WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES - 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00565R000200250002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of I Secret
Central
Intelligence
Warsaw Pact
Theater Forces 1985
Secret
NI JIM 85-10006
September 1985
Copy 3 5 4
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Warsaw Pact
Theater Forces 1985
Information available as of September 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
Secret
NI JIM 85-10006
September 1985
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Scope Note This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum reviews recent developments
and trends concerning Soviet and Warsaw Pact theater forces and provides
a concise compilation of data about weapon characteristics and deployment
levels. It addresses these forces, first by service and then according to
region, as they would be used in the event of war. Background briefs
describe selected concepts, problems, and force subsets that are important
for understanding these forces, their missions, and their future direction.
This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. It was compiled by
of the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, and was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Bureau of
Intelligence Research, Department of State; and the military services
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Secret
Chapter
Background Briefs
Nuclear Weapons for Theater War
2
Chemical Warfare
2
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
5
Introduction
9
17
21
23
24
The New Division and Army Corp
Structures
28
Armor and Infantry
31
Artillery
35
Air Defense
39
Naval Forces
Introduction
43
The SSBN Bastion Concept
45
Surface Ships
47
Attack Submarines
51
The ASW Search Problem
53
Weapon Systems
54
Regional Developments
Northern Europe
57
Amphibious Forces
58
Central Europe
60
The Reliability of the Soviets' Allies
63
Southern Europe
64
NSWP Modernization Problems
66
Southwest Asia
68
The War in Afghanistan
70
East Asia
72
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Theater Forces Secret
The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies maintain a
huge military apparatus to defend against attacks on
their borders by the potentially hostile neighbors that
surround them. These forces are also ready to take
advantage of possible opportunities to extend Soviet
power or to suppress internal threats to the security of
the Soviet Union and her allies. The Soviet people
have not forgotten-and their leaders will not let
them forget-the devastating impact of World War
II, the Great Patriotic War as they know it, and the
consequent necessity of supporting the large and
expensive forces that can preclude the reoccurrence of
such a tragic event. The ground, air, and naval units
arrayed in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia
are stronger now than they have ever been and benefit
from a steady flow of new and better equipment of all
types.
The Soviet military is not without problems, however.
Among them are:
- Unrealistic and stereotyped training practices in
many areas that fail to stimulate leadership initia-
tive and creativity-especially at lower command
levels-and that cannot test readiness adequately.
- Quality control problems in producing and main-
taining some of the more complex combat equip-
ment now being fielded.
- Widespread cynicism and corruption, fostered by
the Soviet system.
- Language and racial problems, with unpredictable
adverse affects on the military.
In peacetime, civilian direction of policy for the Soviet
military comes from the Communist Party's Politburo
and, in particular, from those members who deal with
national security affairs-the Defense Council. The
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff administer
the armed forces, working through the military ser-
vices, the military districts (MDs) around the USSR,
and the groups of forces stationed in Eastern Europe.
A Combined Command of Warsaw Pact Forces,
located in Moscow, lacks control over any Soviet or
East European forces but does plan force development
and allocation in the event of war with NATO and
coordinates these plans with the East European mem-
ber states.
In wartime, military policy will be set by the Supreme
High Command (VGK), which will be headed by the
General Secretary of the Communist Party acting as
Supreme Commander in Chief and would include
high-level Defense Ministry and military leaders. The
General Staff will be the VGK's executive arm for
directing forces. To manage its campaigns, the Gener-
al Staff will use high commands for a number of
regional Theaters of Military Operations (TMOs)-
one each for southwest Asia and the Far East, two for
Europe, and possibly several for maritime TMOs. F_
The High Command of Forces in the Far East was
activated in 1978, and high commands apparently
have been activated for southwest Asia, southern
Europe, and central Europe. Having such commands
active in peacetime will make it easier for the Soviet
and Warsaw Pact command structures to move to a
wartime posture.
Relying on the TMO commands would allow the
General Staff to concentrate on overall direction of a
multitheater war. In wartime, these high commands,
which are completely under Soviet control, would
direct the operations of not only Soviet, but also East
European, forces. Normally, each high command
would direct several fronts formed from the armies
within peacetime military districts and groups of
forces in the particular area. Some military districts
in the interior of the USSR-the Moscow, Ural, and
Volga MDs-are not assigned to any of the high
commands, but instead form a strategic reserve.
The Supreme High Command also controls the use of
strategic nuclear forces for theater warfare and can
direct the use of intercontinental systems against
theater targets if need be. With the growth of the SS-
20 missile force, however, ICBMs are less likely to be
diverted for theater use. Although intended primarily
for strategic missions, some SS-N-6 missiles on Y-
class submarines-particularly those in or near home
ports-could be used in theater strikes.
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The Soviets have a broad range of tactical nuclear delivery systems
in their air, ground, and naval forces in addition to those elements
of their strategic forces that could contribute to theater war. Some
East European tactical aircraft, missiles, and field artillery also
could deliver nuclear weapons, but the Soviets would have to
provide the warheads from storage sites in Eastern Europe where
they keep weapons for both their own and their allies' systems.
Over the last 20 years, the USSR has shifted away from its heavy
emphasis on tactical ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery to rely
more on tactical aircraft. Aircraft probably would deliver up to half
of the weapons in an initial nuclear strike to support frontal
Longer range missile and aircraft systems could deliver strikes well
beyond the battlefield against command and control facilities and
important installations, such as airfields and missile bases support-
ing an enemy's nuclear weapons. These systems include the Back-
fire, Badger, Blinder, and Fencer aircraft in strategic air armies
(see page 13), the Strategic Rocket Force's SS-20s and SS-4s, and
the Navy's SS-N-5 ballistic missiles on a few old submarines (see
page 5). The development of long-range cruise missiles that can be
launched from aircraft, submarines, or off-road vehicles is adding
new dimensions to the Soviet nuclear threat in a theater conflict.
