CHINA'S NEW GROUP ARMIES: ADOPTING A CONCEPT OF MODERN WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00539R000500650002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence T
Modern Warfare
Adopting a Concept of
China's New Group Armies:
tPecret
EA 87-1
June 1987 25X1
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Modern Warfare
China's New Group Armies:
Adopting a Concept of
This paper was prepared by Office
of East Asian Analysis,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, China Division, OEAF-
Secret
EA 87-10016C
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China's New Group Armies:
Adopting a Concept of
Modern Warfare
Key Judgments Over the past decade, Beijing has moved decisively to prepare the People's
Information available Liberation Army (PLA) for modern combat, acquiring selected advanced
as of 1 June 1987 weapons technology, trimming the armed forces by at least 2 million, and
was used in this report.
promoting younger, combat-experienced officers to prominent positions in
regional and national commands. Although modernization has touched all
arms of the military, China's ground forces are undergoing the most
sweeping reforms. China's 35 field armies have been consolidated into 24
more powerful "group armies," creating the framework for a modern
Army with greater mobility, firepower, and combined-arms integration.
The amalgamation of firstline ground forces into group armies has not
fundamentally altered the distribution of military strength along sensitive
borders:
? Along the Sino-Soviet border, most combat troops from the four
disbanded field armies were absorbed into 13 new, larger group armies.
The group armies are still far from equal in fighting power to their Soviet
counterparts, and we expect that group armies opposite the USSR will
continue to have priority in receiving China's limited supply of modern
weapons.
? Opposite Vietnam, seven field armies were reduced to four larger group
armies. However, this reduction of some 40,000 combat troops is more
than offset by the semiannual rotation to the Malipo battlefield of as
many as 70,000 troops from other regions.
? Despite the elimination of one field army opposite Taiwan, China's
combat capability has probably been only slightly reduced. One of the
three remaining armies is the best equipped force in southern China, and
now includes a fourth infantry division and new air defense, artillery, and
tank brigades
As a result of resource constraints and long-term defense priorities, we
believe that China's military modernization program may result in the
emergence of two distinct types of group armies in the next decade. Group
armies deployed against Vietnam and Taiwan will probably remain
infantry-heavy forces, and primary equipment improvements will probably
iii Secret
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consist of weapons best suited to supporting infantry operations. In
contrast, group armies arrayed against the Soviet Union will become
mechanized formations, and potentially offer a capability to project
military power
The amount of combat equipment and combined-arms integration of
Chinese frontline units has improved, but even the most advanced group
armies remain markedly inferior to their Soviet adversaries:
? For example, the Soviet 35th Army-deployed against China's Shenyang
Military Region-has almost three times as many tanks, four times as
many armored fighting vehicles, and almost twice as many artillery
pieces as one of China's best equipped group armies.
? Soviet group armies in the Far East have an entire range of weapons un-
available to Chinese units, including short-range FROG and medium-
range Scud-B tactical missiles, mobile surface-to-air-missile batteries,
and combat helicopters.
Indeed, as its military strength grows, Beijing will need to avoid unduly in-
creasing friction with Moscow that could lead to an arms race that China
cannot win.
Beijing's recognition of these equipment deficiencies, however, does not
mean that China is ready to buy large quantities of military hardware from
the West. Rather, Beijing is more likely for the next few years to seek criti-
cal technologies from the West to "leapfrog" the weapons of the 1970s and
1980s and to revamp its defense industries to build the "smart" weapons
capable of meeting the anticipated Soviet threat of the 21st century. The
Chinese have already proposed joint US-China development of a sophisti-
cated antitank missile, and they have investigated coproducing the US
Patriot advanced air defense system and relatively low-cost means of
countering Soviet armor, such as the US Copperhead laser-guided artillery
projectile
Beijing is looking for assistance in developing its operations research
capabilities, and it is currently as interested in the US management
approach to military research and development as in hardware. Beijing's
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record on producing the appropriate weapon, in the right decade to meet
the threat, is abysmal, and China's defense industry leaders are intent on
correcting this shortcoming.
