IRAQ'S AIR FORCE: IMPROVING CAPABILITIES, INEFFECTIVE STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000700910001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Ineffective Strategy
Iraq's Air Force:
Improving Capabilities,
An Intelligence Assessment
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Ineffective Strategy
Iraq's Air Force:
Improving Capabilities,
Directorate of Operations.
ndl (Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
contributions by
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
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NESA 87-10046C
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Iraq's Air Force:
Improving Capabilities,
Ineffective Strategy
Key Judgments The Iraqi Air Force could be a major factor in bringing Tehran to the bar-
Information available gaining table, but Baghdad has been unwilling to commit fully its air
as oft September 1987 resources against Iran. By continuing to hold back its Air Force, Iraq risks
was used in this report.
missing an opportunity to cripple Iran's ability to launch large-scale
offensives. Unless the Iraqi regime takes advantage of the Air Force's
improvements and Iran's relatively weak air defenses, the impact of
airpower on the war will be limited.
A primary concern of the Iraqi regime is to minimize aircraft losses in an
effort to preserve the Air Force's resources for a long war. Moreover,
political restrictions will continue to prevent the Air Force from performing
up to its potential. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn seeks to limit air
attacks on Iran so as not to antagonize the Iranians and cause them to
strike at Iraq's Gulf allies.
Over the past seven years the Iraqi Air Force has become one of the largest
and most experienced in the Middle East. The acquisition of new aircraft
and weapons, greater emphasis on pilot training, and the upgrading of
airfields, radar, and communication facilities have significantly expanded
Iraq's capabilities. Many shortcomings persist, however, limiting the threat
posed to Iran and the region by the Iraqi Air Force.
Highly centralized control of air operations significantly impairs the Air
Force's effectiveness by slowing its response to changing situations and the
needs of ground commanders. Rigid flight plans and tight ground control
prevent Iraqi pilots from using their judgment and often give them no
choice but to perform ineffectively. The Air Force leadership is reluctant to
challenge these constraints.
Problems with training, tactics, and equipment maintenance also have
contributed to Iraq's poor performance in the air war. A reliance on
foreigners for instruction and technical support will limit improvements in
initial flight training-the Air Force's most serious shortcoming-and in
maintenance. Financial constraints will also keep Iraq from becoming more
self-sufficient in sustaining its Air Force. Economic problems and Iraq's
weak educational base will limit Iraq's ability to obtain and operate newer
high-technology equipment and weapon systems without significantly
more-and costly-foreign help.
Top Secret
NESA 87-100460
October 1987
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Iraq's strategic bombing campaigns against critical Iranian economic
facilities, most evident in 1986, have been the most successful of its
operations. As a result of Iraq's more effective air campaign last year, Iran
lost $1 billion in oil revenues and suffered fuel shortages, widespread
electrical blackouts, and some economic dislocations. A similar campaign,
sustained over a period of several months, could significantly reduce
Tehran's ability to wage war and result in economic hardship and civilian
unrest that might force the leadership to scale down hostilities.
Iraq, however, is unlikely to change its generally conservative strategy for
using airpower and for preserving its resources to fight a longer war.
Baghdad's current strategy meets the needs of the regime. Iraq probably
will increase its attacks against Iran's economy only as the Air Force
improves and demonstrates it can do more within the political restraints set
by the regime.
In the aftermath of the attack on the USS Stark, the Iraqi Air Force will
take greater care to ensure that its operations do not directly affect US
shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iranian responses to Iraqi ship attacks and
strikes on oil export facilities, however, could involve US interests-
possibly including warships-in the Gulf.
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vii
More Airfields
6
Maintaining High Levels of Operation
6
10
10
Campaigns Against Strategic/ Economic Targets
Appendix
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Scope Note This paper addresses the development and current capabilities of the Iraqi
Air Force and its likely impact on the Iran-Iraq war, given the political
constraints under which the Air Force operates. It examines developing
trends in Iraqi airpower and their implications for the United States and its
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Iraq's Air Force:
Improving Capabilities,
Ineffective Strateg3[
After seven years of war, the Iraqi Air Force is
Baghdad's only significant means of taking the fight
to the Iranian people and of demonstrating to its own
people that military measures are being taken to end
the conflict. Until recently, poor performance charac-
terized the Air Force's activity. The Air Force's initial
air offensive against Iran in 1980 was a failure despite
the ground attack experience it had acquired from
campaigns against the Kurds in the 1970s. Moreover,
Baghdad was chastened by its moderately high losses
in the early part of the conflict-we estimate that
nearly 90 aircraft were lost in the war's first six
weeks-and decided not to pursue the air war
vigorously.
Iraq ultimately achieved air superiority by default as
Iran's Air Force-cut off from spare parts and re-
placement aircraft by a US embargo-withered. Iran
now has only 50 to 60 operational fighters, while Iraq
has over 500 operational combat aircraft. The Iraqis,
however, have not been able to make their air superi-
ority felt in the ground war. Instead, Iraq has used air
operations to compensate for its Army's defeats.
