NIGERIA: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL STABILITY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence 25X1
Nigeria:
Population Problems
and Political Stability
e-
-ALA 86-10041
September 1986
Copy 4 8 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Nigeria:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALAO 25X1
Secret
ALA 86-10041
September 1986
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Nigeria:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
Summary Nigeria, the richest and most populous state in black Africa, has served
Information available over the years as a reliable source of crude oil for the United States and its
as of 29 August 1986 Western allies, and as a supporter in Third World forums. Nigeria's
was used in this report.
explosive population growth against a backdrop of dwindling oil revenues,
however, not only poses serious domestic challenges to the regime of
moderate President Ibrahim Babangida, but over time is likely to create
conditions conducive to serious political instability that could open the door
further to external meddling from Libya and Iran. F_~
We believe two key population trends are influencing Nigeria's socio-
economic balance:
? Rapid Population Growth. We estimate that the Nigerian population will
increase rapidly well into the next century and that this growth will act as
an important constraint on efforts to achieve national unity. The current
population of 105.4 million is projected to double over the next 24 years
to reach 211 million by 2010.
? A Fast-Growing Youth Population. The majority of young people
between 15 and 24 are poorly educated and lack well-paying jobs. As a
group they will increasingly strain an already overloaded educational
system and face dim employment prospects. Their numbers, expected to
increase from today's 20 million to 30 million by 2000, will provide
increasingly fertile ground for recruitment efforts by radical political
leaders and religious zealots, in our view.
This population surge, in turn, is almost certain to affect Nigeria's
socioeconomic balance, and we believe a number of issues are likely to take
on increasing importance in determining overall stability in Nigeria:
? Regionalism. We expect north-south rivalries to intensify against a
background of rapid population growth, sluggish economic growth, and
divisive regional competition for shrinking social and economic resources.
The growth in absolute size of regional populations will put serious stress
on the country's resource base. The north's 37 million people are
estimated by the US Census Bureau to nearly double to 72 million by
Secret
ALA 86-10041
September 1986
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Secret
2010, while the south's 51 million will more than double to 105 million
by 2010, and alone will equal the population of the whole of today's
Nigeria. Moreover, we believe Muslim northern leaders will be especial-
ly frustrated by the ongoing migration of northern young people seeking
jobs and schooling in southern cities, reinforcing the leaders' fear that
their traditional power is being eroded in favor of better educated, more
Western-oriented southerners. This migration is estimated to be on the
increase, demographically signaling a slow, but inevitable drop in the
proportionate size of the north and the middle belt in favor of the south.
? Ethnicity. Judging from our review of academic and US official
reporting, we believe ethnic divisiveness-which parallels and reinforces
regional rivalries-is also deepening under the twin threats of high
population growth and a shrinking economy. The Hausa-Fulani of the
north, the Yoruba of the southwest, and the Ibo of the southeast will re-
tain their approximate two-thirds share of the total population, but will
each double in size over the next few decades. This growth will put
increased demands on their ethnic communities and traditional leaders to
secure for them the largest possible share of a dwindling supply of basic
services and goods. Although the remaining 250 minority tribal groups
will grow nearly as quickly as the three largest tribes, their larger size
will not be an advantage, but rather will increase their need to fight for
scarce national goods and services.
? Religion. Religious tensions, coinciding with ethnic and regional faction-
alism, continue to polarize Nigerians and could become even more
contentious as rapid population growth aggravates deep-seated socio-
economic differences. Nationally, about 50 percent of the population is
Muslim and concentrated in the north, 40 percent is Christian and lives
largely in the south, and the remaining 10 percent are adherents of
traditional animist beliefs and are scattered throughout the country.
Religious controversy flared recently over Nigeria's membership in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, which fueled Christian fears of
a Muslim takeover of national powers. Religious unrest has not erupted
on a national scale, but local outbreaks of sect-related violence are
frequent, according to US Embassy reporting.
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? Explosive City Growth. Demographic pressures resulting from rapid
population growth are intense in Nigeria's cities where nearly one-third
of the total population lives. Urban ranks are swelling at an annual rate
of nearly 4.5 percent, over one and one-half times the national growth
rate. In addition to the rapid natural growth of the population, internal
migration is also increasing city size. A vast rural-to-urban migration of
some 5 million over the last decade is expected to increase threefold in
the next 10 years, according to the US Census Bureau. If this occurs, the
urban infrastructure-housing, power, water, sewerage, drainage, and
roadways-is almost certain to deteriorate across the country. At the
same time, a continuing exodus of people to the cities will intensify
unemployment problems in urban areas as well as fuel the need to ensure
adequate food, housing, and medical and educational services for the
growing population concentrations.
