CHINA: FORGING AHEAD WITH MILITARY REFORM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00539R000200270002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
China: Forging Ahead
With Military Reform
sae e--- F wa t
EA 86-10027
July 1986
Copy 3 7 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China: Forging Ahead
With Military Reform
This paper was prepared b
fce
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ofT-ast Asian Analysis, with a contribution from[
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Office of Leadership Analysis. Comments
LOA I
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, China Division
Secret
EA 86-10027
July 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 June 1986
was used in this report.
China: Forging Ahead
With Military Reform
use.
Deng Xiaoping has made important progress over the past year in his long
effort to reform the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Judging from his
speeches and actions, we believe Deng has pursued three broad goals for
changing the military:
? Depoliticization. Weakening the military presence in top policymaking
bodies, sharply reducing the importance of ideology within the military.
? Professionalization. Upgrading the equipment, training, and educational
standards of the Army; rejuvenating its leadership; relieving the military
of responsibilities other than national defense.
? Cost cutting. Reducing the military's share of the budget, cutting the
Army's size, turning some defense production facilities over to civilian
In a series of personnel and organizational moves, beginning last spring and
culminating in the September Conference of Party Delegates, Deng and his
allies:
? Retired nine Politburo members associated with the military.
? Reduced military representation on the Central Committee to a historic
low of 16 percent.
? Replaced all but one of the deputy chiefs of the PLA's three General
Departments with younger officers cast in Deng's reform mold.
? Announced a 1-million-man reduction in China's armed forces.
? Cut the number of military regions (area commands usually comprising
several provinces) from 11 to seven, and appointed several new
commanders.
? Announced minimum educational standards for promotion and
established a National Defense University to train general officers
an honest broker have been key elements in his success.
In particular, Deng largely has succeeded in ridding the Army of leaders
who advanced during the Cultural Revolution and has forced the Army to
admit its "mistakes" during that period. On the basis of Chinese press
reporting, we believe the campaign of reeducation and the leadership purge
in the military are beginning to make some headway, reducing factional
tensions and promoting greater acceptance of Deng's reform goals.
Reforms also continued to relieve the PLA of nondefense responsibilities.
In our judgment, Deng's high standing with the military and reputation as
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EA 86-10027
July 1986
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Despite Deng's achievements, some problems remain. The most serious
relates to succession in the PLA. Deng has had difficulty identifying
younger men of sufficient prestige and competence to assume the top PLA
leadership posts, such as Military Commission Chairman, Defense Minis-
ter, and Chief of the General Staff. As a result, the Army's High
Command is still in the hands of septuagenarians. We believe Deng intends
to relinquish his position as Military Commission Chairman-probably to
General Secretary Hu Yaobang-but, for reasons that are unclear, has not
been able to do so. Scattered and inconclusive evidence points to high-level
political infighting as the main cause of the problem, but we cannot
identify with any certainty the specific players or issues involved. We
suspect the Military Commission problem has held up appointments to
other senior PLA leadership positions; these appointments are also affected
by disputes among senior leaders, who have not been able to reconcile their
individual preferences for successors. Deng needs to resolve the succession
problem soon, particularly in the Military Commission, to safeguard the
reforms and forestall infighting after his death.
Deng has successfully distanced the Army from party decisionmaking, but
has not completely nullified its political influence. The military still plays
an active policy role in matters concerning national defense and sometimes
can frustrate Deng's intentions. For example, although Deng was able to
formally establish a State Military Commission-intended to take over
day-to-day oversight of the Army from the party commission-the two
bodies have identical leadership, and the State Military Commission has
never, to our knowledge, met separately. Problems with the commissions
reflect a general problem Deng faces in all his reforms-guaranteeing
honest implementation rather than lipservice. In general, we expect that
the reformers' gradualist approach will yield continued results, but tensions
between them and the military will linger
In addition to strictly military issues, Army leaders also exert considerable
influence over the development of science and technology, an area with
military implications. For historical reasons, the military retains a strong
voice in cultural and ideological policy, an area still politically sensitive in
China. We judge military influence on China's strategic and foreign policy
to be particularly weak, and likely to remain so. These areas are the
jealously guarded preserve of the top party leaders.
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Most senior military leaders have publicly supported the premise that
economic modernization is a prerequisite to military modernization, and
we do not anticipate a serious challenge to Deng's economic reforms from
within the armed forces. However, the economic implications of several
reforms raise issues Deng will need to address:
? Resource constraints will impede delivery of new equipment and training
to the Army, possibly leading to disillusionment with reforms that fail to
deliver and to pressure for a greater budget share.
? Interservice competition for scarce budget dollars may intensify.
? Demobilization and the shift to professionalism have caused some morale
problems, which will increase as these initiatives proceed.
We expect that the reformers will divert some national resources to deal
with these problems when they flare up, but only enough to keep a lid on
potential disruptions.
Deng's structural military reforms have buttressed adjustments in China's
strategic and foreign policies, which have important implications for the
United States. China has publicly stated that it no longer believes war with
the Soviets is inevitable or even imminent, but, privately, Chinese leaders
have made it clear that they still consider the Soviet Union to be China's
main enemy. This perception and the desire to modernize China's military
combine to promote increasing Sino-US military cooperation, particularly
in technology purchases and military exchanges. However, financial
constraints and a reluctance to become dependent on foreign suppliers will
make the Chinese cautious and selective about purchases.
