WORLDWIDE ACTIVE MEASURES AND PROPAGANDA ALERT (SUPPLEMENT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00986R000100050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 7TVIT See, et
Intelligence
and Propaganda Alert
Worldwide Active Measures
Supplement
November 1987
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DI WAMPA 87-004C
November
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Worldwide Active Measures
and Propaganda Alert
Supplement
November 1987
This paper was prepared by and coordinated within
the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries
are welcome
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DI WAMPA 87-004C
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Libyan and Soviet Front Groups: Fellow Travelers
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Over the past two years, Libyan and Soviet front groups have developed extensive
financial and organizational ties. These linkages have allowed Tripoli to develop
contacts with Moscow-line Communist parties and peace groups in Greece and
Portugal. Moscow has used the relationship as a nondiplomatic channel to show
support for Libya and as a source of additional funding for its fronts.F25X1
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November 1987
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This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active
measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers
the period 15 August 1987 to 15 November 1987. It is also designed to provide
warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:
? A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
? Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
? Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence
arena-active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy-and speculation on
future developments.
? An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently
in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.F___1 25X1
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Article
Libyan and Soviet Front Groups:
Fellow Travelers
Over the past few years, Libyan and Soviet front
groups have established extensive organizational ties
and provided one another with financial and material
assistance. Moscow has used the linkages as a nondip-
lomatic channel to show support for Tripoli and as a
way to secure Libyan funding for Soviet fronts.
Tripoli has used the ties to develop contacts with pro-
Soviet Communist parties and peace groups in Greece
and Portugal, where it shares Moscow's interest in
removing US military bases. Although Soviet-Libyan
front activities have not had a significant political
impact in Greece or Portugal, we expect Moscow and
Tripoli to continue and perhaps increase their cooper-
ation there because US basing agreements in both
countries will probably be under negotiation in 1988.
Outside the Mediterranean, we believe the Soviet-
Libyan front relationship is tenuous. Libyan fronts
have been pursuing policies in the Caribbean and the
South Pacific that are inconsistent with Soviet inter-
ests, and Moscow probably would reduce cooperation
dramatically if Tripoli tried to use Soviet fronts to
further its efforts in these areas.
there are extensive orga-
nizational ties between Soviet and Libyan front
groups. Within the past several years, Tripoli has
established counterparts or national affiliates for two
major Soviet fronts, the World Peace Council (WPC)
and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO).' Libya is represented on the WPC Presi-
dential Committee-which runs the organization on a
day-to-day basis-and is the headquarters for a WPC
women's front, according to the US Mission to the
UN. Next year Tripoli will host the AAPSO Con-
gress, a quadrennial event that serves as AAPSO's
highest organ.
Motives for Cooperation
We believe Tripoli is the driving force behind Soviet-
Libyan front cooperation because it wants to tap into
Moscow's extensive front group apparatus in the
West. Cooperation with Moscow gives Libya access to
pro-Soviet Communist parties in Western Europe,
which are almost always heavily involved in Soviet
front activities. Moreover, Libya can meet other
Westerners by having Soviet fronts sponsor meetings 25X1
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International Secretariat for Solidarity With the
Arab People and Their Central Cause Palestine
Libya's willingness to pump money into Soviet fronts
at a time when several of them are experiencing
financial problems
ISS, founded in Lisbon in 1979, serves as Libya's
leading front organization, sponsoring five to six
international anti-US conferences a year. Tripoli uses
the ISS, a WPC affiliate, as the principal vehicle for
cooperation with Soviet front groups
Nonetheless, we believe Moscow values the relation-
ship because it provides a low-profile way of support-
ing Libya. For example, while Moscow gave little
diplomatic backing to Qadhafi after the April 1986
US bombing raid the
WPC vigorously supported Libya through a visit to
Tripoli by WPC President Romesh Chandra, a special
plenary session of a WPC conference, and propaganda
statements. We also believe that Moscow appreciates
The Go-Between
Umar al-Hamdi, the head of ISS, has been at the
center of Soviet-Libyan front cooperation.
quoted frequently in the Soviet media.
In our judgment, Hamdi has played a crucial role in
the development of the relationship. His slavish devo-
tion to Soviet interests probably has tempered Soviet
concern about Tripoli's unpredictability. The Soviets
high regard for Hamdi was evident this September
when he visited Moscow. Hamdi spoke with senior
officials of the CPSU International Department-
which oversees the Soviet front apparatus-and was
as staging areas for future attacks on Libya.
Activities Focused in Greece and Portugal
Moscow and Tripoli appear to focus their joint front
group activities in Greece and Portugal. Soviet fronts
have longstanding campaigns against the US military
bases there, while Tripoli apparently is very concerned
that Washington will use its bases in these countries
Libya agreed in January 1986 to give money to the
Moscow-line Greek Communist Party (KKE) to help
the Greek peace movement in its campaign to remove
the US military bases from that country.
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pro-Soviet Communist party in Western Europe and
usually acts according to Moscow's directives.
In Portugal, the ISS has developed ties to some
elements of the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP) and its peace front, the WPC-affiliated
Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation
(PCPC).
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Soviet and Libyan fronts have not yet had a signifi-
cant political impact in either Greece or Portugal,
largely because the KKE and the PCP appeal to
narrow audiences. Nonetheless, we believe Soviet and
Libyan fronts can build on the linkages they have
established in both countries. 25X1
Outlook
With US basing rights in Greece and probably Portu-
gal under review in 1988, we expect Soviet and
Libyan fronts to continue and perhaps increase their
joint activities in these countries over the next several
months. Outside the Mediterranean, however, we
believe the Soviet-Libyan front relationship is tenuous
because Libyan front activity often is inconsistent
with Soviet interests. For example:
? In the Caribbean, the Libyans have established a
coalition of leftist groups-the Caribbean Nation
Movement-that is a rival to the Cuban-sponsored
front in the region. The Soviets almost certainly do
not want Tripoli competing with one of their loyal
clients.
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? Libya has been using its most radical front-the
World Anti-Imperialism Center-to try to build a
subversive network in Australia and the small South
Pacific islands. Moscow is making a determined
effort to improve its diplomatic relations in the
region and would not want any of its fronts associat-
ed with Libyan activities there.
Because Tripoli is providing substantial financial sup-
port for some Soviet fronts, it might be tempted to try
to use them to further its efforts in the Caribbean and
the South Pacific. Moscow insists that its fronts hew
to the Soviet foreign policy line, and any Libyan
attempt to manipulate them probably would prompt
Moscow to reduce cooperation dramatically. Moscow
might even reassess the relationship if Libya replaced
Hamdi with someone lacking his strong pro-Soviet
credentials.
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