LIBYAN OPPOSITION GROUPS: MUCH SOUND, LITTLE FURY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000600750001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Sccrct
Intelligence 25X1
Libyan Opposition Groups:
Much Sound, Little Fury
A Research Paper
Secret
NESA 87-10029
May 1987
Copy
334
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
. Libyan Opposition Groups:
Much Sound, Little Fury
A Research Paper
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This paper was prepared by the 25X1
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution by the Office 25X1
of Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank
Secret
NESA 87-10029
May 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 1 May 1987
was used in this report.
Libyan Opposition Groups:
Much Sound, Little Fury
Secret
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Opposition to the regime of Mu'ammar Qadhafi is at its highest level since
he seized power in 1969. Qadhafi has alienated key groups in Libya?
particularly the officer corps?and driven many Libyans into exile.
Although Qadhafi's exposure to antiregime activity by these groups has
increased, he has managed to keep them divided and to check real or
potential threats through ruthless and pervasive security measures. Exclud-
ing the possibility of a "lone assassin" killing the Libyan leader, at this
time only sustained opposition activity inside Libya could destabilize
Qadhafi's regime. 25X1
The military is the only force inside Libya with the capability to topple
Qadhafi. The officer corps generally is opposed to Qadhafi, and many
senior officers would support a change in regime.
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The officer corps could make common cause with pragmatic elements of
Qadhafi's own tribe, which may regard his elimination as necessary to
preserve the dominance of the Qadhafa tribe. Nonetheless, to succeed in
ousting Qadhafi, potential coup plotters would have to be exceedingly
secure and disciplined, and at least a little lucky. 25X1
Most of the approximately 50,000 Libyans living abroad?about 1.5
percent of the population?probably are dissatisfied with Qadhafi's re-
gime. Only about 10 percent, however, are active participants in the 20 or
so dissident groups that have surfaced. 25X1
Despite some initial successes in focusing international attention on
Qadhafi's repression, the Libyan opposition in exile has not been effective.
Although dissident propaganda probably has succeeded in increasing
Qadhafi's obsession with personal security, after several years of activity
the exiles have not acquired a sizable following inside Libya. 25X1
The largest and most prominent of the exile organizations is the National
Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL). The NFSL, which claims a
hardcore membership of about 1,000, has conducted propaganda opera-
tions against the regime and is the only exile group known to have mounted
a paramilitary operation inside Libya?an attempted assassination of
Qadhafi in May 1984. The NFSL has lost momentum since 1985,
apparently because of a lack of will. More recently it appears to have
confined its activities to propaganda. 25X1
iii
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NESA 87-10029
May 1987
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Other exile groups and figures, such as Bashir al-Rabti's Libyan National
Party or former Prime Minister Abd al-Hamid al-Bakkush, are capable of
propaganda operations but are more likely to divide the opposition than to
become a serious threat to the regime. A possible exception may be former
Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni, a prominent exile who
has maintained contact with some senior Libyan officials.
All of the opposition groups abroad depend heavily on foreign support,
primarily from Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria. This dependence seriously
weakens the opposition, as their resources are often hostage to the state of
relations between Qadhafi and other Arab states. The abandonment of the
opposition by Morocco in 1984 and the fall of the anti-Qadhafi Nimeiri re-
gime in Sudan the following year were especially damaging to the
opposition and underscore this vulnerability.
If present trends continue, the exile opposition is likely to become irrelevant
to the security of the regime. With greater activity and will, however, the
opposition could reverse this trend. Even then the exiles by themselves
probably cannot oust Qadhafi, but they could help foster coup plotting.
There are several ways this could evolve:
? The exiles might work toward greater unity?perhaps forming a govern-
ment-in-exile?and concentrate on propaganda activities abroad against
the Libyan regime. To the extent the exiles diminish Qadhafi's prestige
and appeal, they would advance US interests. Such activities might allow
them to play a role in a post-Qadhafi succession.
? The exiles could work to build a network of cells and penetrations in Lib-
ya to support a paramilitary program.
? Huni, working with the Algerians and/or Egyptians, may be able to
galvanize opposition in the officer corps to move against Qadhafi. The
extent of his influence in the Army and security services, however,
remains undemonstrated.
The greatest shortcoming of the exiles has been their failure to act at
crucial times?such as during regime infighting in the fall of 1985 or in the
immediate aftermath of the US airstrikes in 1986. The failure of the exiles
to exploit effectively these internal crises makes them more an irritant than
a serious threat to the regime. Another crisis has resulted from the collapse
of the Libyan Army in Chad, although it remains to be seen whether the
exiles will seize this opportunity to strike at the regime.
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Contents
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Page
Key Judgments
iii
The Expatriate Community
1
Former Royalists
1
The "Old Opposition"
1
The Middle Class
2
Students
2
The Internal Opposition
2
The Armed Forces
2
Islamic Fundamentalists
4
Berbers
4
The Exile Organizations
5
The National Front for the Salvation of Libya
5
Organization and Objectives
5
Membership and Support
5
Propaganda and Paramilitary Programs
6
The Libyan National Party
6
Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni
8
Impact of the Opposition: Talk Is Cheap
9
Propaganda
10
Paramilitary Operations
10
Alternative Prospects for the Opposition
11
Increasing Irrelevance
11
An Irritant but not a Threat
11
A Major Threat
12
An Exile Coup Attempt
12
An Internal Coup Attempt
13
Implications for the United States
13
The Bottom Line
14
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Figure 1
Malta
riisia Mediterranean Sea Lebano
IPOLI
Berber
Jabal Tripolitania
Nalesah ?...