Our preliminary judgment
reporting-is that many of the new military leaders are not necessarily in 25X1
favor of extensive cooperation with the United States. They are less
ideologically rigid than their predecessors, but some appear inclined to
judge the value of bilateral military ties primarily on the basis of the speed
and generosity with which the United States supplies China with military
technology. This is particularly true of those officers associated with the
defense industries. Indications are that many line officers favor increased
contact with the United States. 25X1
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The organizational and political changes Deng has initiated do not affect
China's ability to project force as much as other factors, such as the
purchase of new weapon systems. To the extent that these changes
contribute to a more professional, efficient, and modern Army, they will af-
fect China's relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States, and
other Asian nations-especially Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan. US and
Chinese strategic interests now generally coincide. The degree to which
they do so in the future is likely to depend more on the economic and politi-
cal reforms than on the military ones.
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Key Judgments
Deng's Goals
Reduction of Military Expenditures
2
Major Strides in Military Reform
2
Politics and Personnel: The Army's Orderly Withdrawal
2
New Faces in the Leadership
3
Rectification-The Army Confronts Its Mistakes
4
Professionalism-Progress Continues
5
Changing the Role of the Political Commissar
6
Economies-Toward a Leaner Military
6
The Budget-Socialist Construction First
6
Reduction in Strength
Successors at the Top
Lingering Resistance
After Deng Is Gone
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China: Forging Ahead
With Military Reform
Of all the reforms Deng Xiaoping has initiated in his
eight years as leader of China, none, in our view, has
been more difficult or proceeded more slowly than
reform of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In a
1975 speech to the party's Military Commission, then
Chief of Staff Deng attacked the Army as bloated,
not combat worthy, factionalized, undisciplined, and
unsupportive of party policy. Aging military leaders,
secure in their privileges and threatened by his
proposals, resented Deng's blunt, demanding tone and
dragged their feet. In 1985, with the announcement of
plans for a 1-million-man reduction in force and the
retirement of numerous senior military leaders from
the Central Committee at the September Conference
of Party Delegates, Deng won important victories, but
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reforms.'
for political and economic reform.'
In our view, Deng's military reform plans have three
goals-depoliticization, professionalization, and cost
cutting-and are closely connected to his wider plans
Depoliticization
Although in his public pronouncements on military
reform Deng has always stressed upgrading pro-
fessional standards and reducing expenditures, we
believe his principal goal has been to ease the military
out of policymaking. In the past, heavy PLA
representation on the Politburo and Central
Committee gave the Army a voice in decisions about
all aspects of governing China (see inset). Although it
did not act as a bloc,
the senior PLA leadership-generally elderly,
tradition minded, and reflexively conservative-
viewed the reformers with suspicion, and the
reformers saw them as a potential brake on effective
implementation of Deng's program. Thus, the
weakening of this political force was essential not only
to carrying forward Deng's military reform but also
for the sake of his broader goals. At the same time,
Deng's speeches demonstrated his belief that the
heavy politicization of the armed forces under Mao
detracted from their national defense capabilities.
Professionalization
Compared with its potential opponents, China's Army
is poorly educated, poorly equipped, and poorly
trained-deficiencies that cost it heavily in the 1979
border war with Vietnam. Until recently, it has
operated on a 50-year-old strategic doctrine-
People's War-that some officers have written is
inappropriate for the military challenges China faces
today. Deng has pressed hard to raise educational
standards for officers and men and to improve
discipline and morale; because he wants soldiers to be
able to concentrate on soldiering, he is reducing the
Army's non-combat-related responsibilities-farming,
factory work, and the like. The PLA has developed
new defensive strategies and is groping for a new
strategic doctrine under the rubric of "People's War
under modern conditions"-although many midlevel
officers continue to rely on older People's War
theories, such as guerrilla warfare, in discussions of
tactics with foreign diplomats.' Deng has also set
China on a course of selective modernization of its
military hardware, technology, and production
facilities.
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Probably no army in a Communist state has been as
closely identified with its ruling party as has the
PLA. From the earliest years of the struggle for
control of China, many of the party's leaders were
also military leaders. Because the Army existed
before the founding of the People's Republic of China,
it has long considered itself the party's army rather
than the state's. The close association between the
Army and the party also contributed to the militar 's
gaining influence over nonmilitary policy areas. 7
This tendency reached its apex during the Cultural
Revolution. In 1967, when the party began to lose
control of the youthful Red Guards, the Army was
called in to restore order. Military power at the
center peaked when Marshal Lin Biao, Minister of
National Defense, was designated Mao's heir
apparent. (In 1971, Lin allegedly was killed in a plane
crash. According to official statements, he was fleeing
after a failed coup attempt against Mao. His death
weakened but did not eliminate military influence at
the top of the party hierarchy.) Military men moved
into local governments, factories, and communes to
take over the management of virtually all sectors of
the society. Although they did restore a semblance of
nonmilitary goods needed in society.
some of their excess productive capacity to
Reduction of Military Expenditures
One of Deng's arguments for military reform has
been that China's military budget has been too high,
both as a proportion of national expenditures and in
terms of the Army's wasteful use of resources. In his
speeches and writings, Deng has insisted that effective
military modernization can only be achieved by a
healthy, modernized economy, and he therefore has
advocated policies that strictly limit military
expenditures. He also has called on the PLA to
streamline its administrative, logistic, financial, and
production procedures to eliminate redundancy,
waste, and mismanagement. He has proposed that
facilities once reserved for military use be shared with
civilian enterprises, and that military factories devote
order, their management of industry and agriculture
frequently was inefficient and incompetent. Moreover,
the military was often arbitrary and highhanded in
its administration. The PLA also grew more brazen
in its pursuit of privilege, arrogating to itself the best
housing and such scarce resources as fuel,
transportation facilities, and medical care. As a
result, while the PLA grew increasingly arrogant and
complacent, popular resentment climbed.
