TRENDS IN NORTH KOREA'S GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00539R000400490002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Trends in North Korea's
Ground Forces
PIO3EC,T NUMBER DE4 -ou Z- dL
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Secret
EA 86-10049
December 1986
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Intelligence
Trends in North Korea's
Ground Forces
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
This paper was prepared by Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
EA 86-10049
December 1986
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Trends in North Korea's
Ground Force25X1
Overview North Korea's ground forces development strategy suggests that the use of
Information available force remains an option for achieving Pyongyang's longstanding goal of
as of 1 December 1986 reuniting the Korean peninsula. Since at least the late 1960s, the North has
was used in this report.
engaged in programs focusing first on expanding the size of its ground
forces while improving firepower, and later on enhancing mobility through
smaller, more maneuverable units deployed closer to the demilitarized
zone. Although the ground forces are equipped with weapons of 1940-60s
vintage, renewed military assistance from the Soviet Union raises the
possibility that the North will be able to produce and deploy more modern
weapons
although most of the mecha-
nized brigades will probably be fully mechanized by the end of the century,
North Korea's ground forces will remain primarily a foot infantry force-
as dictated by mountainous terrain and narrow approach routes. The
regular ground forces will probably change little in overall size but will be
buttressed by an increasingly capable reserve force.
Secret
EA 86-10049
December 1986
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North Korea will continue to depend
on its own military production capabilities while trying to obtain assistance
from the Soviets. P'yongyang will probably concentrate on completing a
few weapon systems under development, such as a Scud-type surface-to-
surface tactical missile and several self-propelled antiaircraft gun systems,
while producing at modest levels current weapons, such as self-propelled
artillery and armored personnel carriers. The North will press the Soviets
for weapons that are beyond its capability to develop and produce, such as
modern armor and air defense weapons.
Overall, we believe that only a Soviet decision to transfer large quantities
of modern weaponry to North Korea-which is unlikely, given Moscow's
traditionally cautious approach to supplying its unpredictable ally in
P'yongyang-would result in a dramatic improvement in the North's
ground force capabilities.
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Historical Perspective
1 25X1
2
North Korean Ground Forces Today 3
Force Size and Manning 3
Looking Ahead 6
Size and Organization 9
What Could Change the Forecast? 11
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North Korea's ground forces, the sixth largest in the
world and the major component in P'yongyang's
Trends in North Korea's
Ground Forces) 25X1
military machine,
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ZoA]
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same time.
role in P'yongyang's defense plans, began about the
Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the focus
changed from a major expansion of manpower and
units to a reorganization of regular and reserve forces,
formation of mechanized corps and brigades, and a
forward deployment of forces toward the demilita-
rized zone (DMZ). Elements of the divisions that had
already mechanized were combined with additional
units and reorganized into four mechanized corps.
P'yongyang also used some existing units to create an
armor corps and an artillery corps. The armor and
artillery corps and two of the mechanized corps were
then moved to areas near the DMZ. An upgrade of
the reserve forces, probably to play a more important
units.
changes in weapons deployment patterns.
Historical Perspective
Our analysis of historical data indicates
that since at least the late 1960s P'yongyang has been
pursuing ground force development programs directed
first at expanding the force and increasing firepower
and then at enhancing mobility. During the 1970s the
North's domestic arms industry began to produce
tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and self-
propelled artillery. As part of the buildup, the North
also began to mechanize its forces, and, by the end of
the decade, two infantry divisions had been fully
mechanized, with a third under way.
Some major weapon systems, including tanks and
APCs, began to enter the force in smaller numbers,
suggesting production had slowed. To provide mobil-
ity for the mechanized force, the North combined its
inventory of APCs with less expensive trucks import-
ed from Japan to create a mix of mechanized-
motorized brigades. Increased numbers of obsolete
T-34 tanks-probably removed from storage-were
identified with units deployed in the eastern half of
the country, including one of the mechanized corps.
Until 1981 the number of T-34s had been declining as
newly produced T-55s and T-62s came on line. The
reappearance of T-34s and the use of trucks as troop
carriers may have been part of P'yongyang's effort to
move ahead with its force reorganization without
waiting for a full complement of new weapons.
