SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN THE 1990S: POVERTY AND INSTABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000100100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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External Dissemination
VI/
f Admiral John M. Poindexter d OO it7
Deputy Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs
/ Philip H. Ringdahl mcf(0Director of African Affairs
National Security Council
Colonel David R. Brown ~-
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
`Andrew Marshall ~/ ??~~
Director of Net Assessment, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
~I Noel C. Koch ~q
Principal Deputy Assist anMcretar y
of Defense, ISA
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for
for Political Affairs
IL Staff Director
Policy Planning Council
Department of State
J
4 Ambassador Frank G. Wisner
Deputy Assistant Secretary
African Affairs
Department of State
Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice Presi ent for
National Security Affairs
'r Byron L. Jackson 6-
fb Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Department of Commerce
17 The Honorable Fred C. Ikle O-"V' 0 J V 7
Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy
Lieutenant General John H. Moellering
fY Assistant to the Chairman /
Joint Chiefs of Staff
J Lieutenant General William E. Odom,,/,5,q,,.3
Director, National Security Agency
q The Honorable Vernon A. Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
Oo l O ct
2v~JAmbassador H. Allen Holmes 0 0/ V7 G 3
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs
Department of State
Ambassador James K. Bishop ?~ iI 0
Deputy Assistant Secretary
African Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Chester A. Crocker
Assistant 'Secretary for African Affairs
Department of State
for0O Z l (o3
Princeton Lyman Deputy Assistant Secret062,//0/
ry for
African Affairs
Department of State
1Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Douglas Mulholland
14 Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security)
Department of the Treasury
I/
Z-
The Honorable Peter McPherson
Administrator/AID OCS2 'f
Agency for International Development
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J z 7 Office of African and Latin American Analysis
O ?
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Sub-Saharan Africa
in the 1990s:
Poverty and Instability
Secret
ALA 86-IOOJOL
April 1986
3 4
Copy
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ili -Sabaran erica
SU
in the 1990s
Poverty and Instability
the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and ma bedirected to the Chief, Africa
Division,
Secret
ALA 86-IOOIOL
April 1986
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Sub-Saharan Africa
in the, ,11 Poverty and Instability
Overview ._.....
rom time to time the irectorate of Intelligence publishes reports that
Information available attempt. to examine key international, trends from a broad and longer term
as of20 March 1986 perspective This speculative paper is=designedto provide policymakers
wnc uicpd in chic rpnnrl
W, th a context for long-range planning by assessing the prospects for
economic growth and political stability in Sub-Saharan Africa during the
next decade and their implications for the United States.
This paper addresses the impact on Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South
Africa) of longstanding negative trends. It assesses the consequences of
such factors as chronic economic deficiencies, demographic trends, tribal
cleavages, and political instability.
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In preparing this assessment, we etployed 4` task force approach, which
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included roundtable discussions withpolicymakers, interviews with aca-
demics and other experts,;, The task force 25X1
sought and obtained a wide rangeof, perspectives on the issues discussed in
this paper In addition, this assossrner}t draws Sri the work already
published' by the Directorate of Intelligence on African development and
prospects and Third Worldtreztd' 25X1
Secret
ALA 86-10010L
April 1986
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Overview
Key Judgments
A Legacy of 1~ailure:'Pervasive Trends Portend a Disrt~al.Futtre
Declining Demand for African-P. roducts 7
Capital Starvation
7
The Emerging Ideology of Pragmatism
A Chimera? 9
Words to Please Lenders?
9
The Consequence of Decline: Erosion of Central AtIth-tity
The Growth of Informal Economies
Dealing, With the African Problem
The Soviet Perspective
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Sub-SaharaniAfrica
in the 19.90s:, ..:;
Poverty and Instability.
