddam Husayn. Without doubt, Saddam is the
leading figure on the RCC. Western diplomats cau-
tion, however, that, although he dominates the RCC,
he does not control it. The diplomats maintain that
Saddam's views generally prevail, but, whenever he
encounters forceful opposition, he usually seeks to
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compromise. Saddam is, in addition to being Presi-
dent of Iraq and chairman of the RCC, the head of
the Bath Party and commander in chief of the armed
forces.
Saddam is regarded by diplomats and Western aca-
demics as one of the most pragmatic leaders in the
Middle East. he is
impatient with ideology and would "ally with the
devil" to achieve his goals. He also is ruthless.
Saddam has considerable charisma that the regime
has successfully exploited to mobilize support for the
war. According to US Embassy reporting, Saddam is
not a good speaker. When emotionally aroused, how-
ever, he conveys great sincerity, which seems to strike
a chord in the Iraqis. If he were assassinated or
overthrown in a coup, we believe this would be a
major psychological blow to Iraqi morale and impair
the country's ability to carry on the war.
Taha Yasin Ramadan. Next to Saddam, in the opin-
ion of US diplomats, the most important figure on the
RCC is First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan. He
has been described as the de facto
head of government and Iraq's economic czar. The
diplomats believe he is an extremely competent man-
Iraq's Cult of Personality
face on the dial.
The cult of personality surrounding Saddam Husayn
has been a feature of Iraqi politics throughout the
war. The walls of Baghdad are plastered with posters
of Saddam, some several stories high. Iraqs press is
filled with praise of the `Sole Leader. " Saddam is
portrayed as a brillant wartime strategist, an inspira-
tion to Iraqis at the front, and a clever chief executive
whose economic plans conserve the nation's re-
sources. Many Iraqis carry watches with Saddam's
According to US diplomats, the cult was deliberately
contrived by party leaders who feared the party was
too elitist to inspire the allegiance of the Iraqi public.
They, therefore, decided to humanize the war by
making Saddam the symbol of the struggle. Until
recently, the diplomats say the cult has been largely
effective, particularly with lower-class Iraqis. Those
who have observed Saddam's reception in the lower-
class neighborhoods of Baghdad say he is received
there with genuine warmth.
The diplomats note that Saddam tends to overdo the
cult, however, which has angered some party leaders.
They report that in 1985 First Deputy Prime Minister
Ramadan may have purposely stayed away from
celebrations marking Saddam's birthday because he
regarded them as overly lavish. After this, the diplo-
ager with considerable energy.
Ramadan's role has grown in importance largely
because of his success in managing Iraq's economy
under wartime conditions and protecting the regime
from any backlash from his imposition of wartime
austerity measures. In the early years of the fighting,
the regime tried to spare the Iraqi people economic
hardships by allowing continued imports of luxury
goods. By 1983, however, it fell to Ramadan to put
brakes on the economy. He introduced regulations to
eliminate luxury items from the market, but he also
maintained adequate supplies of essentials such as
food, clothing, and heating fuel. As a result, his
austerity measures did not have a significantly ad-
Ramadan's next major success, according to the
diplomats, was the rescheduling of Iraq's debts in
1984. Following the rise in oil prices in the 1970s, the
country's leaders had embarked on an ambitious
program to transform Iraq into a modern industrial-
ized state. When the leaders realized that escalating
war costs would jeopardize Iraq's development plans,
Ramadan convinced foreign governments to take over
funding of some 800 projects, promising to reimburse
them after the war.
verse impact on popular morale.
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Government technocrats form Ramadan's principal
constituency. These experts-mainly in the Ministries
of Finance, Oil, Trade, and Planning-assist him in
running the government. US Embassy reporting ques-
tions whether Ramadan, who began his career as an
Army sergeant, has a great deal in common with his
proteges, many of whom hold advanced degrees. The
diplomats believe, however, that he retains their loyal-
ty by defending their interests. For example, accord-
ing to US diplomats, Ramadan prevailed over Sad-
dam's objections in 1983 in the appointment of
Hisham Tawfiq as Finance Minister.
