DJIBOUTI: GOULED UNDER PRESSURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200240001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Djibouti:
Gouled Under Pressure
JOB N@'IBE'R
~,~, COPIES o? ~3 ' 3 ~ ~
~~ c?rER 3~d - 3G1 ~
DISSII~I DATE
TpTAL NUMMBER OF COPIES ~~U
PAGE NtIl`~BERS
ALA 86-10025
May 1986
?py 2 61
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Directorate of Secret
Djibouti:
Gouled Under Pressure
Secret
ALA 86-10025
May 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as oJ' I S Apri l 1986
was used in this report.
Djibouti:
Gouled Under Pressure
Mounting political and economic pressures are increasingly straining
Djibouti's stability, but President Hassan Gouled probably will remain in
power over the near term by maintaining French military backing and
balancing foreign and domestic rivalries. Over the long term, however, we
believe Gouled-a staunch advocate of continued US and French military
access to his country's strategic port and airfield-faces the prospect of
increased domestic unrest, especially if he fails to come to grips with a
stagnating economy. In our view, heightened internal conflict in Djibouti
would create ripe opportunities for Libyan, Ethiopian, and Soviet med-
dling. Tripoli is particularly intent on denying US and French access to
Djibouti's strategically located military facilities, in our judgment, and
probably would move quickly to exploit political disorders with a view to
expanding Libyan influence in the Horn of Africa. In the face of these
threats, we judge Gouled has become increasingly concerned about
France's long-term military commitment to Djibouti, and almost certainly
will seek additional US military and economic aid as a hedge against
possible French withdrawal.
Gouled's most pressing near-term problem is the deteriorating economy.
Djibouti is almost completely dependent on foreign assistance because of
its meager resources. Moreover, growing budget shortfalls have put the
Gouled regime in dire need of new aid transfusions. In our view, however,
foreign aid retrenchment by France and Saudi Arabia-long Djibouti's
primary benefactors-is likely to continue. If this occurs, Gouled's political
survival probably will hinge in part on how successful he is in securing al-
ternative sources of assistance. As a result, we judge Djibouti's economic
crunch will lead to increasingly desperate calls for help to other Western
and Arab donors, but particularly to the United States. In the probable
event that Gouled does not obtain enough additional assistance, he will
come under increasing pressure to trim the bloated government bureaucra-
cy and generous social welfare programs inherited from the French.
Nevertheless, with an election scheduled in 1987 Gouled is likely to again
postpone such moves because of the adverse impact they would have on his
political and tribal supporters.
On the positive side, Gouled has benefited from the absence of an
opposition leader who could capitalize on economic strains and catalyze
Djibouti's deep reservoir of personal and tribal antagonisms. This could
change rapidly, however, if he fails to tackle the country's internal
problems or makes a mistake that unwittingly spurs the development of an
opposition movement, particularly among his tribal foes. In our judgment,
Secret
ALA 86-10025
May /986
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Gouled's past inability to stimulate economic growth has deepened discon-
tent in the dominant Issa and Afar tribes and contributed to a popular mal-
aise that affects nearly all sectors of Djiboutian society. While this malaise
and the country's chronic ethnic rivalry are not sufficient to bring Gouled
down, we believe they could eventually become key factors in the
coalescence of a viable opposition to him.
Despite the many external pressures he faces because of Djibouti's military
and economic weaknesses, Gouled has taken an increasingly active role in
working for regional stability and reconciliation, especially between Ethio-
pia and Somalia-both of whom have ethnic ties to Djibouti's rival tribes.
In our opinion, Gouled is well aware of the opportunities his internal
problems provide for foreign pressure or destabilization, but available
evidence indicates he has the political skills to continue to cope with both
domestic and foreign pressures. Nevertheless, while his security forces are
loyal and capable of containing most outbreaks of unrest, they probably
would be hard put to contain a determined foreign subversion campaign.
Even if Gouled is able to weather the internal and external pressures facing
him in the near term, the failure to solve his country's underlying problems
will leave Djibouti vulnerable over the longer haul. With no successor to
the 69-year-old President in sight and the growing likelihood that none will
be appointed before he passes from the scene, we believe the post-Gouled
period could see a sharp rise in domestic tensions as rival interests-Issa
and Afar, French and Libyan, Ethiopian and Somali, and Soviet and US-
jockey for position. Under these circumstances, any successor would be
severely tested to maintain Djibouti's stability and territorial integrity, and
may be induced to upgrade significantly the country's ties to Libya, the
USSR, or radical states. Nevertheless, we judge Djibouti's increasingly
close ties to the moderate Arab nations and France's still vital economic
and military role would act as important counterweights to any pressures
pushing Gouled's successor away from the country's present pro-Western
stance.
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Contents
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
Growing Domestic Pressures
1
Looming Economic Crisis
1
Tribal Pressures
3
Signs of Discontent
~
Foreign Relations: A Delicate Balancing Act
~
The French Role: Key to Stability
9
Libya: Keeping Qadhafi at Bay
10
Ethiopia and Somalia: Caught in the Middle
10
Soviet Union: Gouled Keeps His Distance
11
Implications for the United States
A. Indicators of Political and Economic Instability
B. Leading Political and Military Figures
v Secret
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Figure 1
"' ~ - Socotra
(P. D.R. Y.)
