AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00792R000300020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04: CIA-RDP88T00792R000300020001-4 1
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Secret-
ALA AR 86-023
28 Novemki 1986
copy 96
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and violence.
Although some parents and students are concerned about the long-
term consequences of the school crisis, activists have responded to
Pretoria's new restrictions on black schools with renewed boycotts
theological justifications for apartheid.
The Dutch Reformed Church has moved closer to mainstream white
political views by endorsing limited social reforms and rejecting
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Soviet influence at the expense of the West
Over the past year Zimbabwe has probably pursued closer ties to the
Soviets because it believes Moscow can provide military aid, while
the USSR has carefully cultivated Zimbabwe in hopes of expanding
recognition or pledges of aid for his insurgent organization.
UNITA leader Savimbi's recent trip to Western Europe provided
international media exposure, but failed to win new diplomatic
chronic foreign exchange shortage
Poor management and inattention to wildlife preservation are
costing Tanzania potential tourism revenues that could ease the
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Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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President Doe's government lacks determined and able economic
leadership to deal with longstanding fiscal and financial problems
and is unlikely to gain a substantial rebound soon in the exports
market, which would be necessary to reverse the economic decline.
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Briefs Nigeria: Regime Loses Support Over Journalist's Murder
Malawi: Coping With Mozam
Liberia: Romancing Romania
bique's Refugees
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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South Africa: Education
Crisis
Education remains a highly politicized issue for black
South Africans and continues to spark unrest in the
townships. Militant youths have used school boycotts
to protest the poor state of black education and the
inadequacies of the government's reform program.
Although in recent months, parent groups, civic
associations, and even some student activists have
become concerned about the long-term consequences
of the school crisis, Pretoria's controversial new
restrictions on black schools issued last July once
again have resulted in widespread boycotts, violence,
and school closings. For the third consecutive year,
end-of-year examinations have been disrupted by
militant youths. School boycotts almost certainly will
continue because of Pretoria's penchant for
provocative actions and because they are one of the
few means of protest readily available to blacks under
the state of emergency.
Moderates Take a Stand
As school boycotts and disruptions spread, US
Embassy reporting indicated that many parents and
students became concerned over the implications of
the boycotts and believed that even an inadequate
education was better than none at all. In many
communities local education crisis committees gained
widespread support and rejected the rallying cry of
militant youth-"liberation before education."
Following a conference of several black organizations
last December, most students returned to schools in
January. In March the National Education Crisis
Committee (NECC) was formed by the Soweto
Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) and other civic
action groups, and since then has been at the forefront
of attempts to restore stability to black education.
Although the return of students in January was linked
to black demands that the state of emergency be lifted
and security forces be withdrawn from the townships,
the NECC declared at its founding conference that
students should stay in school even if Pretoria did not
meet these conditions.' The NECC, however,
supported the SPCC's demands for the unbanning of
the Congress of South African Students, release of
detained students and teachers, removal of troops
from the townships, and improved education facilities.
NECC leaders argued that they had achieved a
substantial victory when the government subsequently
agreed to negotiate with them on education issues
even though all of the SPCC's demands were not met.
While many of their demands are political in nature,
the NECC and SPCC have generally attempted to
separate education from political action, and have
argued that student boycotts are not essential to the
revolution. The two groups believe that "liberation
before education" ultimately works against political
activism, and also that students in schools can be
more easily organized for political action than
children out of school. To this end, the NECC has
articulated three primary goals:
? Keep students in school.
? Develop a new curriculum for black schools.
? Continue negotiations with the government on both
the general crisis and individual problems.
'Although the original state of emergency in selected magisterial
districts was lifted in March, Pretoria imposed a nationwide state of
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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Secret
Despite the government's determination to create
"separate but equal" education, black schools and
black performance remain substantially inferior to
that of whites. Senior government officials have
admitted publicly that it will take at least 10 years to
achieve parity in education. Minister of Education
and Development Aid Gerrit Viljoen admitted in May
that government expenditures on black education are
only 20 percent of what they are for whites. Funding
is unlikely to increase significantly given the
economic recession. In addition, black demographic
trends place additional strains on educational
resources; the number of black pupils, including those
in the homelands, increased from nearly 4 million in
1976 to more than 6 million in 1985.
The inequity in funding levels is reflected in the poor
quality of black education and higher student
dropout rates. According to government figures,
93 percent of black teachers are underqualified. The
teacher-student ratio for blacks is more than twice
that for whites. Although school attendance is
compulsory for whites until age 16, it is not
compulsory for blacks. Nearly half of school-age
black children outside the homelands do not attend
school, and of those that do, fewer than half finish
primary school. According to an academic study, for
every 100 black students who began school in 1973,
only 10finished secondary school in 1984, and of
those, five failed their final exams.
Pretoria Takes a Hard Line
Despite the success in getting students back in school,
new tough security regulations and the government's
failure to deliver on many of its promises, such as the
rebuilding of schools and provision of free books and
stationery, have increased black frustration and have
led to further boycotts. Pretoria has become
particularly aggressive since the reimposition of the
state of emergency in June and appears determined to
end all political activity in the classrooms. The
government has closed troublesome schools and has
attempted to control students' access to those that
remain open by having the Department of Education
and Training-responsible for 7,000 black primary
schools and 330 black secondary schools-reregister
all pupils and issue student identification cards. Thus
far, more than 300,000 students have refused to
reregister and have been barred for the rest of the
academic year. Other students have burned identity
cards, and have been prohibited from entering school
grounds by security forces stationed at schools to
enforce the new rules.
At the same time, the government has adopted a hard
line toward the NECC and local education crisis
committees. Deputy Minister for Education and
Training S. J. De Beer, who had met with NECC and
SPCC members several times in the past, refused to
meet with NECC representatives in July to discuss
the new school regulations. De Beer accused the
NECC of trying to politicize education and of using
"innocent children for ulterior motives." In addition,
Pretoria has begun to apply security regulations to the
NECC. The US Embassy reports that five of the
NECC's nine executive members are in detention and
two more have gone into hiding. Police raided the
group's offices in Johannesburg in early November.
Reporting from the US Embassy and press sources
indicate that government attempts to remove politics
from the classroom by squeezing out the radicals have
backfired, and that school boycotts have resumed.
These same sources note that student activists
continue to hone their skills as organizers, and the
Department of Education and Training admitted
publicly in October that the boycotts have become
better organized and more effective, despite the
crackdown under the state of emergency. According
to press reports, more than 80,000 students were
participating in boycotts in Transvaal and eastern
Cape Provinces in October. Over 70 mostly secondary
schools in Soweto and eastern Cape Province have
been closed for the rest of the academic year because
of low attendance. The Embassy estimates that most
students above the fourth grade in eastern Cape
Province are not in school. In addition, militant
youths continue to harass those who do attend school.
