SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: HANDBOOK OF SELECTED PORT AND AIR FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300360001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 126
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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and Air Facilities
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Handbook of Selected Port
ALA 86-10
IA 86-100277
June 1986
Copy 3 3 C.
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
and Air Facilities
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Handbook of Selected Port
This paper was prepared byl
the Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, and
Support.
with contributions from
the Office of Current Production and Analytic
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, Office of
African and Latin American Analysis
Secret
ALA 86-10025
IA 86-10028
June 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of I May 1986
was used in this report.
and Air Facilities
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Handbook of Selected Port
The Soviet Union and the United States view access to air and naval
facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa as important to the advancement of their
interests on the continent and to assist allies in time of crisis. For the past
several years the two states have attempted both to acquire facilities for
their own use and to deny access to the other. Access to African air and
port facilities is not crucial to either power, however, as each has other
means of supporting deployments to the region.
The Soviets rely primarily on the use of naval auxiliaries to support their
warships overseas. In addition, however, access to friendly ports allows the
USSR to perform limited maintenance and replenishment tasks and rest
for the crew that can extend the deployment time of the forces. The Soviets
also have been able to expand the coverage of their maritime reconnais-
sance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft because of access to African
airfields, although such access has sometimes been erratic.
At present the facilities that Moscow relies on have several major
drawbacks, such as insufficient Soviet-controlled ammunition and fuel
storage capabilities, although the Soviets sometimes attempt to compensate
for this by using indigenous facilities. In addition, these facilities are
vulnerable to insurgent attack and to the political whims of host countries.
The United States generally relies on shore-based facilities as well as large
multipurpose replenishment ships to support overseas air and naval deploy-
ment. The island base at Diego Garcia, for example, supports operations in
the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf regions. The ability to respond to a crisis is
improved considerably by having access to facilities along the African
coast.
The United States has signed access or pre-positioning agreements with
Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan in recent years. These complement arrange-
ments with several West African governments, thereby enhancing the
overall ability of the United States to conduct air and naval operations
from Africa.
Secret
ALA 86-10025
IA 86-10028
June 1986
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Looking ahead, we believe the Soviet Union will continue to press for
opportunities to expand access. The Soviets will probably concentrate on
supporting their most important clients in Africa-Ethiopia and Angola-
and might press for expanded access to facilities in these countries.
Moscow also is likely to press other Soviet arms clients-Guinea and
Mozambique, for example-for additional air and naval access.
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Ethiopia 13
Harar Meda (Debre Zeyit) Airbase 19
Aba Tenna Dejazmatch Yilma (Dire Dawa) Airfield 19
Djibouti 25
Djibouti Port 25
Djibouti/Ambouli Airfield 27
Mogadishu Port 29
Chisimayu Port 29
Hargeysa International Airfield 34
Mogadishu International Airport 34
Kenya 39
Nanyuki Airfield 41
Nairobi/Eastleigh Airfield 41
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Namibe (Mocamedes) Port 77
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Conakry
95
Conakry Airport
97
Bamako-Senou Airport
99
Congo 109
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Figure 1
Selected Ports and Airfields in Africa
O Port
? Airfield
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Gulf of Guinea,
SAO TOME AND
Indian
Ocean
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Handbook of Selected Port
and Air Facilities
This reference aid examines major Sub-Saharan ports
and airfields that are or could be used by the United
States or the Soviet Union to support their political
and military objectives. Several countries that possess
important air and naval facilities, such as Nigeria and
Tanzania, were not included because we judge it
unlikely that they would allow access to either major
power. Basic data on the facilities included in this
study-such as runway length, fuel storage capaci-
ty-are in a computer data base for rapid retrieval
and comparative study
Except where otherwise specified, the information on
specific facilities is based on
reporting by US embassies and defense
The Role of Strategic Facilities
in Sub-Saharan Africa
We believe access to Sub-Saharan air and naval
facilities is important, but not crucial, to both the
USSR and the United States. Access facilitates the
ability of Moscow and Washington to maintain a
presence on the continent and to aid their respective
allies in a time of crisis. Moscow, for example, used
Malian airfields in 1975 to help ferry arms to the
MPLA during the Angolan civil war, according to the
US Embassy. Senegal, on the other hand, permitted
US military transports to transit Dakar Airfield in
1983 to fly arms to Chadian President Habre. Access
to African facilities also allows each superpower to
expand its reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare,
and long-distance airlift capabilities.
The Value of Local Access to the Soviets. The Soviet
Navy, according to a review of Soviet practices, is
designed to fight a war in and near USSR home
waters and, thus, has a limited afloat and foreign-
shore based logistic structure. Because of this, the
Soviet Navy relies primarily on afloat logistic support
for warships operating overseas, using naval auxilar-
ies-tankers, cargo ships, tenders, and repair ships-
or merchant ships under naval contract.
longer before returning to their home fleet.
According to military writings, the Soviet Navy,
however, sees benefits in being able to perform logistic
support in friendly ports, in having a stopover point
for crew rest, and in having a local source for fresh
water and perishable provisions. Observed behavior
underscores this. Moscow often stations support and
service vessels where the Soviets have free and regular
access. Our analysis of Soviet naval movements indi-
cates that, by performing pre- and post-transit upkeep
or limited mid-deployment maintenance at such facil-
ities, the Soviet Union can extend the deployment
period for its forces. Indian Ocean Squadron subma-
rines serviced at the Soviet facility at Ethiopia's
Dahalak Island, for example, can remain on station
The Soviets have access to several regional airfields,
but tend to minimize their need for local support by
rotating aircraft regularly and by relying on transport
flights from the Soviet Union that carry spare parts as
well as a small group of technicians on site to support
Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft, in our
judgment, make an important contribution to Soviet
surveillance efforts because of their ability to provide
accurate information on the location of Western naval
forces operating nearby, cover large areas quickly,
and respond in a timely fashion. The small number of
aircraft sent to each site, however, limits the Soviets'
ability to carry out sustained flight operations.
During regional conflicts, we believe the Soviets can
use aircraft deployed abroad to provide intelligence to
the host government. In addition, Soviet naval aircraft
could be used for demonstrations to other govern=
ments of Soviet political support for the host govern-
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Most air and naval facilities that the Soviets have
access to are not sophisticated. According to several
studies, these locations lack adequate repair and
ammunition storage facilities and have insufficient
fuel storage ashore to support Soviet air or naval units
in high-intensity combat. The value of African facili-
ties to Moscow is further tempered by their vulnera-
bility to attack and the constant risk of eviction by the
host government or a sudden change of political
Sudan to support military operations and to enhance
Western efforts to monitor Soviet air and naval
activity in the region. In addition, Djibouti allows US
naval ships and aircraft to quietly use its facilities,
although no formal agreement exists. Major construc-
tion has improved facilities in Somalia and Kenya,
and Mogadishu is a participant in the yearly "Bright
Star" military exercises that take place in the region
involving the United States and other friendly region-
power.
In coming years the Soviet Union probably will
attempt to augment the facilities it presently has in
Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Embassy report-
ing, for example, Moscow has been trying for several
years-but without expending significant political,
economic, or military resources-to secure additional
access in Cape Verde and Ghana in West Africa to
diversify its basing options and to improve its capabili-
ty to monitor the southeastern maritime approaches to
Europe.
Use of Local Access by the West. Major Western
navies, particularly the US Navy, continue to use
shore-based support for forward-deployed units. The
United States, for example, has bases in Europe,
Japan, the Philippines, and the Indian Ocean Archi-
pelago of Diego Garcia. The French Navy uses
facilities at Djibouti to provide logistic and other
support for its Indian Ocean deployments. Western
navies also use large multipurpose replenishment ships
to provide tactical logistic support while under way.
Western concern over foreign base availability is
explained in part by the logistic distances involved.
For example, although Diego Garcia has been devel-
oped into a support port for carrier battle groups and
air operations, it is located more than 17,000 kilome-
ters from the United States. Subic Bay in the Philip-
pines is used for major repairs, but it is 12 steaming
days away from the Arabian Peninsula-East Africa
area.
Over the past few years, US access to African
facilities has been on the rise. In the early 1980s, the
United States signed air and naval access or pre-
positioning agreements with Kenya, Somalia, and
al states.
The US Navy also uses African ports for replenish-
ment and crew rest, especially in East Africa. The
ability to refuel and replenish supplies from these
ports eases the burden on US logistic forces and
allows the United States to spend more time in the
region. Moreover, staging naval reconnaissance flights
out of locations such as Djibouti allows the United
States to monitor Soviet naval activity in the Red
Sea-Indian Ocean region. In West Africa, Senegal
allows US aircraft on an ad hoc basis to monitor
Soviet naval activity in the central Atlantic region.
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Figure 2
Selected Ports and Airfields in East Africa
Lake
Nnsse
Port
Airfield
US access in blue
Soviet access in red
Road
--- Railroad
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
SUDAN
Z)A(IRE RWA
Lake
Albert
SAUDI
ARABIA
bUKUR
Lake Kigoma TANZANIA
Tanganyika
0 250 Miles
1 I
0 250 Statute Miles
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Overview
The military government that overthrew President
Nimeiri last year held an election in April, fulfilling
its pledge to return the country to civilian rule. We
believe, however, that the civilian government led by
Sadiq al-Mahdi will not be able to effectively address
the economic, military, religious, and social problems
besetting the country. In our opinion, the coalition of
governing parties probably will suffer from factional
infighting, poor leadership, and personal squabbles.
Figure 3
Selected Port and Airfields in Sudan
as the USSR and Libya.
probably will be unable to end the
Ethiopian-backed insurgency in southern Sudan. As a
result, the insurgency is likely to continue draining the
nation's economy, strain the military's unity and
loyalty to the civilian regime, and force Khartoum to
accelerate its effort to find new arms suppliers, such
government continues to increase.
We believe Khartoum's ties to Libya will increase as
long as Tripoli continues to provide economic and
military aid. Efforts will be made to keep Libyan
subversive activity under control, but the weak Suda-
nese security system will be hard pressed to contain
Tripoli if its access and influence in the military and
States.
For the near term, Sadiq is unlikely, in our opinion, to
abrogate the 1983 agreement that gives the United
States access and pre-positioning rights in Sudan,
although the agreement will continue to be held in
abeyance. Khartoum probably believes that formal
termination of the agreement would adversely affect
military and economic assistance from the United
Port Sudan is Sudan's only major port and handles
over 90 percent of the country's trade. A Sudanese
naval base is located at Marsa Gwiyai (Flamingo
Bay), at the northern extremity of the city of Port
Port
O Airfield
US access in blue
Sudan.
Road
--~ Railroad
0 250 Kilometers
0 250 Statute Miles
report, Port Sudan is a relatively well-operated facili-
ty that can handle US roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro), contain-
er, and fuel/ammunition ships. Marsa Gwiyai (Fla-
mingo Bay), on the other hand, has serious
shortcomings, such as its limited depth of 5 meters,
total lack of security fencing, and extremely limited
storage space.
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Description. Port Sudan is a natural deepwater har-
bor formed by a narrow inlet in surrounding reefs.
Entry to the port is rarely affected by bad weather, 25X1
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and the approach is free and clear. The entrance to
the harbor is 278 meters wide. There are four anchor-
ages within the harbor and a number of mooring
buoys. An additional anchorage is available approxi-
mately 10 kilometers south of the port that can
accommodate 10 to 12 ships in about 70-meter depths
over good holding ground.
The main quay has 2,600 meters of berthing space
with depths of 8.5 to 10.6 meters alongside. There are
three quays for special cargoes, containers, grain, and
oil discharge, bringing total berthing length to 3,200
meters. The container facility consists of a 260-meter-
long quay with two berths, one rail-mounted container
crane, one contilever crane, and a lighted storage area
with a capacity of approximately 700 twenty foot
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Thirty-four cranes of 5-metric-ton capacity are locat-
ed on the main quay. Three mobile cranes of 35- and
50-ton capacity and one of 75-ton capacity are also
available.
There is adequate covered and open storage available
in the port area. Within the customs area, there are
14 covered storage buildings with a total floorspace of
44,100 square meters. Open storage is virtually unlim-
ited. The port has no drydock facilities, however, and
only minor repairs can be carried out.
The port is cleared by both road and rail. Two paved
roads link the north port area to the airfield at Port
Sudan and the Khartoum highway, both of which are
equipment units (20-foot container equivalent).
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located on the south side of the city. One of the logistic and support facility but
highways passes through the city and is heavily
congested; the other passes to the west of Port Sudan
and joins the Khartoum highway 2 kilometers south
of the airfield. A single-line narrow-gauge railroad
connects the port with Khartoum and other large
equipment is over 1
years old and has eteriorated to the extent that the
missile system is almost certainly ineffective.F_
cities. The rail system has deteriorated in recent years Khartoum International Airfield (15?35' N. 32?33' E.,
due to the lack of money for repairs and new equip-
ment, a shortage of skilled staff, and competition from
the highway system. In addition, delays due to speed Wadi Seidna Airfield (15?49' N. 32? 30' E.,
restrictions are frequent.
Patterns of Access. In March 1981, former President
Nimeiri offered the use of Sudanese military facilities
to the United States, and in 1983 Khartoum signed an
agreement permitting the pre-positioning of US mili-
tary equipment at Port Sudan. The agreement is in
abeyance following the April 1985 coup, but has not
been abrogated by the new regime.
Port Sudan Airfield (19 ? 34' N. 37 ? 13' E.,
Khartoum International is the principal civil airfield
and is capable of supporting sustained operations by
heavy transports. Wadi Seidna, located near the
capital, is the headquarters of the Sudanese Air Force
and the most important military airfield in the coun-
try. Port Sudan Airfield is strategically located on the
Red Sea and near the naval port, but lacks adequate
Activity. The tonnage handled by Port Sudan has
risen from 3 million metric tons in 1974 to over 4
million in 1983, the last year for which information is
available. Current and planned projects probably will
give the port a capacity of 5 million tons per year by
1990. Virtually all of Sudan's foreign trade passes
through Port Sudan, with import volume exceeding
export volume by as much as 3 to 1. Petroleum
products account for approximately half of import
volume.
Fuel Storage. Bunker fuel oil is available at tanker
berths and by tank barge at the main quay or
anchorage. Port Sudan also is the location of the
country's only petroleum refinery, which has a capaci-
ty of 26,000 barrels per day
Defenses. Sudan's naval base at Flamingo Bay, a part
of the Port Sudan complex The
patrol craft stationed there suffer from maintenance
deficiencies, and the facility would be unable to
provide much assistance in an emergency. The Suda-
nese Air Force occasionally deployed MIG-21s or
Chinese-made fighters to the airfield at Port Sudan,
but pilot proficiency and maintenance capabilities as
well as fuel shortages have precluded this in the past
year. Sudan's only SA-2 surface-to-air missile brigade
is located at Port Sudan. The brigade has a good
support facilities.
Description. Khartoum Airfield is located on a level,
semidesert area. It has natural and artificial drainage
and is surrounded by a low floodwall to protect it from
the Nile River. Khartoum has a 3,000- by 46-meter
asphalt runway, which was resurfaced in 1981, and is
able to handle aircraft up to and including the US C-5
military transport. The airfield has a control tower,
approach control, very high frequency omnidirectional
range-distance measuring equipment (VOR-DME),
nondirectional beacon (NDB), and instrument landing
system (ILS). Runway lighting is high intensity with
sodium threshold and edge lighting. Taxiways have
installed edge lights, and the parking aprons have
floodlights. A modest field-level maintenance capabil-
ity exists for both commercial and military aircraft.
Khartoum Airfield is serviced by a two-lane bitumi-
nous highway, and a railroad spur connects the
airfield to the main rail trunk.
Cargo handling at Khartoum Airfield is awkward and
inefficient. Virtually no covered storage is available,
although there are adequate open storage areas on
various aprons and clear areas adjacent to the run-
ways. Military cargo handling capacity is constrained
by aircraft parking spaces.
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J
Wadi Seidna, located 23 kilometers north of Khar-
toum, is the primary base for the Sudanese Air Force.
It has a 3,170- by 46-meter asphalt primary runway
and is capable of handling C-5 transport aircraft. The
general condition of the airfield pavement, however, is
fair to poor.
The control tower is operated by Sudanese Air Force
personnel on an as-required basis. Runway and ramp
visibility from the tower are poor. Wadi Seidna has no
instrument flight rules (IFR) capability, radar ap-
proach control (RAPCON), ground-controlled ap-
proach (GCA), or standard instrument departure,
although it does possess visual flight rules (VFR) and
NDB capabilities.
Maintenance facilities include seven permanent air-
craft hangars with various SAF maintenance special-
ist shops located in each. Aircraft ground support
equipment is primarily of Soviet or Chinese origin.
Aerial port facilities and material handling equipment
are virtually nonexistent at Wadi Seidna. There are
extensive open storage areas but no available covered
storage space. Wadi Seidna is serviced by an all-
Wadi Seidna also is the main ordinance depot for the
Sudanese Air Force. Four underground storage bun-
kers are located approximately 3 kilometers from the
runway. In addition, at least five open ordnance
storage areas are available.
Port Sudan is primarily a civilian airfield but is
occasionally used by the Air Force. It was built by the
British prior to World War II and became a major
civilian airport in the mid-1970s. The airfield is
located 3 kilometers south of the port and has a 2,000-
by 30-meter asphalt runway that can handle US
C-130 military transports. Drainage around the air-
port is poor, and the runway pavement condition is
assessed as fair to good. The single taxiway is general-
ly in fair to good condition.
The control. tower is operated by Sudanese civil
aviation personnel on an as-required basis. Runway
and ramp visibility are good. Port Sudan has very
high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR), IFR,
visual flight rules (VFR), and NDB but has no
RAPCON, GCA, or ILS capabilities
weather road that runs to Khartoum.
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The airfield is accessible by a two-lane bituminous
highway from the city of Port Sudan. It is located 3
kilometers north of a main passenger and freight
terminal, which is the origin of the Sudan National
Railway. A single-track narrow-gauge line has several
branches and routes to points in Sudan.
There are no maintenance facilities at Port Sudan
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Airfield and ground support equipment is limited. No 25X1
covered storage area exists, but extensive outside rated base security as marginal. Sudanese 25X1
storage in close proximity to the parking ramp is fighter aircraft and air defense forces would provide
available. limited defense against air attacks. 25X1
Fuel Storage. Khartoum Airfield has a storage capac-
ity of approximately 42 million barrels of jet A-1 fuel,
although only a small portion of this is used at any
time. The storage tanks are located 3 kilometers from
the airport. Aircraft are refueled by tank trucks.
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage at Wadi
Seidna consists of 1,400 barrels of A-1 jet fuel on base
and 4,800 barrels located 5 kilometers from the
facility. Aircraft refueling is done by tank truck.
probably marginal.
Port Sudan is defended by SA-2 surface-to-air missile
batteries, although their effectiveness is probably
limited because of age and poor maintenance. Suda-
nese Army and naval forces in the area of the airfield
would provide limited defense against ground or naval
attacks. Overall security at Port Sudan, however, is
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Port Sudan has a storage capacity of 450 barrels of
A-1 jet fuel. The storage tanks are refilled by tanker
truck from the refinery, which is located 5 kilometers
from the airfield. Fuel is dispensed by tanker truck.
Activity. Sudan Airways is the primary user of Khar-
toum Airfield. Boeing 737, Fokker F-27 aircraft, and
civilian wide-body aircraft operate from the airfield.
The Sudanese Ministry of Defense also bases helicop-
ters, C-130s, and other transport here.
The Sudanese Air Force operates Soviet-built MIG-
21s, Chinese F-5s (MIG-17) and F-6s (MIG-19), and
US F-5s from Wadi Seidna Airfield. Commercial jet
aircraft have used the airfield on occasion.
Boeing 737 commercial jets, F-27s, and Sudanese Air
Force C-130s routinely use Port Sudan Airfield and,
on occasion, Sudanese fighter aircraft deploy to the
airfield.
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Overview
Ethiopia has been ruled since February 1977 by
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, chairman of the ruling mili-
tary council. He has moved the country along a
Marxist-Leninist path and is one of the Soviet Union's
firmest supporters in black Africa. Ethiopia estab-
lished a Marxist-Leninist party in 1984, and Men-
gistu reportedly intends to proclaim the formation of a
People's Republic in September 1986. The influence
of the party has grown since its formation, according
to the US Embassy, and political cadre are tasked to
indoctrinate the population in the new ideology. The
regime is using the famine and drought to force
peasants onto collective farms in an effort to break
their resistance to government control and to facilitate
political indoctrination.
The Mengistu government faces two major insurgen-
cies that it has been unable to suppress despite a
commitment of vast numbers of men and material.