Indian
Ocean
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
0 150 300 Kilometers
0 150 300 Miles
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Djibouti:
Gouled Under Pressure
Largely because of its excellent deepwater port and
chokepoint location on the Bab el Mandeb Strait,
Djibouti has long been subject to competing African,
Arab, Soviet, and Western interests. The vast major-
ity of the estimated 20,000 ships that pass through the
Gouled frequently refrains from taking action on
important issues because of the potential ethnic unrest
and conflict a government decision could spark. As a
result, many of Djibouti's domestic problems have
been left to fester to the point where they now run the
risk of attracting unwanted foreign attention.
Suez Canal annually in the mid-1980s transit this Looming Economic Crisis
narrow strait, which separates Djibouti from the According to the US Embassy, Gouled's most serious
Arabian Peninsula by only 65 kilometers. Since inde- domestic challenge is the country's troubled economy,
pendence in 1977, President Hassan Gouled has which is plagued by chronic stagnation, severe unem-
skillfully navigated a moderate, pro-Western course ployment, and large budget deficits. Regional eco-
for Djibouti by keeping the country out of the region's nomic deterioration, war, and drought have exacer-
chronic conflicts. In our judgment, however, growing bated these woes and created refugees who have
public discontent-largely caused by lingering eco- become an additional strain on the country's limited
nomic stagnation, high unemployment, and simmer- resources. In addition, transit trade via Djibouti's port
ing ethnic unrest-is likely to make Djibouti increas- and railroad has declined as a result of severe econom-
ingly vulnerable to foreign meddling, especially if is problems in neighboring Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Gouled delays in addressing these problems. This South Yemen. Nevertheless, the US Embassy believes
paper assesses the challenges that face Gouled, both that Djibouti's financial difficulties are largely a
domestic and international, and the prospects for product of internal factors-including high energy
stability in this strategically situated city-state. The and labor costs, low productivity, and lack of trained
implications for US interests in the Horn of Africa manpower-that have made the country unattractive
are also addressed, including the outlook for contin- to foreign investors who might otherwise be tempted
ued US and French military access to Djibouti.~by the country's central location and favorable invest-
ment code.
Growing Domestic Pressures
Although not expected by many journalists and schol-
ars to survive his first year of office, President Gouled
has muddled through for nearly a decade, despite a
political system riven by ethnic strife, an economy
with dim prospects for expansion, and powerful neigh-
bors prone to explosive conflict. Judging from both
US Embassy and press reporting, Gouled has man-
aged to survive in part by staying above the ethnic
fray and avoiding difficult or controversial issues. At
the same time, the record shows he has been unable-
mainly because of longstanding tribal antagonisms-
to develop a political structure that would more
effectively stimulate economic growth, promote politi-
cal stability, and institutionalize the moderate policies
he has pursued since independence. For example,
Lacking the expertise, qualified personnel, and infra-
structure needed to overcome its scanty natural re-
sources, Djibouti has relied on foreign-especially
French-aid for economic survival. The key French
aid ingredients have traditionally included direct bud-
get support, development grants, a military aid pro-
gram, and civilian and military advisers. In 1980
Paris began cutting its budgetary support to Djibouti
across the board with the goal of eliminating it by
1990, according to the US Embassy. Recent French
aid statistics suggest, however, that Paris has recon-
sidered this decision. Indeed, the decline in French aid
has leveled off in the past two years in the face of
potential Djiboutian economic collapse. Even so, di-
rect French budget subsidies in 1985 were only one-
third the 1980 level and now stand at about $10 mil-
lion.
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Hassan Gouled Aptidon: Guardian of the Status Quo
President since Djibouti gained independence from
France in 1977, Hassan Gouled Aptidon is a cautious
leader who "has raised indecisiveness to an art
form, "according to US diplomats. Despite his repu-
tation for avoidance tactics and half measures, these
o,~cials report that President Gouled has skillfully
balanced competing interests within his ethnically
divided country, where rivalries.flourish not only
between the Afars and dominant Issas but also
among the various Issa subclans. In addition, US
diplomats note that Gouled s government of ethnic
power sharing is a delicate, static arrangement that
discourages reform and decisive action. For example,
ministerial posts have sometimes remained vacant for
over a year while Gouled searched for a candidate
with suitable ethnic credentials.
A grandfatherly,figure who enjoys wide popular
support, Gouled avoids decisions that could tarnish
his public image or foster costly tribal wrangling
among his subordinates. According to the Embassy,
According to the US Embassy, France is trying to
help ensure an adequate overall aid flow while sharing
the burden of supporting Djibouti by seeking out
funds from other Western and moderate Arab states.
In doing this, Paris is citing budgetary austerity, its
heavy commitment to Chad, and the negative impact
of a strong US dollar on the French franc. For its
part, Paris has refocused some of its foreign assistance
to include more administrative training and advisory
he is generally viewed as fair, moderate, and compe-
tent by his people and devoted to their well-being.
Although he relishes public contact, Embassy report-
ingindicates that he is somewhat disengaged from
the governing process and relies heavily upon Ismail
Gueddi and Ismael Omar Guelleh, his Cabinet direc-
tor and Cabinet chief; respectively, to oversee govern-
ment administration. Nevertheless, IBS o.>~cials re-
port that Gouled makes all government decisions
himself; and commands the complete respect of his
ministers. ~~
According to Embassy officials, the health of the 69-
year-old President is uncertain, and he might like to
step down. Most observers believe, however, that at
least partially because no successor has emerged who
could hold together Djibouti's fragmented society,
Gouled, health permitting, will choose to succeed
himself when his present term ends in 1987. In the
meantime he appears to be letting the leading aspi-
rants jockey for position while remaining above the
fray possibly in the hope that, in accordance with
Issa tradition, a new leader will emerge through
consensus.