The military had retreated from some of its
administrative duties but few of its prerogatives when
Deng assumed power in 1977 and began his drive to
remold the PLA. Reform of the military took on
greater urgency after the Sino- Vietnamese border war
in 1979. The PLA, which intelligence reporting
indicates had expected to dominate Vietnam easily,
instead found itself in a bruising confrontation from
which it emerged a dubious victor. The conflict
revealed serious weaknesses in PLA equipment,
training, organization, command and control, and
officer competence. The Army's poor showing
undermined PLA prestige and made its claims to
special privilege and status difficult to justify
Even though Deng had made slow and steady progress
in bringing the leadership of the armed forces around
to his points of view on military, political, and
economic reform, 1985 was his most successful year,
especially in depoliticization.
Politics and Personnel:
The Army's Orderly Withdrawal
In our view, Deng's most notable gains have been in
removing military leaders from policy bodies. At the
September party conference, seven of the 10 Politburo
members who resigned were senior soldier-politicians,
and two of the others, although no longer active in the
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Figure 1
China: Military Representation
on the Central Committee
1969
9th Central
Committee
1973
10th Central
Committee
1977
11th Central
Committee
1982
12th Central
Committee
1985
September Party
Conference
0 10
Percent
This chart represents the PLA's declining share of Central Committee
memberships since the high water mark of the 9th Central Committee.
military, were PLA generals. The Army was left for
the first time with no representative-other than
Deng-on the Politburo Standing Committee.' No
military men were promoted to Politburo status, and
the military retained only one representative on the
party Secretariat. Although some new regional
military leaders were promoted to full Central
Committee membership, many more veteran soldiers
resigned, and PLA representation dropped to a
25X1 historical low of about 16 percent (see figure 1). F_
' Although generally thought of as a civilian, Deng has long and
close ties to the PLA. He has held a number of senior military
posts, including chief of staff from 1975 to 1976 and again from
1977 to 1980. He is seen by senior military leaders as someone who
"understands" the military and is generally sympathetic. Deng's
connections with the military began in 1926, when he became an
instructor at the Xian Military Academy during the period of
cooperation with the Nationalists. He organized the 7th Red Army
in Guangxi in 1929, and in 1930 served as chief of staff of an army
corps. He was political commissar of the army that defeated the
Nationalist armored forces in 1949, in a period when political
commissars took an active part in field command of their units.
After the founding of the People's Republic, Deng held a number of
military posts including vice chairman of the Southwest China
Military and Administrative Council, vice chairman of the
National Defense Council, and vice chairman-later chairman-of
The net effect of these changes, in our judgment, is to
diminish greatly the PLA's voice in the councils that
decide China's overall policies. The party has always
maintained control of the Army-even during the
Cultural Revolution-but the party itself until now
has had a markedly military cast. In the last several
years, Deng has been promoting more civilian
technocrats, thereby reducing the Army's say in
decisionmaking outside its areas of competence.
Although the influence of key military leaders was
exercised through personal contacts rather than
military status or specific posts, the simultaneous
"retirement" of so many senior soldiers from the
Politburo sends a clear message to both the party and
the Army: that military influence will be reduced.
That is not to say, however, that senior military
leaders will have less influence over issues directly
germane to the armed forces.
Within the military hierarchy, retirement of the old
soldiers has had a less visible impact. Deng has been
careful to preserve appearances and avoid
unnecessary loss of face for aged generals. For
example, with the exception of the infirm Marshal Ye
Jianying, who resigned all his posts, officers removed
from the Central Committee who were also members
of the party Military Commission were allowed to
retain that position.
that a resignees w u not se
their military status or privileges. We suspect,
however, that this is an interim arrangement and that
most of them will soon retire to face-saving advisory
positions.
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New Faces in the Leadership
We believe Deng has also scored some success in
rejuvenating the PLA leadership, beginning in earl,,
1983, when he called for older military leaders to
retire and make room for a new generation. Initially,
progress was slow; a few batches of superannuated
officers retired, but none of the prominent old
generals stepped down. Real movement began in the
spring of 1985 after Deng announced at a Military
Commission meeting that the PLA would be reduced
by 1 million men and the number of military regions
would be cut from 11 to seven to increase command
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Figure 2. Troops in newly designed uniforms
march in parade on the 35th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic of China.
While reducing military influence, Deng
Xiaoping has given the Army a prominent
efficiency and facilitate the demobilization. It was
soon disclosed that at least half of those to be
demobilized would be officers.
Deng used the opportunity afforded by the retirement
of so many officers at the senior command level to
promote numerous young, professionally competent
officers to make up the core of the "successor
generation" in the armed forces. Five of the current
seven military region commanders are newly
appointed, and have solid professional-rather than
political-credentials. During the spring, all but one
of the deputies of the three General Departments of
the PLA (Staff, Political, and Logistics) were
replaced, and new leaders were appointed in the Air
Force and the National Defense Science, Technology,
and Industry Commission
Rectification-The Army Confronts Its Mistakes
When the often-postponed rectification campaign-
Deng's exercise in purifying the party, government,
and Army-finally kicked off in the fall of 1983, it
encountered especially stubborn resistance in the
PLA. "Totally negating the Cultural Revolution," a
shibboleth of the campaign, strongly implied criticism
of the PLA's substantial role during that period, and
was therefore opposed or ignored in many military
units. Faced with this foot-dragging, Deng and his
allies adopted an approach combining pressure,
persuasion, and reassurance. Although reform leaders
continued to insist publicly that the Cultural
Revolution had almost no redeeming value and that
the role of the Army during that period-particularly
its supporting political factions-was incorrect, they
also promised leniency to soldiers who admitted their
mistakes.