Despite the emphasis on aircraft systems, the Soviets have not
neglected other means. They have increased the number of tactical
missile launchers and improved these systems' performance. They
also have introduced nuclear-capable artillery. The Soviet Navy has
nuclear warheads for antiship missiles, some SAMs and torpedoes,
as well as nuclear depth charges for use with antisubmarine
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Soviet Military Districts and Theaters of Military Operations
Saudi
Arabia
0 Northwestern TMO [ Southern TMO
0 Western TMO Far East
The United Slates Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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The Soviets have a variety of missiles that can strike
targets anywhere from just beyond the front lines to
the full depth of a theater of war. They are fielding
improved versions of most of the current systems and
are introducing new air-, ground-, and sea-launched
cruise missiles as well. Force levels and deployment
locations for some systems depend in part on positions
taken for arms control negotiations, either to influ-
ence or respond to NATO decisions about correspond-
ing systems
SS-N-5. The Soviets have retired the SS-N-5s on
nuclear-powered H-II-class submarines because
launchers on nuclear units are accountable under
SALT I and their dismantlement compensates one for
one for the activation of launchers for new SLBMs.
The medium-range SS-N-5 is still carried on six
diesel-powered G-II submarines assigned to a Baltic
620
700
130
SS-21 Scarab
75
SS-23 Spider
0
Total
1,525
Land Based
SS-4
112 a
SS-20
414
Subtotal
526
Sea based
SS-N-5
39
Total
565
a This figure includes 18 launchers from deactivated bases that
probably were being moved to new bases.
Sea base and seven based in the Sea of Japan.
SS-4 and SS-5. The Soviets have continued to deacti-
vate SS-4s and probably will have phased them all out
by mid-1986. The last SS-5s were deactivated by
early 1984.
SS-20. Between 1977 and mid-1984, the Strategic
Rocket Forces fielded 378 mobile launchers for this
MIRVed ballistic missile at 42 operational bases
across the entire USSR. Each base supports a regi-
ment of nine launchers, housing them in separate
garages with sliding roofs that allow firing on short
notice. In the second half of 1984, the Soviets began
deactivating bases in the central USSR, probably to
convert them to support a new mobile ICBM, while
simultaneously building new SS-20 bases in the east-
ern and western USSR. They probably intend to
relocate the launchers from the deactivated bases to
the new bases, making it difficult for the United
States to assess the size and status of the force. At the
end of 1984, the Soviets probably had 414 SS-20
launchers, including 396 at 44 operational bases and
18 launchers probably being relocated to two new
bases. The number of launchers at operational bases
probably will fluctuate during 1985 as the Soviets
both deactivate and build more bases. Current con-
struction and the overall structure of the force, howev-
er, indicate that the SS-20 force will grow until it
reaches 450 to 500 launchers by about 1987.
New Systems. A variant of the SS-20 has been
developed and may serve a function similar to the US
Emergency Rocket Communications System. The So-
viets also are working on a new missile that could be
available in late 1986 to replace the SS-20.
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Range 2,000 km 1,400 km 4,600 km, CIA;
5,000 km, DIA
Operational Soft pads or Submerged Mobile
mode quadruple silos
Year
operational
The Soviets are testing a family of cruise missiles
(similar in some ways to the US Tomahawk) with a
maximum range of more than 3,000 km. The air-
launched version, the AS-15, became operational on
Bear H aircraft in 1984. The sea-launched version,
the SS-NX-21, has been tested from a modified V-
III-class attack submarine and could become opera-
tional on that class in 1985. It also could be deployed
on M-, S-, Y-, and Akula-class attack submarines.
The ground-launched version, the SSC-X-4, has been
tested from a new mobile launcher and may be
operational in late 1985.
Another cruise missile, the SS-NX-24 (formerly re-
ferred to as the BL-10), is designed to be fired from
submarines and possibly from a ground-based launch-
er. A Y-class submarine modified to carry SS-NX-24
launch tubes conducted the first at-sea test firings in
late 1984, but the missile probably will be deployed on
a new class of submarine. The SS-NX-24 is capable
of supersonic, high-altitude flight to ranges exceeding
2,000 km; it is intended to attack land targets with a
nuclear warhead. It could become operational in
1986.
SSB Missiles Propulsion Year
Operational
SS-12 Scaleboard. The SS-12 Mod 2, previously
known as the SS-22, is more accurate than the SS-12
Mod 1. As a response to Pershing II and GLCM
deployments in Europe, the Soviets have moved three
SS-12 Mod 2 brigades from the western USSR into
Central Europe. Two brigades are now in East Ger-
many; the third is in Czechoslovakia. All three proba-
bly are expanding from 12 to 18 launchers. The
ca.lstruction of concrete launchpads and facilities for
mating missiles and warheads indicates that the Sovi-
ets will keep part of the force on alert. Maintenance
and training needs are likely to keep the fraction on
alert to about a third. This practice and the adoption
of command and control equipment used with the SS-
20 program improve reaction time and enhance the
prospects for preemptive strikes against NATO tar-
gets. Even at maximum range, the SS-12 would hit its
target only nine minutes after launch. It could be used
against nuclear delivery systems and important com-
mand and control facilities.
SS-21. This division-level system has replaced the
FROG-7 in some Soviet divisions in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and in the western USSR. The East
Germans, Czechoslovaks, and Syrians are buying
some for their own forces. The Soviets began fielding
a more accurate version, the Mod 2, in 1983.