Honest Gouled
"may be the only totally incorrupti a man in the
government, "according to Embassy officials. In the
past the President preferred to sweep corruption
problems under the rug; in recent years, however, the
detrimental ejfect of corrupt activities has become so
apparent that Gouled has spoken out against corrup-
tion and replaced some of the most blatantly dishon-
est public officials.
programs to promote Djiboutian self-sufficiency, rath-
er than simply providing money to underwrite budget
shortfalls.
In addition to direct aid, the US Embassy estimates
that spending by French military personnel and na-
tionals accounts for some 25 percent of Djiboutian
GDP. As Paris has lowered its profile in Djibouti over
the years, even these funds have begun to dry up, and
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US Embassy reporting suggests that France's wean-
ing process has stirred fear and resentment among
those Djiboutians who depend on the French for their
livelihood.
The reductions in French support have complicated
Gouled's economic dilemma and put the onus on him
to find reliable alternative donors-his chosen an-
swer-or impose unpopular economic austerity. For
his part, Gouled has turned to Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states for help, but the prospect for further aid is
poor because of plummeting oil revenues. According
to the Embassy, France is putting heavy pressure on
the regime to undertake corrective austerity mea-
sures, including reform of state-run enterprises, reor-
ganization of government ministries, improved tax
collection, and cuts in the expensive system of benefits
to civil servants and military personnel inherited from
France itself. While Gouled has undertaken some
limited and painless reforms, he has balked at adopt-
ing measures that could alienate key sectors of politi-
cal support, particularly in the government bureau-
cracy and military.
Tribal Pressures
Deep-seated tribal rivalry between Djibouti's two
main ethnic groups, the Issas and Afars, is another
factor Gouled must contend with
The conflict stems from the
political and economic dominance of the Issas, who
compose some 60 percent-of the population. Heavily
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concentrated in the capital and ethnically tied to The US Embassy reports that, because of the long-
Somalia, the Issas control the presidency and the key standing animosities between the Issas and Afars,
government ministries, and outnumber the Afars in even low-level government decisions can trigger dis-
the military, security service, and gendarmerie. The cord and disruptive tribal clashes.
Afars, who were dominant before independence, re-
sent their changed fortunes and chafe under Issa
hegemony. A largely nomadic people, the Afars make
up approximately 35 percent of the population, and
feel an ethnic kinship to Ethiopia. Although the Afars
have done little more than grumble about their plight
in recent years, the US Embassy believes that their
grievances, aggravated by Djibouti's high unemploy-
ment, could cause them to opt for more violent forms
of dissent, such as strikes, demonstrations, and
rioting.
Secret 4
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The Economy: A Picture of Dependency
Djibouti-tiny and almost devoid of natural re-
sources and agricultural potential-is a city-state
without a hinterland. About the size of New Hamp-
shire and with a population of nearly 300,000, it
depends upon imports for virtually all its needs, has
little to export, and lacks the entrepreneurial skills
and highly trained labor force to establish major
light industries. Consequently, Djibouti needs exter-
nal economic benefactors, just as its security depends
on having a major military protector and patron.
Even by least developed nation standards, Djibouti's
natural resources are limited. Almost 90 percent of
its territory is desert, nearly 10 percent is pasture,
and less than a quarter of 1 percent of the country is
potentially suitable for agriculture. Essentially all
food is imported, and the country depends almost
exclusively on Imported petroleum for its energy
requirements. Djibouti survives :fairly well in com-
parison to its neighbors primarily through foreign
aid, banking, transshipment, other services, spending
directly associated with the large French military
and civilian presence, and remittances from citizens
working abroad.
The country's generally deteriorating economy is
characterized by rising unemployment, recurrent
budget deficits, rapidly mounting external debts, and
a precipitous decline in budgetary reserves. According
to the IMF, from 1982 to 1984 the economy averaged
1.5 percent per-annum growth with an estimated 1-
percent GDP growth rate in 1985. As a result of the
Djiboutian franc's link to the US dollar, the domestic
rate of inflation has remained below 2 percent since
1982. The IMF currently estimates a jobless rate of
about 20 percent of the working-age population, but
US Embassy o.~cials report there are indications
that unemployment is significantly higher and proba-
bly rising.
Many of Djibouti's economic troubles reflect outside
events, in our judgment. A significant retrenchment in
French grant assistance, coincidentally timed with a
sharp fall of the French franc relative to the US
dollar, has adversely affected a budget greatly depen-
dent upon foreign subventions. Regionally, Djibouti's
trade ties to its neighbors have been disrupted by
Ethiopian-backed Somali insurgents, who use Dji-
bouti as a logistic corridor and staging area for
attacks on northern Somalia. The US Embassy re-
ports that transit trade-a vital source of revenue for
Djibouti-also has declined because of war condi-
tions in the Persian GuU. Furthermore, lalling oil
revenues have curtailed financial assistance from
Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
The Gouled government has taken limited measures
to put its fiscal house in order. A balanced budget is
a constitutional requirement; past fiscal measures
include reduced 1984 outlays followed by small
increases in expenditures in 1985 and 1986. The US
Embassy reports that these budgets have been fi-
nanced through regular-albeit reduced-French as-
sistance, the drawing down of the country's special
reserves, and increased import taxes. The govern-
ment, however, has not taken meaningful steps to
reform a public administration system marked by
lethargy and corruption, an incompetently managed
network of inefficient state-run enterprises, and a tax
system rife with slippages.
