THE IDEA OF AN OPEN WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100040010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Fred Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
SUBJECT: The Idea of an Open World
20 June. 1984
1. As I understand your question, you are posing the problem of
considering (1) whether a wholly open world -- free, that is, from
security strictures on observing Soviet-US military/space/technological
developments -- is a totally impossible idea; (2) what the pro's and con's
of such a regime might be; and (3) what steps the US might take to move in
that direction. The quick-and-dirty view of some of us here at the
National Intelligence Council, in brief, is that on balance such a regime
could involve significant advantage, but that objections to the idea will
surely be raised by the Soviet government and perhaps also by elements of
the American public.
2. The intriguing question of an open world is of course not wholly
without precedent; there is at least some similarity in the Baruch Plan,
Ike's Open Skies, and more recent moves concerning the possible monitoring
of chemical weapons progress. Central to any question of proposing Open
World, of course, is the US intent. For the purposes of this memorandum,
we will assume that that interest is not just propagandistic -- that is,
to propose moves we expect the Soviets will veto -- but a rather genuine
effort to construct a more secure environment.
3. What is meant by Open World? For the purposes of this paper we
define this not as opening up all secrets to outer gaze, but as a mutual
readiness to permit reasonably full and effective on-site (or whatever)
inspection of each other's status/progress concerning nuclear weapons and
their deployment, BW, CW, space vehicles, space warfare, and directed
energy -- anything, that is, that in terms of threats to national security
goes beyond prevailing definitions of general purpose forces.
4. Advantages of an open world, were it to be realized or neared:
-- Significant savings in national treasure, priorities, talent, and
attentions.
-- The ability to redirect some of those monetary and talent savings
to other pressing national and international needs.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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-- Much more confidence in security planning and policymaking because
of the lessening of uncertainty on many key issues.
-- A certain lessening of intense international suspicions, as a more
open world reduces the credibility of worst-case assumptions and
pla,pning.
-- A consequent greater opportunity for the two superpowers to pursue
parallel interests on certain questions of common concern: e.g.,
world climatology, resources, and pollution; nuclear
proliferation; and control of certain Third World crises.
-- By superpower initiative and precedent, a greater leverage on
extreme or irresponsible leaderships in the world to follow suit
and by doing so to better abide by international norms.
-- The US would gain more knowledge of Soviet capabilities than the
Soviets would gain about us, since in an open world their society
would change more radically than would ours.
5. Disadvantages of an open world:
-- The risk that the USSR would not live up to its mutual
obligations, and through various means would seek to exploit the
situation to achieve Soviet world advantage.
-- The lack of feasible US or world enforcement measures, should such
situation develop.
-- Adverse effects of gross disillusionment/backlash among US and
other publics, should the Soviets so renege.
-- Even if the US and the USSR honored the agreement, it is possible
that other major powers would not, in particular,
and would seek to turn Open World to their advantage.
-- Even if reached and reasonably honored, Open World would not in
itself change Soviet global ambitions, or reduce the USSR's
military weight in Europe, or mitigate myriads of instabilities in
the Third World.
-- Open World would remain an extremely fragile phenomenon, prey to
new suspicions and tempers growing out of other world problems.
-- Not least, reaching a meaningful Open World arrangement inevitably
would involve some opening up of America, in fact a certain
diminution of US sovereignty. This, in turn, would make an Open
World package a very difficult product to sell to the American
public and Congress, even if a US Administration desired it
strongly. Recalling the caveats US officials had to insert in the
UN Charter and in SALTs I and II, it is easy to imagine that Open
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World would quickly become a sharp and divisive issue in American
politics, obscuring its true issues and potentials.
6. On balance, advantages of open world would seem clearly to
outweigh its disailvantages, and were it to eventuate it could serve as a
major first step to a more secure world. But in practical terms the
chances of reaching a meaningful open world arrangement seem heavily
adverse.
-- The prime hazard is Soviet suspicion -- the deeply rooted,
overriding suspicion that has marked the Russian state for
centuries. It is difficult to foresee how the Kremlin's leaders
could make the enormous leap from this mind-set to what Open World
would require of Soviet practice. It is also difficult to foresee
how these leaders could think they could rig such an arrangement
to Soviet advantage.
-- The basic causes of the Cold War are political, and any major
improvement will have to begin there. In other words, Open World
will more likely be the result of lessened suspicions, than the
cause.
Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman
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