New Systems. Front and army-level units have begun
receiving the SS-23, a solid-propellent missile intend-
ed to replace the Scud B. An improved SS-23 and SS-
12 will come along later.
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SSC-X-4 SS-NX-21
(developmental)
,,qp
C\
D
Warheads Speed Range CEP Year
Operational
1 2,500 km/h 2,000- ? 1986
3,000 km
Maximum CEP at Year
Range 2/3 Range Operational
925 km (CIA) 600-800 m 1965
900 km (DIA)
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Air Forces Secret
Soviet Air Forces are still making adjustments after a
major reorganization that took place in the late 1970s.
The current structure improves flexibility and simpli-
fies command and control, giving regional combined-
arms commanders more direct control over air and air
defense forces. The number of aircraft in ground
attack and air-to-air combat roles available to support
front campaigns continues to increase, at the expense
of interceptors for strategic air defense.
Strategic aviation, which consists of short-, intermedi-
ate-, and long-range bombers for conducting theater
and intercontinental strikes, comprises five strategic
air armies. One of these armies has an intercontinen-
tal mission; the other four are meant for theater
operations and would be allotted to support TMO
commanders by the Supreme High Command.
Front Aviation includes fighter-interceptors, fighter-
bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. These are orga-
nized as air forces of military districts or groups of
forces so that when fronts form from these entities in
wartime, their commanders will have direct control
over air assets. East European air forces, which vary
in function and structure, also would be controlled by
the front commanders in war. (Some 1,200 Soviet
interceptors, however, are controlled separately by the
National Air Defense Forces because of their strate-
gic role in defending against bomber and cruise
missile attacks and are not discussed in this publica-
tion.)
Army aviation provides aerial fire support, tactical
reconnaissance, and air mobility to the ground forces
at the front, army, and division levels. Although
currently only helicopters are assigned, the SU-25
Frogfoot also may be allocated to army aviation,
possibly at the front level. While operationally subor-
dinate to the ground force commander, army aviation
components receive administrative, technical, and lo-
gistic support from the Air Forces.
Naval Aviation has a variety of aircraft for reconnais-
sance, antiship, and antisubmarine strikes, as well as a
number of land-based and shipborne fighters that
could be used to defend task groups close to the
USSR or to support amphibious landings on nearby
shores. Each of the four naval fleets controls its own
air forces.
Military Transport Aviation (VTA) is responsible for
rapidly moving troops, equipment, and supplies, espe-
cially in airborne operations. Most of the intermedi-
ate- and long-range transport aircraft belong to VTA
units. Additionally, Aeroflot, the civil airline, also
would move troops and materiel in wartime.
Regardless of component, fixed-wing aircraft are
organized into regiments as the basic structural unit.
Depending on mission and type of aircraft, regiments
have 20 to 45 aircraft divided among three squadrons.
Normally, an airfield supports one regiment of the
same or similar aircraft.
Primarily to counter the Chinese threat, tactical
aviation experienced considerable growth from the
mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, but the number of
aircraft has remained generally constant since then.
More important was the large-scale effort to reequip
the Air Forces with new aircraft that began in the
early 1970s. This effort continues, and the advanced
technology of new aircraft and weapons-the MIG-31
Foxhound, MIG-29 Fulcrum, and SU-27 Flanker-
makes the Air Forces far more capable than in the
past. Nearly all modern fighters can operate in ad-
verse weather. More than half can attack other
aircraft at medium and high altitudes from all aspects
and have a limited capability to attack low-altitude
targets. The SU-24 Fencer A/B/C/D, MIG-27 Flog-
ger D/J, and SU-17 Fitter D/H/K can carry twice
the ordnance of the older SU-7 Fitter A, and deliver it
more accurately.
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The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not.ratcessarily authoritative.
Soviet Union
The strategic air armies and fleet air forces are
receiving the TU-22M Backfire; VTA is modernizing
with the IL-76 Candid and will soon receive a new
heavy transport. The inventory of attack helicopters is
growing, and a new large assault transport helicopter
is replacing a 25-year-old model that has a much
smaller lift capacity.
Air support to ground force operations has received
new emphasis as evidenced by changes in front avia-
tion and the development of Army Aviation. As part
of the reorganization in the early 1980s, about half of
the fighter-interceptors in the National Air Defense
Forces were resubordinated to air forces of the mili-
tary districts. These MDs and groups of forces that
already had some fighter regiments have used much
? TU-16 Badger
? TU-22 Blinder
o TU-22M Backfire
SU-24 Fencer
China
1000 Kilometers
Sea of
Okhotsk
Sea of
Japan i
No h , 1-
Soa
Kore
of the newly gained strength to augment their ground
attack capability. Some fighter regiments have been
converted to this role, and others have been retrained.
Army Aviation, created in the reorganization, is
growing and is receiving better attack helicopters,
including improved versions of the MI-24 Hind E. It
probably will soon have the MI-28 Havoc and may
also eventually receive the SU-25 Frogfoot. Thus, the
front air forces are becoming better equipped and
organized for their missions of striking targets, partic-
ularly enemy nuclear weapons and delivery systems,
ahead of the ground armies, with Army Aviation
providing close air support over the battlefield. These
changes are meant to contribute to the high rates of
advance now envisioned in the ground offensive.
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Four of the five strategic air armies are dedicated to
supporting theater operations. Three of these are
opposite NATO: one has the TU-16 Badger, TU-22
Blinder, and TU-22M Backfire bombers; and two
have SU-24 Fencer bombers and some fighter-inter-
ceptors. The fourth air army for theater support-
opposite China-has TU-16s, TU-22Ms, and SU-24s.
The Navy's intermediate-range bombers are in the
fleet air forces-three opposite NATO and one in the
Far East.
