NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01079R000200200005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 24, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part :Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/25: CIA-RDP88T01079R000200200005-2
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UI U
lp- Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Monday
24 August 1987
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S) eeret__
CPAS NID 87-197JX
24 August 1987
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To ? Secret
Contents
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Persian Gulf: Situation Report
1
Panama: Pressure on Regime Eases
2
Lebanon: Druze Overtures to Iran and Libya
3
Suriname: Steps Against the Opposition
4
Cuba: AIDS Control Campaign
5
Notes
UN-USSR: Soviets Primed for Disarmament Conference
6
Sudan: Political Maneuvering After Government's Fall
6
USSR-Mozambique: Outcome of Chissano Visit
7
Vietnam: ASEAN Position on Khmer Talks Rejected
7
Chile: Pinochet Raises Wages, Hopes for Political Gain
8
Fiji: Broadening Regional Relations
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
South Korea: Constitutional Talks
11
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East Germany-Poland: Bilateral Frictions
14
Tea Secret
24 August 1987
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Top Secret
PERSIAN GULF: Situation Report
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Iraqi and Iranian Iraq claims it launched a large air raid ?the second one in
Activities two days?against the unfinished Iranian petrochemical facility at
Bandar-e Khomeyni. Baghdad also warned Tehran that recent Iranian
airstrikes and artillery shelling of civilian areas could to a
resumption of the "war of the cities." On , ehran claimed it
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Saudi and Kuwaiti
Plans To Increase
Iran's Isolation
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait hope to persuade other Arab states to sever
diplomatic relations with Iran, State
reporting indicates Riyadh, during Arab League meetings that began
yesterday in Tunis, will solicit condemnation of Tehran for the Mecca
riots and will ask members to unite in breaking ties to Iran
Comment: Riyadh and Kuwait are unlikely to receive unanimous
support for breaking diplomatic ties to Tehran. Nevertheless, the
meetings could produce a formal complaint blaming Tehran for the
Mecca riots and a warning that additional provocations will result in
strong actions.
1
Top Secret
24 August 1987
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PANAMA: Pressure on Regime Eases
Top Secret
The regime appears to have gained breathing room as the
opposition reassesses its position and commercial banks have
granted a tentative reprieve on the government's loan payments.
Despite the disappointing results of the National Civil Crusade's
general strike last week, most Crusade members continue to insist on
Defense Chief Noriega's removal before beginning negotiations with
the government to resolve the crisis
Meanwhile, international commercial banks tentatively agreed to
reschedule until next March $420 million in principal payments and
$20 million in interest on Panamanian debts. Despite a budget deficit
that the US Embassy estimates still may exceed $300 million this
year, the government reportedly did not ask banks for any new
funding.
Comment: The Crusade's)
movement has been unable to develop tactics
other than strikes?costly to both the opposition and the
government?and nonviolent demonstrations.
The agreement between Panama and its commercial creditors, while
giving the government only minimal financial relief from its anticipated
obligations this year, demonstrates the desire of both sides to
maintain good relations. The regime's decision to forgo a request for
new commercial lending despite its large budget shortfall probably is
calculated to calm creditor fears about Panama's political and
economic stability.
Top Secret
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2 24 August 1987
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LEBANON: Druze Overtures to Iran and Libya
Top Secret
Druze leader Wand Junblatt is improving ties to both Iran and
Libya in an attempt to put distance between himself and Syria
and to protect Druze interests in Lebanon.
Junblatt has declared his
aipporMor4ramia.-itsaconfr,oatglion,with the US in the Persian Gulf.
Junblatt traveled last week to Libya in an effort to regain Libyan
financial and material support. Reports in the Lebanese press say that
the trip was successful and that Libya plans to resume aid to the
Druze and other Lebanese Muslims shortly.
Syria has expressed concern about Junblatt's activities, and Syrian
forces in Lebanon have arrested several members of the Druze militia.
Junblatt continues to fear the Syrians
will try to assassinate him.
Comment: Junblatt hopes that closer ties to Iran and L bya will
strengthen his bargaining position with Syria. At one time, the Druze
were one of Syria's important allies in Lebanon, but relations have
been severely strained by Syria's support for the Shia Amal militia.
The Syrian intervention in West Beirut last February hindered Druze
activities in the capital, and Damascus forced Junblatt to accept a
small Syrian military presence in the Druze-controlled Shuf region.
Junblatt's efforts to open new avenues of support may backfire and
result in increasing Syrian pressure to force the Druze to conform to
Syrian policy in Lebanon. Junblatt's assassination would seriously
weaken the cohesion of the Druze community because Junblatt has
no clear successor, but Syria is probably not ready to take that step.