Diplomatic sources in Baghdad have reported that
Saddam would like to get rid of Ramadan, fearing
him as a potential rival. Nonetheless, Ramadan is
accorded publicity in the newspapers and on television
second only to that given the President. He also
commands the 750,000-man Popular Army, the Bath
Party's militia. We agree with US diplomats that
Saddam and Ramadan, although not personally close,
cooperate out of necessity-Saddam by his charisma
and tight control of Iraq's security services maintains
popular support for the regime, but he needs Rama-
dan's organizational skills to keep the government
operating on a wartime footing.
Tariq `Aziz. Foreign Minister `Aziz is, in our view, the
next most important figure on the Council after
Saddam and Ramadan. In the same way that Rama-
dan directs Iraq's economy, `Aziz is the major influ-
US diplomats credit `Aziz with devising the strategy
to attempt a worldwide embargo on arms sales to
Iran. `Aziz also was instrumental in persuading his
colleagues to renew diplomatic relations with Wash-
ington. Diplomats believe it was `Aziz who persuaded
Saddam to expel Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1985,
which enabled Washington to remove Iraq from a list
of nations supporting terrorism and to begin exporting
US technology to Iraq.
We believe that `Aziz's position as the lone Christian
on the RCC has made him sensitive to the need for
more representation for Iraq's minorities in the bu-
reaucracy. He has appointed large numbers of Chris-
tians, Kurds, and Shias to important posts in his own
ministry.'
Abd al-Jabbar Haddawi, in charge of developed
countries, is a Shia; Peter Yussif, the Ministry's Third
World director, is a Christian; and Ismet Kittani,
Iraq's Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, is a Kurd.
' Since they make up a majority of Iraq's population, Iraq's Shias
cannot be called a minority. Nonetheless, until the advent of the
present regime, the much smaller-and dominant-Arab Sunni
ence on foreign policy.
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Figure 2
Religious Breakdown in Iraq
Christian-Armenian,
Chaldean, Assyrian-5.0
We believe that `Aziz's Christian background is an
asset in dealing with Saddam, who, according to US
Embassy reporting, trusts `Aziz because he does not
view him as a threat. Although not forbidden by law,
we believe that a Christian could not become Presi-
dent of Iraq, a predominantly Muslim nation.
Izzat Ibrahim. Ibrahim, the RCC's vice chairman, is
officially the ranking RCC member after Saddam.
According to US diplomats, he is influential within
the party; a Western diplomat has described him as
the "institutional memory of the Ba'th." He knows
the party apparatus intimately and is one of the few
who can make it work smoothly. For a number of
years he has been secretary of the party's powerful
Military Bureau, which certifies Army officers for
promotion, and this has enabled him to develop a
constituency in the armed forces.
At the same time, we believe Ibrahim lacks the
political potential of either Ramadan or `Aziz. The
US Embassy states he does not appear to be ambi-
tious and has a lackluster personality.
King Fahd and Izzat Ibrahim
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diplomats have reported he would like to
because he is not viewed as a threat.
retire. Like `Aziz, Ibrahim is trusted by Saddam
Sa'dun Shakir. Interior Minister Sa'dun Shakir has
long been one of the regime's major protectors. For
years he was the party's boss in Baghdad. He also has
had a long career in police work and has directed
Iraq's chief intelligence service, the Mukhabarat. As a
result, we believe that Shakir, with his numerous
contacts in the Iraqi capital, protects the party's base
US diplomats have asserted that Shakir is someone to
whom Saddam would turn in a crisis. During the
1950s, when the Bath was driven underground in
Iraq, the diplomats say Shakir provided hideouts for
members, one of whom was Saddam. Shakir, accord-
ing to Western diplomats, is an intimidating personal-
ity.
