NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 17 NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01422R000100130003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 17, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
8 Intelligence
u%itts=1,
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
17 November 1987
CPAS N1D 87-267JX
17 November 1987
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Contents
Persian Gulf: Situation Report
1
USSR-UN-Persian Gulf: Prospect for UN Naval Force
2
Romania: Workers Protest Shortages
3
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Honduras-Nicaragua: Border Security Proposal
5
Italy: Efforts To Reconstitute Coalition
6
Notes
USSR-Afghanistan: Soviets Hint at One-Year Withdrawal
7
Yugoslavia: Mikulic Program Adopted
7
Poland: Price Hikes Proposed
8
Poland: Opposition Activists Meet
8
Bangladesh: Three Opposition Parties Banned
9
Iran-North Korea: Missile Cooperation
9
Chile: Strategy for Protecting World Bank Loan
10
Thailand-USSR: General Chavalit's Trip to Moscow
10
In Brief
11
Special Analyses
Mozambique: Chissano's First Year
12
North Yemen-Libya: Tactical Rapprochement
14
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Top Secret
Persian
Gulf Developments
KuwaiV,V7Atr
Khark0
Island
Fat-sr?
Island
*RIYADH Saudi
Arabia
0 50 100 Kilometers
0, 50 100 Miles
Top Secret
17 November 1987
Persian
Gulf
*MANAMA
e i n
'Qatar (
4k. DOHA
Strait of
Hormuz
cz)
15 November 46,714111?m
Tankerslattacked?by
Iranian small boats
Abu Musa
sirrie Island
Island
16 November
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DHABI 67
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A:24. ft,
boarnary
United
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Oman
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Top Secret
PERSIAN GULF: Situation Report
Ship Attacks Iranian small boats attacked the US-owned, Liberian-flagged tanker
Continue Esso Freeport south of Abu Musa Island yesterday
small boats also attacked a
tanker south of Qeshm Island in Omani territorial waters on Sunday,
Dutch Changing
Operational Plans
Comment: Iran will try to keep pace with Iraqi ship attacks. The
recent increase in Iraqi air attacks on Iranian economic facilities and
oil exports may prompt Tehran to launch additional Silkworm missiles
at Kuwait.
The Dutch Defense Minister has approved plans for two Dutch
minehunters in the Gulf of Oman to enter the Persian Gulf today,
according to the US attache in The Hague. The Dutch Navy accepted
a British offer to join in searching for mines in the vicinity of Bahrain;
the British will provide protection to the Dutch ships while they are in
the Gulf. The Belgian Government apparently has not decided on
whether to allow its three ships to accompany the Dutch. The US
attache in Paris reports that budgetary problems will severely restrict
French operations in the Gulf through the end of the year.
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Comment: The Dutch Navy has pushed hard for approval to enter the
Gulf and probably hopes successful mine-clearing operations will
persuade the government to extend their deployment in the area. The
Belgian Government faces elections on 13 December and may be less
willing to commit its three ships. Despite funding problems, the
French are not likely to reduce the number of ships in the region until
their bilateral problems with Iran are resolved.
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Top Secret
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Regional Reaction to Soviet Proposal for UN Naval Force
Iran probably sees the proposal as useful in further delaying implementation of cease-fire;
Tehran presumably favors a naval force that does not include either superpower.
Syria is the only Arab nation to lobby for proposal.
Iraq rejects the initiative but is exploring ways to exploit it to gain Soviet support for sanctions
against Iran.
Kuwaiti officials have told the Soviets that they view the UN naval force 25X1
proposal as strictly a propaganda move against the US and that they wanted nothing to do
with it.
Saudi Arabia supports the US presence in the Gulf and is irritated by Soviet efforts to pander
to Iran.
UAE's President Zayid recently told the Abu Dhabi press that Iran is primarily responsible for
the presence of foreign fleets in the Gulf.
Bahrain has told US diplomats that the result of the Arab summit clearly shows Arab support
for US policy in the Gulf.
A Qatari diplomat recently characterized Moscow's proposal to US diplomats as "silly and
impractical."
