CUBA-NICARAGUA: HAVANA REVIEWS ITS OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000400530001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
IW~ n) Intelligence
Cuba-Nicaragua:
Havana Reviews
Its Options
Secret
ALA 86-10053
December 1986
copy 4 71
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Its Options
Cuba-Nicaragua:
Havana Reviews
This paper was prepared by
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African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 86-10053
December 1986
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Secret
Cuba-Nicaragua:
Havana Reviews
Its Options
Key Judgments We believe Cuban President Castro's main strategy for supporting the
information available Nicaraguan regime-to buy time for the Sandinistas to strengthen their
as of 1 December 1986 institutional base for a politically stable and militarily strong Marxist-
was used in this report. Leninist state-is likely to remain intact over the next year. Despite Cuba's
increasing economic problems and debilitating long-term involvement in
Africa, we see no indications of any weakening of Castro's commitment-
underscored by Cuba's continuing military and economic assistance as well
as by Castro's personal involvement and political guidanc -to the Sandi-
nistas. Indeed, Castro's muted public reaction to renewed
and the strengthened US commitment in Central
America in general suggests that the Cuban leader will not make any
dramatic policy shifts in the near term that could provoke a US military re-
sponse or alienate a new US Congress.
In our opinion, Castro is likely to weigh carefully the impact of
over the next several months before increasing the
Cuban advisory presence in Nicaragua or broadening its role substantially.
The Cuban leader probably will focus his attention at first on propaganda
and lateral escalation elsewhere in Latin America, rather than risk directly
confronting the United States. Nonetheless, if the influx of
o improve their capabilities and expand their area of
operations significantly, Havana will almost certainly take several political
and military countermeasures, including:
? Providing Managua with additional-perhaps a few hundred-trail
advisers, radar operators, logistics and maintenance technicians,
and pilots.
? Lobbying Moscow on behalf of Managua to procure more Soviet
assistance, particularly helicopters, patrol boats, and air defense equip-
ment, including perhaps SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems
and associated radars. On the basis of training levels and capabilities of
Nicaraguan personnel, Cubans initially would have to man much of the
equipment, and Havana-and probably Moscow-would have to in-
crease its maintenance role.
? "Regionalizing" the war by pressuring leftist allies in Costa Rica,
Honduras, and El Salvador to increase hit-and-run attacks and terrorism
directed at civilian and military targets. Cuba will urge them to try to in-
timidate regional leaders into reducing support for
Secret
ALA 86-10053
December 1986
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ome time ago
Castro provisionally approved the use o sur ace-to-air missiles by the
Salvadoran insurgents and, if the Nicaraguan rebels begin using such
weapons effectively, we believe he would provide the Salvadoran groups
with matching firepower.
? Further "internationalizing" the war by accelerating the recruitment of
larger numbers of volunteers from Latin America to fight in Nicaragua
and escalating revolutionary violence in other Latin American coun-
tries-Colombia and Chile are the most likely cases-as a means of
dividing and distracting US attention and resources.
? Intensifying propaganda and public relations efforts in multilateral
forums and foreign capitals, mainly emphasizing the principle of nonin-
tervention; and drawing parallels between US actions in Central America
and the US experience in Vietnam, as well as working in Managua to re-
duce discord among Sandinista Directorate members caused by increas-
ing domestic problems and external pressures.
? Professing support for the Contadora talks or backing any plan-such as
Guatemalan President Cerezo's idea of convening a Central American
parliament-that gives Castro and the Nicaraguans a better chance of
breaking down regional negotiations into individual bilateral deals
beneficial to the Sandinistas.
If the above measures are not sufficient to block continuing
or halt insurgent advances, Castro, in our view, win encounter
serious constraints. Castro fears provoking a US intervention or alienating
the new US Congress, and, under conditions of a gradually intensifying
insurgency, we believe he would shy away from sending large numbers of
troops to fight the rebels.
Public statements by Cuban officials also
indicate that Moscow has made it clear to Castro that Cuba would stand
alone in any military engagement with the United States.
