ARGENTINA: STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret 25X1
Directorate of
Intelligence
Argentina: Strengthening
Democratic Institutions
Ai Iioe Ant
Secret
ALA 86-10038
August 1986
c~Dpy 325
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Democratic Institutions
Argentina: Strengthening
This paper was prepared by ~ Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions b
25X1
Office of Leadership Analysis. It was
coot mated with the Directorate of Operations
25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 86-10038
August 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Argentina: Strengthening
Democratic Institutions
Key Judgments Argentina has made considerable progress toward developing a democratic
Information available climate since President Alfonsin took office nearly three years ago. We
as cif 25 July 1986 believe a strong democratic government in Buenos Aires will promote
was used in this report.
political stability-in part, by reducing the impact of anti-US right- and
left-wing extremists on the country's political life-and thus buttress US
goals in Argentina and throughout South America. Such a government, in
our view, will also probably remain aligned with the West, pursue a
peaceful solution to the Falkland Islands dispute, and avoid radical
solutions to the foreign debt problem. Moreover, a vibrant democracy in
Argentina would reinforce the democratic trend in South America and
further isolate Chile and Paraguay, the region's remaining dictatorships.
Alfonsin has personally pushed through many of the positive changes now
taking place, notably the trials of former military officers for human rights
abuses, efforts to reorganize the armed forces and the intelligence services,
and discussions on constitutional reform. Alfonsin has also stabilized the
economy, thereby giving his administration-through such institutions as
the newly created Council for the Consolidation of Democracy-breathing
room to formulate long-term plans for strengthening democratic rule.
We see other significant indicators that a new ethos is beginning to take
root in Argentina. Academic studies and public opinion polls show that the
country's political culture is becoming less conflictive and more supportive
of democratic values and processes. Leaders in the ruling Radical party
and, to a lesser extent, the Peronist opposition parties are increasingly
willing to work by democratic rules, accept the verdict of the ballot box, co-
operate with political rivals, and, in general, move away from the sterile ob-
structionism that has afflicted Argentine politics in the past. Finally, the
judiciary has gained more independence over the past year and is asserting
its role as a defender of individual rights, according to the US Embassy.
iii Secret
ALA 86-10038
August 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
We believe these developments lay some of the groundwork for an era of
civilian rule in Argentina. Several key institutions and interest groups,
however, remain either too weak to play a positive role in consolidating
gains made or are still basically authoritarian in character:
? Lack of a strong competitive party system. The Peronists are in disarray,
and other parties are too feeble and small to compete effectively. Over
the long term, Alfonsin's Radicals could become a hegemonic political
force, freezing out smaller parties and alienating significant sectors of the
electorate from the political process.
? The military. Despite Alfonsin's reforms, this institution still perceives
its role as dealing with internal subversion and ousting incompetent
civilian governments, rather than protecting Argentina from external
threats.
? Organized labor. The unions have retained their confrontational prac-
tices, refusing to negotiate seriously with Alfonsin and resisting his
attempts to democratize labor's internal structure.
? Congress. The legislature is disorganized, lacking in public prestige, and
overshadowed by the energetic executive branch.
Most indicators suggest that Alfonsin will stay in office over the next two
years and persevere with his plans for strengthening Argentina's political
institutions. Polls show that Alfonsin and his policies still enjoy a favorable
rating of more than 50 percent. We believe he will avoid strict compliance
with IMF austerity measures, such as sharply reducing the budget deficit,
that would jeopardize his hold on power. The President's adroit political
skills should enable him to successfully finesse challenges from the
military, the unions, and the opposition parties.
Although Alfonsin has vastly improved the prospects for stable civilian rule
in Argentina, changing the fundamental character of the country's political
and social system will be a long-term project. Argentina, in our view, will
need to experience stable democratic rule for perhaps as long as a decade in
order for its political institutions to mature. We believe that many
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
developments currently under way-the reduction of the military's politi-
cal power, the emergence of a reformist Peronist sector, and plans for
constitutional reform-may come to fruition during this period, thereby
underwriting democratic continuity.
We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that Argentina's fragile
democracy could collapse under duress. If hyperinflation and severe
recession returned, the President's popularity could plummet, bringing on
widespread labor agitation, social disorder, and even violence. The ensuing
chaos could spur the military to intervene. Military discontent stemming
from the human rights trials could also jeopardize Alfonsin.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Key Judgments
Historical Perspective
Additional Support to Democracy
3
Public Political Perceptions
5
Party Attitudes
5
The Judiciary
7
Key Challenges to Democracy
7
Lack of a Competitive Party System
8
The Military
8
Organized Labor
9
Congress
10
Implications for the United States
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Figure 1
Boundary representation is
not oecesardy authoritative.