We do not know why P'yongyang moved away from
the major buildup of the 1970s, but we suspect that
economic problems were an important factor. Short-
ages of energy and industrial materials are endemic in
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4 25X1
the economy. Stagnating exports and costly oil im-
ports have prevented P'yongyang from meeting its
debt obligations. In 1982, Kim 11-song publicly an-
nounced increased priority for infrastructure projects
involving agriculture, electric power, and transporta-
tion. Nonetheless, despite Kim's statements and the
more recent highly publicized commitment of military
forces to industrial projects
=over the last few years the North has add~its
defense production ca acit
Additional improvements have come from the outside
in the form of Soviet shipments of major weapon
systems. During the past two years, Moscow has
provided P'yongyanlIG-23 Flogger fighters and
enough components to equip about nine SA-3 Goa
low-altitude, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
North Korean Ground Forces Today
data base
provides a good snapshot of the current status of the
North's ground forces. The force stands at almost
double its size in the 1960s, before the buildup began,
and is equipped with a variety of Soviet-designed
weapons, which P'yongyang has copied and modified
to meet its needs.
Force Size and Manning~data show that
the ground force numbers about 750,000 men, with a
wartime strength of 820,000. The force consists of
about 64 major maneuver units, including a total of
26 infantry divisions and 38 combat brigades. Also
included with the ground forces are about 22 lightly
armed brigades-about 65,000 troops-trained to
conduct specialized warfare behind enemy lines.
Complementing the regular forces is an increasingly
capable ready reserve force organized into about 26
divisions and equipped with weapons that are being
phased out of the regular forces.'
account for the dicrrrnnncies.
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2 These figures are in general agreement with current Intelligence
Community estimates of North Korean ground forces. For exam-
ple, estimates of current peacetime strength range from 743,000 to
794,000. Varying assessments of growth in the forces since the 1981
reorganization and the use of different counting rules probably
Organization. The Ministry of People's Armed Forces
(MPAF) exercises control of the ground forces
through about 14 corps-level organizations, eight of
which have responsibility for a geographic region. A
geographic corps typically includes one or more infan-
try divisions, an artillery brigade, a multiple rocket
launcher (MRL) brigade, and an armor brigade. Six
corps-level organizations, which are colocated with 25X1
several of the geographic corps, apparently have 25X1
functional rather than geographic responsibilities. Of 9FX1
these six functional corps, four are mechanized, each 25X1
with a mix of five or six mechanized or motorized
infantry brigades; one is an armor corps consisting of
at least four tank brigades; and one is an artillery
corps, with four brigades. Two of the mechanized
corps and the armor and artillery corps have been 25X1
deployed close to the DMZ and appear intended for
use as a second-echelon exploitation force. The other
two mechanized corps are deployed to the rear, one
near each coast
Weapons. The ground forces are equipped with
large numbers of Soviet-designed weapons, albeit of
1940-60s vintage, whose makeup clearly reflects
Korea's emphasis on firepower (see figure 2 and
figure 3).
? Fire support. The most common models of tube
artillery are the 122-mm howitzer, the 130-mm
field gun, and the 152-mm gun-howitzer. P'yon-
gyang has improved the mobility of its artillery by
mounting some on tracked chassis to produce a
family of self-propelled weapons unique to North
Korea (see figure 4).
? Armor. The bulk of the medium tank force consists
of T-54/55s, with lesser numbers of newer T-62 and
the obsolete T-34 tanks (see figure 5).
? Troop carriers. Both APCs and trucks-mostly
long-bed trucks-are used for troop transporters
and reconnaissance, providing mobility for about
one-third of the North's infantry battalions. The
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Figure 2
North Korean Weapon Trends, 1966-86
Fire support
Tactical air defense
Troop carriers
aDrop resulted from organizational change affecting numbers
and types of weapons.
Figure 3
Technological Ages of Weapons in the
North Korean Ground Forces
0 1970
1960
IN 1950
Q 1940
01930
86 0 Tube Tanks Troop Tactical
artillery carriersa air
Major weapon classes defense
'Half are trucks.
APCs are primarily the domestically produced
M-1973, a highly modified version of a Chinese
1960s model.
launched missile.
? Air defense. The North relies heavily on gun sys-
tems in both tactical and fixed defense roles. Some
types are fielded in both towed and self-propelled
models. The only missile systems deployed are the
SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles and an un-
known number of the SA-7, a manpack, shoulder-
Operations and Tactics
The little direct evidence we have on how the North
Koreans plan to fight a war with the South, on the
basis of their force development and deployment to
date, suggests they probably will focus on penetrating
Seoul's forward defenses and defeating the bulk of
South Korean and US forces before reinforcements
can arrive. We assume the element of surprise would
play a major role in these plans, giving P'yongyang
the advantage of choosing the time and place and of
massing superior forces in critical areas.
