USSR REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000200050005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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!4:; Intelligence 25X1
USSR Review
July-August 1985
SOV UR 85-004X
August 1985
Copy 579
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l Intelligence 25X1
USSR Review
The USSR Review is published by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the
articles are welcome.
Secret
SOV UR 85-004X
August 1985
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Contents
The Soviets and Perspective
the Middle East
Thirty years after its first inroads with the Arabs, Moscow has
gained considerable influence and a significant military presence in
the Middle East, largely as a result of its ability to supply military
equipment. Its position in the Arab world remains markedly inferior
to that of the United States, however, as it has failed either to make
itself relevant to a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or to appeal
to the Arabs ideologically or economically. On the other hand, the
Soviet position in the non-Arab "Northern Tier" has become far
stronger now that the United States has lost its position in Iran and
the Soviets control the destiny of Afghanistan. Moscow is likely to
continue efforts to establish itself as the protector of the Arab cause,
seeking to forge a coalition of pro-Soviet states that will counter US
policies in the region. At the same time, the Soviets almost certainly
will attempt to position themselves to take advantage of any future
turmoil in Iran.
Soviet Policy Options in the Middle East
Moscow's new leaders almost certainly will seek ways to reinvigo-
rate their policy in the Middle East-which has produced little gain
since the Soviets were ousted from Egypt in the early 1970s.
Moscow may repackage previous proposals with respect to an Arab-
Israeli peace agreement, accompanying its initiative with a diplo-
matic offensive designed to offset the current, US-backed, Jordani-
an-Palestinian effort. In the Persian Gulf, the Soviets could intensify
current efforts to pressure the Iranian regime to modify its policies;
alternatively, they might decide that a favorable response to Iranian
overtures could lead to real improvement in relations. In the broader
Gulf region, the Soviets almost certainly will continue to court the
conservative Gulf states, but could simultaneously step up efforts to
subvert those same governments.
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The Soviet-Syrian Relationship: Centerpiece of Moscow's 13
Middle Eastern Policy
Syria has been the key to Moscow's presence and influence in the
Middle East since the Soviets were expelled from Egypt in the early
1970s. Their strong support for Syria gives the Soviets a role in the
Arab-Israeli dispute, thereby legitimizing their claims to great-
power status in the region. The Soviet-Syrian relationship is based
on arms-supply ties and a shared desire to prevent a US-backed
Israel from achieving separate peace settlements with its other
neighbors, thus isolating Syria. Although the Soviet Union and
Syria differ over many other issues-the extent of the Soviet
security commitment to Damascus as well as policy toward the
Palestinians, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon-they have subordinated
these differences to the pursuit of common aims.
Soviet-Egyptian Relations: Limited Prospects for Improvement
The normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations last summer sig-
naled a modest improvement in ties, but little has changed since
then. Moscow is likely to continue its efforts to expand relations by
exploiting Egypt's need for military spare parts and its desire to
increase trade levels, but is unlikely to offer many concessions on
issues of central concern to Egypt, such as the contentious debt
question. Prospects for better relations will also be constrained by
Moscow's need to avoid alienating Syria and by Soviet opposition to
Mubarak's proposal for an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Moscow has maintained a tough line toward Iran, despite increased
overtures from Tehran over the past year. These largely cosmetic
efforts have not dissuaded Moscow from pressing Iran to stop its
"intolerable" activities, such as provision of aid to Afghan rebels,
repression of Iranian Communists, and expulsion of Soviet diplo-
mats. Moreover, the USSR continues to urge Tehran to end the
costly war with Iraq. Although there has been some movement in
the area of economic ties, a major improvement in relations is
unlikely until Iran addresses Moscow's fundamental concerns.
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The Soviets Probe for Openings in Sudan
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Moscow has actively sought to improve its position in Sudan since
the fall of the Nimeiri regime in April. While cultivating the new re-
gime in Khartoum, the Soviets also have quietly established links to
John Garang's southern dissidents and revitalized existing ties to the
Sudanese Communist Party. Moscow's efforts may be aided by
Khartoum's perception that the USSR holds the key to a future
settlement with the Garang forces.
Soviet Policy in Lebanon: Moscow Hedges Its Bets 31
Soviet policy in Lebanon derives from Moscow's broader Middle
East interests, particularly its need to maintain close relations with
Syria, its effort to establish its credentials as a major actor in
regional affairs, and its desire to create options for future policy. To
the extent these objectives conflict, the Soviets have deferred to
Syria. At the same time, Moscow has moved carefully during the
past 18 months to develop contacts with virtually all the major
actors in Lebanon-the Druze, the Shias, leftist forces, the Leba-
nese Government, and, to a lesser extent, rightist Christian groups.
Other Topics New Soviet Military Assistance to North Korea
The USSR recently provided North Korea with MIG-23 Flogger
fighter aircraft,
Moscow's decision to break its 10-year policy o not sen ing
major weapons to North Korea underscores an interest in building
new ties to P'yongyang to counterbalance Chinese influence in the
North and to strengthen the USSR's overall position in Northeast
Asia.
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Soviet-Vietnamese Relations: Pursuing Common Interests 41
Soviet-Vietnamese relations are driven by the pursuit of compatible
interests through cooperative policies. Vietnam serves Moscow's
security needs and power-projection goals-especially by providing
a major military base at Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam receives economic
aid to shore up its deteriorating economy and military support to
pursue its security objectives vis-a-vis China, Cambodia, and Laos.
Soviet-Vietnamese relations have been permeated by discord, but
the benefits of the relationship continue to outweigh the costs.
Soviet Ground Forces in Afghanistan: The Battalion Perspective 0 45
Combat battalions make up about 60 percent of Soviet military
strength in Afghanistan. The battalion perspective, therefore, helps
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet forces in the
war. These forces have the capability and flexibility to wage a
widespread war of attrition against the fragmented Afghan resis-
tance but do not have enough combat power to consolidate govern-
ment control widely in the countryside.
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The Soviets and the Middle East
Perspective
1985 marks three decades of active Soviet involvement in the Arab world.
The arms deal the Soviets concluded with Egypt in 1955 was their first
with an Arab country and amounted to a declaration to the Western
powers that the USSR was ready to compete for influence in the Middle
East beyond the non-Arab "Northern Tier" of Turkey, Iran, and Afghani-
stan, where Moscow had been involved for decades.
The Soviet Union has achieved considerable influence in the Middle East.
Its success is largely due to its ability to exploit Arab security concerns and
supply major military equipment quickly, in sufficient quantity and at
competitive rates. More than once, because of US domestic considerations
or Western inability to provide sufficient levels and types of arms at
affordable terms and in a timely fashion, the Soviets have been the supplier
of last resort.
Beyond the bordering Northern Tier, however, the Soviet position remains
inferior to that of the United States. The rapid progress Moscow made in
the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s was followed throughout the early
and mid-1970s by one major setback after another. The Soviets have yet to
recover from their loss of influence in Egypt and have failed to gain a voice
in Arab-Israeli negotiations, two of their major goals. Moreover, the recent
efforts of Jordan's King Hussein and PLO chief Arafat-backed by
Egypt-to form a joint delegation for peace talks with Israel through US
mediation threatens, once again, to leave the USSR on the sidelines.
The anti-US reaction of many Arabs to the Camp David accords in 1978 25X1
and to the US military presence in Lebanon in 1982-84, however, created
openings that Moscow has attempted to capitalize on. The increased Soviet
military presence in Syria, South Yemen, and Libya and the continued
importance of Soviet weaponry to such countries as Iraq, Algeria, and
North Yemen ensure the USSR a continuing foothold in the Arab world.
1 Secret
SOV UR 85-004X
August 1985
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Moscow's position in the the Northern Tier is far stronger than it was 15
years ago. The United States is shut out of Iran, and there is a Marxist re-
gime and more than 115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Although
Afghanistan is likely to remain a net liability for the Soviets for some time
to come, over the longer term a pacified, Marxist-ruled Afghanistan would
enhance the USSR's ability to exercise influence in South and Southwest
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The Kremlin's gains in Iran and Afghanistan have not been without costs.
The most significant has been the US decision to increase its military
presence not only near Southwest Asia but also in the Middle East as a
whole. Washington's creation of the US Central Command (CENTCOM),
its securing of access to regional ports and airfields and pre-positioning of
equipment for CENTCOM, along with its increased military cooperation
with Pakistan and selected Middle Eastern countries, have, at a minimum,
complicated Soviet military planning for the Middle East and South Asia.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the continuing Muslim insurgency
have made regional states all the more suspicious of Soviet intentions and
increased their receptivity to US efforts.
The Middle East's Importance in Soviet Strategy
Soviet interests in the Middle East stem first of all from its proximity to
the USSR. Soviet officials have stressed to US counterparts that the
Middle East is a Soviet borderland comparable to Latin America for the
United States. Just as Washington has vital interests in Latin America,
they argue, so too does Moscow have such interests in the Middle East.
Other factors that make the Middle East important to the Soviets include:
? Energy. The region's vast resources of oil and natural gas make it vital to
the functioning of the economies of many Western and Third World
countries. The USSR, itself, is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas but
frequently has found it cost effective to purchase these commodities in
the Middle East or, in the case of oil, to accept it as payment for arms
sales when a client is unable to pay in hard currency.' The decline in
Soviet domestic oil production in 1984-the first since World War II-
and the poor prospects for a rebound in output raise the possibility that
the Soviet Union will become a major purchaser of OPEC oil by the
1990s.
? Hard currency. Since 1955, the Soviets have signed arms deals worth a
total of approximately $66 billion with Middle Eastern states-about
two-thirds of total Soviet arms sales to the Third World. Most of these
customers pay in hard currency, and earnings from these sales have
averaged about $5.5 billion annually during recent years, or approxi-
mately 15 percent of total Soviet hard currency earnings.
? Islam. Besides the natural concerns any country has with its bordering
regions, the USSR has the added concern that the Middle East contains
religious and ethnic kin of Soviet citizens. The approximately 45 million
Soviet Muslims-primarily of Turkic and Iranian ethnic origin-by and
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large have not been a major security threat to the Communist regime
since it subdued the Central Asian Basmachi rebels in the early 1930s.
The vast majority of Soviet Muslims are Muslims by tradition rather
than practice. Since the late 1970s, however, signs of increasing religious
awareness among Soviet Muslims, coupled with the upsurge in Islamic
fundamentalism across the border in the Middle East, have prompted
Soviet authorities to pay closer attention to the "Islamic factor."
? Western involvement. The West, along with Japan, is primarily interest-
ed in the Middle East for its reserves of oil and natural gas and
geostrategic location at the confluence of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The
Western economic presence in the Middle East far outstrips that of the
Soviets, and the Western military presence is a prime concern of
Moscow. Turkey, a NATO member, is the southeastern flank of the
Western alliance, and North Africa lies opposite NATO's entire southern
flank.
For all these reasons, the Soviets see the Middle East as the most
important region in the Third World. The threat to the Soviet homeland
from the Middle East, as a borderland of the USSR, is minuscule
compared to the threats the Soviets face from Central Europe and China,
opposite which the overwhelming bulk of their conventional forces and all
their intermediate-range nuclear missiles are stationed. The Middle East,
however, is the most volatile borderland, and for that reason it probably de-
mands more day-to-day attention from policymakers in Moscow. The
Middle East's explosiveness poses potential dangers to the Soviets because
of the high stakes of both the USSR and the United States in the region
and the possibility that uncontrolled events could precipitate a military
confrontation between the two superpowers. At the same time, this
volatility offers potential opportunities for rapid expansion of Soviet
influence that are not present on the USSR's other borders.
Factors Assisting and Inhibiting Soviet Progress
There are various factors working to Soviet advantage in the Middle East.