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.H.,
chimed by Argentina)
o Province-level capital
-'- Province-level boundary
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Argentina: Strengthening
Democratic Institutions
Introduction
Raul Alfonsin has enjoyed widespread public support
during his first three years as President of Argentina's
fledgling democracy. His decisive actions to halt
runaway inflation, try former military leaders for
human rights abuses, and settle the century-old Bea-
gle Channel dispute with Chile have buoyed the
President's popularity and lent him the image of a
strong leader. Alfonsin, however, has only begun to
implement his wider political agenda, which, in our
view, aims to lay the basis for long-term political
stability by shoring up democratic institutions in
Argentina. This will require profound changes in
Argentina's political culture and party system, as well
as in the attitudes and behavior of the judiciary,
legislature, military establishment, unions, and other
interest groups.
While Alfonsin can play a key role in promoting these
changes, long-term success will depend on the willing-
ness and capability of the institutions themselves to
adapt to a democratic parliamentary system. This
intelligence assessment outlines the steps Alfonsin is
taking to bolster open, competitive politics and the
shifts occurring in the country's major power centers
that either help or hinder this process. It also exam-
ines the extent to which elected government is likely
to become the norm rather than the exception in
Argentine politics and the implications of such an
evolution for US interests.
Historical Perspective
Argentina's history reveals a country where the demo-
cratic ethos has never been deeply rooted, despite the
free elections, congressional representation, separa-
tion of powers, and other trappings of representative
government found in its constitution. Argentina has
been ruled since colonial days by a small conservative
elite based primarily in the city of Buenos Aires, while
regional strongmen have controlled the outlying prov-
inces. During the first decades of the 20th century,
however, political parties representing the growing
middle class threatened to seize control of the govern-
ment and deprive the elite of its privileges. To avoid
this fate, the oligarchy turned to the military. Once in
control, the conservative-military alliance maintained
the facade of democratic rule, but undermined its
substance by relying on fraudulent elections to retain
power.
This pattern was disrupted in 1946, when the newly
created Peronist movement-itself highly authoritar-
ian in nature-dislodged the ruling elite. Peronism
mobilized the previously passive working class by
means of a populist and nationalist ideology, which, in
our view, was as corrosive to the development of a
democratic spirit as the conservatives' electoral ma-
nipulation. For the next 30 years, Peronists, the
military, and the conservative elite vied for power,
using military coups, rigged elections, general strikes,
and terrorist violence to impose their will. As a result,
the already fragile tradition of competitive elections
and civilian rule was further weakened: since Juan
Peron's reelection in 1951, no democratically elected
president has completed a full term in office (see
inset).
The Alfonsin Factor
Against this historical backdrop, Alfonsin has proved
to be an astute politician who has used his wide
popularity and firm control over the government and
his moderately left-of-center Radical Civic Union
(UCR) to tackle successfully several of Argentina's
most urgent short-term political and economic prob-
lems. The President spent much of his first two years
in office dealing with economic crises and the human
rights issue, problems that, if not forcefully addressed,
might have seriously threatened his rule. We believe
that his actions have given the administration a period
of relative political and economic stability that it can
use to undertake more fundamental long-term mea-
sures designed to buttress democratic institutions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
History of Political Turmoil
Argentina has compiled a record of political instabil-
ity second to none during the postwar era. The
country possesses a constitution that is a near copy of
that of the United States, and the major political
forces-Peronism, the military, organized labor-
have generally paid lipservice to democratic ideals.
Nevertheless, only three al 17 Presidents were freely
elected, while another two benefited from fraudulent
elections in which either the Peronist party was
proscribed or severe press restrictions limited public
debate. Ten Presidents gained power by military
machinations or an outright coup. If Alfonsin re-
mains in office until 1989, he will become the only
elected chief executive to complete a full term since
Juan Peron's first presidency.
President
Term
Means of Gaining
Office
J. D. Peron
1946-52
Free elections
J. D. Peron
1952-55
Partially free elections
E. Lonardi
1955-55
Military coup
P. E. Aramburu
1955-58
Internal military coup
A. Frondizi
1958-62
Partially free elections
J. M. Guido
1962-63
Appointed by military
A. Illia
1963-66
Partially free elections
J. C. Ongania
1966-70
Military coup
R. M. Levingston
1970-71
Internal military coup
A. Lanusse
1971-73
Internal military coup
H. Campora
1973-73
Free elections
R. Lastiri
1973-73
Provisional president
following Campora
resignation
J. D. Peron
1973-73
Free elections
I. Peron
1973-76
Succeeded after death
of husband
J. Videla
1976-81
Military coup
R. Viola
1981-81
Internal military coup
L. Galtieri
1981-82
Internal military coup
E. Bignone
1982-83
Internal military coup
R. Alfonsin
1983-
Free elections
59 ... from a small provincial town in the Pampas
... trained as lawyer at University of Buenos Aires
... rose through ranks of Radical Civic Union (UCR)
in late 1950s and early 1960s ... UCR candidate for
governor of Buenos Aires 1967... elected president
by an unexpected majority in November 1983.. .
