NEW FLUIDITY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 27, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director Central Intelligence
Wul D.C.20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 01017-86
27 February 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: New Fluidity on the International Scene?
1. The international situation presents a picture of considerable
fluidity--many problems and a few opportunities. While fluidity is
obviously always present in international politics--and especially in the
Third World--it springs in part from some long-term generic factors worth
identifying, and is increased by a number of other more topical
developments.
-- We do not believe this present state of fluidity is exceptional
but may be part of a longer-term trend of growing diversity of
players on the foreign policy spectrum--greatly complicating the
poTicymaker's job.
2. The major source of turmoil in the world springs from the chronic
state of instability in the Third World as a whole. This instability
poses no favoritism in moving against the established interests of both
the US and the USSR. Neither the US nor the USSR is capable of
controlling this instability.
-- A major difference, however, is that much of the time
instability tends to favor Soviet interests and work against the
Western goal of a moderate, controlled, stable evolution of the
political process. When the USSR gains greater stake in the
continued smooth existence of many Third World states, however,
the problem of instability becomes greater for them as well.
3. Generic Problems of the Third World. There are a number of
generic issues--well known to us all--which help keep the Third World in
a state of turmoil. These include:
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A narrow leadership cadre which is unrepresentative of most of
the population.
Historic ethnic and religious differences within states lacking
historically defined boundaries or history of national unity.
-- The tendency to maintain power through force and intimidation.
-- The acquisition of arms at great cost; a willingness to use
these arms both to maintain domestic control and against
neighbors.
4. These generic weaknesses are further expressed in the weakness of
the political leadership of most Third World countries. This weakness
and inability to solve political problems at home leads to:
-- A willingness to blame and attack foreign enemies as the source
of one's internal problems--especially to blame the West and
dark forces of "imperialism."
A willingness to employ terror as a cheap and effective way to
be heard on the international scene.
-- An unwillingness or inability to bite the bullet on economic
problems--both from fear of allowing a free pluralistic economy
to emerge and from unwillingess to pay the political cost
required by economic discipline.
-- A willingness to accept narcotics trafficking both to gain
profit from it as well as a desire to avoid expending power to
stop it.
5. In the face of growing instability there are few forces within
the world keenly interested in taking initiatives to alter this
situation. Western Europe and Japan when confronted with challenges seem
more interested in not further rocking the boat and in avoiding
confrontation, than in undertaking potentially controversial initiatives
to deal with root problems. European fears grow as root problems raise
the prospect of ideological struggle or East-West conflict.
6. Some Topical Issues. Apart from generic problems that have long
been with us, there are some problems more specifically topical which are
heightening turmoil and instability in the world and contribute
importantly to the present cycle of fluidity.
-- The new leadership in the USSR. The relatively comfortable
predictability of a series 7 -geriatric Soviet leaders has given
way to a younger, more agile command in Moscow. Their sense of
PR is much improved; their reaction time is faster; there is a
greater determination to address tactical issues actively and
flexibly. Soviet ability to project its power continues to grow.
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The continuing poor state of the commodities market continues to
affect nearly every Third World pro ucer.
The fall of oil prices--bringing bad news to some, good news to
others.
The debt crisis seems to be reaching a head in a variety of
countries creating dangerous political and economic instability,
threatening regimes close to the US. These debt-related crises
urgently require generic policies to treat them.
The peace process in the Middle East has collapsed, removing
whatever fig leaf of hope there was from countries facing
volatile movements of nationalism and religion on their
political fronts.
Precedent-making rise of anti-Marxist-Leninist insurgencies in
some six Soviet client states.
East Asia--once a gratifying showplace of economic progress--is
now facing economic recession of unpredictable duration. The
authoritarian regimes which helped create these booms are under
challenge. Problems of succession especially are emerging in
the Philippines, Taiwan, China, South Korea, Singapore, North
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Africa continues to decline into chaos and a morass of insoluble
economic problems. Here too we face an end of a long string of
African leaders who possessed the authority of the anti-colonial
struggle now replaced by newer faces with less legitimacy.
Latin America has shown encouraging moves toward installation of
democratic governments, but inevitably these more open
governments are subject to greater instability on a regular
basis than are dictatorships.
Even where the US profits from Soviet troubles with anti-Soviet
insurgencies in their client states, these struggles spill over
into neighboring countries creating yet new problems for the
US. g anistan deeply engages Pakistan and even India; Angola
touches South Africa; Nicaragua affects Salvador and Honduras;
Cambodia impinges upon Thailand; Ethiopia draws in Sudan, etc.
At least two other states of major importance to the US are
undergoing severe turmoil: the Philippines and South Africa.
Both involve critical US interests and had not, until the last 6
to 9 months, been deemed as imminently volatile.