The 25-year-old secessionist rebellion in Eritrea Prov-
ince continues to drain the government's resources,
according to US Embassy reporting. Although Addis
Ababa has had some military success against the
rebels over the past year, it has failed to score a
decisive military victory or to disrupt rebel supply
lines. Peace talks have taken place periodically be-
tween the two sides, according to the US Embassy,
but we believe the prospects are poor for a political
solution because neither side is willing to make politi-
cal concessions.
Rebels in Tigray Province have been fighting since
1975 for autonomy or a greater share of power in the
central government. The guerrillas have resisted sev-
eral government military campaigns and remain in
control of much of the provincial interior as well as
Tigrean-inhabited portions of two adjoining provinces.
On the basis of US Embassy reporting, the Soviet
Union has provided over $3 billion in arms to Ethiopia
since 1977, enabling the country to establish the
largest (approximately 210,000 troops) and most so-
phisticated military establishment in black Africa.
Figure 8
Selected Ports and Airfields in Ethiopia
Punka,
Port
O Airfield
Soviet access in red
Road
Railroad
0 200 Kilometers
i,
0 200 Statute Miles
We estimate that Moscow has approximately 1,700
military advisers in Ethiopia; they are complimented
by approximately 1,500 Cuban advisers and techni-
cians and 2,000 Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia's
Ogaden region. The Soviet Union, in partial quid pro
quo for its military aid, has been allowed to establish
a small naval facility at Dahlak Island, off the
Eritrean coast. In 1978, Ethiopia and the USSR
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The US Embassy reports that there is opposition
within the Ethiopia military to Mengistu's close ties to
Moscow, but we believe his senior military command-
ers realize that only the USSR is willing to provide
the arms needed to maintain the country's integrity.
Red
Sea
Mite'iwa DesetT $ANAA
Asmere~. ahlak Island * - ?
Tigray
Province
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In addition, the regime, which has a pervasive security
apparatus in both the military and civilian sectors, has
moved ruthlessly against signs of dissent. We believe,
based upon these factors, that Moscow will continue
to play a key role in Ethiopia for the near term at
Description. The Dahlak Achipelago is located in the
Red Sea on the western edge of the sea lanes. The
islands are located 50 kilometers from the Ethiopian
port of Mits'iwa (Massawa), 300 kilometers from
Saudi Arabia, and 600 kilometers from the Bab el
least.
Facility (15?47' N. 39?57' E.,
Dehalak' Deset (Dahlak Island) is the only naval
support facility for Soviet ships in the Red Sea-Indian
Ocean region and plays a useful role in support of
Soviet naval operations there. The facilities are mod-
est even though Moscow has made steady improve-
ments since development began in April 1978. Mos-
cow is the primary tenant on Dahlak Island, but
Ethiopian and South Yemeni naval vessels have limit-
ed access to some of the facilities. The Dahlak Island
complex is vulnerable in the event of hostilities or
heightened tensions.
Mandeb Strait.
While commonly referred to as the Dahlak Island
naval facility, the Soviet complex is actually located
on Nokra Deset (Nokra Island), opposite Great Dah-
lak Island. It has clear sea approaches through a 10-
to 20-meter deep entrance channel. The Dahlak facili-
ty itself includes barracks to accommodate up to 200
personnel, POL and water storage tanks, two floating
piers, two helipads, air defense artillery revetments,
security fences, and a power plant. Eight repaired
buildings and 13 or more new buildings serve as
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storage and housing space. To complement the shore
installation, the Soviets normally keep an 8,500-ton
floating drydock, an oiler, at least one repair ship, and
a submarine tender in the roadstead or docked at the
floating pier. This combination of assets provides
Moscow with limited maintenance and a light repair
and resupply capability.
Patterns of Access. The facility at Dahlak was origi-
nally an Italian police post and later a British prison
camp. The area was largely abandoned until April
1978 when the Soviets positioned the drydock in a
channel next to the island. The drydock was trans-
ferred from the former Soviet facility at Berbera,
Somalia, to South Yemen in late 1977 and was
subsequently moved to Dahlak. A Soviet delegation
visited Ethiopia prior to this move, apparently to
conclude an agreement with the Ethiopian Govern-
ment for use of the islands.
Soviet naval use of Dahlak increased from 40 calls in
1978 to 75 in 1983, peaking at 101 in 1981. Combat-
ants, such as guided-missile cruisers and nuclear-
powered submarines, regularly visit there for logistic
purposes and maintenance. In addition, the Soviets
have used the complex to unload for maintenance
mechanized combat vehicles belonging to naval infan-
try units deployed aboard amphibious warfare ships.
Fuel Storage. There are POL storage facilities for
approximately 10,900 barrels of refined products.
These products probably include diesel fuel for gener-
ators and vehicles as well as aviation fuel for Soviet
helicopters that are used to ferry personnel and
supplies from Massawa to Dahlak Island. POL prod-
ucts at Dahlak are probably also available to fuel
Soviet vessels on a contingency basis. A yard oiler
brings fuel to Dahlak from South Yemen.
Defenses. To provide protection for the Dahlak facili-
ty, the Soviets have fenced off a large area that is
guarded by a security unit of Soviet naval infantry
numbering between 75 and 100 personnel. The unit
has, two
ZSU-23/4 radar-controlled mobile air defense guns
and at least two armored personnel carriers. It is
judged capable of defending the facility for a short
time against small-scale air or ground attacks.
The Ethiopian Navy has a major base at the port of
Massawa, and assets could be drawn from there and
colocated Army units to augment the Soviet defenses
if necessary. In addition, OSA-II missile attack boats
and several patrol craft or frigates could also be used
to defend Dahlak, if needed.
Aseb Port (13100' N. 42145' E.,
Massawa Port (15137' N. 39128' E.
Aseb and Massawa are Ethiopia's only major ports.
Aseb handles virtually all commercial traffic because
of Massawa's decline due to age and extensive dam-
age resulting from the Eritrean rebel siege of 1977.
Description. Aseb is Ethiopia's principal port and is
located on the northwestern side of Aseb Bay at the
southern end of Ethiopia's Red Sea coastline. It has
an estimated military port capacity of 4,100 tons per
day
are negligible
The approach to the port is free and clear and
presents no difficulties. The improved, natural coastal
harbor consists of a breakwater-protected inner har-
bor and a large outer harbor. Three deepwater chan-
nels with depths ranging from 10 to 16.5 meters lead
into two entrances with depths of 11.6 meters. Tides
The primary anchorage is in Aseb Bay, where depths
of 7.3 to 10.9 meters can be found 8 to 13 kilometers
from the port. There is also a much smaller anchorage
2 kilometers from the port with depths of 16.4 to 18.3
meters.
Aseb has two general cargo moles, each with one
cargo handling quay front with two berths and one
deepwater POL berth. Total berthing length is 975
meters in depths of 5.6 to 19.9 meters. At the oil berth
for Aseb refinery, located 2.4 kilometers south of the
port, tankers secure to mooring buoys.
There are nine covered storage buildings within the
port with a total floorspace of 27,500 square meters. 25X1
Twenty-seven additional buildings are just outside the
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port area with a total floorspace of 16,000 square Aseb has virtually no repair capability. The port is
meters. Four additional storage buildings are under cleared by a two-lane all-weather highway that termi-
construction. Open storage area is very limited. nates in Addis Ababa, approximately 850 kilometers
away. There is no rail service.
The four general cargo berths are served by 18 East
German portal jib cranes, 14 with 3- to 6-ton and four
with 10- to 20-ton capacities. The port also has three
tugs and two mobile cranes (90 and 150 ton).
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Massawa is located on the Ethiopian Red Sea coast in
the war-torn province of Eritrea. It is approximately
115 kilometers from the provincial capital of Asmera
and serves as the principal operating base of the small
Ethiopian Navy. The port consists of two peninsulas
plus the islands of T'walet and Massawa, which are
connected to the mainland by causeways. The im-
proved natural harbor is divided into three bays and
an anchorage. In total, Massawa has five separate
anchorages, three for cargo ships and two for naval
vessels. Its military port capacity is estimated to be
4,500 metric tons per day.
The approach from the Red Sea through Mits'iwa
Channel is free and clear. The entrance channel to the
outer harbor lies between coral reefs and has a
controlling depth of 10 meters. There is one main
commercial quay, served by six portal jib cranes;
three additional quays-one for lighters-and nine
small piers (one with a cargo conveyor system). Total
commercial berthing length is 900 meters. Containers
are handled at the main quay and there are two Ro-
Ro berths. Four naval piers and one naval quay are
also present.
Covered storage at Massawa is limited to 10 aging
sheds with a total floorspace of 18,000 square meters.
Open storage is very limited in the immediate port
area, but ample space is available on the mainland.
Mechanical handling equipment at the port is limited
to six old portal jib cranes of 5-ton capacity, five
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mobile cranes of unknown capacity, and specialized
container handling equipment. Three tugboats also
are available.
Massawa is cleared by a two-lane highway that
connects the port to Asmera. At one time the port was
also cleared by a narrow-gauge, single-track rail line
to the interior of Eritrea. This line, however, has been
inoperable since its destruction by Eritrean rebels in
the mid-1970s.
There are no shipyards or drydocks, but Massawa has
good workshops and minor ship repair work is possi-
ble. Massawa has a 300-ton marine railway in the
Shipping activity at Massawa has declined substan-
tially since the port area suffered heavy damage
during the 1977 Eritrean siege. It is still the primary
entry point for goods destined for Asmera and other
northern Eritrean locations, but it does not handle
cargo for other regions in Ethiopia.
Fuel Storage. Aseb has a storage capacity of approxi-
mately 665,000 barrels of refined products. In addi-
tion, the petroleum refinery located near the port can
hold approximately 380,000 barrels of refined POL.
New storage tanks now being built will add another
315,000 barrels to this total. Massawa is capable of
storing approximately 314,000 barrels of refined
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inner harbor for small craft repairs.
Patterns of Access. Prior to 1978, Soviet combatants
made infrequent calls to Ethiopian ports, generally in
connection with the celebration of Ethiopian Navy
Day. The Soviet sealift to Ethiopia during the 1977-
78 Ogaden war resulted in a dramatic increase in
Soviet port calls to both Aseb and Massawa. Soviet
combatant calls to the ports have declined since late
in 1981.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Moscow has
attempted to establish naval facilities at both Aseb
and Massawa since the late 1970s. The Soviets appar-
ently sought extensive access to the port of Massawa
and wanted to build another port near Aseb for their
exclusive use, but Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu re-
sisted Soviet pressure and turned down the requests.
In practice, US naval combatants are denied access to
both ports, although they are not officially banned by
Addis Ababa. US commercial vessels have called at
Aseb frequently in recent months to deliver famine
relief material.
Activity. Aseb handles virtually all of Ethiopia's
trade. Principal exports are coffee, hides and skins,
and bulk salt. General cargo, crude oil, and refined
petroleum products are the port's main imports. Aseb
also is the primary port of entry for military equip-
ment destined for the Ethiopian military.
products.
Defenses. Aseb is well defended by Ethiopian Army
units, including brigade-size elements. Over the years,
Eritrean rebels have raided the port area and adjacent
targets but have never inflicted serious damage to the
facilities.
A small number of Ethiopian naval patrol craft are
based at Aseb. They provide a limited defense against
naval combatants and infiltration along the Eritrean
coast.
Massawa is the headquarters of an Ethiopian Army
division, and several thousand troops are stationed in
the city or along the Massawa-Asmera highway.
These Ethiopian forces possess armor and artillery,
and a system of defensive fortifications has been
constructed to protect the land approaches to the city.
There are no fixed surface-to-air missile sites near the
port, but we believe Ethiopian troops have the SA-7
man-portable system.
attack on Massawa if necessary.
Addis Ababa has a major airbase at Asmera, approxi-
mately 115 kilometers away. MI-24 HIND attack
helicopters, MIG-21s, and MIG-23 fighter bombers
are stationed at Asmera and could respond to an
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Massawa is also home for most men and ships in the
Ethiopian Navy. The Ethiopian naval base is only 2.5
kilometers north of the civilian port facility. OSA-II
missile boats, Petya-class frigates, swiftships, patrol
craft, and various support vessels also provide for the
defense of Massawa. During the Eritrean siege, Ethi-
opian naval craft provided fire support for the ground
troops and also offloaded supplies at the port.
Yohannes IV Airfield (15?17' N. 38?54' E.,
Harar Meda (Debre Zeyit) Airbase (08142' N. 39'00'
Aba Tenna Dejazmat (Dire Dawa) Airfield
(09?37' N. 41?51' E.
Bole International Airfield (08158' N. 38148' E.,
Several airfields in Ethiopia are capable of supporting
jet and transport aircraft operations. We believe the
four airfields listed above, however, are the only ones
that have the location and support facilities necessary
for extensive flight operations. In fact, three of
them-Yohannes IV, Harar Meda, and Bole-are
used by the Soviet Union to support reconnaissance or
airlift operations.
Yohannes IV Airfield, located in Eritrea Province, is
one of the most important facilities in Ethiopia. Harar
Meda is a major Ethiopian military airfield and the
headquarters for the Ethiopian Air Force. Aba Tenna
Dejazmatch Yilma Airfield, located near Dire Dawa,
is the major military airfield for the Ogaden region
and also serves as a civilian airport. Bole, located
outside of Addis Ababa, is the country's principal civil
air facility.
Description. Yohannes IV Airfield, located approxi-
mately 3 kilometers south of Asmera, is used for both
civilian and military operations. It is not only an
international airport and port of entry for Ethiopia,
but it is also the major military airfield supporting air
operations in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces.
The main runway at Yohannes IV measures 3,000 by
45 meters with an asphalt surface. It is capable of
handling C-130, C-141, and C-5 transport aircraft,
although the latter two would have to operate at
reduced loaded weight. The airport has eight asphalt
parking aprons with a total area of 188,633 square
meters.
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Yohannes IV has a control tower, approach control,
very high frequency omnidirectional ranges tactical
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(TACAN). Visual approach slope indicator lights are
at the southwestern end of the runway. Approach
lights extend from the southwestern end of the run- 25X1
way with lights also marking the thresholds and
runway edge.
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The civilian terminal area, located on the western
edge of the airfield perimeter, consists of an asphalt
terminal parking apron, an operations-terminal build-25X1
ing, three hangars, two maintenance buildings, a
firehouse, and three support buildings.
Yohannes IV is cleared by a two-lane bituminous
highway. The airfield has an ammunition storage area
that contains both buildings and bunkers. Yohannes
IV has several hangars and maintenance shops. Am-
ple storage facilities also exist. r
Harar Meda Airbase-commonly called Debre
Zeyit-is located approximately 5 kilometers from
the town of Debre Zeyit. It is headquarters for the
Ethiopian Air Force, a number of technical schools,
aircraft and helicopter pilot training facilities, and
rescue and transport operations. Debre Zeyit's 3,100-
by 41-meter asphalt runway can handle C-130 and C-
141 aircraft. It has six parking aprons with approxi-
mately 125,000 square kilometers of usable space.
Debre Zeyit has a control tower, IFR/VFR capabili-
ty, approach control radio beacon, direction finding
(DF), and TACAN. The airfield is serviced by a two-
lane bituminous highway that leads to Addis Ababa.
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Aba Tenna Dejaz,match Yilma Airfield is a joint The airfield has IFR/VFR capabilities, a control
civilian-military facility located outside of the north- tower, NDB, and TACAN. It is cleared by a 9.1-
ern Ogaden city of Dire Dawa, and it is usually called meter wide all-weather road. A railroad siding east-
Dire Dawa Airfield. It was built in 1956, and substan- northeast of the airfield connects with the Addis
tial improvements were completed in 1980. F____-] Ababa-Djibouti rail line.
Dire Dawa has a 2,705- by 45-meter concrete runway Bole International Airport, the major civilian port for
with five concrete parking aprons that provide approx- Ethiopia, is located approximately 5 kilometers south
imately 50,000 square feet of space. The airfield can of the capital of Addis Ababa. It has a 3,700- by 45-
accommodate C-130, C-141, and C-5 transport opera- meter asphalt runway that can handle C-130, C-141,
tions, although the C-5 can only operate at reduced and C-5 aircraft. There are two asphalt parking
weight.
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aprons encompassing approximately 141,000 square
meters. The airport's over 2,300 meter-elevation, how-
ever, hampers flight operations because of the need to
enforce weight restrictions.
Bole has seven hangars, and its workshops are able to
do major repairs. It has an IFR/VFR capability,
control tower, approach control, NDB, VOR-DME,
and ILS. Bole is cleared by a two-lane all-weather
road that leads to Addis Ababa. There is also a
railroad spur at the POL area located near the north
end of the field.
Fuel Storage. Yohannes IV has both JP-4 and A-1 jet
fuel. Total storage capacity at the airfield is 3,600
barrels that is dispensed by truck. Debre Zeyit has
JP-4 jet fuel with a storage capacity of approximately
4,800 barrels. Fuel is dispensed by both truck and
hydrant. Dire Dawa Airfield has jet-B fuel with a
storage capacity of approximately 1,600 barrels. The
fuel is dispersed by truck. Bole International has both
A-1 and JP-4 jet fuel. Total fuel storage capacity at
Bole is 9,500 barrels, with fuel being dispensed by
truck.
Activity. The Soviet Union deployed two IL-38 May
maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare aircraft
to Yohannes IV from January 1980 until May 1984.
In May 1984, an Eritrean rebel sapper team raided
Yohannes IV Airfield and, in addition to other air-
craft, destroyed one of the IL-38s and seriously
damaged the other. The Soviet Union has not re-
placed them and will probably not station aircraft at
the airfield until the security situation stabilizes.
The Ethiopian Air Force has MIG-21 and MIG-23
fighters based at Asmera to support military opera-
tions in the north. MI-24 HIND attack helicopters
are also deployed to Yohannes IV periodically. These
aircraft are used extensively in ground support opera-
Debre Zeyit, an exclusively military facility, is the
hub of Ethiopian Air Force activity. Almost all newly
delivered aircraft are sent to Debre Zeyit for assem-
bly and flight-testing. A variety of aircraft are moth-
balled at the airfield, including US-made F-5 fighters.
Ethiopian fighters are rotated from Debre Zeyit to
operational fighter bases at Yohannes IV, Dire Dawa,
and Gode-a jet-capable airfield in the southern
Ogaden region.
Debre Zeyit, along with Bole Airport, was one of the
major termination points for the massive Soviet airlift
of arms to Ethiopia that began in November 1977.
Dire Dawa is used by both Ethiopian and Djiboutian
airlines for regularly scheduled flights between the
two countries. Dire Dawa is also the home base for
Ethiopian MIG-17, MIG-21, and MIG-23 fighter
aircraft. From here, the Ethiopian Air Force can
conduct operations in the northern and central
Ogaden and northern Somalia.
through this airfield.
Bole International is a major civilian facility that is
used extensively by Ethiopian Airlines and several
other major carriers, such as Alitalia and Aeroflot.
The Ethiopian Air Force uses it occasionally for
transport flights but fighters are rarely noted at the
airport. Soviet transport flights also utilize Bole on
occasion. Military VIP flights almost always arrive
Defenses. Yohannes IV Airfield is defended by Ethio-
pian Army forces equipped with armor and artillery.
The provincial capital of Asmera is headquarters for
the Ethiopian northern command as well as one
Ethiopian division and several brigades.
Eritrean rebels have shown a capability to infiltrate
the airbase and destroy or damage aircraft despite a
strong government presence. In addition, the facility
is vulnerable to long-range artillery.
tions against Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents.
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Aircraft stationed at Yohannes IV can defend against
an air threat, and Ethiopian pilots are believed to be
very proficient in an air defense role. Ethiopian planes
also can be used to support ground troops if the base
came under assault.
Debre Zeyit Airbase is defended by Ethiopian mili-
tary personnel, who use stationary guard posts and
roving patrols. The Ethiopian Army has an airborne
training camp located near the base and could draw
upon these forces if necessary.
air defense and ground attack support if needed. In
addition, one SA-3 surface-to-air missile battalion is
available to defend against any air threat.
Bole International is guarded by Ethiopian military
and police personnel. Forces are stationed within the
terminal itself while others roam the area.
Air defense artillery units are stationed close to the
airfield for security, and aircraft could be rapidly
deployed to the capital from Debre Zeyit if necessary.
Aircraft stationed at Debre Zeyit could be used in an
air defense role if needed. In addition, the Ethiopians
have two SA-2 surface-to-air missile battalions sta-
tioned around the airfield.
Dire Dawa Airfield is surrounded by several large
Ethiopian Army camps located at Dire Dawa. The
airfield itself is fenced and has both stationary and
roving guards. It was successfully defended against
two major Somali ground attacks during the Ogaden
war. Aircraft based at the airfield can provide both
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Country Overview
Djibouti, independent from France since June 1977,
has been relatively stable under pro-Western Presi-
dent Hassan Gouled. According to the US Embassy,
French influence remains prevalent, and French ad-
visers and contract employees are found throughout
the military, government, and civilian sector. Paris
still has approximately 4,500 military personnel sta-
tioned in Djibouti and is responsible for defending the
country against outside aggression.