By late 1984 and early 1985, this steady pressure
yielded results: more and more military leaders
publicly condemned the whole Cultural Revolution
experience and admitted their own errors. In some
cases, PLA leaders returned to areas where they had
been stationed during the Cultural Revolution and
apologized to local authorities. Moreover, Deng took
steps to diminish the factionalism within military
units that originated in the Cultural Revolution and
clearly diminished military effectiveness. In our view,
the combination of retirements and transfers of
faction leaders, plus "heart to heart talks"-
discussions overseen by the General Political
Department, where past and present problems within
units were exhaustively examined-has significantly
reduced but not eliminated the divisiveness within
most PLA units. It is indicative of the deeply
conservative, Maoist orientation of some segments of
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years longer to make these changes than a
corresponding effort in the party bureaucracy.
the armed forces, however, that it took fully three
Professionalism-Progress Continues
Deng's insistence on high professional standards
might seem unexceptionable to Western observers,
but it is a profound change for PLA officers. The
educational standards, promotion criteria, strategic
doctrine, political role, and emphasis on
modernization that Deng has promoted run counter to
much of what the party has said about military affairs
during the past 30 years. The new line thus has been
received with a mixture of enthusiasm and suspicion,
particularly at upper levels. Building on strong
support for modernization among younger officers,
Deng continued to push these reforms in 1985.
Although the PLA still falls far short of the modern
professional standards he has set, there has been real
progress, and the organizational reforms already
instituted will, in our judgment, provide the basis for
continued improvement.
and appear to have been enforced in 1985.
New educational guidelines for officers were clarified
new officers will be required
levels of the PLA officer corps.
promoted above field rank must have attended one of
China's military academies. The PLA has begun
recruiting heavily, and with some success, among
college graduates. There have been some cases of
faked credentials, and a number of schools that issue
questionable "equivalency" diplomas have sprung up,
but we believe that the guidelines will be increasingly
effective and result in improvement of the educational
to have at least a middle school education, and those
Under Deng, the number and quality of military
academies have increased. Last December, China
announced the founding of a National Defense
University as China's premier military school. All
general officers will be required to attend this
academy. It will also foster educational and training
exchanges with foreign counterparts, a significant
departure from previous policy. The new university is
Figure 3. Officer cadets take a test. PLA
educational facilities are often extremely
headed by two well-respected military leaders-a
former Politburo member and military region
commander, and a former deputy chief of staff-who
retired from their active-duty posts last year. 25X1
Perhaps Deng's greatest success in enhancing PLA
professionalism has been in shearing the Army of 7X1
many of its non-defense-related responsibilities. In the 25X1
last two years, the PLA rolls have been reduced by
hundreds of thousands as Deng has split off
construction, railway, and security units.' There is an
economic payoff to this streamlining, of course, but
most important for Deng's goals is that it focuses
more command attention on national defense
missions. Transferring internal security responsi-
bilities as well as many troops to the newly created
People's Armed Police under the Ministry of Public
Security in June 1983 was especially significant, in
our judgment. The transfer removed a bothersome
and contentious area from PLA purview and provided
convenient job opportunities for demobilized PLA
officers and enlisted men.
'The demobilized soldiers were, for the most part, absorbed by
civilian entities. Some construction and railway units were
transferred almost intact to local jurisdictions or state economic
enterprises
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Changing the Role of the Political Commissar
Deng's reforms have drastically changed the role and
status of the political commissar in the PLA.
Although the commissar remains responsible for the
ideological indoctrination of his unit, that
responsibility is far less important now that Mao
Zedong thought has been discredited. The
commissar's principal ideological tasks today are to
relay decisions of the leadership, explain the intent
and benefits of the reforms, and urge that soldiers
preserve discipline, security, and socialist ideals.
are difficult becaus
fact that some things
do not appear in the defense budget.
However, Howe public portion of the military budget,
which covers most PLA operating expenses, did not
increase from 1979 to 1984, when China was
experiencing some inflation as well as a significant
growth in national revenue-indicating a declining
PLA share of national income.6
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To replace his lost duties, the commissar has adopted
a role combining elements of the chaplain and the
executive officer in Western armies. He is responsible
for training exercises, educational and cultural
activities, personnel management-transfers and
promotions-and morale-building in his unit. One
that a
to soldiers.
political commissar is no longer in the line of
command unless specifically designated by his
commander. Political commissars, in the past often
ignorant of military knowledge, have been exhorted
by the military press to raise their professional
competence by studying military theory and listening
As with political reform and professionalism, Deng
has made significant progress, in our judgment,
toward attaining his two top economic goals: holding
down military expenditures and reducing the size of
the military
The Budget-Socialist Construction First
Reformist leaders' speeches and policies have made
clear for several years that they see China's most
important task as modernizing and consolidating of
the civilian economic structure, and that all other
demands on national revenues have lesser priority.
This has led to reduced military expenditures,
strengthening of civilian controls over military
industries, and diversions of military technology,
expertise, and production facilities to civilian use.