An influx of refugees and immigrants from both
Ethiopia and Somalia has been a further strain on
Djibouti's limited resources. According to the US
Embassy, approximately 19,000 refugees and
drought victims of various ethnic groups are living in
camps managed by Djibouti's relief organization and
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
Steady immigration from neighboring countries-
particularly Somalia-also has fed a population rate
substantially above the natural growth rate of 2.9
percent. Despite US Embassy reports that the Gouled
regime is trying to gradually repatriate the refugees,
Ethiopia's population resettlement programs could
eventually create additional refugees and more pres-
sure on Djibouti's fragile economy.
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Figure 4
Djibouti: Key Economic Indicators
Agriculture, livestock,
and fisheries
4.6
Government 10
44.3
Services and
'commerce
.34.6'
Operating Losses for Major Public Enterpt?ises
Billion Djibouti Francs
Exports FOI3 and Imports FOB
Million US $
2S0
. Exports
- Imports
Secret
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Embassy reporting also indicates that Gouled's at-
tempts to placate the Afars' discontent by allowing
them a significant role in government have been
undermined by squabbling within his ruling Issa tribal
group. Gouled, who is a member of the minority
Mamassan clan, has occasionally come under fire by
fellow Issas for tribal favoritism and nepotism, and
Embassy sources report that small groups of his
critics-including former government officials-have
tried to covertly organize against him. According to
the Embassy, the French military command views
these intra-Issa strains with concern, although it
expects no direct or imminent confrontations because
of the privileged positions most Issas enjoy. The US
Embassy concurs with this view, noting that Gouled's
base of support-key Issas in the military and govern-
ment-still back him strongly.
Signs of Discontent
A review of Embassy reporting suggests that the
Gouled regime's inability to deal with diminishing
economic prospects has led to a "malaise" in Djibou-
tian society that has eroded the government's public
standing in recent years. The Embassy reports that
unemployed youths in the capital-including many
idle Ethiopians and Somalis fleeing drought and
military service-have in the past staged demonstra-
tions to express their discontent. A recent demonstra-
tion begun by vocational students, for example, quick-
ly drew hundreds of supporters and degenerated into a
riot. Reporting from a variety of sources indicates
that most of these demonstrations-unusual for tran-
quil Djibouti-are not politically motivated, but some
have taken on antigovernment overtones and forced
Gouled to intervene with security forces. According to
the US Embassy, the French Ambassador believes
this popular malaise has in turn undermined the
country's administration at the working levels and
engendered low morale, absenteeism, disrespect for
authority, and resentment over incompetence by supe-
riors; at senior levels, it reportedly prompts infighting
among the President's principal advisers, particularly
Foreign Minister Moumin and Cabinet Director
Guedi.
At the most basic level, public discontent and social
tensions are mainly caused by frustration with the
gradually declining standard of living and the scarcity
of jobs. Moreover, Gouled's old remedy-soliciting
foreign aid for employment-generating projects-is no
longer available. The US Embassy reports that the
growing gap between the few, mostly unskilled, jobs
available and the increasing number of well-educated
Djiboutians has magnified the social impact of unem-
ployment. According to the Embassy, Djibouti's rela-
tively high-quality educational system-modeled af-
ter the French-has provided enough education to
people lacking the skills to go to universities in France
to make them overqualified for available traditional
jobs. As a result, rising expectations of better employ-
ment opportunities are fueling dissatisfaction, which
the Embassy believes could eventually strengthen the
appeal of radicals who play on social inequalities.
A review of US Embassy reporting indicates that
widespread government corruption and mismanage-
ment have contributed significantly to the develop-
ment of discontent in Djibouti. Because signs of
wealth are highly visible in this tiny city-state, the
conspicuous consumption of senior government offi-
cials draws public attention to the problems of waste,
fraud, and abuse. In mid-1985 Gouled responded by
launching a limited crackdown on corruption that
resulted in the sacking of his Minister of National
Defense and threats of dismissal to any official seek-
ing to gain from his post. Embassy reporting indicates
Gouled's reluctance to disturb the delicate ethnic
coalition of his Cabinet prevented him from sacking
more ministers, despite the urgings of several senior
officials, including Foreign Minister Moumin.
Foreign Relations: A Delicate Balancing Act
While Gouled is facing mounting internal problems,
he also has to be sensitive to Djibouti's international
stance. A heavily Islamic country, Djibouti closely
follows the foreign policy line of its moderate Arab
neighbors across the full spectrum of issues. Never-
theless, in a region dominated by Marxist and mili-
tary regimes, the Gouled regime enjoys French securi-
ty protection and supports Western interests in East
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula by providing
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Tribal Groups
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France and the United States with access to its port
and airfield, including short-notice US Navy ship
visits and P-3 reconnaissance flights. According to US
Embassy reporting and several academic studies,
however, Gouled's principal foreign policy objective
has long been to keep Djibouti from becoming em-
broiled in regional or international conflicts. In doing
this he has to take into account a number of key
regional actors-particularly Ethiopia and Somalia-.
while at the same time factoring in the roles and
ambitions of international players like France and
Libya.
