LIBYAN-SOVIET COOPERATION: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300310001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Libyan-Soviet Cooperation:
The View From Tripoli
An Intelligence Assessment
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Intelligence
Directorate of Top Secret
Libyan-Soviet Cooperation:
The View From Tripoli
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. it was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.F_
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 86-10033C
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Libyan-Soviet Cooperation:
The View From Tripoli
Key Judgments Tripoli views its relationship with Moscow as one of convenience, with
Information available military cooperation as its foundation. Libyan leader Qadhafi considers
as of 15 July 1986 Soviet support for his military to be vital both for Libyan defense and to
was used in this report.
provide teeth to his foreign policy. No other country is willing to offer
Qadhafi's forces the broad-based support the Soviets provide. 25X1
Since the US-Libyan clashes in March and April 1986, Qadhafi's interest
in closer cooperation with Moscow has grown. He almost certainly
perceives the USSR as the party most able to deter increased US pressure
on Libya and will try to elicit greater Soviet diplomatic, military, and
economic support. To secure this support, Qadhafi probably is prepared to
increase the access of Soviet ships and aircraft to Libyan facilities. Indeed,
he probably believes that a larger Soviet military presence in his country
will prevent renewed US strikes.
Qadhafi remains eager to maintain his independence of action and to avoid
even the appearance of being a Soviet puppet. If Moscow is generous in in-
creasing its support, he probably would be more willing than before to
defer at least temporarily to Soviet interests in the formulation of some of
his foreign policies. He could, for example, suspend major arms deliveries
to Iran if he perceived that they were a significant irritant to the Kremlin.
The Libyan military threat to US friends and assets in the region would be
negligible but for Soviet arms, advice, training, and maintenance. The
rapid construction by Soviet technicians of a second SA-5 complex in
Libya-after missiles from the first complex had been fired at US
aircraft-shows that Tripoli can secure Soviet help to increase Libya's
capabilities even during periods of Libyan-US hostilities.
Too Secret
Top Secret
NESA 86-10033C
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Key Judgments
Products of Cooperation
Military Cooperation the Centerpiece
1
Intelligence Cooperation
9
Diplomatic Cooperation a Spinoff
10
Economic Cooperation-Business Is Business
11
Nonmilitary Trade
11
Nuclear Cooperation
11
Qadhafi's Misgivings
12
Qadhafi Wants More and Is Ready To Pay
13
After Qadhafi
17
Implications f
or the United States
17
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Figure 1
Libya and the Soviet Union
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Libyan-Soviet Cooperation:
The View From Tripoli
Libya and the Soviet Union have established a resil-
ient partnership that Tripoli views as increasingly
important. At a time when Libyan leader Qadhafi
feels increasingly pressed by the United States, Mos-
cow's potential usefulness as a counterbalance almost
certainly appears attractive. In light of the Western
nations' diminishing willingness to supply or maintain
Libya's military, Soviet support of its forces has
become indispensable. Qadhafi has long viewed Soviet
aims in Libya with suspicion and has worked to
preserve his independence from Soviet control, but he
is more likely than ever to accommodate Moscow's
interests for the sake of guaranteeing continued Soviet
backing.
The aftermath of the US air raids on Libya on 15
April highlighted both the depth and the current
limits of Tripoli's ties to Moscow. Immediately after
the raids, the Soviets:
? Reestablished an early warning link between the
Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean-which was mon-
itoring the US Sixth Fleet-Libyan General Head-
quarters, and a liaison ship in Tripoli,F_
Libyan performance and defense needs.
? Began a propaganda barrage against the US action.
? Postponed a meeting with the US Secretary of
State.
Qadhafi indicated his frustration that the Soviets
went no further than this, publicly claiming that "the
ordinary [Libyan] citizen may conclude that the Sovi-
et Union has failed him." Nevertheless, Qadhafi
probably accepts that the Soviets will not go so far as
to fight the United States on Libya's behalf. He has
no other ally that can offer more significant support,
and almost certainly he will go far to assure that close
cooperation with Moscow continues.
Highlighting this Libyan interest was the urgent
dispatch of a senior delegation to Moscow in May.