(plateau) wuzdah
Surt
'ehartA
Surf
Military
District
Fezzan Region
Berber Ethnic group
or tribe
Secret
vi
Boundary representatlon Is
not necessarily authoritative
710316 (A05988) 5-87
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Libyan Opposition Groups:
Much Sound, Little Fury
After then Capt. Mu'ammar Qadhafi toppled the
corrupt and discredited Sanussi monarchy in Libya in
1969 with a handful of young military officers, his
regime enjoyed broad popular support. Under Qadha-
fi's leadership the Libyan Government eliminated
many of the abuses of the monarchy, expanded
educational, economic, and administrative opportuni-
ties for the Libyan middle class, and took a more
nationalist and nonaligned posture in international
affairs. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, Qadha-
fi increasingly dictated Libyan policy according to his
own ideology. Economic mismanagement, foreign ad-
ventures, and growing government repression became
the order of the day, turning an increasing share of
the Libyan population, including influential interest
groups such as the military officer corps, against the
regime.
According to open sources, there are now about
50,000 Libyans?roughly 1.5 percent of the popula-
tion?living abroad. Most of these expatriates are
dissatisfied with Qadhafi's regime, but they do not
participate in any of the 20 or so dissident groups
claiming to be active. In addition, the expatriate
community is divided by a number of differing social
and political interests that hinder exile unity.
The Expatriate Community
Former Royalists
The first segment of the population to go into exile
were members of the old Libyan elite closely associat-
ed with the monarchy. Besides members of the royal
family such as Prince Abdallah al-Sanussi, this group
includes politicians such as former Prime Ministers
Abd al-Hamid al-Bakkush and Mustafa bin Halim as
well as some wealthy businessmen who made their
fortunes before 1969. Press statements indicate that
most of these exiles share a conservative, Western-
oriented outlook, although some, such as Bakkush,
frequently accuse the United States of supporting
Qadhafi?in part to tarnish Qadhafi's nationalist
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credentials. Many of these individuals advocate a
return to a capitalist economy in Libya, although few
hope to restore the monarchy. 25X1
Most of the royalist exiles are discredited by their
association with the monarchy,
Even though they command little support either inside
or outside Libya, their wealth and/or personal con-
tacts in the Arab world allow some to play important
roles in the opposition. Bakkush, for example, is a
vocal anti-Qadhafi propagandist. Press reports say
Halim served in the early 1980s as an intermediary
between the National Front for the Salvation of Libya
(NFSL)?the largest exile organization?and King
Fahd of Saudi Arabia. 25X1
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The "Old Opposition" 25X1
A small element of the Libyan expatriate community
is made up of the old leftist opponents of the monar-
chy from the 1960s. These exiles?intellectuals, for-
mer labor agitators, and political gadflies?range
from strict socialist Bethists to moderate social demo-
crats. Many of these old oppositionists originally
supported Qadhafi but later turned against him as
their visions of republican Libya differed. For exam-
ple, Mahmud Maghrabi?founder of an early dissi- 25X1
dent group, the National Grouping?served as Qad-
hafi's first Prime Minister in 1969. 25X1
Members of the "old opposition" were the first to
begin organizational and propaganda activities
against Qadhafi in the late 1970s, but they could not
broaden their support beyond their original ideologi-
cal constituencies or overcome their personal and
intellectual differences. Divided and unwilling or in-
capable of taking practical action against Qadhafi,
they remain a collection of coffeehouse plotters and
aging leftists who we believe are out of touch with the
concerns of most Libyans today. 25X1
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The Middle Class
Middle-class Libyans?professionals, merchants, and
businessmen?driven out of Libya by Qadhafi's perse-
cution of the bourgeoisie and economic hardship, form
what we believe is the largest segment of the expatri-
ate community. Middle-class exiles provide much of
the organizational and financial resources of the
Libyan opposition. Unlike the less numerous royalists
or old opposition, the middle class is an amorphous
group that shares an antipathy for Qadhafi but lacks
a clearly defined ideology beyond a desire for a stable,
nonaligned regime in Libya. In our view, the failure of
both the royalists and the old opposition to recognize
the nonideological orientation of the middle class is in
large part responsible for their inability to gain the
allegiance of this element of the oppositionJ
Students
press reports suggest that
Libya's traditionally politically active student popula-
tion opposes revolutionary committee control of the
universities and shares the general population's griev-
ances against the regime. We believe many students
active in the opposition are also Islamic activists. The
students are important in part because so many of
them study overseas (over 3,000 in the United States
alone).
The Internal Opposition
Sabotage and other incidents since 1983 suggest at
least a rudimentary resistance network exists in Lib-
ya. In the spring of 1985 groups claiming to oppose
Qadhafi were in contact with a foreign embassy in
Tripoli. Many exile groups claim to have adherents in
Libya, but we believe most of these claims are
exaggerated or specious. Even the NFSL has only a
general idea of the number of its partisans inside
Libya Given
the pervasive Libyan security apparatus, most clan-
destine resistance activity almost certainly is loosely
organized and relies on informal tribal, family, or
professional ties.
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Antiregime protest by General Union of Libyan
Students1
The Armed Forces
We believe the Libyan officer corps poses the most
serious threat to Qadhafi's regime. Qadhafi's radical
policies and the country's worsening economic situa-
tion have undermined the privileged lifestyle of the
officers, and the growing influence of the revolution-
ary committees has eroded the political influence of
the Army.
the officer corps is generally opposed to Qadhafi and
that senior officers would support a change of re-
gime?although few are willing to initiate that
change.