Accurate estimates of Chinese military expenditures
The 1984 adjustment for inflation, which amounted to
about 2.3 percent, according to official Chinese '
statistics, did not offset the effects of China's inflation
rate, according to Chinese press reports, and in 1985
the PLA had to cut spending further. It reduced its
planned expenditures by US $2.5 million and still had
to draw on its reserves to the tune of US $206 million,
according to the Hong Kong press. At an all-Army
logistics work conference in December 1985, logistics
chief Hong Xuezhi said that the shortage of national
defense funds meant that the Army had to "make
every cent count." In his speech, he ordered a
tightening of administrative and supply procedures to
control waste, a chronic problem in the PLA. Among
the increased reforms he called for were
computerization of logistic information and
introduction of modern management methods.
Reduction in Strength
Although the announced plan to cut the PLA by
1 million has significant political and profession-
alization implications, it is also an important cost-
cutting measure. Currently, we do not try to estimate
Chinese military expenditures as a percentage of
budget or GNP, but it is clear from the policies they
have pursued that the Chinese leadership decided that
maintaining such a huge military establishment
(roughly 5.2 million before the demobilization order
6 Military leaders, generally
accept the reformers' argument that an improved industrial base
will pay major military dividends. Some public remarks by military
officers indicate, however, a need to justify this policy from time to
time. New equipment in the PLA inventory suggests that the Army
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was issued),' while at the same time trying to
modernize and upgrade its weaponry, was simply too
expensive. Moreover, with the USSR's increasing
involvement in Afghanistan and with the growth of
relations with the United States, the Chinese probably
judged that a ground force attack against China was
unlikely, and that their own ground forces could be
reduced without jeopardizing their security.
In our judgment, Deng, though he has many motives
for the demobilization, probably concluded that the
policy would be more palatable to the PLA if
presented as driven by a need to economize. Chief of
Staff Yang Dezhi summed up the official line in a
July 1985 Xinhua interview: "If we reduce the
number of Army men by 1 million, we will be able to
save a great deal of expense for national defense each
year. This will be of great benefit in concentrating our
financial resources to carry out national construction
and will quicken our pace in modernizing our Army."
to the Chinese press.
Details of the demobilization plan have trickled out
only slowly. ost of the
cuts will be made in main force units-as opposed to
local forces and militia-because they are most
dependent on the national budget. Local force units
and militia receive a large part of their financing from
local governments.' Half of the 1 million to be
demobilized will be officers, and the General Logistics
Department is also to be cut by 50 percent, according
Despite Deng's impressive achievements in carrying
out reform within the PLA, we believe there are still
important problems he has not been able to resolve.
' Published figures for the size of the PLA are not completely
reliable, in our view, but do reflect general trends in PLA size. The
5.2 million figure is taken from remarks made by Hu Yaobang in
' The frugality drive has affected reserve and militia operations.
Militia training and reserve exercises have been cut back to reduce
personnel time away from production. The size of the militia is
being reduced considerably, while, at the same time, the reformers
are trying to create a modern reserve of civilians who have had
military experience, and who can be called on in times of real
Failure to deal effectively with these issues will affect
both Deng's overall reform of China's political
structure and the continuation of the reform process
within the armed forces
Successors at the Top
Although the rejuvenation process has brought many
competent and qualified officers to command
positions at the corps and even the military region
level, the PLA is still dominated at the very top by
elderly veterans of China's revolutionary experience.
Some of these leaders evidently cannot bring
themselves to turn over their responsibilities;
others are willing 25X1
to step down but have been prevented by political
factors-top leaders cannot agree on who the
successors should be. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the Military Commission, which Deng himself
In our view, when Deng resigned his government posts
in 1980, he believed that he had to keep the Military
Commission job to ensure that his military reforms
stayed on track. However, in the past year, he has 25X1
spoken frequently of the need to retire from active
supervision of affairs, and we believe he now wants to
pass the post on. Hong 25X1
Kong press stories indicate that Hu Yaobang was his
choice and that Deng probably intended to have the
1985 conference of delegates confirm this
arrangement, but Hu was not a popular choice-
especially with the senior military leadership.' Hu has
flimsy military credentials and a personal style that
many of the old soldiers find objectionable. Hu also
has seemed sometimes to slight the military, as when
he told a Hong Kong interviewer last year that
nowadays "the Army is not very important, after all."
Hu is also closely associated with the 1-million-man
cutback that has been a source of anxiety within the
military. He was prominent at the June 1985 Military
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Figure 4. Hu Yaobang reviews troops on the Vietnamese border
and visits a post in the Paracels. Hu frequently visits military
outposts as part of his campaign to enhance his military
Commission meeting where the cutback was officially
announced. Moreover, Hu had actually publicized the
decision two months earlier during a trip to New
Zealand. Although it was widely seen as another
example of Hu's tendency to speak without thinking,
a few diplomatic and press analysts speculated that
the slip was a deliberate leak to force the issue.
Shifting Hu to the Military Commission has been the
most difficult part of Deng's succession arrangements,
We
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doubt that u will ever be enthusiastically received
by the military, but, as officers of the revolutionary
generation retire, Hu's problems should fade.
we believe it is still
PLA contributions.