Baghdad often seems to select targets with high
visibility but limited military value-Iranian cities in
early 1987, for example-in order to punish Iran as
well as to boost Iraqi morale.
The addition of more modern aircraft and new ord-
nance in the past seven years has strengthened the
capabilities of Iraqi airpower. As it demonstrated in a
successful, but short. lived, campaign against Iranian
economic targets in 1986, the Air Force can now
operate more aggressively. We believe that the im-
provement will count for little in the outcome of the
war, however, unless there is a corresponding shift in
the regime's willingness to take advantage of the Air
Force's potential.
We believe that the Iraqi Air Force has the men and
equipment to perform its assigned ground attack and
air defense missions. We estimate that it has between
33,000 and 35,000 personnel and has organized four
air and air defense sectors to protect Iraqi airspace.
Numerous airfields allow Iraqi aircraft to be deployed
throughout the country, providing excellent coverage.
each
sector has at least three interceptor squadrons and two
attack squadrons. Also, most Iraqi combat squadrons
contain 12 aircraft, with some having as many as 18
aircraft assigned.
Growing Inventory of Modern Fighters
Despite estimated losses of between 300 to 325 air-
craft over the past seven years, the Iraqi Air Force has
grown from a prewar strength of nearly 500 to
between 700 and 760 fighters and fighter-bombers. In
our judgment, most of Iraq's aircraft are older models
that are satisfactory for the majority of missions
flown. We believe that Iraq continues to buy less
expensive, older model fighters such as the SU-22
Fitter from the USSR and the F-7 from China in an
effort to economize.
Nearly one-fourth of the over 500 new aircraft deliv-
ered since 1980, however, have been modern aircraft,
such as the multirole French Mirage Fl and the
Soviet MIG-25 interce tor. In late 1986
raq was the first country
outside the Soviet Union to receive the MIG-29 air
superiority fighter, which should improve Iraq's abili-
ty to intercept intruding aircraft. In our judgment,
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Figure 1
Selected Iraqi Fighters and Bombers
Radius (km) (Kg)
425-890 6,300
Relied on for attacks
against ships and
point targets using
precision-guided
munitions.
Combat Payload Comment
Radius (km) (Kg)
590-925 2,700 Ineffectively used for
high-altitude
bombing ... also
reconnaissance.
Combat Payload Comment
Radius (km) (Kg)
590-810 3,000 Used for ground B-6D
attack and air patrol.
Combat Payload Comment
Radius (km) (Kg)
425-700 4,000 Called "bomb truck"
by Iraqis ... relied
on for ground
attacks.
Combat Payload Comment
Radius (km) (Kg)
Radius (km) (Kg)
3,050-4,160 3,000-9,000
Chinese copy of
TU-16 Badger
bomber ... carries
two C-601 air-to-
surface missiles.
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Table 1
Iraqi Air Force Order of Battle
Fighters and
fighter-bombers
498
690
756
MIG-23 Flogger E
30
58
52
MIG-23 Flogger F
46
40
38
MIG-23 Flogger G
0
15
21
MIG-21 Fishbed
237
249
216
F-7 Fishbed
SU-17/20/22
Fitter
135
140
180
Hawker Hunter
15
12
12
SU-25 Frogfoot
0
18
50
Mirage FIEQ5
0
20
19
Mirage FIE
0
48
40
Iraq's other recent acquisitions, the Soviet-built
SU-25 ground attack aircraft and Chinese-made
B-6D bombers, should help correct deficiencies in
antitank and close air support operations and long-
range strikes in the Persian Gulf if they are used
properly.
The Air Force's nearly completed modernization pro-
gram has fulfilled most of Iraq's requirements for
more sophisticated aircraft and reduces the need for
more than minor improvements for years to come.
The Important Role of Transport Aircraft
Transports have been essential to the Iraqi war effort
because of their frequent employment to speed the
delivery of arms and spare parts from Baghdad's
suppliers to Iraq. We believe Baghdad has increased
its inventory of transports from 41 to possibly 65 in
the past seven years. This increase has given Iraq the
ability to lift, if necessary, a maximum payload of
approximately 1,000 metric tons up to 5,250
kilometers
Baghdad probably will buy more transport aircraft.
Nonetheless, Baghdad may be considering the pur-
chase of more modern aircraft, such as the French
Mirage 2000, the Soviet SU-24, or more MIG-29
aircraft. With its cash shortages, Iraq is likely to
decide that its money would be better spent on
equipment that could have an immediate impact on
the war. Iraq's weak educational base will also limit
Baghdad's ability to absorb much more modern, high-
technology equipment and weapon systems without
significantly more-and costly-foreign help. Despite
economic problems, Iraq probably will continue its
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STAT
already reduced efforts to attain self-sufficiency in the
r It
Figure 4. Mirage Fl at Qayyarah West Airfield
STAT
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production of some Air Force equipment.