The US Embassy reports that Djibouti has little
economic potential because of its arid climate and
lack of natural resources. Approximately two-thirds
of the country's estimated 300,000 population lives in
the capital city of Djibouti; the remaining third are
nomads. According to the IMF, over three-fourths of
Djibouti's gross domestic product is derived from
activity associated with the port, railway, airport,
private banking system, and the French military and
civilian presence. Revenue from these sectors has
declined sharply in recent years, however, creating
high unemployment and other serious economic prob-
lems for the government.
In addition to its economic woes, the Gouled regime
faces simmering tribal tensions and public disillusion-
ment with blatant official corruption. Gouled's failure
to address economic and social problems is weakening
public support, according to the US Embassy. Al-
though the regime is not immediately threatened,
these unresolved issues and the economic decline do
not bode well for the country's stability.
Djibouti Port (11?36' N. 43?08' E.
Djibouti is the capital and major port for the Republic
of Djibouti. The port area consists of a commercial
section and naval facility. Ethiopia uses the port for a
small portion of its international trade and as the
terminus of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad.
France, the former colonial power, has a naval contin-
gent based in Djibouti to coordinate maintenance for
ships of the French Indian Ocean Fleet.
Description. Djibouti port is an artificial harbor built
on coral reefs at the northeastern end of a small
peninsula. The approach to the port is free and clear
Figure 16
Selected Port and Airfield in Djibouti
Gulf
Tadjoura _1_1 of
ura Aden
'Asa de Tadj?
0 o~~e DJIBOUTI-/TN
Port
Airfield
US access in blue
- 71-w
Road
- Railroad
Tribe
0 30 Kilometers
T
0 30 Statute Miles
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and well protected by the natural configuration of the
peninsula and the surrounding coral reefs. The inner
harbor is used for offloading all types of cargo as well
as naval berthing. Pilotage, although not mandatory,
is recommended, especially for naval ships. The outer 25X1
harbor is used for bunkering as well as for anchorage.
Large numbers of all classes of ships can anchor in the 25X1
outer harbor and at the designated anchorage area in
the Golfe de Tadjoura. Holding ground consists of
mud and coral with depths ranging from 12 to 21
meters. Both the inner harbor and the entrance
channel are dredged periodically to remove silt.
The port has approximately 20 covered storage build-
ings with a total floorspace in excess of 40,000 square
meters. There are nine mobile cranes on the quay, and
the port has two container cranes of 40-ton capacity
plus a floating crane with a capacity of 70 tons.
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A single-track narrow-gauge rail line clears the port
of Djibouti; this is part of the approximately 800-
kilometer Djibouti-Addis Ababa rail line. All the
principal quays within the port are serviced by rail.
Two bituminous-surfaced roads also clear the port
with one leading to Djibouti/Ambouli Airport and the
other toward the Ethiopian border.
Djibouti has a small shipyard capable of performing
minor hull and engine repairs. There are three marine
railways, the largest of which has a 500-ton capacity
and is 120 meters long. There are no drydock facili-
ties.
Patterns of Access. Prior to independence in 1977,
Djibouti was the headquarters for the French Indian
Ocean Fleet. In addition, the French Army and air
force had units stationed there. In the postindepen-
dence period, France was able to maintain its military
presence by concluding a military cooperation agree-
ment that committed Paris to defending the republic
against outside aggression. As a result, approximately
4,500 French naval, air, and Army personnel are
stationed in Djibouti. At least one naval ship is in port
at all times, and the French air force maintains a
squadron of 10 Mirage-III fighters and various trans-
port and helicopters in the country.
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The United States frequently uses Djibouti's naval
facilities for port calls and to support its Indian Ocean
operations. Although President Gouled is reluctant to
sign a formal access agreement with the United
States, he approves almost all clearance requests. The
Soviet Navy rarely makes port calls in Djibouti.
Activity. Use of the port by commercial vessels has
declined significantly over the past 10 years. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy, Djibouti has been unable to
capture new business for the port despite the reopen-
ing of the Suez Canal. The Embassy reports that the
number of ships calling at the port has fallen by one-
third since 1977, total bunkering tonnage is off nearly
40 percent during the same period, and tonnage of all
types handled by the port has declined 20 percent.
Fuel Storage. Djibouti port has a combined refined
POL storage of 1.6 million barrels in 40 storage tanks
of varying sizes.
Defenses. Security at the port is provided by the
French and Djiboutian military. French ground forces
in the capital number approximately 3,000 men and
possess light tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles,
howitzers, and other weapons. The Djiboutian Navy
has several small patrol craft while the Army has 20
reconnaissance vehicles and light artillery.
Djibouti /Ambouli Airfield (11'32' N. 43'09' E.,
Ambouli, the only airfield in the republic with a paved
runway, is located approximately 5 kilometers from
the port. It is used jointly by the military and civilian
airlines. Ambouli can handle C-130, C-141, and C-5
transports as well as Boeing 747 airliners.
Description. Ambouli has a 3,140- by 45-meter as-
phalt runway with six asphalt parking aprons, the
largest of which is 381 by 183 meters. The airfield has
a control tower, approach control, NDB, VOR-DME,
instrument landing system (ILS), and TACAN. Am-
bouli has five hangars, two of which belong to Air
Djibouti and the third to Air France. The primary
technical drawback of the airport is caused by the
summer heat. The lower density of air at high tem-
peratures makes takeoff more difficult and the per-
missible payload of wide-bodied aircraft has to be
reduced. This problem is overcome to a large extent
by scheduling takeoffs at night.
underground storage tank.
Fuel Storage. Jet A-1 fuel, which is dispersed by
truck and hydrant systems, is received from storage
tanks approximately 5 kilometers from the airfield.
Approximately 23,000 barrels of fuel are in above-
ground storage tanks. In addition, there is at least one
helicopters stationed at the airfield.
Activity. France uses the airfield to support its Indian
Ocean Fleet and to conduct periodic naval reconnais-
sance flights in the region. The French have 10
Mirage-III fighters, Noratlas transports, and several
Although the United States has no formal access
agreement with Djibouti, the government approves on
a regular basis Navy P-3 naval reconnaissance flights
to and from Djibouti and permits regular supply
flights in support of naval operations in the area.
The Soviet Union has no military access to Ambouli,
although civilian VIP flights occasionally transit the
airport.
Defenses. The military section of Ambouli is separate
from the civilian operating area and access is con-
trolled. Security is provided by French and Djiboutian
military personnel.
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Overview
The government of President Siad is beset by a
growing array of political, military, and economic
problems that are slowly undermining stability, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting. Siad's once-broad
tribal support base has narrowed to his Marehan clan
and its tribal allies. His use of the Army to try to
suppress tribal fighting and to enforce internal securi-
ty has alienated large segments of the population and
created fissures within the military.
At the same time, dissatisfaction is also increasing
within the military over the growing inferiority of
Somali forces to those of archrival Ethiopia. Many
senior and midlevel officers are critical of the lack of
Western military support and they have advised Siad
to loosen his ties to the West. according to US
Embassy an
The country's economy continues to stagnate, and it
has been unable to conclude an IMF agreement
because of the paucity of foreign exchange. According
to US Embassy reporting, Siad is under pressure from
his cronies and other key advisers to revoke several
economic reforms instituted last year. The President
has been reluctant to do so, however, and has instead
attempted to find alternative funds. Mogadishu's rees-
tablishment of diplomatic relations with Libya last
year, for example, was motivated, we believe, in part
by expectations that Tripoli will pump money into the
Somali economy.
The Siad regime faces an armed threat from two
groups that receive economic and military support
from Ethiopia.
Othe effectiveness of both groups, however, is
hindered by their narrow tribal bases, although they
are capable of conducting limited cross-border opera-
tions against isolated Somali military units.
In 1977, Siad abrogated the 1974 Soviet-Somali
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, expelled all
Soviet military personnel, and ended Moscow's access
to Somali air and naval facilities. We believe Siad, in
part, was retaliating for Moscow's support of Ethiopia
during the Ogaden war. In August 1980, Siad signed
Figure 19
Selected Ports and Airfields in Somalia
ADDIS
ABABA,
UTI Gulf of Aden
JIBOUTI
Berbera
ETHIOPIA " Laos ceeeood
Off" Phi
0 C P j
o+%
KENYA
Port
Airfield
US access jn blue
0 200 Kilometers
221
0 00 Statute Miles
an access agreement with the United States granting
Washington use of ports and airfields at Mogadishu
and Berbera. The United States has provided Somalia
over $60 million in arms assistance since 1981 in an
effort to improve Mogadishu's defensive capabilities.
Berbera Port (10?26' N. 45?00' E.,
Mogadishu Port (02001' N. 45020' E.,
Chisi7 Port (00122' S. 42133' E.,
Somalia has three major deepwater ports-Berbera,
Mogadishu, and Chisimayu. Berbera is strategically
important because it overlooks the southern entrance
Indian
Ocean
Road
Railroad
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to the Red Sea. Mogadishu is the country's most commercially as an exporter of livestock and for the
important commercial port and one of Africa's discharge of commercial goods for northern Somalia
newest, having been completed in 1978. Chisimayu is and military equipment for northern units. Berbera
a small commercial port located 200 kilometers north has an estimated military port capacity of 2,600 tons
of the Kenyan border that is not being used to its full per day.
potential.
The port has a small natural harbor approximately
Description. Berbera Port is situated in a small 2.5 kilometers long and 800 meters wide with depths
natural harbor on the northern coast of Somalia and of 9 to 18 meters. Approaches from the sea are deep
was completed in 1969 with considerable economic
assistance from the Soviet Union. The port functions
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and clear. Extensive anchorage in depths of 19 meters
over good holding ground is available off the harbor
entrance. Anchorage is available for four medium
The port is cleared by two hard-surfaced roads, one
leading to the city of Hargeysa and the other to Burao
and Laas Caanood. The port has no rail clearance.
ships within the harbor.
There are two deepwater, general cargo berths, one
naval berth, one POL berth, three lighter berths, and
a recently completed Ro-Ro ramp. The port has over
a kilometer of total berthing space suitable for general
cargo in depths ranging from 1 to 9.1 meters. The
offshore terminal used for unloading crude oil is
located on the west side of the harbor. Berbera is
serviced by three portal cranes, one floating crane,
and several tugs and lighters.
well-equipped workshop for minor repairs.
The port of Mogadishu. is located on Somalia's Indian
Ocean coast and consists of a manmade, breakwater-
protected harbor-completed in 1978-with six deep-
water alongside berths. The harbor is dredged to a'
depth of 11 meters. The port used to be located 2
kilometers to the north where shallow depths necessi-
tated the use of lighters for cargo operations. The old
harbor is no longer used as a maritime port. The.
estimated military port capacity of Mogadishu is
There are approximately 10 covered storage buildings
with a total floorspace of 11,100 square meters, and
there is plentiful open storage space.
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The approach to the port is free and clear. Extensive Mogadishu has no quayside or floating cranes. There
anchorage is available in the open roadstead just are seven mobile cranes, the largest of which has a 50-
south of the port in depths of 9.1 to 18.3 meters. The ton capacity.
bottom of the anchorage area is rock and sand, which
normally provides good holding ground. Ships in the
harbor are exposed from the southwest and are sub-
ject to strong gale-force winds and heavy seas, espe-
cially during the May to August monsoon season.
Holding becomes difficult and even large vessels have
been known to drag their anchor.
Mogadishu port has three covered storage buildings
with a total floorspace of 18,000 square meters. The
old harbor has eight considerably smaller buildings
with a total floorspace of 13,000 square meters. Open
The port is cleared by three hard-surfaced roads, two
leading to the interior and one leading to the southern
port city of Chisimayu. Mogadishu has no rail clear-
ance.
Chisimayu port is located on the Indian Ocean.
Approach is free and clear, although movement in and
out of the port is restricted to daylight hours. Chisi-
mayu has an estimated military port capacity of 2,500
tons per day.
storage space is more than sufficient at the port.
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The port has a roadstead outer harbor and a break-
water-protected inner harbor with an entrance depth
of 8.5 meters. Pilotage is compulsory. Although silting
is a problem, little dredging has been done in recent
years.
Extensive anchorage in depths of 10 meters over good
holding ground is available southeast of the entrance
channel. Anchorage is also permitted within the har-
bor in depths of 8.5 meters.
There are three covered storage buildings at Chisi-
mayu with a total floorspace of 8,200 square meters.
Open stacking is limited to the L-shaped mole. The
port has six portal cranes for offloading and two
berthing tugs. Lighterage can be performed with four
300-ton capacity pontoons. Chisimayu has a limited
ship repair capability.
The port is cleared by a hard-surfaced two-lane road
that leads to Mogadishu. There is no rail clearance.
Patterns of Access. The Soviet Union built the port at
Berbera and maintained a naval base there until
expelled by Mogadishu in 1977. The port was part of
a larger military complex that included a major
airfield, missile handling facility, and communica-
tions complex. Soviet warships have not called at
Berbera during the past eight years.
The United States, which signed a military access
agreement with Somalia in 1980, recently completed
a $37.5 million project to improve both the port and
airfield facilities at Berbera. The port construction
included a deepening of the harbor, a ramp for Ro-Ro
vessels, a new causeway, new navigational aids, quay
extension, and new lighting. Washington plans to pre-
position supplies in Berbera to support US Central
Command operations in the region.
Berbera is used by other countries for commercial
activity and some, such as Egypt and China, have
made arms deliveries at the port. The Indian Navy
made a port call in early 1985.
Mogadishu was used by the Soviets for arms deliver-
ies and occasional naval port calls. Several US Navy
vessels have visited the port since 1980.
The Soviets appeared to be in the process of establish-
ing several facilities for their use at Chisimayu prior
to their expulsion, including a building possibly in-
tended for servicing naval missiles. Little development
has occurred at Chisimayu since 1977, although a
new $42 million port rehabilitation project, funded by
USAID and supervised by the US Navy, will begin
later this year.
Activity. The port of Berbera is primarily a commer-
cial facility. Thousands of cattle, sheep, goats, and
camels are shipped from the port to Egypt and other
consumers in the Middle East. Almost all imports
through Berbera are intended only for northern
Somalia.
Mogadishu is a center for the export of bananas,
sugarcane, charcoal, meats, tanned hides, and skins.
Principal imports include machinery, cement, trans-
port equipment, and consumer goods. Military equip-
ment intended for the capital or units in central
Somalia enters through Mogadishu.
Chisimayu is used almost exclusively as a commercial
port since none of the naval craft there are operation-
al. Livestock, bananas, and sugarcane are the princi-
pal exports that pass through it. Because of its
isolation, military deliveries occasionally are made to
Chisimayu.
Fuel Storage. With the completion of US construc-
tion projects, Berbera now has a storage capacity of
approximately 135,000 barrels. A petroleum refinery
with a capacity of 3.6 million barrels per year is
located at Mogadishu, and the city also has storage
facilities for 700,000 barrels of refined products. The
port of Chisimayu has a storage capacity of 230,000
barrels.
Defenses. Somali military units are stationed at all
three ports. Berbera is a major Somali naval base,
although maintenance and the lack of space parts
have left its two Osa missile attack boats inoperable.
The Somali Air Force occasionally stations MIG-19s
and MIG-17s at the airfield, and the SA-2 surface-to-
air missiles employed at Berbera add to air defense
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capabilities. Age, poor maintenance, and a shortage of
space parts, however, significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of these systems.
Mogadishu is defended by several elite Army units
stationed in or near its environs. In addition, SA-2
and SA-3 missile systems provide air defense for the
capital, and MIG aircraft can be deployed to
Mogadishu Airfield.
Chisimayu has several Somali Army units stationed
near the port to provide security against any ground
threat. The port is also a major naval base, but none
of the craft stationed there is operational.
10023' N. 44?57' E.,
Har a sa International Airfield (0913 V N. 44105' E.,
Ogg
al Airport (02?00' N. 45018'
E.
There are severa jet-capable airfields in Somalia but
only Berbera, Hargeysa, and Mogadishu have the
location and facilities to support military operations in
the Red Sea-Indian Ocean region. Berbera Airfield
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has one of the longest runways in the area-necessi-
tated by the extremely hot climate. The runway and
some support facilities were completed by the Soviet
Union prior to its expulsion from Somalia in 1977.
Hargeysa is a combined civilian-military airfield,
handling domestic as well as international flights.
Mogadishu International is the country's principal
civilian airport, although the Somali Air Force uses it
on occasion and performs some maintenance there.
Description. Berbera Airfield has a 4,115 by 46 meter
asphalt runway that has recently been resurfaced. It is
capable of handling C-130, C-141, and C-5 transport
aircraft. Berbera has adequate POL and munitions
storage facilities and is located near the port. The
airfield is used occasionally by Somali Air Force MIG
fighters, although no aircraft are permanently sta-
tioned there.
There is an aluminum hangar-used only by the
Somali Air Force-located at the west end of the
parking apron that is large enough to accommodate
MIG-sized aircraft.
Hargeysa is a daytime-only airfield since it has no
IFR capability. It has a VFR, control tower, and
NDB. is not
operational because power in the city and at the
airfield is turned off during daylight hours and no
aircraft utilize Hargeysa at night. The Somali Air
Force has at least one external power cart at the
airport.
available but tow bars may be hard to obtain.
The taxiway/parking ramp at the US military ramp
on the northeastern side of the runway has standard
blue lighting. The runway itself has operational stan-
dard lighting but it operates on request only. A four-
wheel drive tow tractor capable of moving a C-141 is
The airfield has VFR, NDB, ILS, TACAN, and a
control tower, although the tower and NDB operate
only on request or for scheduled flights
Berbera is cleared by a two-lane all-weather highway
to the interior and the port, although no rail facilities
are available.
19s, and Somali Air Force transport aircraft.
Hargeysa Airfield has a 2,280- by 46-meter asphalt
runway, capable of handling C-130 and C-141 trans-
ports. There is a hard compacted dirt extension at the
end of the main runway that also can be used by
C-130 aircraft. The C-141, however, can only operate
at reduced weight. Hargeysa has one of the best
runways in Somalia-despite lacking an operational
center line, runway edge, taxiway, or apron lights-
and is a major military airbase for MIG-17s, MIG-
Hargeysa is cleared by a two-lane all-weather road.
There is an asphalt road to the city of Hargeysa,
approximately 5 kilometers away, but it is in poor
condition.
Mogadishu International Airfield
does not meet international stan-
dards of safety or services. Many services taken for
granted elsewhere-such as navigational aids, light-
ing, instrument approaches-are substandard or non-
working. Various US-funded military construction
projects are under way, however, to address several of
these problems and should be completed by the end of
October.
Mogadishu has a 3,150- by 45-meter asphalt runway
and can handle C-130, C-141, and C-5 transport. It
has six asphalt and concrete parking aprons that are
too small to accommodate the C-5. An extensive
expansion of the parking apron on the Somali Air
Force side of the airport is well under way. The
airfield is the headquarters of Somali Airline and has
adequate maintenance and support facilities.
Mogadishu has an IFR, VFR capability, control
tower, approach control, VOR/DME, NDB, and
GCA radar, but these services are poorly manned or
maintained. The control tower, for example, is rarely
used because it has very limited control equipment.
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Aircraft are directed in from the flight information
center-which has no windows-located in the termi-
nal. A contract has been awarded to replace the
runway and taxiway lights, and to install a precision
approach path indicator (PAPI) landing system.
Mogadishu Airfield is cleared by an all-weather road
that leads to the capital. It is in generally poor shape
and suffers from a lack of maintenance.
Fuel Storage. Berbera Airfield has a storage capacity
of approximately 3,800 barrels of A-1 jet fuel. Two
25,000-barrel tanks are located at the airport itself.
Somalia suffers from a chronic shortage of fuel for air
operations, however, and its Air Force is frequently
down. We doubt that the airfields could support
sustained air operations without some arrangements
being made for the provision of additional fuel.
Activity. Berbera was built by the Soviet Union and
was intended primarily to support IL-38 and TU-95
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nated, however, before Moscow could use the airfield.
Fuel is dispersed by truck and a recently completed The United States agreed to rehabilitate Berbera in
dual hydrant system. Fuel capacity at Hargeysa is return for Somalia's granting access rights to air and
estimated to be 1,090 barrels of A-1 jet fuel with naval facilities. At the airfield, the project included
refueling conducted primarily by truck. Mogadishu
airport has approximately 1,140 barrels of A-1 jet fuel
storage capacity. Refueling is done by tanker truck.
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resurfacing the runway, installing lighting, and up-
grading various other services. Berbera is used by the
United States to support yearly Bright Star exercise
operations.
Hargeysa was used frequently by the Soviet Union for
IL-38 naval reconnaissance flights over the Indian
Ocean. It is now occasionally used by US Navy P-3
naval reconnaissance aircraft.
