SOVIET SPECTE AT THE U.S. ELECTION FEAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 21, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
16 May 1984
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC
/5/
Herbert E. Meyer
Att:
Newspaper article
Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
Aoak
40
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MEMORANDUM FOR: 'C/N I C.'
NIO/AL (Hal Ford)
NI0/USSR-EE
A/NI0/USSR-EE
Herbert E. Meyer
VC/NIC
Date 16 May 1984
~5 IV I EEDRpON$"'?`~
Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030013-5
? i` ?HE GAILY TELEGRAPH, 21 Apr 84
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Soviet spectre at
~~~~~G oo muuuieueaaeu or .ais- western policy pf firm defence
superiority they enjoy in ingenuous that , they represent .and' fruitful negotiation depends
various fields, and to abort all hostile descri do f the f i
n o
ff
AS WE PREPARE for a new ?
approach to negotiation on
armaments and other, issues
election feast
with the U S 3 R. we may
;consider how' the Soviet lead- By ROBERT CONQUEST
themselves would look QUEST
at the matter, and in particu-
lar their' ways of influencing its purpose is merely to influ- appeaser 'as President of the
the Western public mind. ence those in the West who -United. States;, must be to wait
The general strategy of the for political, temperamental or for,:.better.-.timesxand meanwhile
Soviet Union will rnntinnP to parochial reasons are. _.to be takeiadvantage~.Qf` any errors in
a
y a rap.. see ..a anre in thei
Summit-the current Soviet shtution of the; appearances of Western publ" ri-ood, and the
method of nursuing this aim peace for its reality Western .. ,political. ` ,leaeiershtp
is to let it be known through In fact `;the anger is as back in the i,'direr tion of,
various intermediaries, includ.- Senator Moynihan has recently. undemanding -appeasement
ing British suckers of high written,--that-'-all=the delusions -tee =Soviet siM amPnt a
degree. the notion that they and:-illusions of; the detente.'-' Pt
cannot negotiate " with of the 1910: .will stoke' again.' gramme.- has from the,` start-
Reagan. The usual justification One cannot negotiate.: from been at% the, highest level felt
is that he is re-arming, and strength if people think that to :be' comoatible..,iwith neces-
that s he once called them an the fact of negotiation sarv non-militirv consumption.
-re
30 moves If they,. now.be n!to feel that
first parttisi mere blackmail and the Western public's ?vigilance the strain isy. xcessive, they
the second mere balderdash : intact in an apparently'- friendly may cut back: by: a. few per I
the Soviet Government (of international atmosphere' 'is cent:, to east.';.thle situation.
or .rea e
itgcy~ ob being sus-
Western attempts -to remedy USSR . as a for a tain`ed_ over:"a`? r asonably long
the situation. crusade." period. On the merely technical
Their 'immediate tactics in in. so far as there; is, a con-.,. side; the , Sovfe war economy
this struggle' stave already sti'tuency for this 'stuff, ~.the?-- cannot :.rapidly$ be turned to
declared themselves. The aim Western leadership must take it more constructive tasks. It
is the defeat 'of President into account. The elements in' would inevitably be a slow pro-
Reagan in the November elec- the public mind '