THE CAPABILITIES AND ORDER OF BATTLE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00565R000400500003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of Seerpt
Central
Intelligence
M FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OO MARK ON
The Capabilities and
Order of Battle of
Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI !IM 85-10010
October 1985
Copy 374
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NI I IM 85-10010
THE CAPABILITIES AND
ORDER OF BATTLE OF
VIETNAMESE FORCES IN CAMBODIA
Information available as of 10 October 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
PAVN ............................................................................................. 5
PRK Forces .................................................................................... 6
The Resistance .............................................................................. 6
PAVN/PRK Capabilities .............................................................. 6
Sealing the Thai Border .......................................................
Securing the Cambodian Interior ........................................
The Threat to Thailand ........................................................
Constraints on Communist Forces ............................................... 7
Prospects ........................................................................................
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SCOPE NOTE
The 1984-85 dry-season campaign in Cambodia left the Vietnam-
ese and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in a much
improved military position vis-a-vis Cambodian resistance forces-both
Khmer Rouge and non-Communist. This Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum (IIM) assesses the capabilities of Vietnamese forces now
in Cambodia to carry out specific postulated missions likely under
existing post-dry-season conditions. It also estimates the role and
capabilities of PRK forces to participate in these missions.
This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Office for East Asia. It was drafted by the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that the Vietnamese forces permanently based in
Cambodia, augmented by the existing People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) forces, can accomplish most of the security missions that Hanoi
envisions for its forces:
- Demonstrating control of the border and its environs to prevent
establishment of a "liberated area"
Securing the Cambodian interior sufficiently to enhance the
legitimacy of Heng Samrin's PRK regime and permit delegation
to PRK forces of a greater degree of responsibility for rear area
security.
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia as of 1 September are estimated to
number about 130,000 to 140,000. This new estimate, down from the
previous one of 150,000 to 170,000, reflects both modest troop with-
drawals and a reanalysis of existing data.
Vietnam has improved its logistic system in Cambodia to the point
where there are no major shortages of ammunition or petroleum
products.
Hanoi is dependent on Soviet military aid, which is abundant
(Vietnam ranks seventh among Soviet aid recipients). We expect this
level to continue-allowing some equipment modernization within the
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), but not greatly increasing the
capabilities of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.
Vietnam has said that it intends to withdraw from Cambodia by
1990. Although Hanoi probably would like to reduce its forces, we not
only find this date unrealistic, but believe that Hanoi intends to
maintain a sizable military presence in Cambodia indefinitely.
Should the fortunes of the Vietnamese and PRK forces in Cambo-
dia take a turn for the worse, Hanoi has a demonstrated capability to
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bring in additional forces on comparatively short notice (two divisions
within 14 days).
If, over a period of a year or more, non-Communist resistance
forces succeed in efforts to operate 25X1
independently in the rear areas, some
augmentation of-Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia may be necessary. 25X1
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DISCUSSION
1. The six-year-old war in Cambodia is essentially a
three-way struggle for control among (1) the Vietnam-
ese and their surrogate regime, the People's Republic
of Kampuchea (PRK); (2) the Khmer Rouge under Pol
Pot; and (3) a coalition of non-Communist factions.
Since mid-1984 the Vietnamese have adopted a more
aggressive military strategy
An umbrella orga-
nization to unite the K mer Rouge and the non-
Communists has failed to paper over the smoldering
hostility within the resistance, hostility that dates back
to the period of Pol Pot's brutal rule between 1975 and
1979. Recent military setbacks have failed to generate
greater unity among the resistance factions.F_~
2. Vietnam has carried on its war against the
resistance with the political objective of establishing a
reliable surrogate government in Phnom Penh, along
the lines of that in Laos. To this end, Hanoi pursued a
strategy aimed at
1ip o-
matic acceptance for Heng Samrin's PRK regime and
improving PRK military capabilities.