TU-22M. The Backfire C is currently in production;
about 30 are built per year. The C model may
perform better at supersonic speeds and at higher
altitudes than the older model. A third Air Forces
regiment is receiving the Backfire C, and the Navy
will soon convert its first combat unit to the new
model. The Soviets have converted 11 of their 37
intermediate-range bomber regiments to the Backfire.
All conversions have occurred in units formerly
equipped with the TU-16.
SU-24. Two-thirds of the Soviets' Fencer bombers are
assigned to air armies that support TMOs and one-
third to tactical units (see page 17). Production contin-
ues at a rate of about 100 aircraft per year, and
production of the Fencer C has recently ended in
favor of an improved model, the Fencer D. The D
model probably is fitted for air-to-air refueling (from
another SU-24 or from the developmental IL-76
Candid tanker). By late 1984 it had been provided to
10 regiments. Specialized Fencer variants for recon-
naissance and electronic countermeasures have begun
to replace 20-year-old YAK-28 Brewers.
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Maximum Operational Radius a
Maximum
Year
With
Missiles
Bombs
Speed
Operational
2,300 km
3,100 km
1,000 km/h
1954
2 AS-5s or
2,800 kg
(about half can carry missiles)b
TU-22
Blinder
TU-22M
Backfire
SU-24
Fencer
Maximum
System Range
AS-2 kipper 250 km
4~:~~
2,500 km 2,900 km 1,450 km/h 1962
1 AS-4 2,800 kg
(about half carry the missile)
CIA Estimate
2,590-
3,380-
1,950 km/h
1974
3,050 km
3,980 km
2 AS-4s
4,600 kg
(can carry up to three AS-4s)
4,700 km 5,400 km
2 AS-4s 4,600 kg
2,000-
2,350 km/h
1974
2,300 km
900 kg
a The radius given is for a mission flown entirely at high altitudes.
b Some naval TU-16s can carry one AS-2 to a range of 2,700 km.
Maximum Year Maximum
Maximum
Year
Speed Operational System Range
Speed
Operational
1,750 km/h 1961
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One new fighter-interceptor, the MIG-29 Fulcrum,
became operational during 1984 with three units in
the western USSR. The Soviets have converted 18 Fighter-interceptor
regiments from air-to-air combat or training missions Air Forces
to ground attack since the 1980 reorganization of the SU-15 Flagon
Air Forces and Air Defense Forces and have formed TU-128 Fiddler
three new ground attack units. YAK-28 Firebar
MIG-23 and MIG-27. Currently produced MIG-23 MIG-23 Flogger
Flogger G fighter-interceptors and all MIG-27 Flog- MIG-25 Foxbat
ger J ground attack aircraft have improved avionics MIG-29 Fulcrum
and equipment to counter infrared censors on enemy MIG-31 Foxhound
missiles. Attack
SU-24. A new variant of the SU-24 with a longer nose MIG-21 Fishbed
(the Fencer D) will fill strike, reconnaissance, and SU-7 Fitter
electronic warfare roles and is equipped for air-to-air SU-17 Fitter
refueling (see page 13). SU-24 Fencer
SU-25. Two squadrons of SU-25 Frogfoot are de- SU-25 Frogfoot
ployed in Afghanistan, and the Soviets have begun to Navy
field this attack aircraft in the USSR with combat SU-17 Fitter
units that are to operate in direct support of the YAK-38 Forger
ground forces. The Czechoslovak Air Force has ac- Reconnaissance or electronic warfare
quired a dozen SU-25s. Air Forces
MIG-29. This aircraft was first fielded in the western YAK-28 Brewer
USSR in December 1983. The MIG-29 Fulcrum has MIG-25 Foxbat
better performance for close-in maneuvering than SU-17 Fitter
older Soviet fighters and a much better radar and air- SU-24 Fencer
to-air missile; it is assessed to be able to attack low- Navy
altitude targets from any aspect. Eventually it may be TU-95 Bear
used as a fighter-bomber. AN-12 Cub
Modified YAK-38. A modified Forger began flight
tests in 1984, and the Soviets probably plan to test it
from a new ski jump ramp at a test facility on the
Black Sea coast. Similar ramps could be added to
Kiev-class aircraft carriers or built into future ships,
enabling them to handle improved vertical or short
takeoff and landing (V/ST L) aircraft, such as the
modified Forger.
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Principal Max
Carriers Range
Guidance
Year
Operational
radar or
infrared
seeker
AA-7 Apex
MIG-23 18.5 km
Semiactive
radar or
infrared
1974
seeker
AA-8 Aphid
MIG2I, 5.5 km
MIG-23
Infrared
seeker
1975
Principal Max
Carriers Range
Guidance
Year
Operational
AS-7 Kerry
MIG-27, 11 km
SU-17,
24
SU
Command or
beam riding
1971
-
AS-9
SU-17, 120 km
SU-24
Antiradiation
homing
1975
AS-10 Karen
MIG-27, 10 km
SU-17
Semiactive
laser
1976
SU-24
AS-12
SU-24 30 km
Antiradiation
homing
1981
MIG-25, 250 km
SU-24
Antiradiation
homing
1981
SU-17, 10 km
MIG-27,
SU-24
Semiactive
laser
1980
SU-27. Airframe changes apparently have remedied
the Flanker's aerodynamic and structural problems,
and the modified version has entered initial series
production. Despite production problems most likely
involving its engines and radar, it could become
Maximum Maximum Maximum Year
Operational Payload Speed Operational
Radius a
MIG-23 910 km with 2 metric 2,500 km/h 1972/78
Flogger B/G 6 AAMs tons
MIG-27 815 km with 4 metric 1,800 km/h 1975/78
Flogger D/J 6,500-kg tons
bombs
MIG-25 900 km
Foxbat B/D (reconnais-
sance)
MIG-25
Foxbat E
1,425 km with
6 AAMs
operational by late 1985. The Flanker may have been
tested with arresting gear at the Black Sea test
facility to evaluate it for use with the new aircraft
carrier now under construction (see page 49).
may be operational in the late 1980s.