If, as we believe, Nigerian authorities remain incapable of halting the
country's economic decline and are unable to find a formula to ameliorate
societal divisiveness, the odds for the emergence of increased social
instability will grow. An environment of increasing demands and dwindling
resources, fueled by unabated population growth, could bring about
conditions that would undermine moderate government and provide the
opportunity for a radical regime to gain acceptance, or, alternatively,
promote the spread of violence.
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Summary
iii
Scope Note
ix
Rapid Population Growth: The Bottom Line
I
The Fast-Growing Youth Population
3
Employment
3
Regional, Ethnic, and Religious Divisions
5
Regional and Ethnic Tensions
7
Religious Divisiveness
9
Explosive City Growth
11
Outlook and Implications for the United States
13
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Scope Note
Demographic estimates and projections obtained under contract from the
US Bureau of the Census are the basis for the statistical judgments made
in this paper. Although data on Nigeria's demographic, social, and
economic situation are often inadequate, and sometimes nonexistent, the
Bureau drew on numerous sample surveys and UN estimates dating from
1932 through 1985 to estimate trends in fertility, mortality, and migration.
The incomplete results of the Nigerian 1963 census were adjusted through
the use of indirect demographic techniques using the survey estimates. This
adjusted census base was used to make the projections. We also consulted
official Nigerian sources, academic studies, and US Embassy reporting to
obtain social and economic data.
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Total Population
by Country
(in millions)
r100
Figure 1
African Population Estimates
mid-1986
South
Africa
(33.2)
Ethiopia
" (43.9)
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Nigeria:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
population into a cohesive national entity.'
economy have hindered efforts to unite the diverse
Nigeria is the demographic giant of Sub-Saharan
Africa. Approximately one of every five Africans live
within its boundaries, and its 105.4 million people
make it more than twice the size of black Africa's
next largest population, Ethiopia's 43.9 million. Ac-
cording to UN statistics, Nigeria is currently the 10th
most populous country in the world, and demogra-
phers estimate that by 2025 it will take over fourth
place, immediately behind China, India, and the
USSR, and followed by the United States in fifth
place. Despite its rich human resource base, however,
rapidly changing central governments and a declining
This assessment focuses on Nigeria's population dy-
namics and the impact they have for altering the
balance among regional, religious, and tribal groups,
as well as the implications for rapid urbanization.
These factors will be important determinants in
Lagos's attempts to maintain political stability. F_
Rapid Population Growth: The Bottom Line
closer to 217 million.
The causes of Nigeria's explosive population
growth-high birth rates coupled with a more rapid
decline in death rates-will be sustained and translate
into high growth well into the 21st century, in our
view. US Census Bureau projections show Nigeria's
population doubling over the next 24 years, reaching a
total of some 211 million by 2010. This figure-
projecting an average yearly addition of slightly fewer
than 4.5 million people-assumes a decline in both
birth and death rates. If birth rates do not decline by
the estimated 10 points, or if death rates drop more
quickly than projected, yearly population additions
will be even larger and the resulting total will be
' There have been six military coups and eight different heads of
state in Nigeria since independence from Britain in 1960.1
Figure 2
Nigeria: Population Growth, 1970-2010
25 I I I I I I 1 I I
0 1970 80 90 2000 10
310411 1086
25X1
We foresee no slowdown in this pattern of growth.
Because birth rates have been so high for so long, and
to a lesser degree because of the decline in mortality,
there is a built-in demographic momentum for rapid
growth that can be altered only by an unrealistically
massive emigration, an equally unrealistic precipitous
drop in fertility, or by a catastrophic loss of life. The
US Census Bureau data show that Nigeria has a very
young population; approximately 45 percent is under
15 years of age (compared with 22 percent in devel-
oped countries). Births currently outnumber deaths by
more than 2.5 to 1, a ratio that will increase to 3 to 1
in 15 years as the disproportionately large numbers of
children grow older and have children of their own
(see figure 3).F---]
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Figure 3
Nigeria: Birth, Death, and Natural
Increase Rates? 1960-2010
55
50
5
0 1960 70 80 90 2000 10
a Natural increase rate is a birth rate minus a death rate.
Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1985.
Natural
increase
Demographically, the six- or seven-child family of
Nigeria today is decades away from the two-child
replacement level, when individual couples just re-
place themselves, births and deaths become equal, and
growth begins to taper off. Even when, and if, the
two-child family becomes the norm, the population
will continue to increase. It will take 50 years before
the large numbers of youth are no longer replaced by
even larger new generations, and growth stops. Theo-
retically, if replacement-level fertility were to begin
immediately, Nigeria would still grow by another 80
to 100 percent due to the momentum inherent in its
youthful age structure.
We believe that Nigeria's failure to effectively ad-
dress the population question precludes a significant
drop in the growth rate through the end of this
century. Data from the Nigerian portion of the World
Fertility Survey of 1982 reveal that, while women
have six or seven children, they would prefer to have
more, and that only 6 percent use family planning. A
new draft population policy calling for enhanced
family planning and health programs is currently
under consideration by the Nigerian Government.