Mogadishu has a relatively light load of commercial
air traffic, often only two flights a day, and it rarely
handles night traffic. Somali Air Force aircraft are
occasionally flown to Mogadishu for maintenance and
training purposes.
The United States uses the airfield for Embassy
support flights or other special missions. Like
Berbera, it is also utilized during the Bright Star
exercises.
Defenses. Berbera is defended by several Somali
Army units stationed in the vicinity. The Berbera area
has an SA-2 surface-to-air missile system as well as
air defense guns. The SAMs are of questionable value
because of maintenance problems and age, although
the battery did launch a missile at a misidentified US
Navy fighter in 1983. Security at the airfield is
sufficient to deter any large attack but Somali forces
would have difficulty preventing small unit infiltra-
tion. Berbera Airfield was bombed by Ethiopia on one
occasion during the 1977-78 Ogaden war.
Hargeysa is also located in close proximity to Somali
Army and Air Force units. It is defended by an SA-2
SAM battalion, which probably has a low operational
capability. Army units are sufficient to defend the
base against large-scale attacks but would have diffi-
culty deterring small groups of infiltrators. Somali
Air Force MIGs stationed at the base could provide
limited ground support assistance but would be unable
to defend against an air attack because of low pilot
proficiency, poor communications, and inadequate
warning time.
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Overview
We believe, on the basis of US Embassy reporting,
that the primary internal threat to President Moi's
moderate, pro-Western government comes from tribal
rivalries that are fueled by growing economic and
social problems. Tribal discontent played a key role in
an unsuccessful coup attempt by disaffected Air
Force elements in August 1982.
Reporting from the US Embassy indicates that the
country's economy has been declining in recent years
as a result of decreased foreign investment, inflation,
oil imports, and rapid population growth. Agricultural
production has also been more difficult because of
poor weather, the reduced availability of fertile farm
land because of overpopulation, and poor soil conser-
vation practices. Rural problems have generated a
flight of unskilled workers from the countryside to the
cities, creating social strains and demands for im-
proved services.
Moi has reacted to internal dissent by building a
political coalition of western minority tribes, increas-
ing his personal power, and becoming more repressive.
The US Embassy states that these actions have
eroded his support among major tribal groups such as
the Kikuyu and Luo. The President has managed,
however, to keep his opponents divided and has taken
measures to ensure the loyalty of the Army, weaken-
ing any serious threat to his regime at this time.
Kenya has maintained close ties to the West, particu-
larly Great Britain and the United States, since
achieving independence in 1963. Nairobi participates
in limited and unpublicized military exercises with the
United Kingdom and United States, and the British
have a small advisory team in Kenya. The United
States and Kenya signed an access agreement in June
1980, which allows Washington to use Kenyan port
and air facilities to support operations in the Indian
Ocean-Persian Gulf region. The agreement was re-
newed for an additional five years in June 1985
Mombasa Port (04?02' S. 39138' E.
Mombasa is the largest and probably the best-
equipped port on Africa's east coast. Located on
Figure 26
Selected Port and Airfields in Kenya
Lake
Victoria
Lake
Rudolf
Provisional
ETHIOPIA Adminishalive
- line ,..-~
NAIROBI
nEastleigh
Port
Airfield
US access in blue
Road
~- -. Railroad
Tribe
0 150 Kilometers
fI.
0 150 Statute Miles
for landlocked Uganda and Rwanda.
Kenya's Indian Ocean coast, Mombasa is the coun-
try's only deepwater port, terminus of Kenya Rail-
way's main line, and the primary import-export center
Description. The approach to the port is well protect-
ed and consists of two main inlets separated by
Mombasa Island. The port is virtually free of silting,
and the entrance to the south channel has been
dredged to a depth of 14 meters. There are 17
deepwater alongside berths at Mombasa's Kilindini
Harbor, three of which are used for container and
Ro-Ro ships. In addition, there are two coaster along-
side berths, 17 lighter berths, two POL berths, and
two Navy berths. There are also eight mooring berths
in the harbor for lighter operations.
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Mombasa has more than 30 covered storage buildings
with a total floorspace of more than 200,000 square
meters. Open storage, however, is limited to 42,000
square meters.
The deepwater berths at the port are served by 72
quayside portal jib cranes, three of which have a
40-ton capacity, and the remainder have capacities
ranging from 2 to 7 tons. In addition, there are
approximately 18 mobile cranes with capacities from
11 to 32 tons, three 40-ton container cranes, and one
60-ton floating crane.
Mombasa is cleared by one single-track, 1-meter-
gauge rail line to Nairobi that eventually links up to
the Ugandan and Tanzanian systems. It is also
cleared by three all-weather highways that lead to the
interior of Kenya.
Maintenance facilities are available, including a well-
equipped 20,000-ton drydock, the largest on the East
African coast. In addition, there are five marine
railways capable of medium-hull and engine repair to
vessels up to 2,500 tons.
Patterns of Access. In 1980, Kenya signed an agree-
ment with Washington permitting, among other
things, US Naval access to Mombasa and the pre-
positioning of material intended to support Indian
Ocean operations. The US Navy uses the port for rest
and recreation and to replenish its ships. The United
Kingdom also has an agreement with Kenya granting
British Naval access rights. Both countries have con-
ducted limited naval exercises with the Kenyan Navy.
Soviet Naval units have not visited Mombasa for over
10 years. Approximately 45 Soviet commercial ships
call at the port each year, however, and Soviet trawler
visits usually coincide with US Navy port visits.
Activity. Mombasa has a military port capacity of
15,100 metric tons. It is the headquarters and operat-
ing base of the Kenyan Navy, which consists primari-
ly of British-made patrol craft. Principal imports are
crude petroleum, fertilizer, iron and steel products,
machinery, and transport equipment. Exports include
percent of which were imports.
cement, soda ash, fluorspan, agricultural and forest
products, and refined petroleum products. Total cargo
moved in 1980, the last date for which information is
available, amounted to 7.4 million metric tons, 73
Fuel Storage. There are 2.2 million barrels of crude
and 4.7 million barrels of refined storage available,
with the greater portion of this stored at the Mombasa
refinery. Fuel oil and diesel bunkering oil is available
at most deepwater quays and at two tanker berths.
Fuel is also furnished by four bunkering barges, with
a capacity of 1,100 barrels each. Hose sizes on each
barge are 38.4 and 63.8 mm.
Defenses. There are no known military defenses
around the port area. Mobassa Airfield, however, is
10 kilometers west of the port and has military forces
available. Some security for the port area is provided
by Kenyan police forces, however.
Nanyuki Airfield 00?01' N. 37?0l' E.,
Airfield (01 ? 16' N. 36051' E.,
Moi International Airfield (04?01' S. 39?35' E.,
Nanyuki Airfield is an important fighter base where
F-5s, BAC Strikemasters, and Hawk aircraft are
deployed. Eastleigh Airfield houses the Air Force's
transport, air support, and helicopter squadrons. It is
also the location of the Kenyan Air Force headquar-
ters, supply and maintenance facilities, and the basic
training wing. Moi International Airfield is a civilian
facility that services the port of Mombasa.
Description. Nanyuki Airfield is capable of handling
C-131 aircraft. It has a 4,023 by 30-meter asphalt
runway and several small parking aprons. It has a
control tower and IFR, VFR, ASR, ILS, and NDB
capabilities. Nanyuki is serviced by a two-lane bitu-
minous road to the city of Nanyuki.
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Eastleigh has a primary asphalt runway of 2,438 by Fuel Storage. Nanyuki has a storage capacity of
46 meters and is capable of handling C-130 aircraft. about 645 barrels of A-1 jet fuel. Both hydrants and
The airfield has a control tower, IFR, VFR, NDB tanker trucks are used for disbursement.
approach control, and radar capabilities. It is serviced
by an all-weather highway to Nairobi and a single- Eastleigh has a 1,965-barrel A-1 jet fuel stora e
track rail line located 1 mile north of the airfield. capacity, and fuel is dispersed by hydrant. 125X1
Moi International has a total capacity for all fuels,
3,350 by 45 meters and can handle C-5 transports. It and tanker trucks are used to transfer fuel.
possesses a control tower, IFR, VFR, VOR, NDB,
radar, and ILS capabilities. Clearance is excellent
with an all-weather road to Mombasa, a rail line 3
kilometers north of the airfield, and the ort situated
approximately 10 kilometers to the east.
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Defenses. Nanyuki and Eastleigh are major airbases is protected by approximately 40 Kenyan police offi-
protected by Kenyan Army units that are located in cers. In addition, elite paramilitary police comman-
proximity to both airfields. Moi International Airfield dos, as well as Army forces, are located at a nearby
base.
I
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Figure 31
Selected Ports and Airfields in Southern Africa
2a?
CONGO
BRAZZAVILLE
ANGOLA
Menongue
/1\Lubango
>~O
NAMIBIA
ZAIRE
)f MAS RO
LESOTHO
Lake
Nyasa
Port
Airfield
Soviet access in red
Road
Mozambique
Channel
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Overview
After 11 years of independence, President Machel's
self-proclaimed Marxist regime is struggling to sur-
vive the combined effects of a countrywide insurgen-
cy, faltering economy, and recurrent drought. Machel
enjoys a strong power base in the military and party
and remains the most popular political figure in the
country. Although he has turned to the West for
economic aid, Mozambique remains militarily depen-
dent on the Soviet Bloc. Since 1975 the USSR and its
allies have provided approximately $1 billion in mili-
tary aid to Maputo and currently keep about 800
military advisers and technicians in Mozambique.
war.
Antigovernment guerrillas-the Mozambique Na-
tional Resistance (RENAMO) numbering about
15,000-expanded their activity to all the provinces of
Mozambique in 1984. The insurgents, who describe
themselves as pro-Western, are basically an anti-
Machel movement with an undeveloped program for
reform. Negotiations between the government and the
insurgents broke down in late 1984, and both sides
appear to have opted for a military solution to the
ment mismanagement.
Mozambique's once relatively prosperous economy
now is characterized by almost continuous decline,
with GDP falling by 20 percent in 1985. Government
efforts at collectivization and nationalization from
1975 to 1983 and insurgent attacks on farms and
transport facilities have ruined the once prosperous
agricultural sector and contributed to the economic
decline. Maputo admitted last year that 5 million of
the country's 14 million people were affected by food
shortages caused by drought, insurgency, and govern-
Maputo Port (25?28' S. 32?34' E.~
Beira Port (19?50' S. 34?52' E.
Figure 32
Selected Ports and Airfields in Mozambique
Port
Airport
Soviet access in red
TANZANIA
Road
~-+ Railroad
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Statute Miles
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Nacala Port (14?33' S. 40000' E.~
Three deepwater ports, evenly spaced along Mozam-
bique's 2,970 kilometers of coastline, offer direct
access to the Indian Ocean for the landlocked coun-
tries of southern Africa and for South Africa's indus-
trialized Transvaal Province. The ports are important
to the region's black-ruled states that hope to reduce
transportation dependence on South Africa. The
USSR has naval access to all three seaports. Poor
maintenance and insurgent attacks on connecting
railways and roads have reduced port usage to a small
fraction of capacity.
Description. Maputo is the largest port in Mozam-
bique, with the capacity to unload and clear from
wharves approximately 14,000 metric tons of military
cargo in a 24-hour period (military port capacity). It is
located in a well-protected natural harbor with a
water area of about 21 square kilometers. Approach is
unobstructed through the northern channel, which is
at least 11.4 meters deep, but the southern channel
was closed to most ships as of August 1984.
Maputo's general cargo area is located at the mouth 25X1
of the Estuario do Espirito Santo. As of 1985, the
general and bulk cargo docks included 2,225 meters
of wharf with berths at least 10 meters deep for 12
large oceangoing vessels and one small coastal vessel.
Equipment on the wharf included one coal loader, a
cold storage building, and 29 storage buildings total-
ing more than 70,000 square meters of covered stor-
age. Two more berths reserved for naval ships total
180 meters in length by 6.7 meters in depth and could
accommodate a destroyer escort and minesweeper. A
4,500-ton capacity floating drydock was delivered to
Maputo by the USSR in 1981.
Dockside, cargo-handling equipment consists of 82
electrical cranes, 27 tractors, 158 forklifts, 13 wheel-
loaders, and eight compressors
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have been Soviet officers since early 1982-and two
tugs, all in working order. The port has a modern
container facility with a 200-meter container berth,
two container cranes, and a 1,000-TEU container
storage yard.
Ore and petroleum facilities are located 8 kilometers
upstream at Matola. In 1985, the single ore cargo
berth was 360 meters long by 12 meters deep and had
two ore loaders. Three tanker berths were each 230
meters long by 10 meters deep. One of the berths had
three hoses; equipment at the other is unknown.
Maputo port is connected by narrow-gauge rail lines
and by roads to South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Swazi-
land. Overland travel throughout Mozambique is 25X1
interrupted frequently by equipment breakdowns and
attacks by RENAMO insurgents.
Beira is Mozambique's second-largest city and port. It
had an estimated military port capacity of 7,500
metric tons per day in 1984. Located in the mouth of
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the Rio Pungoe, the port is approached through an 11-
kilometer long channel with an entrance width of 200
meters and a depth of at least 5.7 meters. Silt deposits
are a major problem, and the channel must be
dredged frequently. The outer harbor offers sheltered
anchorages up to 7.6 meters deep over firm holding
ground, while the inner harbor accommodates up to
six small ships at two mooring buoys with depths of at
least 3.4 meters.
Beira port in 1985 contained 1,560 meters of general
cargo berthing, one 166-meter POL bresting wharf,
and two new quays under construction that will offer
another 280 meters of berthing. Containers, ores, and
bulk cargo are handled along the main cargo wharf. A
drydock 115 meters long, 17 meters wide, and 8.5
meters tall accommodated ships up to 5,000 tons
dead-weight.
in early 1985 reported that dock
equipment at Beira also was poorly maintained.
Equipment consisted of 52 portal jib cranes, two
floating cranes, and one mobile crane, although this
equipment reportedly was in poor condition in early
1985. Covered storage is provided by 17 transit sheds
adjacent to the berthing area, with a total of over
31,500 square meters of space. There also is about 31
hectares of open storage. A narrow-gauge railway and
paved roads connect the port to Malawi, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and Botswana
Beira has a small container capability, but not a
modern facility. There are no container cranes. The
only dedicated container storage area is apparently
for empty storage only.
Nacala is Mozambique's third-ranking port and prob-
ably the best natural harbor in east Africa. Small and
compact, it has an estimated military port capacity of
4,000 metric tons per day. The large harbor has
depths varying from 20 to more than 60 meters and
offers good anchorage for ships of any size. The
entrance channel from the north is about 1 kilometer
wide and at least 20 meters deep.
Nacala contains one 633-meter general cargo wharf,
and one newer 352-meter container/Ro-Ro quay. The
modern container facility has the capability to store
and transship roughly 1,000 TEU. The facility is not,
however, equipped with modern container cranes. The
port has a total of 985 meters of berthing length.
Cargo-handling equipment in August 1985 included
20 electric cranes, several smaller mobile cranes,
forklifts, and a 25-ton rail-mounted gantry crane.
Reportedly, at least 20 percent of the cranes are
always out of order: Approximately 18,600 square
meters of covered storage is available adjacent to the
port in eight transit sheds.
Nacala is connected by a narrow-gauge rail line and
paved roads to Malawi, and press accounts say that 90
percent of the container traffic handled at the port is
Malawi's.
Patterns ofAccess. Soviet naval and commercial ships
have called regularly at all three ports since Mozam-
bique and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation in March 1977. Soviet warships
transiting the Cape route around Africa often stop in
Mozambique, as do Cuban troop ships sailing between
Angola and Ethiopia. Soviet arms carriers have deliv-
ered MIG-21 fighters to Nacala, MIG-17s to Beira,
HIND-D helicopters to Maputo, and a wide variety of
other military equipment. Arms destined for other
Soviet clients in southern Africa have been shipped to
Beira, and moved onward by rail. Other frequent
visitors include Soviet fishing vessels that operate in
Mozambican waters and Soviet research ships doing
extensive hydrographic studies of the Mozambique
Channel.
Commercial vessels from the West frequently call in
Mozambique, but naval visits are rare. Military aid
from the West remains limited and rarely involves
arms deliveries
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Activity. Maputo was the busiest port on the East
African coast until Mozambican independence in
1975, when South Africa rerouted its trade to avoid
the new, black-ruled, Marxist state. Although South
Africa has resumed using Maputo, insurgent activity
and continuing port deterioration have reduced port
usage steadily in recent years. Having accommodated
more than 13 million tons of cargo in 1973, Maputo
handled only 6.6 million tons in 1981, 5.6 million tons
in 1982, 4.1 million tons in 1983, and 3.3 million tons
in 1984.
Beira is the terminus of international railways and
roads and of a pipeline carrying petroleum to Mutare,
Zimbabwe. The insurgents have closed the railway to
Malawi, however, and frequently ambush travelers on
Mozambique's roads. Port usage was at least 3 million
tons annually before independence, but dropped to
approximately 1.6 million tons each year from 1981
through 1983. It appears to have diminished to only
600,000 tons of cargo handled during the first six
months of 1984. In early 1985, the port was handling
Ro-Ro ships and about 400 containers every 19 days.
Insurgent activity and gross inefficiency have greatly
reduced port operations and almost closed Nacala's
rail and road links to Malawi and northern Mozam-
bique. The Mozambican press reports that the port
could accommodate 2 million tons of cargo annually,
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but handled only about 780,000 tons each year in
1979 and 1980.
the port was theoretically capable of handling
approximately 300 containers per month, but it had
about 1,500 containers backed up.
Fuel Storage. Estimated storage capacity for refined
products in 1979 was 1.7 million barrels at Maputo
(another 830,000 barrels of crude oil can be stored,
mostly at the refinery) and 1.4 million barrels at
Nacala. A covert raid
at Beira in December 1982 destroyed approximately
half of the oil storage tanks there, reducing storage
capacity to about 730,000 barrels.
Defenses. Soviet warships occasionally call at Mo-
zambique's ports, but no Soviet combat ships are
assigned there. Many of the approximately 800 Sovi-
et, 800 Cuban, and 500 East European military
advisers in Mozambique are stationed near the port
cities.
training base at Nacala.
The Mozambican Navy has about 10 patrol boats and
uses all three ports. Mozambique's Air Force has
about 35 MIG-21 interceptors based at Nacala; a
similar number of MIG-17 fighter-bombers, usually
at Beira; and 15 HIND-D helicopter gunships at
Maputo. SA-3 sites are deployed around the capital
city, and antiaircraft artillery sites are near the
airfield. Newly delivered SA-2 missiles were being
installed north of Maputo in early 1986. Ground
forces garrisoned near the ports include the 6th Tank
Brigade and 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade near
Maputo at Matola and Boane, at least one infantry
battalion and headquarters elements of the 5th Mo-
torized Infantry Brigade in Beira, and an airborne
Mau Air rt (25 ? 55' S. 32 ? 34' E.,
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Nacala Airfield (14129'S. 40043'E.,
Mozambique's primary international airports at
Maputo and Beira, and the regional airfield at
Nacala, are major bases for the Mozambican Air
Force and assembly points for its Soviet-manufac-
tured combat aircraft. Aircraft of any size can land
and take off at Maputo; Beira and Nacala could
accommodate C-141s.
Description. Maputo Airport's primary asphalt run-
way is 3,650 by 60 meters with a 293-meter overrun
on a northeast/southwest axis. The secondary asphalt
runway measures 1,685 by 45 meters and is oriented
east/west. Five aprons provide 67,692 square meters
of parking space. Maputo has only limited cargo 25X1
handling equipment, a known capacity to store 600
barrels of jet fuel although the presence of under-
ground tanks indicates a greater capacity, and a
hydrant and truck fuel dispersal system. Good roads
and a railroad connect the field to the nearby port and
capital city.
This joint military-civilian facility includes a civilian
terminal with one large operations building and con-
trol tower, five hangars, and approximately 20 sup-
port buildings. An adjacent military transport area
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includes one large hangar, one large support building,
an old probable terminal building, and approximately
20 smaller support buildings. The main military area
is surrounded by a double fence and watchtowers, and
includes two hangars, one small ammunition storage
building, two probable barracks, and approximately
25 other administrative and support buildings. Earth
revetments, probably for fighter aircraft, were under
construction in early 1986.
Maputo could accommodate estimated daily sortie
rates of 136 C-130s (delivering 1,770 tons of cargo),
80 C-141s (3,380 tons), or 32 C-5s (2,240 tons).
Beira's Airport has three asphalt runways including
one of 2,400 by 45 meters. The three aprons total
137,305 square meters. The field has standard airline
cargo handling equipment and a few storage sheds,
but the fuel storage capacity and dispensing system
are unknown. A paved road connects the terminal
with the nearby rail junction and port. Beira could
handle an estimated 240 C-130 sorties (3,110 tons of
cargo) or 160 C-141 sorties (6,750 tons) daily.