Hassan Ali and Na'im Haddad. Trade Minister Ali
and Chairman of the Popular Progressive National
Front Haddad are Shias.' US diplomats say that
' The Front is a collection of weak political parties that the Ba`thists
use to bolster the image of popular support. It lost considerable
significance in 1979 when the regime expelled the Communists, and
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Saddam values the two men because of their connec-
tions to the Shia community. Both are veteran Ba'th-
ists and comrades of Saddam from the early 1950s.
Ali has undertaken important domestic and foreign
trade assignments for the regime. He is a member-
along with Ramadan-of the powerful Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations Committee, which directs Iraq's
overseas trade. According to US diplomats, Ali and
Ramadan work closely together. Like Ramadan, Ali
has a reputation for toughness. A US official has
described him as "radiating brutality."
We believe that Haddad is Iraq's point man for
radical causes. As chairman of the nearly moribund
Popular Progressive National Front, Haddad once
was active in developing relations with the Soviet
Union, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Palestin-
ians. Now that Iraq has moderated its support for
radical causes, Haddad's influence appears to be
diminishing. We believe his political stature would
increase, however, if the regime decided to resume a
more radical course.
`Adnan Khayrallah. Defense Minister Khayrallah is
used by Saddam to deflect criticism about the conduct
of the war. In the first two years of Saddam's rule, US
Embassy reporting indicates, Khayrallah was influen-
tial, but his impact has waned with successive defeats
in the war. We do not believe he has a significant
constituency in the armed services.
Khayrallah is a
cousin of Saddam and is married to his wife's sister.
The Bath Party, through which all but one of the
RCC members gained his political experience and
position, is the sole avenue of political advance in
Iraq. There are no significant opposition parties, and
the religious establishment is tightly controlled by
RCC members, all of whom are committed secular-
ists. With the exception of warring Kurds, who are
carrying on a low-level insurrection in the north,
The party's main function is to carry out the direc-
tives of the RCC. To accomplish this, diplomatic
sources in Baghdad report the party apparatus is
organized into geographical bureaus covering the
northern, southern, central, Baghdad, and Euphrates
regions of Iraq. Party bosses are the supreme authori-
ties in these regions. They wield the power of prefects
or governors.
Talented party bosses can-and frequently do-be-
come ministers in the government bureaucracy. `Abd
al-Wahab al-Shaykhli, a boss of the Baghdad Bureau,
last year became Minister of Higher Education and
Scientific Research, an important post given Iraq's
drive to acquire Western technology. If al-Shaykhli
retains the Ministry, he is likely to have increasing
responsibilities for dealing with US officials.
The Party Bosses
In our view, the RCC will look to the senior party
bosses as the next generation of Iraqi leaders. Accord-
ing to US diplomats, in 1982 the RCC elevated six
such bosses to newly created posts as presidential
advisers. They sit in on RCC meetings and participate
in its debates as nonvoting members. Those of the six
who stay in the regime's good graces are almost
certain to become RCC members.
An examination of the backgrounds of the six reveals
what the regime looks for in Iraq's future leaders. All,
according to US diplomats, were outstanding admin-
istrators of potentially disruptive regions. Muhammad
competing power centers do not exist in Iraq.
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Figure 3
Bath Party Area Bureaus in Iraq
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Hamza al-Zubaydi, for example, defused explosive
political and social tensions early in the war in the
predominantly Shia province of Al Basrah. He staged
large rallies in support of the regime, and, according
to the diplomats, developed a network of agents that
infiltrated the outlawed Shia opposition Dawa Party
and helped expose it to the police.
`Abd al-Wahab al-Shaykhli was instrumental in shor-
ing up support for the regime in Baghdad's turbulent
Al Thawra district, where most of the capital's 1 mil-
lion Shias live. As de facto mayor of Baghdad, he
rehabilitated the district, which US diplomats have
called one of the worst slums in the Middle East (the
district is now called Saddam City). Many local Shias
regard al-Shaykhli as a hero for upgrading their
quarter, US diplomats report.