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Sources of Discontent
Political Extremism. We believe that Qadhqfi's ruth-
less enforcement of his radical policies is a key factor
motivating active opposition to him. The first signifi-
cant opposition to Qadhafi emerged in the late 1970s,
when Libyan oil revenues were still rising. This
suggests that political grievances were the root cause
of the emergence of Libyan opposition to Qadhafi,
although declining economic conditions in the 1980s
have accelerated Qadhafi 's loss of popular support.
Following an attempted coup by senior military
officers in 1975, the influence of the officer corps was
curtailed as Qadhafi sidelined the remaining moder-
ate officers on the ruling Revolutionary Command
Council and turned to his relatives, fellow tribesmen,
and ideological radicals for support. Student opposi-
tion to the regime erupted in Banghazi in 1976 and
was brutally crushed. Since then Qadhafi occasional-
ly has hanged a few "counterrevolutionary" or "bour-
geois" students on the 7 April anniversary of the
event.
When Qadhafi dissolved the Libyan republic in favor
of a jamahiriya (state of the masses) in 1978, profes-
sional civil servants and technocrats found their role
diminished by revolutionary committees dominated
by young, pro-Qadhafi extremists. Other measures,
such as the seizure of second homes and the national-
ization of small businesses struck at the well-being of
middle-class Libyans, who had prospered during
Qadhq fi's first decade. At this time a growing number
of Libyans began "voting with their feet," and the
Libyan expatriate community swelled.
Economic Problems. Qadhafi 's political problems
have been compounded by economic mismanagement
and since 1981 by falling oil revenues caused by a
soft international oil market. Since 1981 per capita
income has dropped 30 percent, and the country's
economic output in 1986 slipped to its lowest level in
six years. Consumer goods are rationed and often
unavailable, while spending cuts have made food,
water, and electricity shortages a way of life.
Libyans are restless over eco-
nomic problems, particularly food shortages, and
have become increasingly vocal in their criticism
of the regime.
Foreign Policy Problems. Libyan radicalism abroad
has generated opposition. We believe most Libyans
dislike the diplomatic isolation and military defeats
that Qadhafi's adventures have brought to Libya, and
many fault Qadhafi 's largess to foreign revolutionar-
ies when economic problems have forced austerity at
home. At present the foreign policies that are generat-
ing the most discontent in Libya include:
? Chad. Libya's occupation of northern Chad was not
popular with either the armed forces or the public.
the increased 25X1
fighting in northern Chad that began in December
1986 led to concern among the general public and
increased military desertions. The humiliating Lib-
yan defeats at Fada and Ouadi Doum this year 25X1
almost certainly will lead to renewed plotting in the
officer corps, especially if Libya is forced to give up
the Aozou Strip, which it unilaterally annexed in
1973.
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? Iran. Libyan support for the 25x1
Iranian war effort against Iraq has led to dissension
among some military officers. Qadhafl's frequent
efforts to justify his support for Iran suggest that
his policy is unpopular with the Libyan public as
well. Press reports suggest that Qadhafi is belated-
ly putting distance between Libya and Iran. 25X1
? Soviet Union. We believe the large Soviet and East
European presence in Libya offends nationalist
sentiment and is unpopular in Libya.
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Failure of the Soviets to 25X1
prevent the US airstrikes on Libya in 1986 and the
perceived inferiority of the Soviet equipment to US
weapons may have further influenced the officer 25X1
corps' perception of the value of Tripoli's ties to 25X1
Moscow. 25X1
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More recently, Qadhafi's foreign adventurism has led
to disturbances in the armed forces. Diplomatic
sources say there was unrest among
Libyan military units following the US airstrikes in
April 1986.
Despite his problems with the officers, Qadhafi's
pervasive security measures make him difficult to
reach. He changes residence continually, moves offi-
cers from post to post, and has introduced revolution-
ary committees into the armed services as watchdogs
against military plotting.
Qadhafi's security measures have made most
officers resigned to continued domination by Qadhafi
and unwilling to risk antiregime activity. Nonetheless,
we believe the record of past coup attempts and
Qadhafi's continued attack on the armed forces'
prestige, influence, and professionalism ensure that
the armed forces will remain a threat to the regime.
We believe the humiliating collapse of the Libyan
campaign in Chad is the kind of event that will
embolden disaffected officers to challenge the regime.
Islamic Fundamentalists
many
Libyans are attracted to fundamentalist religious
sentiments similar to those being asserted in Tunisia,
Algeria, and Egypt. Moreover, Qadhafi has attacked
the power of the traditional religious elite by confis-
cating religious endowments, closing Islamic schools,
instituting policies such as military service for women,
and making public statements maintaining the sepa-
ration of politics from religion. Qadhafi, who has
accused his opposition of being members of the funda-
mentalist Muslim Brotherhood, faced some resistance
from the Libyan religious establishment as early as
1974.
In August 1986 a ring of
Secret
fundamentalist dissidents was arrested in Banghazi
and later executed for the murder of a revolutionary
committee official. We believe that many Libyan
fundamentalists?like those in Tunisia and elsewhere
in the Middle East?are from the disinherited middle
class.