RAM-M. With long wings like those of the US TR- 1,
this aircraft may be intended for high-altitude recon-
naissance with signal or imagery collection systems. It
RAM-Q. The RAM-Q appears to be an experimental
aircraft and not a prototype attack aircraft.
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Maximum
Maximum
Maximum
Year
Operational
Payload
Speed
Operational
Radius a
YAK-38
150 km with
1.2 metric
1,200 km/h
1974
Forger A
2 250-kg
tons
bombs
SU-17
Fitter D/H
SU-24
Fencer A
695 km with 4 metric
6,500-kg tons
bombs
1,500 km with 8 metric
10 250-kg tons
bombs
a The radius given is for a mission flown mostly at high
altitudes at subsonic speeds (except for the Foxbat, which is
assumed to fly at over twice the speed of sound)
SU-25
Frogfoot
Maximum
Operational
Radius a
445 km with
4 250-kg
bombs
Maximum
Maximum
Year
Payload
Speed
Operational
4 metric
1,000 km/h
1981
tons
2,220 km/h 1976-77 MIG-29 1,165 km with 3.5 metric about 1984
Fulcrum 4 AAMs tons 2,450 km/h
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Secret
Transport Aircraft
The delivery of IL-76 Candid transports is increasing
the capability of Soviet Military Transport Aviation
(VTA) to move military forces over long distances.
This gain in airlift capability has been largely offset,
however, as the airborne forces have acquired more
armored equipment. The entire lift capacity of the
VTA would be required to move either one complete
Soviet airborne division or six airborne maneuver
regiments and could take several days.
IL-76. The jet-powered Candid, which is replacing
most of the aging AN- 12 Cub medium transports, has
twice the Cub's maximum payload and reduces by
about 40 percent the number of flights required to
move a unit. So far, nine of the Soviets' 16 AN-12
transport regiments have converted to the IL-76, and
another has begun conversion. (Three other regiments
have the AN-22, a heavy-lift transport that can carry
outsized equipment; and another, a training regiment
that has both AN-12s and IL-76s, has acquired some
Military Transport Aviation
AN-12 Cub
AN-22 Cock
IL-76 Candid
Subtotal
Other Forces
AN-12 Cub
Total
Aeroflot
AN-12 Cub
IL-76 Candid
Total
Note: These figures exclude the large inventory of Aeroflot civil
passenger aircraft, which could be used to transport the personnel
of military units; they also exclude various small civilian and
military cargo transports. Some 30 of the Military Transport
Aviation AN-12s are deployed temporarily in Southeast Asia and
Africa, providing airlift support to Soviet client states.
Candid tankers as well.)
This will enable them to maintain the pace of modern-
ization of the transport force, as well as to produce
modified versions of the aircraft for other roles. F_
Civil Airlift Capacity. Passenger aircraft of Aeroflot,
the Soviet civil airline, could be used to transport
troops and materiel. During each spring and fall troop
rotation, Aeroflot conducts some 800 to 1,000 special
passenger flights to Eastern Europe over a two-week
period, plus flights to Mongolia, Afghanistan, and the
Soviet Far East. With only about 165 AN-12s and 50
IL-76s in its cargo fleet, however, the airline could
provide only limited support for movement of heavy
IL-76 Modifications. The Soviets have developed
modified versions of the IL-76 for use as an AWACS
aircraft and a tanker. Two IL-76s support the long-
range cruise missile program as telemetry collectors,
and at least one has been modified for use as a laser
weapon test bed.
Condor. The Soviets continue the development of their
new heavy transport, the Condor, and are building a
second prototype. Development of this aircraft began
equipment.
9 (I
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Transport Aircraft
IL-76T
Candid
AN-124
Condor (developmental)
Maximum Paratroop Radius a
Maximum Airlift Range ^
Average
Year
With Maximum Payload
Speed
Operational
1,870 km (CIA)
1,390 km (CIA)
590 km/h
1959
2,520 km (DIA)
1,480 km (DIA)
with 7,200 kg
20,000 kg
3,200 km 2,350 km 660 km/h 1967
with 45,000 kg 80,000 kg
3,250 km (CIA) 3,650 km (CIA) 770 km/h 1974
4,780 km (DIA) 5,690 km (DIA)
with 14,750 kg 40,000kg
in the early 1970s but has been delayed, most likely The new transport is comparable in size to the US C-
by technical difficulties in building a suitable fuel- 5A, but is estimated to have a larger payload. Its
efficient jet engine and in producing structural com- capability to transport outsized and very heavy cargo
ponents from modern composite materials. If no more is considerably greater than that of the aging AN-22,
major problems occur, the Condor could be operation- which it will eventually replace.
al by 1987 or 1988.
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AN-124 Condor A Transport Aircraft
The Airborne Troops (commonly known by their Russian initials,
VDV) are an elite element of the Soviet military establishment. The
VDV is a branch of the Ground Forces but is earmarked as a
reserve of the Supreme High Command. In military operations,
therefore, the highest level of the Soviet command will control the
employment of these forces. The VDV is meant to operate as part
of combined-arms formations that would link up with the airborne
unit after only a few days rather than independently in power
projection or intervention roles.F__1
introducing the BMD family of armored fighting vehicles. Almost
every airborne division has about 360 BMDs, which provide
transport, communications, and fire support for the troops. In late
1981 the Soviet airborne units began to receive a 120-mm "combi-
nation" gun (essentially a gun-mortar) mounted on a modified
BMD chassis. As more units are equipped with these vehicles and
other BMD variants, the BMD inventory in each division will reach
about 420, transforming the Airborne Troops from a light infantry
The Soviets have eight airborne divisions. Five full divisions of
about 7,000 men are kept at a high level of readiness in the USSR.
