THE RADICAL CHALLENGE TO US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: January 17, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SE T
The Director of Cent Intelligence
Wuhingwn, D.C. 20 S
National Intelligence Council
NIC 00292-86
17 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: The Radical Challenge to US Interests
in the Middle East
1. Three states stand basically opposed to US interests in the
Middle East: Iran, Syria and Libya. All three states have widely
diverging interests, personalities and style, but they share a number of
critical points in common.
-- Opposition to nearly all aspects of US policy in the region.
-- A desire to weaken or destroy moderate Arab leadership.
-- Active opposition to the US peace process
-- Strong hostility to Israel and a willingness to do something
about it.
-- The use of terror to attain political goals.
2. The states differ radically in some respects:
-- Iran loathes the Soviet Union, is anti-Communist, and seeks
the spread of orthodox Islam regimes throughout the Moslem
world.
-- Syria is secular, Socialist--but barely, is basically
pragmatic in its strategy for extension of power and avoids
gratuitous confrontation with the United States.
-- Libya has a quixotic vision of a radical world, possesses a
visceral anti-Americanism and a mercurial approach to all its
foreign relations.
Cl By Signer
Decl OADR
S ET
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3. The leaders b...,ically have contempt for each ot...er, but recognize
the value of the other in attaining the goals listed above. They consult
periodically on strategic issues, develop some generalized common
approaches, and provide some diplomatic support to each other in time of
need. They provide a limited degree of military support to each other.
Each recognizes that, as a group, they help maintain the strength of
radicalism against the forces of moderation in the region.
4. The activities of these states are not directed by the USSR, but
their policies largely serve Soviet interests by damaging both Western
interests and moderate forces. The Soviets provide major military
support to two of the three.
5. Syria is by far the most effective of the three. While its goals
are more limited than the other two, its leadership is tactically
brilliant and generally successful--qualities which hardly describe Iran
or Libya.
6. Iran's attentions are largely consumed by the Gulf war and Shia
politics in the Gulf--despite broader interests in propagating Shia
fundamentalism in the world.
7. Libya, however, is probably the greatest overall threat to the
US, the West, and moderate states in the region. Qadhafi has ambitions
which range from Chile to the Caribbean, to South Africa, across the
Middle East to East Asia, Indonesia, and the Southwest Pacific. No other
state outside the Soviet Bloc has a geographic range of subversive
activity to match Libya.
-- Libya also has more money than the other two radical states
with which to promote its ambitions. Small sums often buy a
great deal in small, backward countries.
-- Libya's threat to its immediate neighbors of Chad, Sudan,
Egypt, and Tunisia is very real, and Libya has significant
military forces to bring to bear.
-- The good news is that a great deal of these activities are
feckless and come to nothing. If even one-tenth of the plots
were to succeed, Libya would be a far greater threat.
8. As the West seeks to contain these forces of radicalism, Libya
presents itself as a unique target:
-- Libya is almost exclusively the product of one individual;
with his demise, Libya's policies could change significantly.
-- Libya is readily accessible to outside intervention, just off
the Mediterranean and its cities near the sea.
SECRET
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JCLKCI
-- Libya has a very small--3 million--population.
-- Qadhafi has alientated virtually every element of Libyan
society by now -- a fact which is not true for the leadership,
of Syria or Iran. Qadhafi is hated and feared by virtually
every single other state in the region; he has few allies
with the exception of Syria and Iran--on occasion.
-- The Soviets are less committed to Libya than to the other
states; conversely, the Soviets' commitment to Syria is deep
and Iran is a sensitive region since it lies on the Soviet
border.
-- Libya's politics are not the product of deep and complex
social and political forces. They represent one man's
vision. Syria's interests are complex and deeply involved in
the entire Palestinian and Arab-Israeli issue; while Iran
speaks for millions of Shia Moslems around the world.
9. Libya, therefore, presents a unique target. The chances are that
were Qadhafi to disappear, the vast number of Libyan plots hatched daily
would greatly diminish. The major destabilizing force in the whole
Middle East, representing hostility to international norms of behavior
would ease the atmosphere of turmoil--somewhat.
10. The collapse of Qadhafi would have a chilling effect on both
Syria and Iran. It would take away considerable momentum from the force
of radicalism in the Middle East and beyond. It reduces the number of
available havens for terrorist and subversive action.
11. Terrorism in the Middle East nonetheless represents many
different strands:
-- Some is conducted by relative moderates who seek concrete
limited goals and a tactical bargaining position--amd are
willing ultimately to negotiate.
-- Some is conducted by thugs for hire by nearly anyone.
-- Some is conducted by dedicated opponents of any political
settlement.
-- Some seek millenarian world revolution.
12. The Palestinian issue remains the single bleeding sore of the
region. Unless legitimate Palestinian grievances are partially
alleviated, nearly all regional players will throw up their hands and
point to this as the root cause for terror and for inaction on their
part.
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-- A partia. alleviation of the Palestinian problem will not
bring terrorism to an end. But it will eliminate a partial
cause -- and even more, the major rationale. It will be
slightly easier for the West and regional moderates to cope
with terrorism if this single long-term package of reasonably*
legitimate grievances and needs are met. The war against
terror must not allow us to lose sight of the key political
issue of the region as well.
-~,
Graham E. Fuller
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SECRET
NIC 00292-86
17 Jan. 86
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Radical Challenge to US Interests in the
Middle East
VC/NIC:Fuller:ba 17 Jan. 86
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1-ER.
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC (Ford)
1 - A/NIO/NESA
1 - SRP
1 - UDI Registry
1 - VC/NIC (Fuller) Chrono
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