To overcome the shortage of funds for weapons research and development,
Beijing has increasingly sought "creative financing" arrangements in the
West.
the shorter term, the Chinese will increasingly seek Western assistance in
areas that can make significant improvements to their group armies
without substantial expenditures:
? Combat Doctrine and Operational Concepts. We believe Beijing intends
to take full advantage of US and NATO experience in combined-arms
operations and knowledge tics. Chinese military
leaders have asked o lecture at the newly
formed National De ense rover-s y, an inese strategic and doctrinal
planners hosted a conference in Beijing with US Army combat operations
experts in February.
? Combined-Armed Tactics. Beijing clearly recognizes the value of West-
ern combined-arms experience, and greater exposure to Western war-
fighting doctrine would probably improve Chinese combined-arms
operations.
? Force Management. As its appreciation for the cost and complexity of
ground force equipment grows, China will probably focus on Western
logistics management techniques. Although Beijing probably does not
perceive a need to copy Western force-sustainment methods, the PLA
may adopt a more centralized, demand-driven logistics system to manage
its most expensive weapon components.
In some cases-to explore concepts requiring modern equipment-the
Chinese General Staff will buy a few items of military hardware from the
West. For example, in late March Beijing purchased eight French light
attack helicopters to form an experimental Army aviation corps subordi-
nate to a group army. This small purchase, however, will probably be the
extent of light attack helicopter acquisitions from the West at least through
the end of 1990.
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As expected in such a fundamental reorganization of military forces,
Beijing's short-term problems are substantial. Nonetheless
although difficulties are recognized, few PLA officers are
questioning the efficacy of the reorganization. Emphasis in the near term
will be on low-cost areas of force restructuring, training, development of
operational art, and experimentation. Beijing's formation of the group
armies is only the first step in a long process to produce a truly modern
force capable of meeting any adversary, even the Soviet Union, in the 21st
century.
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Group Armies Take Shape on the Soviet Border
Implications for the Regional Balance
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China's New Group Armies:
Adopting a Conc
Modern Warfar
Stimulated by the markedly improved Soviet military
threat opposite its northern border and by the prob-
lems in coordination and communication that oc-
curred during its 1979 war with Vietnam, Beijing
during this past decade has moved decisively to
prepare the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for
modern combat. Military leaders have acquired se-
lected advanced weapons and foreign weapons tech-
nology, trimmed the armed forces by at least 2 million
to the current level of 4-5 million, and promoted
younger officers with combat experience to prominent
positions in regional and national commands.__~
Although modernization has touched all arms of the
military, China's ground forces are undergoing the
most sweeping reforms-structural changes that have
eliminated field armies in favor of more powerful
combined-arms armies. The transition to these group
armies culminates a decadelong drive to break with
the central tenet of the Maoist People's War strate-
gy-trading land for time to mobilize China's huge
population for guerrilla assaults on overextended ene-
my forces
Origins of the current reforms date from the Korean
war, where massed Chinese infantry formations were
often decimated by the overwhelming firepower of UN
forces, and US air superiority wreaked havoc with
tenuous Chinese supply lines. The organizational
structure that had served the PLA well during its
guerrilla and civil wars was not readily adaptable to
the modern battlefield and conditions outside the
Chinese mainland: foreign "masses" could not be
mobilized to provide supplies or intelligence to Chi-
nese combatants, and lightly armed infantry units
ultimately could not beat artillery- and armor-heavy
opponents. 25X1
Realization of Beijing's inability to protect regional
interests crystallized following the Vietnamese inva-
sion of Cambodia in 1978, when the threat of China's
military power was not sufficient to deter Hanoi from
attacking a Chinese ally. China's invasion of northern
Vietnam in 1979 failed to force Hanoi to withdraw
from Cambodia and accomplished only limited mili-
tary objectives at considerable economic and human
cost. The invasion illustrated the inadequacies of
PLA doctrine-Chinese field commanders failed to 25X1
adequately synchronize the actions of combat ele-
ments, and tactical flexibility was further constrained
by a cumbersome command and control system.
Combined-arms integration has become a central
goal of the current reform movement. 25X1
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In May 1985, Central Military Commission Chair-
man Deng Xiaoping announced the consolidation of
all remaining field armies to combined-arms group
armies.