The draft, formulated by a national consultative
group with assistance from international donors and
sponsored by the Ministry of Health, asserts that
family planning programs are the most effective and
low-cost measures for controlling social problems and
stemming rapid growth in the shortest possible time.
The government has taken no public stand on the
issue as yet, but the Nigerian press has opened a lively
debate both for and against the new initiative.
According to experts working with Third World
countries where substantial fertility decline has oc-
curred, programs as sensitive as family planning have
little chance of success unless there is strong support
from the highest levels of government and grassroots
involvement in planning and managing outreach pro-
grams-elements that have been absent in Nigeria's
case. Political caution, rather than energetic program-
ing, has characterized Nigeria's approach to family
planning policy in the past. During the 1970s and
early 1980s, successive governments reacted to rapid
growth and high fertility by launching development
programs to try to meet growing social and economic
needs, but avoided policies that dealt directly with the
birth rate and thus would be controversial, according
to Nigerian planning documents. The government's
recent willingness to propose a new population policy
specifically naming family planning, however, may
finally signal the beginning of serious efforts to
grapple with the country's difficult population
problems.
Rapid population growth will clearly intensify the
problem of achieving any meaningful degree of social
and economic development in Nigeria. At a growth
rate of about 2.9 percent annually, the population is
increasing by more than 15 percent every five years.
According to the Health Ministry, Nigeria would
have to double its food production and provision of
health services, water supply, housing, sanitation, and
electricity over the next 20 years in order to maintain
the present, but already inadequate, standard of
living-an unattainable goal, in our view (see figures
4 and 5).
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Figure 4
Nigeria: Compounding Population Growth,
1960-2010
51.7
million
increase in
25 years
million
increase in
25 years
1960 1985 12010
L growth ~ L growth J
rate rate
Youths comprise slightly over one-third of all persons
of working ages-those between 15 and 64. Today,
there are nearly 20 million youths searching for jobs
or advanced training in an economy that has been
shrinking since 1981. Their numbers will swell to 30
million by 2000, a consequence of especially high
population growth rates in the 1970s and early 1980s.
We estimate that there will be approximately 40
million in this age bracket by 2010, an increase which
will only intensify this group's potential impact on
Nigeria's social and political life (see figure 6). F_
Employment
The absence of jobs, especially for educated youth, is
a major element leading to serious youth alienation.
Indeed, academic studies indicate that, when young
people are denied an opportunity to secure even a first
job, their unemployment can become a major ingredi-
ent for future political instability. Youths are now the
victims of a stagnant labor market; over the past six
years, the labor force has moved from manpower
shortages to growing surpluses, according to Western
academicians and reports by Nigerian labor unions.
The US Embassy expects that this prolonged period
of high unemployment will wear down the patience of
Nigerians over the next several years and raise the
potential for outbreaks of serious social unrest.
The Fast-Growing Youth Population
From a manpower perspective, Nigeria's demographic
surge is having its most profound impact on the youth
population. While population growth overall seems
almost certain to outpace government capabilities to
meet social and economic needs, rapid growth in the
young adult age group may pose a further complicat-
ing factor in Nigeria. Various academic and govern-
ment studies point to the youth sector as a factor
inducing political instability.' We believe that in the
Nigerian case, young people in the 15-to-24 age
group-frustrated by unmet expectations for educa-
tion and employment-constitute a potentially vola-
tile group that can present a ready audience for
radical political and religious leaders. In our view, this
sector of society is likely to emerge as a major source
of social and political unrest.
Although labor force data are notoriously inadequate, 25X1
Nigerian estimates show that approximately 70 per-
cent of the unemployed are under 25. Some 108,000
students are now enrolled in Nigerian universities,
and education officials estimate that 60,000 university
graduates over the past three years have yet to find
employment. The highest unemployment level, how-
ever, is among the 614,000-per-year secondary school
graduates, according to Nigerian manpower experts.
At the bottom rung are primary school graduates,
who also expect a job in the modern sector, according
to the US Embassy.
Education
Neither the expectation of attaining higher education
nor that of upward mobility through education ap-
pears to be coming true for Nigerian youth today. The
majority have only a primary education, most finding
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Figure 5
Nigeria: Population Pyramids, 1986 and 2010
75
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
2010
Male
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
it difficult or impossible to win places in secondary
schools or universities because of rising costs and lack
of facilities, according to US Embassy reporting.