Qadhafi's deputy, Abd al-Salam Jallud, headed a
large group of Libyan officials, including the com-
manders of the Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense
Force, as well as the Ministers of Economic Develop-
ment and Industry.
however, except for a statement by a Soviet Foreign
Ministry official that the partners agreed to "greater
cooperation."
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Cooperation with the USSR has produced a broad 25)(25X1
range of benefits for Libya. Military ties are at the
heart of the relationship, providing vital support to 25X1
Libya's forces and teeth to its foreign policy. Other
benefits, largely diplomatic, spin off from this core of 25X1
military cooperation and probably are of growing
interest to Qadhafi.
Military Cooperation the Centerpiece
Arms Sales. The USSR sells the equipment and
training Libya needs to support its claims of being the
Arab world's arms warehouse and a potent regional
70 percent of Libya's arsenal is Soviet built (see inset).
Libyan purchases since 1970 total over $15 billion,
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From Antagonism to Cooperation:
Development of the Relationship
In the early years of his regime, Qadhafi openly
criticized Communism and Soviet policies toward the
Arab states and rebuffed Moscow's overtures. In
return, Soviet commentators ridiculed his "Third
Universal Theory "for social order. Although
Qadhafi included the USSR in his wide-ranging
search for arms for his underequipped military and
made small purchases between 1971 and 1973, he
showed no interest in a closer relationship.
The first breakthrough in the relationship was
prompted by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Qadhafi s
speeches indicate that outrage over his failure to have
a say in the prosecution of the war prompted him to
build an Arab arms stockpile to make him a key
player in the next conflict. The USSR was the only
country willing to provide the comprehensive arms
package he sought. In 1974, Libya signed a contract
with the Soviet Union for more than $2 billion worth
of jet fighters, submarines, tanks, surface-to-air mis-
siles, and missile boats. At the same time, the two
countries established a commission to promote tech-
nical and economic cooperation. Qadhafi treated the
relationship as strictly business, paying cash for
Soviet arms, advisers, and technicians, and resisting
Soviet appeals for access to Libyan ports and air-
fields.
guaranteed.
Qadhafi's interest in closer links to Moscow in-
creased further in 1981 as Libya's diplomatic isola-
tion compounded his sense of vulnerability. Tripoli
had been widely condemned for invading Chad in
1980. France, Tripoli's largest source of Western
arms, cited the invasion in refusing to deliver weap-
ons for which Libya had already paid. The Libyan-
Syrian union, announced in 1980, was by 1981 clear-
ly stillborn. In varying degrees, each of Libya's
neighbors-even tiny Malta-demonstrated animos-
ity toward the Qadhafi regime.
By spring 1981 a closer partnership with Moscow
almost certainly appeared attractive. Public state-
ments by Qadhafi indicate his belief that the occa-
sional presence of Soviet units at Libyan facilities
could deter US or Israeli attack. At the same time,
Soviet advisers could help expand and accelerate
Libyan military training in order to enhance the
country's self-defense capabilities. Major Soviet war-
ships and naval aircraft visited Libya for the first
time in July 1981. The quality of the training given
Libyans on Soviet-built equipment began to improve
notably in 1982.1
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1980/81 Watershed
We believe that Qadhafl became interested in a closer
relationship with Moscow as a result of heightened
concern for Libya's security in 1980 and 1981. US
naval forces conducted two major exercises near the
Libyan-claimed Gulf of Sidra in 1980, encountering
Libyan ships and aircraft both times. The Libyans
began referring to US reconnaissance aircraft off
Libya as "spy planes, "
In May
1981 the United States expelled the Libyan People's
Bureau from Washington and advised that the safety
of US personnel and interests in Libya could not be
Top Secret
In 1983 progress toward closer ties slowed. According
to the Libyan press, in that year the partners "agreed
in principle" to pursue a Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty, but they apparently have been unable to
arrive at terms for the pact.
has followed the accession of the more vigorous
Gorbachev to the Soviet party leadership, but no
clear milestones in the relationship have been evident.
