IMPROVING THE IMPACT OF ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00988R000100150021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/11: CIA-RDP88T00988R000100150021-3
18 August 1986
NOTE FOR: NIOs
A6
FROM: Hal Ford, A/C/NIC
SUBJECT: Improving the Impact of Estimates
FYI, the following are recommendations I gave the DCI last week --
within a memo on other subjects -- for improving the (now
catch-as-catch-can) impact of National Estimates on senior policymakers.
These recommendations take the form of prescriptions that:
o DCI, DDCI, and NIC officers place much more emphasis than we now do
on personally marketing Estimates: that is, buttonholing specific
senior policymakers; personal notes calling their attentions to the
particular piece, etc. This will be aided by maximum exposure of
NIOs to top policymakers, resulting not only from their own
initiative, but from their maximum participation as DCI
representatives in senior policy forums. Also, enlist the support
of well-placed consultants (such as the MAP members) to help
merchandise Estimates with top policymakers.
o DCI, DDCI, and NIC officers place much more emphasis on personally
briefing the President and other top officers on the Key Judgments
of especially significant Estimates, whether authoritative big
studies or fast tracks which speak to some crisis or fast-moving
policy situation. This is only done once in a long while now;
there is room for much more.
o On certain subjects of key importance, the NIC prepare short, sharp
overall estimates, three or four manuscript total. And,
personally brief certain of these (including any alternative views).
o NIOs be more a ressive in not only reflecting back to DCI what the
decisionmakers downtown are interested in, but in pushing these
policymakers to bring the NIC in specifically on ongoing policy
citiiatinnci i_a__ more exercises along the line of the recent
We should be brought in with as much advance
notice as po i e--for various reasons, including maximum
opportunity to discern any special policy pleading and to guarantee
professional, dispassionate estimative results.
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o DCI, DDCI, and NIC officers push policymakers to request the NIC to
pre~are more SNIEs on what would be the likely consequences if
US (theoretically) pursued this or that course re this or that
problem situation in the world. Many such exercises have been done
over the years, to mutual benefit, though very few in recent
years. Bring us in early (as per preceding tick).
o NIOs spend much less time in coordinating big, time-consuming
NIEs. Turn a lot of such tasks over to certain special senior NIC
officers or A/NIOs, and use more of the NIOs' time in crafting
creative, provocative brief policy-relevant thinkpieces for the DCI
and senior policymakers. The NIOs are uniquely situated
bureaucratically and uniquely fitted intellectually to function as
think tankers; few people elsewhere in town have such opportunity,
talent, or professional approach -- certainly in the sense of not
trying to sell some particular policy, priority, or budget emphasis.
o A new (small) office be created in the NSC structure to tie
intelligence and policymaking together much more closely and
systematically. This has long been, and remains, a prime need the need to create a function/service which starts in where
intelligence assessments leave off: drawing policy significance,
consequences of various actions, the presentation of options, etc.
There are no systematic such intelligence-policy ties at present,
and actual professional (and dispassionate) intelligence appraisals
are often absent while the policy process proceeds by its own
steam, its judgments based on all kinds of ad hoc appraisals,
intelligence community and otherwise. N.B.: This should not be
tied in any way to the present OEOB Crisis Management Center, but
must be a professional, credible operation.
00 What is specifically needed is the seconding of a top rate
senior intelligence officer or two, picked by the DCI, to a
sma office of the NSC headed by a top rate officer chosen by
the President for his her professional ability/integrity, not
a functionary or a political assignee. This could perhaps be
centered in the DCI's OEOB office.
oo Until and unless some such professional, systematic function
is created, NIEs and other top assessments will continue
simply to make their way downtown; compete with droves of
other incoming data; be used or not in haphazard function;
and, not least, from time to time be criticized because they
are "not sufficiently policy relevant."
o The NIC develop additional means, on and beyond narrative
paragraphs and graphics, of communicating estimative findings. In
addition to giving more top-level briefings, as discussed a ove,
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possible video communication should be examined. (At the NIC's
request, CPAS is now putting together an experimental such tape,
this particular one communicating Key Judgments of a Philippine
SNIE.) Not too distant in the future will be opportunities for
senior CIA and NIC officers to brief top policymakers through means
of inter-office video hook-ups. Plans for the latter (hardware,
process, and content) should go forward actively now: this will be
a winner, whether or not the experiment with video KJ
presentations, per se, pans out or not.
cc: SRPI on 25 Aug 86
3
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/11: CIA-RDP88T00988R000100150021-3