Transitional Problems
As expected in such a fundamental reorganization of
military forces, Beijing's short-term problems are
substantial. The simple act of streamlining the force,
for example, has led to severe problems in placing the
several hundred thousand demobilized PLA officers
in equivalent civilian posts and disgruntlement among
many who believed that they were guaranteed lifelong
careers in the armed forces.
although difficulties are recog-
the new military organization.
nized, few PLA officers are questioning the efficacy
of the reorganization. Public speeches by China's
highest military officials underscore that they believe
the problems are solvable and that, in the long run,
China's defense interests will be far better served by
The most serious problem facing the group armies is
that they lack sufficient quantities of modern military
hardware:
? Only a few group armies have mechanized infantry
formations, and many still lack sufficient trucks to
move and support their soldiers on the battlefield.
? Group armies have only limited quantities of the
shoulder-fired HN-5 (SA-7) air defense missile. The
HN-5 provides only a close-in defense of four
kilometers or less, and the organic air defense needs
are still largely provided by visually aimed, towed
antiaircraft pieces of World War II vintage.
and has an obsolete warhead un-
able to penetrate the armor of any tank more
modern than the Soviet T-62.
by more pressing economic needs
These and other equipment shortfalls, particularly in
the combat support area, are unlikely to be remedied
soon, for China's military budget is severely restricted
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Moreover, the restructuring has been tremendously
disruptive-Chinese military publications indicate
that some infantry divisions were converted en masse
to artillery and antiaircraft brigades-forcing the
retraining of large numbers of officers and senior
enlisted personnel. The massive reorganization has
also disrupted traditional command relationships-
Two other notable problems are the result of a
tradition of regional orientation. Although nominally
national forces, China's group armies remain closely
associated with individual military regions,
Officers, for example, are trained at mili-
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reers serving in a single group army or military
China's traditional emphasis on regional defenses and
self-reliant combat troops has produced a logistic
system poorly suited for movement of forces national-
ly. The PLA logistic system is designed to ensure that
ground forces can operate independently even if cut
off from Beijing, and to minimize the burden on the
civilian economy by making the PLA as self-sufficient
as possible. The result is a highly decentralized supply
system, best suited to su ortin defensive infantr
operations in place
from the military region support network.
strain Beijing's ability to move group armies away
"push-driven"' system is adequate for unmechanized
peacetime forces with low ammunition consumption
rates-most PLA artillery batteries, for example, fire
only a handful of shells a year-but would probably
be overwhelmed by the wartime requirements of a
more modern ground force. Much of China's basic
military equipment-spare parts, calibration, and di-
agnostic equipment-is produced and managed by
military regions, using different administrative proce-
dures. Moreover, among China's weapons and ammu-
nition factories-many of which produce identical
items-there is little standardization in such basic
areas as spare parts numbering systems or shipping
container designs. These characteristics severely con-
But Long-Term Gains
Despite the problems, the combined-arms army is the
foundation upon which Beijing can build a modern
ground army. Already, the changing structure has
revitalized the discussion of strategy and tactics and
forced officers in the various service arms of the PLA
to think far more realistically about war on the
modern battlefield. Numerous articles in China's
premier military newspaper, the Liberation Army
Daily, indicate that a lively discussion of combined-
arms operations is under way.
Compared with field armies and the 1982 version of
the combined-arms armies, the new table of organiza-
tion offers greater mobility, firepower, and combined-
arms integration (see table 1). In the past year,
entirely new combat organizations have appeared
throughout the PLA, and previously independent
tank, artillery, engineer, air defense, and chemical
defense units have been subordinated to group armies.
Although equipment levels and readiness postures
continue to depend on mission and location, Chinese
main force units are probably more standardized
under the group army structure than at any previous
'Unlike Western and Soviet armies, PLA units do not customarily
requisition supplies from logistics centers, but instead receive
regular, predetermined shipments of spare parts and ammunition.
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Table 1
The Evolution of China's Group Army:
Increased Firepower and
Combined-Arms Integration
Tanks SP Field AAA ATGM AFVs/
Artillery Artillery Launchers APCs
Early Chinese combined-arms army total 240 414 264 0 120
(1981-85)
Note: These figures renre ent estimated attle for ideal
ground formations Chinese combat
doctrine, weapons production capabilities, and regional deployment
patterns. Many past and present Chinese ground force formations
lack uniformity, and most of China's other group armies lack at
least some of these elements.
time. Moreover, heavy equipment has been distribut- Correcting the Flaws
ed to lower command levels-increasing regimental
combat capabilities and, at a minimum, forcing in- Beijing's military leadership clearly understands it 25X1
creased familiarity with mechanized and combined- thus far has created only a basic framework and
arms operations at the lower echelons. Finally, Chi- appears to be moving aggressively to fill in some of
nese tactical mobility has also progressed the gaps. 25X1
nearly all of the group 25X1
armies in the northeast are now fully motorized.