Berbers
In our view, the only other element inside Libya that
may be of concern to the regime is the Berber ethnic
minority of northwest Libya. (A separate Berber
group, the Tuaregs of southwest Libya, has exhibited
no signs of disloyalty.) The Berbers are an indigenous,
non-Arab group numbering about 100,000 that reside
in the hilly Jabal Nafusah that runs from the Tuni-
sian border to the area south of Tripoli. They are
differentiated from the dominant Arabs of Libya by
language and their adherence to the Ibadi form of
Islam?most Libyan Arabs are Sunni Muslims of the
Maliki rite. According to open sources, the Berber
community traditionally has given more allegiance to
local tribal groups than it has to the central govern-
ment. We believe the Berbers are particularly opposed
to Qadhafi's efforts to impose the Arabic language
and to bring their traditional farmlands under govern-
ment control.
The Berbers probably are cooperating with the exiles.
Following the shootout in Tripoli on 8 May 1984
between NFSL commandos and Libyan security
forces, there were arrests and hangings of Berbers in
the Jabal Nafusah.
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The Exile Organizations
We believe that most of the approximately 20 Libyan
organizations opposed to Qadhafi represent little more
than a letterhead and have a negligible following
among exiles, let alone inside Libya. In our judgment,
only two exile organizations and one individual are
serious opponents of Qadhafi. All have the potential
to contribute to instability in Libya, but they also
have weaknesses that probably will prevent them from
realizing their potential
The National Front for the Salvation of Libya
The NFSL, founded in Khartoum by Muhammad al-
Maqaryaf in October 1981, is the largest and best
organized of the exile groups. It is the only opposition
group with a sizable following and the only one to
have attempted a limited paramilitary operation in-
side Libya. In our view, the NFSL is the Libyan exile
organization with the greatest potential to contribute
to the creation of a climate conducive to a coup
attempt. We do not believe, however, that the Front
has sufficient popular support to take power and
dominate a post-Qadhafi government.
Organization and Objectives. Maqaryaf is the secre-
tary general of the NFSL and its real leader. The
NFSL has developed a rudimentary bureaucracy to
administer its various programs, which include propa-
ganda, the support and welfare of Libyan expatriates,
and small paramilitary operations. The NFSL is
active in countries where large numbers of Libyan
exiles are present, including Egypt, West Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The NFSL's immediate objective, as stated in its
literature, is removing Qadhafi from power. Beyond
this objective, however, the group's goals are nebu-
lous. NFSL literature asserts that the group is com-
mitted to the establishment of a nonaligned democrat-
ic government in Libya. The NFSL "Founding
Statement" includes references to a one-year provi-
sional government to oversee the drafting of a new
constitution and the election of a permanent govern-
ment once Qadhafi is gone. Although the NFSL could
prove to be a voice for moderation following Qadhafi's
removal, the post-Qadhafi political environment in
Libya is likely to be chaotic and hardly conducive to
the establishment of democracy.
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Membership and Support. Recent reports on the size
of the NFSL's membership are difficult to acquire, 25X1
In 1983
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the NFSL estimated
its "hardcore" membership at over 1,000 and believed
that it could count on almost 1,000 additional "active
supporters." The NFSL estimated that it had another
3,000 sympathizers. In our view, these figures were
optimistic at the time, but, allowing for growth be-
cause of the NFSL's comparative activism, the num-25X1
bers are a reasonable estimate of the group's size
today.
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We believe the NFSL is a diverse coalition of middle-
class elements, Islamic fundamentalists, students, and
some former royalists. The middle class, by virtue of
its wealth and numbers, probably dominates the
NFSL, a judgment supported by its generally moder-
ate, nonideological program. Nonetheless, press re-
porting suggests the fundamentalists are a major
faction in the NFSL and probably exercise an influ-
ence greater than their numbers. 25X1
Maqaryaf has strong religious 25X1
leanings and at one time belonged to the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Maqaryaf is an orthodox but not radical Muslim, but
the perception of such radicalism?fed in part by 25X1
regime propaganda?may limit the group's appeal
among the more Westernized segments of the popula-
tion. 25X1
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The NFSL claims to have supporters from every
major region of Libya except Qadhafi's tribal heart- 25X1
land of Surt. The backgrounds of the NFSL's known
leadership suggest a balance among the three regions
of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Despite these
efforts to appeal to a broad spectrum of Libyan
society, a member of a rival exile group claims the
NFSL is perceived by many Libyans to be dominated
by Cyrenaicans. Maqaryaf is a Cyrenaican from a
prominent family of the Magharba tribe, and 25X1
key positions in the NFSL25x
are held by Cyrenaicans. We believe the perception
that the NFSL represents Cyrenaican interests
hinders its ability to broaden its appeal and is a major
obstacle to its ability to consolidate its power in Libya
in the wake of Qadhafi's ouster. 25X1
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It is unclear whether the NFSL has managed to
penetrate the armed forces.
the group has a strong following in the Libyan
bureaucracy but little support in the armed forces. On
the other hand, the NFSL claims to have supporters
among the officer corps and can point to former
royalist Army officers such as Col. Aziz Umar Shun-
ayb among its exile members.
Propaganda and Paramilitary Programs. The
NFSL's major antiregime effort is the dissemination
of anti-Qadhafi propaganda within Libya and abroad.
In August 1982 it began printing a fairly sophisticat-
ed Arabic-language magazine, Al-Inqad (Salvation),
in bimonthly editions of 20,000 copies. The group also
publishes a mimeographed newsletter in English, oc-
casional pamphlets, and other materials.