Top Secret
3 24 August 1987
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-Top Secret
SURINAME:
Steps Against the Opposition
The regime's reaction to the opposition coalition's successful
rally earlier this month appears to have convinced the traditional
parties' leaders to avoid further provocative acts.
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Bouterse recently assigned 25X1
full-time bodyguards to coalition leaders, who view him with
increasing skepticism and-fear. 25X1
Flifttrig-E44110046-41 following his resignation from the
supreme policymaking council in response to military pressure,
Bouterse met with coalition leaders who told him they would work
toward the best possible relationship with the Army. In return,
Bouterse promised to abide by the result of the election.
Comment: As the election nears, coalition leaders probably will
continue with public political activity, but most likely will avoid
any action that could encourage the military to renege on
democratization. They may want to wait until they have the moral
force of an overwhelming election victory before mounting a direct
challenge to Bouterse. For his part, Bouterse probably is not yet
ready to concede electoral defeat and will use every means at his
disposal to steal the election.
Top Secret
4 24 August 1987
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Top Secret
CUBA: AIDS Control Campaign
Cuban President Castro views controlling AIDS?which Havana
publicly blames on the US?as a top priority and has
implemented tough measures to identify and isolate those
affected.
The Ministry of Public Health has tested 800,000 people this year for
AIDS antibodies, focusing on military and civilian personnel returning
from Africa, foreigners, and Cubans in contact with foreigners."
Havana publicly admits only that 108 Cubans have tested positive.
Cuba reportedly has deported 1,900 foreigners and quarantined
3,500 Cubans. Havana requires that tourists present medical proof
that they are free of the AIDS infection/
I Havana justified its
stringent measures with a disinformation campaign that claims the
Pentagon invented AIDS, according to the US Interests Section.
Comment: Castro's crackdown on AIDS and the disinformation
campaign?modeled on a similar Soviet effort?evidently reflect
concern about the spread of the disease itself and the political
damage caused by the linkage between AIDS and the already
unpopular Cuban military missions in Africa.
Top Secret
5 24 August 1987
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Top Secret
UN-USSR: Soviets Primed for Disarmament Conference
A two-week UN Conference on the Relationship between
Disarmament and Development, which opens today in New York, will
stress the view that disarmament is a necessary precondition for
Third World development. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy
reportedly will head the Soviet delegation(
Comment: Moscow, a practiced manipulator of UN conferences,
is likely to make a favorable impression on some Third World
audiences. It will contrast its high-level delegation with the US
refusal to participate. The Soviets probably will link the conference's
proposals to General Secretary Gorbachev's disarmament
initiatives?setting the stage for the 42nd UN General Assembly next
month and future propaganda on arms control in the Third World.
SUDAN: Political Maneuvering After Government's Fall
Bargaining has begun among the leaders of Sudan's political parties
to replace the coalition agreement that was broken Saturday. The
joint statement issued by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and
Democratic Unionists patron Muhammad al-Mirghani held open the
possibility of continuing with the same coalition if negotiations failed
to form a broader based, national unity government. Hasan al-Turabi,
leader of the opposition National Islamic Front, said he rejects the
inclusion of all parties in a new government and would consider
joining only if a charter that sets out policies binding on all members
were signed beforehand.(
Comment: Sadiq will find it hard to form a government of national
unity, given the Islamic Front's conditions and opposition in Sadiq's
Umma Party to the inclusion of Turabi's party in a coalition. At the
same time, resumption of the Umma-Democratic Unionist coalition is
unlikely to please the public in Khartoum, which increasingly sees it as
ineffective. It is unclear how the General Staff views the Saturday
shakeup, but negotiations that end in renewed civilian bickering will
add to the military's frustration.
Top Secret
6 24 August 1987
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Top Secret
USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Outcome of Chissano Visit
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Mozambican President Chissano's visit to the USSR in early August
reportedly was a success even though no new economic aid packages
were pledged. The USSR gave Mozambique_a multipurpose loan of
about $60 million, according to the Mozambican press. A joint
communique declared a need for expanding the Soviet role in
Mozambique's defense effort, but specifics will await the visit of a
Soviet delegation. Maputo supported Soviet initiatives on nuclear
disarmament and other international issues but aVoided any direct
criticism of the US. The Soviet press described the talks as"warm
and friendly,"r
Comment: The loan Chissano reportedly brought home is modest
and will not significantly allay Mozambique's economic decline. No
sharp increases are likely in the level of arms deliveries from Moscow,
which probably believes the Mozambican Army currently is unable to
absorb new weapon systems.'
