NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 23, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/29: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
" Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
23 November 1987
0
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011.---Theeret--
CPAS NID 87-272JX
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23 November 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/29: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/29: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/29: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
To ? Secret
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Contents
Persian Gulf: Situation Report
1
Honduras-Nicaragua: Thinking About an Accommodation
3
Ethiopia: Rebels Impede Famine Relief
4
Peru: Insurgents Thwarting Drug Interdiction
5
Notes
USSR: Selling Gold To Purchase Grain
6
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Saudi Arabia: Expanding Capacity for Red Sea Exporting
7
Sudan: Increase in Iranian Activity
7
West Germany-East Germany: Discussing Large Loan
8
Poland: Warsaw Appoints Ombudsman
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
Suriname: Election Outlook
10
South Korea: Jitters in Ruling Party
11
USSR: Setting Limits on Workplace Democracy?
13
Tnn Cgarrat
23 November 1987
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PERSIAN GULF:
Iranian Ship Attacks
Situation Report
<
Comment: Despite clashes with US forces in September and early
last month, Iran apparently continued to lay mines in the Gulf at least
through the middle of last month and possibly later. Tehran probably
has not given up the use of mines but is being more careful to avoid
detection. Iranian preparations to build up coastal defenses reflect
Tehran's continuin concern over a possible escalation of hostilities
with the US
? continued
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1 23 November 1987
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Increasing Danger In a notable change to previous patterns of Iranian ship attacks, Iran
to US-Associated appears to be focusing increasingly on US-associated shipping. Three
Shipping of the seven tankers attacked by Iran this month and four of the 10
struck since mid-October have been US-owned ships. Before the
Iranian Silkworm attacks on two US-associated tankers off Kuwait
last month, only five US-owned tankers had been attacked by Iran or
had struck Iranian mines this year. Iranian media have emphasized
the US association of these ships, once they have been attacked, as
evidence of US weakness in the Gulf
Comment: Iran is likely to continue to target US-associated shipping
not under escort. Iranian intelligence probably is capable of locating
such ships, and Iranian naval forces probably would have little
difficulty in identifying them for attack purposes. Tehran appears to
believe such attacks do not risk US retaliation while helping it to
spread claims that US naval units are ineffective and should be
removed from the reaion
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2 23 November 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/29: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100180002-7
HONDURAS-
NICARAGUA:
Thinking About an Accommodation
Honduras, doubting the firmness of US commitments to
Tegucigalpa and the anti-Sandinista rebels, has prepared
continaencv ;Mans for a bilateral agreement with Nicaragua.
Armed Forces Chief Regalado
ordered a senior officer to prepare contingency plans examining
Honduran policy options toward Nicaragua and the anti-Sandinista
insurgents. The officer reportedly is recommending an
accommodation with Managua because Honduras would have
difficulty defending itself against a militarily stronger Nicaragua and
has no reliable guarantee of US military support,
The Honduran officer claims he has established
contact min a senior Nicaraguan official in an effort to open the door
for talks
Nicaraguan President Ortega has described the recent Honduran
proposal?at the OAS?for dismantling insurgent camps and
allowing multilateral inspection teams as a positive development and
has told reporters he will call President Azcona to discuss it.
the Hondurans view their OAS 25X1
proposal as a delaying tactic and as a cornerstone for a future
accommodation with Nicaragua should events make that necessary.
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Regalado, under pressure from some powerful Honduran officers to
close all insurgent facilities, is skeptical that Azcona can maintain his
refusal to allow on-site inspection of Honduran territory,
iloreover, Regalado reportedly wants to ensure that
the civilian government, rather than the military, is blamed for any
harm to Hcrduran security interests cense by the Nicaraguan
insurgents.
Comment: The Honduran military and the Foreign Ministry are taking
the lead on policy decisions toward Nicaragua and appear to be
ignoring Azcona's desires. The Hondurans nonetheless are unlikely to
move quickly to seek an agreement with Nicaragua and will carefully
monitor developments in Washington before deciding their next
moves.
The Sandinistas have long sought a bilateral deal with the Hondurans
to shut down the rebel bases. Accepting the Honduran offer would
dovetail with Managua's strategy of supporting the Central American
peace accord in a bid to end all external aid to the insurgents
Tea Secret
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Ethiopian Food Crisis
Recent changes in province
boundaries are not reflected.
'\11
Red Sea
Sudan,
Feeding center
Eritrean People's Liberation Front controlled area
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Tigrean People's Liberation Front operating area
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23 October
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Top Secret
23 November 1987
711834 (5446957)11.87
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ETHIOPIA:
Rebels Impede Famine Relief
Ethiopian relief officials and international donors estimate that
the current famine in Ethiopia may prove worse than that of
1984-85.
The full extent of the food shortages will remain uncertain until the
UN Food and Agricultural Organization completes a postharvest
assessment next month. Foreign relief experts in the field say that
1.7 million people in Eritrea, 1.5 million in Tigray, and 3 million in other
provinces are at immediate risk of starvation. Relief officials report
that the Ethiopian Government appears cripplehv bu u
reacratic:
confusion and and has yet to mobilize its resources.
Meanwhile, food shipments to MakeIle in Tigray Province?the
hardest hit area?have virtually halted since recent rebel attacks on
relief convoys. Insurgents in the north have reiterated their intention
to attack all airlifts and convoys not receiving prior rebel clearance.
Comment: The rebels' interdiction of food shipments in the north is a
more serious impediment to relief efforts than was the case in
1984-85. Donors are unwilling to meet rebel demands for advance
notification on the daily movements of relief trucks?which are slated
to distribute an estimated 1 million tons of food over the next year.
UN officials say that acceptance of government military escorts would
make relief trucks even more likely to be attacked. Some international
organizations may push to discontinue the convoys unless both
government and rebel forces offer security guarantees.
Even a threat by donors to deny rebel-held areas the supplemental
food relief funneled into Tigray and Eritrea from Sudan probably
would be insufficient to elicit security guarantees from the insurgents.
The rebels have ignored donor appeals for free passage within
Ethiopia, even though their adherents are particularly at risk of
starvation; they are unlikely to be swayed by the prospect of losing
the smaller flow of relief from across the border
Despite earlier pledges of support for the relief effort, the government
is dragging its feet, as it did in the last famine, on donor requests that
it supply trucks or aircraft from its military inventory. It also has failed
to grant clearances sought by humanitarian organizations to conduct
relief airlifts and to facilitate the transfer of relief trucks from the south
to the north.
TOD Secret
4 23 November 1987
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23 November 1987
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711849 (A01292) 11-87
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Top Secret
PERU: Insurgents Thwarting Drug Interdiction
Increasing insurgent violence is further eroding narcotics
interdiction efforts in the upper Huallaga Valley, source of nearly
half the world's supply of coca.
According to the US Embassy, local residents and police officials
estimate that some 300 Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, as well as up to
100 militants of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, have
infiltrated the valley this year. Although some reports suggest the
insurgents and drug traffickers are cooperating,
Sendero is extorting money from many of the drug barons and trying
to gain support from peasant cocagrowers by forcing traffickers to
pay higher prices for their coca leaf
Sendero has also disrupt
Lpothe drug interdictiowelforts that began in July b king roa
L/ the
a campaign that h ated towns
licvnotility. Sendero reporte s res ? onsib
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