Radical youths attacked students in Soweto last
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Pace College, a private commercial school in Soweto
established by the US Sullivan Code signatories and
run by the American Chamber of Commerce of South
Africa, closed in October following nearly nine
months of political turmoil, violence, and growing
anti-US sentiment among blacks. The school, once a
model for technical and commercial training for
blacks, was condemned by radical youths and adults
as an elite school that catered to its US business
sponsors at the expense of the political struggle. In
March student political and quasi political groups
became more active on the campus, threatening and
assaulting teachers. In September radical students, in
the presence of the school's executive director, burned
an American flag at an assembly called to discuss the
schools future. Confronted with growing violence and
donor unwillingness to continue sponsorship, the
school administration decided to suspend operations.
Negotiations on the school's future are under way
with black leaders in Soweto in an attempt to ensure
that any successor institution will have the full
support of the community.
month when they attempted to write yearend exams.
The government has announced that it will not
postpone or reschedule exams-as it did last year-
for those unable to take them because of intimidation
or violence.
Outlook
In our judgment, Pretoria's policies virtually
guarantee continuation of the crisis in black
education. The government is unlikely to lift the harsh
restrictions on black schools because it considers them
breeding grounds for rebellion and radicalism.
Although Pretoria probably will make some attempts
to improve the physical conditions of schools and to
modify the curriculum during the coming school year,
these actions are unlikely even to scratch the surface
of black demands. Black groups will continue to
confront Pretoria on the school issue. Last month, for
example, the NECC, together with the multiracial
United Democratic Front and the Congress of South
African Trade Unions, announced a new campaign of
joint action against apartheid and the state of
emergency. Among the activities under consideration
are nationwide protests against the closing of black
schools. The NECC is unlikely, however, to sanction
the use of school boycotts.
Despite the calls for new protests, parents and
community leaders will probably attempt again to
normalize the school situation before the new term
begins in January to prevent students from falling yet
another year behind. Black leaders will also seek to
educate youths informally. For example, Anglican
Church officials in Port Elizabeth are planning an
alternative education program in church facilities for
blacks in the area-many of whom have not been in
school for three years, according to the US Embassy.
The NECC and similar groups, however, will have
difficulty convincing students to return to school.
Pretoria's detention of the group's leaders and its
refusal to negotiate with the NECC almost certainly
has undermined its influence and discredited
moderates within the organization.
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South Africa: Reformed
Church Resolutions
A series of controversial resolutions passed at last
month's synod of the white Dutch Reformed
Church-generally known by its Afrikaans acronym
NGK-have altered the church's theological direction
and brought it closer to mainstream white political
views as defined by the ruling National Party. At its
quadrennial convention the church rejected
theological justifications for apartheid, took a
progressive stand on equality in the workplace,
supported basic human rights, opened membership of
the church to all races, and accepted the principle of
mixed marriages. Conservatives have strongly
criticized the synod's decisions, but church leaders
probably will be able to avoid large-scale defections to
more conservative churches or a formal split on liberal
and conservative lines.
Pivotal Synod
Last month's decision that apartheid cannot be
justified on scriptural grounds marks a watershed in
the history of the Dutch Reformed Church. In the
past, the church justified political separation of races
by pointing to God's creation of distinct races. Church
leaders sought to avoid completely alienating their
conservative followers by having arch-segregationist
Prof. Carel Boshoff draft the resolution, by avoiding
outright condemnation of apartheid, and by indirectly
condoning some forms of racial separation, such as
Pretoria's homeland policy. According to the US
Embassy, divergent groups within the church were
able to agree to the resolution because its ambiguous
wording allows a variety of interpretations.
In addition, the NGK has attempted to paper over
differences with its sister Colored Mission Church,
headed by the Rev. Alan Boesak, by calling for talks.
The Mission Church's recent decision declaring
apartheid a heresy has threatened to force a split
between the two churches because they have adopted
conflicting doctrines. The NGK has also sought to
ease tensions with the Mission Church by referring
contentious issues to a commission that will make its
The synod's resolutions were partly overshadowed by
the public furor over the church's declaration that
Islam is a false religion. The decision immediately
sparked loud protest from the country's Islamic
community, with Indian parliamentarians calling for
an apology and retraction of the statement. Two
Islamic groups, the Call of Islam and the Muslim
Youth Movement, organized demonstrations and
rejected Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) overtures to
discuss their differences. Unrest in the Muslim
community in Cape Province turned violent when
protesters refused to stop their march on an NGK
church in Cape Town. President Botha was even
forced to step in to calm the situation and distance
his government from the debate, stating that South
Africa guarantees freedom of faith and worship.
Although tempers have cooled for now, relations
between the NGK and the Islamic community are
unlikely to improve.
Open Membership but Internal Apartheid
Diverse reporting indicates that the most bitter synod
debate centered on a proposal that the racially-based
members of the Dutch Reformed "family of
churches" be allowed to unify their membership,
thereby eliminating the church's internal apartheid
structure. The synod, however, rejected the proposal
and decided that the Dutch Reformed family should
remain divided into separate white, Colored, black,
and Indian churches under the umbrella
administration of the white NGK. The proposal
reportedly was rejected only after hours of
acrimonious debate between conservative members
and reform-minded theologians, many of whom
represented more liberal areas in the western Cape. In
a separate decision, however, the synod did allow
individual churches to open their membership to all
recommendations at the next synod in 1990.
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) 1,693,640
Colored Mission Church (NGSK) 678,380
Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (Black) 1,103,560
Reformed Church in Africa (Indian) 3,900 b
a Based on 5-percent sample of 1980 census.
b Estimated.
races. This motion passed despite efforts by
conservatives to insert provisions that would have
permitted local church councils to investigate and
reject individual membership applications, according
to press reports.
The impact of the open membership decision probably
will vary, because NGK membership is determined
strictly on a regional basis. An individual must reside
within a particular area to become a member of a
given church, and in most cases, the racial restrictions
imposed by the Group Areas Act will prevent the
emergence of racially mixed congregations.
Nevertheless, the synod's decision sanctions the
integrated congregations that exist in areas such as
Cape Town, where slack compliance with and
enforcement of the Group Areas Act has resulted in
racially-mixed residential areas.
Labor Relations
As part of its more activist posture, the NGK also
passed a progressive declaration on labor relations,
calling for equal pay for equal work regardless of race
and the eventual elimination of migrant labor. The
synod criticized migrant labor, which represents a
substantial part of the South African work force, for
hindering the development of a strong middle class
and harming family life. The church also condemned
discriminatory job reservation policies and supported
the improvement of worker facilities and access to
labor unions.