The NFSL also broadcasts its material to Libya by
radio. The programs focus on Qadhafi's financial
maladministration, his "destruction" of Islam, his
political repression, and his foreign adventures. The
NFSL lost its broadcast site in Sudan?which it had
used since September 1982?following the collapse of
the Nimeiri regime in April 1985. The group relo-
cated its broadcast operations to Baghdad, until Iraq
shut them down in early 1987 when it sought to
improve relations with Libya
press
reports indicate that senior NFSL personnel recently
have visited N'Djamena, which suggests that the
NFSL has established a transmitter there.
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The NFSL also prepares a short program, "The Voice
of the Libyan People," which is broadcast without
attribution over Egyptian radio.
The NFSL claims to maintain a paramilitary wing
called the Salvation Forces. Details of the size and
organization of the forces are fragmentary.
at
least two groups of between 30 and 50 NFSL person-
nel received paramilitary training?some in Sudan
and some in Morocco?between 1981 and 1984.
some of the commandos
received one basic and two advanced paramilitary
courses. Allowing for attrition in training and in
combat and assuming some recruiting and training
continues, we estimate the NFSL's cadre of trained
commandos numbers between 50 and 80
It is unclear whether this cadre remains organized. In
April 1984 the
NFSL had infiltrated into Libya three commando
teams totaling about 30 men. At least half of this
group was lost in the gunbattle with security forces in
May 1984, including the founder and leader of the
Salvation Forces, Ahmad Ahwas. Any survivors al-
most certainly fled to avoid being discovered in the
broad security sweeps that followed. Since then there
have been no paramilitary activities in Libya attribut-
able to the NFSL, suggesting that the Salvation
Forces are inactive, if not moribund.
The Libyan National Party
The LNP was founded in 1985 by Bashir al-Rabti,
the former speaker of the parliament of the defunct
Egyptian-Syrian-Libyan union. Although the LNP is
not as large or well organized as the NFSL, it may
over time challenge the predominance of the NFSL in
the exile community.
6
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71
LIBYA N CONSTalriONAL UNION
........ BALANCE REQUMED
cu
? ? ? PARTE Tam m) cu
77E1
No 53 December 98e
........ COACH AN
13 HORSES ...
ALLENGE ...
.... DEADLY GAME .
......... COMPL.EX CASE ........ A CANDLE NORTH COLONEL .......
foilowmg the
thinurd cessation of Libyan funds after
Ite er of Yvonne De rtcher and the
itganfdt tfipiPaIrreZnntfiob'rt
his comments
COUld on the Libyan oppo mon -
therefore hardly be described as
natabfi7?' 'P""n
constructive
G..:songthe/egss, certi,siondisoaissages
RALANcE
REQUIRED
With Gaddan's tenuous hold on Libya
weakening still further during the year, a
;
number of corn n have put Pen to
Paper in 'inn? aoi naryse the :nr,TI'se ';nri to him. 77rcy come
Poorly-inform Med, rh,
herately
situation is given ante lo the
Cnig Harris. 'o
P'n, of 30 NovWensbg,,er-sm
that,
"Theacri?vitie,
rcnncnnv G
Yakal 0
Polon:al, neon. ?
0rg0n flC ICC; led
the Rea?g
p,nn,ansorne,,.)Th. use inostnuanons;reZt
n ,ed Lip by
NFSL,
theYd
??"d the LibY.,
to Ivom;a. th: :a?06001
04b
baukfr
'Poonble Of
y::;:
potici Which, ,n,
r: :.
41.ed' coM:abe Nk:"
d ?
dw:rthP: t."Ph:;Ttlid vP'"Zdch'Td Prtj:
A; \ ? ?)
? \
Various exile publications: (top left) pamphlet by Libyan Constitu-
tional Union; (top right) booklet by National Grouping; (bottom
left) Al-Inqad magazine, by NFSL; (bottom right) NFSL newslet-
ter
7
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Like the NFSL, the LNP appears to represent pri-
marily middle-class interests, although it does not
have the same religious overtones as Maqaryaf s
group. Rabti claims
the LNP has a membership of 400, most of them
located in the United States, Egypt, and the United
Kingdom, and a few in West Germany.
most of the leadership of the LNP is made
up of businessmen and professionals. Unlike the
NFSL, Tripolitanians dominate the LNP leadership.
Although the LNP competes with the NFSL, we do
not believe that it is capable of ousting Qadhafi. In
our judgment, the LNP is a long way from developing
a capability to carry out paramilitary action inside
Libya.1
the creation of a "military de-
partment" represents LNP intentions rather than
capability.
In our view, the LNP will play a spoiler role in exile
politics. Rabti's generally middle-class orientation
could eventually cut into NFSL strength, particularly
if the NFSL does not become more active in confront-
ing Qadhafi. some disgrun-
tled NFSL members broke with Maqaryaf in 1985
and joined the LNP. We doubt, however, that the
predominantly Tripolitanian LNP leadership could
build sufficient support in Cyrenaica and Fezzan to
allow it to become a genuinely national movement.
Abd al-Muttim
We believe that Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni, one of the
original coup plotters with Qadhafi and a former
senior government official, is the only exile with
sufficient stature to be a credible alternative to Qa-
dhafi. Huni, a former member of the Revolutionary
Command Council, Foreign Minister, and intelligence
chief, went into voluntary exile in Egypt following a
1975 coup attempt. Unlike Maqaryaf and Rabti, he
has not founded a formal opposition group. Despite
this, Huni is important because of his prestige.
Rabti himself says the LNP is in financial
trouble?he is reluctant to accept aid with strings
attached from foreign countries?and that its current
organization is an interim structure.