strong advocate of social justice ... founded the
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights during last
military government ... governing style is noncon-
frontational and tolerant ... popular and respected
leader sincerely committed to democratic ideals ...
bolstered leadership image by making tough political
decisions ... has broadened his governing base by
bringing apolitical technocrats, opposition econo-
mists, and others outside the UCR into his adminis-
tration.
One of Alfonsin's most daring steps was his decision
to permit civilian trials of former military presidents
and junta members accused of human rights abuses.
The trials, in our view, were a severe blow to military
morale and dispelled any lingering illusions within the
officer corps that the armed forces would quickly
return to power. The move was also a powerful symbol
of the new civilian government's commitment to
human rights and justice, and of its determination to
face up to the long-dominant military. Polls reveal
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
ILLEGIB
that the trials were popular with the electorate and
helped confirm Alfonsin's image as a strong, decisive
leader.
term political initiatives.
Alfonsin's other signal achievement, in our view, was
his successful inflation control program, known as the
Austral Plan, launched in June 1985. It reduced
inflation from an average monthly rate of 25 percent
during the first half of the year-near the level that
had triggered past military coups-to an average of 3
percent during the second half of the year, according
to the US Embassy. Initial public support for the plan
was strong, and polls show that, over a year later, it is
still approved by over 60 percent of the populace.
Although inflation once again is inching up, it is far
from the potentially destabilizing levels of last year.
The Austral Plan, in our judgment, has not presaged
wholesale reform of the inefficient Argentine econo-
my, but it has reduced inflationary pressures suffi-
ciently to grant Alfonsin time to focus on his longer-
Foremost among these initiatives is the government's
proposed National Defense Law, which goes beyond
the punitive approach of the human rights trials and
tries to lay the groundwork for a modern, Western-
style military establishment responsive to civilian
authority. According to US Embassy reporting, the
law would reorganize and redeploy the armed forces,
enhance their combat effectiveness, and focus the
officer corps' attention on external threats to Argen-
tine sovereignty, rather than on internal subversion. It
would also place the military and civilian intelligence
services-past redoubts of coup plotting and right-
wing terrorism-under the direct control of the Presi-
dent. Finally, the law would enhance the executive's
role as commander in chief of the armed forces. =
Even more ambitious are the proposed governmental
reforms that Alfonsin unveiled in his "second repub-
lic" speech in April. The centerpiece of the initiative
is a plan to move the country's capital to Viedma, a
small provincial city 600 miles south of Buenos Aires
on the edge of the sparsely populated Patagonia
region. Alfonsin, according to Embassy and press
reports, intends the move to kindle a pioneer spirit
that would spur development in the economically
underexploited south, disperse some of the wealth and
power now concentrated in Buenos Aires, and serve as
a symbol of the new Argentina. The President has
also created a "Council for the Consolidation of
Democracy" (see inset) that is considering, among
other matters, constitutional reforms designed to limit
some of the executive's authority and allow Congress
to participate more directly in policy formulation and
implementation. Such reforms, in our view, would
introduce some checks and balances into a govern-
mental system that has been frequently characterized
by abuse of executive power and legislative lethargy.
We believe that the President views these measures as
a way of clearly distinguishing his new, democratic
Argentina from the "old republic" that was vitiated
by fraudulent elections and military coups.
Additional Support to Democracy
Even the unmitigated success of all Alfonsin's policy
initiatives would not, in our view, firmly anchor
democracy in Argentina. Significant changes in atti-
tude and behavior will also have to take place within
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
President Alfonsin initially adopted a populist eco-
nomic policy of printing-press financing that generat-
ed real wage increases at the cost of large budget
deficits. Skyrocketing inflation-averaging over 25
percent per month during the first half of last year-
caused him to change course in mid-1985 and imple-
ment the Austral Plan. The government froze prices
and wages, created a new currency, and pledged not
to print money to finance deficits.
The new program won Alfonsin wide popular support
and rapidly stabilized the Argentine economy. It
reduced inflation to a monthly average of 3 percent
during the second half of 1985, and shrank the
government deficit as a percent of GDP, largely
because of a 'forced savings plan" that required
businesses and individuals to loan money to the
government. Buenos Aires signed agreements with the
IMF and commercial bank creditors to roll over
portions of its $50.2 billion foreign debt and obtain
$5.6 billion in new lending.