A full division and most of the major elements of another are in
Afghanistan. A smaller training division of about 4,000 men in the
Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have considerably strengthened
the ground mobility and firepower of the airborne divisions by
When compared with other armored or mechanized units, however,
the Soviet airborne division still has relatively little firepower or
endurance. Its air defense weapons and artillery are extremely
limited. Until more heavily equipped ground forces link up with it,
tactical aircraft must provide the division's air cover and most of its
fire support. Given suitable defensive terrain, a Soviet airborne
force could be expected to put up a strong, but probably short-lived,
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Helicopters
Army aviation-a component of the Air Forces con-
sisting primarily of helicopters-continues to expand,
providing greater air support for ground force armies
and divisions. Twelve of the 27 ground armies now
have attack helicopter squadrons, and in 49 ground
force divisions the helicopter detachment has been
augmented with MI-8 Hip and MI-24 Hind attack
helicopters to form a direct-support squadron that
also has some transport capability
MI-8. The Soviets continue to field the Hip H with
their helicopter units in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. This improved variant, previously used pri-
marily in Afghanistan, has engines powerful enough
to carry a heavy weapon load plus a full complement
of troops. Other recent variants, the Hip J and K,
MI-24. The Soviets have added disposable fuel tanks
to the MI-24 Hind helicopter for additional range and
loiter time and have modified its launch rails to
increase its missile load. A variant of the Hind E has a
heavier twin gun (which would be effective against
lightly armored vehicles and other helicopters) in
addition to the standard antitank missile, with a range
of 5,000 meters.
MI-26 Halo. This heavy-lift transport can carry a
greater payload than any other helicopter in the
world, in service or under development. It has the
same capacity as the AN- 12 fixed-wing transport-
that is, it can carry nearly twice the payload of the
MI-6 Hook that it replaces. It can carry two airborne
combat vehicles and will provide heavy lift for air
assault operations.
The Soviets are developing two new helicopters, the
Havoc and the Hokum. Although the Havoc probably
will have a primary role of ground attack, the role of
the Hokum is not yet understood. Some believe it is
Combat Helicopters
MI-8 Hip
MI-24 Hind
Assault Transport
MI-6 Hook
MI-8 Hip
MI-26 Halo
Total
Havoc A Attack Helicopter
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MI-6
Hook
MI-8
Hip E
MI-24
Hind E
MI-26
Halo
Havoc
(developmental)
Hokum
(developmental)
Operational Armament Cruise Year
Radius Speed Operational
315-km
with 5,500-kg
payload
215 km AT-2 ATGM, 215 km/h 1977
with 1,720-kg rockets, bombs,
weapon load Gatling gun
190 km
with 2,400-kg
payload
220 km AT-6 ATGM, 260 km/h 1978
with 1,150-kg rockets, bombs,
weapon load cannon or
Gatling gun
265 km
with 20,000-kg
payload
CIA, DIA: 300 km ASM or AAM,
(USAF: 275 km) rockets, bombs,
with 1,850-kg cannon or
payload Gatling gun
CIA, DIA: 300 km AAM or ASM
(USAF: 275 km) or ATGM,
with 1,850-kg rockets, bombs,
payload cannon or
Gatling gun
280 km/h
1987
330 km/h
1987
(CIA 1987-88)
meant primarily for air-to-air combat with a second-
ary mission of ground attack. Both are smaller than
the MI-24 and more maneuverable. They probably
are intended to augment the MI-24 rather than to
replace it.
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Ground Forces Secret
The Soviets are improving their ground forces in four
ways.
- They are continually providing new equipment, as
modernization efforts begun in the mid-1960s have
become steady and even paced.
mobilization in rear areas, prevent reestablishment of
defensive lines, and occupy enemy territory. Nuclear
weapons delivered by tactical missiles and artillery
would be important instruments-along with those
delivered by aircraft and longer range missiles-used
to destroy the enemy's nuclear systems, command and
control facilities, air defenses, and major support
- Mobilization bases, which were created beginning
in the 1960s to stockpile older equipment for
inactive divisions, are gradually being activated
with enough troops to form a cadre that could
expedite expansion to wartime strength and readi-
ness. In 1984, the Soviets activated four bases.
Since the late 1970s, a few active divisions at a
time have been undergoing structural changes that
make them larger, more mobile, and more flexible.
Through the end of 1984, at least 36 divisions have
been involved.
The reorganization of two divisions into new-type
army corps consisting of brigades probably portend
future changes to provide selected fronts with one
of these powerful units that is able to act as an
operational maneuver group in exploiting penetra-
tions of enemy defenses.
East European countries also are attempting to mod-
ernize their forces but are unable to keep pace with
Soviet improvements and may find their wartime roles
altered if Moscow attempts to compensate for its
allies' shortcomings.
The Warsaw Pact ground forces are trained to with-
stand an enemy attack and within days to begin their
own offensive operation. They are trained to penetrate
and overrun the enemy's forward defenses, disrupt
facilities.
To perform these tasks, the USSR has two new-type
army corps, 201 active divisions, 13 mobilization
bases for inactive divisions, and some 32 maneuver
regiments and brigades that are independent of divi-
sions. Of these, both corps, 82 of the active divisions,
and most of the independent units are regarded as
ready. These are well-trained and well-equipped units
with 50 to 90 percent of their wartime personnel. The
remaining 132 active and inactive divisions are not
ready, generally are less well equipped, and have less
than 50 percent of their wartime manpower needs.