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If the insurgents make unexpected, dramatic gains over the next year,
Castro's past strategy suggests that at at first he would push any ongoing
negotiations. He might counsel the Sandinistas to seek a cease-fire, perhaps
administered by the United Nations, and to offer concessions regarding
political freedoms at home. By the same token, however, we doubt that
Castro would urge Managua to offer rebel leaders an equal role in the gov-
ernment and the military. Castro, in our view, would urge the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) to fight to the last and to engage any
successor government, particularly an FDN-led (Nicaraguan Democratic
Force) regime, in a protracted insurgency.
We think it unlikely, but cannot rule out the possibility, that Castro-who
can act unpredictably and emotionally in the face of a challenge-will
pursue a more aggressive policy. He might risk sending troops to Nicara-
gua with the limited objective of protecting key cities and military
installations-as they do in Angola-to free additional Sandinista units for
combat. Moreover, if Castro became convinced that the insurgents were on
the threshold of ousting the Sandinistas or that US intervention was
inevitable anyway, he might send Cuban combat units into battle against
the rebels or participate with the Nicaraguans in a massive attack against
insurgent bases in Honduras. The egotistical Castro might hope that a US
military intervention-and his lead role in opposing it-would cripple
US-Latin American relations for years, bolster leftist groups in other
countries, and assure his place in history as the foremost "anti-imperialist"
of his time.
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Key Judgments
The Scope of Cuban Involvement
Playing the Negotiations Angle
2
Public Relations Support
4
Political Mentoring
4
Castro Confronting a Faltering Strategy
5
Increasing Role at the Front
6
"Regionalizing" the War
8
"Internationalizing" the War
9
Propaganda and Diplomatic Maneuvering
9
Implications for the United States
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-`'r'BELMO
Belize
Guatema
TEG IGALPA
Nicaragua
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Cuba-Nicaragua:
Havana Reviews
Its Options
Introduction
President Castro's assertion at Cuba's Third Commu-
nist Party Congress in February that he would do
everything possible to provide additional aid to Mana-
gua if the United States increased its assistance to the
insurgents underscored his commitment to the Sandi-
nistas. The continued maintenance of 5,500 to 6,500
Cuban military and civilian advisers in Nicaragua
also attests to the depth of Castro's resolve to back the
regime in Managua, his only ally in the hemisphere
and the sole payoff of 26 years of fomenting armed
revolution in Latin America. US Congressional ap-
proval of $100 million in aid for the rebel forces,
however, and the diminishing prospects for a
Contadora-sponsored regional peace agreement prob-
ably will add to the pressures on Nicaragua and to the
costs to Cuba of its continuing large-scale involve-
ments
s an examination of Cuba's past and present
strategy and tactics in supporting the Sandinista
regime, and Castro's options in light of recent regional
developments and the renewal of US aid to the
opposition. As such, it examines the scope of Havana's
political and military aid to Nicaragua over the past
year, and explores the flexibility of Castro's policy
regarding Nicaragua. It then assesses how the Cuban
leader is likely to adjust his policies to the changing
situation in Central America, including the potential
for taking far riskier courses of action. Finally, the
paper considers the implications for the United States
of a deepening Cuban role in Nicaragua.
The Scope of Cuban Involvement
Although Havana's tactics in supporting the Sandinis-
ta regime have varied over the years as pressures on
Managua have ebbed and flowed, we believe Cuba's
main strategy-to buy time for the Sandinistas to
strengthen their institutional base for a politically
stable and militarily strong Marxist-Leninist state-
has remained intact. The most important contribution
Figure 2. Ser io Ramirez, Fidel Castro, and
Daniel Orteg
by Havana to its ally in Managua, in our opinion, has
been the assistance provided by its military advisers to
the growing Sandinista armed forces and security
services
we estimate that some 5,500 to 6,500 Cuban
military and civilian personnel advise the regime in
Managua.
Cuban military advisers are involved in counterinsur-
gency operations, intelligence activities, and training
of Nicaraguan military conscripts. In addition, Cuban
civilian and technical advisers occupy positions in
virtually every Nicaraguan institution and service
organization, from education to telecommunications,
and play a critical role in molding prerevolutionary
institutions into instruments of Sandinista control.