Five of the new advisers-al-Zubaydi, Abd al-Ghani
Abd al-Ghafur, Mazban Hadi, Abd al-Hasan Rahi
Fir'awn, and Sa'di Mahdi Salih-are Shias, and we
believe this shows the regime's determination to hold
on to the allegiance of this important community. US
Embassy officials have suggested that, by elevating
Shias to prominent posts in the government, the
regime hopes to offset Iranian propaganda that it
discriminates against the Shia community.
All of the six except al-Shaykhli made their reputa-
tions in the provinces, which suggests the regime is
also interested in building up the party in the more
remote areas of the country. According to US diplo-
mats, the party in the past concentrated its organizing
efforts on Baghdad and Saddam's home territory of
Tikrit, north of the capital.
Since Saddam took over as President, the party has
been trying to broaden its membership to counter
popular perceptions that it is elitist. US diplomats
estimate the party has about 1 million candidate
members and 40,000 full members. The candidates
must undergo a probationary period before being
admitted. The probation can be onerous, according to
the diplomats, involving long hours of party work and
drilling in party ideology. It also can take up to seven
years before a candidate is fully accepted.
The Party Bureaus
In our view, the area bureaus are the most important
organs of the party. It is through the area bureaus
that the regime exercises discipline over the party
cadres.
The party also has functional bureaus that sign up
members according to work specialties. Diplomatic
sources in Baghdad report that the Vocational, Mili-
tary, Students and Youth, Labor, and Peasants Bu-
reaus are the most significant.
The party's Military Bureau-which has responsibil-
ity for political organization in and oversight of the
Iraqi armed forces-is controlled directly by RCC
members.
Over the last decade, Iraq's large bureaucracy has
become an increasingly important power center.' All
major industries in Iraq are nationalized-except for
agriculture, which is largely in private hands-and, as
a result, a large part of Iraq's labor force is employed
by the government.
Iraq's
bureaucracy started growing shortly after the 1973 oil
boom. Prior to that, it was directed mainly by so-
called party experts, who, according to US diplomats,
were largely hacks who owed their positions to politi-
cal connections.
Even after growth began in the 1970s, the regime
tried restricting important ministerial posts to Ba`th-
ists
5 We have no precise statistics on the size of the Iraqi bureaucracy,
but estimated that it may number as
high as 667,
or, %I I
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Ultimately, the leadership relented and made talent
the major criterion for bureaucratic advancement.
Today, US diplomats say, many top Iraqi officials-
like Oil Minister Ahmad Taqi al-'Uraybi-are not
party members. An Iraqi official recently drew the
attention of a US diplomat to the fact that five of the
six high-ranking bureaucrats seated with them at a
banquet were not Ba'thists.
Despite the increasing independence of the bureaucra-
cy and its growing role as a key prop of the regime, it
has not yet established itself as a conduit for member-
ship on the RCC. No one has ever made it to the RCC
solely because he was a successful bureaucrat. Former
Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi came closest-
being frequently invited to sit in on RCC delibera-
tions-bu Ham-
In the early 1980s, Saddam's family, the Tikritis, took
control of the Mukhabarat, making it their personal
power base. Saddam's half brother, Barzan al-Tikriti,
was installed as Mukhabarat director. Barzan ap-
pointed Tikritis to important posts,
and ultimately the clan
virtually annexed the security establishment.
Following Saddam's pact with Bath leaders in 1982,
a power struggle developed between them and Barzan,
who, according to diplomatic sources, resented the
RCC members' influence on his half brother. Ten-
sions came to a head in the summer of 1983, when,
according to US diplomats, Barzan ordered the arrest
of leading Ba'thists whom he accused of sedition.
according to a
diplomatic source, the party leaders pressed the Presi-
dent to investigate his half brother's activit~~
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madi was never a heavyweight in the regime.
We believe that with the end of the war the bureau-
crats' political importance will increase as the regime
looks to them to rebuild the country. Under such
conditions, it seems likely that-as has occurred in
the Soviet Union-expert managers will be elevated
to the supreme governing body. Likely candidates for
RCC membership, in our view, are Oil Minister Taqi
al-'Uraybi and Minister of Finance Hisham Tawfiq.