The passage of time has revealed that the Austral
Plan was largely an emergency measure to overcome
hyperinflation and maintain political stability, rather
than a well-conceived project to reform Argentina's
economy. We believe that Alfonsin frittered away his
political honeymoon following the plan's implementa-
tion, missing what the US Embassy has dubbed "an
historic opportunity" to introduce structural reforms
that could have reduced the role of government in the
economy and created a more favorable climate for
private investment. The policy supplements that Bue-
nos Aires has added to the Austral Plan this year
confirm our view that Alfonsin is resigned to incre-
mental changes tailored to the statist mind-set that
prevails in Argentina.
Alfonsin may further refine the Austral Plan over the
next year, but we judge that he is unlikely to initiate
far-reaching fiscal and structural reforms. We there-
fore expect the economic gains from the program to
dissipate over time, and that Argentina's persistent
payments problems and strained relations with inter-
national creditors will reemerge.
Alfonsin 's Council for the Consolidation
of Democracy
Alfonsin created the Councillor the Consolidation of
Democracy in December 1985 to recommend ways to
strengthen and improve Argentine democracy. The
multipartisan council includes two members each
from the Radical, Peronist, and Socialist parties,
along with a Christian Democrat, a human rights
activist, and a retired general. Although the group's
diverse makeup has in some cases slowed it from
reaching a consensus on many topics, US Embassy
and press reports indicate the council is nevertheless
playing an increasingly important role in influencing
Alfonsin's decisions.
The council is divided into six commissions, studying
questions as diverse as modernization of political
institutions and regional development. In our view,
one of the most important topics on the council's
agenda is constitutional reform; the US Embassy
reports the council has created five subcommissions
to study the issue. Reforms under discussion include
direct popular elections of federal senators (they are
currently elected by the provincial legislatures), re-
ducing the presidential term from six to four years,
implementing a parliamentary-like system, and giv-
ing Congress the right to convene its own sessions.
The group is also studying the initiatives suggested
by the President in his so-called Second Republic
speech last April, the foremost of which is his
proposal to move the federal capital from Buenos
Aires to Viedma.
The council is the most concrete manifestation of
Alfonsin 's far-reaching agenda for Argentine democ-
racy. The President has put his prestige and author-
ity on the line in support of the council, according to
the US Embassy, and press reports indicate that the
electorate supports fundamental change in the coun-
try's political institutions. In our judgment, even if
many of the council's reforms fall by the wayside or
take years to implement, the fact that Argentines are
publicly discussing issues basic to the health of
democracy is in itself a positive development.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
at least some of Argentina's many political parties
and interest groups. Such a shift may be under way.
Recent transformations in Argentina's political cul-
ture, its two main parties, and the judicial system all
appear to complement Alfonsin's efforts to strengthen
democratic institutions.
Public Political Perceptions. Polls, academic studies,
and election results suggest that Argentina's public
political culture-characterized by many observers as
a free-for-all between the military, political parties,
and organized labor in which elections, coups, and
terrorism are considered to be equally legitimate ways
to achieve power-is slowly changing. On the basis of
a review'of opinion polls and the press, it appears that
the general public and important interest groups are
coming to appreciate the benefits of representative
government and civil liberties. This shift began under
the last military government, whose debacle in the
Falklands and mismanagement of the economy
sapped the legitimacy of authoritarian solutions to
Argentina's ills. Most important, the massive human
rights violations committed by that regime-unparal-
leled in Argentine history-drove home to the popu-
lace the dangers inherent in disrespect for civil rights.
Moreover, academic studies reveal that the Peronists
lost the 1983 election, in part, because they had
become identified with the military and antidemocra-
tic traditions in Argentine politics, while Alfonsin
profited from his reputation for genuinely valuing
democracy as an end in itself, not just as a means of
gaining office.
Recent polls show that this new attitude did not
dissipate along with the postelection euphoria. In a
poll taken in late 1985 (after two years of civilian
rule), 94 percent of the respondents believed that only
a democratically elected government could solve Ar-
gentina's problems, and 70 percent believed that
Argentine democracy would be consolidated over the
next few years. Other polls show Alfonsin enjoying
popularity ratings of between 64 and 72 percent,
while well over half of the electorate approves of his
specific policies. Moreover, the military and labor-
two groups that historically have received substantial
public support but whose commitment to democracy
is questionable-rate extremely low levels of public
confidence.
This change in view is further illustrated by the
Radicals' success in the congressional election of
November 1985. Despite a hard-hitting campaign in
which the opposition attacked the administration's
economic, labor, and foreign policies, the Peronists
were outpolled by the UCR by 10 percentage points.