Outlook
The synod's decisions reflect greater NGK sensitivity
to political issues, and bring its doctrines and policies
more in line with mainstream white attitudes. The
church's new racial policies, for example, parallel the
platform and limited reforms of the National Party
government, which has labeled discriminatory
apartheid "outdated" but has continued to organize
political institutions along racial lines. Similarly, the
NGK's separate sister churches for whites, Coloreds,
blacks, and Indians correspond to Pretoria's racially-
based "own affairs" structures in government.
Conservative white reaction to the synod's decisions
has yet to run its course. The leader of the far-right
Herstigte Nationale Party expressed outrage at the
decision and predicted that liberal ministers would
now invite nonwhite clergymen to preach in their
churches and that the church's next move would be to
unify the white and nonwhite churches. Other key
rightwing politicians critized the synod's decisions and
accused the NGK of opening the door to nonwhite
leadership of the church.
By charting a careful course, however, the NGK
appears to have avoided-at least in the short term-
large-scale desertions or a formal split. The
endorsement of the synod's decisions by many key
conservative theologians, such as Carel Boshoff, will
undoubtedly work to reassure uneasy white members.
Reforms tend to be applied unevenly throughout the
country once approved, and some conservative
churches are likely to try to ignore NGK
proclamations. Nevertheless, the recent reforms make
it inevitable that tensions will grow, especially if, as
we expect, some nonwhites attempt to join all-white
congregations and some liberal ministers invite
nonwhites to preach at services. A few local churches
with very conservative memberships almost certainly
will consider joing the ultra-conservative Reformed
Church. Most member churches, in our judgment, are
unlikely to leave the NGK unless future synods
advocate an even faster pace of reforms that
outdistance mainstream white attitudes.
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.:. vI
Zimbabwe-USSR:
Expanding Ties
Traditionally cool relations between Zimbabwe and
the USSR have warmed significantly since Prime
Minister Mugabe's official visit to Moscow last
December. In the past year, there has been a flurry of
bilateral exchanges, and late last month a
Zimbabwean delegation headed by Deputy Prime
Minister Muzenda went to Moscow to discuss the
purchase of military equipment and civil aircraft. The
Zimbabweans are probably pursuing closer bilateral
ties at this time principally because they believe that
Moscow can assist them with security needs. For their
part, the Soviets have carefully cultivated Mugabe
and other Zimbabwean leaders in hopes of expanding
their influence at the expense of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and other Western countries.
In our judgment, Harare is unlikely to break with the
West or to tilt dramatically toward the Soviets any
time soon, and we see little prospect of a rapid
expansion in bilateral trade or economic ties.
Nevertheless, the declining security situation in
southern Africa, for which Mugabe holds the West in
large part responsible, almost certainly will create
new opportunities for Soviet involvement and
influence in Zimbabwe
Historical Differences
Bilateral relations have been strained since Zimbabwe
gained independence in 1980. Mugabe and other
members of his Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) resented exclusive Soviet support for Joshua
Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
during the liberation struggle. According to the US
Embassy in Harare, Mugabe remained suspicious of
Soviet intentions and, probably correctly, viewed
Moscow as slow to sever its special relationship with
Nkomo. Although formal diplomatic relations
between Harare and Moscow were established in
1981, the Zimbabweans delayed opening an embassy
in Moscow until December 1984, and Mugabe did not
visit the USSR until a year later. In the meantime,
Zimbabwe expanded ties to Communist countries
such as China, North Korea, Romania, and
Yugoslavia, which had aided Mugabe and ZANU
when he and his party colleagues were in exile.
More Recent Fence Mending
Mugabe's two-day trip to Moscow last December
indicated that Harare was finally willing to let
bygones be bygones. During the visit, Mugabe signed
two general agreements-one on economic and
technical matters, and the other on party-to-party
exchanges-neither of which specified levels of
cooperation or procedures for implementation. Most
important, the Soviets privately assured Mugabe that
they would respond positively to Zimbabwean arms
requests, according to the US Embassy in Moscow.
Embassy reporting indicates that there has been a
series of exchanges of military delegations since
Mugabe's visit to Moscow. On several occasions, the
Soviets reportedly have demonstrated weapons to
visiting Zimbabwean defense officials, expressed
willingness to sell military equipment and spare parts,
and discussed the possibility of Soviet training for the
Zimbabwean Army.
the delegation headed by Muzenda that recently went
to Moscow probably discussed the purchase of an
improved air defense system and additional arms for
the more than 5,000 Zimbabawean troops fighting
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)
insurgents in neighboring Mozambique. Although the
Soviets shipped light arms and ammunition to
Zimbabwe in March 1983, the Zimbabweans have
traditionally looked to the United Kingdom and other
Western countries for military assistance. The
Mugabe government also has considered purchasing
Soviet commercial aircraft, according to the US
Embassy in Harare
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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aVIUM
Major Bilateral Contacts in the Past Year
January 1986
February 1986
March 1986
June 1986
August 1986
October 1986
Mugabe visits Moscow; signs agreements on economic and party cooperation.
Soviet military delegation visits Harare to present draft agreement on defense
cooperation.
Senior Soviet government official Yuri Youkalov visits Harare to discuss Moscow's
disarmament proposals.
Zimbabwean military delegation led by Army Commander Nhongo and Minister of
State for Defense Kadungure travels to Moscow to return Soviet visit in January.
Zimbabwean subministerial delegation visits Moscow to explore purchase of Soviet
commercial aircraft.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin visits Harare on the eve of the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit to deliver a message from Gorbachev.
Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Mangwende delivers the Harare Appeal on
disarmament to Gorbachev.
High-level Soviet Foreign Ministry official Mikhail Sytenko visits Harare to deliver
a personal message from Gorbachev.
Zimbabwean delegation headed by Minister of Industry and Technology Ndlovu
visits USSR to discuss expanding trade and technical cooperation.
Zimbabwean delegation led by Transport Minister Ushewokunze visits Moscow to
explore purchase of Soviet commercial aircraft.
Nhongo leads delegation to Moscow to prepare for arms talks to follow.
Zimbabwean military and security delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister
Muzenda departs for Moscow to discuss arms purchases.
Soviet Ambassador to Zimbabwe Ter-Gazaryants delivers Gorbachev's formal
response to the Harare Appeal.
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Economic and Cultural Ties
Bilateral economic and cultural relations also have
warmed in recent years. Harare and Moscow
concluded a trade agreement in January 1984 that
afforded each state "most favored nation" status but
did not set targets for trade or specify commodities to
be sold. According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the
Soviets would like to export more machinery and
equipment to Zimbabwe and to import from
Zimbabwe greater quantities of raw materials and
foodstuffs. At present, however, Zimbabwean trade
with the USSR and Eastern Europe is minuscule. The
US Embassy in Harare reports that in the 12-month
period ending in April 1985, trade with Bloc countries
amounted to only about 2 percent of Harare's overall
trade
The Soviets have not provided Zimbabwe with
significant amounts of economic assistance. Since
Zimbabwe's independence, the Soviet Union's major
aid program has consisted of academic scholarships,
probably designed to realize future political benefits.