The Intelligence and Security Services
Despite former Mukhabarat director Shakir's pres-
ence on the RCC, we believe that the influence of
Iraq's security and intelligence establishment has
waned since a purge in 1983. It consists of four
agencies-the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Mukha-
barat), the internal police force, Military Intelligence,
and the Palace security unit.
Embassy officials commented at the time that Bar-
zan's fall advanced the fortunes of the RCC because
he and other prominent clan members were the main
rivals to the party leaders. Saddam's decision to
remove his half brother threw the clan into disarray,
with some clan members supporting Saddam, others
Barzan. US Embassy officials believed that the dis-
missal of Barzan provided a great boost for the
regime's popularity. Barzan was regarded by many
Iraqis as a corrupt individual who had climbed far
above his station.
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Despite Barzan's dismissal, family ties to Saddam
persist in the security establishment because the
President retained a number of cousins in important
security posts. One such cousin, Husayn Kamil
al-Majid, heads the Palace security unit. The internal
police force is directed by another cousin, Hasan Ali
al-Majid.
According to US diplomats in
Baghdad, the party leaders believed that, during
Saddam's absence, Husayn Kamil-not RCC Vice
Chairman Ibrahim-was the real power in Baghdad.
The military has played an almost constant role in
Iraqi politics since the overthrow of the monarchy in
1958. Practically all of Iraq's subsequent leaders have
been officers who seized power in successive coups.'
The Bath Party's first attempt at leadership in 1963
was aborted within months by a military overthrow.
As a result, Saddam and his Ba'thist colleagues have
been particularly wary of the potential for further
military involvement in Iraqi politics. Using as his
instrument an intelligence unit called the Public
Relations Bureau (the unit out of which grew the
Mukhabarat), Saddam systematically purged the
military in the late 1970s by implicating many offi-
cers in alleged antiregime activity and executing
them.
6 The exception is Saddam, who has no military background and
who came to power peacefully, the anointed successor of Gen.
Ahmad Hasan Bakr. Nonetheless, since taking power, Saddam has
endeavored to portray himself as a military figure. He has assumed
the rank of marshal and is invariably seen in public wearing a
military uniform
To maintain the military's loyalty, Iraq's civilian
leaders have tried-since they took power in 1968-to
assign Ba'thists to senior commands wherever possi-
ble.
The present Chief of
Staff, Jawad Thanun, was a Bath Party activist
together with Saddam in the 1960s.
The regime monitors the loyalty of commanders
throughout the armed forces by attaching political
guidance officers to major units.
The war presented the regime with a major challenge
regarding its control of the military. Iraq's leaders
responded by taking over command and control of the
prosecution of the war, both to guarantee that orders
would be followed and to ensure against the develop-
ment of power bases within the military for officers
with political aspirations. According to diplomatic
sources in Baghdad, until mid-1984 the regime insist-
ed on approving all major military operations in
advance and made all tactical decisions down to the
company level. The practice met with considerable
opposition within the officer corps, and, after mid-
1984, the source claims, it was restricted to units
above the brigade level. Nonetheless, regime interfer-
ence continued to have a debilitating effect on officer
performance and morale. US diplomats say, however,
that, since the defeat at Al Faw in February 1986, the
regime has been reconsidering policies that discourage
initiative by local commanders. The appointment of
more aggressive commanders-and any subsequent
relinquishment of authority to them-could require
the regime to consider relinquishing more political
power as well.
At present, the military is the only major power bloc
in Iraq not represented on the RCC, and, in our view,
there is only a remote possibility that the regime will
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promote a military leader to Iraq's highest governing
body. If such a move were to take place, a likely
candidate would be Shanshal. According to US diplo-
mats, he has excellent relations with other RCC
members, none of whom views him as a threat.