Better Munitions
We believe that the greater accuracy and lethality of
new munitions acquired by Iraq have been almost as
important as new aircraft to the increase in the Air
Force's capabilities. Unlike the first two years of the
war when the Iraqis had only World War II-type iron
a variety of bombs, rockets, and precision-guided
munitions against Iran.
Iraq still relies heavily on iron bombs, but cluster
bombs, fuel-air explosive bombs, and others are being
used in larger numbers, adding the capability to tailor
ordnance to specific targets.
Although the Iraqis
normally have used cluster bombs against Iranian
frontline formations, they also have been used against
an Iranian pumping station, possibly to prevent work-
ers from repairing airstrike damage
The accuracy provid-
ed by Iraq's French-built, precision-guided air-to-
surface missiles such as the Exocet and the AS-30L
has increased the effectiveness of Iraqi airstrikes
against point tar ets.
Iran and Iraq studiously avoid
dogfights, but occasional downings of Iranian aircraft
by air-to-air missiles indicate that Iraq's Soviet-made
AA-6 and French-built AA-550 Magic air-to-air
missiles are effective.
In our judgment, however, training deficiencies
among support personnel have seriously degraded
Iraq's employment of its munitions. We believe that
early in the war between 30 and 60 percent of Iraqi
bombs failed to explode, probably because ground
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Figure 5
Iraq's Precision-Guided Munitions
The AM-39 Exocet is the all-weather air-launched variant qJ'
a subsonic, sea-skimming antiship cruise missile sold by the
French firm Aerospatiale. Iraq fires the Exocet from FI air-
craft and occasionally from Super Frelon helicopters.
Maximum Range Warhead Guidance
50-70 km 165 kg Active radar
The AS-30L is a highly accurate air-to-surface missile that is
also produced by Aerospatiale. The missile's laser guidance
system allows the aircraft to maneuver evasively while the
missile is in flight. This missile was probably used in several
attacks on critical Iranian oil and power generation facilities
in 1986.
The C-601 is an air-launched variant o/'the Chinese Silk-
worm antiship cruise missile. The C-601 can be fired from
Iraq's four Chinese B-6D long-range bombers.
Maximum Range Warhead Guidance
100 km 510 kg Active radar (possi-
ble infrared variant)
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crews were not proficient at setting fuzes. The diffi-
culties caused by the limited technical skills of ground
crews were repeated when Iraq initially used the
Exocet missile and cluster bombs. In our judgment,
wartime experience and greater familiarity with the
new equipment have helped to overcome some of the
problems, but deficiencies persist and the Air Force
still drops a large number of duds.
Iraq's biggest problem with munitions may be main-
taining a sufficient stockpile. According to Iraqi press
reports, more than 1,400 ground attack sorties were
flown against Iranian positions by Iraq in the first 10
days of the Al Basrah offensive this year. In our
analysis, in both the Al Faw and Al Basrah offensives,
Iraq's Air Force averaged between 100 to 200 sorties
per day against the Iranian attackers, delivering tens
of thousands of tons of bombs during the battles. Iraq
made many urgent requests to Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and some Communist countries to acquire more
bombs, according to
minimal participation in the Iraqi defeat at Mehran in
July 1986 may have been the result of a shortage of
munitions, according to sources of the US defense
attache in Baghdad.
We believe that Iraq is trying to reduce the wasteful
expenditure of munitions.
in 1985 Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn gave a medal to an Iraqi pilot who had not
dropped his bomb load when unable to find the
designated target, indicating that the Iraqis are trying
to end their pilots' wasteful practices. We expect that
continuing economic difficulties will exert further
pressure on Baghdad to stop wasting munitions. The
French press reported earlier this year that Paris was
demanding payment on delivery for its arms, a move
that threatened to suspend deliveries of critical preci-
sion-guided munitions. Other suppliers could make
similar demands, resulting in significant shortfalls for
Iraq.
More Airfields
Since 1981 the Air Force has constructed three major
and 21 dispersal airfields, mostly in southern and
western Iraq
Many of these are complete and operational. The
others are in the mid-to-late stages of construction.
the Iraqis also
have made improvements at many of their 16 existing
major airfields since 1981. They have built new
runways to speed operations and constructed addition-
al hardened aircraft shelters and maintenance/ assem-
bly hangars to protect aircraft from air attacks and
exposure to weather.