The not ready force would need extensive training
after mobilization, but most units could be effective in
offensive combat operations within a month. The
peacetime manpower of 1.9 million troops would
increase to about 4 million after mobilization.
The East European members of the Warsaw Pact
provide another 55 active divisions and 13 mobiliza-
tion bases that vary considerably in organization and
weaponry despite efforts at standardization. Their
peacetime strength comes to about 900,000 men and
would grow to about 1.4 million in wartime.
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Soviet Ground Force Divisions in the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and Afghanistan
Ger. ,n
J
i.E. Ger.
Saudi
Arabia
The United State, Government hoe not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia. end Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
a ~e Finland
sire ,
North
Caucasus
Y?
Afghanistan
~p KABULJ
Siberian
Soviet Union
With 328 tanks and some 11,000 men in wartime, a Soviet tank
division is a formidable force. Since 1980 the most ready divi-
sions-primarily those opposite NATO-have gradually been al-
tered to improve their firepower, mobility, and flexibility. They now
Specifically, each of a tank division's three tank regiments is adding
an artillery battalion and expanding its motorized rifle company to
make it a battalion. The divisional artillery regiments are convert-
ing to self-propelled, rather than towed, equipment. In these
divisions, the Soviets also are adding tanks to the reconnaissance
battalion and creating a helicopter squadron from the existing
detachment. The artillery, reconnaissance, and helicopter changes
Despite the large increase in equipment-2,000 artillery pieces for
the 19 Soviet divisions in East Germany alone-peacetime manning
apparently is remaining constant. As a result of the expansion, the
percentage of troops on hand in relation to wartime authorized
Sea of
Okhotsk
Total 171
- Military district boundary
0 1000 Kilometers
E r l
0 1000 Miles
In 1980, divisions at Kyakhta in the Transbaikal MD and at Minsk
in the Belorussian MD began converting to a new-type army corps
structure. These corps, each with a wartime strength of some
20,000 to 25,000 men, would be nearly twice the size of a standard
motorized rifle division. Each appears to have four or five maneuver
brigades that are somewhat larger than the maneuver regiments of
divisions and have heavier air defenses. The brigades, in turn,
consist of four or five composite battalions. These battalions make
the organization unique because they mix five infantry and tank
companies. An airmobile assault regiment in each corps will allow
the commander to move troops with helicopters bypassing enemy
strongpoints and increasing the tempo of the attack. Strong artil-
lery and air defense will enable the army corps to operate independ-
ently beyond the range of higher echelon artillery and air defense
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Tank
battalion
Motorized rifle
battalion
Howitzer
battalion
Air defense
battery
Support
elements
Motorized rifle
battalion
Tank
battalion
Howitzer
battalion
Air defense
battery
Antitank
missile battery
Support
elements
SS-2l Helicopter
battalion squadron
Reconnaissance Support
battalion elements
Howitzer
Missile --
battalion
battery
Multiple rocket
launcher battalion
Technical
battery
Targetting
battery
Surveillance
Support
battery
elements
Support
elements
Tanks 328
APCs/ACVs 456
Field artillery 108
Mortars 40
Multiple rocket launchers 18
SS-21s 4
Helicopters 18
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Armor and Infantry
Improvements to the tank force include an extensive
program to modernize some older tanks in addition to
continuing production of new models. The Soviets also
are fielding advanced armored combat vehicles to
improve protection and mobility for the infantry
troops that move with advancing tank formations.
Modernizing older T-55 and T-62 tanks probably
would involve equipping them with new fire-control
systems and additional hull and turret armor. They
also will be refitted with new engines and transmis-
sions, and some may receive new guns. These changes
probably cost one-third of the price of a new tank,
making modernization particularly attractive to the
East Europeans.
At least three new tank models are in production-the
T-64B, a T-72 variant, and the T-80. The T-64B and
T-80 can fire antitank guided missiles, as well as
standard tank munitions, through their gun tubes.
The T-72 variant has improved armor and a better
fire-control system. Most.of the new tanks are going
to divisions opposite NATO. In addition, Poland and
Czechoslovakia are assembling an earlier T-72 vari-
ant in small numbers as part of a consortium.
Motorized rifle units are receiving both tracked and
wheeled vehicles. Units in Afghanistan and regiments
in tank divisions opposite NATO are the primary
recipients of a tracked infantry fighting vehicle-the
BMP-2-that has a 30-mm high-velocity cannon in-
stead of the older 73-mm gun and a newer antitank
missile than the original BMP. The new cannon and
additional external armor noted recently give this
vehicle significant firepower and protection advan-
tages over NATO models. It also can engage helicop-
ters with the cannon and the missile. A lighter tracked
29,500
18,800
BTR-70
6,060
BMP-1
22,660
BMP-2
950
vehicle, the BMD, is produced for airborne units, and
another light tracked vehicle, the MTLB, is being
delivered to units in the northwestern and far eastern
USSR where it is better suited to the terrain than
heavier vehicles. The wheeled BTR-70 remains in
production to provide a cheaper and more reliable,
though less mobile offroad, alternative to the tracked
vehicles.
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Main Armament Armor Weight Year
Operational
125-mm smoothbore gun, Laminate 38 metric tons 1981
antitank guided missile
125-mm smoothbore gun, Laminate Over 40 metric tons 1983
antitank guided missile
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BMD
(with airborne units)
14.5-mm and
7.62-mm
machineguns
73-mm gun,
7.62-mm machinegun,
Sagger antitank missile
(new models have
30-mm gun)
73-mm gun,
7.62-mm machineguns,
Sagger ATGM
14.5-mm and
7.62-mm
machineguns
BMD M-1979 7.62-mm machineguns,
(with airborne units) Sagger ATGM
Speed
Capacity
Year
Land
Water
Operational
80 km/h
10 km/h
3 crewmen,
8 troops
1961
65 km/h
6 km/h
3 crewmen,
8 troops
1967
80 km/h
10 km/h
3 crewmen,
6 troops
1970
More than
80 km/h
?