The US Embassy reports that Peronism was hurt by
the lingering public perception-reinforced by violent
intraparty squabbling before the election-that it
retained substantial authoritarian tendencies. Fur-
thermore, Peronist candidates identified with political
openness and reform roundly defeated their more
traditionalist colleagues. For the first time in modern
Argentine political history, devotion to democratic
institutions and the rule of law-rather than populist
promises and nationalist diatribes-has become good
politics.
Party Attitudes. Argentina's two major parties, the
Peronists and the Radicals, are, in our view, also
showing signs of a serious commitment to pluralist
redirection of the country's politics, with the UCR far
in the lead. Alfonsin, for example, emphasized the
need to work with moderate opposition leaders at a
highly publicized meeting of the UCR governing
board last November, and he has brought members of
the Peronist party into the government, predominant-
ly as part of his economic team.
The US Embassy reports that Alfonsin has also taken
care to promote a collegial spirit within the Radical
party. Press accounts reveal that his control over the
UCR stems primarily from his personal charisma and
popularity and that he does not keep a tight grip on
the party apparatus.
We believe that the UCR's willingness to
tolerate internal dissent and Alfonsin's eagerness to
cooperate with other parties and interest groups pro-
vide the Argentine political system an element it has
long lacked-a major party that both runs itself and
governs the nation according to democratic rules.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Argentine Public Opinion and Democracy a
The following responses by a cross-section of the
Argentine public to questions about the value of
democracy and the Alfonsin government are evidence,
in our view, of incipient changes in Argentina's politi-
cal culture. We believe the respondents' overwhelm-
ingly positive support for democracy and the high
level of expectations from it are signs that Argentines
are growing tired of revolving-door governments and
the authoritarian politics of the country's past. Nev-
ertheless, some responses-such as the continuing
subjugation of individual liberty to the protection of
public order-indicate that the public could still
countenance authoritarian rule during a period of
economic or political crisis, or even, in our view, if the
Alfonsin government failed to fulfill the high hopes
most Argentines have for it.
The Value of Democracy
Only democratically elected governments can solve
social problems.
Expectations Under Democratic Rule
Protection of human rights.
Will increase: 88 percent
Will decrease or remain the same: 7 percent
Freedom for political activities.
Will increase: 87 percent
Will decrease or remain the same: 7 percent
Getting the government to pay attention to the aver-
age citizen.
Will be easier: 66 percent
Same or harder: 19 percent
Amount of corruption in public life.
Will decrease: 50 percent
Will increase or remain the same: 35 percent
Support for the Alfonsin Government
Agree: 94 percent Disagree: 3 percent
Democratic governments can solve serious economic
problems better than authoritarian governments.
Agree: 88 percent Disagree: 6 percent
Maintaining order is more important than protecting
the rights of individuals.
Agree: 83 percent Disagree: 12 percent
Democracy is only suitable for countries that are well
developed economically.
Agree: 38 percent Disagree: 55 percent
People should participate in important decisions even
if it delays economic recovery for a few years.
Agree: 82 percent Disagree: 11 percent
a Source: Preliminary findings of a USIA-sponsored public opinion
survey, taken in March 1986.
How do you evaluate the job done up to now by the
present government?
Very good or good: 51 percent
Fair: 39 percent
Bad or very bad: 9 percent
Don't know: 2 percent
How much confidence do you have that the Alfonsin
government can solve the country's problems?
A great deal or some: 72 percent
Little or no: 25 percent
Don't know: 3 percent
Do you approve or disapprove of the present govern-
ment's management of the country's economy?
Approve: 50 percent
Disapprove: 36 percent
Don't know: 14 percent
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
The rival Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ) has made
much less progress in this area, but the trend is
nevertheless positive. Some PJ leaders-primarily in
the so-called Reformist faction-are as effusive in
their public endorsement of the new politics as the
Radicals, have avoided destructive criticism of the
Alfonsin regime, and have even attempted to intro-
duce democratic procedures within the PJ. Neverthe-
less, old-style bosses still run the party in dictatorial
fashion, resist any serious effort to reform Peronism's
basically authoritarian ideology, and some, according
to Embassy reports, maintain close ties to disgruntled
military officers. We believe, however, that, while the
Reformist Peronists are not presently in command of
the party, they represent a younger, up-and-coming
generation that has a good chance of eventually
molding the movement in their image. In our view,
Reformist domination of the PJ would moderate the
party's often obstructionist behavior and alter its
historical tendency to conspire with the military or
labor against elected governments, thus further aiding
the development of a mature, competitive political
system in Argentina.