Maintaining High Levels of Operation
We believe that Iraq's ability to maintain its aircraft
is very good by Third World standards and provides
some evidence of the Air Force's ability to absorb-
with significant foreign help-modern equipment
while maintaining respectable readiness levels
routine maintenance oc- 25X1
curs regularly at Iraqi airfields, although limited
coverage precludes a determination of its frequency.
a
squadron of 12 MIG-21 or MIG-23 fighters will
normally have one of every three aircraft undergoing
routine maintenance at a given time.
we estimate Iraq's operational
readiness rate for all types of aircraft is between 70
and 75 percent. We believe that the increased number
of sorties flown during the past two Iranian offensives
indicates that the ground crews quickly prepared
returning aircraft for new operations.
Extended high-intensity operations take a toll on
readiness rates, however, because Iraq's technical
base for supporting its Air Force beyond routine
maintenance is still weak. This was demonstrated by
the lull in nearly all Air Force activity following the
Iranian Al Faw offensive last year. A similar pause
occurred toward the end of the 1987 offensive near Al
Basrah when Baghdad initiated a moratorium on air
operations against civilian targets
The Air Force does not have sufficient skilled Iraqi
technicians and relies on approximately 30 French
and several hundred Soviet personnel to keep its
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aircraft flying.
we believe that Iraq sends
many of its aircraft and engines to the Soviet Union,
East Germany, Bulgaria, and France for major
repairs and overhauls.
The Iraqis appear to be making strides in this area.
Iraq modified at least one of its F1 aircraft-later
involved in the attack on the USS Stark-to carry
two Exocet missiles. In our judgment, this moderately
difficult task showed that Iraqi technicians can con-
duct some technical operations without foreign help,
although, according to sources of the US defense
attaches in Baghdad and Paris, the Iraqis continually
experiment with their new systems with little success.
Iraq had previously modified some of its Soviet
aircraft to carry Western ordnance.
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Iraq is almost totally dependent on foreign suppliers
for spare parts. The diversity in the types of aircraft in
the inventory adds to the problem. The Iraqis, howev-
er, have been able to acquire sufficient supplies to
support their operations during most of the war.
Emphasis on Pilot Training
Iraq's pilot-to-aircraft ratio is slightly over 1:1. Bagh-
dad is trying to increase the number of available pilots
to allow the Air Force to sustain extended high-
intensity operations during Iranian offensives. Ac-
The content of Iraqi training does not prepare pilots
thoroughly for the types of missions actually flown by
the Air Force.
Iraqi pilots complain that, once assigned to a squad-
ron, their skills deteriorate because they follow tactics
that vary from the basic pilot training in Soviet tactics
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cording to a source of the
Iraq has put grea er emphasis recently on
training aeronautical engineers-most of whom go on
to become pilots-at the Military College of Technol-
ogy. sources of the US
defense attache in Baghdad report that about 200
pilots-approximately half scheduled for fighter air-
craft-begin training annually. Many, however, wash
out. In early 1986 the Air Force Academy speeded up
training, according to another source of the US
defense attache in Baghdad, by compressing the
three-year course to less than two years0
Iraq depends on instructors from many countries-
primarily the Soviet Union, France, India, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh-for both domestic and foreign train-
ing. In our judgment, the training is of low quality.
The foreign instructors' assessments of Iraqi pilots are
generally negative, and,
foreign instructors highly either
French flight training is tougher and more
thorough than that of the Soviets, and Iraqi pilots who
wash out of training in France often get their wings to
fly Soviet-made aircraft.
many of the foreign instructors do not speak Arabic,
and the language barrier hampers instruction.
they receive.
Limitations on Improved Capabilities
We believe that tightly centralized control of all air
operations and political interference significantly im-
pair the performance of the Iraqi Air Force. Regime
concerns about pilot and aircraft limitations, security
considerations, and limited cooperation between the
air and ground forces before and during the war
strengthen Baghdad's tendency toward tight control.
We believe that the Air Force seldom raises questions
about the operational and political restrictions placed
on it. Many senior officers and Iraqi pilots have grown
rich from cash and land awards presented to them for
their service, and they are unlikely to jeopardize their
position by questioning the regime.
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Figure 9. Iraqi pilots have suf-
ferd from poor training, partic-
ularly that provided by the So-
viets. Earlier in the war,
says that, on some missions
involving more than one aircraft, only the leader
knows the destination and the others just follow,
dropping their bombs on command. These observers
lament that Iraqi pilots will follow flight profiles that
prevent them from accomplishing their mission rather
than deviate from them and face punishment on their
return. Security regulations also cause problems.
These sources suggest that, in many instances, pilots
are forbidden to share information about their
missions.
Iraq's Air Force relies heavily on its ground control
intercept stations to direct not only air-to-air combat,
but also ground attack missions-a practice in part
necessitated by the relatively primitive avionics of
Iraq's older Soviet-model and Chinese aircraft. Iraqi
pilots apparently cannot substitute their own judg-
ment, even when they are in a better position to direct
says that many Iraqi pilots use these con-
trols as an excuse for not doing their job properly. The
Iraqi pilots will often "pile on" the easiest or least
defended targets because of inadequate briefings and
the failure to assign specific targets to individual
aircraft. Many pilots use the instruction not to lose
aircraft as an excuse to avoid reasonable risks. The
Air Force leadership has tacitly supported this behav-
ior by rewarding the pilots with medals and
automobiles, regardless of performance.