According to the US Embassy in Harare, there were
about 100 Zimbabwean students in the USSR as of
December 1985. Most were in five-year study
programs pursuing degrees in technical fields. The
same source reports that Zimbabwean students
generally regard training in the USSR as inferior to
that offered in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Those studying at Soviet institutions
frequently complain of poor living conditions, racial
problems, and Soviet favoritism toward followers of
Nkomo.
In recent years, the Soviets also have increased their
cultural exchange programs with Zimbabwe. The US
Embassy in Harare has noted that most are carried
out under the auspices of semiofficial Soviet
organizations and are designed to build links to
Zimbabwean trade unions, womens' and youth
groups, political organizations, and the media.
Zimbabwean Motives
In our judgment, security concerns have been the
foremost factor impelling Harare to move closer to
Moscow. South Africa's raids on African National
Congress (ANC) targets in Harare last May
demonstrated Zimbabwe's vulnerability to a military
strike from Pretoria. Zimbabwe lacks a sophisticated
air defense system or advanced fighter aircraft to
ward off South African raids. In addition, the
Zimbabwean Army, which has become increasingly
bogged down in neighboring Mozambique, will need
additional arms if, as Mugabe has publicly pledged, it
is to provide even greater military assistance to
Mozambican President Chissano's new government.
Harare's commitment at home to outfitting and
training a newly created 6th Brigade also could
partially explain Zimbabwe's willingness to seek
weapons from the Soviets
The Mugabe government also probably favors
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several years ago and because the Soviets have
become highly circumspect in any dealings they have
with Nkomo and his followers. Harare, at least
publicly, has come to accept Moscow's position that
the assistance the Soviets earlier provided Nkomo was
intended only to speed Zimbabwean independence
and that the recipient was of less consequence.
Privately, Mugabe and close aides almost certainly
remain suspicious of Soviet intentions and do not find
this explanation completely adequate
In addition, Mugabe may regard intensified dealings
with Moscow as timely because relations with
Washington are strained over southern African and
other issues. In an apparent effort to exploit this
situation and advance Moscow's interests, General
Secretary Gorbachev in recent months has been
particularly solicitous of Mugabe, sending him a
number of personal messages in Mugabe's capacities
as Prime Minister, ruling party leader, and Chairman
of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). According to
the US Embassy in Harare, such attention has
fostered the impression that Moscow, to a greater
extent than Washington, is open and responsive to
Zimbabwean and NAM concerns.
Soviet Intentions
Embassy reports suggest that Moscow has gone to
considerable lengths in recent years to improve its
relations with Harare. The Soviets appear to have
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mcrer
concluded that ZANU will be in power for the
indefinite future and that the wisest course they can
pursue is to be supportive. More generally, Soviet
policy toward Zimbabwe appears consistent with the
general policies of Gorbachev, who since coming to
power in March 1985 has sought to expand Soviet
influence in the Third World by singling out a few
Third World leaders, such as Mugabe and Argentine
President Alfonsin, for special attention
In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, the Soviets have sought
to develop agents of influence. They have successfully
befriended several key party and government
officials-most notably Information Minister
Shamuyarira-and have enlisted them to promote
Moscow's interests.
frequently wines and dines Shamuyarira,
The leftist leanings of Shamuyarira and other senior
ministers have made the Zimbabwean media more
receptive to Soviet approaches and have facilitated
Moscow's efforts to place pro-Soviet and anti-
Western stories in the press. The country's leading
newspaper, The Herald, for example, in recent years
has carried stories on alleged US military links to
South Africa, US plans to deploy cruise missiles to
South Africa, and CIA responsibility for the AIDS
virus. Even in the absence of Soviet influence,
however, many stories appearing in the Zimbabwean
media probably would have a decidedly leftist and
anti-Western bent
Moscow almost certainly believes that closer ties to
Harare, most notably resulting from Soviet arms
assistance, will better enable the Kremlin to pursue its
broader aims in southern Africa. We believe that
these include fostering pro-Soviet regimes and
liberation movements, as well as reducing Western
influence in the region. The Soviets effectively use
their unambiguous opposition to South Africa's
internal and external policies to burnish their image in
Zimbabwe and other black African states. Moscow
also has encouraged Harare to take tougher stands
against US policies on southern Africa, including US-
sponsored regional diplomacy. The joint Soviet-
Zimbabwean communique issued at the end of
Mugabe's visit to Moscow last year and many of
Mugabe's subsequent speeches-probably consistent
with his own views-have reflected such criticisms of
the United States.
Prospects
In our view, the gradual improvement in
Zimbabwean-Soviet relations over the past year
probably will continue and perhaps accelerate,
particularly in the political and security spheres. Long
before the recent rapprochement, ZANU had adopted
Marxist-Leninist slogans, and, with the notable
exceptions of the Afghanistan and Cambodia issues,
Harare in practice already has aligned itself with the
Soviets on most Third World questions. Mugabe's
security concerns and aspirations to build a socialist
Zimbabwe almost certainly will provide additional
opportunities for the growth of Soviet influence,
probably including a major arms supply arrangement
and more frequent party-to-party exchanges between
ZANU and the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. Anti-US propaganda and rhetoric will
increase in Zimbabwe if, as is likely, the Soviets
succeed in developing further contacts and become
more deeply involved in Zimbabwean and regional
affairs.
Nevertheless, Mugabe's desire to secure Western aid
and his need to take into account the views of more
moderate members of his government militate against
a precipitate tilt toward Moscow. Mugabe almost
certainly will continue to harbor suspicions of the
Soviets, and he and many ZANU members will
remain cautious in their dealings with Moscow in view
of past antagonisms.
In addition, Mugabe,
although a professed Marxist, is a strong nationalist
and probably would like to maintain a respectable
political distance from both Moscow and Washington.
We see little prospect that Zimbabwean-Soviet
economic ties will expand rapidly in the near term.
There is little demand for Zimbabwe's exports in the
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Secret
USSR, and the Zimbabweans reportedly are skeptical
that the Soviets can supply the manufactured and
industrial goods they need on terms competitive with
British, American, and other Western firms. In
particular, according to Embassy reporting, they fear
that the Soviets will try to sell them products of
substandard quality.
The potential for countertrade also is limited, the
Embassy reports, because Harare realizes that many
of its exports, including tobacco and minerals, can
command hard currency on international markets. In
addition, Zimbabwean officials have not been pleased
with barter deals they have entered into with Moscow
in the past,
They reportedly have concluded that the Soviets often
use such arrangments to take advantage of their
African and Third World trading partners.