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Top Secret
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USSR-UN- Prospect for UN Naval Force
PERSIAN GULF:
The Soviet proposal for a UN naval force in the Persian Gulf has
attracted little support beyond Moscow's allies and Third World
clients.
Moscow has billed the initiative as a solution to the tensions in the
Gulf raised by the "provocative" presence of US forces there. The
proposal calls for the withdrawal of the naval forces of "nonlittoral"
states from the region and their replacement with a UN naval force
under the now powerless UN Military Staff Committee. Moscow
maintains that the US naval presence is contributing to Iran's
reluctance to accept a UN cease-fire.
Most Arab states see Moscow's proposal as a ploy to deflect criticism
of Soviet reluctance to support UN resolutions against Iran. Iraq and
Kuwait, for example, while publicly noncommittal about the Soviet
proposal, have told US diplomats they firmly oppose any UN force
that would protect Iranian shipping. Syria?the only Arab state
supporting Moscow's initiative?was sharply criticized at the recent
Arab summit in Amman for advocating its adoption rather than
highlighting Iran's refusal to accept the UN's cease-fire resolution.
Comment: The Soviet proposal is not likely to be rejected outright by
most states because they hope to get Moscow's support for UN
sanctions against Iran. Even the Arab states, which are most annoyed
by it, avoided criticizing Moscow directly in the Amman summit's final
resolution, choosing instead to rebuke Syria for promoting the
proposal.
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Top Secret
ROMANIA: Workers Protest Shortages
On Sunday, Romanian industrial workers triggered the largest
reported antiregime protest in a decade.
According to US Embassy reporting, thousands of protesters led by
200 tractor factory workers marched on party headquarters in
Brasov, 85 miles (135 kilometers) north of Bucharest, to protest
economic conditions. as many as 80,000 to
100,000 may have participated. Troops using tear gas were reportedly
used to clear the streets.
The demonstrators chanted anti-Ceausescu slogans including,
"Down with the dictatorship" and "We want food." After wrecking
party headquarters and burning posters of Ceausescu, they attacked
city hall. The Embassy reports thousands of workers in Brasov were
facing layoffs and possible forced return to farms or mines. Over the
past two years, workers at the tractor factory, one of the largest
plants in the country, have been hit hard by punitive wage policies.
Comment: The incident in Brasov appears to have been isolated, but
other demonstrations may also have occurred. Economic conditions
are equally bad in other parts of the country, and the authorities have
moved earlier than normal this year to tighten energy rationing for the
winter.
To calm the local situation, the authorities probably will send extra
food, but this could deplete stocks elsewhere. In addition, the police
will try to identify the ringleaders and remove them.
The incident, coming so early in the winter, will make Ceausescu even
more insecure and increase his reliance on the security services. If the
incidents spread, some of Ceausescu's critics in the leadership could
become bolder in their opposition.
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Top Secret
HONDURAS-
NICARAGUA:
Border Security Proposal
Honduras, in the face of international scrutiny to comply with the
Central American peace plan, has proposed a multilateral
commission to control insurgent activities along its borders with
Nicaragua and El Salvador.
In a speech to the OAS last week, the Honduran Foreign Minister
reiterated the importance of simultaneity and called for Managua to
withdraw troops and equipment from the border area, end its
violations of Honduran territory, open talks with the anti-Sandinista
insurgents, and issue a broad and unconditional amnesty.
In return, Honduras proposed to join Nicaragua and El Salvador in
establishing an international security commission that would disarm
insurgents, confine them in internationally inspected camps, and
prevent them from using border areas for military purposes.
Honduras also said it would consider a withdrawal of temporary US
military personnel from its territory if Nicaragua, in a simultaneous
and verifiable manner, reduced the presence of military advisers from
Soviet Bloc countries.
Some key Honduran Foreign Ministry officials believe that US foreign
policy in Central America has unnecessarily humiliated Honduras and
allowed the Sandinistas to gain ascendancy in the region,
Although the Hondurans doubt
Nicaragua will comply fully with the Central American peace plan, they
believe they must plan for the worst possible outcome,
Comment: The proposal probably is intended to counter perceptions
that Tegucigalpa is an obstacle to the peace plan. At the same time,
the Honduran Foreign Ministry, probably with the tacit approval of the
military, may believe the proposal could ensure that Honduras will
avoid having to disarm and resettle insurgents by itself if the peace
accord goes into effect.