Despite Cuba's increasing economic problems at
home and its debilitating long-term involvements in
Africa, we have seen no indications of any weakening
of Castro's commitment to the Sandinistas.' From a
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manpower perspective, Cuban involvement has re-
mained relatively constant over the past year. US
Embassy and
and technical assistance
on military equipment-remains critical to the Sandi-
nista regime, even though Havana has phased out its
assistance in some areas-such as education-as the
Nicaraguans have become more self-sufficient. In-
deed, as the military and economic pressures on
Nicaragua have grown over the past few years, =
Castro has
been able to maintain a high level of influence with
Sandinista leaders through continuing material aid
and political counsel.
Nicaraguan President Ortega has trav-
eled to Havana on several occasions this year to
personally consult with Castro. While Castro has
proved willing to maintain a relatively constant level
of support to Managua, he also has been careful to
avoid expanding Havana's involvement beyond the
point that could trigger a military response from the
United States. Cuba remains the Sandinistas' primary
role model and the Cuban leader their principal
mentor. Moreover, Havana continues to be involved in
almost every aspect of Nicaragua's affairs at home
and abroad.
Playing the Negotiations Angle. In the diplomatic
realm, Havana has worked especially hard at the
Contadora-sponsored peace talks to limit Washing-
ton's ability to exert pressure on the Sandinistas.
According to the
US Interests Section reporting from Havana, Cuban
officials clearly view the continuation of the Conta-
dora process as a means to put pressure on Washing-
ton-through Latin American countries and US pub-
lic opinion-to refrain from direct military
intervention. Moreover, Castro undoubtedly hoped
that setting the prospect of a negotiated settlement
before the US public would block the administration's
efforts to substantially increase aid to the anti-Sandi-
nista insurgents.
Although not a direct party to the Contadora talks,
the Cubans have taken an active role at the meetings
advising Sandinista negotiators and lobbying the Cen-
tral American, Contadora, and support groups' coun-
tries to support Nicaraguan arguments.
Figure 3
Nicaragua: Estimated Cuban Presence,
1979-86
Decline shown in 1986 reflects Intelligence
Community reassessment of Cuban military
presence in Nicaragua
It does not
represent an actual decline of the overall
Cuban presence in Nicaragua or of Cuban
military personnel.
Nicaraguan negotiators general-
ly consult with Cuban officials before regional group
meetings, often traveling to Havana to do so.
the Cubans worked
hand in hand with the Nicaraguans at Contadora
Moreover, US Embassy reporting
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Cuban Military and Civilian Assistance Programs
Stiffening the Sandinista Ranks. Havana's strategy
in support of Managua's counterinsurgency effort is
designed to give the Sandinistas enough military
equipment, planning and logistics assistance, and air
support to limit guerrilla activity largely to rural
areas and along the borders. Indeed, although there
are no indications that Cuba has increased its adviso-
ry presence substantially or introduced combat units
into Nicaragua, the estimated 2,000 to 2,500 Cuban
military advisers (Intelligence Community analysts
recently agreed that,
our previous estimate of 2,500
to 3,500 Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua
should be lowered to 2,000 to 2,500) serving there are
playing an increasingly active role in developing and
implementing counterinsurgency operations, as well
as helping Nicaragua absorb, maintain, and operate
its growing inventory of Soviet weapons.
Cuban military assistance appears to have had its
greatest impact over the past year on the conduct of
Sandinista air operations.
Cuban pilots are per-
forming a variety of combat support missions-
including troop transport, medevac, and air cover for
arms convoys. Moreover, Cuban piloted Nicaraguan
MI-25 (Hind) helicopter gunships have flown combat
missions against insurgent forces to support govern-
ment troops in northern Nicaragua. In one example, a
Sandinista unit with an usually large number of
Cuban advisers apparently was saved from being
overrun by rebel forces by the Hind gunships. Two
Cuban pilots, moreover, were among those killed last
December when rebels downed a Nicaraguan MI-8
helicopter with an SA-7 surface-to-air missile.