Nacala's single asphalt runway measures 2,500 by 44
meters. Three asphalt aprons total 44,933 square
meters. The field has limited cargo-handling equip-
ment, an operations building and control tower, three
hangars, and about 70 administrative, housing, and
storage buildings. It has an unknown fuel storage
capacity, and fuel is dispensed by truck. Nacala could
handle an estimated 112 sorties of C-130 aircraft
(1,450 tons of cargo) daily.
Activity. A Soviet Military Assistance Group was
established with its headquarters in Maputo in 1977
or 1978. Soviet advisers
train pilots an supervise aircrait maintenance for the
Mozambican Air Force. Since May 1983, Moscow
has stationed two Soviet military transport AN-12s in
Mozambique on a rotational basis; although they are
based at Maputo, the AN-12s have been seen at
regional airfields throughout the country in support of
the Mozambican Armed Forces.
Nacala Airport is the assembly point and home base
of all of Mozambique's MIG-21 interceptors. Thirty-
seven MIG-21s were seen there in February 1986, but
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airfield is equipped with ground-controlled intercept
radars to support the MIG-21s.
Mozambique's approximately 35 MIG-17 fighter-
bombers are based at Beira Airport. MIG-17s also
have been seen at Maputo and Nacala from time to
time, and they have been reported at other airfields as
well.
Maputo Airport is the primary assembly point and
home base for Mozambique's fleet of Soviet-built
helicopters. HIND MI-25 helicopter gunships were
first observed in Mozambique in October 1983, and
by August 1985 at least 16 had arrived-one was
subsequently shot down by insurgents. Maputo Air-
field sometimes houses at least nine Hip transport
helicopters and six AN-26 fixed-wing transports.
Defenses. The Maputo area is protected by four SA-3
surface-to-air missile sites, SA-2 missile launchers
being installed in April 1986, and air defense artillery,
South African
aircraft bombed and straffed a Maputo suburb in
May 1983 without loss, but a reconnaissance drone
was shot down later.
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Overview
The South African leadership is facing one of its most
serious political and economic challenges since the
ruling National Party came to power in 1948. Black
opposition to apartheid has generated almost daily
rioting and demonstrations throughout the country.
President Botha's efforts to introduce limited and
gradual racial reforms to the political system have
angered more conservative whites and fueled discon-
tent on the part of blacks who want immediate
changes to the system. Declining investor confidence
has triggered a debt crisis, which has been ameliorat-
ed for the moment through an agreement that credi-
tors will roll over most loans through June 1987. C
The primary black opposition group, the outlawed
African National Congress (ANC), generally has been
unable to harness the domestic unrest, but nonetheless
has enjoyed increased international support as a result
of intensive media coverage of the violence. Although
it is the most popular group among South African
blacks, the ANC lacks an effective political and
military structure within South Africa. Most of the
4,000 to 5,000 troops in its military wing are located
in Angola. The states bordering South Africa have
restricted ANC use of their territories out of fear of
South African military retaliation. Periodic raids by
Pretoria against ANC targets in neighboring states
have kept the organization in disarray in recent years.
Indian Ocean Ports
Richard's Bay (28?49' S. 36?06' E.j
Durban (29?53' S. 31000' E.,
East London (33102' S. 27155' E.,
Port Elizabeth (33?57' S. 25?38' E.
South Africa's well-run and highly specialized Indian
Ocean ports serve the mineral and agricultural areas
of the interior plateau. Richard's Bay, newly devel-
oped to handle expanding exports of coal and to
Figure 39
Selected Ports and Airfields in South Africa
Port
Airport
Road
--* Railroad
0 200 Kilometers
T
0 200 Statute Miles
relieve congestion at Durban, handles more tonnage
than any other port in Africa. Durban is the largest
port in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the most important
in South Africa in terms of value of exports and
imports. East London is the major terminus of the
southern railway handling traffic for Zaire, Zimba-
bwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. Port Elizabeth
handles the agricultural exports of South Africa's
Cape and Orange Free State Provinces. Ship repair at
Durban and replenishment at the other ports would
benefit commercial ships and naval forces operating
in the southern Indian Ocean and along the Cape of 25X1
Good Hope passage around Africa.
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Description. The four largest ports between the Mo-
zambican border and Cape Town are efficiently man-
aged and well equipped but, except for Richard's Bay,
they are shallow by world standards. All four ports
accommodate container and roll-on/roll-off ships and
tankers. Richard's Bay and Durban are equipped for
the import of crude oil, and a major pipeline leads
inland from Durban. The largest grain ships that can
use Durban, East London, or Port Elizabeth, however,
are 30,000 tons in capacity, whereas 50,000-ton ves-
sels are commonplace in the United States.
Northernmost of the four, Richard's Bay has the
capacity to handle an estimated 6,765 metric tons of
general cargo in a 20-hour workday. It is an improved
natural harbor and has an anchorage for vessels of all
sizes 4 to 8 kilometers outside the port. The breakwa-
ter-protected water area of 538 hectares has depths
from 4 to 19.5 meters. The entrance channel is 300
meters wide by 19 meters deep. The port can accom-
modate ore ships up to 250,000 tons deadweight,
according to one press account in early 1985.
The port facility consists of one 538-meter dry bulk
cargo quay, one 159-meter general cargo quay, one
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806-meter coal transshipment quay, and one 160-
meter POL berthing wharf. Cargo-handling equip-
ment includes eight 4-ton mobile cranes, three gantry-
type traveling conveyor coal loaders, two bulk cargo
loaders, and one container crane. The harbor has
three tugboats. Three single-track rail lines (all 1.067-
meter gauge in South Africa) and two paved roads
connect the port with the national rail and road
networks.
harbor with good holding ground of fine sand. The
entrance channel is 1,500 meters long by 185 meters
wide and at least 12.8 meters deep.
Durban port has 1,950 meters of container shipping
berths, 1,590 meters of dry bulk cargo berthing, 7,400
meters of general cargo berthing, a 433-meter POL
transfer quay, and seven POL bresting wharfs. The
port can accommodate the largest general cargo,
container, or roll-on/roll-off vessel now in existence.
Located about 160 kilometers south of Richard's Bay
is the port of Durban. It is capable of handling an
estimated 54,700 tons of general cargo per day, or
84,200 tons of combined general and containerized
cargoes. Durban is an improved natural harbor with
unlimited anchorage for vessels of all sizes outside the
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Three private shipbuilding and repair firms at Durban
share a drydock (80,000 deadweight-ton capacity), a
floating dock (lifting capacity of 3,629 tons), and a
shipbuilding way (maximum size ship 30,000 tons).
The small naval base within the port has a 2,000-ton-
capacity synchrolift. The 12,000- to 16,000-ton vessel
under construction at Durban-South Africa's first
indigenously designed and produced replenishment
ship due to be completed about mid-1986-indicates
the port's growing shipbuilding capabilities. Durban
shipyard may produce surface combatants of corvette
size within a decade, and possibly submarines by the
end of the century.
Durban is the most versatile and best equipped of the
four ports. It has 153 portal jib cranes varying from 4
to 15 tons in capacity, one heavy-lift crane (80 tons
capacity), three floating cranes (25, 60, and 200 tons),
eight container cranes (40 tons), 13 mobile cranes (6 to
35 tons), and numerous straddle carrier container
cranes. The port has more than 300 forklift trucks
(3- to 25-ton capacities) and specialized loaders for
grain, sugar, alumina, soda ash, molasses, coal, and
ores. Harbor craft include nine tugboats. Within the
port are at least 94,000 square meters of covered
storage in 16 large transit sheds and open stacking
space for more than 30,000 TEU of containers.
Every wharf at Durban is cleared by at least one
hard-surfaced multilane highway, and virtually all
wharves are served by rail. Connections are to the
nearby city of Durban, thence on to the nationwide
road and rail networks. Louis Botha Airfield, which
can take aircraft up to C-141 in size, is 13 kilometers
south of the port.
Approximately 380 kilometers southeast of Durban is
the port of East London, which can handle an estimat-
ed 11,800 metric tons of general cargo per day. Port
facilities stretch 1.6 kilometers along both banks of
the Buffalo River estuary. The roadstead northeast of
the harbor entrance provides poorly protected but
extensive anchorage for ships of all sizes in depths of 6
to 27 meters over good holding ground of sand. The
entrance channel is 183 meters wide and dredged to a
depth of 10.6 meters.
The port has six berths at least 8.5 meters deep for
very large oceangoing ships with general cargo, and
nine other berths usable by smaller oceangoing ves-
sels. There are two berths equipped with pipelines, one
of which can accommodate a large ocean tanker.
Shore equipment includes 31 cranes, ranging in ca-
pacity from 4 to 20 tons, and about 60 forklifts. There
are over 14,000 square meters of covered storage for
general cargo, one grain elevator, and 3.5 hectares of
open stacking space, including one container storage
lot. Repair facilities include a graving dock 198.5
meters long and one floating drydock. Harbor craft
include five tugboats. One rail line-only single track
at one point-and three multilane hard-surfaced
roads connect the port with the national rail and road
systems.
About 240 kilometers southwest of East London is
Port Elizabeth, an artificial, breakwater-protected
port on Algoa Bay. Port Elizabeth could handle about
15,690 metric tons of general cargo per day. The bay
offers extensive protected anchorage in depths of 9 to
18 meters over good holding ground of mud, clay, and
shells. The entrance channel is 380 meters wide and
12.2 meters deep.
The port has three quays and a total of 865 meters of
berth space for general cargo and containers, one 198-
meter Ro-Ro/bulk cargo quay, one 18-meter-wide
Ro-Ro ramp, and one 120-meter POL berthing wharf.
Total commercial berthing space is 1,190 meters.
There are 41 portal jib cranes, three container cranes,
four mobile cranes, two ore leaders, and numerous
container straddle carriers. Harbor craft include three
tugs and one coastal lighter. The port had 9,200
square meters of covered storage in six transit sheds
adjacent to the berths. Open stacking space for about
10,700 TEU of containers is present. Two single-track
rail lines and three paved roads clear the port.
Activity. Following dramatic harbor development pro-
jects of the 1970s-including construction of new
ports at Richard's Bay and Saldanha, and the conver-
sion of existing harbors to handle containerized car-
go-the world recession of the early 1980s has cur-
tailed most port expansion in South Africa.
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Nonetheless, Richard's Bay has a water area more
than three times the size of Durban and could eventu-
ally become South Africa's major port. Pretoria is
proceeding to double-track a portion of the railway
and add three ship berths at Richard's Bay by
December 1986, however, which will enable that port
to export 44 million tons-of coal annually. The entire
rail line to the port is to be double-tracked in the
1990s to expand capacity at Richard's Bay to 80
million tons of coal exports each year.
Durban is the country's busiest harbor-handling 25
percent of South Africa's seaborne cargo and more
than half its container traffic as of mid-1983, accord-
ing'hto official statistics-but is underutilized. Durban,
which exports some ores but mostly lighter cargos,
had an estimated cargo-handling capability of 35
million tons annually in mid-1984,.which was more
than 50 percent of the potential of all South African
ports combined. It handled almost 450,000 containers
in fiscal year 1985, and container traffic had in-
creased at about 15 percent annually over recent
years. Exports included coal; manganese, iron, and
chromium ores; general cargo; sugar; fruits; and
grain. Imported goods included containerized and
general cargo, petroleum products, timber, motor
vehicles, and other manufactured items.
With the shift to containerized cargoes, Port Eliza-
beth has ceased to be primarily an import port for the
eastern Cape and Witwatersrand (in Transvaal Prov-
ince) areas, as well as an important entry point for
Zimbabwe. It now is predominantly an export port,
handling manganese ore, asbestos, wool, and motor
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East London is chiefly an export port for maize. It
also handles substantial copper from Zambia and
Zaire.
Fuel Storage. Durban had a storage capacity of 10.6
million barrels of crude oil in 35 tanks and 17.7
million barrels of refined products in 552 tanks in
May 1984,
Activity at the four Indian Ocean ports in 1982 is
shown in the following tabulation:
Cargo Handled Ships Calling
(thousand (oceangoing
metric tons) vessels)
Defenses. South African defenses are strongest at
Durban, where the Navy's flotilla of eight missile
boats is based. The boats are Israeli Reshefs produced
under license in South Africa, each carrying a normal
load of six Skorpion (Israeli Gabriel II antiship
missiles, Five of
the boats were operational and three were in storage
as of mid-1985.
Each of the ports is protected by a harbor protection
unit of South African marines. Each unit normally
has two Namacurra patrol boats.
he as-
sessed the unit's strength at about 65 marines. The
marines are focused on the harbor and any threat
from the sea, while South African railways and
harbor police control access to the port from land.
Cape Town, Table Bay (33054' S. 18026' E.,
Simonstown Naval Base (34? 11' S. 18126' E.,
Cape Town, located on the Atlantic coast about 55
kilometers north of the Cape of Good Hope, is an
important port and railroad terminal for passengers,
general cargo, and perishable exports. More ships call
there each year than at any other port in South Africa
except Durban. Located nearby is Simonstown, the
major operating and repair base of the South African
Navy and the best-equipped naval base in southern
Africa. Its use by US naval forces operating in the
region would reduce the need for costly and time-
consuming transits to the United States for ship
repairs and services.
Description. Cape Town was capable of handling an
estimated 33,400 metric tons of general cargo daily in
1976, and new facilities for container traffic have
been added since then. Cape Town has an improved,
natural harbor with seven breakwater-protected ba-
sins and a small ancillary harbor. Outside the harbor,
Table Bay provides extensive anchorage for vessels of
all sizes at depths of 11.5 to 36.5 meters over good
holding ground of mud and rock. The entrances to the
three major basins are all at least 11.5 meters deep,
and the harbor has a total water area of about 280
hectares.
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The port contains, 2,650 meters of general cargo
berthing, 1,380 meters of dedicated container ship-
ping berths, two 172-meter POL berthing wharfs, one 25X1
383-meter bunkering wharf, and one 260-meter off-
shore bunkering wharf.
tugs, and three pilot boats.
According to published data, equipment at the gener-
al cargo wharves in 1985 included the following
functional electric cranes: six 15 tons, one-hundred-
eighteen 4 tons, and four 3 tons. There was one 15- to
35-ton mobile crane and two floating cranes of 200
and 60 tons capacity. The port had over 200 forklifts,
two 25-ton side loaders, and 20 shunting tractors.
Harbor craft were five ocean going tugs, three pilot
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n
Cape Town port had 50,700 square meters of covered
cargo storage in sheds. The container stacking area
has a capacity of at least 2,600 TEU and is equipped
with five 35-ton cranes. The port is cleared by four
hard-surfaced roads linking to the national road sys-
tem, and by two electrified rail lines. The double-
track line connects with the national rail system, and
the single-track line extends 35 kilometers to Simons-
Sturrock graving dock, located within the port, is the
largest in Africa. It is 379 meters in length and can be
divided to accommodate two vessels. The other grav-
ing dock has a length of 161.2 meters. There is a
synchrolift with a capacity of 1,750 tons and four
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town.
marine railways for repair of small craft.
r
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Simonstown is administered by the South African
Navy and has little commercial potential. Between
5,000 and 6,000 tons of general cargo could be
unloaded there daily.
Simons Bay provides sheltered anchorage for vessels
of all sizes in depths of 12 to 21 meters over good
holding ground of mud and sand. The entrance to
Simonstown's two well-protected, artificial inner har-
bors is 91' meters'wide and at least 11.5 meters deep.
The inner harbor, with a water area of about 11
hectares, has a large graving dock and is used primar-
ily for ship repairs. The submarine harbor, with a
water area of about 3 hectares, is the repair and
operating base for South Africa's fleet of three diesel
submarines.
Secret
Simonstown port facility contains the most extensive
and modern warship repair facilities of any shipyard
from the Cape of Good Hope to Singapore. The
largest vessel that Simonstown could accommodate
would occupy an anchorage berth 14 meters deep and
323 meters long, or an alongside berth 8.9 meters
deep of unrestricted length. Total berthing space for
Simonstown Naval Base is 4,474 meters.
Wharf equipment includes nine cranes, three of which
are 50 tons in capacity. Harbor craft comprise three
tugs and three launches. The base has about 5,600
square meters of covered storage for general cargo,
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E
P.
U
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One paved road and one
double-tracked rail line clear the port and. connect
with the national system. A second road terminates at
the Cape of Good Hope.
Simonstown shipyard provides major repairs to naval
vessels and is capable of building tugs and small
vessels. The graving dock is 237 meters long. The
syncrolift has a lifting capacity of 2,500 tons and is
able to handle ships up to 60 meters in length. There
also are three small marine railways adjacent to the
shipyard.
that the facility could handle the ollow-
ing vessels for refit simultaneously: one frigate, one
submarine, one missile boat, two mine countermea-
sures ships, and three smaller vessels.
Activity. Cape Town handled 5,500 tons of cargo,
1,432 ships, and 167,000 containers in 1982. Among
South Africa's major ports, only East London and
Mosselbaai handled less cargo by weight, but only
Durban accommodated more ships and containers.
The port handles most of South Africa's fruit and
other perishable exports, and a new refrigerated hold-
ing store for 500 containers opened in early 1983.
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Fuel Storage. Cape Town had 92 petroleum tanks The international airports at Johannesburg, Cape
with approximately 2.7 million barrels of storage Town, and Durban are capable of handling aircraft of
capacity in 1976. Simonstown at that time could store any size. They serve South Africa's three largest cities
about 170,000 barrels of fuel oil, diesel fuel, and and economically most active areas, and are linked to
gasoline. the national road and rail systems. The United States
probably would require some use of the airports at
Cape Town and Johannesburg should it be required to
transport and sustain a UN peacekeeping force super-
vising a transition to independence in Namibia.
Jan Smuts Air annesburg (26?08' S. 28? 14' 25X1
E. Description. Jan Smuts Airport is located 15 kilome- 25X1
ters northeast of Johannesburg, South Africa's largest
D. F. Malan Airport, Cape Town (33'58' S. 18036' city, and about 30 kilometers south of Pretoria, the
Louis Botha, Durban (29?58' S. 30?57' E.,
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capital. It has three asphalt runways approximately
61.meters wide and of varying lengths: 4,398, 3,382,
and 2,798 meters. The South African press has
reported that a new runway put into operation in
August 1984 has doubled the airport's capacity from
40 to 80 flights per hour. There are at least six
concrete parking aprons, the largest measuring 818 by
362 meters. The field has a control tower, terminal
building, and numerous hangars and support build-
ings. The usual commercial cargo-handling equip-
ment is available. Connections to major highways and
rail lines are nearby.
The airport could handle an estimated 240 sorties of
C-5 aircraft per day, which could deliver about
16,770 tons of cargo. Alternatively, it could accom-
modate an equal number of sorties of C-141 aircraft
(delivering 10,120 tons of cargo) or C-130 aircraft
(3,110 tons).
D. F. Malan Airport is 11 kilometers east of Cape
Town, South Africa's second-largest city and a major
road and rail terminal in the south. It is a joint
civilian and military airfield with two asphalt run-
ways: 3,187 by 58 meters, and 1,700 by 46 meters.
There are numerous taxiways and crossovers. The
main support area with the control tower and civilian
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terminal includes 12 hangars and at least 37 mainte-
nance and support buildings. The smaller military
support facility includes an administration building,
four large hangars, and at least seven support build-
ings associated with navigational aids and airfield
radars. An ammunition storage area contains three
revetted storage bunkers, one revetted checkout and
storage bunker, two revetted holding areas, and three
support buildings
The airfield could accommodate about 56 daily sorties
by C-5 aircraft delivering approximately 3,910 tons of
cargo. It could handle about 160 sorties of C-141
aircraft (6,750 tons daily) or 240 C-130 sorties (3,110
tons of cargo).
Louis Botha Airport is 11 kilometers southwest of
Durban, South Africa's primary port and third-
largest city. It has a 2,425- by 60-meter runway.
There are five parking aprons and several taxiways
and crossovers. The field is equipped with a control
tower and terminal, three hangars, one maintenance
building, and 14 support buildings. There is a good
highway to Durban, and a rail line just west of the
field.
Louis Botha could handle about 104 C-5 sorties daily,
delivering 7,260 tons of cargo. It could accommodate
232 C-141 aircraft in a day (delivering 9,790 tons of
cargo) or about 240 C-130 sorties (3,110 tons).
Fuel Storage. All fields have commercial jet fuel
available and dispensed by a hydrant system and
refueling trucks. Fuel storage capacity at D. F. Malan
is an estimated 1,350 barrels, that at Louis Botha is
approximately 1,540 barrels, and that of Jan Smuts is
20,250 barrels. The fuel storage capacity of all three
airfields is probably much greater but cannot be
determined because the tanks are underground. Sub-
stantial storage capacity is available in the industrial
and port areas near all three airports.