Key Judgments Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s will face seemingly insurmountable
Information available economic and political problems Enduring political instability, character-
as of 20 March 1986 , ized by coups and insurgencies, will produce ineffective governments whose
was used in this report.
leaders are guided by xenophobic ideologies and preoccupied with the near-
term struggle to stay in power. Africa's intractable economic problems are
likely to worsen under weak political leadership that is unable to take bold,
effective measures to manage the region's crisis. Economic deterioraton is
likely to persist and Africa will face more food shortages, Western
disinvestment, falling production, and declines in the standard of living.
We believe Africa's rate of economic growth during the next decade will
lag far. behind even that of other less developed regions of the world:
International, markets for African commodities will increasingly dry up,
and African' governments will fail to diversify their economies to
compensate for the loss in revenues
i he continent's growing population will tax the economic and social
infrastructures,of African states, lead to rapid urbanization, and contrib-
ute to political instability:
Africa will;:. continue to. be unable to=feed its population. There will be no
',green revolution in Africa, and misguided government policies will in
many; cases prevent even modest improvements in food production.
? Africa will remain a bad::credit.rrsk African countries are unlikely to at-
tract enough concessional aid or private investment to allow for higher
rates bf'economic growth.
Africa's economic problems are not just a result of the continent's poor
physical endowments exacerbated by harmful government policies. In the
absence of cohesive political structures, African leaders have created
corrupt and bloated bureaucracies that have hindered reform, played to
narrow tribal interests, and sacrificed long-term political development to
guaranteethe immediate survival of their regimes. We believe this pattern
will continue into the 1990s, and coupled with the debilitating effects of
economic decline, often will result in the: weakening of central government
control ; African; governments will become irrelevant to greater numbers of
people in their own countries
? Informal econommic sectors .will grow, as new entrants into the labor force
fail to findjobs.in the, moderneconcmies The proliferation of informal
economic activity! will deny necessary tax revenues to the governments,
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thereby making it:"even rriore difficult for `them to extend services and
maintain control'througl t touhe rcountries.
? Insurgoneies.willalso limit government authority, as will the irredentist
activities of tribal groups whose traditional lands span national
boundaries.
? The decline in government control could lead over the long term to the
breakup of national boundaries and the creation of new national entities
in countries such as Sudan, Chad, Uganda, and Angola. Government
inability to deliver goods and services could encourage secessionist
tendencies in.other disaffected regions.
Despttetheir staggering'dimensions, the politica aneconomic problems
of Africa by themselves will have only a minor' impact on the world
community? Nevertheless, the situation in `frica will be replete with
humanitarian cons derat ons and will create more opportunities for Soviet
and Soviet surrogate , exploitation of the region's problems for political and
rhilitary "advantage
? Africa's extreme poverty will give it little leverage over; the world
economy. Africa's international debt problems, for example, although
severe ;for the economies of the continent's countries, pale in comparison
to the debt problems of other developing countries, i:particularly those in
Latin America. Africa's enduring food crisis will have the greatest
international impact and will continue to necessitate massive internation-
al relief efforts.
? African interests are even likely to diverge from those of other Third
World countries, given the continent's failure to match the development
of most countries in Latin America and Asia. Countries such as Brazil
and India, for example, will be competing for export markets abroad,
while most African `states will continue to need to import most manufac-
tured goods African producers of raw materials will not be able to
compete with resource-rich developing countries such as Brazil, Malay-
sia, and Chile that will be in a position to expand exports or diversify.
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Africa's endemic political instability is also unlikely to command any
more m'world attention than it does today Most governments will quickly
recognize Clew leaders of African states epnerging from coups, assassina-
ttonswor successful insurgencies, but,nbst';of these new regimes will make
scant if any progress in overcoming their countries' problems.
As African leaders continue to govern from positions of weakness, they will
be tempted to accept Soviet Bloc assistance to prop up their regimes. For
its part, we believe that Moscow and its allies will continue to offer military
and security assistance to African countries that either cannot afford to
purchase arms on the international market or are not eligible for Western
security assistance programs. Such Soviet assistance should ensure that
Moscow will' be able to maintain relations with most African states and
thus position itself to influence weak African leaders.