3. We believe Hanoi permanently bases between
130,000 and 140,000 troops in Cambodia. This esti-
mate, lower than our previous estimate of between
150,000 to 170,000 men, reflects both modest troop
withdrawals and a more precise analysis of the order
of battle of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in
particular our better understanding of the PAVN table
of organization and equipment (TO&E).
4. Our judgment that PAVN capabilities are consid-
erable, especially when measured against those of the
resistance, remains unchanged. Most PAVN officers
above the company level are combat-experienced
veterans of the second Indochina war. The ratio of
support forces to frontline troops is high. Support
facilities such as hospitals, maintenance facilities, and
ammunition depots, for example, are in some instances
located in southern Vietnam. We believe that about
20,000 men at these facilities are assigned a primary
responsibility of supporting operations in Cambodia.
5. In addition, rather than maintain a larger base-
line strength in Cambodia, Hanoi has periodically
drawn on units in southern Vietnam for special pur-
poses, generally to augment combat forces at times of
dry-season offensive activity. In the 1984-85 dry sea-
son, for instance, two PAVN divisions were brought in
from southern Vietnam, one for the campaign against
the Khmer Rouge resistance in the Phnom Melai area,
the other for use in the Thailand-Cambodia-Laos
triborder area.
6. We estimate that, at present, Vietnam has nearly
40,000 troops that could be moved to Cambodia from
existing locations in southern Vietnam should the need
arise. (This figure excludes provincial units that are
logistically capable of being moved to Cambodia, but
which almost certainly would be retained in Vietnam
for rear area security.) Regular forces available for
deployment to Cambodia total 38,750, made up of
11,650 in Military Region V, of 5,550 in Region VII, of
11,000 in the 4th Strategic Army Corps (located in
Region VII but independent), and 10,550 others. The
2nd Division, which was moved into western Cambo-
dia in early 1985 and subsequently returned, is located
at An Khe in Military Region V. The 7th Division,
which was also active in Cambodia during the past dry
season, is part of the 4th Strategic Army Corps in
Military Region VII.
7. From the outset, there has been some confusion
concerning the impact of Vietnamese troop withdraw-
als and rotations on Vietnamese capabilities in Cambo-
dia. According to Vietnamese law, a conscript's tour in
Cambodia is limited to three years. Although this
provision is not strictly observed, troop rotation does
take place, generally in the spring (April-May) and fall
(October-November) of each year. These ongoing rota-
tions make it difficult to verify Hanoi's claims of
permanent withdrawals. In 1983 the Vietnamese ap-
parently withdrew over 11,000 troops. The following
year, however, we were able to verify the withdrawal
of only about 4,000 troops.
8. This year, the problem has been complicated by
Hanoi's having reinforced its forces in Cambodia by
more than two divisions in the fall of 1984. As a result,
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mum of 3,200 troops thus far in 1985.
9. In any event, even as the Vietnamese announced
their first troop withdrawals in 1982, they were in-
creasing in-country capabilities by greater use of
combined-arms operations. Although the PAVN had
made some use of combined infantry, armor, and
artillery tactics in Cambodia from the outset, earlier
operations had often involved mass infantry assaults
against well-defended resistance strongholds, support-
ed by a few armored vehicles and limited artillery fire
support. During the 1982-83 dry season and again
during the 1983-84 dry season, the PAVN conducted
more effective combined-arms assaults against resis-
tance bases along the Thai-Cambodian border. PAVN
commanders maneuvered full infantry regiments, sup-
ported by one or more artillery regiments and ar-
mored battalions, to overrun these bases
10. Several other factors were also important in the
success of Vietnam's 1984-85 offensive. The PAVN
moved to multidivisional operations, demonstrating an
ability to attack widely scattered objectives simulta-
neously. Elements of four divisions were employed in
the Phnom Melai campaign, the largest force assem-
bled for a single operation in Cambodia since the
invasion in 1978. The Vietnamese have improved their
logistic system, employing thousands of drafted Cam-
bodian civilians to upgrade roads throughout Cambo-
dia. Supply services were upgraded to the point where
there appear to have been no major shortages of
ammunition or petroleum products, notwithstanding
heavy expenditure of ordnance of all kinds. There was
also greater use of armor along the Thai border than in
any recent year.