Secondary and higher education graduates discover
their skills inadequate or unneeded in a contracting
modern-sector job market, according to Embassy
sources. Meantime, austerity measures are shrinking
the already inadequate number of trained teachers,
school buildings, and supplies, according to Education
Ministry officials. World Bank data for 1982-even
before the most recent deterioration in the economy-
show that, while nearly all children in the primary
ages go to school, only 16 percent are enrolled in
secondary school, and 3 percent in higher education.
As a consequence, undereducated and unemployed
young people are pushed into the streets or subsistence
society of rural areas, where, in our judgment, they
are likely to blame the central government for depriv-
ing them of opportunity.
We believe the potential for violent unrest is especial-
ly high on university campuses. The US Embassy
reports that Nigerian students are politically aware
and have a reputation for speaking out on issues
through student organizations. President Babangida,
who took power in a military coup last August,
initially received student support when he announced
the restoration of free speech and lifted the bans on
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Figure 6
Nigeria: Youth Growth Persists Despite Slowed Growth Rate, 1976-2010
15-24 year olds as
percent of national
population
30
3
20
2
10
Population growth rate
Percent
student organizations. Subsequently, however, contro-
versial questions such as Nigeria's membership in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the
proposed institution of Islamic law courts in non-
Muslim areas, and debate over acceptance of an IMF
program have proved divisive issues. The honeymoon
between government and students ended abruptly last
May when a wave of protests against police brutality
swept many university campuses, according to the
Nigerian press. We believe violent student protests
will become more frequent if, as seems likely, Nigeri-
an leaders prove unable to stem economic decline or
resolve contentious political issues.F__1
Regional, Ethnic, and. Religious Divisions
We believe that the rapid rise in population coupled
with slow economic growth will intensify longstanding
rivalries between regional, ethnic, and religious
groups as the size of the per capita economic pie
declines. With fewer resources to pass on, the central
government will find it increasingly difficult to avert
open conflict between the various groups amid the
escalating competition for dwindling economic and
social resources needed to support their burgeoning
populations.F_~
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Figure 7
Nigeria's States and Regions
Regions as a Percent of Total Population,
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Nigeria: Regional and State
Populations, 1986 to 2010
Population Growth
(millions) Rate,
1986-2010
1986 2010 (percent)
Population Growth
(millions) Rate,
1986-2010
1986 2010 (percent)
Population
(millions)
Growth
Rate,
1986-2010
1986
2010
(percent)
Population
(millions)
Growth
Rate,
1986-2010
1986
2010
(percent)
Note: Regional groups are estimated by CIA on the basis of
historical, geographical, and tribal considerations. They do not
imply tribal, religious, or political homogeneity. Population data for
states are from the US Bureau of the Census.
Regional and Ethnic Tensions
The demographic composition and rapid growth of the
population, along with intense regional loyalties for
ethnic homelands, explain in part the nature of the
present regional and ethnic divisiveness and give
indications that these rivalries are likely to intensify in
the future. Nearly two-thirds of the population belong
to three major tribes-the Hausa-Fulani in the north,
the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east-that
aggressively compete for favored treatment by the
central government. This political struggle can be
traced through the efforts by former regimes to
restructure Nigeria's regional boundaries. The three
principal regions at the time of independence became
four by 1963, followed by a complete breakdown
during the civil war from 1967 to 1970 caused by the
former eastern region's (Biafra's) threatened seces-
sion. After the war, states were formed-first 12, and
by 1976 the present 19-which broke up the large
regional bases of the majority tribes and granted some
measure of autonomy to ethnic minorities, particular-
ly in the middle belt states that occupy the center of
the country (see inset, "Regionalism and the Popula-
tion Census Fiascoes"). F__-]
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Figure 8
Nigeria's Tribal and Religious Distribution
Population by Tribe, 1986 and 2010
Population in millions 1986
Hausa & Fulani
(intermingled)
Ibo
0 Yoruba
MUSLIM PERCENTAGE
? over 70
MINOR TRIBES
0 Kanuri
Edo
Nupe
Ijaw
Other
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Although the approximately 250 minority tribes have
gained readier access to the smaller state bureaucra-
cies resulting from the regional breakup, the over-
whelming size of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo
groups and their geographic concentrations perpetu-
ate their ethnic advantage. High growth rates for all
groups, estimated to be between 2.8 and 3.2 percent
by the US Bureau of the Census, assure that all of the
tribal populations will double in size over the next two
and one-half decades, leaving the present tribal per-
centages nearly static between now and 2010. The
larger size of each group, especially if the economy
does not have commensurate growth, will mean the
scramble for basic social and economic services will
become even more intense (see inset, "Economic and
Social Disparities").F---]
northern grip on the central government.