Soviet military bommitments to African states during the 1980s exceeded
economic aid bya ratio of 3 to'1, in contrast with the 1960s, when Soviet
economic assistance to African states: far outpaced military deliveries. We
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expect that this emphasis on mtlitary assistance will continue and perhaps
become evermore, acute during the i 990s
We believe, hoever, tht.:lVloscow will be prepared to expend both
substantial economic and military resources to support several key African
states..,Angola and Ethiopia will continue to be the recipients of large
amounts of Soviet military assistance. From the Soviet perspective,
continued support to these states satisfy more than just Moscow's broad
foreign policy goals in Africa:
? In Ethiopia and Angola, for example, the development of relatively
modern armed forces could provide the Soviets with new surrogates to
help them influence events in the Horn of;Africa, the southern Persian
Gulf, or-tin Angola's case-southern Africa.
? Close relations with these key clientstates also provide Moscow with
bases from which to train and support pro;-Soviet insurgent groups
operating in neighboring countries For example, Angola is the principal
safehaven for the South-West Africa People's Organization and the
African National Congers
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We believe...that during the 1990;Moscow will be willing to pursue
opportunities to establish similar client relationships with other key
African states, such as Nigeria or Zimbabwe; tf avowedly pro-Soviet
leaders gam power in such countries, we would expect the Soviets to
provide them with extensive military and some economic asistance to
ensure that pro-Western governments do not reemerge. In other key states,
such as Zaire, we would expect the Soviets directly or indirectly to aid sub-
versive groups attempting the overthrow of pro-Western governments.
The perilous African environment will create difficulties for the United
States as it develops and conducts its policies toward the continent. The
United States still will be faced with the task of countering Soviet Bloc at-
tempts tot gain new allies on the continent by preying on the insecurities of
unstabl'African,;regimes, In addition, the United;: States may discover that:
? It MW! f%ian for short-term disruptions ih access to strategic minerals or
installations because ofichanges in governments or widespread
insurgencies.
? It will .have to remain alert to ,Qpportuntttes to woo ue= stalwart Soviet
friends with Western economic aid. Some African leaders may realize
they have derived few benefits from their years of. alignment with
Moscow. and might be. willing to reduce their commitment to the
Soviets r" .en.reject Soviet aid altogether to cikitain Western eco-
nomic assistance.
? The staggering nature of Africa's economic problems may necessitate the
selective use of economic aid, concentrating assistance in those few
countries that pursue rational economic policies and have exploitable
natural resources.
? Protecting US interests in key African states may require more direct
intervention. The former colonial powers, primarily the United Kingdom
and France, may, find it. difficult to preserve Western interests in Africa
because of` the continent's daunting problems and the economic and
political limitations of individual countries. The United States may
choose to take up the slack, if only to prevent. the Soviet Union from gain-
ing influence with additional African governments
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? US succ"sses m' Africa will 'be ncompleteand far from secure. The
Soviet Bloc is likely to continue supporting such key client states as
Angola and Ethiopia againsttl eir'domestic"opponents. Even if pro-
Westernleaders replace Soviet clients,,they will face many of the same
problems as their predecessors, be 'prone to the same mistakes, and
require continued Western assistance to remain in power.
? African states, even those considered friendly, are unlikely to provide
consistent diplomatic support to the United States. In particular, the
crisis in South Africa will continue to be an issue in the West's relations
with black Africa.
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Sub-Saharain ;Africa
in the 1990s
Poverty and Instability
After 25 years of independence, most African'' states
have yet to fulfill the bright; expectations that African
leaders had for their countries Former colonial pow-
ers, such as the United Kingdom and France, have
had to prop up unstable regimes with economic
assistance and political and military support, and,
when the resources of these Western powers have
proved inadequate, other members of the internation-
al community, particularly the United States and the
Soviet Bloc, have stepped in.