Overly centralized control prevents the Air Force
from being responsive to battlefield commanders or to
changing situations. Coordination problems, which
earlier led the Army to take control of most of Iraq's
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helicopter fleet for close air support, continue.
Weak Leadership
In our judgment, the Air Force leadership has done
little to increase its role in airpower policy making
during the war. The current commander of the Air
Force, Lt. Gen. Hamid Sha'ban, was chosen in part
because Saddam believed he would not challenge the
regime's handling of air operations,
press, however, strongly indicate that Air Force oper-
ations still are governed as much by political decisions
as by current capabilities and opportunities.
The leadership of the Air Force may also be ham-
pered because of its subordination to Army officers.
The Air Force commander is under the chief of the
Armed Forces General Staff and the General Head-
quarters in Baghdad, which is staffed predominantly
by Army officers. We believe that most senior Army
officers involved in planning have had little instruc-
tion or experience in air operations and capabilities
Iraqi Strategy: Saving the Last Bullet
Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi Air Force perfor-
mance has been severely limited by Saddam's political
agenda. In our judgment, Saddam has kept Iraqi air
strategy focused on two main objectives: preventing
an Iraqi defeat by using the Air Force to avert or stop
Iranian ground offensives; and forcing Tehran to the
negotiating table by attacking economic targets. De-
spite its overwhelming advantages in the air, Iraq has
not succeeded in either mission. In our view, the
failure is partly the result of technical and training
deficiencies, which are slowly being overcome by
wartime experience.
We believe that the Air Force has been hampered by
Saddam's decision to hold much of its assets in reserve
and use them only in sporadic air campaigns. In our
judgment, Saddam's primary concern is to prevent
significant aircraft losses and maintain air superiority
until the war ends, using the threat of an all-out air
campaign to deter the Iranians from a war-winning
ground offensive. If deterrence fails, Saddam appar-
ently believes that the Air Force can serve as a "last
bullet" to stop a major offensive. Saddam also does
not want to provoke drastic Iranian reprisals against
Iraq or an expansion of the war to Baghdad's Gulf
Arab allies.
protected.'
Campaigns Against Strategic/Economic Targets
In the early years of the war most of Iraq's aircraft
did not have the range to attack Iran's important
targets. When attacking closer targets, Baghdad
would usually send too few aircraft, which would
bomb from high altitudes at high speeds. Baghdad did
not use its Soviet-built, long- and medium-range
bombers for these attacks, probably because it lacked
confidence that these slow-moving aircraft could be
' Baghdad refrains from using its bombers for strategic attacks but
employs them for missions against troop concentrations and, occa-
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Saddam Husayn
President, Field Marshal
Hamid Sha'ban
Commander, Air and Air Defense Forces
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, on the advice of his
closest confidants and allies, has allowed the Iraqi
Air Force to take stronger action against Iran in the
past year. We believe that, following major battle-
field defeats in the first half of 1986, the President's
principal subordinates and Arab allies convinced him
to authorize the Air Force's bombing campaign
against Iran's economy.
Although Saddam probably has delegated greater
operational authority to the Air Force, he still sets
guidelines and monitors operations. He is briefed
frequently on Air Force activities and must approve
long-range strategic raids,
Saddam, however, seeks the advice of
political advisers.
Except for his wartime experience, Saddam has no
military background. He rose to power through the
Ba'th Party ranks and views the armed forces as a
potential opposition,
Hamid Sha'ban, a trusted military adviser to the
President, used his recently increased authority to
orchestrate Iraq's successful bombing campaign
against Iran in the second half of 1986. The air raids
planned by Sha'ban and his staff caused economic
problems for Tehran and demonstrated to the inter-
national community Iraq's ability to stave off defeat.
Since taking command of the Air Force, Sha'ban has
presided over a steady increase in its size and
performance.
Sha'ban, about 55, is a native of Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn's hometown of Tikrit. A member of
the ruling Bath Party, he commanded a key Air
Force squadron that helped bring the party to power
mander in late 1983.
commander, chief of Air Force training, and deputy
commander and then commander of the Air Force
until his brief retirement in 1979. He was recalled to
service in 1980 as an adviser to Defense Minister
Adnan Khayrallah and reinstated as Air Force com-
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In our judgment, Iraq's more recent campaign against
Iran's economy has been the most successful use of its
air assets. We estimate that Iran lost about $1 billion
in oil revenues as a result of the substantial number of
attacks by the Iraqi Air Force against Iranian eco-
nomic and military facilities in 1986. The Iraqis
caused greater damage to critical targets largely
because they employed better aircraft and munitions.