The French Role: Key to Stability
US Embassy and defense attache reporting indicates
that France still views Djibouti as strategically impor-
tant. Djibouti, for its part, enjoys French military
protection guaranteed by the 1977 Franco-Djiboutian
Defense Treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, Paris
is obligated to defend the country against external
aggression; in return, France receives unlimited access
to all Djiboutian air and maritime facilities. These
well-located facilities allow French air, ground, and
naval forces to serve French interests in the region,
and provide a unique training ground for French
personnel and equipment. Moreover, France bases its
Indian Ocean naval squadron in Djibouti, where it
serves as a vital link to French forces in Europe and
helps protect oil routes from the Persian Gulf through
the Bab el Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal.
Aware of Djibouti's anxiety over falling economic aid,
France has sought to reassure Gouled that its
4,800 man military contingent will not be cut. Al-
France's Historical Role in Djibouti
France seized Djibouti in the 1860s for use as a
refueling station for ships steaming through the newly
opened Suez Canal to Indochina. France and Ethiopi-
an Emperor Menelik II agreed on the boundaries of
the protectorate-then called French Somaliland-in
1897, the year construction started on the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railway.
Border clashes with Italian forces following the Ital-
ian occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930s prompted
Paris to enlarge its Djibouti garrison significantly.
Vichy French forces controlled Djibouti from the fall
of France until December 1942, when the Free French
and Allied forces took over.
25X1
25X1
On the eve of independence for many French African
colonies, Djibouti chose in a 1958 constitutional
referendum to become a French overseas territory,
entitling it to representation in the French parlia-
ment. The next decade saw growing conflict between
some French overseas civil servants who clung to
Djibouti as one of Paris's few remaining colonial
outposts and Djiboutians seeking employment in the
territory's administration, according to academic
sources. Despite growing pressure for independence,
in 1967 the colony decided in a referendum to remain
within the French Republic. In the mid-1970s, howev- 25X1
er, Paris began to accommodate increasingly insis-
tent-and frequently violent-calls for autonomy,
and Djibouti,finally voted for independence in May
though French security assistance has been gradually
reduced to its present level of $11 million per year, the
program still is extensive and includes supply of
equipment and ammunition, training in France, and
approximately 100 advisers who serve in the Djibou-
tian forces. Despite its seemingly steadfast military
commitment to Djibouti, the US Embassy reports
that Paris sees no successor to Gouled who has his
stature, and fears that a weak successor might be
displaced by "progressive" or radical Arab elements
that would exploit unemployment and corruption.
Djibouti's economic and security weakness has led
Gouled to rely on and staunchly defend the vital role
France plays in supporting and protecting Djibouti-
and also makes him worry about Paris's commitment
over the longer term. According to the US Embassy,
Djibouti probably would not exist long as an indepen-
dent state without French military patronage, just as
its economy would collapse without France's still
extensive economic largess and the presence of French
technical advisers, known as cooperants. Nonetheless,
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press and Embassy reporting indicates Gouled occa-
sionally threatens to turn to Libya for economic and
military succor-with some succes.;-as a means of
emphasizing Djibouti's strategic importance to
France and gaining assurances of continued financial
support.
Libya: Keeping Qadhafi at Bay
Djibouti's internal problems have attracted the atten-
tion of Libyan leader Qadhafi, who seems intent on
enlarging Tripoli's role in the Horn of Africa at
Western-particularly French-expense. US Embas-
sy reporting indicates that Libya has kept the Gouled
regime off balance with carrot-and-stick tactics, and
has tried to drive a wedge between Paris and Djibouti
by offering Gouled attractive aid packages. For exam-
ple, Qadhafi has pressed Gouled to grant Libya a
cultural center and relay facilities for Radio Tripoli,
implying that Libyan funds will be forthcoming in
return. The US Embassy reports that, although no
active Libyan aid programs are now under way,
Tripoli recently provided Djibouti with awell-
equipped maternity clinic but is withholding operating
funds in an attempt to compel Gouled to support
Libya in international forums. As a result of these
tactics, Gouled has become wary of Qadhafi's prom-
ises of assistance, and appears to have concluded that
in any event the risks of accepting his offers are too
great, according to the US Embassy.
Complementing Tripoli's diplomatic pressure tactics
are signs of a Libyan campaign to undermine the
Gouled overnment.
While Libya's diplomatic gains in
1985 with Sudan, Somalia, and Morocco may have
enhanced Qadhafi's stature in the eyes of some
Djiboutian officials, according to the Embassy, we
believe Gouled is deeply suspicious of the Libyan
leader and will continue to keep him at arm's length.
Ethiopia and Somalia: Caught in the Middle
In addition to dealing with international actors,
Gouled has to consider the regional political balance,
especially the rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia.
According to reporting from several US Embassies
and open source literature, both Addis Ababa and
Mogadishu seek to safeguard their interests in
Djibouti against encroachment by the other. For his
part, Gouled aims to avoid giving either of his imme-
diate neighbors a pretext for interfering in his coun-
try. Indeed, Gouled's success in roughly balancing
their interests has kept each side fairly content, even
though his efforts to accommodate them often stir the
suspicions of both.
per year.
The key concern on Addis Ababa's part is one of
access. Ethiopia is particularly sensitive to any moves
that might threaten its use of Djibouti as a commer-
cial port and point of transit for trade via the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railway. While Ethiopia's efforts to
expand its port facilities at nearby Assab have result-
ed in reduced traffic on the railway, Djibouti contin-
ues to serve as an important access point for Ethiopian
imports, especially relief aid. According to US Em-
bassy estimates, Addis Ababa also garners an esti-
mated $30 million in yearly revenue from legal
Djiboutian imports of the mild narcotic khat, which
also earns Djibouti some $11 million in tax revenues
Somalia's main interest in Djibouti is the continued
political dominance of its Issa kinsmen, which Moga-
dishu sees as its most effective barrier to potential
Ethiopian political inroads with the Gouled regime.