11. Vietnam clearly intends to turn over to the PRK
army greater responsibility for internal security. De-
spite a spotty performance, PRK forces have assumed
a larger role both in terms of combat and in occupying
captured resistance base areas. A pattern detected
during the 1983-84 dry season-the employment of
Cambodian troops in joint operations with the Viet-
namese-continued in the 1984-85 dry season. The
successful Vietnamese attack on the resistance base at
Nong Samet in December 1984 included two battal-
ions of the PRK 286th Division in the initial assault. A
subsequent attack on the resistance base at 0 Bok was
carried out successfully by PRK forces without direct
Vietnamese involvement. Subsequently, PRK forces
participated in virtually every major attack on resis-
12. We believe that Vietnam will build up PRK
forces over the next few years:
- To permit further Vietnamese withdrawals with-
out diminishing in-country military capabilities.
- And to allow PRK forces to handle rear area
security, probably to a point where Vietnam will
not have to reinforce with special units each dry
season.
Although clear evidence is lacking, Vietnam's annual
troop withdrawals since 1982 may have been a result
of the delegation to PRK forces of somewhat greater
security responsibilities, particularly for point defense
in the interior
13. The militarily most effective element of the
resistance confronting Vietnam continues to be the
Khmer Rouge. Cobelligerents with the Khmer Rouge,
but also political rivals, are the two non-Communist
factions, the Khmer People's National Liberation
Front (KPNLF) and the Sihanoukists (ANS-Armee
Nationale Sihanoukienne). The non-Communists enjoy
two important advantages: a degree of political ac-
ceptability within Cambodia, and a conviction among
the ASEAN Three (Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore)
that they must be built up as a counterweight to the
Khmer Rouge. The ASEAN countries believe that a
strong Cambodian resistance-one not dominated by
the Khmer Rouge-could eventually convince Hanoi
of the need to seek a negotiated settlement.
14. Despite a series of military setbacks for the
resistance in 1984-85, we are not aware of any sharp
drop in its personnel strength: 30,000 to 40,000 for the
Khmer Rouge, 11,000 to 14,000 for the KPNLF, and
7,000 to 9,000 for the Sihanoukists.
PAVN/PRK Capabilities
15. We believe that the 130,000 to 140,000 Viet-
namese troops permanently based in Cambodia, aug-
mented by the existing PRK force of about 35,000, can
accomplish most of the security missions that Hanoi
envisions for PAVN/PRK forces in Cambodia.
tance bases.
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Securing the Cambodian Interior
18. Ideally, Hanoi seeks a degree of security in the
Cambodian interior that will enhance the legitimacy
of the Heng Samrin regime and permit the delegation
to PRK forces of a greater degree of responsibility for
rear area security. Internal security will prove elusive,
however, largely without regard to the number of
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia
the forward ep oy-
ment of Vietnamese and PRK troops has reduced
forces committed to internal security. We anticipate
that Hanoi, rather than augmenting its own forces in
the interior, will attempt to upgrade PRK forces for
internal security responsibilitiesF---]
20. For the Vietnamese, the most important con-
straint in connection with their occupation of Cambo-
dia is the threat of another large-scale invasion of
northern Vietnam by China. Today, we estimate that
some 600,000 of Vietnam's million-man army are now
deployed in the northern military regions adjacent to
the Chinese border, as opposed to the about 100,000 in
1979 before the "Chinese lesson." The invasion
obliged Vietnam to treat Cambodia as a secondary
theater as it responded to the new threat from China.
Information
'n icate that Vietnamese forces in Cam-
bodia are second-line units, generally officered by
northern Vietnamese but manned by conscripts from
the south. Equipment is for the most part inferior to
that provided units in northern Vietnam. Morale in
many Vietnamese units is poor, and malaria is endem-
ic in some. Nevertheless, we find no evidence that
Vietnam has not been able to allocate resources com-
mensurate with its objectives in Cambodia.