Activity. Most international flights to South Africa
terminate at one of these three airports, all of which
offer good connections to local flights, roads, railways,
and ports.
Defenses. The South African Air Force maintains
operational bases near all three airfields, although its
Mirage interceptors normally are based at two Air
Force bases near Jan Smuts Airport. They could be
deployed quickly to protect the other fields. South
Africa)
has moderate numbers of low- and medi-
um-altitude SAMs and antiaircraft artillery. Substan-
tial ground forces are available to secure all three
airports quickly against a threatened seizure. Pretoria
probably would have strategic warning of any major
attack on South Africa, and the Air Force is steadily
expanding its tactical early warning radar coverage in
the region.
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Overview
South Africa first occupied then German South-West
Africa (Namibia) in 1915 as a British ally in World
War I. In 1920 the region was given to the South
Africans as a mandate by the League of Nations.
Since that time, Pretoria has continued to govern the
area in "the spirit" of that mandate despite United
Nations insistence on immediate elections and Na-
mibian independence.
South Africa insists that any future government in
Windhoek must be to its liking. As a result, an
interim government formed by the Multi-Party Con-
ference (MPC), a South African-backed coalition of
political parties, took office in Windhoek in June
1985.
According to the US Embassy, the South African
Administrator General in Windhoek retains veto pow-
er over the government's actions, and Pretoria con-
trols Namibia's defense, security, and foreign affairs.
The South Africans, however, are attempting to en-
hance the interim government's legitimacy by giving
it opportunties to dispense patronage as well as con-
trol of the country's railroads and the port of Lude-
ritz. In addition,
hat South rica s counterinsurgency police
force has been absorbed into the local police force.
Figure 49
Selected Port and Airfields for Namibia
roottontem
Swakopmundl
Walvis Bay
SOUTH
AFRICA
Luderitz
South
Atlantic
Ocean
? Port
O Airfield
J. G.
Strijdam
SOUTH
Oran9e A F R I C A
Road
- Railroad
0 200 Kilometers
Tl
0 200 Statute Miles
increasing Soviet Bloc influence over the past decade
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No foreign nation has recognized the MPC govern- and receives large amounts of arms, money, and
ment. The international community supports UN training, although the exact amounts are not known.
Resolution 435, which calls for immediate elections in Soviet influence can be seen in SWAPO rhetoric,
Namibia and declares null and void all unilateral which increasingly emphasizes socialist goals
internal measures aimed at giving the country inde-
pendence. The UN recognizes the South-West Africa Walvis Bay (Walvisbaai)' (22?57' S. 14?29' E.,
People's Organization (SWAPO)-which probably
has the support of 50 percent of the population-as
the sole legitimate spokesman for the Namibian peo-
ple.
SWAPO refuses to participate in the interim govern-
ment and plans to intensify its 20-year-old guerrilla
struggle against the new authorities in Windhoek and
their South African backers. We believe, on the basis
of a variety of sources, that SWAPO has come under
Walvis Bay-a self-arrogated South African exclave
in Namibia-is the only deepwater port along the
3,000-kilometer coastline of southwestern Africa be- 25X1
tween Luanda and Cape Town. It is linked to central
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Nambia and South Africa by rail, road, and air, and
to Angola and Botswana by roads. The port offers the
most economical means for the United States to meet
its obligation to deliver and maintain a projected
7,500-man UN monitoring force that would be re-
quired in the event that a UN plan is implemented for
a transition to independence in Namibia.
Description. The anchorage is 5.5 to 14 meters deep
over good holding ground sheltered by a 9-kilometer-
long natural sand breakwater. Ships enter the port
through a channel that is 3,500 meters long, 135
meters wide, and over 10 meters deep.
The wharf has an alongside depth of 10 meters and an
easily dredged sandy bottom. The port has 1,375
meters of commercial berthing for general cargo,
container, and Ro/Ro vessels. The wharf is equipped
with 20 portal jib cranes with a lifting power of
between 3 and 15 tons, plus two overhead gantry
cranes of 25-ton capacity used to stack containers. A
synchrolift capable of lifting a 2,000-ton vessel is used
almost exclusively for repair and servicing of the
fishing fleet. The synchrolift is connected to a rail
network on shore, which allows eight to 10 vessels to
be under repair in the shipyard simultaneously. Just
offshore is a 235-meter tanker quay, 10 meters deep
alongside.
Walvis Bay is capable of unloading and transporting
inland an estimated 10,700 tons of break bulk and
container cargo daily. If the cargo is all break bulk,
the port's capacity is only 5,600 tons per day. Avail-
able storage capacity is 38,215 tons, and clearance
capacity is 46,750 tons per day by road and rail.
Storage adjacent to the quays consists of 4,200 square
meters under cover in three transit sheds and open
storage. The container storage area has a capacity of
about 575 TEU, with an additional 100 TEU in open
lot.
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Connections to Namibia and South Africa include a
single-track, 1.067-meter railway, a two-lane all-
weather highway, and a civil/military airport that can
accommodate jet aircraft up to C-141 in size. Roads
to Angola are tarmac and generally good. The runway
at nearby Rooikop Airfield is asphalt and measures
2,133 by 45 meters.
Namibia's only other port-400 kilometers to the
south at Luderitz-is too shallow for oceangoing
ships. The draft is only 6 meters deep alongside the
150-meter wharf-and the rocky bottom would be
difficult to dredge-so ocean vessels must unload via
lighters. Luderitz supports a fishing fleet and two
crayfish firms. It has limited cargo-handling equip-
ment and storage facilities, lacks a heavy-duty rail
link, and is located far to the south of Namibia's
population and economic centers.
Contingencies. The United States has agreed to
transport and supply UN monitoring forces that
would be required to oversee any transition to Namib-
ian independence under UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 435. The use of Walvis Bay would be essential to
do so economically, and the task probably would still
require supplemental use of other ports and airfields
in Namibia and South Africa.
Walvis Bay's location on Namibia's central coast-
with no comparable facilities for about 1,500 kilome-
ters to the north or south-makes it a valuable site for
a naval base. The port could support vessels patrolling
the Cape route along which petroleum from the
Persian Gulf and strategic minerals from southern
Africa are carried to the United States and Western
Europe. The route would be vital if the Suez Canal
were closed. A naval base at Walvis Bay also could be
useful to counter Soviet naval and naval air reconnais-
sance forces operating from Angola.
Activity. Walvis Bay handles about 40 percent of
Namibia's foreign trade-97 percent of its sea traf-
fic-including nearly all base mineral exports and
most imports of fuel oil and manufactured goods,
according to academic sources and the South African
press. A recent press article said that about 1,000
ships dock there each year, and the port annually
handles about 800,000 tons of cargo, including some
17,000 containers. The port is operated by the South
African Transport Service, a governmental agency,
and was operating at 20 percent of capacity in March
1983. If the port were reserved entirely for military
use, emergency food and oil supplies for the civilian
populace could be landed at Luderitz and the small,
heavily silted harbor at Swakopmund, 30 kilometers
north of Walvis Bay.
Walvis Bay supported a thriving fishing industry until
the late 1970s, when the pilchard fish virtually disap-
peared. The seven canneries closed at that time and
about half of the labor force departed, but by March
1983 three of the fish-processing factories had re-
opened and a large fishing fleet was again home-
ported at Walvis Bay.
Were it necessary to expand port capacity and opera-
tions rapidly, ample unskilled workers are available
locally-including former dockworkers in the segre-
gated townships of Narraville (for blacks) and Kuiseb-
mond (for mixed-race Coloreds)-but obtaining the
necessary skilled personnel probably would require
bringing in whites from South Africa. The port has
been undergoing renovation and modernization in
recent years.
Fuel Storage. The harbor can store 1.25 million
barrels of refined fuels in 52 tanks
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Defenses. The harbor is protected by the South
African 131st Marine Protection Unit MPU which 25X1
has three Namacurra patrol boats. Th 25X1
include divers trained in explosive ordnance disposal. 25X1
The 2nd South African Infantr Battalion Group-a
unit of approximatel with some armored 25X1
cars and artillery-also is based in the enclave in the
town of Walvis Bay and 19 kilometers to the east at
Rooikop. Landward access to the harbor is controlled
by a police checkpoint at the gate. No sabotage has
been reported at the port, but SWAPO guerrillas have
blown up sections of the rail lines between Walvis Bay
and Swakopmund, as well as north of Windhoek.
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The South African Navy operates radar and surveil- The two largest airfields in Namibia serve the capital
lance equipment and maintains a 24-hour communi- city of Windhoek and the major logistics base at
cations watch at Walvis Bay Grootfontein. These airfields ensure that South Afri-
reinforcements could arrive by air or sea from South
Africa. Pretoria's forces include three diesel attack
submarines and eight missile boats, and its most
capable interceptor is the Mirage III.
J. G. Strijdom Airfield (22029' S. 17'28' E.,
Grootfontein Airfield (19136' S. 18008' E.,
ca can reinforce and supply its forces in northern
Namibia rapidly to counter any likely threat to the
territory. UN forces supervising a transition to inde-
pendence in Namibia probably would use both air-
fields, as well as many of the secondary airstrips in
the north.
Description. J. G. Strijdom Airfield can accommo-
date aircraft of any size. Its two asphalt runways
measure 4,729 by 46 meters and 1,526 by 31 meters,
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The single con-
crete and asphalt apron has an area of 96,000 square
meters. The field is equipped with a control tower and
VOR, VHF/DF, and NDB navigational aids. It is
connected to the capital, approximately 40 kilometers
to the west, by a two-lane bituminous highway and a
single-track, narrow-gauge railway.
Strijdom Airfield could accommodate approximately
40 sorties of C-5 aircraft delivering 2,795 tons of
cargo each day. Alternatively, it could accept about
80 sorties of C-141 aircraft (3,375 tons per day) or 176
sorties of C-130 aircraft (2,285 tons per day). Light
aircraft up to C-47 also could land at nearby Eros 25X1
Field, just outside of Windhoek. 25X1
Grootfontein Airfield can handle aircraft up to the
C-141 in size. It has two asphalt runways: the first is
3,560 by 45 meters and the second is 1,200 by 30
meters. Five concrete and asphalt parking aprons have
a total area of 137,000 square meters. The field has a
control tower and separate civilian and military termi-
nals. It is connected to the nearby military base and to
Namibia's road and rail network by a two-lane bitu-
minous highway and a single-track rail spur.
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Grootfontein Airfield could accommodate approxi-
mately 88 sorties of C-141 aircraft delivering 3,710
tons of cargo each day. It could handle 240 sorties of
C-130 aircraft and 3,115 tons of cargo daily.
Fuel Storage. J. G. Strijdom Airfield can store an
estimated 6,900 barrels of A-1 jet fuel, which is
dispensed by a hydrant and truck system. The esti-
mated fuel storage at Grootfontein Airfield is 63,800
barrels; the dispensing system is hydrant and truck.
Activity. Both military and civil flights from South
Africa land at Strijdom and Grootfontein Airfields.
The rail line from South Africa passes through Wind-
hoek to terminate at Grootfontein, so most heavy
cargoes arrive by rail. Troops destined for the border,
however, have been observed
arriving at Grootfontein by air from South Africa.
The logistics command at Grootfontein distributes
men and supplies by truck to the military units
throughout the northern border region.
Defense. South Africa provides all air defenses in
Namibia. South Africa's best interceptor-the Mi-
rage III, armed with air-to-air missiles-is not nor-
mally based in the territory but can be deployed there
quickly. Pretoria also has older Mirages and indige-
nously built Impala fighter-bombers.
Ground forces in proximity to J. G. Strijdom and
Grootfontein Airfields include an understrength bri-
gade of territorial reservists headquartered in Wind-
hoek and South African and territorial units assigned
to the major logistics base at Grootfontein. Sufficient
combat forces to secure both airfields could deploy
quickly from the northern border area or South
Africa itself.
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Overview
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has ruled Angola
since September 1979, following the death of Agos-
tino Neto, the founder of the ruling Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Dos
Santos, who lacks the charisma and reputation of
Neto, faces heightened antagonisms between the
country's blacks and mulattoes, worsening economic
difficulties, and social unrest, in addition to South
African incursions and an expanding civil war.
Despite the country's problems, dos Santos not only
has retained power but also has significantly expand-
ed his control over the MPLA through skillful politi-
cal maneuvering and balancing of factions in the
leadership. We believe that his Marxist regime re-
mains firmly tied to the Soviets and Cubans, although
Angola has attempted to adapt the structure of his
national Communist regime to local conditions
Angola's civil war has dragged on for over 10 years
with no end in sight. The belief of the ruling party
that it would be able-with Soviet and Cuban back-
ing-to defeat the guerrillas of the National Union
for Total Independence of Angola led by Jonas Sa-
vimbi has been shaken by the insurgents' continued
success. The dos Santos regime controls the urban
centers but has been unable to subdue UNITA in the
countryside. In our opinion, the insurgents still appear
to have the momentum and are increasingly capable
of urban attacks. They cannot, however, dislodge the
MPLA from the cities or force dos Santos to the
Figure 53
Selected Ports and Airfields in Angola
Port Road R Diamonds
Airfield Railroad 00 Petroleum
Soviet access in red
Government forces Military Region
UNITA-held area
Selected province boundary
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Statute Miles
negotiating table.
Since 1976, we estimate that the USSR has delivered
over $2.6 billion in arms to Luanda, making Angola
the sixth-largest recipient of Soviet weapons in the
world. Moscow sharply increased military sales to
Angola in recent years, following stepped-up UNITA
operations and South African incursions into southern
Angola. There are now some 1,200 Soviet and 500
East European military advisers in Angola. In addi-
tion, there are some 36,000 Cuban troops and military
advisers as well as an additional 6,000 Cuban civilian
currency earned from its petroleum industry. Al-
though there is some dissatisfaction in both the
military and party leadership about Angola's strong
ties to its Communist allies, we believe most govern-
ment officials recognize that the MPLA would col-
lapse without Moscow's and Havana's support.
Namibe (Mocamedes) Port (1511 V S. 12108' E.,
advisers and technicans.
Angola pays for most of this assistance in hard
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Luanda Port (08147' S. 13014' E.
Angola's deepwater port at Namibe is located on the
southern coast of Angola, 340 kilometers southwest of
Lobito. Located at the edge of the desert on the
southeastern shore of a large shell-shaped bay, it was,
prior to independence, Angola's leading facility for
iron ore exports from the now closed Cassinga mine.
Today, seaborne deliveries of Soviet weapons and
military equipment arrive at Namibe to supply Ango-
lan and Cuban forces stationed in southern Angola
near the insurgent-dominated southeast and the bor-
der with South African-occupied Namibia.
Luanda's deepwater harbor, located 290 kilometers
south of the Congo River delta, is Angola's major port
of entry and principal naval base. A 10-year insurgen-
cy has disrupted the transportation network and has
isolated the harbor and capital city from much of the
Angolan interior. Nonetheless, the congested port
handles most Angolan foreign trade, deliveries of
Soviet military equipment, and support of Cuban and
Angolan combat forces.
Description. Namibe is a natural coastal harbor.
Much of Baia de Namibe (Namibe Bay) is too deep
for anchorage, but the shallower southeastern sector
has good holding ground of mud. The bay is easily
approached from the north, although there are no
warning lights on the Baixo Amelia sandbank to the
south.
General cargo facilities are located at Namibe port;
and ore, petroleum, and fishing facilities are 7.2
kilometers to the north at Porto Saco. General break-
bulk cargo is handled at a 917-meter quay with
depths alongside of 6 to 10 meters. The ore facility at
Porto Saco is 325 meters long with 19-meter-deep
berths alongside. Namibe has eight portal jib cranes
and Porto Saco has a 3,500 ton-per-hour ore loader
and three POL pipelines. Two transit sheds provide
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approximately 6,700 square meters of covered storage
adjacent to the quay, while two other storage sheds
add another 3,300 square meters. There also are two
large cold storage buildings and 15 hectares of open
space for vehicle parking and bulk cargo offloading.
Two all-weather roads connect the port with Tombua
94 kilometers to the south, and Kuvango, 722 kilome-
ters to the east. A narrow-gauge rail line runs 756
kilometers east to Menongue. Two airfields near
Namibe can handle aircraft up to AN-26 or C-130 in
size.
Luanda's port and naval base are located within a
tidal harbor, naturally sheltered by a long narrow
sandspit. The approach to the harbor is unobstructed
with a fairway width of 2.7 kilometers and a mini-
mum depth of 27.5 meters. Anchorage is well protect-
ed and 22 to 30 meters deep over good holding ground
of mud and sand.
The commercial cargo area offers 2,150 meters of
berthing alongside one mole and two quays. An
offshore POL terminal has two sets of mooring buoys
and a specialized cement pier. Eighteen transit sheds
provide 57,000 square meters of covered storage
adjacent to the berths with an additional 7 hectares of
open storage area.
The port accommodates container traffic and Ro/Ro
vessels, but equipment shortages hamper efficient
operation. Although the quay has 40 cranes with
capacities of 3 to 10 tons, several lighter mobile
cranes, and 76 forklifts, much of the equipment has
deteriorated beyond repair. A new container terminal
and warehouse were still under construction in early
1986.
Overland routes from the port include two all-weather
roads southeast to Dondo and northeast to Caxito and
a narrow-gauge rail line east to Malanje. Nearby
Luanda Airfield is a modern commercial and military
facility accommodating jet aircraft of any size
Patterns of Access. Since the closure of the Cassinga
iron mine and decline of the fishing industry in the
mid-1970s, Namibe's strategic importance has been
as a gateway to the southwestern provinces of Huila
and Cunene, a region housing large government forces
and subject to increasing insurgent attacks. The port
is connected by rail and road with Lubango, where
there is a major Angolan airbase and garrisons for
Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO insurgent forces.
SWAPO bases in southwestern Angola have been the
targets of South African incursions, while Angolan
forces have engaged UNITA guerrillas operating in
the area. The railway segment from Namibe to
Lubango provides a vital conduit for military supplies
and equipment destined for Angolan and Cuban
troops in the south.
Most Soviet military aid arrives at Luanda harbor,
some of which is then transshipped to ports farther
south. The former Portuguese naval base adjacent to
the harbor is the primary naval installation used by
the Soviet West African naval forces. At least one
Soviet naval vessel, usually a guided-missile destroyer,
a landing ship, or a minesweeper, has been stationed
at Luanda since 1982, and a repair ship is often
moored there as well. Major combatants, which are
not part of the West African naval patrol, regularly
visit Luanda. These have included nuclear-powered
attack submarines, a guided-missile cruiser, and a
Kiev-class aircraft carrier.
Activities. A major port since the 16th century,
Luanda harbor's importance to the Angolan Govern-
ment has increased with civil unrest and economic
deterioration caused by a decade of insurgent warfare.
UNITA has attacked economic targets throughout
the country, and insurgents or South African com-
mandos severely damaged Angola's only petroleum
refinery at Luanda in late 1981. In early 1984, they
sank two ships in Luanda harbor. Moreover, the
Angolan economy has not recovered from the loss at
independence of the skilled Portuguese labor force.
Food imports by sea are essential to support Luanda's
approximately 1.2 million population, which has near-
ly tripled since 1970. The port is less critical to the
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petroleum industry-because operations are mostly
offshore at Angola's exclave of Cabinda 380 kilome-
ters to the north-or to the diamond industry, which
exports mostly by air. Exports of cement and textiles,
however, depend upon the port.
Defenses. The Angolan Navy makes limited use of
Namibe, although there is no permanent naval base
there. The Soviets have installed coastal surveillance
radars, and the port is defended by two SA-3 missile
sites, part of the air defense system along the
Namibe-Menongue rail line.
At Luanda, Angola maintains a naval force of about
40 patrol boats and landing craft, and about 1,500 to
2,000 troops. The force includes six Osa-class missile
delivered by the Soviets in 1982-83. The Soviets have
also provided coastal surveillance radars located at
Luanda and nearby Cabinda. In 1984, SA-3 missile
sites were established in the Luanda area.
Luanda Airport 08051' S. 13014' E.,
Lubango Airfield 14055' S. 013134' E.,
Luanda Airport is Angola's principal military and
commercial airfield and also serves as the primary
gateway for Cuban troops arriving from Havana. The
airfield is also the assembly point for Soviet-supplied
military aircraft, including MIG-21, SU-22, and
MIG-23 fighters, and MI-8, MI-17, and MI-25 heli-
copters. Since the interdiction by guerrillas and dete-
rioration of the land and rail transportation system,
air transport has emerged as the primary means to
equip and resupply isolated Angolan and Cuban
military garrisons, which puts a heavy burden on
Luanda Airport.