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Figure 2. Qadhafi and Gorba-
chev meet in Moscow, October
Table 2
Libya, the Preferred Customer
First Year
Exported Outside
Warsaw Pact
First Year
Exported
to Libya
MIG-25 Foxbat
1978
1978
MIG-23 Flogger B
1979
1981
MIG-23 Flogger G
1982
1984
MI-25 helicopter gunship
1978
1979
MI-14 ASW helicopter
1981
1981
Osa-II missile boat
1974
1976
SA-8 surface-to-air missile
1982
1982
SA-13 surface-to-air missile
1985
1985
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Figure 3. SA-8 and MIG-25:
Libya was the first recipient of
these weapons outside the
Port and Airfield Access. Soviet naval ships and
aircraft have been calling at Libyan ports and air-
fields since 1981. Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine aircraft
frequently deploy to Tripoli to conduct antisubmarine
and reconnaissance missions against US and NATO
fleets throughout the Mediterranean. Access to Liby-
an bases, together with Syrian airfields, allows the
USSR to conduct its first aerial reconnaissance of all
the Mediterranean since the Soviets were expelled
from Egypt in 1972. Use of Libyan airfields allows
the aircraft to reach the western Mediterranean,
which they cannot do from Syria. In addition, Soviet
submarines occasionally use Tobruk as a secure an-
chorage for maintenance to alleviate Soviet service
demands at Tartus, Syria, which has long been used
for similar purposes.
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Advisers. We estimate that about 2,000 Soviet and
1,000 East European advisers and technicians provide
essential instructional, planning, and maintenance
assistance to Libya's military establishment. They are
found in Libya's Army and Air Defense Force down
to the battalion level, in military schools, with many
Navy and Air Force squadrons, and with the major
staffs. We have no information indicating that they
have manned any weapon system for the Libyans.
We believe that these advisers have had a profound
influence on Libya's military capabilities and
planning:
the Libyan Army 125X1
the process of reorganizing along Soviet lines, with
battalions and brigades similar in size and composi-
tion to their Soviet counterparts. The reorganization
emphasizes traditional Soviet themes of mobility 25X1
and firepower. 25X1
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Al Julrah Airbase: Libyan Plans and
Soviet Contingencies
A large and modern airfield at Al Jufrah, under
complete,
~in the heart of Qadhafi's
tribal area-is to be the site of Libya's General
Headquarters and Qadhafi s new capital.
on Libya is imminent, he may seek it.
The Soviets probably will be allowed contingency
access to Al Jufrah they
built a facility there for large air-to-surface missiles
such as AS-4s or AS-5s. (No Libyan aircraft is
configured to carry these missiles, but their Blinder
bombers could eventually be so modified.) This im-
plies that Moscow intends eventually to sell Libya
these weapons or sees a contingency in which Soviet
strike aircraft would use the facility, or both. Soviet
Navy Badger and Backfire bombers can carry these
missiles. Qadhafi may not be aware of the intended
function of the missile facility, but he will not dismiss
out of hand a Soviet request to operate strike aircraft
temporarily from Al Jufrah. If he believes an attack
? Libyan and Soviet ships conducted exercises off
Libya in 1982 and 1983 that we believe were
designed to increase Libya's capability to defend
itself against a US naval assault.
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? The Soviet Union probably had an instrumental role 25X1
in Libya's success in hiding its forces in Chad after25X1
the signing of the Franco-Libyan withdrawal agree-
ment in 1984.
Despite this large and pervasive advisory presence, it
is unlikely that Moscow has gained any control over
the use of Libyan forces.
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Meanwhile, Qadhafi's 25X1
security apparatus-which permeates the military-
undoubtedly watches for attempts at covert foreign 25X1
control that could eventually threaten the regime.
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The Libyan military is the organi-
zation Qadhafi sees as the single largest threat to his
regime, judging by the security precautions he has
imposed. Soviet advisers, with their broad access to
the Libyan military, may be in a good position to
detect at least some unrest and coup plotting.
Diplomatic Cooperation a Spinoff
Although military cooperation between Tripoli and
Moscow is widespread, their diplomatic cooperation
has been much less comprehensive. The political
orientation of the two states frequently produces
complementary foreign policies toward the West, but
we doubt that there is significant cooperation in the
formulation of these policies. Qadhafi's dogged pro-
tection of his freedom of action is a principal restraint.
The result is mutual support in international forums
when suitable opportunities arise and generally pri-
vate bickering when Libyan and Soviet foreign poli-
cies conflict.