At the same time, according to the US Embassy in
Moscow, Gorbachev is disinclined to spend freely in
the Third World, preferring to marshal Soviet
resources for defense and domestic needs. To the
extent that Moscow commits resources to Africa,
Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are likely to take
priority. As a result, Moscow in the foreseeable future
will not attempt to supplant the West by providing
significant economic aid to Zimbabwe.
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Angola: Savimbi's West
European Initiative
UNITA leader Savimbi, bolstered by his successful
visit to the United States last January, has launched a
campaign in Western Europe designed to gain
increased military and political support. Although his
trip to Paris and the European Parliament in
Strasbourg in October provided international media
exposure, it failed to win increased diplomatic
recognition or pledges of new aid for UNITA. In our
judgment, UNITA's ties to South Africa and West
European economic and diplomatic relations with
Luanda will continue to pose serious obstacles to any
efforts to gain additional public assistance and
recognition.
Savimbi's trip received broad media exposure in
Western Europe and probably won additional
supporters for UNITA in conservative circles. In an
informal gathering of conservative members of the
European Parliament, talks with conservative business
and political leaders in France, and numerous press
interviews, Savimbi stressed UNITA's willingness to
begin a dialogue with Luanda without preconditions.
Savimbi's failure to convince West European
governments to meet with him on an official basis,
however, overshadowed his successes. Although he
went to Europe with high expectations of meeting
French Prime Minister Chirac, British Prime
Minister Thatcher, and German Chancellor Kohl, he
was not formally received by any government.
London's and Bonn's refusals to agree to even
unofficial meetings forced Savimbi to cancel
scheduled stops in England and Germany. His off-
the-record meetings with French officials also created
'The Republican Party is the largest component of the Union for
French Democracy that governs in coalition with Chirac's Gaulist
considerable debate in Paris and drew protests from
President Mitterrand and several domestic interest
groups. In addition, the European Parliament
narrowly passed a resolution branding UNITA a
terrorist organization and condemning US support.
Luanda, with support from the USSR, Cuba, and
other Frontline States, mounted a substantial effort to
undermine Savimbi's trip and to head off any
increased European support for the insurgents. Press
reports indicate that Luanda vigorously sought to
draw attention to Savimbi's ties to South Africa as
well as to Western Europe's diplomatic and economic
relations with Luanda. Angola reportedly threatened
to reduce ties to any country whose officials met with
Savimbi. Ambassadors to European countries from
the Frontline States lodged their own protests and
European Communist movements also condemned the
visit.
Prospects
In our judgment, Savimbi's ties to South Africa will
make it difficult for him to gain significant new
political and military support over the next year in
Western Europe. The South African connection gives
Luanda considerable propaganda ammunition to use
on European public opinion and is likely to constrain
most European governments from additional public
involvement with UNITA. Angola's diplomatic and
commercial ties to Europe-including French,
British, Portuguese, and Belgian interests in Angola's
lucrative oilfields-also work against UNITA.
In our judgment, Savimbi probably believes his ability
to win new assistance in Western Europe depends on
presenting UNITA as a legitimate black African
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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Secret
liberation movement. To achieve this goal, Savimbi
during the next year is likely to:
? Continue attempts to arrange official meetings with
senior officials in France, the United Kingdom,
West Germany, and Portugal, or, at the very least,
meet with these officials covertly.
? Mount a media campaign designed to convince the
West European public that, despite Savimbi's
acceptance of South African aid, he is a black
nationalist and not a puppet of Pretoria. At the
same time, Savimbi is likely to stress that UNITA
has broad ethnic support within Angola and a viable
political organization capable of running the
country, while the regime in Luanda has little
popular support, is unable to administer the country,
and has failed to provide an economic livelihood for
the people.
? Attempt to focus attention on the large Soviet and
Cuban presence in Angola in an effort to undercut
Luanda's "black nationalist" and "anticolonialist"
credentials. In addition, he is likely to focus
attention on the role that oil revenues play in
maintaining Cuban troops and the payments for
unprecedented levels of Soviet arms, in order to put
public pressure on European businessmen to reduce
ties to Luanda.
? Make battlefield gains, particularly in the north, to
bolster claims that UNITA cannot be defeated
militarily. Savimbi probably believes that once West
European governments realize this fact, they may
be more willing to make open political contacts with
UNITA.
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Secret
Tourism Industry
Tanzania is losing millions of dollars annually in
potential tourism revenues that could ease the
country's chronic foreign exchange shortage. Ill-
advised government investment regulations,
overreliance on an inefficient public sector, and
inattention to wildlife preservation are primarily
responsible for the underdevelopment of the tourism
industry. Meanwhile, poaching, which is taking a
tremendous toll on Tanzania's wildlife, could become
a political issue tied to President Mwinyi's
anticorruption campaign
Land of Unseen Beauty
Tanzania probably still has the largest concentration
of game left in Africa, and the great game parks and
reserves of the north (Serengeti, Manyara,
Ngorongoro) and the south (Ruaha, Mikumi, Selous)
comprise nearly a quarter of the country. Its major
land formations, including the Great Rift Valley, the
Ngorongoro Crater, and Mount Kilimanjaro, are
natural tourist attractions which, along with
Tanzania's exceptional wildlife viewing opportunities,
could attract 400,000 tourists annually, according to
Tanzanian authorities. Tanzania attracted its highest
number of tourists-178,000-in 1974, however, and
the number of visitors has declined dramatically since
1977 when the Kenyan-Tanzanian border was closed
upon the demise of the East African Community, a
loose union comprising Tanzania, Kenya, and
Uganda. The combined circuit of Tanzanian northern
safari grounds and Kenya's southern parks had been
the major tourist attraction in the region. In the past
several years, Kenyan tourism has predominated
because Kenya's tourism industry relies on private
safari tour operators who consistently outperform the
state-owned Tanzanian Tourist Corporation (TTC),
which controls the industry in Tanzania.
What's Wrong?
Dar es Salaam has consistently failed to address
serious problems that have contributed to the decline
and lack of development of the industry. Tanzania's
mismanaged economy has led to chronic shortages of
basic goods such as fuel, light bulbs, and soap; and
lowering the standards and raising the prices of
tourist accommodations that cater primarily to
Westerners. In addition, tourism was severely hurt by
the drastic fuel shortages in the fall of 1985, when a
short cab ride from Kilimanjaro airport to the nearest
hotel was as high as $100. Potential visitors also are
likely to be dissuaded by the rise in dread diseases in
Tanzania, including cholera, plague, and chloroquine-
resistant malaria, caused by the government's
inability to administer its once effective public health
program.