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Acquiring New Weapons
China has made considerable progress toward devel-
oping some of the new weapons and equipment needed
to give offensive punch to group armies. In the past
three years, Beijing has unveiled an impressive variety
of weapons, including an improved main battle tank,
new armored personnel carriers, self-propelled and
towed artillery, and lightweight surface-to-air mis-
siles China's
most elite group armies in the northeast are receiving
China's newest ground weapons
The new systems are being provided in small quanti-
ties, however, and China would be unlikely to fully
equip its forces opposite the USSR for at least 10
years. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly would
continue upgrading their forces during this period. As
these new weapons are deployed, however, and until
the Soviets add new weapon systems to their forces
along the border, the Chinese systems will begin to fill
some glaring gaps in Beijing's defenses:
? New, extended-range artillery systems provide im-
pressive fire support, equaling or exceeding the
range of the Soviet guns facing them.
? The new Chinese tank is superior in range, accura-
cy, and mobility to standard T-54/55 and T-62
tanks, which make up 90 percent of Soviet tanks
currently facing China.
? The new infantry fighting vehicles offer a challenge
to the BMP-1, the backbone of Soviet mechanized
infantry forces in Asia; the automatic cannon of
Chinese infantry fighting vehicles demonstrated at
an arms show in Beijing late last year could destroy
BMPs at ranges up to 3,000 meters. However, if the
Soviets fit BMPs in the Far East with additional
armor-as they have in Eastern Europe and Af-
ghanistan-this range would be considerably
reduced.
? Deployment of self-propelled antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) and infantry fighting vehicles with automat-
ic cannons would provide Chinese mechanized
forces with improved defense against Soviet attack
helicopters (see figure 10, foldout)
undergoing a transformation.
Training the Modern Soldier
The composition of the Chinese officer corps is also
Chinese officers are no longer promoted
directly from the enlisted ranks; all new officers must
at least be senior middle school (high school) gradu-
ates and complete a two-year officer training course
at a military academy. Furthermore, to attract
China's most educated youth to the military, college
graduates can receive commissions after completing a
one-year officer training course, or completing mili-
tary training courses now mandatory at some civilian
universities.
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Equally profound changes are under way in China's
enlisted ranks, aimed at increasing the number of
technically trained soldiers by creating a career non-
commissioned officer (NCO) corps. The first NCO
training academy was opened last year to retain
technically skilled enlisted men who can no longer
expect to advance to officer ranks. An NCO career
system also provides a base for training conscripts and
wartime mobilization of a ready reserve. Within
group armies, a skilled NCO corps will free junior
officers from technical and administrative tasks
and-like most Western armies-will allow officers
to focus on improving leadership and command.
throughout China have participated in Beijing's cam-
paign of military pressure against Vietnam.' During a
recent visit to the Shijiazhuang officer academy south
of Beijing,
was considered an elite
assignment for new officers, who can test their com-
mand abilities in combat against battle-hardened
Vietnamese troops. Beijing is more fully exploiting the
training opportunity provided by the Malipo cam-
paign this year.
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Over the past three years, two highly specialized
means have been used to provide very different types
of training experiences for China's ground forces. The
most dramatic of these is the battlefield south of the
town of Malipo on the Vietnamese border where,
since April 1984, more than 200,000 troops from
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Although combat at Malipo provides battle-hardening
for China's rejuvenated officer corps, it offers little in
terms of combined-arms experience. Beijing has limit-
ed the battlefield to a series of hilltops just inside
Vietnam in an area some 15 kilometers wide and 3
kilometers deep, in part because penetrations farther
into Vietnam would overtax China's logistics and
communications capabilities. Moreover, the fighting
at Malipo has provided no opportunities to improve
the PLA's most pressing deficiencies: close air support
and integrated armor and infantry operations. Nei-
ther side has used aircraft to support infantry opera-
tions on the battlefield, and armored vehicles are
unsuited to the mountainous terrain of MalipoF__
China has turned to the West for advanced training
techniques. Chinese military visitors to the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California,
(three ground force maneuver
areas that cover approximately 300 square kilometers,
consisting of infantry assault courses, impact areas for
artillery and ground attack aircraft live-fire exercises,
the Chinese fully exploit the opposition force concept,
these troops will probably use tactics designed to
simulate those that China's ground forces would face
against a Soviet attack.