The Arab-Israeli dispute, Israeli assertiveness, and the close US-Israeli
relationship sustain Soviet offers of security assistance and enable Moscow
to charge the United States with backing Israel and ignoring Arab
interests. Other regional rivalries, such as the war between Iran and Iraq,
Syrian-Iraqi differences, Libyan-Egyptian tensions, North-South Yemeni
disputes, as well as the national ambitions of leaders such as Libya's
Qadhafi, also provide the Soviets with an entree to the region. 25X1
But the numerous factors working to limit Soviet advances have predomi-
nated over the years. These include Moscow's inability to affect a solution
to the Arab-Israeli dispute (in large part because it has no leverage with
Israel), longstanding Arab antipathy to Communism and suspicion of
Soviet intentions, the legacy of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Arab
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nationalism, rivalries between Soviet friends, and a lack of economic
appeal. Despite 30 years of effort, Moscow does not have a client in the re-
gion that can compare with Cuba or Vietnam in terms of cooperation and
compatibility. Only South Yemen and Afghanistan are headed by Marxist
regimes, and there do not appear to be obvious candidates for leftist
revolutions elsewhere in the region, with the possible exception of Sudan.
Uncertain Prospects
It remains to be seen what effects the recent changes in the Soviet
leadership will have on Moscow's policy toward the Middle East. Neither
General Secretary Gorbachev nor Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has
experience in dealing with the Middle East, although Shevardnadze has
traveled there and has ruled the party apparatus in a republic bordering
the region.
At a minimum, President Gromyko's departure from the Foreign Ministry
should allow Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to take a fresh look at Soviet
policies toward the Middle East. The setbacks Moscow suffered in the
region after 1970 appeared to leave a bitter taste in Gromyko's mouth. He
often adopted a condescending, abrasive tone in his talks with regional
friends and adversaries alike and never failed to berate his Arab counter-
parts for their inability to end their blood feuds. In recent years, Gromyko
spent relatively little time on Middle Eastern issues. The only countries he
ever visited in the region while Foreign Minister were Egypt and Syria, and
his last trip was in 1980.
Thus far into his tenure, Gorbachev has not shown any special interest in
the Middle East. However, the determination he has displayed in
comments to force the United States to treat the USSR as an
equal suggests that he will insist at least as adamantly as his predecessors
that Moscow be included in any regional negotiations.
In addition to the Afghan problem, the most pressing issues facing the new
Soviet leadership in the Middle East are how to:
? Prevent Jordan and PLO chief Arafat from entering peace negotiations
with Israel through US mediation and with no role assigned to Syria and
the USSR.
? Reunify the PLO on an anti-US basis and mend the rift between Arafat
and Syrian President Assad.
? Unify the Arabs into a radical, anti-US front by ending the isolation of
Moscow's closest "allies" in the region, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
? Prevent Egypt from drawing other Arabs into a moderate, pro-US front
that is willing to negotiate with Israel and is cool, if not hostile, toward
the Soviet Union.
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? Increase Soviet influence in Iran or, at a minimum, ensure that a
successor to the Khomeini regime does not move back toward
Washington.
? Maintain the gains made with Iraq since 1982 without crimping
Moscow's ability to seize opportunities in Iran.
? Capitalize on US setbacks in Sudan and Lebanon.
? Stem Algeria's drift away from overwhelming dependence on Soviet
weapons.
? Develop greater access to moderate regimes in the region.
? Erode Turkey's security ties with the United States.
Policy Options
Barring a change of regime, Syria is likely to remain the bulwark of the
Soviet position in the Middle East throughout the rest of the decade (see
"The Soviet-Syrian Relationship: Centerpiece of Moscow's Middle Eastern
Policy"). Moscow and Damascus continue to have sharp differences on a
number of issues-especially Syrian attempts to control the PLO-but a
shared objective of preventing any resolution of the Palestinian question
that excludes either state is likely to lead them to minimize differences and
continue their marriage of convenience during the next few years.
The Soviets, however, could decide that Syria's dependence on Soviet arms
gives them room to maneuver in terms of new approaches to the Arab-
Israeli problem (see "Soviet Policy Options in the Middle East"). The
USSR might:
? Float yet another Arab-Israeli peace initiative.
? Intensify efforts to improve relations with Egypt (see "Soviet-Egyptian
Relations: Limited Prospects for Improvement").
? Resume efforts to court Jordan's King Hussein.
? Increase support for the Arafat faction of the PLO.
? Accelerate efforts to strengthen contacts with various political forces in
Lebanon (see "Soviet Policy in Lebanon: Moscow Hedges Its Bets").
? Improve communications with the Israelis.
Just as Egypt is the key Soviet target in the Arab world, so Iran is in the
Northern Tier (see "Moscow's Tough Line Toward Iranian Overtures").
The most likely course under Gorbachev is a continuation of the current
uncompromising Soviet position toward Tehran, but he might contemplate
more innovative and risky policies. On the one hand, the Soviets could
increase pressure on the Khomeini regime and provide more active support
for opposition elements. On the other hand, they could take Iran up on its
overtures for better relations with the hope of improving their position
inside Iran and positioning themselves well to capitalize on Khomeini's
eventual departure from the scene.
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In the broader Persian Gulf region, the Soviets almost certainly will
continue to court the conservative Gulf regimes but could simultaneously
step up efforts-through South Yemen-to subvert those same govern-
ments. Similarly, Moscow could decide to take a more active role in Libyan
subversive efforts, particularly in the unstable Sudan (see "The Soviets
Probe for Openings in Sudan").
All of these alternative policies carry risks for the USSR, both in alienating
existing friends, such as Syria and Iraq, and in provoking local and US re-
sponses. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, however, after a thorough policy
review, may eventually decide that the general stagnation of Soviet policy
in the Middle East since the early 1970s demands that such risks be run.
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Soviet Policy Options in the Middle East
Gorbachev's accession to power and the shift of
authority to a new generation of leaders almost
certainly will have an impact on Soviet policy in the
Middle East. At a minimum, Soviet policy will be
invigorated by the infusion of new personalities. New
ideas and approaches should be generated and impe-
tus given to existing policies. Shifts in emphasis and
policy may well emerge over time. The new Soviet
Foreign Minister will want to know why Soviet policy
in the Middle East has not moved off dead center
since the Soviet ouster from Egypt in the 1970s and
will be looking for ways to improve Moscow's position.
Soviet Objectives and Policies
The Soviets will continue to pursue their broad objec-
tive in the Middle East-the enhancement of their
own influence and presence at the expense of the
United States. They will seek closer ties to key
regional states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
while preserving their current links to Syria, Libya,
and Iraq. They are both supported and frustrated in
their efforts by the constantly shifting environment in
which they operate. New initiatives with respect to a
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the chaos in
Lebanon, the protracted war between Iran and Iraq,
the unpredictable Qadhafi, and the impact of Islamic
fundamentalism all seem to offer opportunities for
Soviet advances-but all contain inherent pitfalls as
well.
Moscow's successes in the Middle East to date have
derived almost entirely from its ability to supply
military assistance to clients involved either in conflict
with Israel or in disputes with their neighbors. Mos-
cow's primary clients will continue to be leftist and
radical states, but it also will push arms sales to
moderate Arab states (such as Jordan and Kuwait)
that are disgruntled with a perceived lack of US
support. The moderates are willing to purchase Soviet
military equipment but tend to limit their dealings
with Moscow to avoid both a pervasive Soviet pres-
ence and an angry US reaction.
The Soviets also seek to expand the base of their
position in the Middle East by establishing their
relevance to the Arab-Israeli peace process and by
trying to create and lead a broad coalition of Arab
states. Failing in these efforts, Moscow consistently
opposes Middle East negotiations from which it is
excluded.
The Soviets are concerned that separate agreements
leave them associated only with the most radical and
recalcitrant Arabs and thus limit their prospects in
the region. They therefore try to maintain ties to a
range of actors in the Middle East. They defend the
independence of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), for example, in spite of their suspicion of
Arafat. Their dependence on Syria, however, prevents
them from taking a strong position to defend the PLO
from Syrian-backed attacks.
Finally, the Soviets try to accomplish their aims by
encouraging the establishment of leftist, pro-Soviet
regimes in the region. They have provided support to
Communist and other leftist elements, have tried to
manipulate domestic politics in their favor, and have
used disinformation and forgeries as well as propagan-
da to bolster their own position and undermine that of
the West. They will continue such efforts and may
consider intensifying them in the months ahead.
Possible Policy Options
As long as Syrian policy remains fundamentally
compatible with that of the USSR and Syria remains
dependent on the Soviets for arms, Moscow will treat
Syria as the key to its position in the Arab-Israeli
context. Should Syrian policies shift fundamentally,
Moscow would adapt its position to attain maximum
benefit and limit its losses. On many issues Soviet and
Syrian interests already differ, however, and Moscow
pursues policies that conflict with those of Syria. The
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11. -
Soviets could decide that Syria's dependence on Sovi-
et arms gives them sufficient room to maneuver to
justify new initiatives either with respect to an Arab-
Israeli settlement or toward other key actors-Egypt,
Jordan, the Palestinians, Lebanon, or Israel. They
could:
? Undertake yet another new initiative with respect to
a peace settlement designed to appeal to moderate
Arabs (frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations)
and advance their own claims that they have a
constructive role to play. (Brezhnev's original out-
line for a settlement of the conflict, advanced in
1981, has already been modified to include an
acknowledgment of a new Palestinian state's right
to form a confederation with Jordan.) The Soviets
could repackage their call for an international con-
ference under UN auspices to address an overall
settlement.
? Renew their calls for US-Soviet cooperation (possi-
bly at the summit in the fall) to help resolve the
dispute-and advance these calls more vigorously in
Western Europe. The Soviets might hope that the
French and other Europeans would in turn put
pressure on the United States to include the USSR
in any discussions.
? Accompany a peace proposal with a renewed diplo-
matic offensive designed to distract attention from
US efforts. There has not been a high-level Soviet
visit to the Middle East since Gromyko traveled to
Syria in 1980. Shevardnadze, who visited Algeria in
1984, might well put the Middle East high on his
list of potential trips.
? Intensify efforts to improve relations with Egypt,
hoping to discourage Egyptian leadership of a new
moderate Arab coalition. While it is unlikely that
Moscow would agree to forgive Egypt's military
debt, given the unwanted precedent this would
establish, it simply could proceed without resolving
the issue. This might open the way for deliveries of
spare parts and, possibly, the establishment of a
military attache's office in Cairo.
? Resume efforts to court King Hussein, which were
interrupted by his peace initiative and their own
strong opposition to it. They could reissue their
invitation for him to visit Moscow and offer further
sales of sophisticated arms, following up on recent
deals involving air defense systems.
? Increase support for the Arafat faction of the PLO,
while supporting those leftist elements-the DFLP
and the PFLP-that are seeking to pull Arafat
away from the peace process. They will certainly
continue trying to arrange some accommodation
between Syria and Arafat.
? Accelerate efforts to strengthen contacts with vari-
ous political forces in Lebanon, particularly Walid
Junblatt's PSP, and to bolster the Lebanese Com-
munist Party in order to create future options
independent of the Syrians.
? Take initiatives designed to improve communica-
tions with the Israelis, by taking advantage of the
Labor Party's desire to increase the emigration of
Russian Jews to Israel. Moscow would hope thereby
to enhance its credibility as a participant in the
negotiating process.
Any of these steps would be opposed by Syria,
particularly while the US-backed Hussein initiative
remains extant. Should the initiative collapse, howev-
er, Moscow might believe that it could afford to
distance itself from Syria and work to expand its
options. It would certainly try to avoid having to make
a choice between any of these initiatives and its
relations with Syria. If forced to do so, however, it
would continue to give priority to its Syrian ties.
As long as the Hussein initiative is alive, the Soviets
and Syrians retain a strong, mutual interest in under-
mining it and in maintaining pressure on those in-
volved. While the Soviets apparently were unpleasant-
ly surprised by Syria's movement of troops to the
Jordanian border in 1980, they did not actively oppose
the move and probably would acquiesce in such
Syrian action again if Jordan were on the verge of
reaching an accommodation with Israel. Moscow's
own direct ability to prevent a settlement, however,
remains as limited as its ability to attain a solution.
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In the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula region, the
Soviets continue to believe that Iran is the major prize
and will remain open to any opportunity to advance
their position. The current Soviet line with respect to
Iran and, more broadly, Islamic fundamentalism, is
very negative, however. Whereas, in the early days of
the Iranian revolution, the Soviet attitude toward
fundamentalism was ambivalent and the potential for
leftist gain was stressed, Soviet writing currently
depicts fundamentalism as working against long-term
leftist interests. As a deputy chief of the CPSU
International Department, Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy,
wrote in the May issue of the party journal Kommun-
ist, the ruling clergy of Iran has "managed for a
certain time to slow down and brake the inexorable
march of historical progress."