The Soviet Union provided its most significant-but
still low-cost--diplomatic support to Libya to date in
the aftermath of the US air raids on Tripoli and
Banghazi. Immediately after the raids, Moscow post-
poned a meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State to
protest the US action. Soviet General Secretary Gor-
bachev gave a speech asserting that US actions in
Libya and Nicaragua, as well as continued nuclear
Top 1
support Libya received in those tense times.
testing, were harming US-Soviet relations. Shevard-
nadze publicly urged the United Nations to use all
means at its disposal to stop the US use of force
against Libya. The Soviet gestures undoubtedly fell
short of Qadhafi's hopes at the time, but he probably
now views them as the most important diplomatic
There are numerous earlier examples of low-cost ways
the two partners have provided mutual diplomatic
support. Tripoli has:
? Publicly supported the Soviet occupation of Afghan-
istan, a rare stance for a Muslim state.
? Advocated closer ties between Moscow and Arab
capitals.
? Supported Moscow's efforts in Europe to oppose the
development of "Star Wars" technology and to
promote disarmament.
Moscow has:
? Condemned US threats and military action against
Libya.
? Publicly criticized the French presence in Chad
while justifying the Libyan occupation.
? Criticized London's reaction to the Libyan shooting
in 1984 of anti-Qadhafi demonstrators and a British
policewoman in St., James Square.
? Actively helped Libya avoid a UN Security Council
condemnation for its meddling in Sudan in 1983.
The US Mission at the United Nations assessed that
any resolution condemning Libya would face a
Soviet veto.
There are no examples of instances in which diplo-
matic support by either partner has helped the other
achieve significant political victories.
Moscow's provision and maintenance of Qadhafi's
military arsenal indirectly support his diplomacy.
Soviet equipment enhances his reputation in the Third
World. The perception that Libya has tanks as good
as those of the United States, for example, probably
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impresses many Third World leaders and radical
groups. The size and sophistication of the Libyan
arsenal draw some, like Iran and Nicaragua, to
Qadhafi's doorstep.
Economic Cooperation-Business Is Business
The Economics of Arms Supply. The Libyan-Soviet
arms supply relationship dominates bilateral trade.
Between 1974 and 1982, Libya was the largest recipi-
ent of Soviet arms outside the Warsaw Pact. Since
1982 it has been surpassed by Syria's extensive
military reconstruction effort following the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon and the battering of Syria's
forces.
Oil is the chief medium of Libyan payment for these
arms. An oil barter arrangement between Tripoli and
Moscow was worked out after the soft oil market led
to lengthy delays in Libya's hard currency payments
Even with oil barter, we believe that payment prob-
lems on military contracts remain a source of friction.
By tracking deliveries, we estimate Libya's current
military obligations to the USSR are $700-800 mil-
Nonmilitary Trade. Soviet trade statistics indicate
that Libyan-Soviet nonmilitary trade has averaged
about $300 million a year since 1980, about 6 percent
of Libya's nonmilitary trade. Libya almost certainly
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prefers Western technology and expertise-trade sta- 25X1
tistics show that over 80 percent of Libya's nonmili-
tary trade was with the West last year-but it
sometimes turns to the Soviet Union because of
political considerations or the unwillingness of West-
ern countries to provide these items.) 25X1
Warsaw Pact technical assistance is a significant item
in Libya's nonmilitary trade. The Libyan press indi- 25X1
cates that about 5,000 Soviets and 50,000 East Euro-
peans work in various nonmilitary occupations in
Libya-more than 14 percent of Libya's foreign labor
force. We estimate this presence costs Libya over
$500 million per year. The Soviets have been involved
in several large Libyan development projects, high-
lighted by a nuclear research facility at Tajura'. They
built and are now extending a gas pipeline from
Misratah to Marsa al Burayqah are building a fertil-
izer plant and chemical complex, and are installing 25X1
new power lines. East European workers play an
important role in road and housing construction, the
oil and gas industry, and agriculture. 25X1
Nuclear Cooperation. The nuclear relationship is one
of the most erratic aspects of Libyan-Soviet coopera-
tion. The Soviets completed a nuclear research center
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at Tajura' in 1984 and are negotiating a contract to
build two power reactors at Surt.