Shanshal is not a party member, however, and this
might rule him out as a candidate. Lt. Gen. Hisham
Fakhri, who conducted the purge of Barzan loyalists
in the Mukhabarat in 1983, is a strong party member
and, therefore, a more likely choice to join the RCC.
We believe that the present system of collective rule
in Iraq will last at least until the end of the war.
Saddam and his party colleagues probably recognize
that-given the wartime emergency-it is the stron-
gest and most expedient approach to decisionmaking.
Instead of limiting power to Saddam and his cronies
and family members, it exploits the considerable
expertise and political savvy of other key party lead-
ers. They can be a check on Saddam, and they can put
forth alternative views and more thoroughly explore
the consequences of contemplated actions in the give-
Moreover, the system enables the regime to make
more effective use of the party apparatus. The lead-
ers, working through their constituencies, can ensure
that decrees are implemented speedily and effectively.
As a result, according to US diplomats, Iraq's politi-
cal system is better disciplined and organized than
Iran's, which tends to be chaotic.
We also believe that the self-interest of Iraqi leaders
helps to keep the present system in operation. Any
shakeup in the RCC while the war is going on would
betray to the public that the regime was losing
confidence in itself. US diplomats say a purge in the
leadership could force Iraqi morale-already low-
Moreover, a shakeup of the RCC leadership would
impair the functioning of the government. The loss of
First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan, for example,
would probably demoralize his constituency in the
economic ministries-a major part of Iraq's brain
trust. These technocrats look to Ramadan as their
leader. Without him, they probably would not operate
as efficiently, and some-out of resentment-might
withhold cooperation from his successor. The same
would apply, in our view, in the cases of Ibrahim and
Shakir with their respective followers in the party and
the intelligence services.
The regime also knows that the Iranians would exploit
any sign of dissension among Iraq's leaders to their
advantage. A purge would provide Iran at least with a
major propaganda coup and at most with an incentive
to try to force the war to a military conclusion.
The ultimate shape of Iraq's political system depends,
in our view, on the outcome of the war. Nonetheless,
we can sketch two possible scenarios, assuming the
present regime survives the conflict intact:
? The first scenario would involve a further strength-
ening of collegial rule. The odds for this scenario
would increase if Iraq's leaders perceived that the
challenges of postwar reconstruction required a
broad-based effort. For example, some Western
diplomats have suggested that Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait will cut off or sharply reduce aid to Iraq as
soon as the war is over. Under such circumstances,
it would be difficult-perhaps impossible-for Iraq
to rebuild fully its ravaged economy (this certainly
would be the case if the price of oil remained
depressed). We believe Iraq's leaders would respond
by closing ranks to enhance reconstruction efforts
and to protect Iraq's regional influence. A prolonged
period of cooperation between Saddam and the
party leaders, in our view, would bring about a
permanent restructuring of the political system.
Younger leaders-men like al-Zubaydi and
al-Shaykhli-who had grown accustomed to colle-
gial rule, would probably seek to perpetuate it when
they became members of the RCC.
? The second scenario would be a return to one-man
rule. In such a case, Saddam would seek to take
advantage of the end of hostilities to institute
another purge to sweep aside rivals like Ramadan
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Saddam Husayn
Military Bureau
presidential advisers
Palace security unit
Military Intelligence
Mukhabarat a
Republican Guards
Military Bureau
Military Intelligence
Tikrit/Sunni
Taha Yasin
Ramadan
Popular Army
Economic ministries
Foreign Economic
Relations Committee
Tariq `Aziz
A!-Thawra
(party newspaper)
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Information Ministry
Izzat Ibrahim
Military and Peasants
Bureaus
Ministry of Agriculture
Internal Security
Directorate
Mukhabarat a
Hassan Ali
Labor Bureau
Trade Ministry
Foreign Economic
Relations Committee
Na'im Haddad
Popular Progressive
National Front
a Saddam exerts control over the Mukhabarat through his son
Uday, the Deputy Director. The Director, al-Barraq, is a protege of
Shakir.
b There are persistent reports that Shakir is a Shia.