Secret
in August 1986
antiregime pamphlets were distributed in Libya over
Huni's signature. In late 1986 the Egyptian press
reported that Huni met with representatives of the
major opposition groups to form a united front. He
also traveled to Iraq in late 1986 and early 1987,
almost certainly to obtain Iraqi support for his efforts.
8
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Smaller Opposition Groups
Numerous small Libyan opposition groups operate in
Europe, the United States, and the Middle East.
Most of their energies since 1980 have been spent on
abortive efforts to forge a united front. For example,
in October 1985 five small groups met in Houston
and agreed to form the Joint National Allied Leader-
ship Committee, with the aim of competing with the
NFSL for influence among Libyan exiles. The princi-
pal stumblingblocks to exile unity, as suggested by
press reporting are personal
rivalries and political disputes over the form of a
post-Qadhafi government. In our judgment, these
factors will continue to plague efforts to form exile
coalitions.
Most of the lesser groups confine their activities to
propaganda. The Libyan National Democratic
Grouping, Libyan Liberation Organization, Libyan
Constitutional Union, and Libyan National Move-
ment sporadically produce magazines, articles, and
pamphlets and issue press statements. The Libyan
Liberation Organization is primarily a vehicle for
former Libyan Prime Minister Bakkush.
Bakkush circulated
propaganda in Libya in the summer of 1986. The
Libyan National Movement, primarily a cluster of
Libyan Ba`thists supported by the Iraqi Ba'th Party,
used to broadcast on Baghdad Radio. 25X1
Although none of the smaller groups have to our
knowledge mounted paramilitary operations in Lib-
ya, some of them may be responsible for attacks on
Libyan personnel and facilities in Western Europe. In
January 1984 and again in January 1985, Libyan
diplomats associated with antidissident functions
were assassinated in Rome. A shadowy group called 25X1
Al-Burkan (The Volcano) claimed responsibility. i 25X1
Al-Burkan is a front for 25A1
the Libyan National Struggle Movement. Formerly
called the Libyan National Salvation Army, this is e25)(1
small Cyrenaican group supported by Yasir Arafat 's
Fatah Palestinian group 25X1
Another group, 7
April, claimed responsiblity for the bombings of the
Libyan consulate and airline office in Athens in the
fall of 1985, apparently in retaliation for the shooting
of a dissident by Libyan agents. The group also
announced that it carried out the December 1985
bombing of the Libyan cultural center in Malta.
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Huni's prestige?and his ties to senior officers?could
prove decisive should the armed forces determine
continued rule by Qadhafi is intolerable but cannot
agree on one of their own.
Qadhafi was especially concerned by Huni's
leaflets and feared that he would incite unrest.
9
Impact of the Opposition: Talk Is Cheap
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Despite a promising beginning, we do not believe the
Libyan opposition in exile?especially the NFSL? 25X1
has lived up to its potential. Although dissident
25X1
propaganda probably has succeeded in increasing
75X1
Qadhafi's obsession with his personal security,
25X1
even after 25X1
several years of organizing and other activity, the
exiles have not acquired a sizable following inside
Libya. 25X1
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Qadhafi to two revolutionaries:
"Find me someone to exe-
cute . . . I'm feeling lethargic."
In our judgment, the greatest shortcoming of the
exiles has been their failure to act at crucial times?
such as during the regime infighting in the fall of
1985 or in the immediate aftermath of the US
airstrikes in April 1986. We believe that during such
times even a small operation inside Libya would have
had a significant impact on the stability of Qadhafi's
regime. We believe such operations are necessary for
the NFSL?or the other groups?to maintain credi-
bility and gain adherents inside Libya, particularly in
the armed forces. one
reason the Libyan populace is unimpressed by the
exiles is the lack of concrete activity by those groups.
Propaganda
Despite the opposition's failure to engage in timely,
disruptive activities, we believe that its propaganda,
especially its radiobroadcasts, leaflets, and cassettes
distributed in Libya, has had an indirect impact on
the stability of Qadhafi's regime. Such materials
focus discontent on Qadhafi and reassure individual
Libyans that they are not alone in their dislike of the
regime.
Secret
More important, however, has been the personal
impact on Qadhafi of opposition propaganda, which
has provoked him to undertake rash acts to silence the
dissidents and assert his control in the country.
the appearance of leaflets in
Libya after the US airstrikes was especially worri-
some to Qadhafi. His attempt to bomb the NFSL
transmitter in Sudan in 1984 and his repeated at-
tempts to kill the vocal Abd al-Hamid al-Bakkush
highlight his sensitivity to opposition propaganda.
Qadhafi's determination to silence the opposition, in
our view, leads him to take increasingly unpopular
actions at home?such as public executions.
Paramilitary Operations
In our judgment, antiregime paramilitary operations
in Libya have heightened regime insecurity. To the
extent that they have raised the level of discontent in
Libya, we believe they increase Qadhafi's paranoia
and may strengthen the willingness of the officer
corps to move against him. The exiles, however, have
conducted only one such operation in Libya?the
May 1984 gunbattle between l-FSL commandos and
regime security forces in Tripoli. All other incidents?
such as explosions at military facilities in Al Abyar
and Mizdah in 1984?apparently have been generat-
ed internally.
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We judge the NFSL has squandered the considerable
momentum it developed following the May 1984
operation. We believe its failure to follow up that
incident is a major factor in the continued reluctance
of Algeria and Egypt to provide active support to it. If
the NFSL had mounted even a small sabotage opera-
tion shortly after the killing of Hassan Ashqal in
November 1985 or in the immediate aftermath of last
year's airstrikes, we believe it would have aggravated
those crises and put additional pressure on Qadhafi.