Despite-or perhaps because=df-the contin...ent's in-
stability, the region has become another arena for
East-West conflict, even though the stakes in Africa,
compared with other parts-of the world such as the
Middle East and Latin America, arerelatively small.
The costs of intervention in Africa have not been high,
thus encouraging aspiring regional powers or mater
ick troublemakers, such as Libya and, in recent years,
Iran, to attempt to establish their own areas of
influence there.'
During the 1990s, the individual actors involved in
Africa are likely to be diffeent frm, those active
today. Many black leaders who have ruled their
countries since independence, such as Zambian Presi-
dent Kaunda and Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny,
will pass from the scene. The former colonial powers,
as a result of their own economic limitations or
changes in governments, may not be as willing to pour
money and energies into preserving Western interests
on the continent. Other countries Involved in Africa,
such as Libya or Iran, may lose interest in.the region
as a result of changes m,their leadership.
The United States, however still will find itself
involved in African affairs, if only to forecloseoppor-
tunities for Soviet influence there or help;resistSoviet
or Soviet surrogate activities. Regardless of how the
cast of characters changes, tie United States still will'
have to decide how torespon,to the continent's
economic needs and protect its interests from the
effects of endemic African political instability. This
section analyzes these "constants" in African affairs
and assesses how developments in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca will affect the conduct of US policy toward most of
the continent.
A Legacy of Failure: Pervasive Trends
Portend a Dismal Future
Sub-Saharan Africa will begin the 1990s as the
poorest and least developed region in the world. Many
I'll African government's have been preoccupied over the
last decade with thequest for aid to stave off econom-
ic disaster, and have one little planning for future
growth ;Nevertheless, despite the billions of dollars in
aid that have flowed into the region studies
__ show that infrastructures
have deteriorated and productive capacity has eroded.
Politically, African states have been a paradigm of
i istabrlity Frequent cot s, persistent insurgencies,
and government mismanagement have thwarted the
nation-bui1 Ij il 5cess and retarded economic devel-
opment. Unless there are dramatic shifts in economic
and political developments, Africa will enter the 21st
century as an area of even less importance to the rest
of the world economy. (For Africa's share of world
production today, see figure 2.)
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, despite signifi-
cant economic and cultural differences, have exhibit-
ed some broad similarities in political and economic
development since independence. A review of CIA
studies of the regionhas indicated several widespread
and deeply rooted negative trends that probably will
persist well into th&I 990s:
? :Political Instability.
? Weak world demand for African products.
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Figure 1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Mediterranean Sea
Libya
amako
0uagadougav.-
Ivory
Coast
Abidjan,
'Chan
Accra
Central African
Republic,,,
Namibia
1 Wi*ndhoek
Harare*
bouti
ibouti-i
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
Som
Zambia Mala
1gwe
Lusaka
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? Agricultural stagnation.
? Demographic pressures
? Poverty of varying degrees.
Political Instability
The single greatest cause of Africa's predicament now
and for the foreseeable future, in our judgment, is
endemic political instability. The failure to develop
cohesive political institutions has discouraged foreign
investment, led to irrational and self-destructive gov-
ernment policies, and, in over 20 instances in the last
eight years, resulted in coups.'
The region's long-term economic and political prob-
lems, in our view, require strong leadership, able to
enforce sweeping changes in the allocat on of re-
sources and the conduct of government Yet, the
Since independence, only 10 of the 45 statesofSub-Saharan
Africa (excluding South Africa) have been free of cdups or attempt-
ed coups: Botswana, Cape'Verde, Dijbouti, Ivory Coast Malawi,
Mauritius, Sao Tome, Swaziland Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Most of
these have uncovered coup plots how,.ever.l
survival of many African regimes has hinged on their
shortAirm economic and political performance. Lead
-
ers typically. have designed policies to satisfy the
immediate demands of supporters (the military, bu-
reaucracy, urban dwellers, and specific ethnic or
gften~'have run counter to require-
ments for longer term development and rational gov-
ernment.