Growth Imbalances. The demographic imbalance in
regional size and growth further aggravates ethnic
divisiveness and contributes to the longstanding north-
south conflict. Nigeria's northern and southern re-
gions each are many times larger than most African
nations, and, at their current rate of growth, almost
certainly will provide colossal management challenges
for the government in the future. With 51 million
people, the south by itself could be the most populous
country in Africa, and the north's 37 million could
give it the fourth-largest population of black Africa's
48 states. Projected to grow by 3 percent annually, the
southern population will more than double to 105
million in 24 years, equaling the present population of
all of Nigeria, according to US Census Bureau projec-
tions. The north, growing at only a slightly lower rate,
will nearly double its population to reach 72 million
over the same period. The smaller 18 million popula-
tion of the middle belt states-still larger than 80
percent of African countries-will also almost double
to reach 35 million during this time frame. Coupled
with what the US Embassy reports has been the slow
erosion of its political superiority, the north's relative-
ly smaller population could become another weakness
that southerners might seize upon to loosen the
Although growth is explosive in all regions, the per-
centage shares of the total population of the north and
of the middle belt are slowly dropping, a result of an
expanding flow of predominantly young migrants
seeking jobs and education in the cities of the south,
according to population studies. The southwest, home
to the Yoruba tribe and the site of the capital, Lagos,
is the fastest growing and most Westernized area in
Nigeria. The outmigration of the most able northern
youth, along with the more general perception that
the south could overwhelm the north by sheer num-
bers, almost certainly adds to the frustration and
distrust of the established northern elites toward the
more aggressive southern tribesmen.
Religious Divisiveness
A deepening of ethnic and regional divisiveness could
provoke a surge in religious tensions as well. Never far
from the surface, and often paralleling ethnic and
regional factionalism-with Muslim influence cen-
tered in the north among the Hausa-Fulani people
and Christianity predominant in the south-divisive
religious issues often take on the air of a north-south
confrontation, according to the US Embassy. More-
over, intense ethnoreligious frictions often result in
localized violence, when pockets of Christians in the
north-usually members of minority tribes-come
under attack by Muslim Hausa-Fulani, according to
numerous reports from Western missionaries and
Nigerian officials.'
Western and Nigerian sociologists report, however,
that among the Yoruba of the southwest, where
Christians and Muslims each account for about 40
percent of the population, religious tensions are dif-
fused by a strong acceptance of their common Yoruba
culture and tradition. Nevertheless, we agree with the
US Embassy that on national issues, where religious
affiliation often has ethnic and regional implications,
the Christian and Muslim communities tend to stand
together, each fearing encroachment and domination
by the other.
Given the'pressures building from declining oil reve-
nues and a shrinking economy, religious and ethnic
strife could intensify unless the government is seen as
evenhanded and meticulously neutral, according to
' In 1966, just prior to the civil war, an estimated 30,000 Ibo living
in the north were killed by northern mobs and another I million
fled to safety in the eastern region following an Ibo-led coup
attempt that claimed the lives of several senior northern religious
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Regionalism and the Population Census Fiascoes
Regionalism played a decisive role in the failures of
four population censuses since the early 1950s. The
politicization of the census process by regional power
brokers has resulted in counts so obviously biased
that none is able to stand as a reasonable population
estimate, according to US and Nigerian scholars.
Nigeria has officially accepted only the 1963 census,
disregarding or officially repudiating the other three.
of the incompleteness of the data.
Controversies over census counts began before inde-
pendence when the 1952-53 enumeration found 30
million people, with 55 percent attributed to the
northern region, according to census historians. US
and Nigerian academics report that southerners pro-
tested, charging that colonial authorities had inflated
the northern total in order to achieve a northern
majority in the Federal House of Assembly. South-
ern politicians expected that the next census would
favor the south, thereby setting the record straight,
according to the academics. Demographers today
agree that the population was undercounted by at
least 10 percent, even though undercounts are highly
unusual in Third World countries. Further, a reliable
differentiation of population as belonging either to
the north or south is technically impossible because
The 1962 census was more of a political debacle than
the previous one, in our view, doing little to reassure
southerners that they had-finally received a fair
enumeration. Although the results were never pub-
lished, it is understood by population specialists that
the national count was 45 million, of whom 22
million were in the north. Nevertheless, the Federal
Census Office announced that the north officially
contained 31 million people, giving it nearly 70
percent of the population. The enumeration through-
out the eastern region was described as 'false and
inflated, " and failure to enumerate large areas of the
western region was laid to weaknesses in the regional
organization-the census document reports that the
western region was under a state of emergency and
the regional government was suspended during the
enumeration period. Rising political turmoil forced
the federal prime minister to acknowledge the failure
of the census and announce plans for a new count,
according to the United Nations.
The recount in 1963 was both a demographic and a
political failure, in the opinion of most US and
Nigerian scholars. The final results appear to have
been produced by the determination of all regions to
match the east's capacity for falsification the year
before, according to academic reports. The vastly
inflated total population was announced to be 56
million people, nearly 54 percent of them in the north.