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P'yongyang probably would employ one or more of
the following tactical options in implementing such an
offensive plan:
? Manpower. Use the DMZ divisions backed by
massed armor and artillery to break through the
South's defenses.
? Firepower. Use substantial amounts of firepower,
primarily from artillery, to soften and open holes in
the defense.
? Maneuver. Use the mechanized corps as a second-
echelon force to exploit any breech in the South's
defenses or to block a counterattack.
? Infiltrate. Use the special operations forces to infil-
trate behind the DMZ in large numbers, spread
panic, and cause the South's DMZ defenders to
desert their defenses and open the way for the
North's penetration.
using a conventional ground attack coupled with a
rear area assault by special operations forces, as well
as a massive artillery barrage followed by a conven-
tional ground attack with additional supporting armor
and artillery.
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Figure 5
North Korean Armor, 1966-86
T-62
11
T-54/55
T-34
M Light tanks/assault guns
In forming our projections, we have considered several
key factors that we believe will influence future force
planning. Perhaps most important will be the state of
the North's economy. We estimate that annual eco-
nomic growth for at least the next 10 years will
average only 2 to 3 percent, enough to permit some
continued force growth but too little to free P'yon-
gyang of difficult choices between new civil or more
sophisticated and expensive military programs. With
defense spending already high-up to 25 percent of
gross national product (GNP) by our estimates-
P'yongyang has little latitude for shifting more re-
sources from heavy industry or agriculture to the
25X1 military.
North Korea: Ground Force Weapons,
December 1986 a
Tube artillery
3,900
Multiple rocket launchers
2,100
Mortars
5,800
Armor
a Does not include weapons with reserve units.
b Another 5,900 weapons are deployed in fixed defenses and in
support of the air forces.
Nor is P'yongyang likely to find economic relief
abroad. The North remains at the bottom of the
international credit list, having failed repeatedly to
meet its hard currency debt obligations. Most West-
ern countries, therefore, are unwilling to provide
financing for sales to North Korea. Faced with few
options, P'yongyang probably will continue pushing
for technological and military aid from Moscow.
Assistance from Beijing is also possible, but for the
most part China has not yet deployed in quantity in its
own forces the modern weapons P'yongyang wants.
North Korea's poor credit rating, as well as its
traditional emphasis on self-reliance, has precluded
the acquisition of modern technology and expertise. In
our judgment, the North would need a major infusion
of technology in such key areas as electronics, preci-
sion machine tools, and metals technology, as well as
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more and better training programs for its own scien-
tists and engineers, before it could effectively produce
modern weapons.
A less clear-cut factor influencing the development of
North Korea's ground forces is the succession issue.
Kim II-song's advancing age makes a change in
leadership in P'yongyang likely within the next de-
cade. Overt sources indicate that Kim's son-Kim
Chong-il-already is in charge of many of the coun-
try's daily affairs, and we expect that senior military
leaders, who Kim 11-song has handpicked, could well
transfer their loyalty to Kim Chong-il. Upon succes-
sion, however, we doubt the younger Kim would have
the absolute authority his father enjoys. Although
Kim Chong-il might be willing to accede to requests
for additional resource allocations to weapon pro-
grams in an effort to ensure military support, he still
would be limited by economic conditions
The North's view of South Korean force improve-
ments will be another major factor in its military
planning. In the early 1980s the South embarked on
the second of its force improvement programs intend-
ed to close the gap with the North in terms of both
numbers and firepower. Major aspects of the plan are
an increase in the number and range of artillery
weapons, including self-propelled models; deployment
of the indigenously produced K-1 tank incorporating
some of the most modern features of the US M-1
tank; and introduction of the South's own infantry
fighting vehicle on the basis of a US design for an
APC from the late 1950s. According to current
Intelligence Community estimates, South Korea's
ground forces consist of 544,000 personnel organized
into 19 infantry divisions, two mechanized divisions,
two armor brigades, and one infantry brigade. Addi-
tionally, South Korea's Naval Marine Force has two
infantry divisions and an infantry brigade. The inven-
tory of South Korean major ground force weapons
includes:
Although budget cuts and technological problems
have delayed South Korea's plans, P'yongyang almost
certainly is monitoring progress with concern, particu-
larly in light of the potential the South's dynamic
economic performance offers. The South Korean
economy already is about two and a half times larger
and is currently growing two to three times the rate of
the North's. We estimate that Seoul will maintain a
5.5- to 6-percent allocation of GNP for defense
spending. At this rate the South will be outspending
the North on defense in absolute terms by at least the
end of the decade.