According to press reports, eventually every group
army will travel to the National Training Center for
combat evaluation. However, intensive combined-
arms training at a single national facility for China's
77 infantry divisions would require more than five
years, and we believe instead that the Nanjing facility
will serve as a model for the development of other
combined-arms training centers throughout China.
We believe that reorganization and consolidation of
the armed forces have not significantly reduced
China's fighting strength (see appendix). In the past
two years, we estimate that as many as 400,000 troops
have been trimmed from China's ground combat
forces (excluding cuts in the General Logistics De-
partment and the General Political Department).
in PLA fighting strength have probably been limited
to 100,000 troops-roughly 3 percent of PLA ground
forces-composed largely of China's oldest, least edu-
cated officers and soldiers.
Moreover, China's force modernization and reorgani-
zation are aimed largely at improving defensive capa-
bilities against the Soviet Union, and thus F__1
In the three military regions along the
Sino-Soviet border, most combat troops from the four
disbanded field armies were absorbed into 13 new,
larger group armies. The group armies are still far
from equal in fighting power to their Soviet counter-
parts but troop
levels along the Soviet border now constitute a greater
proportion of total Chinese troop strength than before
reorganization. Moreover, group armies opposite the
USSR will continue to have priority in receiving
China's limited modern weapons.
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ground forces.
very few weapon systems are in production for the
try division.
armored personnel carriers to mechanize every infan-
To overcome the shortage of funds for weapons
research and development, Beijing has increasingly
sought "creative financing" arrangements in the
As a result of resource constraints and long-term
defense priorities, we believe that China's military
modernization program may result in the emergence
of two distinct types of group armies in the next
decade. Group armies deployed against Vietnam and
Taiwan will probably remain infantry-heavy forces
because their opponents are less mechanized than the
Soviets. Primary improvements will probably consist
of weapons best suited to supporting infantry opera-
tions-towed artillery, mortars, small arms, tactical
radios, and artillery fire-control systems-and inte-
grated close air support coordination. In contrast,
group armies arrayed against the Soviet Union will
probably become highly mechanized formations with
weapons comparable to Soviet and Western 1980s-
vintage designs, and potentially offer a major capabil-
ity to project military power.
Implications for the United States and the West
Beijing's recognition of the equipment deficiencies
apparent in the group armies does not mean that
China is ready to buy outright large quantities of
military hardware from the West. China's priority, as
reflected in the state budget, is not major defense
spending but building China's civilian economy.
Equipping the group armies soon to meet the idealized
weapon holdings would be prohibitively expensive-
for example, China would have to build over 10,000
In some cases, to explore concepts requiring modern
equipment, the Chinese General Staff will buy a few
samples of selected military hardware. The Chinese,
for example, are planning to form an army aviation/
army air corps structure with light attack helicopters
subordinate to the group army
Rather than buying equipment, Beijing is more likely
for the next few years to seek critical technologies
from the West to "leapfrog" the weapons of the 1970s
and 1980s and to revamp its defense industries to
build weapons capable of meeting the anticipated
Soviet threat of the 21st century (see inset). Using the
slogan "win the 21st century," an article in the
authoritative Liberation Army Daily in October 1985,
authored by members of the General Staff Depart-
ment, strongly urged that the PLA should build for
the future and concentrate its limited resources on
the Chinese military-industrial complex is increasing-
ly insistent on exploring the possibilities of offset
agreements or long-term loans to finance the projects.
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Beijing believes the Soviet
Union is concentrating on rebuilding its economy and
defending the gains it made in the 1970s before
resuming the offensive early in the next century. At
that time, Moscow will increase the military pressure
on China to bend Beijing's policy to Moscow's will.
This Chinese judgment is reflected in Beijing's con-
tinuing and determined military modernization pro-
gram designed to meet the Soviet threat in the next
century.