hard bargaining over the price
of future nuclear projects have generated much acri-
mony between the partners
We believe, that the Libyans anticipated that the
Tajura' nuclear research center would allow them to
develop a core of technically qualified personnel nec-
We believe Qadhafi eventually will accept Soviet
conditions for manning the research reactor and any
new power reactors. He still wants the prestige of
nuclear facilities and has little prospect of finding
another nuclear patron. Libya does not have the
facilities or the indigenous expertise to develop major
nuclear projects on its own by procuring material and
assistance piecemeal on the international nuclear gray
market. We believe that neither Libya nor the USSR
will allow the nuclear problem to endanger their
overall relationship.
Qadhafi's Misgivings
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essary to support a wide range of nuclear activities.
In our view, Qadhafi has strong misgivings about too
close a relationship with Moscow. We believe
Qadhafi's desire to protect his independence of action
is second only to his desire to assure the survival of his
regime. Generally distrustful of the superpowers, he
probably fears that the USSR will try to manipulate
Libyan foreign policy for its own ends. Beyond this, he
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almost certainly is eager to avoid being considered a
Soviet puppet. He also probably fears, as a worst case,
that the Soviets may back a coup attempt by a Libyan
figure more willing to serve Moscow. This worry
almost certainly was reinforced by the support the
Soviets provided South Yemeni rebels in the coup
there this year.
favors such a treaty on the whole
We judge that Qadhafi has a deep-seated prejudice
against foreign bases on Libyan soil. He moved
quickly to expel US and British military units from
Libya after the coup in 1969 that brought him to
power. In our judgment, a fear that there may be no
end to Soviet demands for access has been a factor
inhibiting Qadhafi from signing a Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty with the USSR, even though he
to avoid total dependence on Soviet equipment.
over the years. They also have prompted Qadhafi to
put a high priority on finding Western arms suppliers
These misgivings have always been overcome by
Qadhafi's pragmatism regarding the potential bene-
fits of cooperation with Moscow. They have, however,
affected the pace of development of Libyan-Soviet ties
behalf.
Qadhafi Wants More and Is Ready To Pay
Qadhafi's increased fear of the United States proba-
bly is prompting him to press for even closer involve-
ment with the USSR. He almost certainly perceives
Moscow as the party most able to deter increased US
pressure on Libya, even though he probably accepts
that the USSR is unlikely to go to war on Libya's
Qadhafi probably is pleased with the Kremlin's public
statements of support for Libya in its conflict with the
United States. Qadhafi may view as a milestone the
Kremlin's public linkage-enunciated after the 15
April raids-of progress in US-Soviet relations and
US actions against Libya. Qadhafi almost certainly
will try to elicit additional and stronger statements
along these lines, hoping that Washington will decide
that battering Tripoli is not worth, for example,
jeopardizing the arms talks. He also may perceive
that the more explicit the Soviets' rhetoric about their
backing of Libya, the more the Kremlin is obliged to
support Tripoli in crises to prevent the USSR from
being labeled a fair-weather friend. A Libyan-Soviet 25X1
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty would suit this
strategy very well, from Tripoli's point of view.
In our view, Tripoli also is seeking Soviet help in
upgrading its defenses with a new sense of urgency.
the Soviets recently delivered computer vans and data
link communications antennas that are part of an air
defense command and control system that is intended
to centralize control of Libya's surface-to-air missiles,
interceptors, radar, and electronic warfare sites. The 25X1
Libyans probably want immediate installation of this
system by Soviet technicians, paralleling the rapid
construction of Libya's SA-5 sites earlier this year.
They may even ask the Soviets to man these and other
systems until Libyan personnel can be trained.
The clashes with the United States also pointed up
deeper weaknesses in the Libyan military that Tripoli
probably will seek Soviet help in addressing. We
anticipate the Libyans will ask the Soviets to help
them build a program for night intercept training-
the US raids in March and April 1986 occurred after
Tripoli may seek Soviet aid in
developing the skills to fire ship-to-ship missiles at
maximum range over the horizon.