Military Bureau Tikrit/Sunni
Defense Ministry
Sulaymaniya/
Kurd
and reassert his earlier near-dictatorial powers. US
diplomats cite the cult of personality surrounding
Saddam and his disposition to continue it even after
the war as signs that this scenario might occur. A
move by Saddam against the party leaders would
require strong support from the security forces.
With Saddam's cousins, Husayn Kamil al-Majid
and Hasan Ali al-Majid, in charge of Iraq's prima-
ry security services, the President would be well
positioned to conduct a purge, and this could lead to
the resurgence of power of Saddam's family at the
expense of the party.
It is also possible that continued military defeats
inflicted on Iraq could produce a regime change
before the war is over. Iraq's military commanders
might turn against the RCC members and demand
that they relinquish control of war planning to the
Army. The RCC probably would resist such a move,
leading to serious domestic turmoil and perhaps the
replacement of the current regime by a military
strongman.
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No matter what type of rule evolves in Iraq after the
war, Baghdad will almost certainly strive to improve
relations with the United States. It wants US technol-
ogy and looks to Washington for aid against Iran,
which will remain a threat to the Iraqi regime even
when the war is concluded.
In our view, chances for active cooperation between
Washington and Baghdad would increase if there is
collegial rule in Iraq. Since Iraq resumed diplomatic
relations with Washington in 1985, practically all
RCC members have encouraged visits from US offi-
cials.
We also believe that collegial rule helps create a
political climate in Iraq conducive to improved rela-
tions. Collective leadership has produced a more open
society and led to the first modern constituencies in
the country's history. Some of these constituencies-
in particular the technocrats-appear well disposed
toward the West. In meetings with visiting US offi-
cials, the technocrats display a good understanding of
Western political systems-many were educated in
Europe and the United States-and they express
admiration for Western scientific advances. We antic-
ipate that such groups would facilitate the develop-
ment of closer ties between Baghdad and Washington.
In addition, we believe that continued collegial rule
would promote internal stability in Iraq. The top
leaders now have broader support, and their authority
and influence touch a wider segment of the communi-
ty. A more stable Iraq is likely to produce a more self-
confident regime that is less of a threat to the Arab
Gulf states
On the other hand, we foresee difficulties for US-
Iraqi relations if the country reverts to one-man rule.
Given Iraq's volatile history, such a regime could be
expected to maintain itself in power primarily through
violence, and in turn it would be subject to coup
attempts.
One-man rule would also probably produce less coher-
ent and more arbitrary decisionmaking, and access to
the leadership would probably be severely restricted.
Moreover, a return to the narrow, family-based style
of government that characterized Iraq before the
present collegial rule was introduced would probably
drive many of Iraq's most qualified technocrats into
voluntary exile, weakening a constituency that favors
improved ties to the West.
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Appendix
Members.of the RCC
President (since 1979)
Chairman, RCC (since 1979)
Shrewd ... pragmatic ... the dominant force in Iraq's
domestic and foreign policy ... willing to sacrifice
Bath Party ideology for economic development and
security ... fled Iraq twice and was imprisoned for
political activities during the late 1950s and mid-
1960s ... participated in successful Bath coup in
1968 ... became vice chairman of the RCC in 1969
... gradually built his power base and became Presi-
dent in 1979 ... holds a degree from Baghdad College
of Law ... about 48.
First Deputy Prime Minister
(since 1979)
Commander in Chief, Popular
Army (since 1975)
Member, RCC (since 1969)
The second-most important figure in the Iraqi Gov-
ernment ... power bases in the Bath Party, govern-
ment bureaucracy, and Popular Army ... ruthless
and ambitious .. arrested for antigovernment activi-
ties during the 1960s ... helped bring present Bath
regime to power in 1968 . .. during the 1970s served as
Minister of Industry, Acting Minister of Planning,
and Minister of Public Works and Housing ... has a
secondary school education and probably attended the
Military College in Baghdad ... about 48.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since 1983)
Deputy Prime Minister
(since 1979)
Member, RCC (since 1977)
One of President Saddam Husayn's most intelligent
and trusted advisers ... skilled negotiator and chief
architect of Iraqi foreign policy ... a Chaldean
Christian ... served as the Bath Party's propagandist
(1958-68) ... participated in successful 1968 Bath
coup ... editor in chief of Al-Thawra, the official
party organ (1969-78) ... Minister of Information
(1974-77) ... holds a B.A. in English from Baghdad
University ... about 49.