The new Soviet leadership may well decide that the
Islamic regime is so hostile to Soviet interests that
increased pressure and active support for opposition
elements is warranted. The Soviets may believe that
Tehran will not turn to the West under any circum-
stance and that, consequently, the risk is negligible.
They therefore may feel they can concentrate on
rebuilding the Tudeh Party, trying to link it to other
leftist elements in Iran. They thus would prepare for
Iran's eventual collapse into anarchy. Under this
scenario, Moscow would not want to prop up the
present regime by giving it economic, political, or
military support of any kind. This is the direction
Soviet policy currently appears to be leaning.
The new Soviet leadership could decide to change
course, however, and to respond to Iranian overtures
positively, hoping for a real improvement in relations:
? Moscow could return its technicians to Iranian
projects, be accommodating in economic talks, ease
restraints on clients such as Libya and Syria with
respect to arms deliveries, and agree to deliver some
lesser weapon systems to Iran itself.
? The Soviets will continue arms deliveries to Iraq and
will support Iraqi calls for an end to the war
whether or not they respond favorably to Iranian
gestures. Moscow might hope, however, that im-
proved ties to Iran would give it more leverage with
Baghdad, which has moved closer to the West and
to the moderate Arabs in recent years.
In the broader Gulf region, the Soviets will continue
efforts to improve their bilateral ties to the conserva-
tive states of the region. The Iran-Iraq war has set
back their efforts as the Gulf states have looked to the
West and to each other to bolster their security
position. But Moscow will hope to capitalize on the
view recently expressed by Bahrain's Prime Minis-
ter-that the Gulf states would benefit from having
ties to both superpowers:
? Moscow could refloat initiatives such as its proposal
for an international conference to discuss Persian
Gulf security or its frequent calls for the establish-
ment of nuclear-free zones in the Persian Gulf or
the Indian Ocean.
? It could renew diplomatic efforts designed to draw
the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, into a
dialogue.
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Moscow, on the other hand, could again urge the use
of subversion and insurgency against the conservative
Gulf states. Although such activities undermine ef-
forts to improve bilateral relations, the Soviets have
frequently pursued such a two-track policy in the past.
The hiatus in such activity since the 1970s has
resulted from a number of factors-not least of which
has been South Yemen's pursuit of respectability and
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Soviets may agree with internal Yemeni critics that
Aden's current policy has not paid off. Although they
apparently still support President Hasani, the Soviets
might encourage South Yemen to reduce efforts to
improve ties to its neighbors and to return instead to
support for radical Gulf elements seeking to under-
mine existing regimes:
? Moscow could renew attempts to subvert Oman,
urging South Yemen to resume active support for
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
(PFLO).
? Similarly, the Soviets could encourage South
Yemen's backing of military action by the National
Democratic Front, directed against North Yemen.
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Moscow has subordinated such activity to its court-
ship of the North Yemeni regime in recent years,
seeing its long-term leverage against Saudi Arabia
best served by strengthening bilateral ties to Sanaa.
Soviet concern that the North will be looking
increasingly to the West because of recent oil
discoveries by a US firm could prompt it to move in
this direction.
A Soviet decision to goad South Yemen into a more
militant posture would reflect a shift in policy empha-
sis that might also be evident elsewhere in the Middle
East. Libyan leader Qadhafi is scheduled to visit
Moscow this fall, and the signing of a Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty at that time might indicate great-
er Soviet willingness to be identified with, and thus to
encourage, Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize other states
in North Africa. This might involve increased Soviet
support for the southern insurgency in the Sudan or
for Libya's efforts to advance its interests in Chad.
The Soviets could also try to piggyback on Libyan
policy in the Maghreb. Should Algeria continue to
distance itself from the Soviet Union, Moscow could
try to upgrade its relations with Morocco, exploiting
the Libyan-Moroccan union and its own economic
relationship with Morocco. While Moscow has typi-
cally been wary of tying its own policies too closely to
those of the unpredictable Qadhafi, it may decide that
the potential for gain outweighs the possible losses.
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The Soviet-Syrian Relationship:
Centerpiece of Moscow's
Middle Eastern Policy
Syria has been the linchpin of the Soviet position in
the Middle East since the USSR's loss of influence in
Egypt in the early 1970s. The Soviets' relationship
with Syria-by far the most powerful Arab "confron-
tation" state opposing Israel-has provided them
entree into the Middle East and influence in the
region's most important conflict: the Arab-Israeli
dispute. Moscow and Damascus have been drawn
together by some common objectives as well as the
USSR's lack of alternative avenues of influence in the
region and Syria's lack of alternative sources of
military support. The relationship is one of necessity,
not mutual affinity or ideological compatibility.
Shared Objectives
The most important objective the USSR and Syria
share is to prevent Israel and the United States from
achieving separate peace settlements between Tel
Aviv and each of its Arab neighbors. Accordingly,
Moscow and Damascus strongly oppose such "sepa-
rate deals" as the Camp David accords and the
Arafat-Hussein agreement of February 1985. The
Soviets are against such partial settlements because
the United States historically has been the broker and
they have been left out. The Syrians believe they and
other Arabs can only get a satisfactory deal from
Israel (and this only after they achieve military parity)
if they negotiate as a bloc and resolve the major issues
simultaneously.
Military Backing: The Tie That Binds
The dominant factor in the Soviet-Syrian relationship
is Moscow's willingness to provide military support.
The Soviets have delivered more weapons to Syria
than to any other Third World client (approximately
$15 billion worth through 1984). The USSR and its
East European allies provide Syria virtually all its
arms, and, in recent years, Damascus often has been
the first to get newly exported versions of Soviet
weapons.
The volume and quality of Soviet weaponry delivered
increased significantly between 1979 and 1983, espe-
cially after the 1982 war in Lebanon. After Syrian
losses from that war were replaced, deliveries dropped
off sharply in 1984 (a 47-percent drop in tonnage
compared to 1983). The decline probably will be only
Beyond the approximately 3,000 Soviet military ad-
visers and technicians with Syrian forces (see inset),
the USSR has had some independent military units of
its own in Syria. The most significant were the two
SA-5 surface-to-air missile units the Soviets sent to
Syria in early 1983. There were some 2,000 Soviet
personnel manning the complexes at Hims and Du-
mayr until they began leaving in October 1984.
technicians left at each complex and U they-along
with the Soviets at air defense headquarters in Da-
mascus-maintain a key role in command and con-
trol. Final say over firing the missiles, however,
probably has been turned over to the Syrians. Other
Soviet units in Syria include:
? A detachment of Hip J/K electronic countermea-
sures helicopters at Al Mazzah airfield outside
Damascus.
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Figure 1
Selected Weapon Systems the Soviets Might Provide
Syria During the Rest of the 1980s
Introduced in
Soviet Forces
Transportable, medium-range (100 km) SAM. Newest, most capable 1980
Soviet system. Effective against aircraft at all altitudes. Radar can
be used with other SAMs against low-altitude targets.
Improved MIG-23 ground attack aircraft with greater payload and 1975/1978
better navigation system. J variant equipped with laser range-
finder and target designator.
Latest Soviet combat aircraft. Designed for close air-to-air combat. 1984
May also serve as a fighter-bomber. Only small number produced
thus far.
Latest Soviet ground attack aircraft. In use with Soviet forces in 1981
Afghanistan and delivered to Iraq in 1985.
Latest Soviet medium tank with gas turbine engine, improved 1981
armor protection, and better mobility than earlier tanks. Able to
fire antitank guided missile through gun tube.
Diesel-powered attack submarine. Already exported 1958
to several countries outside the Warsaw Pact.
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Soviet Military Advisory Presence
To assist the Syrians in operating and maintaining
equipment, as well as to train them in general
military tactics and doctrine, the Soviets maintain
approximately 3,000 military advisers and techni-
cians in Syria. They are present at virtually every
level of the Syrian armed forces, from battalion to
general command.
antisubmarine warfare and naval reconnaissance air-
craft there for the first time in 1981 and have done so
five times since 1983 on what now appears to be a
regular basis. Longer range TU-16 Badger reconnais-
sance aircraft also deployed to Tiyas in 1981 and have
flown there twice so far in 1985.
annarently give Soviet bids on economic projects in
Outside the military sphere, the Soviets receive Syrian
support in international forums on many issues, in-
cluding Afghanistan and Moscow's perennial "peace"
offensives. In addition to the hard currency the
Soviets earn from arms sales to Syria, the Syrians also
Syria preferential consideration.
Economic Aid
Soviet economic assistance to Syria has been highly
visible but, when compared with Arab aid, relatively
modest. Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have focused
their assistance on such large-scale projects as the
Euphrates hydroelectric complex, the Tartus-Hims
railway, the Syrian oil industry, and land reclamation.
Today there are approximately 1,000 Soviet economic
technicians working in Syria. Moscow has extended
about $2 billion in economic credits since 1957. (By
way of comparison, Arab government disbursements
to Damascus in 1981 alone amounted to $1.8 billion.)
The Soviets did not extend any credits to Syria
between 1976 and 1983, but the more than $1 billion
provided since then and the recent negotiations over
building a nuclear power reactor and research center
are leading to a major expansion of Soviet economic
involvement in the country.
The Syrian Quid Pro Quo
In return for this assistance, the Syrians have granted
the Soviets some access to the ports of Tartus and
Latakia and the military airfield at Tiyas. The Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron makes regular use of the
support facilities at Tartus. In 1983 and 1984, Soviet
ships made far more port calls in Syria than in all
other Mediterranean ports. The Soviets have used
Tiyas airfield since 1972. They deployed two IL-38
Limited Soviet Influence
Despite the wide scope of their presence in Syria, the
Soviets have limited ability to affect the Assad re-
gime's policymaking in matters of importance to
Syria. Soviet officials have stated,
that Moscow is unable to exert eci-
sive influence over Assad and regards him with
considerable mistrust.
the one occasion when the USSR is known to have
attempted to use its military relationship to pressure
the Syrians to change their policy-during Syria's
military intervention in Lebanon in 1976-77-it
failed.' Damascus, in
retaliation for Moscow's cutback on arms deliveries,
threatened in January 1977 to bar Soviet use of the
port of Tartus. Assad's threat eventually led to a
resumption of arms shipments.
The USSR's lack of ability to influence key Syrian
decisions stems from real differences over regional
policy. These differences in turn foster the mutual
' The Soviets strongly opposed the Syrian intervention on on the
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distrust that has marked relations since Assad's sei-
zure of power in 1970. Both sides have kept each
other in the dark over the years about major issues
This lack of consultation evidently continues. Soviet
officials have frequently complained during
the past few years that Damascus does not discuss
with them its policy in Lebanon or contacts with the
United States. Moscow, for its part, did not brief the
Syrians fully on the US-Soviet talks on the Middle
East in Geneva in February, according to comments
made by Syrian officials to US Embassy officers in
Damascus.
Policy Differences
On policy issues, Soviet-Syrian differences center on
the extent of Soviet military support for Syrian
strategic objectives and on specific policy toward the
PLO, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt, Lebanon,
and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Soviets have
claimed that a primary source of tension in the Soviet-
Syrian relationship is the Assad regime's attempts to
broaden the 1980 treaty to, in effect, commit the
USSR to come to Syria's defense militarily in the
event of war. Soon after the announcement in 1981 of
the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement, the
Syrians began calling for a
similar accord between Syria and the USSR. They
have also sought Moscow's backing for their goal of
"strategic parity" with Israel.
past Soviet behavior strongly
suggest that Moscow is still determined not to tie
itself to a specific response in the event of another
Syrian-Israeli war. The dispatch to Syria of Soviet
SA-5 units in 1983 committed Moscow to Syria's
defense to a much greater degree than ever before.
The Soviets, however, evidently continued to refrain
from putting that commitment in writing. Moreover,
we believe that, with the removal of most of their
SA-5 crews, the Soviets now will be even less likely to
accede to Syrian requests to formalize their security
relationship. In addition, the Soviets, although deter-
mined to continue strengthening Syria, almost cer-
tainly do not believe it can attain actual military
parity with Israel.