According to the US Embassy, Somalia-which still
harbors Irredentist aspirations against Djibouti-also
is wary of threats to the position of the small but
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influential ethnic Somali population in Djibouti. Eth-
nic Somalis occupy two ministerial positions in the
Gouled government, according to the Embassy, and
non-Issa Somalis-mostly merchants and traders
from the Darod, Issak, and Gadabursi tribal groups-
play an important role in the Djiboutian business
community.
Despite these ethnic ties and Gouled's frequent efforts
to improve relations, tensions with Mogadishu sur-
faced in 1984. According to US Embassy reporting,
the tensions were primarily a result of President
Siad's refusal to visit Djibouti and of his repressive
policies toward northern Somalia, which has particu-
larly close economic and tribal ties to Djibouti's
ethnic Somali population. Further friction developed
over the Somali-backed dissident attack on the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railway in February 1984, which
damaged Djibouti's economy and prompted Gouled to
quickly increase trade ties to Ethiopia. To underscore
his displeasure with Mogadishu, the following March
Gouled invited Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu to be-
come the first head of state to visit Djibouti, and
joined Mengistu in a pledge to coordinate border
surveillance against "hostile forces," a clear reference
to Somalia's support for the guerrillas.
Relations with Somalia have since thawed as a result
of Siad's visit in January 1986 to attend the regional
drought and refugee summit, where he met Mengistu
for the first time since 1977. In our view, Djibouti's
temporary tilt toward Ethiopia sent Somalia a signal
it could not ignore. Moreover, this move testifies to
Gouled's skill in carving out maneuvering room for
Djibouti in the triangular relationship, despite its size
and obvious military weakness. More important, Em-
bassy reporting suggests his success in arranging
January's summit talks between Siad and Mengistu
through quiet and persistent diplomacy has helped
Djibouti put relations with its quarrelsome neighbors
back in rough equilibrium.
Soviet Union: Gouled Keeps His Distance
US Embassy and other reporting suggests that, de-
spite Gouled's occasional public threats to expand ties
to the Soviet Union if Western assistance does not
increase, he remains profoundly suspicious of Mos-
cow. The Embassy reports that the record of the
Marxist-Leninist experiments in Ethiopia and South
Yemen has confirmed Gouled's longstanding and
fundamental opposition to Moscow. Furthermore, we
judge the overthrow in January of South Yemeni
President Hasani and Moscow's subsequent backing
of the rebels in Aden almost certainly quashed any
ideas Gouled may have had about upgrading 25X1
Djiboutian-Soviet relations. Foreign Minister
Moumin told the US Ambassador that a Soviet "dirty
trick" led to the coup in Aden, and cited Soviet
"duplicity" as the reason for Djibouti's denial of
Soviet requests for overflight clearances.
Moscow's refusal to assist in Djibouti's economic
development also contributes to Gouled's dim view of
the Soviet Union. Other than the Aeroflot landing
rights that Moscow pays for, the US Embassy reports
no known Soviet aid or assistance programs to
Djibouti nor significant commerce or trade. Although
a Soviet Navy cruiser recently visited Djibouti for the
first time since 1982, the Gouled regime reportedly
encouraged the port stop only as an expedient means
to gain badly needed hard currency
Nevertheless, US Embassy officials report that the
Soviets are attempting to build contacts in Djibouti.
For example, Moscow ofTers up to 50 scholarships per
year to Djiboutians for study in the Bloc countries,
and Soviet officials reportedly have tried to cultivate
contacts with those returning from such training-
most of whom work in the government bureaucracy.
The Soviets also have recently increased their propa-
ganda activities in Djibouti by sponsoring small film
shows and a public exhibition touting Soviet accom-
plishments. According to the Embassy, however, none
of these activities has gained Moscow support or
influence among the populace and none seems likely
to, as Djiboutian security officials keep close tabs on
Soviet movements in the country.
On the basis of a review of indicators of political and
economic instability (see appendix A), we believe
Gouled is in no danger of losing his grip on power over
the near term. According to the US Embassy, there is
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little evidence to suggest that the limits of the
populace's tolerance of economic deterioration are
reaching the breaking point. Indeed, the Embassy
reports that most Djiboutians consider themselves
much better off than their neighbors, and the extend-
ed family system continues to provide a cushion
against severe economic hardship. Nevertheless,
Djibouti's outlook for economic expansion is dim, and
Gouled's future depends in part on his diplomatic skill
in supplementing-or restoring-waning French eco-
nomic aid. We believe Gouled can realistically expect
little more than the maintenance of present total aid
levels, however, even with the conservative French
Government in power. As a result, mounting budget
shortfalls will eventually force him to cut government
spending and make needed economic reforms, even
though he will try to postpone such moves until after
the presidential election in 1987. While such belt-
tightening measures will adversely affect some of
Gouled's base of domestic support in the government
bureaucracy and military, we believe he can avoid
serious political backlash by moving cautiously-his
stock in trade-and shielding his key allies from the
full impact of any cutbacks.