3 crewmen,
8 troops
1978
80km/h
10 km/h
3 crewmen,
6 troops
1979
BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle
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Artillery
Modernization and expansion of artillery assets has
been a continuing task for the Soviets since the mid-
1970s. Soviet efforts are aimed at achieving a high
density of fire and improving mobility, particularly
for the artillery components of tank and motorized
rifle divisions. A wide variety of weapons, some of
which have been in production more than 10 years,
are being provided to fill needs at various command
levels. The proliferation of 152-mm weapons provides
nuclear-capable artillery down to the division level.
Army- and front-level artillery units are still receiving
the BM-27 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) first
fielded in 1977. They also are being supplied with a
152-mm towed gun and the 2S5, a self-propelled
152-mm gun. The heavy artillery brigades assigned to
fronts are slowly replacing old towed weapons with
self-propelled 203-mm guns and 240-mm mortars.F-
Most divisional artillery regiments have received the
BM-21 MRL that dates from the mid-1960s, and
many are converting from an older towed system to
the self-propelled 2S3, a 152-mm gun howitzer. At
the regimental level, the Soviets are fielding the Grad-
1 MRL and are continuing to form 122-mm howitzer
battalions. Many have received the towed D-30 howit-
zer, but some tank and motorized rifle regiments are
Self-propelled artillery
2S1 122-mm M-1974
2S3 152-mm M-1973
2S4 240-mm M-1975
2S5 152-mm M-1981
2S7 203-mm M-1975
Subtotal
152-mm
122-mm
203-mm
Subtotal
Multiple rocket launchers
BM-21
Grad-1
BM-27
Airborne MRL
Subtotal
being equipped with the self-propelled 2S1.
The number of weapons is increasing at all levels.
Some artillery battalions at army and front level have
expanded from 18 to 24 weapons. In addition to
forming battalions in the maneuver regiments of most
divisions, the Soviets also are establishing artillery
brigades for some armies and are expanding the
number of artillery divisions and heavy artillery bri-
gades at the front level
1,900
1,750
190
240
180
4,260
7,460
13,350
170
20,980
4,520
180
720
90
5,510
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Main Maximum Year
Armament Range Operational
2S1
M-1974
2S4
M-1975
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Main
Armament
Maximum Year
Range Operational
M-1975 12 122-mm 20.5 km 1975
(with airborne units) rockets
BM-27
M-1977
GRAD-1
M-1978
16 220-mm 50 km 1977
rockets
36 122-mm 20.5 km
rockets
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The Soviets continue to stress the coordination of
aircraft and ground-based systems in air defense
operations. Units at the division level and below are
receiving more advanced surface-to-air missile sys-
tems, and improved radars are increasing the effec-
tiveness of each firing unit. A new SAM system is
nearly ready for army- and front-level units, and
several other air defense development programs are
coming to fruition.
SA-11
SA-13
Total
SA-6 850
SA-8 700
SA-9 570
SA-6b. Seven divisions in the USSR have received
SA-6b launchers. The launcher has its own radar, and
each unit is receiving enough of them to double its
target-handling capacity. The latest SA-6 missile has
improved capabilities against helicopters and against
targets using electronic countermeasures.
SA-11. This SAM system has greater range than the
SA-6 and SA-8 and can engage targets at higher
altitudes. With its own radar, each launcher can
operate independently after target acquisition data
has been provided. The SA-11 has been fielded with
the new-type army corps in the Belorussian MD and
has been identified at front- and army-level SA-4
garrisons in the western USSR.
SA-13. This tracked launcher continues to replace the
wheeled SA-9; it can accommodate either missile.
Each maneuver regiment in the ready Soviet divisions
(about 40 percent of active divisions) has an air
defense battery consisting of four SA-9 or SA- 13
launch vehicles and four ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft guns.
SA-14. This improved man-portable SAM is replac-
ing the SA-7 in ground force battalions and compa-
nies. The older SA-7 is effective only when fired at
the rear of a target, but the SA- 14 can intercept a
target nearly head on.
56
680
4,528
Note: Although these SAMs are primarily intended to protect
theater forces, some of them could be used to augment the SAMs
dedicated to territorial air defense. The SA-2s in this table are in
antiaircraft divisions in the USSR; the SA-3s protect Soviet
airbases in Eastern Europe. One SA-5 complex is subordinate to
Soviet forces in East Germany.
SA-X-12. This advanced tactical SAM system has
two different missiles, each with its own launcher and
radar. The SA-X-12 can engage multiple targets of
various types simultaneously. Its Gladiator missile
can engage high-performance aircraft and short-
range ballistic missiles such as the US Lance, and its
Giant missile appears to be able to intercept tactical
ballistic missiles such as the US Pershing IA and
Pershing II. The SA-X-12 probably will become
operational in 1985 and may begin replacing SA-4s in
front- and army-level SAM brigades in the next year
or so.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29: CIA-RDP88T00565R000200250002-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29: CIA-RDP88T00565R000200250002-1
Secret
SA-4
Ganef.
SA-6
Gainful
Vw-ff
SA-X-12 (developmental)
Gladiator
Guidance
Rails per
Year
Launcher
Operational
10 km
50 km, CIA
100 km, DIA
100 m
25,000 m
Semiactive
radar
2
4 km
24 km