China's Window of Security:
Buying Time To Modernize
that allows China to reorganize its military
but the
next 10 to 15 years represent a window of security
We believe that Beijing's strategy requires a low level
of tensions with Moscow if its reform program, which
includes the ambitious military modernization drive,
is to succeed. This strategy will probably become
more difficult-and more crucial-over the next
decade. Indeed, as its military strength grows, Beijing
will be compelled to pursue a dialogue with the
Soviet Union to avoid unduly increasing friction with
a powerful adversary, creating an arms race that
China is not able to win. Beijing realizes that no
military strategy it might choose would allow it to
fully meet the Soviet threat. Accordingly, the Chinese
continue to see talks as the key to controlling ten-
sions. To this end, we expect Beijing to continue to
exchange visits and to sign economic and technical
agreements with Moscow-without fundamentally
altering its assessment of the Soviet threat.
acquiring advanced military technologies for their
military-industrial complex and delay the production
of a lot of military hardware. The Chinese, therefore,
are focusing their acquisition efforts on the "smart" 25X1
weapons' of the West:
that China was no longer interested in buying the I-
TOW antitank missile but proposed for the first
time a joint US-Chinese development program for a
sophisticated, laser-guided antitank missile.
? Chinese buyers are seeking the technology for guid-
ed and unguided submunitions-designed to destroy
massed armor formations-that can be delivered by
aircraft, artillery, and multiple-rocket launchers.
? Advanced Western air defense systems could pro-
vide a quantum improvement in the battlefield
survivability of China's group armies
In addition to seeking the advanced technologies,
Beijing is looking for assistance in learning systems
analysis in the management of defense research and
development projects. Beijing's track record on pro-
ducing the appropriate weapon, in the right decade to
' "Smart" or "fire and forget" weapons use computer microcircuits
and heat sensors or radar to identify enemy targets without being
aimed or controlled after firing. For example, the US SADARM
(Search and Destroy Armor) is delivered by aircraft or artillery over
massed enemy armor and, while descending by parachute, identifies
and fires a projectile at the heat signature of vehicle engines.
2r,''
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meet the threat, is abysmal, and indications are strong
that China's defense industry leaders are intent on
correcting this problem.
US joint systems analysis team to visit Beijing in 1987
to educate Chinese scientists on the US approach.
was more interested in the
US management approach to military research and
development than in hardware. In fact, Wu invited a
In the shorter term, the Chinese will increasingly seek
Western assistance in areas where they can make
significant improvements to their group armies with-
out substantial expenditures of funds:
? Combat Doctrine and Operational Concepts. We
believe Beijing intends to take advantage of US and
NATO experience in combined-arms operations and
knowledge of Soviet doctrine and tactics. During
US Army Chief of Staff Wickham's visit to China
in November 1986,
? Combined-Arms Tactics. Beijing has made an ex-
tensive effort to study US and NATO modern
combat tactics. Greater exposure to Western war-
fighting doctrine-and the PLA's growing emphasis
to lecture
on a variety of topics at the newly formed National
Defense University including army aviation doc-
trine, command and control, and air defense proce-
dures for US ground forces. During meetings in
Beijing with US Army combat operations experts in
February, Chinese strategists demonstrated a strong
focus on US operational art and doctrine for com-
bating massed Soviet armor.
on realistic combined-arms training-should result
in improved Chinese combined-arms operations,
especially as more modern weapons become avail-
able and younger, better educated officers move
into command positions.
? Force-Management Techniques. Beijing's interest in
Western force-management techniques will proba-
bly grow with the increasing complexity of group
army equipment. Especially in the northern military
regions, the focus of wartime logistics management
is shifting to providing spare parts for laser range-
finders, battlefield computers, and large-caliber am-
munition. China will probably focus on the tools
used to manage logistics-quality-assurance tech-
nology, large-scale automated logistics management
systems-and probably does not perceive a need to
copy Western force sustainment methods or signifi-
cantly modify the PLA's decentralized force man-
agement practices. However, as its appreciation for
the cost and complexity of modern ground force
equipment grows, the PLA may adopt a more
centralized, demand-driven logistic system to man-
age its most expensive weapon components.
Beijing's formation of the group armies, therefore, is
the first step in a long process-one that spans
decades-of force modernization. Emphasis in the
near term will be on those low-cost areas of force
restructuring, training, the development of the opera-
tional art, and experimentation. But the new forma-
tions are designed to carry the Chinese Army into the
21st century with the hope that, once the funding is
available and defense industries become sufficiently
modernized, Beijing can field a truly modern force
capable of meeting any adversary, even the Soviet
Union.
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