The TTC-a responsibility of the Minister of Natural
Resources and Tourism, Getrude Mongella-is a
typically corrupt and inept parastatal, in our view. It
oversees all tourist activities and owns 80 percent of
all tourist hotels and lodges, the majority of which
operate at a deficit according to tourism trade
journals. The government's rigid trade and currency
restrictions and excessive redtape have squeezed out
tourist-oriented private enterprise. This contrasts with
Kenya, where competition to attract hard currency
has led to a proliferation of safari tour companies,
luxury lodges, and innovations such as safaris by
balloon. Although the TTC announced an expansion
program several years ago, we believe that Tanzania's
economic difficulties have caused the government to
divert tourism development funds to more vital sectors
of the economy.
Game park entry and hunting fees in Tanzania are
probably among the highest in East Africa,
discouraging all but the most determined and well-
heeled hunters and wildlife observers. Access to the
game parks is difficult. The rudimentary roads and
transportation networks often are in disrepair and fuel
supplies are sporadic.
Ministers of Natural Resources and Tourism-
Mwinyi served in this position during 1982-83-have
provided indifferent leadership. Reflecting the
government's ignorance of tourism's earning potential
and continued adherence to socialism, Mongella
recently warned that Tanzania "will not develop
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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Secret
SUDAN
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REPUBLIC
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MOZAMBIQUE
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Secret
Tanzania-Kenya: Tourism Statistics
Tanzania
Kenya
a Estimated.
Source: Country Profiles, Economist Publications, Ltd.
4,479 4,973 4,973
9,011 9,207 9,204 9,025
tourism solely as a commercial enterprise and will not
sacrifice its natural heritage merely for money."
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Spending for park upkeep and wildlife preservation is
kept to a minimum. For example, only $200,000 is
spent annually to manage the Selous game reserve-
the largest in Africa, measuring 320 kilometers from
north to south-and there are only three vehicles
available to patrol for poachers, according to the US
Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The Embassy reports that
the poachers' activities are open and well-organized
and they can bribe any government officials, probably
including the small, underpaid staffs of rangers in the
parks
Poaching: A Political Problem
Poaching has soared to unprecedented levels in recent
years, and
criminals are intensifiying their poaching in fear that
Mwinyi's crackdown on corruption soon will prohibit
heir lucrative activities. The network of poaching
probably is as entrenched in Tanzania as other forms
of corruption. Criminals have coordinated support
within the police, the military, and the government,
Conservationists are urging Dar es Salaam to
undertake an antipoaching campaign because a recent
study revealed that unchecked poaching has caused a
dramatic decline in Tanzania's elephant and rhino
populations, according to Embassy reporting. The
study indicated that poachers have smuggled out 25X1
490,000 kilograms of ivory worth $49 million and
$3 million in rhino horns from the Selous reserve
alone over the past four years
We agree with the conservationists' assessments that 25X1
the high level of poaching threatens the already small 25X1
amounts of hard currency that the tourism sector
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Secret
Minister since 1985... only woman on ruling party Central Committee ... close
to former President and current party Chairman Nyerere ...
lacks background and experience for tourism
portfolio ... narrow political base centered in party women's organization ...
former Minister of State in Office of the Prime Minister ... primary interests are
social welfare, health and community development ... from Ukerewe Island, not
far from Nyerere's home village ... 41.
Minister during 1984-85 ... currently Minister of Agriculture and Livestock
Development ... member of ruling party National Executive Committee but not
of Central Committee ... took few, if any, initiatives while Minister of Lands,
Natural Resources, and Tourism, despite apparent sympathy for much-needed
reform according to US
diplomats ... has considerable support in party's o guard". .. Ambassador to
United States (1972-83) ... was leading candidate for Prime Minister in 1985.. .
trusted colleague of Nyerere's, from Nyerere's home region of Musoma ... 61.
Minister during 1983-84 ... currently Ambassador to China, North Korea, and
Vietnam ... competent and hard working
... close to Nyerere but political
imluence has been on decline since 1970s ... early member of ruling party ...
during 1966-83 masterminded plans (now stalled) to transfer national capital
from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma ... built up power and influence as head of
Capital Development Authority during 1970s,
.. Minister of State for Capital Development during 1980-83 ... 57.
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Ivory, shown here for legal sale in Dar es
Salaam, is the poachers' major profit earner.
Party Secretary General Kawawa, a prominent
supporter of Nyerere and opponent of Mwinyi's recent
reform moves, may also be involved in the poaching
network
Outlook
Tourism is unlikely to operate up to its full earning
potential, in our view, because of the government's
failure to address the problems confronting the sector.
We believe that the government does not have the
resources or interest to pursue long-term projects such
as wildlife preservation; it prefers to concentrate on
quicker moneymaking schemes, and Dar es Salaam
does not seem aware of tourism's substantial
moneymaking potential. Moreover, despite Mwinyi's
International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended
economic reforms, the government is not moving
effectively to eliminate the thicket of currency and
trade restrictions that hamper private-sector
participation needed to boost investments and
innovation in the industry
We believe that Mwinyi may publicly proclaim a
crackdown on poaching, but this will be a largely
symbolic gesture despite the lobbying efforts of
Western conservationists. Mwinyi's crackdown on
poaching is likely to run into the same problems he
has encountered in tackling other forms of corruption:
earns. Reduced animal populations will discourage
tourists who are drawn to the wildlife of the Serengeti
and Selous parks. In addition, depletion of the
elephant and rhino populations will create
environmental problems that will require substantial
amounts of money to reverse, as well as impacting
negatively on other animal species.
Tanzanian officials, including Mongella, are
considering a.detailed plan by conservationists to
combat poaching, and, according to an Embassy
source, will highlight poaching in Mwinyi's
continuing public campaign against official
corruption. The source maintains that the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Tourism has sufficient
evidence to remove several officials, including the
recently demoted regional commissioner of Morogoro
region (where the Selous park is located) and other
senior officials who have close ties to former President
and current ruling party Chairman Julius Nyerere.
? Mwinyi probably does not want to anger Nyerere,
who still carries considerable political weight, by
seeming to persecute the former President's cronies.
? Tanzania lacks the financial resources to wage a
war on poaching and has earmarked new funding
from the IMF and the World Bank for more
immediate needs.
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Economy
President Samuel Doe has been unable to remedy
Liberia's growing financial problems, and we agree
with the US Embassy that the economic decline may
shortly overshadow political developments. The
government has lurched from crisis to crisis, lacking
determined and able economic leadership to tackle
longstanding fiscal and financial problems. To reverse
the decline, Liberia would need a substantial rebound
of its exports market, but we do not anticipate this in
the near term. Doe appears unwilling to impose severe
austerity measures needed to turn the country around,
and he probably will be looking to Washington to be
more accommodating to Liberia's plight.