We believe that the absence of strong, radical right-
or left-wing groups capable of pressuring Alfonsin or
committing destabilizing acts of violence also pro-
motes the country's democratic evolution. The radical
leftist Intransigent Party
describe as infiltrated by former People's
Revolutionary Army terrorists and whose leaders
have ties to Havana-polled 6 percent in the 1985
congressional race, placing it a distant third behind
the UCR and the PJ. The numerous other far left
parties are tiny, disorganized, and uninfluential_
Moreover, Argentina's
last military government decimated the once powerful
leftist guerrilla groups-the Montoneros and the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army. Most of their few surviving
leaders are in prison or exile, and press reports reveal
that their violent campaigns in the 1970s discredited
them with the Argentine public.
The extreme right is also weak at present, according
to the US Embassy. The press and Argentine Govern-
ment officials have implicated far right civilian and
military sectors in several terrorist bombing incidents
over the past year. These actions, however, have failed
to destabilize the Alfonsin regime and, in our view,
may have enhanced its prestige as a contrasting
bulwark of political decorum. Polls show that the
radical right has even less popular support than the
extreme left. We believe that in the current political
climate the far right's fortunes are unlikely to improve
and that even a small-scale resurgence will be diffi-
cult, since many rightwing extremist leaders are in
exile to avoid arrest.
The Judiciary. The trials of military officers for
human rights violations have given the judicial branch
a highly visible role over the past three years, but its
most important contribution to democracy, in our
view, is its growing independence. The court system in
Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, has been
subservient to other branches of government, especial-
ly the executive. Since the return to democracy,
however, US Embassy and press reports indicate that
the administration has implemented measures to pro-
tect the courts' autonomy and improve the speed and
quality of justice. Congress, for example, increased
the judicial budget by 12 percent in 1985, according
to the US Embassy, and also authorized the Supreme
Court, for a one-year trial period, to set salaries for its
judges and other officers that had been previously
mandated by the executive. Moreover, Congress is
presently considering legislation to create a judiciary
treasury, funded through fines and court fees, that
would be independent of the national budget.
Judicial reform has also become a priority project of
Alfonsin's Council for the Consolidation of Democra-
cy. The council has recommended key changes in the
courts, according to press reports, including trial by
jury-not a normal practice in Argentina-and a
sharp streamlining of the cumbersome legal bureau-
cracy. In our view, these changes would help to mold a
strong, independent judiciary that can buttress Ar-
gentine political health by helping to implement the
system of checks and balances provided for in the
constitution.
Key Challenges to Democracy
Despite the many changes taking place that support
the development of a democratic governmental system
in Argentina, we see many strains in the country's
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
political fabric. We believe that several key institu-
tions and interest groups remain too weak to play a
positive role in consolidating democracy, while others
are still rooted in the authoritarian ethos that has
thwarted political stability in Argentina over the past
half-century.
Lack of a Competitive Party System. One of the
primary shortcomings of Argentina's current political
landscape, in our view, is the relative weakness of all
parties except the UCR. Peronism remains a mass
movement, but the party is riven by factional infight-
ing and shows no signs of reuniting in the near term,
according to the press. The US Embassy reports that
efforts at reconciliation through a national party
congress have failed repeatedly over the past two
years. Incessant squabbling, combined with a leader-
ship vacuum, has virtually paralyzed the party and
prevented it from developing into a viable alternative
to the Radicals. Moreover, although Peronism still
retains the loyalty of about a third of the electorate,
its popular support has been steadily eroding, as
reflected in the defeats the movement received at the
Another roadblock to broad political participation is
the absence of a strong conservative party. The
Argentine business community and upper middle
classes have generally shunned engagement in elector-
al politics, preferring to depend on the military to
defend their social and economic interests. This pat-
tern shows few signs of change: the country's leading
rightwing party polled only 3.5 percent of the vote in
last November's congressional election, and petty
personal and ideological disputes among conservative
groups continue to impede the formation of a united
front on the right. As a result, an important sector of
Argentine society feels alienated from the democratic
process, and, in our view, this could dispose them to
support a military coup during a time of economic or
political crisis.
The Military. We believe that altering the military's
perception of its role in society is key to the success of
democracy in Argentina.' Civilian rule in Buenos
Aires has in no way lessened the armed forces'
penchant for politics:
polls in 1983 and 1985.
Peronism's disarray, combined with the fact that
other parties are too weak to compete on the national
level, allows the UCR to govern largely unfettered. So
far, Alfonsin has assiduously avoided the temptations
to autocratic rule inherent in such a situation, prefer-
ring to nurture what democratic potential exists in
Peronism rather than try to eliminate it as a political
force. Some sectors of the Radical party, however,
have publicly expressed interest in converting the
UCR into a "historical movement" that would expand
its control over Argentine society and politics in a
basically authoritarian fashion.' Such a project, in our
view, could produce a Mexican-style, single-party
system, rather than a truly open one.