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We anticipate that Qadhafi will invite the Soviets to 25X1
increase their use of Libyan ports and airfields. We
believe that Qadhafi drew from the US strikes several
important lessons about the impact of the Soviet
i
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Figure 10
Selected Soviet Weapons Systems in Libyan Inventory
Introduced in
Soviet Forces/
in Libya
Long-range (240-275 km) high-altitude SAM. Primary Soviet 1966/1985
strategic defense against US bombers.
Mobile, low-to-medium altitude, medium range (24 km) SAM with 1970/1977
improved ECCM.
Mobile, low-altitude, short-range (12 km) SAM. Used by ground 1974/1982
forces and for point defense.
Low-altitude, short-range (7 km) SAM. Tracked and possibly
improved version of older wheeled SA-9.
1977/1985
Tactical fighter. Libyans have latest version (MLD), best in Soviet
operational inventory.
1978/1984
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Figure 10 (Continued)
RIB
SSC-3
Antiship cruise missile on mobile launcher for coastal defense with
a range of 80 km.
1979/1983
Diesel powered, attack submarine. Already exported to several
countries outside the Warsaw Pact.
1958/1976
Patrol boat equipped with 4 SS-N-2 cruise missiles for
antiship warfare.
1969/1981
Introduced in
Soviet Forces/
in Libya
This tank has improved fire control with laser rangefinders. Libya 1980-81/1984
does not have the version with improved armor, the T-72 M1, which
has gone to Syria and India.
Single stage 300 km range surface-to-surface missile widely deployed 1961/1976
in the Middle East.
25X1
To Secret
25X1
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Prospects for Increased Soviet Access
to Libyan Facilities
Trying to buy at least the appearance of Soviet
protection, Qadhafi probably is prepared to allow
Moscow increased access to Libyan ports and air-
fields, at least doubling the current rate of 10 ship
visits and four tofive aircraft deployments to Libya
per year. He would offer more if he were desperate.
Three types of increased access are possible: in-
creased Soviet deployments to Libya, the stationing
of Soviet units at Libyan facilities, and the turnover
of a facility to the Soviets to use as their own base.
The prospects for these are addressed in decreasing
order of likelihood:
? Soviet deployments. Libya already allows Soviet
ships and aircraft into Libyan ports and airfields.
Such deployments are likely to increase as the
visits become more routine and as Tripoli reaps the
benefits of joint training, technical assistance,
The pace of
visits so far in 1986 has been even higher, at least
partly at Tripoli's request, because of US-Libyan
tensions.
presence in Libya on US tactical planning. He was
almost certainly impressed by several factors:
? US press reports that, in March, Washington direct-
ed its forces to attack only the SA-5 radars to avoid
casualties among Soviet advisers believed to be in
other parts of the SA-5 complex.
? US aircraft attacked Tripoli International Airport
in April rather than the nearby Umm Aitiqah
airbase, which had doz-
ens of MIG-25s and other military aircraft. Qadhafi
probably believes that Umm Aitiqah was a more
worthwhile target, but he may conclude it was left
untouched because of the presence there of three
Soviet Navy aircraft.
? Soviet stationing. If Qadhafi's fears of US or Israeli
military action increase, we anticipate that he will
invite the Soviets to station aircraft and ships in
ships and submarines could rely on Libyan ports
instead of on some of the offshore anchorages where
they currently rest and replenish.
? A Soviet base. We believe Qadhafi will drop his
long-held opposition to foreign bases in Libya only
if he believes that to do otherwise would risk the
destruction of his regime. Even at that, he probably
would renege on the deal at the first opportunity.
Nevertheless, he will continue to threaten to give
the USSR bases in hopes of deterring NATO
nations from allowing the United States to strike
Libya from bases in Western Europe.
It seems likely that, taken together, these factors will
convince Qadhafi that Libya would derive increased
protection from a larger Soviet presence, even without
a Soviet commitment to Libya's defense.
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Finally, Libya probably will try to increase its eco-
nomic ties to the USSR and its allies to reduce the
impact of Western sanctions. Tripoli is likely to build
on the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agree-
ment-signed with Moscow in October 1985 and
expanded last May-to try to compensate for the
withdrawal of US technicians and parts from Libya
and as a hedge against increased West European
support for the sanctions.
air defense missiles.