In addition to the level of French economic aid,
Gouled's future-and Djibouti's stability-is linked
to the maintenance of the lucrative French military
commitment. French military forces are an important
part of the local economy, and we judge any signifi-
cant drawdown of French personnel would cause
serious economic damage. In our opinion, however,
France's strategic interests-including its credibility
in Francophone Africa-and cultural pride probably
will keep Paris engaged militarily in Djibouti for at
least the near term with little or no change in the size
of its garrison.
Should Gouled delay too long in tackling the coun-
try's budget problems, we judge deepening economic
hardship probably will trigger more active opposition
to his regime. Gouled's ruling tribal coalition is
fragile, and increasing levels of domestic unrest-
particularly if centered within his own Issa clan-
could cause it to come undone. However, US Embassy
officials report that none of Gouled's tribal opponents
appear well organized at this time, and in most cases
are not willing to risk violence to redress their griev-
ances. As long as Gouled forestalls complete economic
collapse and keeps from aggravating tribal tensions,
we believe that with the help of his security forces he
can prevent the development of significant opposition
to his rule.
In many ways Djibouti's security forces and military
are Gouled's strongest cards.
the country's security
service, gendarmerie, and 1,200-man paramilitary
National Security Force are loyal to Gouled and
capable of containing violent outbursts, including
rioting. Gouled also appears to have the full support of
the 2,600-man, French-trained Army, according to
the US Embassy and defense attache. We have no
evidence of coup plotting among the Army's senior
officers, and US Embassy discussions with the French
military attache indicate no French concern on this
score. The French role in the Army is still a big one,
and French officers attached to Djiboutian units
continue to perform all the key organizational func-
tions, according to the US defense attache. Despite
evidence that the Army suffers from many of the
problems endemic to Djiboutian society, including
generational, personal, and clan rivalries, we believe it
would remain loyal to Gouled in the event of serious
political upheaval because of his longtime commit-
ment-economic problems notwithstanding-to the
maintenance of the military's many privileges and
financial benefits.
In the foreign policy arena we expect Gouled to rely
on his demonstrated skill in juggling competing for-
eign interests in Djibouti; as a result we anticipate
little change in the country's moderate foreign policy.
In our view, Gouled's recent success in improving
relations with Somalia probably will buoy his domes-
tic prospects, and may also enhance Djibouti's role as
mediator in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. While he
most likely will balance ties to his neighbors for the
near future, over the longer term we expect Gouled-
fearing growing Ethiopian military strength and Men-
gistu's revolutionary rhetoric-probably will increas-
ingly seek to accommodate Addis Ababa as a means
to preclude potential Ethiopian meddling. Although
Gouled is unlikely to succumb to Libyan pressure for
improved ties as long as French aid is not cut
significantly, we believe he may entertain Libyan aid
offers as a risky means of gaining leverage on his
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Western and Arab benefactors for increased economic
assistance. For its part, Moscow appears content to
bide its time, realizing that it stands to gain from any
political disorders or Libyan efforts to steer the
regime away from the West.
We judge the most serious threat to Djibouti's stabil-
ity over the long term will arise when Gouled steps
down or passes from the scene, particularly if he
continues to refrain from appointing a clear successor.
Although we expect him to stay on for another term in
1987, Gouled's health is uncertain, and we believe a
succession crisis could unleash the long-simmering
ethnic and class grievances built up under his leader-
ship. Political infighting probably would hinder the
emergence of an individual who can gain both local
stature and French confidence-the key factors in
Djiboutian politics. Tribal antagonisms also might
escalate and spark violence in such a scenario, which
we believe could draw Ethiopian or Somali interven-
tion on behalf of their clan brethren. Under these
circumstances, any successor lacking Gouled's politi-
cal instincts would be hard pressed to keep order and
preserve Djibouti's independence.
In the event of an attempted coup against Gouled,
France's willingness to back up its interests in Chad
with military force leads us to judge that Paris would
intervene with troops on his behalf, but only if
formally asked and then only if the situation could be
handled without alarge-scale involvement. On the
basis of discussions with the US Embassy and defense
attache in Paris, however, if France judged its vital
interests-namely continued military access-were
not in jeopardy, we believe it might choose only to
protect its nationals and take its chances with a
successor regime. In such a scenario, Paris might
believe its still important economic and military role
in Djibouti would be enough to sustain French influ-
ence in the post-Gouled period, no matter how radical
his successors.
Implications for the United States
As long as Gouled remains in power-and, according
to the US Embassy, he is virtually assured of another
presidential term in 1987 if he wants it-we believe
he will maintain good relations with the United States
while emphasizing Djibouti's choke point location to
gain additional economic and security assistance. US
officials report that Gouled is uncertain about
France's long-term commitment to Djibouti, and we
believe he will increasingly look to the United States
to supplement France's role as military patron and
protector.
While a more visible US military role could be a
sensitive issue for Gouled both domestically and inter-
nationally-until recently, for example, he cleared
US ship visits and reconnaissance flights on a case-by-
case basis-we concur with the US Embassy that he
almost certainly would welcome a quiet increase in
Washington's military aid. According to the Embassy,
Gouled believes that current US aid, which has
tripled since 1983 to approximately $9 million, is still
too low given the importance to the United States of
access to Djibouti's military facilities and of its
continuance as apro-Western, democratic state locat-
ed in a strategic position.
The lack of a clear successor to Gouled poses the most
serious potential threat to Djibouti's stability and pro-
US stance in the coming years, in our judgment. Even
if Gouled does appoint one before leaving the scene,
his role as the country's founding father and most
popular figure will be a difficult act for any successor
to follow. We have no evidence that any of the leading
contenders (see appendix B) would be opposed to close
ties to Washington or continuing US military access
in Djibouti. In any event, we believe the still vital
French role in Djibouti probably will constrain the 25X1
emergence of any regime hostile to the United States
and the West.