In considering the factors that could affect military
planning for North Korea's ground forces, we have
also weighed the element of.time. Because of the
relatively large size of North Korea's ground forces,
overall changes, particularly those involving the intro-
duction of new weapon systems, stretch out over
several years. Thus, our projections for the near term
(up to 10 years) are heavily influenced by the reorga-
nization in progress and weapon systems under devel-
opment. Long-term projections (10 to 20 years) are
more arbitrary and are based on our assumptions
ranging from the potential for economic growth and
technological breakthroughs in North Korea to the
quality and quantity of outside aid, particularly from
the Soviet Union.
Future Forces
Our projections suggest that for the next two decades
North Korea will pursue a ground force development
program that relies principally on its own capabilities,
combined with selective aid from the Soviet Union.
Manning of the active force probably is near its peak,
and we expect only limited additional growth (see
figure 6.) Our projections show an increase, however,
in the size of the reserves, which we believe also will
be equipped with better weapons. P'yongyang will
concentrate its resources on completing development
of a few new weapon systems, such as a Scud-type
tactical surface-to-surface missile and several self-
propelled antiaircraft gun systems. To complement its
0
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Figure 6
North Korean Ground Forces Wartime
Manning, 1966-2005
units will be reformed, but at least two infantry
divisions already have been, and at least another three
that had been based in geographically strategic areas
probably will be
To supplement the active force, we project
P'yongyang will continue to upgrade the capabilities
of some reserve units. District commands have been
formed to control local forces organized into divisional
equivalents. These units are being equipped with
weapons retired from the active force. For example, in
the Liberation Day ceremonies in 1985 reserve forces
paraded with multiple rocket launchers, towed field
artillery, and antiaircraft guns-weapons that 0
are being replaced in the active
force by newer models. We have also seen such
equipment on imagery of industrial facilities, where it
is probably used by personnel in reserve units. We
believe the North has already formed about 26 re-
serve infantry divisions, as well as several artillery and
possibly armor units. North Korea maintains a sizable
force-perhaps as many as 5 million personnel in
varying degrees of reserve status-from which it
could draw to form additional reserve divisions. They
would be equipped with weapons retired from the
I I I I I I I I I I i I i
efforts, P'yongyang, we believe, will try hard to
acquire a new infusion of weapons and technology
from the Soviets, particularly in the areas of armor
and air defense.
Size and Organization. The limited growth under
way in the force will continue to focus on fully
equipping the six new corps, and on eliminating gaps
created when forming them. Analysis
suggests that the manpower-as well as the
equipment-for the four mechanized corps came pri-
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widely dispersed throughout the country. The armor
corps was formed primarily from previously existing
units of two armor divisions directly subordinate to
the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) and
an armor brigade that had been subordinate to one of
the geographic corps. MPAF units probably were also
used to create the nucleus of an artillery corps, while
the remaining units to fill out the corps were newly
formed. We are uncertain how many of the depleted
regular forces.
Weapons. We expect that the moderate pace in
fielding weapon systems already in production will
continue through the remainder of the 1980s, along
with the introduction of several systems under devel-
opment. Domestically produced weapons incorporat-
ing newly acquired Soviet technology probably will
not begin to appear with operational units before the
early 1990s, although the Soviets could transfer small
numbers of such weapons to North Korea at any time:
? Artillery. Emphasis will continue on increasing the
size of the self-propelled artillery force (see figure
7). We believe that, to correct a major deficiency in
current self-propelled artillery, by the mid-1990s
the North will introduce several models that incor-
porate a fully enclosed turret design to afford better
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Figure 7
North Korean Artillery, 1966-2005
protection for the crew. Towed weapons with long-
range capabilities, such as the 122-mm and 130-
mm field guns, will probably remain in ground
force units.