The growth rate between 1953 and 1963 was calculat-
ed at 6.3 percent annually, a demographic absurdity
for a country that did not have massive immigration,
according to UN demographers.
Miscounting the population had become an accepted
political ploy by 1963, used as yet another way of
swaying official decisions on political and develop-
ment issues, in our view. Regional politicians publi-
cized the 1962 census as the basis that would deter-
mine political representation and establish claims to
public services, according to population and develop-
ment specialists. The resulting willingness, and in-
deed, the enthusiasm with which ordinary people
falsified the census record shows the extent to which
the regional politicians were able to mobilize local
support of regional rather than national interests.
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The 1973 census, conducted in the buoyant atmo-
sphere of rising oil revenues and successful recovery
from the civil war, had perhaps the best chance of
success. It was one of the necessary measures for a
return to civilian rule and would have provided the
statistical base for the distribution of social and
economic services under an ambitious development
plan, according to international development plan-
ners. The military government, in an effort to ensure
a complete and accurate count, deployed the Army to
accompany census enumerators in the field, according
to Nigerian census experts. Nonetheless, complaints
that northern troops coerced the populace and slanted
the enumeration in favor of the north arose from all
quarters and the stage was set for yet another failure,
according to Nigerian newspaper accounts. The im-
plausible national total was overlooked as public
attention again focused on the regional numbers.
According to the official count, the six northern
states had grown by nearly 6 percent and comprised
64 percent of the population, while the south showed
only negligible growth; the populations in the south-
western and southeastern states were smaller than in
1963. The outcome was unacceptable to most Nigeri-
ans and the census was officially declared null and
void, an action few countries have taken, according to
UN records.
Both US and Nigerian demographers report that,
since 1973, census taking has been effectively re-
moved from the national agenda. Political represen-
tation and economic policies are shaped by using the
token results of the 1963 census, corrected by addi-
tional data from sample surveys.F__~
the US Embassy. Yet, the Babangida regime already
has stirred controversy by opening religious questions
to national debate, according to press reports. We
agree with the US Embassy's assessment that tension
between religious groups has been fueled by issues
such as Nigerian membership in the OIC, the ques-
tion of whether southern states should have civil
courts using Islamic law, the problem of religious
schools, and the disagreement on the duties of a
secular state. These tensions were already high in
northern cities, where thousands of lives have been
lost in the last six years in sectarian riots, according to
US Embassy reporting. The Nigerian press reports
that local incidents of church burnings in Muslim
areas and other forms of religious harassment contin-
ue to occur despite calls for tolerance by state officials
and traditional leaders. Muslim elders keep a watch-
ful eye on potentially violent groups like the Muslim
Student Society in order to help control the volatile
youth population, according to US Embassy reports.
Explosive City Growth
Nigeria's cities are especially vulnerable to demo-
graphic pressures. One outcome of rapid growth is
that internal migration will increase and rural mi-
grants will flood the cities, contributing to already
deteriorating living conditions amid increasingly
inadequate public services, high unemployment, and
elevated crime levels. High population growth, low
living standards, and limited opportunities are some of
the factors that create a climate conducive to political
instability, in our view.F__1
Fed by the inflow of rural migrants, cities throughout
the country are likely to continue to grow at the rapid
annual pace of nearly 4.5 percent for the next two
decades. The urban share of the total population will
rise from a current level of about one-third to slightly
over 40 percent soon after the turn of the century,
according to US Census Bureau projections. We
believe conditions in the countryside will continue to
provide the impetus for large-scale migration to the
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Economic and Social Disparities
Population growth is not the only factor affecting
regional cohesion. Keeping the lid on regional jealou-
sies and charges of government favoritism remain a
major challenge for the regime in Lagos. Every
government since 1970 has attempted to overcome
traditional inequities and promote the appearance of
regional fairness in the distribution of economic
goods and social services in order to allay tribal and
regional tensions and -muster broad support
The provision of social
services, especially health care and education, is an
indicator of modernity and the quality of life, and
represents to the majority of people the degree to
which the national government serves them, accord-
ing to numerous studies by social scientists. Never-
theless, regional balance has not been achieved in the
social-service sector, as demonstrated by the move-
ment of migrants to the south. Although social data
are woefully inadequate, our review of the available
information suggests that the north and the middle
belt have been shortchanged in both health care and
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torical disparities that date back to the colonial
cities, where migrants account for slightly over 40
percent of all urban growth. Numerous academic
studies show that migrants believe economic and
educational opportunities lacking in the rural areas
can be found in the cities, and that urban housing and
social services will raise their standard of living.
Demographic studies estimate that massive migration
occurred over the last decade-on the order of 5
25X1 million people-and despite deplorable economic and
social conditions in many large cities, migration could
increase to over three times that in the next 10 years.