The Sandinistas are likely to interpret the Honduran offer as a sign of
declining support for the insurgents and may toughen its position in
cease-fire negotiations with the rebels. Nicaragua will probably
reemphasize that a broad amnesty is contingent on the cessation of
US funding for the insurgents and that a political dialoque can beain
only after the rebels have put down their arms.
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Top Secret
ITALY: Efforts To Reconstitute Coalition
Italian President Cossiga will begin a difficult but probably
successful effort today to reconstitute the ruling coalition?
which came apart over the weekend when the Liberals left the
government?by asking the incumbent Prime Minister, Giovanni
Goria, to form a new government.
Cossiga held an emergency meeting yesterday with the leaders of the
four partners remaining in the coalition and with the Liberals following
Goria's decision to submit his resignation in response to the Liberals'
withdrawal. The leaders of all five parties said publicly afterwards they
wanted to restore the three-month-old coalition, which ruptured over
objections by the Liberals to proposed budgetary changes curtailing
tax reductions.
Comment: Cossiga is a dedicated constitutionalist, and his main
concern will be to foster a swift solution to avoid further damage to
the already low credibility of Italy's political institutions. He is thus
most likely to reappoint Goria, who is probably best placed to form
a new government quickly because he appears to enjoy at least
grudging personal support from the leadership of the outgoing
coalition.
The Liberals, having dramatically emphasized their desire to squeeze
the public sector, may now be inclined to compromise to avoid
political isolation. In any case, the four remaining members of the
outgoing coalition control a parliamentary majority and could form a
government without the Liberals. An agreement among these four
could prove difficult, however, because they are divided over how to
tackle a range of controversial issues, especially nuclear power plants
and judicial immunity, which were voted on recently in national
referendums.
Goria or a successor will probably be able to patch together another
weak center-left coalition, if only because Socialist leader Craxi and
Christian Democratic leader DeMita are reluctant to force a full-blown
governmental crisis at this time. DeMita probably prefers to wait at
least until after his party's national conference next spring to force a
showdown with the Socialists over their resistance to his efforts to
head a more solidly based coalition. Craxi is probably content to let a
weak Christian Democratic-led government take the heat for
imposing fiscal austerity while he paves the way for a hoped-for return
to the prime-ministry.
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Top Secret
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Soviets Hint at One-Year Withdrawal
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Soviet officials in Afghanistan
told a West German journalist last week that General Secretary
Gorbachev, during his US meetings next month, would announce his
readiness to withdraw all Soviet troops over a 12-month period after
the conclusion of a settlement. The officials claim Afghan leader
Najibullah was told of the plan this month and was given an ultimatum
to stabilize his regime quickly. Soviet and East European officials
have hinted over the past two months that Moscow will make a one-
year troop withdrawal proposal soon. Similar hints were made before
the UN-sponsored Geneva negotiations in September, but Kabul
reduced its offer by only two months to 16.
Comment: There has been no indication Moscow will relent on its
insistence that implementation of any withdrawal schedule would be
contingent on cessation of "outside interference" and agreement on
the composition of the government in Kabul. The Soviets may
calculate that a 12-month offer would allow them to remain
uncommitted on specifics while brightening the atmosphere of the
summit. They may hope to retake the diplomatic initiative after their
setback at the UN last week, where Pakistan's yearly resolution
calling for withdrawal of foreign troops passed by a slightly larger
margin despite strong Soviet lobbying. Nonetheless, Pravda recently
carried Najibullah's admission in his speech to the Afghan party
conference that Afghan forces remain unable to defend themselves
without Soviet assistance. Moscow may again forgo the public
relations gains of a 12-month offer if it decides the regime is too
unstable.