Although we do not believe the number of Cuban
military advisers has risen over the last year, the
Cuban contribution to the Sandinista ground offen-
sive may be growing in importance.
Sandinista military deserter reports that Nicaragua's
irregular warfare battalions are periodically accom-
panied by their Cuban trainers on combat operations.
Cuban personnel also are involved in operating Nica-
raguan radar sites
Institutionalizing "Sandinismo": The 3,500 to 4,000
Cuban civilian personnel that we estimate are cur-
rently working in Nicaragua continue to assist, as
they have since 1979, in the development of the
Sandinista security and intelligence services, the mi-
litia, mass organizations, and other institutions-
such as the media-as instruments of social control
and political regimentation. The Cubans also have
traditionally played, and still play, a major role in
the service areas-health, education, agriculture-
that revolutionaries typically employ to mobilize
popular support for the regime.
Although there may be a slight drawdown of Cuban
civilian personnel as projects are completed and the
fighting widens, Cuban construction units probably
will continue to play an important role on such
military projects as the airfield at Punta Huete and
improvements to the arms-receiving port at El Blif.
The airfield at Punta Huete, when completed, will
have the longest runway in Central America and will
be capable of handling high-performance jet fighters
and interceptors. The Matagalpa-Puerto Cabezas
highway now under construction will substantially
increase the mobility of Sandinista military units in
the remote northeast.
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from various Central and South American capitals
underscores the extent to which the Cubans aggres-
sively sought to consult with influential players before
important meetings.
Havana and Managua have
Reporting from various US Embassies shows
that Cuba led the unsuccessful effort at the recent
Nonaligned summit in Harare to gather support for
Nicaragua's bid to host the next summit and subse-
quently chair the Movement.
Another facet of Havana's public relations support is
arranging the travel of third-country "international
brigades" to Nicaragua.
Political Mentoring. Castro apparently is concerned
about the possibility of factionalization among the
Nicaraguan leadership and clearly wants to avoid the
type of revolutionary self-destruction that occurred in
Grenada in 1983. The Cuban leader was largely
responsible for the merger of the three major insur-
gent groups into the Sandinista Front during the war
against Somoza, and the Cubans apparently still play
a role in ensuring that personal rivalries do not
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damage regime stability.
Thus far, Castro's public reaction to the changed-
and more threatening-situation in Nicaragua has
been muted. The Cuban leader barely mentioned
Nicaragua in his annual 26 July speech commemorat-
ing the beginning of his revolution-a forum Castro
often uses to convey a message to US policymakers.
Indeed, since the late June US Congressional vote the
Cuban leader has made several major speeches in
which he has given only scant attention to the
stepped-up funding of the insurgents. The Cuban
media have published attacks on the action, but,
according to the US Interests Section, these amount
to no more than routine indignation. Cuban Deputy
Foreign Minister Alarcon told US media representa-
tives in late July that Cuba was already responding in
kind-as promised in Castro's statements to the Third
Cuban Communist Party Congress-but denied that
the Cuban aid involved an increase in advisers, sup-
plies, or weapons.
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Havana also has counseled the Sandinista leadership
on how to handle their internal opposition, particular-
ly the Catholic Church
Castro Confronting a Faltering Strategy
In our view, renewed US aid to the anti-Sandinista
rebels-as well as the loss of momentum in the
Contadora talks-has made it clear to Castro that his
strategy of playing the negotiating angle and US
public opinion has not succeeded in easing the politi-
cal and military pressures on Managua. Moreover,
from Castro's perspective, continued US support for
the insurgents runs the risk of enabling them, in time,
to seriously challenge the regime or, conversely, could
lead to direct US military action if the rebels, despite
substantial backing from Washington, fail to dislodge
the Sandinistas.
no quanti-
tative increase of Cuban assistance in the last few
months, however, and Alarcon's remarks, in our
opinion, probably were only a face-saving exercise to
cover Castro's earlier bluster.