Vice Chairman, RCC
Assistant Secretary General,
Ba'th Party Regional Com-
mand (since 1979)
Member, RCC (since l 969)
Manages the Bath Party's daily affairs ... since 1975
chairman of the party's Military Bureau, which moni-
tors military loyalty ...
Sufism (Islamic mysticism).
imprisoned three
times in the 1960s for Bath Party activities ...
appointed supervisor for provincial development pro-
jects after the Bath took power in 1968 ... served
successively over the next decade as Minister of
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and Interior ...
about 44 ... a devout Sunni Muslim who practices
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Gained President Saddam Husayn's trust during the
1960s by hiding Saddam and other leaders of the then
outlawed Bath Party
active in Bath Party since 1955 ... im-
prisoned several times as a result of his party affili-
ation ... led the Mukhabarat, Iraq's largest intelli-
gence service (1973-77) ... concurrently ran
Baghdad's infamous "Palace of the End" prison ...
holds a degree from the College of Law and Politics of
al-Mustansiriya University ... about 46 ... like
Saddam, is a native of Tikrit.
Minister of Trade (since 1977)
Member, RCC (since 1977)
Saddam Husayn
... longtime Ba'thist who was imprisoned
for antiregime activities before the party took power
in 1968 ... appointed to the Arab Affairs Bureau of
the RCC in 1969 ... chairman for the Supreme
Agricultural Council (1974-76) ... Minister of Do-
mestic Trade (1976-77) ... assumed his present
position when the Ministries of Domestic and Foreign
Trade merged ... holds a B.A. degree in political
economics from the University of Baghdad ... about
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Chairman, Popular Progressive
National Front
Member, RCC (since 1977)
Hardline ideologue and confidant of President Sad-
dam Husayn ...
Bath
Party activist in the 1950s ... jailed after the ouster
of the 1963 Bath regime ... appointed a provincial
governor in 1970, but arrested in 1971 for alleged coup
plotting ... rehabilitated and subsequently served as
Minister of Youth (1974-77), Acting Minister of Oil
(1975), Minister of State (1977), and Speaker of the
National Assembly (1980-84) ... holds a degree from
the Elementary Teachers College in Ba'qubah ...
about 53.
Minister of Defense (since 1977)
Deputy Prime Minister (since
1979)
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Armed Forces (since 1979)
Member, RCC (since 1977)
Owes his positions to family relations; he is a cousin
and brother-in-law of President Saddam Husayn ...
plays only a limited role in formulating military
policy, according to US diplomats ... Iraqi officer
corps probably resents him for appointing Bath Party
members and relatives to commands early in the Iran-
Iraq war ... joined Bath Party in 1958 ... arrested
for attempted assassination of former Prime Minister
Abd al-Karim Qasim (1959) ... participated in 1963
and 1968 Bath coups ... holds degrees from the
Military College (1961) and College of Law and
Politics of al-Mustansiriya University (1976) ...
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A Kurd who helped found the Kurdish Democratic
Party in 1945 ... has limited influence despite his
membership on the RCC and largely ceremonial
position as Vice President, which fosters the appear-
ance of Kurdish participation in the government ...
an experienced diplomat ... served successively in
Tehran, Cairo, London, and Jiddah (1949-68) ...
interrupted Foreign Ministry career and moved to
London to represent the Kurdish movement (1963-64)
... was Minister of State in 1968 ... Ambassador to
Italy, with concurrent accreditation to Albania and
Malta (1970-74) ... about 61 ... law degree from
Baghdad University.
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