Deng's intention to resign his chairmanship in favor of
Hu, perhaps at the 13th Party Congress scheduled for
1987. In this regard, Hu has worked steadily to
broaden his contacts within the military. Although he
has been outspoken on the need for reform, he has
also gone out of his way to demonstrate respect for
Hu, who will be 72 next year, would be no more than
a short-term solution at that point. In our view, the
most likely scenario is that Hu will be given the job
for a limited period-two years or so-though this
may not be announced publicly. It is also possible
that, even though he will hold the top slot, there will
be an understanding with the Army that one of the
vice chairmen will call most of the shots on military
questions. To protect the reforms and prevent
infighting after his death, Deng needs to settle a
younger, more permanent replacement soon at the top
of this critical body. It is possible that Hu's successor
could be chosen and informally anointed early in Hu's
tenure.
The Military Commission is not the only high post for
which Deng appears to have had difficulty identifying
and promoting a successor. Despite Deng's success in
rejuvenating leadership at some levels, notably the
military region commanders and deputy general
department directors, he has yet to move any younger
men into the very top jobs. Minister of Defense Zhang
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Aiping (76}-whose resignation has been expected
ever since he lost his Central Committee standing last
September-retained his position at the recent Na-
tional People's Congress session, despite abundant
rumors that he would be replaced. None of the
general department chiefs has stepped down, even
though Hong Xuezhi of the General Logistics Depart-
ment also resigned his Central Committee member-
ship last September. The General Staff and General
Political Department chiefs, who are 75 and 71,
respectively, have reliably carried out Deng's reforms,
ment to the principle of rejuvenation
but have not yet demonstrated a personal commit-
One possible explanation for continued leadership by
these aging veterans is the difficulty of finding reli-
able, competent, sufficiently prestigious successors
who are acceptable to all concerned parties.F_
Given his own age and that of the
men in the top military posts, Deng must press his
search for successors. He may have to settle for men
of less stature and ability than he would prefer, simply
to ensure that he is able to oversee the transition.
We believe-on the basis of public statements and
written articles-that the majority of higher-ranking
military officers concur with Deng on the need for
reform. Most also agree with the trend of Deng's
military modernization drive, although there is proba-
bly considerable disagreement over the details of its
implementation. There are, however, some reforms to
which the military is distinctly lukewarm, none more
so than Deng's commitment to transfer authority over
the military from the party to the
government. When Deng and other reformers under-
took in 1982 to place day-to-day administration of the
PLA under the genuine control of the state appara-
tus-policy matters were still to be the party's prerog-
ative-military and party traditionalists were able to
prevent it. The Sixth National People's Congress in
mid-1983 created a State Military Commission to
oversee the armed forces, but its membership was
identical to the party's Military Commission; to our
knowledge, the State Military Commission has never
held a separate meeting. In short, it was a reform in
name only. In our estimation, Deng will continue
working to establish an operational State Military
Commission to further his goals of depoliticization
and professionalization, but the longstanding special
relationship between the party and the Army will
most likely make progress slow.
Especially difficult is ensuring honest implementation
of promulgated policies. Not all opposition is political.
According to the Chinese military press, a Liberation
Army Daily reporter found a cadre burning sheaves of
new regulations. When asked why, he replied that
they were potentially troublesome and it was thought
best to destroy them before too many people could
read them.
We believe residual leftism, while still present, poses a
less serious problem. Deng has purged the Army of
most of its high-ranking leftists, though at middle
levels many who joined during the Cultural Revolu-
tion remain. For the most part poorly educated,
basically conservative, and schooled in the extreme
"campaign" style of Cultural Revolution politics,
many of these middle-level officers show little under-
standing of what Deng is trying to accomplish in
either the economic or military reforms. This is
evidenced by the number of times in recent years
elements in the Army have supported countercurrents
to reform, such as the 1981 Army-sponsored attacks
on "liberalism" in the arts, or the 1983 "spiritual
pollution" campaign. Such episodes sustain the im-
pression within the party that the Army as a whole is
opposed to reforms, even though this is not the case.
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25X1 Indeed, what opposition exists is fragmented and
parochial. "Some
grumble because the new weapons are not being
deployed fast enough, others don't want them at all;
one group speaks of revolutionary purity, another tries
to get into business."
Deng has adopted a firm but nonpunitive approach to
overcoming endemic problems in the Army. While
refusing to retreat from his policies, he has
concentrated on persuasion and education, making
clear that compliance is expected but stopping short of
penalizing soldiers for past "mistakes." Deng's tactics
have enabled him to make steady progress, while
avoiding a showdown with the Army. We expect the
reformers' continued application of this approach to
bring about gradual reduction of the importance of
these political problems, but some tension between
civilian reformers and their military targets will
probably persist.
systems they are trying to buy.
Reluctance to Professionalize
The shift to professionalism continues to concern the
ranks and will require sensitive handling (see inset).
Although the reformers have succeeded in imposing
minimum requirements for officers, genuine
upgrading of the educational level of China's armed
forces will be a long struggle. Deng not only has to
attract a new corps of educated officers, but also has
to reeducate many of those now serving. In our view,
China lacks the resources to educate the huge number
of officers who have barely a primary education, or
who joined the Army when expertise was suspect and
the educational system was in disarray. Yu Qiuli
admitted early this year that a considerable number
of officers, especially at or below Army level, are of
"poor quality." This problem exists also at higher
levels. Foreign attaches in Beijing have concluded
that even senior staff officers responsible for
technology acquisition programs-such as the
recently appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff He
Qizong-often display little understanding of the
Reforms in the economic sphere have made it more
difficult to attract the educated or technically trained
into the Army. Anyone with a college degree,
knowledge of a skilled trade, or even a middle-school
A measure of the difficulty Deng faces in
professionalization of the military is the problems he
has had with reestablishment of ranks in the PLA.