Alternative Prospects for the Opposition
Sustained propaganda and/or paramilitary activity by
Libyan dissidents inside Libya almost certainly would
hasten the deterioration of Qadhafi's public standing
and his support among military officers and civil
servants. The regime appears especially exposed in the
wake of its defeat in Chad. Even with a sustained
program, however, it is unlikely that the Libyan
expatriate opposition can remove Qadhafi from power
and replace him with a significantly less radical
government.
We believe the Army, the security forces, and Qadha-
fi's own tribe ultimately will be the forces that
individually or in coalition will determine the survival
of Qadhafi's regime. The security forces include the
pervasive revolutionary committees, the Deterrent
Forces, and the 2,000-strong elite Jamahiriya Guards,
drawn primarily from the Qadhafa and allied tribes.
These organizations would have to be co-opted or
otherwise overcome by any plotters. For the moment,
these forces appear loyal, in large part because they
are insulated from the harshness of Qadhafi's foreign
and domestic policies. If, however, increasing num-
bers of these Libyans begin to suffer in combat with
Chadian forces, they could find common cause with
dissatisfied officers. Alternatively, the added strains
of apprehending deserters and watching the armed
forces may strain the capabilities of Qadhafi's securi-
ty forces to discover and thwart antiregime elements.
In such a situation, an energized exile campaign could
become a significant catalyst in the destabilization of
Qadhafi's regime and would enhance the exiles' abili-
ty to influence a post-Qadhafi government.
11
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In our analysis, the prospects for the Libyan opposi-
tion encompass five possible scenarios, excluding the
possibility of a "lone assassin" killing the Libyan
leader. 25X1
Increasing Irrelevance
If present trends continue, we believe that this scenar-
io is the most likely outcome of exile activity. It posits
a continued inability or unwillingness by the expatri-
ate opposition to conduct operations inside Libya and
a resultant stagnation. Such lack of momentum wou125x 1
further erode the exiles' credibility and undermine
their ability to gain crucial foreign support. It also
would probably lead to greater fragmentation.
Developments that would reinforce the likelihood 25X1
this scenario include:
? The death or defection to the regime of a prominent
exile leader.
? The refusal of Algeria, Tunisia, or Egypt to permit
the dissidents to stage operations from those
countries.
? The cessation of Iraqi or other foreign support to the
exiles.
? An abortive opposition operation in which the re- 25X1
gime inflicts numerous casualties on the dissidents.
? A major increase in oil prices resulting in improved
economic conditions in Libya.
? Significant compromises by Qadhafi that help
dampen domestic discontent (for example, curbing
of revolutionary committee abuses). 25X1
An Irritant but not a Threat
Although we do not believe this scenario is the most
likely outcome of present opposition activity, with
somewhat greater effort the exiles probably could
achieve this level of success. In this case the opposi-
tion would be primarily an embarrassment to Qadha-
fi, capable of propaganda operations but unable to
destabilize his regime. 25X1
A reasonably well-organized and active exile move-
ment, however, would be better positioned to influ-
ence the outcome of a post-Qadhafi succession. Qad-
hafi's successors might invite major exile groups back
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to Libya to burnish the legitimacy of a new regime
and increase Libya's cadre of trained and educated
personnel. The exiles also might be invited back to
help unify the country, especially if the successor
regime were heavily weighted toward one region and
had few representatives from other parts of Libya.
Developments that would improve the prospects for
this scenario include:
? Unification, or at least greater coordination, of the
major opposition groups.
? Formation of an opposition "government-in-exile."
? Continued or increased opposition access to radio or
television transmitters capable of broadcasting to
Libya.
? Regular circulation of opposition literature or cas-
settes inside Libya.
? Defection of a senior regime official to the
opposition.
? High-profile opposition activities overseas, such as
demonstrations, sit-ins at Peoples' Bureaus, and
confrontations with Libyan officials in public fo-
rums.
A Major Threat
This is the optimal scenario for the opposition. We
believe that it is also the least likely. To produce this
outcome the Libyan opposition would have to mount
paramilitary operations inside Libya on a sustained
and regular basis?we estimate at least one per
month. In particular the opposition would have to
strike targets identified with the Qadhafi regime?
revolutionary committee offices, internal security ser-
vice facilities, and regime propaganda organs?rather
than targets identified with the state, such as armed
forces installations. The attacks would have to be
fairly visible and coupled with an effective propagan-
da campaign to increase their impact.
In our judgment, even if the exiles could sustain such
a campaign, it would not be sufficient to topple
Qadhafi. It would, however, be a major factor con-
tributing to insecurity and instability in Libya. In
such an atmosphere, we believe that key Qadhafa
tribesmen and regime officials would put distance
between themselves and Qadhafi, the security services
would become overtaxed, and the armed forces would
be emboldened to move against the regime.
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We believe the following developments would be
necessary to realize this scenario:
? Algeria, Egypt, or Tunisia permit use of their
territory for staging opposition operations into
Libya.
? One or more of the major exile groups develops a
network of cells in Libya capable of supporting a
sustained antiregime program.
? Iraq or another foreign sponsor is willing to main-
tain funding and training of Libyan dissidents.
? The price of oil remains depressed, and economic
austerity measures remain in force in Libya.