Its characterization in numerous open sources shows
that Lagos is an international symbol of rapid growth
and chaotic urban life. Average annual growth rates
period and not addressed by the northern elite who
have been in power after independence. Nigerian
official statistics show that, while only 35 percent of
the Nigerian population is covered by any form of
modern health services, the north, with only a 14-
percent share of hospital facilities, and the middle
belt with 11 percent, get only a small piece of an
already small pie.
In education, the south again enjoys the largest share
of opportunities, especially in training beyond the
primary level. In the early 1980s, northerners com-
prised 35 percent of the national population, but only
about one-fourth of the national primary school
enrollment was in the north, and only 9 percent of all
secondary students were northerners, according to
Ministry of Education data. This is partly due to a
cultural bias against nonreligious schooling in the
northern states, but academic studies indicate that
this is changing. Northerners now bitterly complain
about rising school costs for modern education, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting. The middle belt's
17 percent of the population has fared somewhat
better, with 22 percent of primary school enrollment
and 10 percent of secondary school enrollees.
of 7 percent over the last 20 years raised the city's
population from 1.5 million in 1966 to the current 6
million, according to the US Census Bureau. This
very high sustained growth would have been closer to
10 percent if large numbers of illegal aliens had not
been expelled during the last three years. The US
Census Bureau estimates that 80 percent of the aliens
expelled from Nigeria were expelled from Lagos, as
many as 1.6 million in 1983 and 560,000 in 1985.
Although the growth rate of the city has dropped
somewhat to about 5.5 percent per year, projections
indicate nearly 16.5 million people in Lagos within 20
years.F___-]
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The potential for serious urban unrest already exists
in Lagos, but will increase over the longer term, in our
view. The federal government commits significant
portions of economic development funds to the capi-
tal, but many parts of the city are without water,
electricity, waste disposal, or good roads, according to
economic studies. Lagos is crime-ridden despite severe
penalties imposed for robbery and lesser crimes, ac-
cording to local newspaper accounts and studies by
UN organizations. The demand for housing and
transportation has far outstripped the supply, result-
ing in sprawling slums and squatter settlements inter-
spersed among better neighborhoods and, on occasion,
massive traffic jams. A recent UN study reported that
a substantial percentage of the people were still
illiterate, and only a small portion had education
beyond the primary level. The unemployed are con-
centrated in the 15- to 29-year group, and of those
employed at any age more than 50 percent are in the
informal sector working for very low wages as petty
traders, roadside mechanics, or the like, according to
the study. Still, migrants from the rural areas contin-
ue to pour into the city, over 1 million of them in the
past 10 years, accounting for 44 percent of city
growth, according to estimates by the US Census
Bureau. Many of these migrants, along with commu-
nities of West African aliens, congregate in specific
localities chosen for affinity with family, village of
origin, or tribe, where ethnic enmities often flare in
the competition for limited jobs and services.F_~
The long-held plan to build a new federal capital in
Abuja, 1,100 kilometers from Lagos near the center
of the country, has been heralded since 1962 as the
answer to the congestion in Lagos and a means of
making government accessible to more people, ac-
cording to UN documents and Nigerian newspaper
reports. Although the first federal ministry began its
move to Abuja in June 1986, with three others slated
to move this year, much of the planned construction
has been abandoned because of the government's
failure to pay the contractors, according to the US
Embassy. The lack of housing, schools, infrastructure,
and telephones and deteriorating sanitation in what
has been a dormant city for several years will continue
to slow the transfer of the majority of ministries,
according to US officials. An International Labor
Office study points out that, so long as Lagos remains
the financial center and principal transportation hub
for the country, it will continue to grow and draw a
significant share of migrants. In our view, Lagos will
continue to command a substantial share of urban
resources to keep it a viable center of the Nigerian
economy and government for some years to come.
While other large cities may be less critical to the
central government from an economic and political
standpoint, they nevertheless are of key concern to
regional and ethnic-based political constituents, and
are likely locations for urban unrest, in our view. Most
are afflicted by problems similar to those in Lagos,
but on a smaller scale. Kano State officials last year
blamed an influx of rural jobseekers into Kano City
and other smaller towns for rising tensions in the
region as the newcomers competed with longtime
residents for limited jobs. City officials also cited an
inadequate educational system that has failed to train
the rising numbers of unskilled, unemployed workers.