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Appendix A
Djibouti: Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Prospects for major regime policy change
? During next six months
Q During next six months to two years
? Not of concern ~ Substantial concern
O Low concern ~ Serious concern
Q Moderate concern
s '1 n / n
ocia c ange con ict Ethnic/religious discontent
O Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
O Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Q
Tensions remain at low
Q
levels.
~
Reforms necessary bu[
O
unlikely soon.
O
?
Food/energy shortages
~
Inflation
~
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Q
Opponents isolated and
Q Opposition conspiracy/planning
Q
appear unwilling to risk
Terrorism and sabotage
~
violence.
Insurgent armed attacks
O
Public support
~
Military attitudes/ Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
Key base of Gouled's
activities Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
~
support; well provided
? Discontent over government action/policies
~
for.
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
~
External factors External support for government
Q
French role gradually
~ External support for opposition
Q
declining.
Threat of military conflict
~
Regime actions/ Repression/brutality
?
Security forces loyal antl/'
capabilities Security capabilities
~
efficient.
~ Political disunity/loss of confidence
Q
Loss of legitimacy
O
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Appendix B
Leading Political and Military Figures
MOUMIN Bahdon Farah
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation since 1978 ... secretary general of
the Rassemblement Populaire Pour le Progres (RPP), Djibouti's sole legal party
... Gouled's longtime political ally ...highly regarded by US diplomats for
effective and moderate approach to foreign affairs ...supported construction of
US facilities in Berbera as a counter to Soviet presence in Ethiopia ...shrewd and
perceptive analyst of regional issues ...energetic, hard worker ...Issa ethnic
group, Yonis Moussa subclan ...about 46 ... most owerful official in the
government after Gouled .. he is rumored to 25X6
favor repressive measures against t e ars ... ea mg candidate to succeed
Gouled but support has eroded somewhat because of increasing government
infighting and his own sagging business fortunes .. .
Ismail GUEDI Hared
Director of the Cabinet since 1977 and de facto Prime Minister ...deputy 25X6
secretary general of the RPP ... Gouled's principal adviser, completely trusted .. .
oversees government administration with emphasis on economic issues ...appears
to be Moumin's chief rival in succession struggle ...competent technocrat 25X6
..unpopular among other ministers ... L~J~b
Ismael Omar GUELLEH
Chief of the Cabinet and unofficial head of intelligence and security ...controls
government's information services ...inspector general of the RPP Politburo .. .
nephew of Gouled, enjoys his complete trust ...coming on strong as President's
favorite and has his ear ...emerging as strongman, feared but respected ...one of
wealthiest men in the country ... Issa ethnic
group, Mamassan subclan ... 39 ... rumored to be pro-Ethiopian, seen by many
as Addis Ababa's front man in Djibouti ...has the means to topple Gouled but
lacks political stature ...riding on President's coattails and hoping to play king-
maker in succession struggle ...could tip the balance in favor of Moumin or
dynamic ...Issa ethnic group, Saad Moussa subclan ...about 45. 25X1
m the Horn ...enjoys being a public figure ... a competent and professional
officer ...former officer in the French Gendarmerie ...1983 graduate of the
French War College ...first Djiboutian to achieve general officer rank (1984) .. .
Gen. Ali Meidal WAISS
Chief of Staff, Djibouti National Army, since shortly after independence in 1977
...sometimes acts without the concurrence of President Gouled .. .
ou is French commitment to Djiboutian
security, according to the US Embassy, and advocates a more active US presence
Issa ethnic group, Mamassan subclan ... 46 ... married, six children.
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BARKAT Gourad Hamadou
Prime Minister and Minister of Port Affairs since 1978 ... first vice president of
the RPP ...compromise choice for prime minister to assure ethnic balance in
government ...may want to succeed Gouled in 1987 but is not considered a
serious contender ...does not formulate policy . leader and 25X6
administrator .. genera y we iked ...Afar
ethnic group, Adorassoul clan ... 56 ... experienced legislator, honorary nonvot-
ing member of the French Senate.
subclan ...probably in his early forties.
Maj. ZAKARIA Cheik Ibrahim
Commander, 1st Armored Company, Djibouti National Army ... an influential
officer with a strong nucleus of support within the Army ...charismatic and
capable ...widely respected as a strong, professional officer ...French trained .. .
devout Muslim ...intensely nationalistic ...ambitious but loyal to the President
...rumored as having close ties to Libya ...Issa ethnic group, Mamassan
ALI Aref Bourhon
Leading Afar political personality ....dominant preindependence figure .. .
President of the Council of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (now
Djibouti) for over 10 years ...has not held a political office since French sacked
him in 1977 in favor of Gouled ...opposes Issa political domination and "second-
class" citizenship of Afars ...about 52 ... highly respected administrator ...well
educated, sophisticated.
Ahmed DINI Ahmed
A vocal and visible critic of Gouled government ...temporarily quiescent but may
try to influence succession ...has ties to several dissident groups ...served as
prime minister for six months following independence, resigned in protest of
alleged Afar oppression ...founded the aborted opposition Popular Party of
Djibouti in 1981 ... subsequently imprisoned for a short time ...high ambitions
alternates allegiance to Addis Ababa and Mogadishu .. .
Afar ethnic group, Adali subclan ...about 44 .. .
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