YUGOSLAVIA: Mikulic Program Adopted
The Yugoslav Federal Assembly last Saturday approved Premier
Mikulic's revised anti-inflation program, despite strong opposition
from the developed north. The new program includes large price
hikes on such goods and services as electricity, bread, milk, and
cooking oil and will be followed by a six-month price freeze. It also
calls for limits on wages and government spending, devaluation of the
dinar, and tighter monetary policy. The Slovene delegation?which
claims the program is similar to past failed policies and relies on
government intervention?voted en mass against the program, while
Croatian delegates apparently split their vote.
Comment: Mukulic has survived a test that increases the chances his
government will last at least until the constitutionally mandated vote
of confidence next May. The higher prices probably will cause new
grumbling, but the price freeze should prove popular to a public
facing triple-digit inflation. The economy is not likely to improve for
some time, however, and nationwide support for Mukulic is likely to
decline further. His next big hurdle will come soon, when he tries to
negotiate debt relief with Western creditors.
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POLAND: Price Hikes Proposed
Top Secret
The Polish press this weekend published price reform proposals
calling for increases next year of as much as 40 percent on many
consumer goods, with prices of fuels and rents doubling or tripling.
The announcements claimed the increases would be largely offset by
hikes in wages and subsidies. Panic-buying in some parts of Poland
had already begun last week in anticipation of greater inflation under
Polish leader Jaruzelski's reform program, which comes to a vote
29 November in an unprecedented public referendum.
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Comment: Although government press spokesman Urban last week 25X1
had promised some warning of intended price hikes before the
referendum, the magnitude of the increases seems likely to elicit a
rejection of reforms and may lead to public protest. Jaruzelski may
believe the reaction to the price increases will subside between now
and the referendum. On the other hand, he may see a strong or
violent reaction as a chance to either respond with a show of
compromise or plead with the IMF to soften whatever austerity
measures it attaches to the standby agreement Poland has been
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POLAND: Opposition Activists Meet
Some 300 opposition activists?including moderate independent
Catholics and leading hardliners?met in Warsaw last week to
discuss the government's proposals for economic and political
reforms, according to one dissident. Despite a large police presence,
participation was not hindered and no arrests were made. Andrzej
Stelmachowski and other leading Catholic intellectuals are scheduled
to have discussions, labeled as "quiet" and pragmatic, on unspecified
issues with Politburo member Jozef Czyrek later this month.
Comment: The meeting probably focused on opposition tactics for
the coming referendum on reform and whether the opposition can
present a united challenge to the regime. Moderates probably are
under pressure from hardliners, who refuse to meet with the regime,
to demonstrate that progress is possible through dialogue. The
regime is likely to tolerate additional opposition meetings, hoping to
convince Church moderates it is serious about allowing greater
political freedom and therefore deserves support for its reform
program. The regime, no doubt, also hopes that its more tolerant
approach will split the opposition, but such toleration could backfire
if the opposition unites on a single course of action.
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Top Secret
BANGLADESH: Three Opposition Parties Banned
President Ershad has banned three opposition parties in a further
move to quell violent demonstrations against his rule. According to
press reports, the Communist Party of Bangladesh and two smaller
parties?the militant faction of the Marxist Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal
and the leftwing Swadhinata Party?have been barred from further
political activities. Violence and arrests continue as the opposition
observes half day general strikes. The government claims three
people have been killed and 18 injured since the demonstrations and
strikes began on 10 November, but the opposition says at least
17 have died and scores more have been injured, according to the
US Embassy.
Comment: The banned opposition parties have long opposed
Ershad's rule and have been at the forefront in fomenting violence
since the demonstrations and strikes began. Ershad probably will not
ban the two major opposition parties?the Awami League and the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Such a ban would galvanize their
members and lead to more violence. At present, most Bangladeshis
are not supporting the opposition, and the police seem to have the
situation under control.
IRAN-NORTH KOREA: Missile Cooperation
Iran plans to produce Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles, possibly
with North Korean assistance. A minister for the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard announced Tehran is on the threshold of manufacturing
surface-to-surface missiles copied from Soviet-origin Scuds
Comment: If Tehran can build new assembly facilities or modify
existing ones, it may be able to manufacture Scud-B missiles by 1989
by assembling North Korean-produced components.