Lubango, capital of Huila Province in southwestern
Angola, is a key Angolan Army garrison and head-
quarters for Angolan and Cuban forces in Military
Region Five. The airfield at Lubango is the primary
tactical fighter base in southern Angola and the
regional air defense headquarters. The Namibian
insurgent group (SWAPO) maintains its headquarters
and support bases nearby. Lubango is also the center
for troop deployment and logistic resupply for the
counterinsurgency effort against UNITA guerrillas in
southwestern Angola.
Description. Luanda Airport is adjacent to downtown
Luanda and can accommodate military and civilian
aircraft of any size. There are two asphalt runways,
the larger measuring 3,740 by 46 meters. Luanda also
has 26 revetted hardstands. The largest apron meas-
ures 730 by 230 meters. Facilities include a control
tower, radar, and VOR and ND13 navigational
beacons
Air approaches from all directions are generally fa-
vorable except during the annual wet season, which
lasts from October to April, when frequent thunder-
storms, turbulence, and aircraft icing create hazard-
ous flying conditions. Commercial air service to Luan-
da includes scheduled flights by Aeroflot and Cubana,
as well as the Angolan national airline, TAAG.
A four-lane all-weather road connects the airfield and
the adjacent Luanda city. Luanda's major deepwater
port and naval base are nearby at Baia de Luanda
(Luanda Bay), and a narrow-gauge railway runs east
to Malanje.
Lubango is the country's primary tactical fighter base
in southern Angola and its only airfield with hardened
aircraft shelters. There are two asphalt runways, the
largest measuring 2,385 by 30 meters. Eight hardened
aircraft shelters and 52 revetted hardstands are adja-
cent to the main runway to provide parking space and
to protect the aircraft from attack. Facilities at
Lubango Airfield include a control tower, an aircraft
maintenance area, and ground-controlled approach
radar.
An all-weather road from the airfield leads to the
nearby Namibe Railway and the deepwater port at
Namibe. The railway extends 750 kilometers east-
ward across southern Angola and is the primary
means of supporting Angolan and Cuban forces in the
south. Most military supplies for the region arrive at
the port at Namibe, approximately 150 kilometers
west of Lubango.
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Fuel Storage. Luanda Airport has facilities for the
storage of approximately 12,600 barrels of POL at the
military location. Approximately 10 kilometers north-
east of the airfield are facilities for an estimated
19,000 barrels of POL. The civilian facility has an
unknown fuel-storage capacity. Luanda has Type-A
and JP-4 jet fuel available. Approximately 9,800
barrels of POL are available at Lubango Airfield with
an additional 3,100 barrels located at an adjacent
facility. Type-B jet fuel can be obtained at Lubango.
Activity. Soviet deliveries of high-performance fighter
aircraft and attack helicopters, which are assembled
at Luanda prior to deployment to regional airfields,
increased dramatically in 1984. Soviet and Cuban
technicians remain permanently at Luanda Airport to
assemble and service the newly acquired military
aircraft. Soviets and Cubans probably maintain com-
plex equipment at nearby radar and SAM sites, and
the Cubans pilot and maintain most of Angola's more
advanced aircraft.
At least 11 Soviet AN-12 Cub transport aircraft have
been permanently stationed in Luanda since 1983.
Soviet TU-95 Bears periodically deploy to Luanda,
accompanied by an IL-62 Classic carrying support
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the South Atlantic Ocean.
Lubango is a major base for Cuban combat and
support personnel, and most ground combat units
there are believed to be Cuban. MIG-21s have been
stationed at the airfield since 1978 while MIG-23
Flogger aircraft were deployed to Lubango in July
1984, the first operational deployment in Angola
outside of Luanda. about 30
MIG-21s and 10 to 15 MIG-23s at Lubango.
Defenses. Defenses in the Luanda area have improved
since late 1983 when the insurgents began to increase
operations in the northern part of the country.
UNITA guerrilla attacks on towns near Luanda,
mining of the harbor in 1984, and continued downing
of power lines to the city have resulted in a strength-
ening of security forces in the region. A new Cuban
brigade is still forming just outside Luanda. Air
defenses have also been improved. Three SA-3 missile
sites have been deployed near Luanda-one was
installed at the airfield in January 1984.
Lubango Airfield has MIG-21 and MIG-23 intercep-
tors; air warning and ground-control intercept (GCI)
radar; fixed SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile
sites; SA-6, SA-9, and SA-13 mobile air defense
missile systems; and antiaircraft guns.
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Overview
Since independence in 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe
and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) have slowly moved toward transforming the
country into a socialist society. The government easily
defeated opponents in the country's first postindepen-
dence election in July 1985 and increased its parlia-
mentary majority. Mugabe now is moving to elimi-
nate all traces of political opposition in order to install
a one-party state and to allow a more activist govern-
ment role in directing economic development.
ZANU has felt little restraint in its efforts to destroy
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)-the
main opposition party-as a political force. Heavy-
handed government tactics over the past three years
aimed at undermining popular support for ZAPU
have helped fuel an armed dissident movement in
western Zimbabwe. The unrest, however, does not
pose a direct threat to the stability of the central
government.
During the summer of 1985, Zimbabwe increased its
military presence in central Mozambique to about
9,000 men, following Maputo's request for assistance
against antigovernment guerrillas, and began under-
taking offensive operations. Senior Zimbabwean mili-
tary officers and political leaders have expressed
concern over their country's expanding involvement in
the Mozambican insurgency and in early 1986 urged
a reassessment of such operations. A widening of
Harare's role in Mozambique also risks stimulating
Mozambican insurgent attacks on Zimbabwe's vital
supply and transportation lines.
Harare Airport (17 ? 55' S. 31106' E.
Thornhill Air Force Base (19?26' S. 29?52' E.,
Harare Airport, Zimbabwe's primary international
airport, and Thornhill Air Force Base are the two
main bases of the Zimbabwean Air Force. Harare
Airport serves the capital and could handle aircraft of
any size. Thornhill Air Force Base-near Gweru-
about 200 kilometers southwest of Harare, could
Figure 58
Selected Airfields in Zimbabwe
O Airport
Road
+- -. Railroad
0 100 Statute Miles
accommodate C-130 aircraft. Both are about 800
kilometers inland from the coast and could be valu-
able in conducting airlift operations to or through
southern Africa.
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Description. Harare Airport has two asphalt runways
measuring 4,936 by 49 meters, and 1,358 by 46
meters The civil-
ian area includes one large concrete parking apron, 15
smaller aprons, a terminal building and control tower, 25X1
18 hangars, and at least 57 support buildings. The
military support area has a large concrete and asphalt
apron, an operations building and control tower, 10
hangars, seven small aircraft shelters, and at least 41 25X1
support buildings. The ammunition facility includes
15 revetted buildings and nine unprotected support
buildings.
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The airfield could handle about 40 sorties daily of C-5 Thornhill Air Force Base has two parallel asphalt
aircraft delivering about 2,790 tons of cargo. Alterna- runways measuring 2,662 by 36 meters and 2,371 by
tively, it could accommodate about 88 sorties of 31 meters. The longer runway has paved overruns of
C-141 aircraft (and 3,710 tons of cargo) or 160 sorties 49 and 200 meters, and there are four grass runways
of C-130 aircraft (with 2,080 tons).F____-] of 1,256 meters or less. Parking facilities include two
aprons, seven helicopter pads, and two taxiways.
air traffic control radar and a tower-mounted proba-
ble IFF radar. The field also has an ILS system and
marker beacons.
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compound, an operations building and control tower,
nine large hangars, 12 barracks, two probable ware-
houses, one security building, and about 70 support
buildings. A revetted ordnance storage area at the
airfield includes a large headquarters building, nine
administrative buildings, and about 70 family housing
and barracks. The field is equipped with a VOR
beacon, marker beacons, and IL
Fuel Storage. Harare Airport has a petroleum storage
compound consisting of 14 tanks of various sizes plus
drum storage, with an estimated storage capacity of
at least 42,000 barrels. Thornhill has a fuel storage
area with both partially buried and aboveground
tanks with an approximately 7,475-barrel capacity.
Activity. As Zimbabwe's primary international air-
port, Harare Airport offers commercial service to
Africa and Europe. The military portion of the field,
known as New Sarum Airbase, is concerned primarily
with transport, bomber, and helicopter operations.
Assigned units are equipped with one to three Canber-
ra light bombers, 20 to 25 transports (C-47, Islander,
and Casa 212 aircraft), and 30 to 40 helicopters
(Allouette Ills and some Augusta Bell 205 and 412
models). A Hunter fighter-bomber was seen
in April 1985 for the first
Force Base.
Thornhill is the nation's other Air Force base and is
concerned with fighter-bomber, training, and light
transport operations. Aircraft assigned there include
one to five Hunter fighter-bombers, about two Hawk
jet trainers, one to five Marchette SF-260 trainer/
light-strike aircraft, nine Cessna FTB-337G light
ground-attack aircraft, and a few utility aircraft.
The Zimbabwean Air Force still has not recovered
from the sabotage in July 1982 of 13 aircraft (nine of
them destroyed) at Thornhill Air Force Base. Zim-
babwean officials blamed the incident on dissident
white officers aided by South Africans. Pakistani Air
Force officers were invited to take over most com-
mand and supervisory positions in the force, and
Pakistani pilots were doing most of the flying as of
January 1985, but now have departed, according to
the US Embassy. A British firm was maintaining the
aircraft.
both airfields.
Defenses. Zimbabwean air defense aircraft had can-
nons but no air-to-air missiles or aircraft-mounted
radars in late 1984. Zimbabwe has few qualified
pilots. Antiaircraft artillery positions are visible at
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Figure 61
Selected Ports and Airfields in West Africa
400 Kilometers
400 Statute Miles
? Port
Airfield
US access in blue
Soviet access in red
Road
- - Railroad
ALGERIA
CONGO
G?c
BBEVILLE
GABON
,.Mbinda
AZZAVILLEE
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Overview
Senegal's location on the bulge of West Africa astride
important mid-Atlantic air and sea lanes and its
moderate pro-Western political orientation in a vola-
tile region make it important to France and the
United States. Senegal has long been one of the
strongest and most vocal opponents of Soviet, Libyan,
and Cuban interference in Africa. Predominantly
Islamic, Senegal is relatively stable, although Presi-
dent Diouf's popularity has declined in the face of
chronic economic problems, generational conflicts
within the ruling party, and some Islamic fundamen-
talist ferment that Libya seeks to exploit. Diouf
counts heavily on extensive economic and military ties
to France to maintain stability. Senegal's apolitical
armed forces are one of the best trained and disci-
plined in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Military cooperation between Senegal and France has
remained virtually unchanged since independence in
1960. France maintains naval, air, and ground forces
at Dakar's port and air facilities. A mutual defense
agreement calls for Paris to intervene at Dakar's
request if the country's security is threatened. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy, after Senegal sent troops
into The Gambia-an enclave of Senegal-in 1981 to
crush a Marxist-led coup, Diouf received President
Mitterrand's assurance that France would honor the
defense treaty if Senegal invoked it.
Dakar Port (14?41' N. 17?26' W.,
Dakar is the second largest port on Africa's west coast
(after Lagos, Nigeria). It is midway on main maritime
routes from Europe to South America and from New
York to Cape Town, South Africa. The port handles
most of the country's imports and exports as well as
virtually all of neighboring, and landlocked, Mali's
trade. Dakar is also the main naval logistics and
communications base for France in central and west-
ern Africa.
Figure 62
Selected Port and Airfield in Senegal
Port
Airfield
US access in blue
November rainy season.
0 80 Kilometers
0 80 Statute Was
navigation. The entrance into the port is made on a
westerly course between breakwaters about 250 me-
ters apart. Dakar is an improved, natural harbor
formed by two breakwaters aligned north and south to
afford excellent protection. The harbor is approxi-
mately 1.9 kilometers long and 1 kilometer wide with
depths ranging from 3 to 12 meters, enclosing about
200 hectares. The port has excellent anchorage over a
good holding ground of sand and gravel, and can
accommodate any size ship. Silting presents no signif-
icant problems because dredging is performed rou-
tinely to maintain the channel and alongside depths.
Tidal currents are weak within the harbor, and swell
is only a minor problem in the port during the June to
Description. The approach to the harbor is free and
clear, although two wrecks are located just outside it.
Buoys mark both wrecks and neither is a hindrance to
Road
-u Railroad
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The port has just over 11,000 meters of deepwater
alongside wharfage containing 55 berths in excess of
5.5-meter depths and another 31 berths for smaller
ships to depths less than 5.5 meters. Although some
quayside cranes and special handling equipment exist
in Dakar, the vast majority of alongside berths,
including some of the container berths, require the
ships' own gear for cargo handling; therefore, most
ships calling at Dakar are self-sustaining container
types. Harbor equipment includes five cranes of 6-ton
capacities; two heavy-lift floating cranes rated at 60
and 120 tons; and four harbor tugs, of which two are
operational.
The port has ample and diverse storage facilities.
Covered storage includes 46,500 square meters of
space in 13 buildings. Eleven of the buildings are
dedicated to break-bulk cargo, while the remaining
two buildings have a combined storage area of 4,500
square meters reserved for storage of peanuts-
Senegal's principal export. In addition, two 50,000-
ton storage sheds for phosphate ore are located on the
north mole. Open storage for break-bulk cargo is
available but limited. Dakar has 3.7 hectares of
dedicated container stacking space. Several cold stor-
age buildings provide almost 15,000 cubic meters of
storage space, including modern icemaking and ice-
crushing equipment.
Dakar's estimated military port capacity is 39,000
tons per day of break-bulk and container cargo un-
loaded in 20 effective working hours. However, the
use of roll-on/roll-off ships would significantly in-
crease this capacity. The port is cleared by a well-
maintained, two-lane bituminous-surface highway
and double-track, narrow-gauge rail line, the main
route of the Senegalese railroad system.
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Dakar Marine, the largest shipyard, provides the port
with extensive ship repair facilities as do two smaller
drydocks. The largest repair asset is a recently in-
stalled, Norwegian-built floating drydock. It has a
lifting capacity of 28,000 tons and can accommodate
a ship up to 80,000 dwt.
Fuel Storage. Total crude storage at the refinery for
Dakar is 525,000 barrels, and the total refined prod-
ucts storage at 13 locations throughout the area may
be as high as 3.1 million barrels if all the locations are
used for this purpose. Bunkering is available at all
POL offloading berths and at the naval base, with
delivery rates of 2,200 barrels per hour for fuel oil and
2,600 barrels per hour for diesel oil. Two bunkering
barges are available with delivery rates of 1,630
barrels per hour.
Defenses. The former French naval base at the port is
now the sole naval operating base of the Senegalese
Navy. France maintains a 450-man force at Dakar
harbor with one sea-reconnaissance aircraft. The 762-
man Senegalese Navy is capable of guarding coasts
and protecting fisheries within the 12-mile limit of the
country's territorial waters.
Soviet trawlers operate illegally in Senegalese waters
but, by staying near maritime borders disputed with
Guinea-Bissau, they diminish their chances of being
caught. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest
that the Senegalese are reluctant to arrest Soviets
violating their territorial waters because they fear the
loss of revenues gained by repairing Soviet trawlers at
Dakar Marine.
Dakar/Yoff Airport (14 ? 44' N. 17129' W.,
Dakar/Yoff, the primary international airfield for
West Africa, is a principal crossroad for air traffic
between Africa and Europe, South America, and
North America. The airfield is about 12 kilometers
northwest of the Senegalese capital of Dakar.
Description. The airfield consists of three asphalt
runways. The largest and main runway measures
3,472 by 44 meters. In 1980 the main runway and
taxiway were strengthened, upgrading them to accept
Boeing-747 and similar aircraft. It can accommodate
C-141 and C-5 aircraft and also can support C-130
aircraft at maximum gross takeoff weight. The air-
field is equipped with ILS, VOR, HF communica-
tions, inner marker beacons, and approach lights.
Fuel Storage. POL storage is available adjacent to
the main passenger terminal. Two aboveground fuel
storage tanks can hold about 23,800 barrels while the
capacity of a colocated underground storage facility is
unknown
Activity. French maritime air patrols stage from
Dakar. Dakar/Yoff airport was used for refueling by
British aircraft during the Falklands war, and in 1983
Senegal permitted US military aircraft to transit the
airport on the way to Chad. The United States has ad
hoc landing rights for naval air surveillance of Soviet
naval task forces in the Atlantic, and Dakar Interna-
tional Airport is a designated emergency landing site
for the US space shuttle under a 10-year agreement
signed in 1983.
Defenses. Yoff is surrounded by a 2-meter-high wall
broken intermittently by barbed-wire fence and is
occasionally patrolled by armed police in vehicles.
There are one or two armed policemen at each
entrance. On the civilian side of the airport, the 20- to
30-man airport brigade of the National Gendarmerie,
headquartered on airport property, provides security.
The crack Intervention Group of the National Gen-
darmerie (GIGN) can arrive at the airport within the
hour with heavy weapons and armored cars
On the military side of the field, the French man the
watchtower and security patrols. French forces in-
clude a 400-man air force unit with four transport
aircraft, helicopters, and four Jaguar fighter aircraft.
In addition, there is a 500-man ground force located
at Dakar/Yoff Airport. This force is 50 percent
mechanized and 50 percent armored.
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Overview
President Conte, who seized power in 1984 after the
death of former President Toure, is wrestling with the
legacy of economic decline, ineffective socialist poli-
cies, and political repression left by his predecessor.
Conte's prospects, since he suppressed a coup in July
1985, now rest on his ability to articulate a clear
policy of economic reform and to diffuse heightened
tribal tensions. The attempted coup appears to have
made Conte more amenable to economic reform
guidelines proposed by the IMF, despite the political
risks involved, and to have underscored his need for
substantial US and other Western assistance.
The USSR, however, remains the foremost supplier of
Guinean military hardware and training, despite the
new government's desire to decrease Soviet influence.
Moscow uses its military and economic ties to ensure
retention of limited access to Guinean air and naval
facilities, which are important in supporting the Sovi-
et presence in Angola, the West African naval contin-
gent of the Soviet Navy, and the Soviet fishing fleet in
West African waters. Guinea receives very little
economic assistance from Moscow, but the Soviets
remain fully entrenched in certain lucrative sectors of
that country's economy, including the fishing and
bauxite industries. Guinea is likely to continue to
accept aid from any source so long as it carries no
political strings and does not jeopardize its ties to
Moscow that date from 1958.
Conakry (09131' N. 13043' W.
Conakry is the country's only general cargo port,
handling virtually all maritime imports and exports.
Located on the Ile Tombo, this natural, coastal harbor
is connected to the Presqu'ile Camayenne by a landfill
and causeway. Two overlaping breakwaters protect
the inner harbor which encompasses an area of 208
hectares ranging in depth from 2 to 11 meters.
Description. The seaward approach to the harbor is
free and clear, while the approach from the south is
between the Iles de Los and the Ile Tombo. The
entrance channel has a depth of 9 meters and a width
Figure 65
Selected Port and Airfield in Guinea
Po ft
Airfield
Soviet access in red
Road
-~ Railroad
0 50 Kilometers
0 1 50 Statute Miles
of 137 meters. Numerous partially protected anchor-
age berths are provided 5 kilometers south of the port
and east of the Iles de Los in depths of 11 to 15
meters, over fair holding ground of mud and sand.
The port has about 1,900 meters of quayage and can
berth two large and five standard oceangoing ships as
well as one small ship. Tankers also dock at the large
oceangoing cargo berths. In addition, there is ade-
quate supplemental wharfage for tugs and pilot boats.
The largest vessel Conakry can accommodate is
43,000 tons. Harbor equipment includes mobile
cranes with capacities ranging from 8 to 45 metric
tons; a floating crane with a 50-metric-ton capacity,
numerous forklifts with 3- to 10-metric-ton capacity;
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a banana conveyor system; two alumina ladders with
a 100-metric-ton-per-hour capacity; and one portal
iron ore ladder with a 1,200-metric-ton-per-hour ca-
pacity. There are at least three automotive cranes in
the port. At least three tugs with up to 1,600 horse-
power are available. Conakry has a military port
capacity of 7,000 metric tons per 20-hour working
is only one 800-ton capacity slipway owned by the
Port Authority for naval ship repairs, but it is rarely
used and may be abandoned.
Patterns of Access. The USSR gained access to
Guinean naval facilities in 1970 by agreeing to estab-
lish a small naval patrol off the coast to deter invasion
attempts by exiled Guineans. In the early 1970s,
Guinea granted the Soviet Navy logistic support at
the port. Conakry is the only West African port
routinely used by the Soviets' small, Luanda-based
West African naval patrol consisting of five to seven
ships, although the number and length of ship-days in
port have fallen steadily since the mid-1970s.
day.