The Cubans' unusually phlegmatic response to the US
action, especially in view of the diminishing role of the
Contadora group, represents, in our opinion, a studied
attempt to avoid overreaction to an accomplished fact.
Cuban officials have told US Interests Section person-
nel several times that the Sandinistas will defeat the
insurgents whether they have US support or not;
Havana probably does not want to appear excessively
concerned at this point. Moreover, although Castro's
strategy regarding Nicaragua has suffered a setback,
in our opinion, the increased US pressure on Mana-
gua has clearly not panicked or paralyzed Cuban
policy. Castro, a keen student of US politics, is certain
to watch for any indications that funding for the
insurgents might be curtailed or stopped. Havana has
had ample experience with protracted insurgencies in
Africa and is likely to weigh carefully the impact of
US aid on insurgent performance before making any
major policy moves.
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Figure 5. Two Zhuk patrol boats being delivered to Nicaragua
from Cub
Hard Choices Ahead for Castro
Castro's studied silence thus far suggests to us that
Cuba is reviewing its options in light of Washington's
increased role, considering the implications of a wider
war, and deciding what to do about the more negative
outlook for Cuba's Nicaraguan interests. The Cuban
leader probably recognizes tha
spells, at a minimum, heavier fighting in the
near term. While we do not expect Castro to make
any dramatic policy shifts or sudden moves to raise
the stakes in Nicaragua over the next few months, we
believe Castro will shift more emphasis and resources
to Cuba's military role. Moreover, Castro's past per-
formance suggests he will also modify his propaganda
and diplomatic efforts, support alternative negotiation
opportunities if the Contadora-group efforts die, and
advise the Sandinistas to take still tougher measures
against internal opposition groups.
Increasing Role at the Front. We believe Castro will
respond to the military challenge in Nicaragua mainly
by intensifying the programs and operations that
Havana already has in place. As the tempo of fighting
increases, we believe Cuba will send additional com-
bat-experienced military advisers, pilots, and medics
to Nicaragua-perhaps a few hundred personnel-to
assist Sandinista counterinsurgency operations.
combat missions in Nicaraguan helicopter gunships,
and, in our view, this practice will become more
commonplace as the Sandinistas add to their helicop-
ter inventory. We also believe Cuban personnel will
take a larger role in logistics, maintenance, intelli-
gence, communications, and medical services.
Castro almost certainly will lobby the Soviets for
more aid-particularly military hardware-for Nica-
ragua. For example, Havana is likely to buttress
Nicaraguan requests for more helicopters and perhaps
patrol boats-both are critical to the Sandinistas'
ability to interdict the guerrilla logistic network and
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Earlier this year Brig. Gen. Nestor Lopez Cuba, 44,
replaced Division Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa as commander
of Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua. Like
Ochoa, Gen. Lopez fought in the revolution against
Batista, participated in various overseas military
actions, and is a member of the Cuban Communist
Party Central Committee. An armored forces special-
ist, Lopez may be working to improve the capabilities
of Nicaragua's armored units. Trained in armor
tactics at a special Soviet military school, he led one
of the first tank units to arrive at Playa Giron during
the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequently has
resupply lines. Castro also may press the Soviets to
provide Nicaragua with air defense weapons, includ-
ing perhaps SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems and associated radars, to deter U-2
reconnaissance overflights and defend against high-
performance aircraft. Another SAM system Castro
may ask Moscow to provide is the mobile SA-6 system
that would substantially improve the Sandinistas'
ability to interdict insurgent airborne resupply opera-
tions. Few Nicaraguans have been trained sufficiently
on air defense equipment-none that we know of on
the SA-6 system-and Cuban personnel would have
to initially man any SAM batteries in Nicaragua. The
Soviets also may provide the Sandinista military with
Lopez was also commander of an ar-
mored division in southern Angola during 1976-79.
His last known position was Chief of the Southern
Army Corps of the Cuban Eastern Army in 1983 and
1984.