During the Cultural Revolution, ranks were
abolished in the PLA as being bourgeois relics. Since
1982, China has periodically announced that it is
about to reintroduce rank designations. A variety of
dates have been reported as the beginning of the new
rank system, but implementation has always been
postponed. The principal reason for the
postponements, we believe, is not ideological
resistance but economics.
many PLA officers-especially those on the
verge o being retired-believe they are entitled to a
higher rank than the central authorities wish to
assign them. Because their rank will affect their
retirement pay and benefits, and thus the outlay
necessary to retire them, progress has been stalled.
The leadership is unwilling to accede but unable to
enforce its will.
A problem also exists among officers who are not
scheduled for retirement. There are probably fears of
creating a command topheavy with high-ranking
officers who lack professional qualifications of the
kind Deng has called for, and for whom there are not
enough jobs s they believe
they deserve.
education can do much better outside the military.
The new conscription law, which offers extra benefits
to such people who join the military, probably will not
significantly reverse this trend, in our judgment. In
the past, China only rarely has had to resort to a
draft, even though the law is on the books, because the
PLA was an attractive career and the ranks could be
filled by volunteers. If economic reforms continue to
be successful, it is probable that there will be
increased reliance on conscription to bring in soldiers
better able to use and maintain more advanced
weapon systems.
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The pressure to acquire educational credentials has
led to a growth in the number of high school or even
college "equivalency" courses. However, the Chinese
press has charged that, in fact, many of these are little
more than ploys by units to protect their officers.
Some officers reportedly have even resorted to faking
credentials. The General Staff and Political
Departments issued a joint circular last year
25X1 attacking these practices, but we believe they lack the
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resources and will to seriousl olice the many PLA
schools and training units.
the plan to cut the PLA by 1 million m
also is meeting some resistance. Former military
region commanders are reported to have used their
influence to block major cuts in their regions. Our
analysis suggests that the PLA has not been as
successful as it claims in reducing its strength, and
that the announced figure of 4.2 million men under
arms may, in fact, be a target and not yet reality.
Fierce competition over perquisites and compensation
for those slated to be cut has complicated the
reduction. The leadership has claimed that the
interests of those who must leave the Army will be
protected, but this has proved a difficult promise to
keep. Younger officers almost always must take a pay
cut when entering civilian life, and they also lose the
numerous fringe benefits that PLA service bestows-
for example, preferential housing, medical care, and
transportation. Moreover, only a relative few can be
placed in attractive jobs or receive training to make
them competitive in the civilian sector. A former PLA
doctor told a US Embassy officer that only those with
sought-after technical skills receive much help in job
placement; others are left to their own devices.
The losers in the reduction may become a troublesome
locus of dissatisfaction and resentment. Resistance to
demobilization-which has already resulted in
sporadic violence-could intensify. Conscription
efforts will be hurt by the Army's inability to take
care of its former members. Because most of the
burden for placing veterans falls on local
government's shoulders, complaints about the policy
from this quarter will probably increase. In our view,
the most likely scenario is that the reformers will be
forced to divert some national resources to deal with
the problem, but that they will expend only enough to
prevent the situation from getting out of hand. For the
next several years, as the Army goes through the
personnel readjustment, the placement of veterans
will continue to be a distracting but not crippling
concern
Competition between services and bureaucracies for
the military dollar will also present continuing
management problems. Feuding between the
indigenous arms industry and senior officers who look
to foreign purchases for quick fixes is already
complicating some arms deals, and we believe it will
grow. So far, the reformers have been careful to see
that each service has benefited from the opening to
the West, but we expect interservice rivalries to
surface as each pursues its own modernization
initiatives.
After Deng Is Gone
Deng's successes in transforming the Army have
surpassed the expectations held by most analysts a
few years ago. He has set the PLA, once an
embodiment of Cultural Revolution problems, on the
road to becoming a modern professional force. He has
removed the military from the center stage of politics,
and moved the Army toward civilian oversight.
Despite considerable grumbling, no significant
military challenge to the reforms has arisen
Deng has undeniably been aided by circumstances,
luck, and able assistants, but a major ingredient in his
success has been his personality and prestige. His
ability to combine coercion, persuasion, and bribery,
to manipulate praise and blame, has been crucial to
the reforms. Deng's reputation as an honest broker,
willing to listen to grievances and objections, has
helped keep the lid on a potentially volatile process.
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Deng is no doubt concerned that weak leader-
ship wil dilute the ability of the Army to press
forward with existing reforms or generate new ones,
an important step in maintaining momentum. If Deng
or his immediate successors cannot cultivate strong,
supportive leadership in the military, reforms could
boa down in formalism and lack of interest.
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Figure 5. Deng Xiaoping (right) and Hu Yaobang
review troops at 35th anniversary parade,
Most Chinese observers credit Deng with resolving
problems between the party and the Army-and
therein lies the problem.