VIETNAM: ASEAN Position on Khmer Talks Rejected
Vietnam has rejected ASEAN's stipulations that informal discussions
on Cambodia-be based on the resistance coalition's eight-point peace
proposal and that Vietnam join the talks immediately after Khmer
representatives meet, according to official statements. The
Vietnamese say this violates an agreement between Hanoi and
Jakarta. On Friday Prime Minister Hun Sen of the People's Republic
of Kampuchea renewed his offer to meet resistance officials and
implied his support for a power-sharing arrangement in Cambodia, as
long as it excluded the Khmer Rouge. He was particularly conciliatory
toward Prince Sihanouk, invoking the honorific title "samdech" rarely
used by PRK officials.
Comment: Hanoi insists that the Cambodian problem be resolved by
the Khmer groups and that its own role be treated in the context of
talks with ASEAN on broader regional security issues. Nonetheless,
the Vietnamese are retaining some flexibility by keeping the original
"cocktail party" proposal alive and by softening the Cambodian
regime's harsh rhetoric. ASEAN and Vietnam will continue to blame
each other for the lack of diplomatic progress to court international
support for their respective positions before the UN General
Assembly meets next month.
Top Secret
7 24 August 1987
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Top Secret
CHILE: Pinochet Raises Wages, Hopes for Political Gain
President Pinochet's recent announcement of a 16-percent wage
increase for most public employees and a 12-percent hike in the
minimum wage settled a debate between the progovernment
Economic and Social Council and the Finance Ministry. The Ministry
had resisted the Council's call for a higher minimum wage, noting that
current policy stresses reducing unemployment rather than raising
wages. The President contended that the hike was necessary after a
harsh winter and to compensate for inflation since the previous wage
increase last November.
Comment: By entering the public debate between the Council and
Finance Minister Buchi as a champion of the poor, Pinochet evidently
hoped to stem the-steady decline in his popularity. He probably does
not intend to break with Buchi, in whom he has long had confidence.
Inflation is running near 20 percent afinually, and the wage increases
will be quickly erode-d, leaving little political gain for Pinochet. TKO
government had probably budgeted wage increases for November
in any event, however, and the early raises are unlikely to upset
Santiago's financial plans.
FIJI: Broadening Regional Relations
Unable to reach a consensus on constitutional changes that ensure
native Fijian political dominance, Governor General Ganilau's
constitutional review committee last Friday advised against declaring
a republic. The committee also endorsed keeping Fiji's membership in
the British Commonwealth. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Ratu
Mara, currently the Foreign Affairs adviser in the interim government,
has been actively courting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
for closer trade ties and possible sources of military equipment. Fiji's
relations with its traditional partners, Australia and New Zealand,
were strained by the military coup in May. Fiji is also seeking closer
ties to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. In addition, according to the
US Embassy, France apparently plans to strengthen its commercial
and diplomatic relations with Fiji, possibly by offering military
assistance.
Comment: Fiji's recent approaches abroad are not likely to produce
relationships that would supplant its predominant commercial and
political ties to Australia and New Zealand, which will probably mend
in time. Recognizing that Fiji's elected government cannot be
restored to power, Canberra and Wellington are trying to protect their
traditional influence by supporting the role of the Governor General
and by relaxina restrictions on dealing with the interim government.
Top Secret
24 August 1987
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Top secret
In Brief
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Africa
Zimbabwean legislators(vOted to abolish white reserved seats in
Parliamentaeeerding-ttrtra-Embes.. move long anticipated
by white community.., part of Prime% inister Muaabe's
longstanding goal of creating one-party state.
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continued
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
In Brief
Americas
Europe
Hondurans in Moscow last week for trade talks... US Embassy
says military opposed trip ... TASS reports Soviets accepted draft
accord granting MEN status, settling trade accounts ... would be
first official pact.
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About 20 Nicaraguan soldiers detonated explosives outside
unoccupied house leased by US Embassy in Managua... no
injuries, only minor darnar ... probably meant to intimidate US
diplomats. 25X1
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Twenty Czechoslovak, Polish dissidents met recently without
interference, called for more human rights in Eastern Europe...
first such meeting since 1970s... regimes' recent permissiveness
may encourage increased regional dissident activity.
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Top Secret
24 August 1987
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Special Analysis
Top Secret
SOUTH KOREA: Constitutional Talks
Ruling- and opposition-party politicians missed their 20 August
deadline for constitutional revision but are publicly claiming that
a meeting this week between Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam
will produce a constitutional amendment. Ruling-party rumblings
that it has "made its best offer" and infighting in the opposition
camp suggest neither Roh nor Kim will have much room to
bargain. Failure to settle the issue soon could play into the hands
of both radical dissidents?who are hoping public frustration will
create a climate for renewed demonstrations this fall?and
government hardliners who appear ready to crack down if unrest
gets out of hand.
The US Embassy reports the parties have settled on 78 of
111 constitutional issues, but agreement on provisions that will
directly affect each party's election chances remains elusive. Sticking
points include opposition demands for a lower voting age?their
candidates are front-runners among young voters?and ruling-.art
resistance to constitutional guarantees of an apolitical military.