During its longer range missions, Baghdad has relied
on two of its modern aircraft, Soviet MIG-25s and
French Mirage Fis. Both were used as soon as they
became available. Until the end of 1985, Iraq primari-
ly used the MIG-25 against strategic targets because
it could operate in relative safety over long ranges at
high altitudes and speeds. Since 1985 the Iraqis have
relied on the F1 armed with French-made AS-30L
air-to-surface missiles because this combination has
allowed pilots to strike targets more accurately with
minimal risk. Unlike the MIG-25, the F1 can attack
targets from low altitudes at a safe distance using
precision-guided munitions. MIG-25s are still used
when accuracy is not so important, such as in Iraq's
campaign against Iranian cities in early 1987.
The Iraqis have benefited from the F1's capability to
be refueled by other Fls equipped with additional fuel
tanks. Using this technique to extend the Fl's range,
the Air Force conducted several long-range attacks in
late 1986 on Iranian oil shuttle terminals near the
Strait of Hormuz and the Neka power station, north-
east of Tehran. Baghdad also targeted munitions
plants, steel mills, and other defense industries but
avoided areas that were strongly defended. Iraq sel-
dom attacks Iranian airfields and usually has its
aircraft avoid other military facilities as well. We
believe that Iraq's moratorium on attacks on civilian
targets in February 1987 resulted in part because
Baghdad wanted to reassess its tactics following the
loss of a high-flying MIG-25 over Esfahan.
the war, it succeeded in downing an Iraqi MIG-25
flying at 20,000 meters. Tehran probably will make
future attacks increasingly difficult by improving its
air defenses with more surface-to-air missile systems.
Ship Attacks
Iraq's systematic attempts to stop seaborne oil exports
from Iran have been an important part of its overall
campaign against Iran's economy. We expect that, as
long as the war continues, Baghdad will conduct ship
attacks, being careful not to push so hard that the
Iranians retaliate forcefully against Iraq's Gulf allies.
Earlier in the war, Iraq employed Super Frelon
helicopters, whose range limited ship attacks to the
upper part of the Gulf. Attacks on tanker traffic
around Khark Island began only after France loaned
Iraq five Exocet-armed, Super Etendard aircraft in
1984. Once its Fls became operational, Iraq increased
ship attacks, although the effect was reduced by poor
tactics and technical problems
In the first half of 1987 Iraq maintained the high level
of ship attacks seen in 1986. The Iraqi Air Force has
averaged between four and five successful attacks per
month and has hit more than 160 tankers and mer-
chant ships since it began these operations in 1984.
Although only a few tankers and about 20 merchant
ships have been sunk, we believe Iraq's purpose is to
raise the cost to Iran of exporting oil and, in turn,
reduce Tehran's export revenues. The danger posed
by Iraqi attacks has forced Iran to open an oil shuttle
between Khark and Larak Islands and to offer special
prices to entice buyers to send their tankers to Khark
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The incremental and sporadic nature of the Iraqi air
campaigns has allowed Iran time to recover from the
damage and improve its air defenses. In early 1987,
Iran deployed at least four Libyan-supplied SA-2 and
Chinese-built CSA-1 medium-to-high altitude sur-
face-to-air missile batteries, and, for the first time in
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Support for Ground Forces and Interdiction
The Iraqi Air Force has been ineffective in countering
Iranian ground operations through close air support
for Iraqi troops at the front and interdiction opera-
tions against Iranian reserves and supply units. We
believe, however, that Baghdad's understanding and
appreciation of the importance of these missions have
grown during the war.'
Close Air Support. Iraqi efforts to increase the lethal-
ity of its close air support missions have met with
mixed results. Early efforts reflected a lack of Air
Force and Army experience in joint air and ground
operations. After the Air Force mistakenly attacked
Iraqi ground units on several occasions, the General
Headquarters began limiting it to interdiction mis-
sions against Iranian rear areas. Army helicopters
took the place of Air Force ground attack aircraft
along the front.
STAT
the Army remains unskilled in controlling air and
ground operations and in using forward air control-
Since 1985, however, the Air Force has been flying
more missions near the frontlines in support of ground
operations, but their effectiveness is still questionable.
and chemical bombs, increased the destructiveness of
these attacks, but Iraqi tactics continue to impair
performance.
` A close air support mission attacks targets such as tanks, field
fortifications, and artillery in close proximity to friendly ground
forces. Interdiction missions aim to delay, disrupt, or destroy an
enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear against
Interdiction. We believe that the Air Force is becom-
ing more proficient at disrupting and damaging Irani-
an support of its ground operations, although it still
cannot stop Iranian offensives. In 1982, Iraq could not
destroy the few bridges over the Karun River that
were instrumental in Iran's recapture of Khorram-
shahr. During the most recent Al Faw offensive,
however, the Iraqi
Air Force knocked out the most important permanent
bridges over the Bahmanshihr River, interrupting
critical Iranian lines of communication. The improve-
ment in performance was clear, even though its
consequences were mitigated by Iranian use of pon-
toon bridges and causeways.