We believe there is no younger party leader with the
credentials to command the respect of the Army to
the extent Deng does. None of the potential successors
in the second or third echelons has anything ap-
proaching Deng's experience, contacts, or unrivaled
prestige in the PLA. We believe that to the degree he
can make civilian chairmanship of the Military Com-
mission routine, Deng will increase the likelihood that
his successors will be able to manage military affairs
smoothly.
man was 78-year-old Yang Shangkun.
cal skills to shepherd Deng's reforms are in short
supply. There are no military counterparts to rising
party stars like Hu Qili and Li Peng. At a recent
conference on reforms and corruption, for example,
party and State Council organs were represented by
third-echelon leaders, while the only military spokes-
The leadership problem goes deeper, however, than
just finding a successor for Deng. Men with solid
military skills are taking their places in the regional
commands, but younger military men with the politi-
the new deputy chiefs of the General
Staff are having a great deal of trouble
Spheres of Influence
Although the Army's political influence has been
reduced, it remains important in some areas of Chi-
nese decisionmaking. Clearly, the leadership of the
armed forces in the Politburo and below maintains a
strong voice in matters directly relating to national
defense and professional responsibilities, although
Deng has taken care to see that those who speak for
the PLA are in sympathy with his aims. After Deng,
we expect the Army will continue to have a significant
and occasionally decisive influence over defense mat-
ters. As to the related area of strategic policy, we do
not view the military leadership as having had much
influence in the past, and there is no compelling
reason to believe a post-Deng leadership will break
the pattern of keeping foreign policy decisionmaking
power in party hands. We consider it unlikely that the
Army will play a decisive role in deciding the succes-
sion. Much of the Army's past power in party affairs
derived from the dual roles of the founding fathers as
both military and party leaders. Today, we can identi-
fy no military figure who has enough of a follow in to
cross over to or influence the party leadership.-
Judging by newspaper articles and other reporting, it
appears that, in addition to military affairs, the PLA
has considerable say-which we expect it to retain-
in policymaking in at least two other areas: science
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and technology, and ideology and the arts. Military
influence over S&T policy stems from the many
research and production facilities still under PLA
control, and from the obvious importance of
technology to modernizing the military. Scattered
evidence suggests that, despite the military's status as
the fourth of the "four modernizations," it can still
commandeer technology and trained personnel that it
deems essential.
together reform efforts like the 1-million-man
reduction in force, less strident anti-Soviet rhetoric,
and insistence that China needs a "generation of
peace," we believe it is clear that the Chinese view the
Soviet threat as having subsided and the need for
close strategic cooperation with the United States as
having been correspondingly reduced.
Military concern for ideology and cultural policy is, in
part, a residue of the extreme politicization of the
armed forces under Mao, and, in part, a reflection of
the fundamentally different views about motivation
held by PLA veterans and reform economists. The
premium placed on material incentives by economic
reformers is at variance with the Army's necessary
concentration on personal values, such as loyalty,
patriotism, and courage, to motivate soldiers.
Moreover, the military-particularly for its role in the
Cultural Revolution-has been the target of
"liberals" in the arts, and, as a result, has led efforts
to curb artistic freedoms. Judging by his published
comments, Deng appears to share these conservative
concerns, and, in our judgment, probably also sees
cultural policy as an area where he can make
concessions to military sensibilities at relatively little
cost to his core reform program.
Military reform and modernization in China are of
great strategic significance to the United States.
Much of what Deng has tried to accomplish in
military reform stems from the leadership's
perception that sufficient strategic equilibrium
between the United States and the Soviet Union has
been restored since 1980 that China can afford to
divert resources away from a military buildup to more
pressing economic development needs. The reforms
themselves-depoliticization, professionalization, and
readjustment of military spending priorities-are
directed at transforming the PLA from a huge,
backward, and inefficient wartime Army to a
"peacetime Army capable of rapidly mobilizing for
war," as National Defense University Political
Commissar Li Desheng recently put it. Adding
There is little doubt, however, that the Chinese
consider the USSR the principal long-term threat to
China's security, and that they are directing their
modernization efforts at countering that threat
militarily. Military and civilian decisionmakers are
aware that this drive for a leaner, better-equipped,
and more professional military will require foreign
technology, hardware, and organizational expertise.
We believe, therefore, that China's military reform
program favors continued growth in Sino-US
cooperation, both in technology purchase and in
military academic and training exchanges.
In view of the lack of hard evidence, our preliminary
judgment is that military reform will not necessarily
bring into prominence military leaders more favorably
disposed toward cooperation with the United States.
Although some of the younger rising stars in the PLA
appear marginally friendlier toward the United
States, they are still clearly constrained by the
continued dominance of the Old Guard. Judging from
their comments to 25X1
any of them appear to evaluate 25X1
bilateral military relations mainly on the basis of US
willingness to provide sensitive technology on
concessionary terms. We believe there is a difference
of opinion within the PLA on relations with the
United States, with officers associated with defense
industries most inclined to take a hard line on
technology transfer issues, while line officers and
some of the best educated military technocrats are
more interested in across-the-board improvement in
Sino-US cooperation.
China's financial constraints and longstanding
reluctance to become dependent on outside sources
will continue to slow progress on the issue of US arms
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sales to China. The Chinese will probably push to buy
selected technologies rather than systems, and will
continue to seek alternative suppliers and bargain
hard for favorable prices and terms.
Structural and political reform of the PLA will not
have as direct an impact on China's ability to project
its power, or on the war-fighting capabilities of its
armed forces, as variables such as weapon systems,
which are beyond the scope of this paper. To the
degree that the processes Deng has put in motion
succeed, however, they will create a more formidable
military machine and are a concern to China's
neighbors, including Vietnam and the Soviet Union,
Japan and Taiwan." Some ASEAN nations have
expressed concern to US diplomats about China's
military modernization and the US role in it, and
these concerns will probably grow as the tangible
results of Deng's programs become more evident. In
general, US and Chinese strategic interests now
coincide. The degree to which they will in the future is
likely to depend more on the success of the political
and economic reforms under way than on the military
ones.
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