An agreement would be,to the advantage of both Roh and Kim Young
Sam. Roh has been under increasing public pressure to deliver on his
two-month-old reform proposal and probably would see a successful
meeting as a way to boost his political stock. Kim Young Sam
probably judges that an agreement will give him an edge over Kim
Dae Jung in the battle to be chosen as the opposition's presidential
candidate.
The stakes may be highest for Kim Dae Jung, whose political fortunes
would decline if Kim Young Sam came away with a deal that has
popular support. On the other hand, such a development might even
prompt Kim Dae Jung to try to scuttle the meeting, perhaps by
claiming the death of a striking worker during a clash with police over
the weekend would make negotiations inappropriate. On the other
hand, Kim Young Sam has received poor marks for his political skills,
and a misstep with Roh could make Kim Dae Jung the clear
front-runner.
continued
Top Secret
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Top Secret
The Dissident Factor
Dissident opposition groups began preparing for their fall offensive
last week with several small rallies in Seoul and a strategy meeting of
radical students in the provincial city of Taejon. The Embassy reports
that moderate dissidents are expecting their demonstrations to keep
pressure on both parties to produce a democratic constitution.
Radical students are hoping protests will prevent an agreement, lead
to rising public frustration and set the sta e for a " eo le power"
revolution this fall,
activists among the dissidents may have
moved now, rather than wait for students to return to campus next
month, in order to capitalize on labor unrest. However, workers have
focused on labor issues and have been hostile to student efforts to
interject political issues into strikes, according to the Embassy.
The government is concerned that, if the constitutional revision talks
drag on into next month, dissidents will be ready to capitalize on
growing public frustration with the slow progress on reform. Indeed,
one senior official told US officials last month that he expects massive
unrest in September and believes the government may have to
declare martial law.1
Outlook
With electoral self-interest at the heart of disagreements on
constitutional revision, both Roh and Kim probably will have difficulty
selling a compromise to their respective camps. Negotiations
technically could continue until November, with time left for passage
of an amendment in the National Assembly, a subsequent national
referendum, and a direct presidential election before Chun leaves
office in February. But, with both the students and the security
services preparing for a troublesome fall season and labor flexing its
muscles, the politicians may lose the political initiative well before
then.
Top Secret
12 24 August 1987
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Special Analysis
EAST GERMANY- Bilateral Frictions
POLAND:
Longstanding frictions between East Germany and Poland have
been made worsen recently by internal developments in both
countries, by a dispute over territorial waters, and by their
differing responses to new Soviet domestic and foreign policies.
East Germany apparently believes Polish leader Jaruzelski's lack
of firmness toward both the Catholic Church and Solidarity
activists guarantees new unrest in Poland. For its part, the Polish
leadership is upset by new indications of what it considers
German nationalism, such as East Germany's revival of its
Prussian past and the coming visit of party chief Honecker to
Bonn?issues likely to be raised when Jaruzelski meets with
Honecker in East Berlin this week.
Growing Polish Suspicion
The Polish regime, for its part, resents East German criticism of its
internal affairs. In party-to-party relations, the East Germans have
adopted a schoolmaster's approach toward Polish functionaries.
Since the initial Solidarity crisis, East Germany has sought?by
closing its border with Poland to all but officially approved tour
groups?to avoid political contamination.
East Germany earlier this year extended its territorial waters in the
Bay of Szczecyn between the two countries, provoking a sovereignty
dispute with Poland that has yet to be resolved. For this and other
reasons, Poland is suspicious of East Germany's increasing attention
to its national past?particularly the prominence given to historical
figures like Frederick the Great and Bismarck, who were no great
friends of Poland's. Polish leaders also harbor exaggerated fears that
continued
Top Secret
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Top Secret
improvements in intra-German relations, such as the coming
Honecker trip, increase the possibility of German unification or
confederation at the expense of Polish security. When Jaruzelski
meets with Honecker this month, he will ask Honecker to stress the
permanence of Germany's division and Poland's current borders
during the East German leader's trip to West Germany,
111 * II II
Outlook
Deep national antagonisms will persist between Moscow's two key
East European allies, despite 40 years of proclaimed Communist
solidarity. Jaruzelski's likely inability to rein in domestic opponents
completely will continue to feed East German fears of spillover. East
Germany may try to use continuing instability in Poland to undermine
Jaruzelski's status in Moscow bot-rotate.tar-laasiettpiaer.teeto
.4xuzelskEs.donegW.murnse. Altbough-Somiet.permiasipn,to
Aionecker1VVISlriob-abirwarivt-welcomed'eWars'aVicir
zetlects-n-o?dirriiiiiitionin-Moscowls,sensitivit to.P Ii welias1ts
.2.m..jgcOly.coance_ra$?
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op Decret
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