Even if Moscow is not generous in meeting Libyan
requests for a closer relationship, we anticipate that
Qadhafi will work to preserve at least the current level
of ties for the foreseeable future. Much of Qadhafi's
foreign policy is based on posturing, rhetoric, and
threats of subversion. What gives it substance is his
military arsenal and his money. He almost certainly
will seek to avoid a permanent breach with the
USSR-Libya's most important source of military
supplies, maintenance, and training-since that would
jeopardize his foreign policy. In addition, with Libya's
isolation from Western arms producers increasing,
Tripoli has only Moscow to turn to for sophisticated
weaponry, such as more advanced fighter aircraft and
Notwithstanding the urgency Qadhafi almost certain-
ly feels for increased help from the Soviets, we
anticipate he will bargain hard to get all he can from
Moscow as cheaply as possible. This approach almost
certainly will continue to generate acrimony between
the partners. As in the past, Qadhafi is likely to tell
Moscow that:
? It would show bad faith to take advantage of
Libya's vulnerability to the United States to insist
on tough terms for new contracts.
? Increased access to Libyan facilities is worth great
Soviet concessions.
support.
? The success of the US strikes on Libya shows that
the defense equipment and training Moscow has
provided thus far are second rate and fall well short
of Libya's defense needs. Implicit would be a threat
to publicize the shortcomings of Soviet military
At the same time, however, we believe that Qadhafi is
ready to pay more than ever to elicit increased support
from Moscow. Depending on how generous Moscow
is, Qadhafi would consider:
? Inviting Soviet ships and aircraft to establish a year-
round presence in some of Libya's facilities.
? Temporarily deferring to Soviet interests in the 25X1
formulation of some of his foreign policies. (For
example, Qadhafi might suspend major arms ship-
ments to Iran, ease anti-Mubarak propaganda, or
avoid adventures like the Red Sea mining of 1984).
? Being more scrupulous in making payments to
Moscow on time and being more flexible on the
price of barter oil.
After Qadhafi
There is a strong possibility that Qadhafi will be
overthrown in the next two years. Likely successors
vary, depending on the timing and nature of the
transition of power, but we believe that most of the
credible candidates would continue Qadhafi's pro-
Soviet course. A military regime, in particular, would 25X1
be most likely to maintain close ties to Moscow, since
it almost certainly would put a high priority on
maintenance of Libya's Soviet-built armed forces.
In the current Libyan-US confrontation, Soviet advis-
ers and technicians are providing meaningful support
that has reduced the impact of the US air raids of
March and April. 25X1
nearly all of the Libyan missile ites 25X1
that were damaged in the raids had been repaired by
late May. There is no indication that Soviets partici-
pated directly in opposing the US strikes.
25X1
25X1
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an Arab-Israeli war.
Moscow's support provides Qadhafi the military
strength he needs to increase tensions in the Middle
East and to.threaten US interests elsewhere in the
Third World. Qadhafi has, for example, drawn on his
arsenal to send arms to Iran, Syria, various factions in
Lebanon, and anti-US regimes as far afield as Nica-
ragua. We believe that Qadhafi would open his
stockpiles to embattled Arabs in the event of a new
Arab-Israeli war. Significant logistic obstacles, how-
ever, would prevent deployment of most equipment-
other than aircraft-to the battle areas in quantities
sufficient to have a significant impact on the course of
Tripoli almost certainly accepts that the USSR will
not intervene in Libyan-US combat with its own
forces but probably hopes that, in the future, Soviet
technicians and advisers will provide direct, albeit
discreet, support. This could include such activity as
Soviet help for Libyan air controllers in identifying
and setting priorities for targets for interception,
preparation of equipment to be used in combat, or
operation of the new air defense computer equipment
that arrived in Libya in
recent months. Such support could significantly in-
crease Libyan air defenses against US aircraft.
Soviet support for Tripoli also threatens US interests
less directly by enabling Libya's military to cause
trouble for such US friends as Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan,
and Chad. Washington dispatched US forces to the
region in 1984 after Tripoli used a Soviet-built bomb-
er against Omdurman, Sudan, and again after it laid
Soviet-made mines in the Red Sea. Additionally,
Soviet access to Libya's airfields helps Moscow moni-
tor the US Sixth Fleet.
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