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-- Nuclear proliferation problems already pose deeply destabilizing
problems in the Indian sub-continent and loom down the road
between Israel and the Arab states and between Brazil and
Argentina. (Yet some tentative initial studies suggest that
these weapons conceivabl could possibly have a sobering impact
upon states in conflict.)
-- The long-deadlocked Iran-Iraq war could possibly still lead to
rapid strategic change in ei er Iran, Iraq or both.
-- Instability stemming from terrorism and radical insurgent
movements is also a direct product of our technological era.
Groups once destined to local obscurity now enjoy worldwide
prominence as they establish regular contact by telephone and
cable, employ the international media to push their line, enjoy
international air schedules to meet with other bloody-minded
colleagues worldwide, draw upon international sympathies which
lend justification to their cause, invoke trendy intellectual
theories to vindicate their methods and goals, and increasingly
play on the stage of a global village once non-existent.
-- Education and the international media ironically have not served
to homogenize beliefs and create greater tolerance; on the
contrary it has in part strengthened regionalism, religious
particularism, and ethnic chauvinism. The Oxford education
enables the African tribesman's son to publicize--not
submerge--his particularistic cause. Ante thirst to return
to one's own roots and religion--often expressed in radical
terms--partly stems from the assault of Western and
international culture upon local tradition.
7. All these trends are natural objects of manipulation by the USSR
through assistance to insurgent elements, provision of shelf-item
ideological theories, arms, and exacerbation of local traditions of
endemic violence. Perhaps violent actors will always find some source of
support somehere, but the collective danger is heightened as it is allied
with a superpower, its allies and certain rabidly anti-US posturers.
8. The US foreign policy mechanism may not be able to cope with a
growing flow of unstable situations that require careful policy
considerations. While general principles can serve as guidelines to
policy, nearly every situation requires US tactical decisions informed by
the most accurate intelligence on the long-range nature of the -problem
and early policy review designed to anticipate, and not react to,
prob ems. We still lack systematic policy group measures to make fullest
use of intelligence to foresee and manage crises well early on. With a
few exceptions, the onslaught of instabilities are moving to overwhelm
USG capabilities to cope.
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9. With fluidity comes opportunities for the US as well.
-- The Soviets increasingly face the dangers of instability. Their
Third World clients with the exception of Cuba and Vietnam are
under internal siege to one extent or another. East Europe is
moving toward graver financial crisis and potential
restiveness. The Soviets likewise are hardly free of mistakes;
even under Gorbachev they have already badly handled both the
PORY and Philippine crises--"activism and imagination" not-
withstanding.
-- The world is growing increasingly multipolar, polycentric and
diffuse. More and more major actors are appearing on the scene
with ability to act in ways that both assist and weaken US
policy goals. Many of these players cannot be placed clearly in
either the Soviet or American camps.
-- Ultimately the US should fare much better in such a complex
and diverse world--in which a great variety of activity is
taking place that cannot be orchestrated.
-- It is the USSR which insists on a relatively narrow range
of outcomes to accord with its own interests: the ultimate
establishment of doctrinaire left-wing states, or--failing
that--turmoil in areas of interest to the West. The US on
the other hand is able to live with a far greater range of
political activity; we do not believe that rigid control of
the activities of these states is even necessary from the
Western point of view. In short, it is getting tougher for
the bad guys to bunch up together.
Although economic trends in the world are in many ways quite
negative for much of the Third World--the transfer of wealth
from North to South is decreasing--these issues offer the
opportunity to engage US economic and technological power
broadly. The USSR will be increasingly incapable of dealing
with basic economic problems anywhere. These problems should
play to US strengths if they are handled imaginatively. It will
require greater focus on economic olic and our technological
strength as a basic instrument of foreign policy. The Soviets
can only seek to turn Third World social and economic discontent
against the West, they cannot solve their problems.
Socialism is now discredited virtually around the world--even
among "intellectuals"--as a means of solving anything. As
nations move toward some degree of privatization of the economy
their priorities will inevitably be affected. Adoption of more
open economic systems should have a moderating affect on the
foreign policies of most states. China is a vivid example.
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10. In sum, we do see a growing--often perplexing and
taxing--process of diversification and fluidity in international
relations. Satisfying conclusions are perhaps less frequent but so are
decisive setbacks. One thing is for sure--the USSR is generally less
capable of handling, and more upset by, fluidity on the international
scene than is the West. It may be small comfort but it is comfort. But
it also calls for added US imagination and will.
Graham E. Fuller
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NIC 01017-86
27 February 1986
MEMORANUUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: New Fluidity on the International Scene?
NIC/VC/NIC:GEFuller:jcn 27 Feb. 86
Distribution:
1 - DC I
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - VC/NIC (HF)
1 - C/NIC
1 - DDI Registry
1 - VC/NIC Chrono (GEF)
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