'One element of this approach is a constitutional amendment being
pushed by some UCR activists to permit Alfonsin to succeed
himself when his term expires in 1989. These militants believe
Alfonsin would be easily reelected, thus giving the UCR another
four or six years to cement its dominance of Argentine politics.
Alfonsin, however, has not committed himself to supporting this
the press ~
report a widespread percep-
tion among some members of the armed forces that
Alfonsin's actions-including the human rights trials
and the National Defense Law-are intended ulti-
mately to destroy the military. The President's efforts
to reorganize the security forces
are meeting wit ttt e or no cooper-
ation within the ranks
The persistent hostility of the armed forces toward
Alfonsin, in our view, will keep civil-military relations
tense and hold open the prospect of military interven-
tion in politics. We concur
that the military
continues to see its prime function as eradicating
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Trials offormer Junta members
for human rights abuses earned
the government widespread
popular support but have an-
leftist subversion and repairing the damage wrought
by inept civilian governments, rather than defending
the country from outside aggression. Until this pro-
pensity to go beyond professional military duties is
curbed, issues as varied as the prosecution of officers
for human rights abuses, a resurgence of hyperinfla-
tion, or a spate of leftist terrorist attacks could spark
serious coup plotting.
Organized Labor. According to press and US Embas-
sy reports, Argentina's Peronist-dominated labor
movement remains ambivalent toward democratic
processes. Within the unions' umbrella organization,
the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), old-guard
leaders rely on strong-arm methods of contro
unions to hold free internal elections-a process that
almost surely will curb the power of the more auto-
cratic union chiefs.
labor's opposition to
Alfonsin has generally been ineffective, mainly be-
cause of the unions' disorganization and strong public
support for the President's economic policies. Since
the beginning of this year, however, labor's frustration
has grown: the CGT has sponsored three general
strikes and its leaders' public attacks on the govern-
ment have become more frequent and vitriolic. The
CGT has repeatedly backed out of negotiations with
the government on wage and social issues, preferring
to resort to confrontation when it could not achieve all
of its goals at the bargaining table.
Moreover,
although union leaders verbally support democracy, in
our view, they prefer traditional practices that gave
labor much more clout than it enjoys today. They are
more attuned to the past, when deals cut between
institutions such as labor, the military, and Peron-
ism-rather than elections or parliamentary maneu-
vering-determined the course of the nation. CGT
leaders have been especially critical of the govern-
ment's move to democratize labor by forcing the
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Congress. US Embassy and press reports indicate that
Argentina's legislature has not yet played an impor-
tant role in the country's new democracy. Congress,
overshadowed by the President's personality and polit-
ical adroitness, suffers further from the inexperience
of most legislators and the tendency of opposition
members to take knee-jerk adversary positions vis-a-
vis government policy. The Embassy reports that
Congress has failed to seize the initiative on most
important issues, leaving itself sidelined while both
the executive and judiciary have played activist roles.
Moreover, the Embassy adds that Congress has been
plagued by procedural difficulties, such as the inabil-
ity to raise a quorum, poor relations with the Presi-
dential liaison office, and intense inter- and intra-
party rivalries.
There are some signs, however, that change may be in
the offing. President Alfonsin's Council for the Con-
solidation of Democracy is focusing on measures to
strengthen the legislature and make it a fuller partner
in government. The US Embassy reports that Con-
gress earned some public respect in a series of tele-
vised debates on the foreign debt aired last March. In
addition, the legislative agenda for this year includes
several important issues, such as divorce, the National
Defense Law, and constitutional reform, which may
give Congress the opportunity to improve both its
performance and image, and contribute to accustom-
ing Argentines to the give-and-take of a competitive
system.
scathed.
Outlook
We believe that Argentina will need some time-
probably as much as a decade of elective civilian
rule-for its social and political institutions to mature
and shed long-held authoritarian habits. Develop-
ments such as constitutional reform and the revital-
ization of Peronism are key to this long-term process.
In our view, however, Alfonsin will be doing well in
the short term if-as we expect-he preserves eco-
nomic and social stability sufficiently to keep his
political prestige-which for most Argentine citizens
has come to personify democracy-relatively un-
In our judgment, at least some of the basic require-
ments for Alfonsin's success are already in place. The
President's own commitment to democracy will be
buttressed by a public increasingly disposed to favor
the style and values he promotes. The military, weak-
ened as a political force, will, in our opinion, remain
unable to effectively assert its will during Alfonsin's
tenure. Finally, the vital judiciary that has emerged
seems almost certain to continue its vigorous guard-
ianship of individual liberties.