? Armor. We expect that by the early 1990s the
North, with Soviet help, could begin production of
the Soviet T-72 medium tank. Deployment of the
T-62, North Korea's newest tank, appeared to end
in the early 1980s, although T-62
chassis being used for a new se prope a antiair-
craft weapon system. Because of the marginal im-
provement of the T-62 over the T-55-the tank the
North has the greatest number of-and the lack of
evidence that significant numbers of T-62s are
being deployed into armor units, we believe that
any additional T-62 production and deployment
will be negligible
logical follow-on to the T-55 and T-62 programs.
Moscow may even supply P'yongyang with a limit-
ed number of T-72s before the end of this decade,
perhaps in response to the deployment of the
South's K-1 tank (see figure 8). The Soviets have
exported the T-72 to such countries as Syria, India,
Iraq, Algeria, and Libya; and Moscow has licensed
production of a version of the T-72 in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and India. P'yongyang may also
decide to upgrade the large force of T-54/55 tanks
to improve their operating capabilities and useful
life.
? Troop carriers. North Korea probably will continue
to produce and deploy the M-1973 APC, and what
appears to be an indigenous infantry fighting vehicle
on the basis of the M-1973 design, to replace the
long-bed trucks in its mechanized forces. Nonethe-
less, the majority of North Korean infantry will
probably remain on foot because of the high cost of
mechanization, and because Korea's mountainous
terrain and narrow valleys are not conducive to
armor operations.
? Air defense. We believe that by the early-to-middle
1990s the Soviets will probably assist P'yongyang in
deploying the SA-9 and SA-6 SAM systems, which
would provide better air defense for mechanized and
armor units. Both systems have been widely de-
ployed outside the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
countries, including Syria, Libya, and Yugoslavia.
The SA-9 is a mobile, low-altitude missile system,
while the SA-6 is a mobile system that is effective
against high-performance aircraft at low-to-medium
altitudes. Overall, however, gun systems-including
a growing number of self-propelled chassis-will
continue to provide the bulk of the air defense
protection for the ground forces (see figure 9 and
figure 10).
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Figure 8
North Korean Tanks, 1966-2005
aT-72 and new light tank.
bProjected.
? Tactical missiles. Initial deployment of a tactical
missile system similar to the Soviet Scud B is likely
before the end of the decade, and about two bri-
gades, each equipped with 12 missile launchers,
could be operational by the mid-19s
7test launches have been c90on ucte this
year. i a Scud B has a maximum range of 300
kilometers, giving P'yongyang more options for
striking targets in the South.
What Could Change the Forecast?
Our projections do not point to another surge in force
improvements, and we have no evidence Pyongyang
has been laying the groundwork to launch such an
effort in the 1990s. We cannot rule out that possibili-
ty, however, because the North has made abrupt
Figure 9
North Korean Tactical Air Defense
Weapons, 1966-2005
0 Missilesa
._ 1 Guns
a Does not include SA-7.
bDrop resulted from organizational change affecting numbers
and types of weapons.
c Projected.
changes in force-development programs in the past. In
arriving at our projections, we could have overestimat-
ed the severity of the North's economic and techno-
logical difficulties. P'yongyang may have used the
period since the late 1970s to assimilate its earlier 25X1
gains and at the same time to begin investing in the 25X1
plant, equipment, and technology necessary to up-
grade its defense industry to produce more modern
weaponry.
The evolution of North Korean-Soviet relations could
also affect the accuracy of our projections because we
view Moscow's role as key to P'yongyang's ground
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Figure 10
North Korean Tactical Air Defense
Weapons, 1966-2005
Self-propelled
0 Towed
4,000
3,000
2,000
i
1,000
a Drop resulted from organizational change affecting numbers
and types of weapons.
bProjected.
force modernization efforts. On its own, North Korea
is likely to make only limited progress. With a modest
amount of Soviet aid
o ernizatton wt
affect only a part of the force. The Soviets in the past
have been careful about the types and amount of
military aid they have provided to P'yongyang. None-
theless, P'yongyang and Moscow have drawn steadily
closer over the past two years, with recent highlights
including a Kim-Gorbachev summit in Moscow and
the first joint military exercise off North Korea's
northeastern coast. The USSR has the capability to
transfer large quantities of modern weaponry to
North Korea, and such a shift in policy would cause a
dramatic improvement in North Korea's ground force
capabilities
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP88T00539R000400490002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP88T00539R000400490002-2
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP88T00539R000400490002-2