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Different perspectives on the PLO have led to some of
the sharpest Soviet-Syrian differences over the past
decade. Moscow has consistently opposed Syrian at-
tempts to dominate the organization, from the Syrian
intervention against PLO forces in Lebanon in 1976
to the apparently Damascus-backed attacks on Pales-
tinian camps in Beirut this May and June. The
Soviets, however, have had little success in tempering
Syrian moves against the PLO and, in the most recent
case, have mixed feelings because they share many of
Damascus's grievances against PLO leader Arafat,
particularly his joining with King Hussein in an
attempt to negotiate with Israel through US media-
since late 1984 to tilt further toward Damascus in the
Syrian-PLO dispute.
These developments underscore how closely Moscow
is tied to Syria's position on an Arab-Israeli peace
settlement. The Soviets cannot risk endorsing any
peace initiative that does not meet Syria's objectives;
if they alienate Damascus, they will have no entree
into the peace process. At the same time, Moscow has
not shown the ability to convince Damascus to soften
its position. Thus, the Soviets are left with little choice
but to follow the Syrian lead, and the Syrians appear
in no hurry to engage in negotiations.
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Moscow, similarly, has had no success in convincing
Assad to mend fences with Iraq and Egypt. As for
Lebanon, the Soviets have suppressed their misgivings
about Syrian policy there since the Israeli invasion in
1982, but they still oppose long-term Syrian domina-
tion of the country.
Differing Perspectives on the Peace Process
Soviet-Syrian difficulties over the Arab-Israeli peace
process have usually not been over the final terms of a
settlement but over how best to obtain those terms.
Moscow has sought a comprehensive settlement at an
international conference that it would cochair with
Washington-the solution that would give the USSR
the greatest voice. Damascus refused to attend the
only international conference on the issue ever held-
at Geneva in December 1973-and would not support
the US-Soviet call in October 1977 for reconvening
the conference. The Syrians have publicly expressed
support for the USSR's current effort to hold an
international conference, but Syrian officials have
admitted to US Embassy officers that Assad is not
enthusiastic about the idea.
Despite these differences, fear that Yasir Arafat and
King Hussein-backed by Egypt-are moving toward
their own separate deal with Israel has led Moscow
Deferring to Damascus While Protecting Long- Term
Interests
The Soviets' dependence on Syria for presence and
influence in the Middle East has required them to
acquiesce in Syrian policies on most regional issues.
As long as Syria remains so central to a continuing
Soviet role in the area, we believe that Moscow will
continue to adjust its policies toward other countries
to mesh with those of the Syrians. The Soviets
recognize that these issues are of vital importance to
Damascus and will not jeopardize relations with Syria
over matters of lesser importance to the USSR.
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At the same time, the Soviets are well aware of the
speed with which situations can change, particularly
in this volatile region. Their setback in Egypt in the
1970s demonstrated the impermanence of seemingly
solid bilateral relationships. Although Assad's politi-
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is fragile and his longevity uncertain. The Soviets may
believe that any of his probable successors would
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pursue similar policies. Given the fact that the current
regime represents a small minority of the Syrian
population, however, they cannot be sanguine about
this either.
Thus, while deferring to Syrian interests and modify-
ing their policies sufficiently to avoid jeopardizing
relations with Damascus, the Soviets will continue to
pursue their own interests in the region. Their unwill-
ingness to abandon Arafat demonstrates their reluc-
tance to tie their fortunes totally to a single actor in
the region.
The Soviets recognize that they too have leverage in
the relationship, given Syrian dependence on the
USSR for arms and great-power backing. To protect
its own long-term interests in the region, Moscow,
therefore, will continue to seek improvement in rela-
tions with Iraq and closer ties to Jordan, Egypt, and
Yasir Arafat. It will also support those factions in
Lebanon that it considers sympathetic to its interests.
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Soviet-Egyptian Relations:
Limited Prospects for
Improvement
The normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations last
summer signaled a modest improvement in relations
that had been cool since the early 1970s. Much to
Moscow's disappointment, however, there has been
little change since then.
Legacy of Mistrust
Former President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet person-
nel from Egypt and the turn toward the United States
in the early 1970s was a severe blow to Soviet fortunes
in the Middle East. In 1977 Sadat announced a 10-
year moratorium on repaying Cairo's military debt to
the USSR and withdrew Egypt's Ambassador to
Moscow. The Soviets stopped delivering spare parts
for Egypt's Soviet-built weapons.
In 1978 the Camp David accords, which highlighted
Moscow's inability to influence the Arab-Israeli peace
process, further soured relations. Soviet media were
especially vitriolic during this period. In 1981 Sadat
expelled the Soviet Ambassador, charging him with
interfering in Egyptian internal affairs. Sadat's in-
tense anti-Sovietism and the animosity between him
and the Soviet leaders left a legacy of distrust that
made any rapprochement virtually impossible as long
as he remained on the scene.
Soon after President Mubarak assumed office in
October 1981, he took small steps to normalize rela-
tions but was in no hurry to exchange ambassadors.
The Kremlin was cautious but ready to proceed at any
time, and it welcomed the opportunity to deal with
someone other than Sadat, despite Mubarak's pledge
to adhere to Sadat's policies.
Mutual Interest in Normal Relations
Soviet influence in Syria, Libya, and South Yemen
has not replaced the loss of influence in Egypt,
because it leaves Moscow with clients that either
cannot defeat Israel militarily, such as Syria, or that
are irrelevant to the dispute. The Soviets openly
acknowledge that Egypt is the most important coun-
try in the Arab world, primarily because of its pivotal
role in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and have devoted
considerable effort to rebuilding their influence with
Cairo. While it probably had few illusions that rela-
tions would ever return to the heyday of the late
1960s, Moscow expected the return of ambassadors to
precipitate more rapid change than has taken place.
the lack of progress in expanding ties. The Soviets
have asked Egypt to reopen their consulates and
return buildings seized by Sadat. They are irritated
that Mubarak has requested balanced trade while
ignoring Egypt's estimated $2.5 billion military debt.
The Soviets hope to parlay Cairo's economic weakness
and need for military spare parts into an opportunity
for expanding Soviet influence, thus increasing their
ability to play a major role in the Middle East. The
Soviets' immediate aims appear to be to:
? Reduce Cairo's dependence on the United States by
providing a limited alternative to US military aid.
? Undermine Egypt's commitment to the Camp Da-
vid accords.
? Improve economic ties.
? Foster a rapprochement between Cairo and
Damascus.
Achievement of these goals could clear the path for
closer Soviet-Egyptian ties while minimizing the risk
of undercutting Soviet relations with Syria, the
USSR's closest ally in the region.
Mubarak has several reasons for normalizing rela-
tions. It helps Egypt regain credibility with Arab
countries that had criticized Cairo for becoming an
American "puppet"-a crucial step in ending Egypt's
isolation in the Arab world.
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IMubarak appears
to have every intention of limiting the Soviet presence
and Soviet activities in Egypt.
Obstacles to Closer Ties
The major obstacles to better relations are the legacy
of mistrust, the fundamentally different approaches
the two sides are taking in resolving the Arab-Israeli
dispute, the Egyptian military debt, and Soviet rela-
tions with Egypt's adversaries. Soviet media have
criticized Mubarak's peace initiative, announced after
the 11 February 1985 accord between Jordan's King
Hussein and PLO chief Arafat. The initiative called
for an international conference that would include the
Soviets only after direct negotiations between Israel
and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation had
reached an agreement. While an international confer-
ence is an integral part of the Soviet peace plan, the
Soviets have rejected the notion that a conference
should "rubberstamp" agreements already reached
through direct negotiations. They almost certainly
saw Mubarak's proposal as a clever, Sadat-like move
Soviets are limited to some extent in improving ties to
Egypt by their interest in maintaining those relation-
ships. They probably would justify any move closer to
Egypt by trying to convince Damascus that they were
drawing Cairo away from Washington. Moscow is
less concerned about upsetting Libyan leader Qadha-
fi, but, while it would not allow relations with Libya
to interfere with improving ties to Egypt, it would not
want to jeopardize its growing military access to
Libya for uncertain or marginal gains in Egypt.
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aimed at undermining their role in the issue.
Moscow has publicly called the Hussein-Arafat ac-
cord and Mubarak's proposal capitulatory to Israel
and harmful to the Palestinians' best interests. In an
article condemning Mubarak's initiative, Izvestiya
said it is regrettable that there are "Arab leaders"
taking advantage of current tensions within the PLO
and treating the Palestinian issue "as if it were small
change."
Cairo's military debt is particularly irritating to Mos-
cow. It represents a substantial amount of money, but,
more important, it is symbolic of the Soviet Union's
humiliating defeat in Egypt in the 1970s. Since
Sadat's moratorium on servicing the debt began in
1977, no payments have been made.
the Soviets have frozen
Egypt's accumulated trade credit surplus of approxi-
mately $450 million, insisting that it be applied to the
military debt.
The Egyptians are also suspicious of Soviet ties to
Syria and Libya and of possible efforts to expand
relations with the new government in Sudan. The
Cairo is probably concerned that recent events in
Sudan could lead to a Soviet- and Libyan-brokered
axis among Libya, Sudan, and Ethiopia, thus sur-
rounding Egypt with hostile countries. Moscow's in-
terest in Sudan or in such an axis, however, probably
would not override its interest in closer ties to Egypt.
Moreover, although the government in Khartoum is
interested in improving relations with Moscow, it
would not want to be perceived as a Soviet ally in the
region.
The Soviets have few exploitable assets in Egypt. The
military is not generally impressed with Soviet weap-
ons but sees the need to maintain the large inventory
of equipment on hand. Soviet intelligence-gathering
efforts are primarily directed toward the Egyptian
military and its relationship with the United States.
The Soviets probably see the military as an important
power broker and source of influence in Egypt. The
Soviet Embassy is in frequent contact with Egypt's
leftist and Palestinian press and with the local Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity Organization-a Soviet
front-but none of these groups is very influential in
Egyptian politics. Moscow also maintains contact
with Egyptian Communists-there are seven illegal
Communist parties-but realizes they are virtual
nonentities in Egypt and would not risk heavy involve-
ment with them while trying to improve relations with
Mubarak.
Modest Improvement
The most positive aspect of Soviet-Egyptian relations
has been in the economic sphere. In May the two sides
signed a trade protocol that met Mubarak's call for
balanced trade,
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high-level Soviet delegation went to Cairo to discuss
the debt-the most extensive talks the two sides have
had on the issue since the 1977 moratorium. Senior
Egyptian officials told the US Embassy that the two
sides failed to agree on the debt's size and on the
application of Cairo's trade surplus funds to its repay-
ment. The Soviets reportedly rejected Cairo's argu-
ment that the debt be reduced by the amount Egypt
has spent on reproducing Soviet spare parts and by
the rapid depreciation of the equipment. The deadlock
delayed implementation of the trade protocol.
Talks are likely to resume this fall. Moscow may
consider favorably Cairo's proposal that the frozen
trade surplus be applied toward the purchase of
equipment to modernize Soviet-built factories in
Egypt, but they probably will demand that most be
used to service the debt.
Soviet exports to, as well as imports from, Egypt have
ranged in value from US $200-300 million annually.
The Soviets export coal, chemicals, cast iron, and
machine equipment to Egypt and import cotton,
textiles, oils, and perfumes. They also participate in
During 1984, presidential press passes were issued to
members of the Soviet media for the first time since
their expulsion in the early 1970s, giving them access
to Mubarak's press conferences and presidential brief-
ings. The number of Egyptians studying in the USSR
Outlook
The Soviets are likely to continue efforts to expand
relations, taking advantage of Egypt's need for Soviet
military spare parts and desire for increased trade.
There is little else they can do unilaterally to promote
closer ties, because it is the Egyptians who are being
courted and who are setting the pace in the relation-
ship. Also, Moscow could not afford to risk alienating
Damascus or, to a lesser extent, Tripoli unless closer
relations with Cairo were assured. They are unlikely
to offer many concessions, however, especially on the
debt issue. The Kremlin also will continue to oppose
Mubarak's peace proposal and any other initiatives
that exclude Soviet participation in an Arab-Israeli
settlement, thus limiting prospects for closer ties.
Mubarak, for his part, is likely to continue to keep the
Soviets in official channels and extend relations only
to the point of satisfying Egypt's need for spare parts.