? Qadhafi refuses to curb the power of the revolution-
ary committees or reverse unpopular policies such as
the intervention in Chad.
An Exile Coup Attempt
This scenario is difficult to assess because a prerequi-
site for its success is secrecy. In this scenario Huni
would serve as both an alternative to Qadhafi around
whom disaffected elements could rally and as a broker
of foreign support to the coup plotters. Once internal
conspirators had removed Qadhafi, Huni could return
to lend the new regime some legitimacy while Algeria
and/or Egypt moved to shore up the new government.
It is unlikely that even Huni could successfully orga-
nize a coup that initially seized the entire country. He
would have to depend on foreign support to deter pro-
Qadhafi elements from moving against him.
Developments that would enhance the likelihood of
the scenario include:
? Huni continues openly to oppose Qadhafi.
? Huni gains the support of at least some members of
the security services and the Qadhafa tribe as well
as the officer corps.
? Algeria and/or Egypt commit themselves to protect
a new military regime from counterattack by pro-
Qadhafi forces.
? Qadhafi curbs some of the power of the revolution-
ary committees, reducing their ability to protect the
regime.
? Additional US military action against Libya dam-
ages the security apparatus and diminishes confi-
dence in the regime.
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? The Libyan armed forces are made the scapegoats
for the defeat in Chad and continue to suffer
significant casualties, desertions, and declining mo-
rale as a result of Chadian guerrilla actions in the
Aozou Strip.
An Internal Coup Attempt
This scenario probably is the most difficult to assess
both because of the secrecy required for its success
and our lack of reliable information on what, if any,
organized opposition exists in the armed forces. In this
scenario, disaffected officers without links to external
forces would move against the regime. As in the
scenario involving Huni, it is unlikely that military
conspirators could seize the entire country in one
blow. At a minimum, they would have to eliminate?
by assassination, arrest, or exile?Qadhafi and other
senior members of his entourage. They would then
have to gain quickly the support of most of the
military to overcome the almost certain challenge to
their authority by loyalist elements. Their chances of
success would increase if the plotters included ele-
ments of the Qadhafa tribe
Many of the developments that increase the likelihood
of an exile coup also apply to an internal putsch.
Developments that pertain to an internal coup at-
tempt include:
? Qadhafi commits larger numbers of revolutionary
committee personnel and security force units to
Chad, where they suffer casualties.
? The continued failure of Qadhafi's policies, particu-
larly those that concern the security of Libya,
causes many Libyans to doubt the regime's ability
to remain in power and prompts maneuvering
among senior officials in anticipation of a succession
struggle.
? Austerity measures and revolutionary committee
abuses prompt increasingly open opposition by the
Libyan public.
? The necessity for defending the Aozou Strip in-
creases armed forces access to ammunition.
13
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? Disaffected officers are able to exchange views on
the political situation securely among themselves
and to organize without discovery by the various25x 1
security forces.
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Implications for the United States
The impact of Libyan opposition activities on US
interests varies with the degree of success the dissi-
dents achieve. If, as we believe, present trends result
in a fragmented and ineffective Libyan exile opposi-
tion, then US interests will be adversely affected.
Qadhafi's prestige will be enhanced by such an out-
come, and his confidence?and probably his aggres-
siveness?is likely to increase. Moreover, Qadhafi has
publicly stated?and we believe he is convinced?that
exile activities are inspired, supported, and directe25X1
by Washington and its Western allies. He almost
certainly would regard a victory over the exiles as a
victory over the United States, and at a minimum he
would portray it as such in Libyan propaganda.
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US interests are partly served if the exiles remain an
irritant, but not a threat, to the regime. To the extent
that the opposition focuses international opinion on
the abuses of the regime, it would diminish Qadhafi's
prestige and appeal. In addition, if such activity gives
the exiles greater influence in a Libyan succession, it
would also provide the United States an avenue of
influence in post-Qadhafi Libya. There is the risk,
however, that continued exile propaganda pressure,
even if it does not threaten his hold on power, would
provoke Qadhafi and lead to Libyan terrorist retalia-
tion against exiles abroad, including those in the
United States. 25X1
A scenario that leads to Qadhafi's ouster would be
beneficial to US interests, but it is not without risks
and disadvantages. A pro-Western government is
unlikely to replace Qadhafi's rule in Libya, but almost
any successor regime to Qadhafi is likely to be more
compatible with US interests. A Huni-led regime
would at least be a pragmatic government and some-
thing of a known quantity. A regime that emerges
from an internal coup would be more unknown and
perhaps less secure than one involving Huni, but we
believe that any successor will have to address Libya's
internal problems and curtail many of Qadhafi's more
quixotic adventures abroad. 25X1
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On the negative side, Qadhafi's ouster is likely to
usher in a period of instability?possibly even civil
war?in Libya. Such instability probably would affect
countries in the region friendly to the United States,
such as Tunisia and Egypt. These countries may be
tempted to intervene to influence the succession and
could look to Washington to counter Soviet influence
in Libya or even to support their intervention. More-
over, such instability could prompt elements in Libya
to seek support from Moscow and thus provide an
opening for the Soviets to increase their influence in
Libya.
The Bottom Line
The political and economic trends in Libya are run-
ning against Qadhafi. The Libyan opposition may yet
exploit Qadhafi's vulnerabilities, but only if they can
foster the perception that there is an organized resis-
tance to the regime that continues to operate despite
Qadhafi's harsh security measures. The longer the
exiles delay internal antiregime operations, however,
the more likely they will become irrelevant to the
stability of the regime.
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