Havana is also likely to continue helping Managua in
other equipment-oriented areas
three u -c ass
patrol boats were delivered to Nicaragua from Cuba
last summer
The Nicaraguans have installed a number of coasta
surveillance radars on the Atlantic coast, and the
delivery of the patrol boats appears to be a move
aimed at upgrading their patrol and interdiction
capability along the sparsely populated eastern coast.
additional radar-guided antiaircraft artillery batteries Other areas of Cuban support are likely to include the
that probably also would require some Cuban assis- island's continued use as a transshipment point for
tance to train Nicaraguan crews and integrate the Soviet weapons deliveries to Nicaragua. Many of the
new weapons into the Sandinista air defense network. larger military items-such as aircraft and patrol
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boats-are shipped by the Soviets to Cuba, where
they are assembled and tested prior to their delivery
to Nicaragua. An AN-30 aerial survey aircraft
shipped to Cuba from the USSR earlier this year was
assembled in Cuba and subsequently flown into Nica-
ragua. several
Sandinista AN-2 light transport aircraft and at least
one MI-8 helicopter have been returned to Cuba for
repairs in recent months. The Sandinistas apparently
lack adequate repair facilities and expertise-defi-
ciencies that suggest that, as the Nicaraguan military
acquires more equipment, it will become increasingly
dependent on Havana for much of its depot-level
maintenance.
"Regionalizing" the War. Aside from stepping up
Cuba's military role in Nicaragua, Castro is also
likely to respond to growing military pressure against
the Sandinistas by increasing his pressure on Mana-
gua's neighbors. To date, US Embassy reports indi-
cate Havana has been employing a carrot and stick
approach in dealing with Nicaragua's neighbors: try-
ing to dilute Costa Rican and Honduran opposition to
Nicaragua by offering to mediate problems with the
Sandinistas, while concurrently supporting leftist
groups in both countries. We believe that part of any
Cuban response to greater anti-Sandinista insurgent
activity will include attempts to increase pressure on
San Jose and Tegucigalpa by promoting more leftist
agitation in the two countries over the next year:
Honduras.
We also believe Castro will look favorably on any
decision by Managua to intensify military pressure
along the Honduran and Costa Rican borders. This
could include incursions into the neighboring coun-
tries in "hot pursuit," or large-scale assaults against
guerrilla base camps such as the attack by some 2,000
Nicaraguan troops into Honduras last March. While
these decisions are likely to be made in Managua on
the basis of the military situation, Castro will see such
attacks as complementing his own pressures on San
Jose and Tegucigalpa, as well as possibly creating
political problems between the United States and
Honduras. Nonetheless, Castro probably would not
permit Cuban pilots to fly helicopter airstrikes against
the rebel camps any time soon because of the potential
political, propaganda, and military backlash from the
United States if a Cuban pilot were to be captured in
Elsewhere in Central America, we believe Castro and
the Sandinistas would like to see more hit-and-run
attacks by the Salvadoran insurgents-particularly
against US personnel and other American targets-in
part, to help ease the pressure on Nicaragua.
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"Internationalizing" the War. We believe Castro also
will seek to "internationalize" the war in an attempt
to respond to greater pressure on Managua. One
tactic could include expanding Cuban sponsorship of
volunteer international brigades in Nicaragua with
personnel drawn from throughout Latin America.
the Cubans may believe that combat deaths of
volunteers from other Latin American countries-
such as Venezuela, Colombia, the Dominican Repub-
lic, and Argentina-in Nicaragua could help promote
public demonstrations and anti-US sentiment in Latin
Castro's efforts to divide and distract US policy
attention and resources may also include activity
beyond the Central American region.
arms caches recently uncovered by the Chilean mili- 25X1
tary contained enough weapons and equipment to
outfit over 5,000 guerrillas, and compelling evidence
indicates that they were delivered to Chile by Cuban
fishing boats. Castro also may encourage his guerrilla
allies to increase violence in other countries-such as
Colombia and Ecuador-although most leftist groups
in Latin America are capable of only sporadic at-
tacks-not sustained terrorism campaigns. Finally,
although the Cubans were surprised by the events in
Haiti last winter, Havana has moved quickly to build
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age political violence there to create another trouble-
spot for the United States in the Caribbean basin.