He probably will be cautious about using the "Soviet
card" with the United States, however, to avoid
jeopardizing the even more vital US military and
economic assistance.
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secret
Moscow's Tough Line Toward
Iranian Overtures
Since March 1982, Moscow has made it clear that
any improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations must be
initiated by Tehran. Iran began making overtures in
the spring of 1984, but not until early this year did
both sides appear to consider seriously opportunities
for better ties. By June, however, the Soviets probably
were convinced that prospects for closer ties to the
Khomeini regime were slim, and they are continuing
their tough line toward Iran.
Moscow's Tilt Toward Baghdad
The Kremlin sought closer ties to the Khomeini
regime following the revolution in 1979, and particu-
larly after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, but was
consistently rebuffed. Khomeini's coldness toward the
Soviets as well as his consolidation of power in Tehran
by late 1981 apparently convinced Moscow to reassess
its policy.
A March 1982 article by Pravda's leading Third
World commentator, Pavel Demchenko, signaled the
Soviet reassessment. He dropped the generally posi-
tive line the Soviet media usually took toward the
Khomeini regime and criticized it for unfriendly
actions: reducing the Soviet diplomatic presence in
Tehran, closing the Soviet consulate in Rasht, unilat-
erally terminating cultural relations, promoting an
overall anti-Soviet rhetoric in the Iranian media, and
allowing Afghan rebels to operate from Iranian terri-
tory. Especially galling to Moscow was the media's
equating Soviet policies with those of the United
States. The Soviets were also unhappy about Iran's
closing of the natural gas pipeline between the two
countries in 1980. The conclusion of a $2 billion arms
agreement with Baghdad in April 1982 marked Mos-
cow's decision to support Iraq in the war and to place
relations with Iran on hold until either the regime
adopted a more pro-Soviet stance or a new govern-
ment emerged in Tehran.
In June 1982 the Iranians pushed the Iraqis out of all
but small pockets of Iran and for the first time took
the war into Iraqi territory. The Soviets then began
publicly criticizing Iran's stance on the war, praising
Iraq's stated willingness to end it, and supporting
Iraqi-inspired UN Security Council resolutions. In
July a landmark Kommunist article by the party's
senior Third World theoretician, Rostislav Ul'yanovs-
kiy, presented the most authoritative Marxist-Lenin-
ist condemnation of the Khomeini regime and its
Islamic revolution.
Soviet Conditions
From the fall of 1982 through the spring of 1983,
relations worsened. Iranian demonstrators burned the
Soviet Embassy flag on the anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Members of the Tudeh
(Communist) Party were arrested and confessed (prob-
ably under torture) to charges of spying for the KGB,
and the party was outlawed. In May 1983 Iran 25X1
expelled 18 Soviet diplomats for ties to the Tudeh and
interference in Iranian internal affairs.
The Soviets made their policy clear when then For-
eign Minister Gromyko addressed a session of the
Supreme Soviet in June 1983. Gromyko noted that
Moscow was "linked by friendship" with Iraq. In
contrast, he said only that the USSR wanted good
relations with Iran and would reciprocate if Tehran
sought normal relations but also would respond appro-
priately if Iran had other objectives. He further
criticized Iran's position on the war with Iraq by
censuring those who "oppose ending it."
Since then, Moscow has stuck to its demand that 25X1
Tehran take "concrete" steps toward correcting
"intolerable" activities. The major conditions Moscow
wants met include:
? A sustained reduction in the anti-Soviet rhetoric.
? An end to Iran's support for the Afghan rebels.
? Permission to replace the expelled Soviet diplomats.
? An improvement in economic cooperation.
? An end to the repression of the Tudeh Party.
Moreover, the Soviets would like Iran to be more
willing to negotiate an end to the war, which has led
many of the Persian Gulf states to increase their
security cooperation with the United States.
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1 Secret
Probing for Better Ties
Over the last year, Iran's battlefield failures have
caused it to seek improved ties to the USSR, but not
until early this year has it been willing to take any
action on the Soviet conditions. We believe Tehran's
objectives are to reduce Moscow's support for Iraq in
the war and to acquire major weapon systems from
the Soviets or their allies. Since January of this year,
Iran has:
? Redoubled its diplomatic approaches to the Soviets,
including a request to the Syrians to intercede with
Moscow in its behalf.
? Reduced the level of anti-Soviet rhetoric in its press
(although the USSR still is condemned along with
the United States by clerics and the population in
general).
? Whitewashed anti-Soviet grafitti from the wall of
the Soviet Embassy in Tehran.
? Postponed the trial of the Tudeh members, which
was scheduled for last November.
In June 1984 an Iranian Foreign Ministry official met
with Gromyko in Moscow, and a Soviet energy dele-
gation visited Iran. Both exchanges, however, were
unproductive.
By early 1985 the Soviets appeared willing to test the
sincerity of Iran's overtures and also took some steps
to improve the atmosphere. The Soviet Ambassador,
according to the Iranian media, in January initiated
the revitalization of the Soviet-Iranian Joint Econom-
ic Committee, inactive since 1980. In April, for the
first time since 1980, the Kremlin sent greetings on
the anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Repub-
lic. An authoritative TASS statement on 4 April
dissociated the USSR from Iraq's bombing of Iranian
cities.
Also in early April, Gromyko received Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister Kazempur-Ardebili-the highest
ranking Iranian to visit the USSR in three years.
Gromyko appar- 25X1
ently continued to take a tough stance on the major
obstacles to improved relations.
Kazempur-Ardebili's visit did not go 25X1
well. Moreover, Korniyenko has yet to visit Tehran.
Soviet-Iranian trade declined significantly over the
last year. The revival of the Joint Economic Commis-
sion will be a test for expanding economic cooperation
and improving ties in general, but the two sides have a
long way to go just to restore their earlier levels of
trade (see table).
most Soviet economic technicians left Iran by
early June because of the Iraqi bombing of Iranian
cities. (The Soviets had left a major power plant in
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Ahvaz for similar reasons in 1984.) The withdrawal of
1,000 to 1,500 technicians will hamper Soviet-spon-
sored economic projects and put yet another obstacle 25X1
in the way of any improvement in relations. The
Soviet-built steel plant in Esfahan appears to have
been particularly affected.
Other obstacles also persist. The Soviets probably
recognize that Iran's overtures are motivated primari-
ly by its desperate need for arms and a need to end its
political isolation. Iran continues to support the Af-
ghan rebels (although tensions between the Iranians
and the rebels have increased); it brokered a truce,
announced 17 June 1985, among some rival Afghan
Shia factions fighting the Soviets. Clerics also contin-
ue to denounce the USSR as the "other" Satan.
diminished.
The National Voice of Iran-a clandestine radio
station out of Baku operated and funded by the
Soviets-still calls daily for the overthrow of the
Khomeini regime. In late May an Ul'yanovskiy article
in Kommunist was extremely critical of the Khomeini
regime, noting that it had betrayed the 1979 revolu-
tion and even charging the clergy with profiteering
from the Iran-Iraq war. In June, Pravda replayed a
Tudeh protest calling for an end to repression by the
Khomeini regime. Afghan violations of Iranian air-
space continue-something the Soviets could easily
stop. Moreover, Soviet support for Iraq has not
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Soviet-Iranian Trade Million US $
Soviet Imports
From Iran
Soviet Exports
to Iran
1980
116
399
1981
653
567
1982
260
795
1983
509
755
1984
298
297
Source: Official Soviet trade statistics, rounded to the nearest
million US dollars.
Greater economic cooperation and even an increase in
the intermittent flow of small arms, ammunition, and
spare parts deliveries from the USSR, Eastern Eu-
rope, and other Soviet allies are possible if Tehran
takes additional steps to meet Moscow's conditions.
Although General Secretary Gorbachev's and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze's views about Iran, and the
Middle East in general, are not known, the Iranians
almost certainly will prefer to deal with them than
with the difficult Gromyko. But a major upturn in
relations, including substantial arms transfers to Iran,
is unlikely. The Soviets have spent the last three years
rebuilding relations with Iraq and are likely to avoid
steps that could alienate Saddam Husayn, when
prospects for commensurate gains in Tehran seem
dim.
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3ecrcL
The Soviets Probe for
Openings in Sudan
Moscow has actively sought to improve its position in
Sudan since the fall of the Nimeiri regime in April.
While cultivating the new regime in Khartoum, the
Soviets also have quietly established links to John
Garang's southern dissidents and revitalized existing
ties to the Sudanese Communist Party. Moscow's
efforts may be aided by Khartoum's perception that
the USSR holds the key to a future settlement with
the Garang forces.
Before the Coup
The USSR made little headway in restoring Soviet
influence in Sudan during the 16-year rule of Presi-
dent Nimeiri. Although the Soviets succeeded in
building extensive military assistance ties between
1969 and 1971, relations soured following Moscow's
premature endorsement of an aborted Communist
coup in mid-1971. Khartoum's subsequent crackdown
on local Communists, the expulsion of Soviet military
technicians in mid-1977, and growing US-Sudanese
ties in the late 1970s sustained the downward slide in
Soviet-Sudanese relations.
The Soviets became increasingly critical of the Ni-
meiri government as the United States developed a
military presence in Sudan in the late 1970s. Howev-
er, events in Sudan were not central to Soviet interests
in the Middle East at the time, which focused on
Egypt-and other states engaged in the broader Arab
struggle against Israel-and on the Ethiopian-Somali
conflict in the Horn of Africa.
Courting the New Leadership
The Soviets moved quickly to cultivate the new
regime and gauge the extent to which it was commit-
ted to its professed desire to pursue a more "bal-
anced" foreign policy.
dents subsequently interviewed the head of the new
Transitional Military Council, Suwar Al-Dahab-a
conversation later aired on Soviet television-as well
as the new Prime Minister, Dr. Jazzuli Dafallah. The
interviews focused on the "progressive" changes under
way and the possibilities for closer ties to the USSR.
These overtures were complemented by other gestures
of Soviet good will. Moscow, for example, made
several deliveries of relief assistance for Sudanese
drought victims in April and May. The Soviet Ambas-
sador also met with the Sudanese Deputy Prime
Minister in June to discuss other economic aid possi-
bilities.
Soviet Media Approaches:
Targeting the United States
Soviet media characterizations of the Sudanese situa-
tion also reveal Moscow's positive approach toward
the new regime. In generally straightforward ac-
counts, the media have applauded Nimeiri's ouster
with a predictably anti-US twist-citing his fall as an
example of what happens to Third World leaders who
align themselves too closely with Washington. In
discussing recent changes, the Soviets have highlight-
ed Sudan's "democratization," namely, the release of
political prisoners-including the local Commu-
nists-and its more balanced foreign policy orienta-
tion. At the same time, they also have acknowledged
Sudanese statements about the need for continued
economic ties to the United States.
Soviet media themes suggest that Moscow's short-
term objective is to erode US influence in Sudan. In
interviews with Communist party officials, Soviet
media have focused on US economic, political, and
military "penetration" of Sudan under Nimeiri, and
the need to cleanse the security apparatus, "which
had served as the CIA's regional center from which
were conducted US operations against neighboring
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^ Jecret
countries in Africa." Similarly, the media have car-
ried Sudanese Communist calls for the dissolution of
"inequitable accords" with the United States and
rejection of the International Monetary Fund's
"shackling terms."
Behind-the-Scenes Maneuvering
Even while cultivating the new government in Khar-
toum, the Soviets have been discreetly expanding
their links to various opposition groups in Sudan,
largely through intermediaries.
In addition, the Soviet media have sought to burnish
the Sudanese Communists' image as a leading force
on the domestic scene. On 21 June Pravda summa-
rized a Lebanese newspaper interview with the Suda-
nese party leader, focusing on the anti-US, anti-IMF
the Soviet position has been
enhanced by the new regime's perception that the
USSR-through its ties with Ethiopia-has the nec-
essary leverage to prompt the Garang forces into an
internal settlement. This view led to the Transitional
Military Council's decision in late June to send an
emissary to Moscow to request a cessation of Soviet
aid to the SPLA.
Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
Overview: Improved Soviet Prospects
The Soviets clearly recognize the potential political
and diplomatic opportunities stemming from Khar-
toum's perception that the USSR can help end the
insurgency in the south. Soviet Foreign Ministry
officials have told US diplomats that Ethiopian and
Sudanese support for insurgents in southern Sudan
and Eritrea, respectively, "offers the chance for an
arrangement." Soviet success in brokering some kind
of settlement could enhance Moscow's image in the
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Soviet efforts to build influence in Sudan-and di-
minish that of the United States-probably will be
abetted by Khartoum's improved relations with Libya
and Ethiopia, with whom Moscow has major military
ties. The Soviets may benefit from the recent Libyan-
Sudanese military assistance accord, simply because
it has further strained Khartoum's relations with
Egypt and Washington. The Soviets might also even-
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the Soviets may already have discussed 25X1
renewing military assistance with Sudanese military
regional interests.
At present, the Soviets probably judge that their
interests are best served by the low-key, dual-track
approach of cultivating the Transitional Military
Council while expanding ties with various opposition
forces. The current situation probably is seen as too
fluid to risk choosing sides, and the Soviets are
probably all the more cautious because of their pre-
cipitate moves in 1971. Moreover, blatant Soviet
meddling could undercut Soviet efforts to improve ties
with Egypt, a state more central to Moscow's broader
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Soviet Policy in Lebanon:
Moscow Hedges Its Bets
The Soviets have developed contacts in the last 18
months with virtually all the major actors in Leba-
non-the Druze, the Shias, leftist forces, the Leba-
nese Government, and, to a lesser extent, rightist
Christian groups. The Soviets apparently are seeking
to capitalize on the chaotic situation in Lebanon and
to preserve their options for whatever occurs there.
Moscow's freedom of maneuver in Lebanon is con-
strained by Syrian interests and by the Soviets' need
to maintain close relations with Syria, the USSR's
most important ally in the Middle East. The Soviets
also do not want tensions in Lebanon to escalate to the
point of sparking a return of Israeli forces.
Another constraint on Soviet policy has been the
reluctance on the part of the various Lebanese fac-
tions to become too closely identified with Moscow.
Although these factions have been responsive to Sovi-
et arms offers as they have sought to expand their
area of control in Lebanon, they realize that Syria is
increasingly becoming the controlling force of Leban-
on's fate and have taken care not to provoke Damas-
cus by moving too close to the USSR. Despite these
constraints, Moscow is likely to try to expand its
contacts with the various factions to increase its
presence and influence and avoid the past situation in
which it had almost no significant contacts among the
Lebanese independent of Syria.
Recent Soviet Activity and Lebanese Response
Soviet prospects in Lebanon have brightened with the
withdrawal of the US Marines in 1984 and the Israeli
Defense Forces this spring. Although these withdraw-
als magnify Syria's influence in Lebanon, they also
create openings for the Soviets to build independent
contacts with the various Lebanese factions. The
Soviets may also hope that such contacts will give
them additional leverage with Syria.
The Druze. A main target of Soviet efforts has been
Walid Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).
The Syrians generally have the final word on Soviet
arms deliveries to the Druze, because most shipments
are channeled through Syria. In the last year, howev-
r. some Soviet arms have reached the Druze directly,
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militia has occupied the coastal strip south of Beirut
since April, it is unlikely that the Soviets, considering 25X1
their past practice, would risk offending Assad by
reeularly shipping arms directly to the Druze.
Training is another means of Soviet support for the 25X1
PSP. Druze militiamen in the USSR reportedly have
been trained in tank warfare, artillery use, infantry
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Profile of Selected Lebanese
Political Groups
Progressive Socialist
Party
Amal
Political Confessio
Orientation Affiliation
Pro-Syrian Druze
Pro-Syrian Shia
nal
Walid Junblatt
Nabih Barri
7,000 to 8,000
6,000 to 7,000
Lebanese Communist
Party
Communist Action
Organization
Pro-Soviet None
Independent, some None
links to Moscow
George Hawi
500 to 1,000
tactics, and flying.
t e ovtets provide educational schol-
arships and train political cadres.
Shia Amal. The Soviets are also building contacts
with the Shia Amal movement. Its leader, Nabih
Barri, recently accepted an invitation to visit the
USSR at an undetermined date. He last visited
Moscow in July 1984, meeting with Karen Brutents,
the CPSU's top Middle Eastern specialist, and Vladi-
mir Polyakov, head of the Foreign Ministry's Near
Ama has now opened an office in
Moscow. Until recently, training was the only mili-
tary assistance offered by the Soviets to Amal. How-
ever, the Soviets have reportedly made at least two
arms deliveries to Amal forces this spring. For Amal,
Soviet arms supplies increased in importance when
Amal-Palestinian fighting broke out in May, but
Amal's move against the Palestinian camps may have
given Moscow second thoughts about supplying arms.
Organization (CAO) also receives weapons and train-
ing assistance from the Soviets. The CAO, however, is
more independent of Moscow than the LCP is, and is
not recognized by the Soviets as a legitimate Commu-
nist party.
The LCP is for the most part responsive to Moscow,
mainly because it has no other means of support. The
Communists are minor players in Lebanese politics;
thus, visible interaction with Moscow enhances their
prestige.
Notably absent are any reports of Soviet contacts with
Palestinians in Lebanon. This is a reflection of two
things-the shattering of the PLO presence in Leba-
non that resulted from the Israelis' 1982 invasion, and
the fact that most Palestinian groups in Lebanon are
Syrian-backed dissidents, with whom Moscow has
had little or no contact. Closer ties with these groups
would tend to compromise Soviet relations with Yasir
The Communists and the PLO. The Soviets have tried
to expand their longstanding ties with the Lebanese
Communist Party (LCP) over the past three years.
Moscow has helped rebuild the LCP militia since its
dissolution in June 1982.
Arafat's mainline PLO.
The Christian Right.~Soviet overtures to
the Lebanese right surfaced only recently.
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reported in the open press, was a briefing the Soviet
assistant defense attache gave in February to the
Christian Lebanese Forces Command Council.
The Christian leaders are probably suspicious of
Moscow's approaches and are not likely to take Soviet
overtures seriously. Their response probably will be a
cautious flirtation for the sake of arousing the West
into more active support for Christian interests in
no current need for Soviet arms, apart from ammuni-
tion for a few Soviet artillery pieces acquired in the
1970s. The Lebanese Government might nonetheless
purchase some Soviet military equipment either as a
political gesture to assert its nonaligned status or as a
move to spur the United States into greater respon-
Outlook
The Soviets are in favor of a Lebanon that is stable
and responsive to Syrian interests. They are probably
concerned that continuation of the present chaotic
situation in Lebanon could lead to a return of Israeli
troops or an increased US military presence in the
region. A recent Izvestiya article supported former
President Franjiyah's call for the return to Lebanon
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Courting the Government
In addition to building contacts with the various
Druze, Muslim, and Christian factions, the Soviets
have been cultivating ties with the Lebanese Govern-
ment. Brutents's two visits to Lebanon last year
included meetings with President Gemayel, and
Polyakov came to Lebanon in August 1984 to meet
with Prime Minister Karami. In addition, Karami
was received by Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov at
Chernenko's funeral in March.
Gemayel may seek Soviet contacts as poten-
tial leverage in future dealings with Syria and the
United States
olitically, the
Lebanese Government is not likely to go much beyond
a gradual normalization of official relations, such as
last month's appointment of an ambassador to fill the
long-vacant post in Moscow. Militarily, the LAF has
of the Pan-Arab (Syrian) peacekeeping forces.
At the same time, the Soviets almost certainly will
continue to develop independent contacts with the
various factions in Lebanon as a small step toward a
greater role in the Middle East, as well as a hedge
against whatever new political arrangement arises in
Lebanon. Soviet capabilities to do this are limited,
however, mainly because politically relevant Lebanese
are aware that, in the context of the Soviets' overall
Middle Eastern policy, Moscow will continue to defer
to Syria on important questions in Lebanon.
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Other Topics
New Soviet Military Assistance
to North Korea
Moscow's decision to provide North Korea MIG-23
Flogger fighter aircraft probably presages a stronger
bilateral military relationship.
Moscow's decision to set aside a 10-year policy o no
sending finished major weapon systems to North
Korea underscores an interest in cultivating P'yong-
yang to offset China's influence in the North and to
strengthen the USSR's overall position in northeast
Asia.
Further development of the Soviet-North Korean
military relationship will depend in large part on how
each side evaluates the costs and opportunities of
improved ties. The Soviets want to take advantage of
cooling Sino-North Korean relations to develop new
ties to P'yongyang and to counter closer relations
between the United States, China, Japan, and South
Korea, but they remain wary of P'yongyang's unpre-
dictability. North Korea will try to retain its indepen-
dence while seeking the support of both the USSR
and China.
Delivery of MIG-23s ...
The Soviets sent six MIG-23s to Pukch'ang Airfield
in North Korea on 22 May
MIG-23s in mid-July and eventually will probably
provide North Korea a regiment of 35 to 40 aircraft-
the first qualitative improvement to its air force in
many years.
Delivery of MIG-23s represents a dramatic change in
Soviet policy toward North Korea. Over the years the
Soviets have provided P'yongyang with the technology
to produce tanks, antitank weapons, and surface-to-
air missiles. But North Korea's tilt toward China
made the Soviets reluctant to send major arms, and
they had not delivered a finished major weapon
system since the mid-1970s. In fact, China has provid-
ed most of North Korea's military imports since 1976,
including F-6 (MIG-19) and F-7 (MIG-21) aircraft. In
addition to political considerations, North Korea's
inability to pay for new military equipment has made
it a less attractive arms customer to the Soviets, who
sell arms elsewhere in the Third World to garner
needed hard currency.
... And Other Weapons
The Soviets recently provided North Korea with the
SA-3 surface-to-air missile system. The SA-3 will
give North Korea a more effective air defense system
because its low-to-medium-altitude coverage comple-
ments the medium-to-high SA-2 system already in the
North Korean inventory.
The Soviets probably will provide other modern weap-
ons to North Korea.
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Korean TU-154 aircraft at a Soviet airfield where the
Soviets were conducting an air-to-air missile demon-
stration-presumably for a North Korean delega-
tion-involving both MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft.
While the Soviets may have been demonstrating just
the MIG-23 aircraft for the North Koreans, the
presence of MIG-25s,
strongly
suggests that a MIG-25 deal is in the works. The
MIG-25 is a high-altitude interceptor aircraft that the
Soviets claim is capable of shooting down US SR-71
reconnaissance aircraft, which regularly fly over the
Korean DMZ. The North Koreans have long been
interested in acquiring such a capability.
balance in airpower to the North.
Impact on Military Balance
Provision of a complete MIG-23 regiment to North
Korea would not greatly alter the balance of forces
between North and South Korea. South Korea has 70
F-4s, which are superior to anything the North had
before receiving the MIG-23s, and will take delivery
next year of the first of 36 F-16s-an aircraft a
generation ahead of the MIG-23 in capabilities. Sovi-
et provision of significant numbers of MIG-23s, MIG-
25s, or more advanced aircraft such as the MIG-29
over the next several years, however, could shift the
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Secret
Soviet delivery of the ZSU-23/4 self-propelled anti-
aircraft gun or the mobile SAMs and more modern
antitank guided missiles would further widen the
quantitative and qualitative advantage the North has
over South Korea in most types of ground weapons
and equipment.
If North Korea agreed, Soviet bombers and naval
strike aircraft, using North Korean airspace, could
also have another route to exit the Sea of Japan for
reconnaissance and training operations against targets
in northeastern China-including bases supporting
the Chinese nuclear submarine force. Soviet naval
aircraft that deploy to Vietnam may use this route,
instead of flying between South Korea and Japan as
they do now. The Soviets probably already have
worked out an arrangement that allows Soviet aircraft
to use North Korean airfields for emergency purposes.
Moreover, the Soviets may view overflight rights as a
first step toward gaining routine access to North
Korean airfields. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flying
from North Korea would be able to extend their
coverage farther south than aircraft based in the
Soviet Union. Moscow might try to overcome any
North Korean resistance by arguing that the presence
of Soviet aircraft in North Korea would help deter a
US-South Korean attack and by promising to share
the intelligence collected with the North Koreans.