Iran probably will not be able to produce and
assemble its own components without foreign assistance before at
least the mid-1990s. Tehran may be overstating its manufacturing
capability in response to an Iraqi press announcement that Baghdad
could produce an indigenous surface-to-surface missile with a
400-mile (650-kilometer) range.
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Top Secret
The Structural Adjustment Loan Vote
The 22 Executive Directors of the World Bank will vote on the loan.
Seven directors represent countries with weighted voting shares
ranging from 3 percent for Saudi Arabia to nearly 20 percent for the
US; the other 15 cast their votes in the name of groups holding voting
shares of 2 to 4 percent each and represent 20 or more countries. The
countries that have indicated support for Chile will have to persuade
the other members of their group as well as the Executive Directors to
go along on a favorable vote. Last year's loan passed with 51 percent,
with support from all Third World and some developed nations.
Directors representing 41 percent of the vote, including the US,
France, Canada, Austria, Spain, and the Netherlands abstained. The
no vote of about 7 percent included Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal,
and the Scandinavian countries.
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Top Secret
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CHILE: Strategy for Protecting World Bank Loan
Santiago is trying to keep Western nations critical of the Pinochet
regime from blocking a $250 million World Bank Structural
Adjustment Loan. The loan is scheduled for a vote next month. The
Chilean Ambassador to Washington has tried to defuse US opposition
by arguing that the 1987-88 loan is tied to health and social welfare
programs and will benefit the poor.
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Comment: Despite the loan's limited short-term economic
significance, Santiago fears a no vote could set off wider sanctions
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that would eventually do serious damage to the economy.
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Santiago
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may now believe it has the absolute majority
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needed to pass the loan over the anticipated objections of the US.
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THAILAND-USSR: General Chavalit's Trip to Moscow
General Chavalit, after postponing his visit last month because of bad
weather, will travel to Moscow tomorrow to discuss ways to improve
Thai-Soviet relations Chavalit is the first Thai Army commander to
visit the USSR he will 25X1
meet with the commander of the Soviet Ciround Forces and tour
several military facilities. Chavalit plans to invite his Soviet
counterpart to Thailand for the King's birthday celebrations next
month, according to US diplomats in Bangkok. 25X1
Comment: Chavalit's trip follows an exchange of visits by Foreign
Ministers last spring and demonstrates a growing willingness in
Bangkok to deal with the Soviets directly. Chavalit probably hopes to
lay the groundwork for a visit by Prime Minister Prem next spring and
to open a dialogue with the Soviets on Cambodia. The Soviets, in
turn, will try to use the visit to improve relations with the traditionally
anti-Soviet Thai military. Bilateral relations will develop slowly
because Bangkok distrusts the Soviets, and the pace is likely to hinge
on Moscow's willingness to promote a settlement of the Cambodian
conflict.
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Top Secret
In Brief
Americas
East Asia
Europe
? Opposition's resignation from Salvadoran Reconciliation
Commission undercuts regime's efforts to show national
consensus on peace... US Embassy reports move sparked by
lack of government consulting on implementing accord.
? China condemning demonstration by 500 Tibetans in New Delhi
yesterday... protesting Sino-Indian border talks ... with Lhasa
under control of Chinese police, Tibetan activists abroad probably
will continue seeking international media attention.
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? George Vassiliou, independent Cypriot presidential candidate
backed by Cypriot Communists, visiting Washington tomorrow...
has good chance of reaching second round runoff in February vote
... visiting to improve foreign policy credentials. 25X1
? Albania hosting Greek Foreign Minister, West German politician
Franz Josef Strauss this week... Papoulias is only second
Western Foreign Minister to visit since World War ll ... diplomatic
initiatives probably effort to increase Western trade.
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Neighboring Countries' Troop Deployments in Mozambique
Loge'
Rio
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17 November 1987
Mozambique
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Area of most significant
RENAMO activity
ED Beira transportation corridor
(port, oil pipeline, railroad, and
road)
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
MOZAMBIQUE: Chissano's First Year
Mozambican President Chissano, who inherited daunting
problems when he assumed office a year ago, has pursued
generally pragmatic policies that have enabled him to
consolidate his position at home and win new economic and
military support abroad. Nonetheless, his regime has made little
headway against the aggressive RENAMO insurgency, which has
caused more than 400,000 Mozambicans to take refuge in
neighboring states and contributed to food shortages among
3.5 million Mozambicans, about a quarter of the population.