We believe that poor targeting, training weaknesses,
and political considerations prevent Iraq's interdiction
missions from being more effecti ieF
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that Iraq attacks many suitable Iranian military
targets such as artillery batteries, boat storage areas,
or air defense sites. Moreover, analysis of Iraqi air
operations indicates that possibly because of training
shortcomings Iraqi pilots seldom fly during periods of
low visibility-a deficiency exploited by the Iranians
who move troops and supplies during these periods.
Political decisions interfere as well. Baghdad has
announced its reluctance to bomb Ahvaz-a major
logistic hub and supply depot for the southern war
front-for fear of injuring its predominantly Arab
population.
Air Defense
The Iraqi Air Force's foremost achievement has been
its successful defense of Iraqi territory against the
diminished Iranian air threat. The addition of new
fighters, air defense weapons, and Soviet and French
air-to-air missiles have significantly improved Iraqi
air defenses since 1980. The integration of the Soviet
MIG-29 fighter into Iraq's Air Force will also in-
crease Baghdad's ability to challenge intruding air-
craft. We estimate that over half of the Air Force's
personnel belong to the Air Defense Command, which
controls more than 5,000 antiaircraft guns and 400
surface-to-air missile launchers. In the face of Iraqi
defenses, Iran musters only infrequent and ineffective
airstrikes.
The Israeli raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in
1981 awakened Baghdad to the weakness of its air
defenses in western Iraq. Progress has been made in
reducing the gaps in air defense coverage in the west,
but many of Baghdad's projects will not be completed
for several years. Iraq has set up additional early
warning radar sites and increased its surface-to-air
missile network in the area. New airfields under
construction and improvements in existing airfields
should increase Iraq's intercept capabilities in the
west once the war is over and Baghdad can disperse
its aircraft more widely. Moreover, communication
links for passing air defense information have been
established with Amman and Riyadh, although these
improvements probably would not enable Iraq to stop
a determined Israeli air attack.' We believe, however,
that they will complicate Israeli planning and increase
the likelihood of losses to the Israeli strike force.F_
Impact on the War With Iran
We believe that the Iraqi Air Force could be instru-
mental in ending the war if Baghdad used it more
aggressively. Although it could not win the war, we
believe that a sustained campaign that succeeded in
destroying critical targets of Iran's vulnerable eco-
nomic infrastructure would significantly reduce Teh-
ran's ability to prosecute the war. Furthermore, these
attacks could create economic hardship and lead to
civil unrest sufficient to compel the Iranian leadership
to scale down the conflict. The current strategy of
modulating pressure in response to movements in the
ground war, however, gives Iran the opportunity to
repair facilities, improve air defenses, and otherwise
adjust to Iraqi air attacks. By failing to fully exploit
its Air Force to reduce Iranian ground operations, we
believe that Baghdad allows Tehran to increase the
strain on Iraq's limited manpower by persistently
launching offensives.
Baghdad is unlikely to change its overall strategy of
conserving its airpower to fight a longer war. Saddam
probably believes that this strategy matches both the
regime's war policies and the capabilities of the Air
Force. Moreover, he may fear losing the Air Force's
political support by demanding dramatic improve-
ments in combat performance. In the past year Bagh-
dad has been willing to widen the scope of its air
campaigns as the Air Force showed itself able to do
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more without incurring heavy losses. Nonetheless,
such a conservative strategy could permit Iran to
achieve a major breakthrough on the ground that the
Air Force could not stop.
If Tehran again appears to be gaining the upper hand
in the war, Baghdad may significantly step up attacks
on economic targets to speed Iran's economic
decline. Iraq's Arab allies also could press Saddam to
do more to seize the initiative as they did following
the Iraqi defeat at Al Faw. Barring increased Iranian
pressure on Iraq, however, Baghdad is more likely to
remain cautious and may even temper its current
modest campaign because of the slight improvement
in Iranian air defenses this year.
By continuing to hold back its Air Force, however,
Baghdad risks missing an opportunity to cripple Iran's
ability to launch large-scale offensives. In our judg-
ment, a sustained air campaign directed against Irani-
an oil exports, domestic refineries, and defense pro-
duction facilities could significantly weaken Tehran's
warmaking capability. We estimate, however, that it
would take at least several months before the impact
of a full-scale campaign against Iran's economy would
be felt. In addition, the Air Force used as a "last
bullet" would be unlikely to stop an Iranian break-
through on the ground.