Alfonsin will remain in power over the next two years
and will meet considerable success in consolidating
these gains. The President, in our view, will take the
steps needed to check pressures-such as hyperinfla-
tion or a sharp recession-that could set the stage for
political instability. He will also continue his skillful
management of labor, Peronist and military opposi-
tion through negotiation, public pressure, or forceful
use of his broad executive powers.
Changing the fundamental nature of Argentine poli-
tics will be a much more difficult and longer-term
project. Although Alfonsin has been instrumental in
fostering democracy in Argentina, we believe that his
personal role in this regard will have to diminish in
coming years in favor of other leaders and institutions
who can provide continuity if the new Argentine
politics are to achieve permanence. Alfonsin's pro-
posed "Second Republic" reforms, to be implemented
toward the end of his six-year term, may lay the
groundwork for such continuity by boosting the legis-
lature's contribution and decentralizing the power of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
~E57Nd EN CONFLICTO ???
Labor has adopted a confrontational attitude
under democracy. This cartoon reads "Mr. Min-
ister, I have a list of all the unions on strike" to
which the Minister replies "Let's be brief-just
Buenos Aires. We believe that enforcement of the
National Defense Law, by restructuring the armed
forces, will lessen the military's ability-if not de-
sire-to intervene in politics.
Sustained progress, moreover, will result, in our view,
only when other key institutions-which to date have
shown only lukewarm support for the changes of
recent years-begin to alter their attitudes and ac-
tions. Although the evidence is mixed, we think on
balance such changes have a good chance of occur-
ring. Continued public preference for centrist politics,
for example, probably will result in the eventual
dominance within the Peronist party of its pragmatic
Reformist faction. The 1987 gubernatorial elections
and 1989 presidential elections will be milestones by
which to measure how successfully Peronism adapts
to the increasingly democratic tastes of the electorate.
internal elections recently mandated by the govern-
ment. The elections also will probably compel old-
guard union bosses to either abandon their confronta-
tional style or risk being replaced by a new generation
of more progressive leaders open to compromise and
negotiation.
Downside Scenarios. Argentina, however, remains
politically volatile, and we believe that its fragile
democratic institutions could still buckle easily under
duress. A key catalyst for such a scenario would, in
our view, be an unraveling of Alfonsin's economic
program, characterized by the return of hyperinfla-
tion and a severe recession. Such economic reverses
could set the stage for widespread labor agitation,
social disorder, growing right- and left-wing violence,
and a plummeting of Alfonsin's popularity, especially
among the middle class. We judge that the political
chaos engendered by an economic collapse might
alone suffice to discredit Alfonsin completely and spur
sectors of Peronism and the labor movement to knock
on the barracks doors. The military could then inter-
vene, returning Argentina to its traditional pattern of
praetorian politics and revolving-door governments.
The most serious threat to civilian rule stems, in our
view, from military discontent over human rights
trials. Nearly 300 such cases involving junior, mid-
level, and senior officers are now pending in civilian
courts.
We believe that influential sectors of the armed forces
would consider moving to topple Alfonsin rather than
accept such "humiliation" from civilian courts, even
though public antagonism and international opinion
would make military rule difficult if not untenable.
25X1
25X1
Dissatisfaction among the rank and file with current
labor leadership is another healthy sign, in our view,
that may lead to more responsible union behavior.
Democratic practices within the labor movement may
be strengthened if the unions carry out the free
Implications for the United States
The development of strong democratic institutions, in
our judgment, will buttress US goals in Argentina and
elsewhere in the region. Although US-Argentine rela-
tions will almost certainly suffer from occasional
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
disputes over economic issues and Argentina's need to
pay occasional lipservice to Third World initiatives, a
democratic government in Buenos Aires will most
likely remain aligned with the West. Such a govern-
ment would be reluctant to make radical moves on the
foreign debt front and would probably pursue a
peaceful resolution of the Falkland Islands dispute
with the United Kingdom.
A democracy with widespread public support will, in
our view, also discourage extremist, anti-US groups
such as the Montoneros from operating outside of the
legitimate political arena. The demise of the terrorist
left would remove one of the main pretexts used by
the civilian radical right and antidemocratic elements
in the military-who are often equally anti-US-
from intervening in politics.
Finally, a successful prolongation of Argentina's dem-
ocratic experiment would further isolate Chile and
Paraguay-the major nondemocratic governments
left in South America.
. We also believe that a
democratic regime in Buenos Aires will likewise en-
courage and support civilian governments in other
countries such as Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000300370001-3