Chissano has made only limited progress in containing the insurgents,
who remain active throughout the country and in recent months have
increased attacks in southern Mozambique and on major
Mozambican transport links serving the region. The rebels also have
begun cross-border raids into eastern Zimbabwe to punish Harare,
Maputo's principal military ally.
In an effort to reverse his military fortunes, Chissano has sought to
improve the capabilities of his beleaguered Armed Forces. In June, he
reorganized the 35,000-man military, replacing virtually all senior
commanders with younger and more competent officers,
He also has secured new training from
foreign backers such as the USSR, North Korea, the UK, Spain, and
Portugal and is urging France to provide helicopters. Despite these
efforts, the Army remains ill-equipped and demoralized and appears
unable to make major gains against the insurgents soon.
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While publicly asserting that his government will seek a military
solution to the insurgency, Chissano privately appears to be exploring
prospects for talks with RENAMO. He probably will act cautiously,
however, to preserve political consensus among members of his
government who harbor deep-seated mistrust of RENAMO.
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Persisting Economic Difficulties
Chissano has made some progress on economic problems. In the
past year, Maputo has sharply devalued the currency, eased price
controls, and encouraged the private sector. Such reforms made
possible the government's first IMF program, facilitated new World
Bank loans, helped attract bilateral aid, and led to a rescheduling of
Mozambique's foreign debt. In part because of these initiatives, the
continued
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US Embassy expects the economy to grow this year for only the
second time since 1981. Nonetheless, sustained recovery is unlikely
unless the government can reduce the destruction caused by the
insurgency.
Activist Foreign Policy
Chissano has solicited aid from both Western and Soviet-allied
sources to support his economic and military reforms. His travels to
the US, Western Europe, and the USSR and his apparent ability to
establish rapport with major foreign leaders, such as British Prime
Minister Thatcher, have led to increased assistance from both West
and East. London has expanded its military training and economic aid
programs, and virtually every major West European country, as well
as Canada and Japan, has increased economic assistance. Even the
USSR, Maputo's primary military supplier, also has modestly
expanded its economic assistance.
Chissano's regional policies have produced critical combat support
for the counterinsurgency. Zimbabwe has a 6,000-man force in
Mozambique, and approximately 3,000 Tanzanian and 800 Malawian
troops began assisting Maputo early this year. At the same time, each
of the allies has been privately critical of the ineffectiveness of the
Mozambican military, and each appears to be looking for ways to
reduce its military burden.
During Chissano's tenure, relations with South Africa have improved
only marginally. Maputo earlier this year resumed regular bilateral
security exchanges with Pretoria, and the Botha government is
helping to fund a project to upgrade the port of Maputo.
Nonetheless, in recent months Chissano has become increasingly
outspoken in his denunciations of South African support for RENAMO
and has charged that Pretoria was at least indirectly responsible for
several massacres of civilians in southern Mozambique. South Africa,
for its part, believes Maputo can do more to prevent African National
Congress guerrillas from infiltrating through Mozambique, and
Pretoria is likely to mount more operations against ANC targets there.
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Threat to US Security
Threats to US security are not likely to increase dramatically
because of closer ties between Libya and North Yemen. Despite the
Libyan-sponsored shooting of a US Embassy employee in Sanaa
shortly after the 1986 US airstrike on Libya, Tripoli probably will not
use North Yemen as a venue for further attacks on US personnel and
facilities. The Libyan People's Bureau in Sanaa is closely watched, its
personnel kept under strict surveillance, and their activities and
contacts closely monitored. The difficult operating environment and
.the minimal level of anti-US sentiment among North Yemenis hinder
Libya from exploiting domestic radicals to promote attacks on US
interests. Furthermore, North Yemen will carefully monitor its
?elations with Libya to ensure that Tripoli?emboldened by its closer
relationship with Sanaa?will not be tempted to resume meddling in
Yemeni affairs or to conduct operations against its enemies on
North Yemeni soil.