Eighteen buildings provide 32,000 square meters of
covered storage area. Open storage consists of a 2-
hectare tract for iron ore and an 11-hectare expanse
for containers. Four silos with a total capacity of
about 100,000 cubic meters store alumina. A
standard-gauge railway line with connections to Kan-
kan and to the Fria mines and paved roads connecting
to the national highway system clear the port. There
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Guinea continues to reject repeated Soviet proposals
to construct a naval installation on the Iles de Los
outside Conakry
seven naval craft are operable, limiting the Navy's
effectiveness. Moreover, Guinea completely lacks
ship-to-shore communications. The Navy has no base
within the port, which forces it to moor its vessels
among tugboats and trawlers. Some Guinean naval
officers attend Soviet naval schools, and junior offi-
cers and enlisted personnel are trained by an in-
country cadre of Soviet naval advisers. In 1985, the
Navy's defense capabilities were bolstered by a $3
million US grant to purchase military equipment,
Loss of Soviet naval access would some-
what inconvenience Moscow and possibly lead to a
search for alternative ports of call such as Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, and Benin.
Fuel Storage. The total POL storage capacity in the
vicinity of the port is about 810,000 barrels.
Defenses. The 500-man Guinean Navy is charged
with defending the port as well as patrolling the
country's 22-kilometer territorial waters limit and
370-kilometer economic exclusion zone. Only two of
including patrol boats.
Conakry Airport (09134' N. 13136' W.,
Conakry, the largest airfield in Guinea and the only
airport of entry, has facilities that can accommodate
international air traffic, as well as the functions of a
military airbase. It has a civilian terminal and a
separate military operations area.
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Description. The largest concrete runway, 3,270 by
45 meters, is capable of supporting C-130, C-141, and
C-5 aircraft with an estimated daily offloading rate of
2,290, 4,050, and 2,235 tons, respectively. This run-
way was resurfaced in 1984 and now has new landing
aid markers. The total concrete apron area is 76,714
square meters among the three parking aprons. The
airfield is equipped with a tower, approach control,
VOR, NDB, and VHF/DF. All-weather roads clear
the airport, and the port of Conakry is 15 kilometers
away. Major drawbacks at the airport include a lack
of well-trained ground controllers, poor-quality fuel,
and inadequate drainage that makes runway opera-
tion difficult during heavy rains. The airport offers
only limited repair facilities. These drawbacks, how-
ever, do not seem to diminish Soviet interest in access
to Conakry.
Fuel Storage. The airport's total storage capacity for
all types of fuel is approximately 40,460 barrels at two
storage sites at the airfield and one near the port. A-1
jet fuel is available, and the fuel is dispensed by truck.
Activity. During the 1970s, Guinea allowed Soviet
TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft to use Conakry
as a staging area for aerial reconnaissance of US
naval activity in the Atlantic. However, mounting
Guinean dissatisfaction with the paucity of Moscow's
economic and military aid caused Conakry to with-
draw TU-95 landing rights in 1977. Since the Soviets
lost access to Conakry, they have been forced to stage
their reconnaissance aircraft to Luanda via Cuba
starting from the Kola Peninsula in the USSR.
Luanda is too far south (3,000 kilometers) from
Conakry to permit surveillance of Western naval force
operations in the central Atlantic. Moscow periodical-
ly requests renewed access for TU-95 operations out
of Conakry. The Guinean Government also refused
transit privileges for Soviet planes transporting Cuban
troops to Ethiopia to stem the 1977 Somali invasion.
The Soviets continue to enjoy limited access to Cona-
kry, primarily as a regular transit stop for military
transport flights to Angola via Hungary and Algeria.
Soviet aircraft typically stop overnight in Guinea for
refueling and crew changes before continuing on to
Luanda. Planes transiting Guinea include AN-22s,
IL-76s, and AN-12s. The IL-76s and AN-12s also are
deployed within Angola to support in-country military
operations. Soviet IL-62s also use Conakry; they are
used to support TU-95 naval reconnaissance deploy-
ments to Luanda.
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Overview
Mali, one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, suffers from a deteriorating economy stem-
ming from years of inefficient socialist policies and
exacerbated by severe drought, according to US
Embassy reporting. President Moussa Traore, who
seized power in 1968, has loosened ties to the Soviets
and improved relations with France and the United
States in search of desperately needed economic
assistance that Moscow will not provide.
We believe, on the basis of a variety of sources, that
Soviet ties to Mali are based upon the provision of
arms and military training, party-to-party relations,
and student scholarships. The USSR continues to be
the only military supplier willing to satisfy Mali's
desire for expensive and relatively sophisticated weap-
ons. In our judgment, Soviet military aid is designed
not only to curry favor with the Malian armed
forces-the key political force in the country-but
also to advance Moscow's interest in gaining military
access to West African targets of opportunity.
Bamako-Senou Airport (12?32' N. 07?57' W.,
Figure 68
Selected Airfields in Mali
O Airfield
Soviet access in red
Road
Railroad
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Gao Airfield (16? 15' N. 00?00' W.,
Bamako/Senou Airport is the main international
airport servicing the country. Gao is the most impor-
tant military airfield in Mali.
Description. The asphalt runway at Bamako mea-
sures approximately 2,700 by 45 meters. The five
asphalt parking aprons encompass a total area of
73,750 square meters with the largest measuring 343
by 100 meters. The airfield is capable of supporting
C-130 and C-141 operations. Air traffic control capa-
bilities include a control tower
repair
hangar, freight warehouse, and six aircraft sheds are
available. The airport is serviced by a two-lane bitu-
minous road to Bamako, and a railroad line at
Bamako that goes to Dakar, Senegal.
Gao Airfield is currently undergoing expansion with
Soviet aid. For several years the Soviets have been
lengthening runways at the airfield to approximately
3,000 meters-too long for current Malian needs. The
asphalt runway presently measures 2,745 by 45 me-
ters. The two asphalt aprons encompass a total area of
about 20,000 square meters with the largest measur-
ing 128 by 98 meters. Navigational aids include a
control tower, VOR-DME, and NDB. There are
several storage sheds and warehouses in the military
support area. The airfield is cleared by a two-lane
bituminous road to Gao. The airfield is capable of
supporting C-130 operations with an offloading rate
of 210 tons per day.
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Fuel Storage. Jet fuel is available at Bamako, with a
storage capacity for all types of fuel of approximately
23,800 barrels, dispensable by truck or hydrant. A-1
jet fuel accounts for more than 630 barrels of the
storage capacity and is dispensable by hydrant.
Activity.The Soviet military presence in Mali dates
from the early 1960s when about 30 military assis-
tance personnel began working with the armed forces.
The number of Soviet military advisers swelled to 600
in 1976, but has since declined to the current level of
about 150. The USSR could use Mali's two principal
airfields to transport Soviet arms and supplies to
client states in southern Africa or even Latin America
in an emergency. For example, in 1975 Mali was
among several left-leaning African states that allowed
Soviet cargo aircraft to transit their territory when
Moscow mounted an arms ferry to Angola to stave off
the defeat of the MPLA faction that now rules
Luanda.
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Gao Airfield also is protected by Soviet maintained
missiles, and a Malian Army camp is situated just
north of the runway.
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Overview
Liberia's Port of Monrovia and Roberts International
Airport-which were built by the United States dur-
ing World War II-are the only strategic sites in
West Africa to which US military forces have the
right of access; the United States negotiated special
access rights when it turned these facilities over to
Liberian control. US military priority access to Liber-
ia's port and airfield could help provide for the rapid
staging of US forces into Africa, the Middle East, or
Southwest Asia. Communication facilities located in
Liberia constitute the largest block of official US
assets in black Africa. These assets include a Voice of
America relay station serving all of Sub-Saharan
Africa as well as parts of the Middle East and Europe;
Figure 71
Selected Port and Airfield in Liberia
US private investment in Liberia
totals $430 million-the largest in black Africa after
Nigeria.
Liberia has experienced severe economic decline since
the mid-1960s and political fragility under Head of
State Doe, who seized power in 1980. The political
and economic climate in Liberia is likely to remain
uncertain and subject to sudden change, even though
Doe successfully put down a coup attempt in Novem-
ber 1985 and inaugurated his civilian government two
months later. He continues to face a difficult array of
political and economic problems that recently have
sparked popular protests and grumbling in the mili-
tary. Most Liberians, including a majority of the
military, remain favorably disposed toward the Unit-
ed States, however, which should limit opportunities
for Soviet and Libyan meddling in the event of serious
instability.
Port Road Communications
Airfield - Railroad facility
US access in blue Iron mine
Monrovia Port (06'20'N. 10?47' W.,
that requires periodic dredging.
Description. The Liberian National Port Authority
operates the manmade port formed by two rock
breakwaters extending approximately 2.4 kilometers
into open ocean and encompassing 304 hectares of
protected water. The harbor's approach channel is 2
to 5 kilometers long and 150 meters wide with a depth
of 15 meters. The harbor has ample anchorage over
good holding ground, but silting presents a problem
50
~ 50 Statute miles
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The port consists of one 582-meter-long commercial
quay with container and general cargo berths. There
also are three large narrow concrete piers equipped
with specialized machinery for loading iron ore. One
POL berth handles large tankers at an offshore
bresting platform. Ship's gear is mostly employed for
offloading containers and break-bulk cargo. Monrovia
has no floating or portal jib cranes. Port cargo
handling equipment is comprised of two iron ore
automatic loading systems; a fixed jib crane with a
50-ton capacity; and mobile cranes with 3, 5, 7, and
25 ton capacities. There are four harbor tugs, and two
barges of unknown capacity are also available.
Covered storage facilities include four transit sheds
adjacent to the quay, affording 16,300 square meters
of space; and seven storage silos, each with a 2,500-
metric-ton capacity, devoted to the storage of latex
rubber. There are 25.5 hectares of open storage within
the port. Monrovia's estimated military port capacity
is 2,300 metric tons of cargo per day, unloaded in 20
effective working hours. The port is cleared by two
hard-surfaced roads and two rail lines. The two rail
lines serve only the iron ore pier; one standard-gauge
single track extends to the Bong iron ore mines while
the other, a narrow-gauge line, continues inland to the
Sierra Leone border.
Ship repair facilities are limited to one small floating
drydock capable of lifting 250 tons, with a maximum
draft of 2.4 meters and a synchrolift of 250-ton
capacity owned by a private fishing company.
The port has been plagued by a number of serious
problems. Management over the past several years
has been ineffective, the marginal wharf is rapidly
deteriorating, and equipment and spare parts short-
ages abound. The Liberian Government proposed a
plan for rehabilitating the port in February 1985 to a
group of prospective financial donors, but the outcome
of the negotiations are uncertain, given Liberia's
deteriorating economic situation.
The port handles about 12 25X1
million tons of commercial shipping traffic annually
and supports the country's agrimineral export opera-
tions. Some 66 percent of all world shipping is under
Liberian flag-of-convenience registry, the world's
largest.
Fuel Storage. The POL terminal contains a total of
16 tanks of redefined products between them with a
combined storage capacity of 34,000 metric tons. In
addition, the Liberian Petroleum Company can pro-
vide another two tanks with a total storage capacity of
47,800 metric tons. Diesel fuel and a variety of fuel oil
blends are available in the port.
Defense. The Port of Monrovia is protected by a
security force employed by the National Port Author-
ity and by the Liberian National Coast Guard
(LNCG) whose main base is located there. The force
does not have its own pier, however, and all of the
Coast Guards' six patrol craft are out of service
because of a lack of spare parts and proper mainte-
nance. Even when the craft are operational, they are
not sufficient to protect the country's 370-kilometer
economic zone and are limited to harbor patrol opera-
tions. The boats cannot effectively patrol areas more
than 90 kilometers off the coast because they lack
seakeeping ability for periods longer than two to three
days. Consequently, Liberia relies on the monitoring
of radios from friendly ships as a means of guarding
its territorial waters. Liberia's Coast Guard has close
ties to the US Coast Guard which provides all new
officers with basic officer training in the United
States. Liberian army units are stationed in and
around the city of Monrovia, but none are posted at
the port proper.
Roberts International Airport (06 ? 14' N. 10 ? 22' W.,
Roberts International, located 50 kilometers southeast
of Monrovia, is the country's main civilian airfield
and its chief port of entry. The airport provides
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contingency access for the United States to the rest of
the continent and the South Atlantic Ocean. Pan
American World Airways operates and maintains the
field under contract to the Liberian Government.
Roberts International Field "during a national emer-
gency." The United States used the airfield during
the 1978 Shaba crisis, but inadequate fueling, servic-
ing, and storage facilities hampered its usefulness.
The USAF completed an upgrading of the facilities in
1984 to rectify these defects. Pan American World
Airways flies four times per week into Roberts.
Aeroflot flew TU-154s into the airport prior to the
Soviet airline's expulsion from the country in July
Description. The 3,332- by 45-meter asphalt runway
is capable of supporting C-130, C-141, and C-5
operations. An intersecting runway is abandoned. The
airport is equipped with a control tower, approach
control, VOR-DMO, and ILS. A new 27,591-square
meter concrete parking apron was recently completed
at the field.
Fuel Storage. The recent completion of a new 4,760-
barrel fuel storage and distribution system enhances
the airport's usefulness. This upgrades the total air-
port storage capacity to 9,520 barrels.
Activity. In 1954 the United States and Liberia
exchanged notes authorizing Washington's use of
1985.
Defenses. Overall security at Roberts International
Airport is lax. The civilian field is protected by a
private contingent of 75 local security guards hired by
the airport and augmented by 20 Liberian army
personnel stationed on the premises. Local residents
cut holes in the fence surrounding the airport to
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facilitate travel through, instead of around, the field,
and the fenced perimeter is patrolled randomly and
infrequently. There are unmanned entry point
There are no known antiaircraft weapons in
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Overview
Shortly after independence from France in 1960,
Congo turned sharply to the left and established close
ties to the Soviet Union. In the late 1970s, however,
growing economic problems and irritation at the lack
of Soviet development aid caused Brazzaville to look
for more assistance from the West, particularly
France. The US Embassy reports that President
Denis Sassou-Nguesso continues efforts to attract
more Western economic aid and investment needed
both to help weather the current recession and for
future oil exploration and development. Brazzaville's
pragmatism, in our judgment, is motivated by its
belief that increased Western investment and aid are
critical to economic development and disappointment
with the quality of Moscow's military assistance
program. The US Embassy reports that, since 1981,
France alone has accounted for slightly more than
half of Congo's total annual imports, and Congo has
become the third-largest US trading partner in black
Africa.
Nonetheless, Sassou's commitment to Third World
ideology, the importance of Marxist political controls
to ensuring domestic stability, fears of fostering seri-
ous opposition from leftists, and the need to maintain
access to Soviet arms work against any fundamental
shift to a Western political orientation or alignment.
Figure 74
Selected Port and Airfield in Congo
CAMEROON
EQUAT.
GUINEA
? Port
O Airfield
~BOUntlary represenleli0n ~s
not necossar~ly autM1onrabvo
Road
-~ Railroad
0 100
100 Statute Mlles
In our view, Western reluctance to provide major 706544(A05785) 6_96
military hardware and to offer terms competitive with
the USSR leaves Brazzaville little choice but to
preserve ties to Moscow and access to Soviet arms, a destined for the Central African Republic, eastern
critical element in ensuring Army support for Sas- Gabon, and southern Chad. The port also serves as
sou's government. We believe Congo's importance the primary maritime point of entry for military
would increase significantly, however, if the Soviets supplies for the entire region.
lost access to Luanda, in Angola. In such a case, we
would expect Moscow to expend substantially more
resources to encourage the emergence of a more
radical regime in Brazzaville in hopes of gaining
military access, particularly if no alternative were
available elsewhere in the region.
Pointe-Noire Port (04?47' S. 11150' E.,
Description. Pointe-Noire is the only port serving
Congo and is a major transshipment point for goods
Pointe-Noire is located near the southern border of
the country in an improved natural harbor. The port
consists of a breakwater-protected harbor with a
water area of approximately 100 hectares with depths
of 4.6 to 13.0 meters. The tidal range is 1.6 meters.
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The approach to the port is from the northwest and is
free and clear. Vessels enter the port directly from the
sea through a channel 200 meters wide with a mini-
mum depth of 10 meters. An anchorage area with
unlimited space, in depths of 10 to 15 meters over
good holding ground of mud and sand, is available
2 to 3 kilometers from the entrance to the harbor.
Alongside berths are available at Quay G, Quay D,
Mole 1, and various other quays within the harbor.
Quay G has a tow ore and one container berth with
depths of 13 meters and a total linear wharfage of 515
meters. Quay D has five general cargo berths with
depths of 6.7 to 9.0 meters and total linear wharfage
of 712 meters. Mole 1 has three general cargo berths
with depths of 8.5 meters and a total linear wharfage
of 952 meters. In addition, there is a 180-meter-long
wharf with depths of 2.4 to 4.6 meters used by fishing
vessels and a 380-meter-long wharf with depths of 4
meters used by lighters. Total wharfage present in the
harbor equals 2,520 meters. Cargo handling equip-
ment consists of one dry bulk ore loader system, two
container top-pick carriers, two portal jib cranes,
several mobile cranes, and numerous forklifts. There
are no container cranes at the container berth. Three
tugboats are available for towage, each rated at 1,800
horsepower.
Pointe-Noire has approximately 43,500 square meters
of covered storage in 13 transit sheds. There are
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380,442 square meters of open storage available,
including 5.1 hectares for manganese ore, 1.5 hectares
for containers, 16.1 hectares for timber, and 2.8
hectares for general cargo. The estimated military
cargo capacity is 5,300 tons per day. A small ship
repair yard has one marine railway with a hauling
capacity of 750 tons. The port is cleared by one
narrow-gauge, double-track railroad line and one
bituminous road.
Current development projects include the extension of
Mole 1 for the possible construction of a container
ro/ro terminal, and a mole between Quay D and Mole
Patterns ofAccess. Over 3.2 million tons of general
cargo move annually through the port. Despite the
repeated refusals by several Congolese leaders, Mos-
cow still hopes to acquire naval base rights at Pointe-
Noire and to conclude a mutual defense treaty under
which it could intervene at Congo's request. We
believe the Soviets seek base rights as a contingency
should Moscow lose access to neighboring Angola,
where Luanda serves as the primary support site for
Moscow's small West African naval patrol and peri-
odic Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance flights in the
South Atlantic. From the Soviet perspective, Congo
facilities are also useful to support Cuban military
1 for fishing vessels.
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who reports that there are normally between
500 and 1,000 Cuban troops in Pointe-Noire on leave
from Angola.
Fuel Storage. An unknown amount of POL storage is
available. Bunker fuels are available by pipeline at the
POL berth at Mole 1 which has a depth of 9.4 meters
and Quay D.
Defenses. The Congolese Navy has a base at Pointe-
Noire, including one company of naval infantry.
Maintenance problems plague all 11 naval ships at
Pointe-Noire, limiting their effectiveness. Also, there
is a garrison of unknown size located near the port.
Many Congolese naval officers have been trained in
France, with some now receiving training in China.
Brazzaville/ Maya Airport (04? 15' S. 15015' E.,
Description. Brazzaville/Maya Airport, 375 kilome-
ters east of Pointe-Noire, is the country's primary
international airfield. It is capable of supporting
C-130, C-141, and C-5 operations, with a tonnage-
per-day offloading rate for each aircraft of 1,870,
2,360, and. 1,675, respectively. The asphalt runway
measures 3,278 by 45 meters. The four concrete
aprons encompass a parking area of about 80,000
square meters, with the largest measuring 704 by 90
meters. Air traffic control capabilities include a con-
tiol tower, approach control, NDB, ILS, and VOR.
Cargo handling equipment includes one 10-ton crane,
two 7-ton cranes, two conveyor belts, one 6-ton fork-
lift, and one 10-ton forklift. Several warehouses and
storage sheds, including cold storage, are available. A
repair hangar measuring 71 by 66 meters has been
completed on the civilian side of the airfield. The
hangar has a central high-bay section that measures
62 by 49 meters with a height of 17 meters. The
airport is cleared by a four-lane bituminous road and
a railroad line from Brazzaville to Pointe-Noire.
Fuel Storage. The airport boasts a total storage
capacity for A-1 jet fuel of 1,260 barrels, which can
be dispensed by hydrant or truck.
Activity. In February 1985, two AN-12s, possibly
Aeroflot passenger aircraft, and several MIG-21s
were sighted at Brazzaville Airport. The focus of
Soviet attention and activity, however, has shifted to
Pointe-Noire Airfield, which is being used to support
logistic operations for Cuban units in the Angolan
exclave of Cabinda as well as to support routine
movement of Cubans to and from Angola.
Defenses. Brazzaville/ Maya is the headquarters for
the Congolese Air Force. The tactical capabilities of
the country's MIG-17 and MIG-21 pilots are consid-
ered poor, and the Air Force probably remains inca-
pable of fighting an air war. Also, ground forces are
garrisoned in Brazzaville. The Soviets installed 12
self-propelled and 24 towed antiaircraft guns at Braz-
zaville Airfield in 1984
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