The Economic Situation
Last year the Liberian Government agreed to
introduce long overdue economic reforms, including
civil service retrenchment, cuts in government
spending, and turning over public corporations to the
private sector, but implementation has been sporadic
at best. The US Embassy reports that the government
lacks the ability to impose greater fiscal discipline and
end extrabudgetary expenditures. We agree with the
US Embassy that Doe has made servicing the payroll
his top priority-in an attempt to retain the loyalty of
the military and civil servants-rather than
introducing politically risky economic reforms.
Liberia is unable to pay its mounting international
debts. Last January the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) declared the country ineligible for new loans,
blocking access to their facilities until all outstanding
debts to the IMF are paid, which total more than
$100 million, according to press reports. Liberia's
fiscal year 1986/87 budget, announced last July,
totals $366 million, an almost 24-percent increase
over the previous budget of $296 million. We agree
with the US Embassy that the allocation for debt
servicing-only $52.2 million-will do little to tackle
the country's escalating debt arrears and the
estimated foreign debt of $1.1 billion.
Liberia has faced steadily growing economic
problems since the 1970s. The country's dependence
on iron ore exports, which usually account for at
least half of the country's export earnings, make the
economy highly vulnerable tofuctuations in world
prices. International demand for ore began to drop in
1973 and the world steel market slump produced a
huge stockpile in Liberia's main iron export port,
Buchanan. The rubber industry also suffered from
low productivity and slack international demand in
the 1970s. Moreover, the Tolbert regime borrowed
heavily overseas, and in 1979 spent $20 million for
the one-week Organization of African Unity summit
held in Liberia, according to press reports. When Doe
seized power in April 1980, he inherited about a
$650 million external debt and found only $5 million
in the treasury.
Doe's initial haphazard economic policies worsened
the financial situation. One of his first acts was to
execute a number of prominent Americo-Liberians,
including President Tolbert. The executions
prompted an exodus of Americo-Liberians, depleting
the skilled labor pool and spurring large-scale capital
flight. His decision to double civil service salaries
and quadruple military pay in 1980 cost the
government $45 million, and in his first eight months
in power, the government spent $1.2 million on travel
expenses, according to press reports. The imposition
of a general price freeze on rents and all commodities
in 1980-while not fiscally prudent-won Doe
popular support. From 1981 to 1985, his
preoccupation with real and imagined threats to his
regime diverted him from dealing with economic
problems and long-term development planning, and
he relied on temporary, stopgap measures, according
to US Embassy reporting.
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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becrer
CHART 2
UBER1A: MEDIUM AND LONG TERM DEBT SERVICE
200 -
Projections for export revenue are based on the CIA's econometric
model of Liberia. Debt data are based on IMF estimates and may
The Local Business Community
The US Embassy reports that a growing number of
Liberian businesses have gone bankrupt and the
remaining ones increasingly lack faith in the
government's policies. According to an Embassy
estimate, of 250 firms surveyed in 1983, 26 percent
are bankrupt or have ceased operations, and
30 percent have reduced their work force. USAID
estimates that the number of firms in the Monrovia
area alone has dropped by 50 percent since 1980.
Moreover, the Indian and Lebanese communities,
which control an estimated 80 percent of retail and
Legend
? AMORTIZATION
? INTEREST
- IMF PAYMENTS
wholesale trade, are cutting back their operations,
reducing inventories, and laying aside plans for
expansion.
Which Currency?
Doe publicly states that Liberia will maintain the US
dollar as legal tender, but the US Embassy reports
that the country is gradually and probably
permanently drifting to a de facto local currency.
Since 1982 Liberia-in an effort to finance its
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aecrei
deficits-has minted and circulated its own coins, in
denominations up to $5, which are theoretically
exchanged at par with the US dollar. In the past year,
moreover, Doe has released an increasing number of
Liberian coins to pay government salaries. The
Embassy reports that US dollar notes are being
hoarded and traded at a premium as they become
scarce, and in Monrovia some merchants, who lack
faith in the unbacked Liberian currency, will accept
only US notes.
Doe will almost certainly refuse to adopt the Liberian
coins as the only national currency for at least the
next few months. The US Embassy reports that
Liberia lacks the estimated $100 million needed to
"buy" the Liberian coins out of the system, and return
the country to the US dollar standard. If Liberia went
off the US dollar, a lower-valued local currency would
help make commodity exports more competitive, but
Doe probably believes this move would be politically
embarrassing and highlight his inept economic policy.
Restrictions on Foreign Business
To alleviate the growing foreign exchange shortage,
since April Liberia has required exporters to
surrender 25 percent of their foreign exchange
earnings to the National Bank of Liberia, which
reimburses them in local currency through the
Liberian banking system. The US Embassy reports
that some companies believe this violates the terms of
their concession agreements. In recent months, Doe
has accused some exporters of ignoring the foreign
exchange requirement, and in mid-September the
government temporarily embargoed iron ore
shipments from mining companies until the payments
were made, according to Embassy reporting
We agree with the US Embassy that this strategy-
"creeping expropriation"-may drive out the foreign
businesses and fuel even greater capital flight. The
government probably believes that it must move
against these companies to gain control of
increasingly scarce foreign exchange. The US
Embassy reports that the two predominant foreign
banks may leave Liberia, partly as a result of this
policy. Major US banks are drawing tentative plans to
cease operations in 1987 or 1988 if the economy does
not improve.
Prospects for the "Productive Core"
Iron Ore. The US Embassy reports that prospects are
poor for the iron ore sector, the country's largest
source of foreign exchange, with exports valued at
$279 million last year. The world market for iron ore
is guarded at best, according to press reporting. One
mining consortium, the National Iron Ore Company,
closed its operations in Liberia in 1985. The Liberian-
American-Swedish Mining Company (LAMCO),
which is managed by Swedish businessmen but 75 25X1
percent of which is owned by Liberians, will exhaust
its deposits of high-grade ore within five years and
will have to find new markets for its lower-grade ore,
according to the US Embassy. Bong Mining, a joint
venture of West German and Italian steel companies
and the Liberian Government, mines low- rade ore
that will be exhausted by the mid-1990s. I 25X1
The Rubber Sector. The outlook for rubber, Liberia's
second-most important foreign exchange earner, is
also problematic. The US Embassy reports that
international rubber prices are stagnant and are likely 25X1
to remain at an alltime low. The country's rubber
industry is dominated by four concessions, three of
them US owned (Uniroyal, Firestone, and Liberian
Company) and one Malaysian (Gutherie), none of
which are increasing their investment or expanding
acreage. These companies produced about 90,000 tons
in 1985, or 2 percent of the world rubber market, and
their exports were valued at $77 million. Firestone,
which accounts for two-thirds of the country's
production, claims it has lost $20 million since 1984
and has hinted that it may eventually pull out,
according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, the
rubber companies are concerned that the
government-in an effort to secure new revenues-
may want to reopen negotiations on the terms of their 25X1
concession agreements. 25X1
Shipping. Liberia's shipping registry faces difficulties
as well. Monrovia receives about $24 million a year in
revenue from the Liberian flag of convenience
registry, which is the largest in the world. Monrovia,
however, increasingly faces strong competition from
newly created flags of convenience, such as Vanuatu
and The Bahamas, which charge lower fees.