Causes of Endemic Political Instability. We believe
that the factors inherent in the African situation that
have produced instability will not be eliminated dur-
ing this century. These include: the inability or unwill-
ingness of leaders to commit themselves to building
viable nations out of the political structures inherited
from the colonial powers, tribalism, and regime
illegitimacy:
? The problem of nation building. The geographic
entities created bythe former colonial powers at
independence fail in many cases to meet theoretical
standards fair viable polities. Most encompass differ-
ing linguistic and 'ethnic groups that, under the best
of circumstances, "consider each other to be strang-
,Oa
et5 and sometimes are enemies. Primary loyalties
often extend to kinsmen divided by modern bound-
gries =Kenya and Ivory Coast, despite the strong
personal leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and Hou-
phouet-Boigny still suffer from fractious tribal ri-
valries and a tenuous sense of nationalism, in our
view. A scenario in which ethnic infighting causes
the fall of either government during the 1990s is
entirely plausible. At the other end of the scale,
years of ethnic violence in Uganda have eradicated
whatever progress had been achieved toward nation
building. Even the precolonial nation of Buganda,
which once existedh;within the space now recognized
as Uganda, has lost its political cohesion after years
of suppression by ethnically hostile governments.
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? Tribalism. Most African governments, even those
that incorporate modern constitutional structures,
are based on systems of tribal authority that are
likely to prevail into the next decade. Tribal rule is
highly paternalistic; the ruler assumes responsibility
for the welfare of his own group, an'd wealth and`
favors flow from the top down,, In the African. state,
therefore, a single tribe-or a coalition of-tribes
tends to use government as a means;; of rewarding its
own members and excluding others.` Tribal rule has
led in the past to widespread corruption as relatives
are rewarded with jobs, contracts, and commissions.
In such circumstances, public officials are not ex-
pected to act in the national interest because they
often feel morally bound to assist their kin. Tribal
obligations also have been partly responsible for the
costly buildup of African bureaucracies and the
proliferation of state-owned companies,F
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? The question of legitimacy. Thease with? r ich a
potential African leader can establishea government
with international legitimacy contributes to the:
cycle of instability, in our view. An African govern-
ment has legitimacy. until it is overthrown. The new
regime, once it establishes its capacity to occupy the
capital of the country, becomes legitimate. Orderly,
constitutional succession has: occurred rarely Vin,
part because aging leaders have?avoided grooming
successors who have the potential to. become rivals!.
The international community, however, has reeog
nized the legitimacy of the African regime that
comes to power by force almost as quickly as it does
one by constitutional succession. In many countries,
a minimum amount of organization is necessary,
and even an inexperienced group can take over-as
in Liberia, Burkina, and Ghana. Often, as in those
same cases, only occupation of the presidential
palace and a radio station from which to announce
the new government is needed for world recognition,
Deepening Economic Decline
The outlook for economic growth m Africa during the
1990s is dismal. A recent set of economic forecasts,
for example, concludes that, in the second half of this
decade, Sub-Saharan Africa will average only 3 per<
cent real growth, as compared', 4th 5 percent in Asia,
Figure 3. Jerry Rawlings addresses crowd in
Ghana after launching his second coup in 1982.
42 percent in the, Middle East, and 3.5 percent in
Latin America ?,:The'World Bank projects, moreover,
that Africa will continue to los ground compared
with the rest of the developing world through at least
the first half of'tlie 1990s.
Even under an optirnistic_scenario allowing for higher
growth and reduced protectionism in developed coun-
tries, private-sector forecasters see per capita GNP in
low-income African countries declining through 1995.
By contrast, low-income Asian countries would grow
by 3.7 percent per capita over the same period. We
believe that, because of the poor outlook for their
commodities and the high rates of population growth,
even the higher income countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa, such as Zambia, Senegal, and Nigeria, will
have declining per capita income during the 1990s.