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China
BEIJING
j ruKcn an
Airfield Wonsan
P YONGYAA +
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of
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Boundary r.or...nt.tfon u
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The Soviets, however, could find North Korean de-
mands for sophisticated weaponry and production
technology an unacceptable price for such access.
The Soviets, in fact, may not feel strongly about
gaining access to North Korean air and naval facili-
ties, at least in part because of North Korea's proxim-
ity to Soviet bases in the Far East. The Soviet Pacific
Fleet is headquartered in Vladivostok, only 100 nauti-
cal miles from the nearest North Korean port. Thus,
North Korea is less significant as a potential asset for
Soviet power projection than other, more distant areas
where Moscow has sought access. Although access to
ship repair facilities in North Korea would relieve the
already overburdened Soviet yards at Vladivostok,
North Korean ports are themselves small and crowd-
ed. No North Korean port has repair facilities to
handle ships larger than a frigate.
Political calculations may also be tempering Soviet
efforts to gain access to North Korean facilities. The
Soviets are aware that North Korea has been ada-
mantly opposed to granting any foreign power any-
thing that might look like concession of sovereignty.
They may calculate that exerting too much pressure
on P'yongyang could backfire, alienating the North
Koreans and producing a significant setback to Soviet
efforts to cultivate a better overall relationship.
At the same time, despite political disincentives and
the lack of appeal from an operational perspective, the
Soviets could be interested in gaining some type of
limited access. For instance, they might hope to use
port calls as a wedge to gain eventual permission to
use North Korean repair facilities, if only for Soviet
auxiliary ships.
of F-16s in 1986.
Outlook
The delivery of MIG-23s to North Korea reflects
Soviet interest in asserting a stronger voice in the
region's affairs. The Soviets clearly want to demon-
strate a capability and willingness to support an ally
militarily in the face of .a perceived effort by the
United States to strengthen its military position in
northeast Asia. In the context of the military balance
on the Korean Peninsula, the USSR probably wants,
at a minimum, to counter South Korea's acquisition
Moscow's new policy toward North Korea almost
certainly will entail provision of other modern military
equipment. The Soviets probably believe that delivery
of new arms will ensure continued North Korean
cooperation in Soviet intelligence collection flights
and possibly pave the way for eventual air and naval
access. But Moscow will have to assess how much
modern military equipment is enough to demonstrate
support without leading North Korea to believe it has
Soviet backing to attack the South.
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Soviet-Vietnamese Relations:
Pursuing Common Interests
Ten years after the end of the Vietnam war, Soviet-
Vietnamese relations in many respects mirror the
Soviet-Cuban relationship. As Communist regimes
dependent on Moscow for economic survival and
military aid, both Cuba and Vietnam are members of
CEMA, are aligned with the Kremlin in party and
foreign policy, and lie in the "backyard" of one of the
USSR's chief adversaries. Moscow's relations with
both countries are driven by the pursuit of mutual
interests through cooperative policies, attempts by
each country to maximize its leverage within the
relationship, and adjustments to the strains of com-
plex interaction.
Both Moscow and Hanoi benefit from their coopera-
tive policies. Hanoi gains combat aircraft, tanks,
military advisers, and financial military support of
about $800 million annually to modernize its armed
forces. The Vietnamese also receive ships for coastal
defense and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and par-
ticipate in joint ASW training exercises with Soviet
naval units at Cam Ranh Bay about once every 18
months. Soviet economic aid to Vietnam averages
about $3 million per day (compared to $11 million per
day for Cuba) and has been a vital force in shoring up
Hanoi's deteriorating economy, especially following
imposition of a trade embargo by most Western
countries after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in
December 1978.
Moscow, in turn, has exploited Hanoi's national secu-
rity vulnerabilities. At Hanoi's request the Soviets
signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with Viet-
nam in 1978. Since the Chinese incursions into Viet-
nam in early 1979, Moscow has used Cam Ranh Bay
to deploy Badger TU- 16 strike bombers, Bear D long-
range reconnaissance aircraft, and Bear F ASW
aircraft. A squadron of MIG-23 interceptors was
deployed last year to protect the Cam Ranh complex.
Cam Ranh has become a significant communications
and intelligence-gathering facility as well as a naval
base for 20 to 30 Soviet ships-the largest concentra-
tion of ships regularly stationed overseas. The Soviet
Navy uses Cam Ranh Bay not only for surface ships
and submarines plying the South China Sea but also
for vessels transiting between the Far East and the
Indian Ocean.
The Soviets probably support Vietnam's interest in
improved relations with the United States. Moscow
could expect a lighter economic burden from its
Vietnamese ties should Hanoi gain access to US aid
and trade and thereby open new trade opportunities
with Japan and other Western countries. Openings to
the United States would undercut opposition by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to
Soviet-backed Vietnamese control in Laos and Cam-
bodia. Moscow would hope to gain from any Vietnam-
ese use of US links to counter the Chinese in South-
east Asian regional politics. It would not be pleased,
however, if Hanoi were to use improved relations with
the United States to exert leverage against the USSR.
Support for Policy Goals
Vietnam's geographic location on China's southern
flank serves Moscow's security needs and power-
projection goals. Vietnam promotes Soviet interests
by:
? Affording the Soviets a platform for air, naval,
communications, and intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities that expands their power in Asia, the Pacific,
and the Indian Ocean.
? Placing the Soviets in a position to interdict the flow
of traffic along the sea lanes of Southeast Asia.
? Checking US influence in Southeast Asia, attempt-
ing to intimidate US allies, and containing China by
securing dominance over Cambodia and Laos and
creating a regional balance of power more amenable
to Moscow.
? Enabling the Soviets to enlarge their own influence
in Cambodia and Laos.
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? Diverting Chinese military resources and attention
away from the Sino-Soviet border.
has already created strong anti-Soviet sentiments
among some members of ASEAN, especially Thai-
land and Singapore.
? Helping to open up Soviet access to the South
Pacific for future penetration of the region-Fiji,
Tonga, Western Somoa, and Papua New Guinea,
all of which have ports that could accommodate the
Soviet Navy. This would deny the West, Japan, and
China a zone of exclusive influence.
For its part, Vietnam has so far succeeded in drawing
upon Soviet support to promote its own policy goals.
Moscow's economic and military support provides a
crucial deterrent to major Chinese military action
against Vietnam and helps Vietnam combat Chinese
shelling and minor incursions, which have continued
since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February
1979. Moscow backs Hanoi's overthrow of the Khmer
Rouge regime in Phnom Penh and the drive for a
regional settlement in Cambodia favorable to Viet-
nam's long-term nationalist goal of hegemony in
Indochina. Soviet support maintains the viability of
the Soviet-style centrally planned Vietnamese econo-
my, ensuring a steady flow of essential goods, and
enhances the survivability of the Vietnamese leader-
ship.
Sources of Continuing Discord in the Relationship
Soviet-Vietnamese relations, like the Moscow-Havana
relationship, have not been without strain. While the
Vietnamese have used Soviet aid to advance their
interests, they deeply resent their dependence on any
country. Hanoi's nationalistic frustrations are height-
ened by the knowledge that Vietnam fell into the
Soviet embrace because of its need to acquire an ally
against China, pursue regional goals, and support
economic recovery. The Vietnamese are suspicious
about improvements in Sino-Soviet relations, which
they fear could lead to reduced Soviet aid and a
sellout by Moscow of Vietnam's interests. They also
want more advanced weapons from the Soviets, such
as MIG-23s. The Soviets have been unwilling to
provide such weapons, probably believing that Hanoi
might use them to create unacceptable risks for
Moscow by aggressive actions against China or in
pursuit of Cambodian resistance fighters near Thai-
land's border. Vietnam's use of Soviet-built tanks and
heavy artillery against Cambodian resistance fighters
The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship has gone through
several periods of discord. Vietnamese resentment of
Soviet actions date as far back as the Geneva Agree-
ment of 1954, when Moscow failed to push for a
unified Vietnam. Strains occurred repeatedly during
the 1960s, because Hanoi never believed the Soviets
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not forgotten that the Soviet Union did little to help
during the Vietnam war when the United States
blockaded North Vietnamese ports and harbors.F__
in recent years the Soviet Union has 25X1
repeatedly complained that its aid to Vietnam was not
being used effectively-which could be seen as a
threat that aid would be reduced.
Soviet arrogance and heavyhanded opportunism,
joined with Vietnamese ethnocentrism and national-
ism, spawn a persistent current of conflict. Sharp
reductions in Soviet economic aid in 1980, combined
with oil price rises in 1981, have fueled these underly-
ing strains, as have political conflicts caused by the
growing Soviet presence in Laos and Cambodia since
the early 1980s. Key sources of current friction
include:
? Moscow's reluctance to provide more advanced mili-
tary equipment and Moscow's desire for a more
permanent arrangement at Cam Ranh Bay.
? Vietnam's perception that its relations with the
Soviets are a function of Soviet-Chinese relations,
which creates uneasiness in Hanoi regarding Mos-
cow's efforts to improve relations with Beijing.
? Strains between the Soviet Union and Vietnam over
who should exert greater control in advising the Lao
regarding long-term planning.
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? Perceptions by individual Vietnamese that they can-
not do business with the Soviets, who are "ungener-
ous" and usually unwilling to deal in the local black
market or with shop and sidewalk merchants.
of Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet relationship are a
tolerable price to pay for the strategic benefits of Cam
Ranh.
? Moscow's displeasure with what it perceives as
Vietnam's economic mismanagement and low rate
of economic growth, lack of interest in Soviet aid
projects, lackadaisical attitude toward work, and
rejection of even "friendly guidance and advice."
Still, it would be a mistake to interpret such strains as
indicating an interest by either Hanoi or Moscow in
weakening the relationship. The Chinese threat en-
sures a continuing Vietnamese interest in the alliance
with Moscow, and the Soviets apparently perceive the
benefits of their Vietnam ties to far outweigh the
costs.
While General Secretary Gorbachev has accelerated
efforts to improve relations with China, he has been
extremely careful to assure the Vietnamese of contin-
ued Soviet support for Hanoi and its Indo-Chinese
allies. Unlike Chernenko, Gorbachev has been outspo-
ken in givine direct support to the Vietnamese in
Cambodia
Prospects
The Soviets probably will continue to try to improve
the atmospherics of Sino-Soviet relations, while reas-
suring their Vietnamese clients. This reassurance is
likely to consist of support for Hanoi's position in
Cambodia, continued high levels of economic aid, and
substantial deliveries of military equipment to the
Vietnamese Government. Moscow has agreed to grant
Hanoi new credits during the period 1986-90 on easier
repayment terms, to reschedule repayment of earlier
credits, and to increase exports of goods to meet
Hanoi's "urgent needs." Hanoi has pledged in return
to strive to fulfill its export commitments under
existing bilateral agreements and to increase exports
of rubber and other commodities of particular interest
to the Soviets. Moscow probably believes that the
negative reactions of ASEAN to Soviet support of
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the irritant
Because Sino-Soviet relations probably will not
change rapidly under Gorbachev, despite periods of
seemingly warmer contacts between Moscow and
Beijing, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship will re-
main intact. Continuing border tension between Viet-
nam and China, combined with Vietnam's regional
aspirations in Southeast Asia, will reinforce Hanoi's
need for Soviet military, political, diplomatic, and
economic support. Soviet privileges in Cam Ranh
Bay, combined with Vietnamese regional activities
that divert Chinese resources, shore up the relation-
ship from Moscow's perspective.
Soviet efforts to improve relations with China will
continue to cause uneasiness in Hanoi. Vietnam fears 25X1
a warmer Sino-Soviet relationship will undermine its
close ties to the Soviets and thus undercut its current
efforts to consolidate its control of Indochina. These
fears generate the need for political reassurances from
Moscow, as indicated by high-level Vietnamese visits
to the Soviet Union as counterparts to Soviet-Chinese
trade and political talks. Le Duan's visit to Moscow in
June 1985, when the Soviets announced they would
boost aid to Vietnam and reschedule outstanding
debts, is a case in point. Future negotiations over Cam
Ranh Bay offer Vietnam additional leverage to ensure
Soviet economic and military commitments even in
the context of warming Soviet relations with China.