Impact on the Arab-Israeli Balance
The increase in the size and capabilities of the Iraqi
Air Force only marginally reduces Israel's superiority
over the Arabs. Iraqi attention will remain focused on
its eastern border for the foreseeable future even if the
war with Iran ends. We believe Baghdad would allow
no more than a small contingent of aircraft operating
out of Iraq to become involved in a future Arab-
Israeli conflict. Moreover, these aircraft probably
would not play a decisive role. Nonetheless, Iraq's
newer aircraft might increase Israeli losses in the air,
and Iraqi fighter-bombers would have an increased
possibility of successfully bombing strategic targets
inside Israel. Improvement in Iraq's air defense net-
work probably would make Israeli air attacks against
Iraqi territory more costly. Baghdad is better pre-
pared to defend against a repetition of Israel's 1981
attack on the Osirak reactor or a similar attack on
other strategic facilities such as the Samarra chemical
weapons production plant, although Israeli aircraft
probably could still reach their targets.
Impact on US Interests
As demonstrated by the FI attack on the USS Stark
in May, Iraq's continuing air campaign against Iran's
Persian Gulf shipping increases the likelihood that the
United States may become involved in an escalation
of the Iran-Iraq war. Any US commercial ships
operating in the northern Gulf will remain at risk
from inadvertent Iraqi attack despite Baghdad's at-
tempts to improve Air Force command and control.
Moreover, Iraq can use air attacks on critical Iranian
oil facilities in the Gulf and in Iran's interior to
refocus international attention on the war, thus keep-
ing pressure on the United States and the other
permanent UN Security Council members to main-
tain progress on resolving the war.
If an escalation in Iraqi ship attacks leads to a
broader antishipping campaign by Iran, the Gulf
Arab states may request additional US security assis-
tance, such as the Kuwaiti reflagging and escort
program. Similarly, Iraqi strikes against economic
facilities in Iran's interior could cause Tehran to take
military action or launch terrorism against Iraq's
allies, responses that Iran already has threatened.
This would further heighten tensions in the Gulf and
would lead to pressure by the Gulf Arabs for greater
US involvement.
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Appendix
On 17 May 1987 an Iraqi Fl accidentally attacked
the USS Stark, an incident that demonstrated the
Iraqi Air Force's strengths and weaknesses. The
guided-missile frigate, patrolling the Persian Gulf as
part of the US Middle East force, was struck by two
Exocet missiles. In the blast and ensuing fires, 37 US
sailors lost their lives, becoming victims, in part, to
improving Iraqi technical abilities and, conversely, to
weaknesses in Iraq's tactics and control of air
operations.
Surprising Ability
The attack revealed important Iraqi capabilities.
Iraq's modification of an F1 to carry two Exocet
missiles demonstrated that Iraqi Air Force techni-
cians were improving. Baghdad probably wanted to
provide its aircraft with greater striking power against
tankers, which absorb hits by the Exocet with mini-
mal damage. We believe that most of the modifica-
The attack also indicated that Iraq's F1 pilots proba-
bly are skilled. We believe that the attacker, despite
making some careless mistakes, must have been well
trained and experienced to get his aircraft in position
to attack. AWACS data indicate that the modifica-
tions probably made the F1 more difficult to fly. The
aircraft moved erratically and at dangerously low
speeds. The pilot, however, managed to keep the Fl
airborne for the relatively lengthy flight. Moreover,
he apparently used his fire-control radars in such a
manner as to minimize the warning given to the
Stark
coast used by tankers servicing Khark Island. Bagh-
dad has said that any ships inside its or Iran's
declared exclusion zones are potential targets. Iraq's
aircraft are often launched with limited target infor-
mation and seldom work with maritime patrol aircraft
to help locate or identify targets. The pilots appear to
be sent to specific points to look for their prey. They
sometimes fly with no specific target in mind, relying
on the aircraft's radar to locate one within the
exclusion zones.
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What Went Wrong
Despite its capable performance, the Iraqi Air Force
blundered-due mainly to its flawed ship attack
procedures. Most Iraqi ship attacks occur in an
apparently predetermined area along the Iranian
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Consequently, pilots are never sure of finding a ship to
attack. Many return to base without attacking a ship,
probably because they could not find a target. The
distance between the attacker and the target, as well
as darkness, precludes visual identification. Moreover,
the image on the radar screen cannot help the pilot
identify his target beyond a determination of the
ship's size.
In addition to failing to properly identify his target,
we believe the pilot made other mistakes. The Stark
was outside the Iranian exclusion zone and should not
have been targeted. The patrolling AWACS deter-
mined that the aircraft traveled much farther west
along the Saudi coast than normal, suggesting that a
possible navigation error had been made. The pilot
might have entered incorrect data into the inertial
navigation system that would later make him believe
that his position was farther east and that the Stark
was in the exclusion zone. The aircraft's modifications
and the pilot's subsequent difficulties in controlling it
also may have played a part in the possible navigation
errors.
The pilot did not respond to the warnings issued by
the Stark. He may have had his radio off or the
volume low-a habit possibly developed from flying
missions requiring little or no communications. In
addition, his command of English may have been
insufficient to understand the warnings.
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