Moreover, while growth is slower than in Lagos, the
population of Kano City will more than double in the
next 20 years, from 813,000 to 1.8 million, with
migrants comprising somewhat more than 20 percent
of the total increase, according to US Census Bureau
projections
Current demographic trends indicate that Nigeria's
rapid population growth and pervasive social problems
will continue unabated for several decades, and we
believe governments will be unable to stem the conse-
quent erosion of living standards. Problems arising
from large annual population increments and deepen-
ing societal divisiveness are likely to create an envi-
ronment conducive to mounting unrest among volatile
youths-especially students and the unemployed-the
urban poor, ethnic and religious factions, and radical
Muslim fringe groups
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Although Nigeria supplied only 5.6 percent of US oil
imports in 1985, Lagos remains an important source
of crude oil located outside the Persian Gulf and
relatively accessible to the United States and its
Western allies. In the event of disruption in the
supply of oil from the Gulf, Nigeria almost immedi-
ately could increase production from the present
average of about 1.5 million barrels per day (b/d) to
2.2 million b/d within a few months, according to the
US Embassy. The exposure of US banks in Nigeria is
over $1 billion, according to US Federal Reserve
data. US-Nigerian trade rose during 1985 to some
$3.1 billion, while Nigeria emerged as the fifth-
largest importer of US wheat.F__-]
As one of black Africa's most influential nations,
Nigeria also can serve as a useful ally for the United
States in Third World forums. US Embassy officials
report that the current regime of Gen. Ibrahim
Babangida hopes to bring Nigeria closer to the West
and repeatedly seeks US advice and assistance. In
return, Lagos has offered to support US policies in
southern Africa, and more recently-despite Libyan
efforts to bring pressure on the president through
Nigerian Muslim leaders-Nigeria refused to de-
nounce US antiterrorist action against Libya, accord-
ing to US Embassy sources. F__1
It appears unlikely to us that the government will be
able or willing to commit major resources to slowing
population growth. In particular, we doubt that top
officials will risk the almost certain divisiveness that
would be set off by their backing a policy calling for
family planning. Although some Muslim leaders say
that family planning is allowed under Koranic law,
fundamentalist groups would be sure to charge that
family planning is a plan by Christian southerners to
weaken Islam. Moreover, both Christian and Muslim
Nigerians would probably object to such a policy as
Western interference in traditional African life. We
expect the regime to pay lipservice, but little more, to
the urgings of Western donors to inaugurate an
effective population program. F_~
The size and growth of the youth population consti-
tute Nigeria's most volatile demographic problem, in
our view. Expectations of young men and women for
greater opportunities and a high standard of living
were raised during the years of rising oil revenues and
a booming economy,
We see no indication that the ever-larger youth
population no longer expects to receive the education
and jobs that will lead to a better life. This group is
likely to become increasingly impatient with and
vengeful about its lot. Student protests, such as the
violent ones in late May, for example, are likely to
occur more frequently. F__1
Discontent in Lagos and other fast-growing cities is
likely to reach dangerous levels as competition for
education, health care, and jobs exacerbates tensions
between various ethnic, religious, and generational
groups. Inept administration, bad planning, and non-
existent or unworkable transportation, water, sanita-
tion, and power systems are likely to add to urban
frustrations and focus attention on the shortcomings
of both the local and federal governments. Further,
we believe urban groups will become increasingly
vulnerable to mobilization by radical political or
religious activists who blame Nigeria's moderate lead-
ers for the country's problems.
In this environment of increasing demands and
shrinking resources, intensifying religious and north-
south differences could make Nigeria an attractive
target for external subversion by regimes hostile to
moderate African governments
Muslim fringe groups in several
African countries are particularly vulnerable to
Libyan infiltration, money, and influence. According
to US officials, Iran also actively recruits candidates
in Nigeria for military and religious training and
periodically introduces radical Muslim propaganda on
university campuses. We believe heightened domestic
unrest in Nigeria would tempt Libya and Iran to seek
common cause with Nigeria's Islamic north. For
example, Libyan and Iranian support could encourage
Muslim leaders to step up their demands for the
imposition of an Islamic state and thereby create a
climate for increased Muslim-Christian violence.
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Nigerian leaders, faced with dividing a shrinking
economic pie, will almost certainly turn to Western
governments and international financial institutions
for increased levels of assistance. Moreover, Lagos
would probably argue, correctly in our view, that
social, economic, and political turmoil will provide
growing opportunities for meddling by Libya and
Iran, particularly in the northern, Muslim areas of the
country
If, as seems likely, Nigerian authorities remain inca-
pable of confronting population problems, slowing
economic decline, and finding a formula for national
unity and social peace, we believe the prospects for
serious regional and ethnic conflict will escalate. In a
worst case scenario, the Nigerian federation over time
could split along religious and ethnic lines. Violence-
like that during the Biafra war, which took over a
million lives and destroyed the former Eastern Re-
gion's economy-would probably spread throughout
the country, damaging or isolating oil installations
and undermining Lagos's ability to counter external
meddling. Ethnic, regional, or religious factions seek-
ing outside support would probably find the USSR,
Libya, and Iran ready and willing to help to try to
install a radical government-or even an Islamic
revolutionary state modeled on the Iranian
experience.
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