Propaganda and Diplomatic Maneuvering. Cuba
may also try to "internationalize" the conflict on the
diplomatic front. Such an effort could include intensi-
fied lobbying and propaganda in multilateral forums,
foreign capitals, and in the media. We believe Cuba's
propaganda will emphasize-even more than it does
now-four basic themes:
? Washington's disregard for the tenet of noninterven-
tion that is held as inviolable by Latin American
leaders.
? The "David versus Goliath" nature of the conflict.
? The increasing parallel of the conflict to the US
experience in Vietnam.
? Human rights violations by the US-backed
guerrillas.
On the basis of Havana's efforts to date, these themes
will be directed at different audiences. The first two
themes will most likely be aimed, in large part, at the
Latin American audience in an attempt to generate
hemispheric solidarity on behalf of Managua; the
latter two will be used to play to US audiences in an
attempt to influence future support for aid to the
insurgents. In playing the propaganda angle, Cuba
also is likely to continue emphasizing the findings of
the International Court of Justice against the United
States; Havana worked hard to include a statement of
support for those rulings in the final resolution of the
Nonaligned summit in Harare in September.
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Another element of Havana's diplomatic maneuvering
is likely to revolve around potential negotiation fo-
rums. While the diminished importance of the Conta-
dora negotiations has undermined an important ele-
ment of Cuba's strategy to deflect US pressure on
Nicaragua, we believe Havana will continue to profess
support for the Contadora talks and to do what it can
to keep the process alive. Because the prospect of
viable negotiations is necessary, from Havana's per-
spective, to lend credence to any propaganda pressure
on Washington to drop its support to the anti-
Sandinistas, Castro is likely to back-and advise
Managua to participate in-any negotiation opportu-
nities that arise as an alternative to the Contadora
talks.
Among possible negotiation alternatives, we believe
Havana would prefer Guatemalan President Cerezo's
idea of convening a Central American parliament.
Havana's favorable media treatment of Cerezo sug-
gests that Castro believes Guatemala can be persuad-
ed to be even more independent of the Contadora
Core Three-Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa
Rica-and helpful to Nicaragua in talks. The Cubans
also probably believe that their two-track policy of
intimidation (supporting leftists) and olive branch
(offering to mediate problems among Central Ameri-
can leaders) would be more effective in the context of
From the perspective of Havana, a forum limited to
its Central American neighbors holds some promise.
Cuban officials probably believe-correctly, in our
view-that, if negotiations were moved to a Central
American parliament setting, their intimidation tac-
tics-such as putting military pressure on the borders
with Honduras and Costa Rica-would be more
effective. For example, Nicaragua might be better
able to shift the negotiations from a comprehensive
regional package to individual bilateral deals with its
neighbors that are beneficial to the Sandinistas. This,
however, is not to say that the Cubans and Nicara-
guans would not face potential challenges in a Central
American parliament. A parliamentary setting would
eliminate or minimize the role of mediators who, as
US Embassy reporting in the case of the Contadora
talks indicates, can be helpful to the Sandinistas in
deflecting pressure from the other Central American
countries. Moreover, the Central American countries
might have more success focusing negotiations in a
parliamentary setting on the issue of pluralism and
internal democracy in Nicaragua.
While Havana is probably willing to use negotiations
to protect Managua, we believe there are limits
Castro would not want to exceed. Unless the Sandinis-
tas are under extreme duress, we do not believe
Castro would agree to negotiations or political conces-
sions to the United Nicaraguan Opposition/Nicara-
guan Democratic Force (UNO/FDN). However, the
Cubans might favor talks with other opposition
groups-perhaps KISAN, the main Indian rebel
group, or the Southern Opposition Bloc-to split them
away from the United Nicaraguan Opposition and co-
opt them by offering them minor roles in the govern-
ment.
nistas.