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Poverty. Over the last 2O years, statistics
indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest
rate of economic growth-about 15 percent--=of all
developing areas (see figure4). In 1985,22 of the
world's 35 poorest nations were in Sub Saharan"Afri-'
ca. Despite improvements since independence, UN
development indicators show' that the region is lagging
far behind the rest of the,developing world, in: quality
of life: child mortality in Africa is still double the
average of all developing countries:and life expectan-
cy is 10 years less than the average for LDCs. Many
observers also believe that general health is declining.
The "population quality" will continue to decline in
the years to come because Africa's dismal economic
outlook precludes adequate investment in education,
because of declining per capita spending for educa-
tion This will affect not only the future growth of the
country,,but also the availability during the next
decade;of such basic needs as medical care, food and
fuel, and housing ;___
The consequences of rapid population increase also
C61141 hreaten what there is of political stability in
some countries The inability to create new jobs fast
enough to avoid' greater unemployment and underem-
ployment could add to destabilizing pressures. In
Kenya-with an overall population growth rate of
over 4 percent per year-the labor force will double
by the year 2000. Even today, only about 1 million of
the country's 7.4 million labor force works for wages
in the modern sector, according to US Embassy
training, and health.
Demographic Factors.
b-Saharan
the rate of population? increase i&-S.
Africa has accelerated from 2.3 percent pet' year in
1960 to 3.3 percent by 1984, the highest of any region
in the world. In the case bfNigeria, for example, with
an increase of 3.3 percent ' between now and the
beginning of the next decade, the population will grow
from an estimated 94 million in 1983 to'1,63 million
by the year 2000-or about1,25 million more Nigeri
ans than would have been the case with an average
increase of only 2.3 percent"'Children under 15.years;
old already constitute more than 45 percent of the
population of Sub-Saharan Africa-as compared with
37 percent in Asia,
Governments already have been unable to create
employment for a labor force that is growing at over 3
percent per year and accelerating
The African rate of urbanization is also
the highest in the world with increasing numbers of
unemployed and underemployed concentrating in cit-
Rapid population growth; will contribute significantly
to economic decline because; governments will have to
spend more for immediate consumption and will have
less to invest in infrastructure and production
the acute shortage of
managers and technicians will persist into the 1990s
reporting.
Agricultural Stagnation. No other issue hangs so
darkly over Africas future as that of food. Africa is
the only region in the world in which food production
per person and per Hectare has been declining over the
past decade (see figure 5). Unless this trend is reversed
dramatically African governments will have to com-
ntit a greater portion of their foreign exchange to food
purchases As it is, international trade data show that
the volume. of cereal imports increased by over 200
percent between 1970 and 1981, and a further tripling
of import levels by 1990` is likely, according to an
academic study. boor land, drought, and population
growth contribute to Africa's agricultural plight, but,
. .. . . . . . . . ... . . .. .: : ..... .. . . . . .: . .
according to development experts, the counterproduc-
tive policies practiced by mostAfrican governments-
such as overvalued currencies and low producer
prices-have been principally responsible for the long-
term decline in food production. No improvements are
yet evident that would abate the food crisis during the
next decade, according to a variety of studies by
academics and international organization (see inset,
"Why No `Green Revolution' for Africa").