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Special Analysis
NORTH YEMEN- Tactical Rapprochement
LIBYA:
The warming trend in North Yemeni-Libyan relations appears to
be based primarily on tactical considerations. Libyan military
and economic assistance has provided the beleaguered regime
of President Salih with a much-needed shot in the arm, while, in
turn, Tripoli is using its aid to North Yemen as a means to gain
leverage over the Sanaa regime, undermine US influence, and
secure support for its war in Chad.
Salih feels obligated to Libya for its assistance and under pressure to
respond to some of Tripoli's requests, sometimes at the expense of
US interests. The value Salih places on his relationship with Libya was
demonstrated by his emphasis on Libyan issues during talks in
September with the US delegation to North Yemen's National Day
celebrations, an occasion partly financed by Libya.
North Yemen Seeking a Quick Fix
Salih probably believes that Libyan economic and military aid?in
the face of cutbacks in Saudi economic and military assistance and
declining US aid?has played a pivotal role in shoring up his
regime. Libyan military and economic aid for South Yemeni exiles in
North Yemen has helped to relieve the burden they placed on
North Yemen's already strained economy. Libya also is providing
15,000 barrels of oil per day?approximately half of North Yemen's
domestic requirement?on concessionary terms.
s training
North Yemeni troops on bcua tactical missiles ana bA -6 surface-to-
air missiles and has promised to sell those systems to Sanaa. Their
acquisition would help mollify Salih's critics within the defense
establishment. Libya is also helping facilitate Salih's limited arms
diversification program and, in fact, has been Salih's only significant
source of arms outside the USSR since the January 1986 civil war in
Aden.
Libyans Want Leverage
In Libyan leader Qadhafi's view, military and economic assistance to
North Yemen is a low-cost way of obtaining Sanaa's support for his
foreign policy objectives. He almost certainly hopes to restrain
Sanaa's relations with the US and to promote a more active policy
continued
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Economic and Military Aid to North Yemen, 1986-87
Percent
1986
481 million US $
UAE 3
Libya 8
US 9
Saudi
Arabia 36
Soviet 44
1987
683 million US $
Saudi Arabia 3
US 5.5
UAE 6.5
Libya 12
Soviet 73
314882 11-87
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,
against Israel. He is probably also attracted by North Yemen's
proximity to Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, and Somalia?periodic targets of
Libyan-sponsored subversion.
The relationship has already provided Qadhafi several benefits. North
Yemeni military support for Libya's war with Chad will reduce some of
the combat burden on Libyan forces.
Sanaa has facilitated the transfer of South Yemeni military
exile personnel to Libya and may send North Yemeni regulars. The
exchange of visits between North Yemeni and Libyan officials have
also provided a safety valve against domestic discontent in Libya by
giving Qadhafi an appearance of international acceptance, thus
easing his concern about Libya's isolation.
Prospects for the Relationship
Although short-term prospects for the relationship are good, it will be
troubled over the longer term by recurring political differences and
the volatility of Qadhafi's foreign policy. Salih cannot satisfy the
mercurial Libyan leader indefinitely, and failure to meet Libya's more
outrageous demands over time will undermine Qadhafi's stake in the
relationship, probably derailing the Scud missile deal and other
agreements.
Moreover, the relationship is characterized by deep mutual suspicion.
Salih believes Qadhafi will continue to support North Yemeni
dissident groups, to which he has close ties. Salih has tried to limit the
Libyan role in his country by refusing to accept a Libyan training
brigade, and he may have located
an alternative source of oil assistance. This may cause Qadhafi to
suspect that Sanaa is merely using Tripoli to obtain aid and has no
intention of supporting his foreign policy initiatives.
Salih will weigh US aid and support against what he sees as more
tangible benefits from Libya and probably is prepared to risk US
displeasure. Nonetheless, he will try to assure Washington that his
relationship with Libya is not harmful to US interests
Salih recognizes the value of US oil development aid and limited
military assistance. He also will continue to appreciate the role
Washington plays as a counterweight to the Soviet presence in North
Yemen and as a sympathetic voice in dealing with the Saudis.
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