From a broader perspective, a shift in venue to the
Organization of American States probably would be
strongly opposed by Havana because Cuba's access is
limited-Cuba is not a member-and support for
Nicaragua would be diluted by the participation of
Latin American leaders unsympathetic to the Sandi-
Castro's Wild-Card Potential
Castro has considerable maneuverability and a formi-
dable array of policy tools that he can employ to help
Nicaragua cope with a slowly intensifying insurgent
challenge. Nonetheless, we believe that under present
circumstances there are upper bounds on Cuban
policy in Nicaragua. The most serious constraint is
Havana's fear of provoking US military retaliation or
a direct US intervention in Nicaragua.
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presents another constraint on Cuban policy. In the
past, the Soviets have warned the Cubans to move
cautiously in Central America,
they have made it clear to Castro that Cuba would
stand alone in any military engagement with the
United States.
If the insurgents make unexpected, dramatic gains
over the next year, however, we cannot rule out the
possibility that Castro-who clearly can act unpre-
dictably, defiantly, and emotionally in the face of a
challenge-will pursue a more aggressive policy.
Moreover, we believe Castro would be more inclined
to act independently of Moscow in protecting the
Nicaraguan Government than he would on any other
foreign policy issue. This wild-card potential of Cas-
tro's probably would manifest itself, however, only if
the anti-Sandinista insurgents began operating in the
heavily populated western plains and more seriously
threatened the regime in Managua. With such a
scenario, we believe Castro might risk sending troops
to accomplish the limited objective of protecting key
cities and military installations in Nicaragua-as
they do in Ethiopia and Angola-to free additional
Sandinista units for combat. Castro could try to blunt
international reaction by pointing to the greater US
role in the Nicaraguan conflict and by appealing to
broad apprehensiveness in Latin America about a
perceived threat of direct US intervention. Although
Castro has shied away from political terrorism as a
tactic in the past for fear of provoking US retaliation,
we believe that the Cuban leader also might react to
the imminent overthrow of the Sandinistas by calling
on his longtime radical allies throughout the Third
World to undertake violent actions directed at US
Embassies, military bases, and private businesses.
On the political front, Castro might concurrently
counsel the Sandinistas to offer substantial conces-
sions with respect to political freedoms and to seek an
international arbiter-perhaps the United Nations-
as a means of gaining some breathing space. Should
the Sandinista regime be in danger of falling, howev-
er, we doubt Castro would ask Managua to grant
rebel leaders-especially the FDN-an equal role in
the government and the military. Rather, we believe
Castro would exhort the Sandinista cadre to fight to
the end and to continue the fight by going to the hills
Implications for the United States
The United States will continue to face formidable
and determined opposition from the Cubans on all
aspects of its Nicaraguan policy. In addition to ex-
panding Cuba's military assistance to Nicaragua,
Cuban military advisers are likely to take a more
active role in combat.
We believe that Castro will "internationalize" the
conflict in other ways. For example, Havana will
pressure leftists elsewhere in Central America to
increase their antigovernment and anti-US activities.
Castro probably will urge leftists in other Latin
American countries to agitate and pressure their
governments to oppose US policy. As a result, we
believe that governments in the region-particularly
Honduras and Costa Rica-will request additional
US aid in exchange for their support of US policy. It
also may mean that both official and private US
interests abroad will be increasingly subject to Cuban-
inspired terrorism and political violence.
If the insurgents begin to score major successes on the
battlefield within the next 12 to 18 months and the
momentum of the war clearly shifts to their advan-
tage, we believe Castro will once again favor negotia-
tions as a tactic to gain time for the Sandinistas and
perhaps move the United States to prematurely relax
diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on Mana-
gua. If military pressure on the Sandinistas is main-
tained during talks, however, Castro probably would
conclude that the United States and other Central
American countries would not genuinely pursue nego-
tiations, and he would urge Managua to fight to the
end rather than bargain away their control.
If the insurgents begin to seriously threaten the
Sandinistas' stability and no worthwhile approach
existed for negotiations, the Cuban leader might even
risk provoking a US military intervention by sending
combat forces to Nicaragua. Castro is capable of
taking such a high-risk course of action, in our
opinion, because, even if such a gambit failed and led
to a US invasion, he would draw some satisfaction
that US relations with Latin America would be
damaged for years and leftist organizations in the
region would be rejuvenated.
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