Should China seek to teach Vietnam a "second
lesson" by invading northern Vietnam as it did in
1979, Moscow probably would respond favorably to a
request from Hanoi for increased military advisory
assistance and financial support to modernize the
Vietnamese forces. Moscow might pursue other poli-
cies designed to back Vietnam, such as threatening
activity on the Sino-Soviet border or stepped-up activ-
ity by Soviet assets in Cam Ranh Bay. These actions
would reduce strains in the Soviet-Vietnamese rela-
tionship.
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While no significant breakdown in the Soviet-
Vietnamese relationship is on the horizon, the ebb and
flow of relations will probably continue to induce
substantial strains. Discord is likely to result from:
? Hanoi's rising debt with Moscow and increased
Soviet insistence that its debts be paid.
? Any further deterioration of Vietnam's economy
and Soviet demands for corrective action.
? Growing complaints from Vietnamese personnel
sent to work in Eastern Europe or the USSR to help
pay off Vietnam's debt.
? Soviet Bloc dumping of used or second-rate military
equipment on Vietnam and the need for Hanoi to
compensate for Soviet aid in the form of prime
Implications for US Interests
The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship and adversarial
Sino-Soviet activities offer opportunities to strengthen
US strategic involvement in Asia. China's perception
of encirclement by enemies creates a favorable atmo-
sphere for continued improvement in US-Chinese
relations. Likewise, continued Soviet-Vietnamese ties
are likely to provide the United States with opportuni-
ties for:
? Developing closer coordination with the ASEAN
countries, particularly Thailand and Singapore.
? Forging closer US-Japanese-Chinese security rela-
tions to counter the expansion of Soviet military
power in the Far East.
? Extending cooperation on issues that involve
ASEAN-Japanese relations in opposition to Soviet-
Vietnamese ambitions in Southeast Asia.
? Reinforcing Indonesia's underlying insecurities re-
garding Marxism/ Leninism-a possible avenue for
leverage, although Indonesia is more anxious about
Pursuit of these opportunities could be complicated by
Soviet efforts to:
? Communicate a greater interest in normalizing rela-
tions with China without reducing support for the
Vietnamese, by showing a willingness to address
China's security concerns, including making modest
Soviet troop cutbacks on the Sino-Soviet border, or
dealing with the Chinese more positively on
Mongolia.
? Push the Vietnamese leaders toward normalization
of relations with China or toward a negotiated
settlement on Cambodia.
? Exploit regional awareness of the growing Soviet
presence at Cam Ranh as a means of encouraging
opposition in the Philippines to US bases-implicit-
ly targets for Soviet nuclear attack-and fostering
regional interest in a Pacific nuclear free zone.
? Increase the bidding for Soviet commercial access to
the small islands of the South Pacific, for example,
But Moscow's attempts to improve its position in the
Soviet-Chinese-US triangular relationship will be
conditioned by Vietnam's intense nationalism, com-
mitment to power projection in Cambodia and Laos,
and historic conflict with China. Hanoi will not easily
be moved by Soviet manipulation that advances Mos-
cow's interests at the expense of Vietnam. Nor will
Moscow lightly trade away its assets in Cam Ranh
Bay for rapprochement in Sino-Soviet relations; in-
deed, it is likely to see retention of these assets as a
means to induce Beijing to adopt a more accommo-
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Soviet Ground Forces
in Afghanistan:
The Battalion Perspective
The war in Afghanistan is not a war of armies and
divisions, but rather one of battalions and companies.
Small-scale combat operations are the norm, and
campaigns such as the 20,000-man offensive into the
Panjsher Valley in April and May 1984 are rare
exceptions. The extent to which the Soviets can cope
with the insurgency is therefore determined not so
much by the number of divisions or the total number
of personnel deployed in Afghanistan as by the num-
ber of combat maneuver battalions that can be
brought to bear against the insurgents. The battalion
perspective, therefore, helps to highlight the capabili-
ties and weaknesses of the Soviet expeditionary army
in Afghanistan.
The Combat Battalions
About 60 percent of the approximately 117,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan are in Ground Forces combat
units. KGB Border Troop mobile maneuver groups-
which conduct combat operations and are of approxi-
mately battalion size-make up another 1 percent of
the total. Together these forces comprise 110 maneu-
ver battalions, 37 fire support battalions, and miscel-
laneous smaller combat and support elements within
the divisions and regiments. These units vary in size
and capability, and some have clearly defined security
missions that limit their ability to conduct active
counterinsurgency operations.'
Elements from different battalions are frequently
combined into "task forces" for combat operations. A
motorized rifle battalion, for example, may be rein-
forced by a tank company, an artillery battery, and
other supporting elements. This kind of task organiza-
tion is practiced at lower levels too-a motorized rifle
company may receive a tank platoon and other sup-
port for an operation. In general,
perhaps two companies of
We estimate the insurgent forces at about 150,000 full- or part-
time guerrillas. Most are organized into small independent bands of
30 to 50 men armed with rifles, heavy machineguns, antitank
rockets, and some light fire support weapons such as 82-mm
Soviet Combat Maneuver
Battalions in Afghanistan
Type Number Manpower Total
(Approximate) Troops
Motorized rifle 43 450 19,350
Tank 18 200 3,600
Airborne/air assault 17 350 5,950
KGB mobile maneuver 12 250 3,000
groups
5,000
3,850
1,050
one battalion supported by a company from another
unit. This means that most combat actions involve
only a few hundred troops, and many smaller opera-
tions-involving as few as 20 to 40 men-are also
conducted.
Geographic Distribution of the Combat Force
The disposition of these units in Afghanistan reflects
Soviet objectives and perceptions of the threat. About
63 percent of the combat battalions are based in the
northeast quarter of the country-an area that in-
cludes Kabul, the main highway from the USSR to
the Afghan capital, the major infiltration routes from
Pakistan, and the most difficult operational terrain in
the country. This heavy commitment of resources
reflects the Soviet emphasis on maintaining the sem-
blance of a functioning central government and the
military assessment that the insurgent threat is great-
est in this region. About 10 percent of the maneuver
battalions are located in the southeast, 16 percent in
the southwest, and 11 percent in the northwest.
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Since the beginning of the year, six battalions have
been added to Soviet forces in western Afghanistan
and two have been assigned to the eastern part of the
country. The commitment of the bulk of this spring's
augmentation to the west suggests that the Soviets
realized their forces there were insufficient to counter
the persistent insurgent threat in this vast area.
Nevertheless, the west remains of secondary impor-
tance to the Soviets.
Soviet forces are based near the major cities and
airfields and along the lines of communication. They
generally deploy out of regiment-sized base camps to
conduct combat actions ranging in duration from a
few days to a few weeks. A few base areas, such as
Bagram and Shindand, have larger groupings of
forces, and a number, such as Bamian, Chagcharan,
and the KGB Border Troop sites, are of battalion size.
other combat units are required to devote to this task
is more difficult
In general, base
security appears to involve units other than the ma-
neuver battalions, for example, artillery, air defense,
and antitank units. Some tanks and armored person-
nel carriers are also seen on base security duty, but
these are generally few in number. Most combat
battalions when not on an operation are parked in
administrative areas and patterns within their base
camps that suggest these units are available for
operations. This judgment is supported by the recur-
ring deployment of major elements of these units to
the field for combat.
Degradation of Combat Strength
Administrative and operational factors degrade the
capabilities of the 110 combat battalions to conduct
offensive counterinsurgency operations. Among the
most important administrative factors are difficulties
in keeping the force manned and coping with noncom-
bat (primarily disease) casualties.
Whatever the manning level of a given unit, the
number of personnel actually available for duty will
vary from day to day. The most likely reasons as-
signed personnel might not be available for duty on a
particular day would be detachments for duty else-
where (TDY), administrative lags in replacing combat
losses, and noncombat medical problems. In this
regard, degradation of combat potential due to disease
casualties-especially hepatitis-has probably been
the most serious drain on personnel.
Combat potential is further degraded by operational
considerations-primarily the requirement to provide
security for major bases and lines of communication.
Ten of the 110 combat battalions (the independent
security battalions) have this specific task and are not
generally considered to be engaged actively in coun-
terinsurgency operations. Assessing how much effort
The Soviets attempt to maintain security along the
major lines of communication through the use of fixed
security posts and convoy escorts. A Soviet traffic
control brigade has primary responsibility for this
mission, but some combat units probably are involved.
some combat battalions may be assigned such duties
on a rotational basis. four to six 25X1
battalions may be involved in line-of-communications
security at any one time.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Although the Soviet combat units are unable to
maintain a countrywide presence or constant pressure
on the insurgents, the force is a flexible one and is
capable of conducting a relatively large number of
widespread independent operations. Given the number
of maneuver battalions in the country, the Soviets'
economy-of-force approach to the war, and their
emphasis on keeping their casualties as low as possi-
ble, it is doubtful that availability of combat units has
been a major constraint on Soviet operations. More
serious limitations have probably included inefficient
administrative and logistic support, poor intelligence,
and inadequate training and preparation for combat.
Battalion-sized operations give the Soviets the capa-
bility to attain local force superiority in men and
firepower over most insurgent groups, which generally
number only about 30 to 50 men. In addition to
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organic battalion firepower, the Soviets have the force
multipliers of mobility-provided especially by heli-
copters-and additional fire support provided by regi-
mental, divisional, and army artillery and by air-
power. The 37 fire support battalions in the 40th
Army, for example, give the Soviets over 100 artillery
batteries (usually six weapons each) to employ against
the insurgents. Many of these batteries can support
combat operations without having to deploy from
their base areas-a factor that enhances security and
timeliness of support. Smaller operations involving
less than a battalion can be mounted to gather
intelligence, interdict insurgent supplies, and harass
rebel bands.
Soviet operations since
the intervention have appeared to be a mix of smaller,
"quick-reaction" combat actions and longer term,
more carefully planned forays against major insurgent
strongholds. There is some degree of "tension" be-
tween these two approaches. At issue is whether the
Soviets could utilize their combat forces more inten-
sively, conducting more frequent and/or more pro-
tracted operations, and whether such a course of
action would be worthwhile. More intensive use of the
force could increase rebel attrition (although at great-
er "cost" than the Soviets may want to pay), but this
probably would not overcome the inability of the
Soviets or their Afghan allies to maintain control in
areas that had been "cleared."
The combat force's effectiveness has been reduced by
a variety of factors-objective ones such as weather
and terrain as well as subjective considerations like
leadership, training, and discipline. Soviet inability to
create and operate efficiently with a loyal Afghan
government force and to obtain accurate and timely
intelligence on insurgent activities has also degraded
operational effectiveness. 1 -1
Implications
Although the consolidation of Afghan government
authority clearly is a major goal, Soviet combat forces
are only capable of conducting a campaign of attrition
against the insurgents. Soviet forces have made limit-
ed efforts to maintain a consolidating presence in
certain strategic areas such as the Panjsher Valley,
but, by and large, they do not have the combat forces
to garrison wide areas of the countryside. Soviet
maneuver units do, however, have the capability to
gain local force superiority over most insurgent
groups, and, using tactical and strategic mobility, the
Soviets can transfer forces and focus their efforts in
widely separated areas against the fragmented Af-
ghan resistance.
Any further augmentation of the Soviet army in
Afghanistan probably would emphasize combat ver-
sus support elements, to the extent possible. There
undoubtedly are limits to the capability of the current
infrastructure to support additional combat units, and
intermittent shortages of fuel and ammunition occa-
sionally restrict combat operations. Nevertheless, aug-
mentations in 1984 and thus far in 1985 have added
11 combat battalions plus one fire support battalion to
the force without any significant increase in the
command-logistic infrastructure, and additional in-
creases of this kind are possible.
The Soviets could also enhance their ground com a
capability in other ways, such as by reducing illness
rates, manning the force at higher levels, deploying
better equipment-especially improved artillery-or
through more intensive use of their forces. Because of
such potential, their capabilities to inflict casualties
on the insurgents will probably improve even if their
numbers do not increase substantially.
Under their current "minimalist" approach, however,
the Soviets will have to depend on the reconstitution
of effective Afghan military forces or the collapse of
the insurgency to extend government control beyond a
tenuous grip on main towns and lines of communica-
tion. Neither of these events is likely to occur in the
short term. Soviet combat forces, therefore, will con-
tinue to bear the brunt of the fighting.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04: CIA-RDP88T00799R000200050005-1