Numerous observers believe that Africa has the re-
sources to;increase food production. Even at present
levels of technology'(no fertilizers, traditional seeds
and dropping; patterns, and no conservation measures)
there is enough land to allow food self-sufficiency for
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Efforts to produce a green revolution on the order
achieved in Asia face enormous difficulties in Afr
Most agricultural experts agree that any improvesli:
ments will be achieved in small increments and there
will be no dramatic technological discovery that will
have a major impact on the scale of`the enormous
yield increases realized in Asia. African natans
present an entirely different set of technical and
human problems, according to Nigeria's Internation-
al Institute of Tropical Agriculture. Asia has rela-
tively deep, fertile soils, an abundance of water, only
two crops (rice and to a lesser extent wheat), and a
well-developed infrastructure. Africa has a harsher
climate (extremes of high and low precipitation and
unpredictability from one season to the next), the.,
land is more depleted from erosion and overuse arid:
there are many different crops to deal with. Africa
also lacks extension services and credit for.far?ers,
its infrastructure is poor, governments are unable or
unwilling to adopt policies to deal with,problems,;`
and, most fundamentally, there are a greater number
of microenvironments with a variety of soils, cli
mates, diseases, and pests than are.found in Asia
It will be three to five years before-soil scientists even
begin to understand how the addition of fertilizers r
and pesticides affect some African soils, according to
some agricultural experts. Improved seed varieties
imported from Asia have not been very successful in
Africa, and there is a delay in the development and
introduction of new seed varieties that adapt to
African environments. A drought-resistant sorghum
has been developed in Sudan, but the task of distrib-
uting it to farmers presents another major obstacle.
Some specialists are more optimistic about tie devel-
opment of improved seeds and cultivation techniques
appropriate to Africa, but most agree that the region
faces other seemingly insurmountable difficulties.
Throughout most Of Africa, the link between research
and the farmer ts.weak, farmers. have little credit
with which to purchase seedsgrvernment policies do
not always encourage or reward the farmer who
,experiments,% and;even if crops are produced, the
infrastructure for tran'sporttng and storing the pro-
duce is inadequate. A?shortae of technical experts
and reliable data on agriculture also constrains
improvements in most countries. In Zimbabwe, which
has the best extension services and facilities, a new
maize (corn) technology that took decades to develop,
according to an agricultural economist., produced a
bumper crop in 1985. However, the new technology
has not been introduced to other parts of eastern and
southern Africa because of the lack of credit and
delivery systems.i'
Land erosion has occurred widely as a result of the
destruction of wooded lands and as population pres-
sures have led to, "arming more marginal acreage:
In parts the Sahel;' population growth is making
it impossible to allow for the traditional long fallow
periods which .replerush soil fertility, according to a
study published by the French Ministry of
Agriculture
? Expansion of such cashicros as cotton and peanuts
that are planted and harvested annually has been
especially harmful, and nutrients have been lost
quickly.
? In Kenya,l I the
country's relatively good record of agricultural
production is being achieved at the expense of
widespread soil erosion, depletion of the nutrient
content of the soil, and destruction of the indige-
nous forests.
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more than the present population, according to the
Food and Agricultural Organization(FAO)However,
most of the potential for expansion exists, in central
Africa (Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic
Zaire, Angola, Cameroon, and Zambia) where po-
lation density is lowest and land is underutilizedi O
the other hand, the FAO estimates ?that-without
technological improvements-there is insufficient
land in 14 countries, primarily along the Sahelian
belt, to support even the present popuIations. Popula-
tion pressure in many of these areas has led to more
intensive farming methods, often on marginal land
that has resulted in more ecological damage.
Food assistance to Africa, therefore, will be a necessi-
ty for the long term, and not just a response to
droughts, war, or blight, F_ -1
The poorer nations will become
creating a supplicant relationship that is a further
disincentive to improve their food production,
Declining Demand for African Products
the declining
demand for Africa's primary':, products and competi-?
tion from more efficient prof leers have reduced
earnings at a time when dependenceon exports for
domestic growth and foreign exchange earnings has
increased. This conclusion is:buttressed by
production innova-
tions, recycling, shifts in consumer preference, and
the use of substitute materials have reduced the need
for some major commodities including copper, tin,
rubber, natural fibers, aluminum, and even some food
products. jcom-
modity export earnings for eve oping countries by
1990 probably will be no higher in real terms than
they were in 1983-assuming worldwide' growth aver-
aging 3 percent' (see inset, `,`:Dismal Outlook for
African Commodities in the 1990s" ).J
Capitttt:-Starvation.; Judging from current financial
statistics and discussions with international lending
officials, Africa, already starved of loans and equity
investment during the 1980s, will have even less
access 0,11i e'