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CHART 1
LIBERIA: FOREIGN DEBT AND EXPORT REVENUE
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985* 1986' 1987*
YEARS
According to press reports, earlier this year Monrovia
reduced some fees, made plans to introduce other
discounts to stem the movement to other nations, and
opened a marketing office in East Asia in an attempt
to woo the rapidly expanding shipping fleets operating
in the Pacific.
Ineffective Economic Leadership
We agree with the US Embassy that the indecisive
economic leadership has fueled the country's financial
problems. The current economic team-Minister of
Finance Tubman, National Bank Governor Bestman,
Minister of Planning Jeffy, and Budget Director
Johnson-has failed to impose budget discipline, and
each member is reluctant to go beyond his narrow
portfolio to devise a comprehensive policy. The group
Legend
? M&L-TERM DEBT
? EXPORT REVENUE
has also failed to agree on basic short-term objectives.
Bestman argues that
the hard currency should be used to meet Liberia's
foreign debts, while Tubman says the money should
be used to finance the payment of back wages for civil
servants and the military.
Liberia almost certainly will lack a coherent economic
policy as long as policymaking is divided between the
Executive Mansion and the various ministries. The
US Embassy reports that Executive Mansion advisers
have undercut Bestman's efforts at monetary reform,
and that Jeffy and Johnson lack the political clout to
influence Doe's policies. We strongly suspect that Doe
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. a.Vt
is vulnerable to pressures from Alvin Jones, his cousin
and former Finance Minister. Jones, currently the
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, exercises a
"mystical" sway over Doe on financial issues,
according to the US Embassy
Outlook
Liberia's economic crisis will continue to grow. Doe's
priority almost certainly will remain meeting the
salaries of civil servants and the military. Liberia can
only restore credibility with international lenders if it
enacts an economic austerity program, but we see no
evidence of such an initiative. Doe probably believes
comprehensive reform would be too risky politically.
In the near term, Liberia is likely to pressure foreign
companies for greater returns and may even ask them
to renegotiate their concessions. Low-level unrest,
perhaps sporadic urban violence, and strikes by poorly
paid and disgruntled workers are likely in the coming
months. Moreover, should Doe fail to pay the military
on time, soldiers may be less willing to put down
urban unrest)
In our judgment, Doe will continue to ask Washington
for financial assistance to bail him out of his economic
quagmire. He expects this because of Liberia's
"special relationship" with the United States, and his
support for Washington in the United Nations and
the Nonaligned Movement. Doe may threaten a
rapprochement with Libya and the USSR to extract
additional economic aid from the United States, but is
unlikely to carry through because he is wary of their
activities in Africa. In addition, he may take a tough
stance toward Washington to enhance his image with
the military and the general public as a strong and
independent leader if the United States is not
forthcoming. While unlikely for the near term, Doe-
in desperation-may threaten to impose sizable rental
fees on strategically important US communications
and navigation facilities in the country.
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Africa
Briefs
Nigeria Regime Loses Support Over Journalist's Murder
Widespread suspicions of government involvement in the unsolved murder of a
prominent local journalist in late October have weakened the regime's popularity
and triggered rumors of military coup plotting. The US Embassy reports that the
assassination of magazine editor Dele Giwa occurred two days after security
officials had interrogated him about allegations that he sought to promote a
socialist revolution. Press reports also indicate that Giwa had published stories on
government corruption and other sensitive issues. Public speculation about official 25X1
complicity has been fueled by the regime's refusal to appoint a special investigative
panel or request foreign police assistance to help track down suspects
Nigeria's military leadership reportedly has been concerned that President
Babangida could lose the support of influential officers and civilians because of
unanswered allegations that connect his wife to the murder,
a senior security official
has dismissed rumors of a move against Babangida as unfounded. Although we do
not believe that the government's clumsy handling of the incident itself will
seriously weaken Babangida's power, the US Embassy reports that the case adds
to the list of unresolved grievances against the regime.
The influx of over 70,000 Mozambicans fleeing that country's civil war in recent
months has forced Lilongwe to turn to the International Red Cross for emergency
assistance. Red Cross officials estimate that $1.5 million will be needed in the next
six months to provide the refugees with food, tents, and blankets, according to the
US Embassy in Malawi. Thus far, no other official aid has been distributed. Until
recently, the Malawi Government refused to admit that a refugee problem existed,
but a serious health threat is developing in the densely populated rural border
areas because of the refugees' overcrowding and inadequate medical and sanitary
facilities. The beginning of a light rainy season is likely to worsen an already
desperate situation for the majority of the refugees, who live in the open, according
to the Embassy.
In our judgment, bilateral relief aid has the potential to become a controversial
issue. Malawi already is being strongly criticized by other southern African states
for continuing formal diplomatic relations with South Africa and allegedly aiding
the Mozambican insurgents, and it does not want to be seen aiding any rebels who
may have mixed with the refugees.
Secret
ALA AR 86-023
28 November 1986
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omania also has agreed to provide an
unknown number of military transport aircraft. The financing of these deals
remains unclear, although Doe claims the arms are a grant from Romania.
President Doe's visit to Romania in October appears to have led to the delivery of a
limited amount of military equipment. The US Embassy reports that 10 Romanian
armored cars arrived in Monrovia in mid-November,
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Monrovia signed its share of two mining
could damage US-Liberian relations.
was not consulted on the arms deal and has expressed fear that the agreement
equipment.
concessions over to the Romanian Government as partial payment for the military
Liberia's timber, gold, and diamond potential later this month,
Doe also appears to have tried to expand Liberia's limited economic links to
Romania during his visit. A group of Romanian experts probably will survey
The US Embassy reports that Doe also had hoped, but failed, to
early 1980s.
convince the Romanians to purchase Liberian iron and rubber. Bucharest
reportedly still owes Monrovia several million dollars for iron ore it received in the
generous.
Doe has told the Embassy that inadequate levels of US military aid prompted his
turning to Romania. The deal, however, does not signal a shift in Liberia's pro-
Western foreign policy, in our view. Doe periodically demonstrates his pique with
what he regards as inadequate US aid levels, and demonstrates his political
independence from Washington by flirting with other potential donors. By doing
so, Doe hopes to pressure the United States to ease restrictions on aid and be more
L~AI
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