21. Vietnam has also paid a heavy indirect cost for
the occupation of Cambodia in terms of foreign aid
that, as a result of international disapproval of its
occupation of Cambodia, has either been terminated
or never initiated. In terms of direct costs, however,
the occupation has been a low-budget affair. Equip-
ment needs are covered to a large extent by Soviet aid
deliveries, while Vietnamese troops in Cambodia are
believed to live off the land to a considerable degree.
Because of the high level of unemployment in Viet-
nam, the modest diversion of labor from the economy
represented by that portion of the PAVN in Cambodia
has little impact on the economy
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19. We do not anticipate a major Vietnamese attack
on Thailand, or a move by Hanoi to occupy large areas
acknowledged to be Thai territory.
22. A much greater constraint is that of equipment.
Vietnam's own defense industry is oriented toward the
production of low-technology items such as rifles, and
the overhaul of more advanced equipment, generally
with the assistance of Soviet technicians. Cambodia
has no known defense production capability. For more
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advanced equipment, such as artillery and armor,
Vietnam is dependent largely on the USSR. Hanoi
ranks relatively high among recipients of Soviet mili-
tary aid: the $620 million provided in 1984 placed it
seventh among recipients of such aid (see table 1). Aid
totals were $1,350 million in 1980, $545 million in
1981, $800 million in 1982, and $730 million in 1983.
Considering Moscow's global commitments, however,
we expect Soviet aid deliveries to continue at recent
levels. Military aid at current levels will provide for
some equipment modernization within the PAVN, but
will not greatly increase the capabilities of Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia.
Table 1
The Top 10 Soviet Arms Clients in 1984
(Value of Deliveries)
Iraq
1,850
Jordan
1,145
Angola
900
Libya
760
Cuba
665
India
625
Vietnam
620
Ethiopia
550
East Germany
430
Czechoslovakia
350
Prospects
23. We believe that the Vietnamese have not al-
tered their long-term objectives in Cambodia, but have
decided to pursue these objectives through a more
aggressive military strategy. As a result, the 1984-85
dry season brought a change from Hanoi's earlier
policy of containing the resistance, and a focus on
destroying the principal resistance bases and on re-
claiming border areas. Because the Vietnamese cannot
expect to destroy the resistance entirely, we judge they
are pleased with their recent performance and, for this
reason, generally satisfied with the military capabili-
ties of Vietnamese/PRK forces in Cambodia. _1
consolidate its military gains:
to deny to the resistance
any bases in the border area; and to improve security
in the Cambodian interior. The fact that the 2nd and
7th Divisions have been returned to Vietnam suggests
that Hanoi hopes to achieve these objectives with
forces now in Cambodia, though probably with some
increase in PRK forces=
25. Vietnam has said that it intends to withdraw
from Cambodia by 1990. Although Hanoi probably
would like to reduce its forces, we not only find this
(late unrealistic, but believe that Hanoi intends to
maintain a sizable military presence in Cambodia
indefinitely.
26. Should its military fortunes take a turn for the
worse, Hanoi has a demonstrated capability to bring in
additional forces on comparatively short notice. We
believe that it can bring one or two divisions from
southern Vietnam to western Cambodia within a
period of about 14 days. The most likely contingency
that would bring such an augmentation would be a
significant increase in resistance activities in the interi-
or, accompanied by evidence that PRK forces were
incapable of dealing with the increase. Fragmentary
evidence indicates that, while instances of resistance
ambushes and sabotage continue, they pose no signifi-
cant threat to the regime and are generally at levels
that Hanoi finds acceptable. Over time, perhaps a year
or more, non-Communist resistance efforts
may bear fruit and necessitate some augmenta-
tion of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. We believe,
however, that for at least the next year Hanoi will
settle for the capabilities of its 130,000 to 140,000
troops now in Cambodia.
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