INSTABILITY IN SOVIET THIRD WORLD ALLIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00988R000100100041-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP88T00988R000100100041-6
s?CR TO DELR _
1 April 1986
FROM: Hal Ford
SUBJECT: Instability in Soviet Third World Allies
NOTE FOR:
Randy, the following quick, very brief thoughts on your new
endeavor/publication. A very good first cut: sophisticated,
responsibly done, etc. I would nonetheless urge that still more factors
be ground into the equations, in the interest of more fully portraying
the total dynamics of these case studies.
1. By the nature of the exercise, the focus is given overly to
instabilities. To avoid overestimating (US-desired) instability, added
emphasis needs to be given to forces tending to stability and/or to
continuing ties with the USSR: e.g., nowhere else to go; desire to play
off East and West; anger at Israel or other associates of the US; past
experience with Western but not Eastern imperialism; source of arms
easier, cheaper, and quicker from the East than from the West; existing
relations with Moscow seem to insure (?pre-PDRY, at least) continuance
in power of present elites; tribal, etc., instabilities are "always with
us, hopeless but not serious," etc. -- the danger of overestimating the
significance of such chronic instabilities.
2. Another item I would particularly urge be included is some
measure of Soviet.(or Soviet allied) success in penetrating certain
centers of political/military power in each case study example. Can the
host regime materially loosen its ties with the USSR even if it wishes
to? Asked another way, have the Sovs gone -- or not gone -- about
penetration in more effective ways over the last decade or so, so that
the relative ease with which Egypt, Somalia, Ghana, etc., earlier
stepped away no longer applies to that degree?
3. Still another (and central) variable -- and I'll leave it to you
and yours to decide how best to factor this item in -- what are the
East-West dynamics at any given time with the given Soviet associate?
What is US doing or not doing? To what degree and in what measure is
the US engaged in aggravating existing instabilities? What realistic
expectations of US behavior can local regimes entertain?
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SECRET/NOFORN
4. I can appreciate the interests which have given rise to this
particular publication/endeavor. I suppose it's worth pursuing further,
improving the approach, and maintaining the professional independence of
judgment, etc. In addition, however, to the above-mentioned danger of
unintentional bias toward instability, I wonder if the mere act of
putting down on paper the various indicators and box scores may not also
create too great an impression of stasis in certain instances: that is,
that x country is unstable (and therefore theoretically hopeful from the
US point of view); while , country is stable (hence no hope) -- while in
reality there is more fluidity present at any time in certain of the
situations, with sudden change more possible (of various kinds and
caused by various vagaries), than the imprinted word might connote.
5. Since writing the above I have seen Graham Fuller's critique of
a quantification which doesn't quite communicate "feel." I share his
view. I also appreciate that your endeavor is one which seeks through
quantification to introduce a more rigorous analytic method into a
bottom line judgment. OK, but by the nature of the beast still in large
part a matter of feel.
6. In any event, good luck.
JJ,
Hal
Ford
cc: Graham Fuller
H. Ford Chrono
SECRET~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP88T00988R000100100041-6